Envelope No. 3 • Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) Reports (With One Item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports

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Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope No. 3 • Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) reports (with one item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports

Date Created 21/08/1970

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0865-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit '*s f-

New York, 21 August 1970

Sir, I should be grateful if you would forward the following message to your Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"CM-'JIT HJ "I have the honour to refer to my conversation of 0 August 1970 with .Ambassador El-Farra, at which I requested him to ascertain the views of your Government concerning the site, timing and other arrangements.for the forthcoming discussions to be held under my auspices, and to my letter of 12 August 1970, in which I expressed certain views concerning the site of, and level of representation at, cuch meetings. "I have now had the opportunity to consider the views of the parties on this question, including the information concerning your position provided "by Ambassadors Lil-Forra and Sharafj and feel that I should now make a recommendation to the parties as to the place and timing of the meetings. 1 therefore propose that the place for the initial meetings should be New York and that the opening date should be Tuesday, 215 August 1970. "It is my understanding that this proposal is agreeable to your Government.

Hit Excellency Mr. Abdul liataid Sharaf Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of America "You will note that I have made no recommendation concerning the level of repreeentation of the parties, I continue to hold the view expressed in my letter of 12 August 1970 that the discussions would be most profitable if held at the Foreign Minister's level and it is my earnest hope that your Government will find it possible to agree to that level of representation at an early date. At the present stage, however, it seems to "be most important to begin the discussions with the least possible further delay. "Higheot consideration* "Gunnar Jarring" Please accept, 6ir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Gunnar Jarring Special Bepresentative of the Secretary-General to the Middle JCast \ "'*:• V0 SSestt of US proposal as eesit to OAR, confirmed as accurate laiTum - Washington Poet, 23 July 1970

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i -I-rt* c rt 5 Q c ti ^• i,r-J , . .— .— •- .2 ^; '-^ ^ "^ DECLASSIFIED PER ST./AI/326 28 DEC 1 3VC.fti»ie. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES By ff\,ft.fl Date A<} -i a -33

Israel and the UAE, In consideration of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, Confirming their obligations under Security Council Resolution 2k2 of November 22, 1967 and expressing their readiness to implement it in good faith in all of its provisions, Recognizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war, Recognizing also the need to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East under the terms of which each State in this area can live in security, Agree that their representatives will convene under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring to work out without delay, starting on the basis of the following provisions, a final and reciprocally binding accord on ways of implementing Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, to establish a just and lasting peace. Point 1 The parties, in reaching a final accord on a package settlement on the basis of these Fundamental Principles, would determine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory occupied during the conflict of 19&7 to boundaries to be delineated in accordance with Point k. On the day of deposit with the UN of the final accord reached, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces would begin. -2-

Point 2 It would be agreed by the parties that work on the clearance of the Suez Canal and the resumption of navigation would "be coordinated with withdrawal of Israeli armed forces. The facilities of the UN could "be utilized to clear the Canal. Withdrawal of Israeli forces would be carried out under the observation of UK representatives, during an agreed time period not to exceed three months, or as otherwise agreed. Point 3 From the moment of deposit with the UN of the final accord, the state of war and belligerency which has existed for twenty-one years between Israel and the UAR would be terminated and a formal state of peace would exist between them, and they would refrain from, and would restrain all persons and entities on their territories from committing, instigating or encouraging acts inconsistent with the state of peace and the cessation of the state of war. Point k The parties would agree on the location of the secure and recognized boundary between them, which would be shown on a map or maps approved by the parties which would become part of the final accord. Israel would agree that the former international boundary between Egypt and the mandated territory of Palestine is not excluded as the secure and recognized boundary between Israel and the UAR. -3-

Point 5 For the purpose of ensuring the territorial inviolability of the parties and guaranteeing the security of the recognized boundary, demilitarized zones would be established consisting of the territory from which Israel withdraws. Such zones should not give advantage to either party, and their administration would contain only limitations of a purely military nature. The parties would also work out the procedures for securing the demilitarized status of such zones, availing themselves as they may agree of the appropriate facilities of the UN. Point 6 The parties would further agree that the disposition of Gaza would be worked out between Israel, Jordan, and the UAR under Ambassador Jarring's auspices and be recorded in the final accord between Israel and the UAR and the final accord between Israel and Jordan. The parties would^aconsider the following: (a) the question of withdrawal of Israeli forces; (b) the demilitarization of Gaza and other practical security arrangements; (c) the possibility of an interim UN administration; and (d) the ultimate status of Gaza. Point 7 Both parties would declare that the Strait of Tiran is an international waterway and would affirm the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba -k- for the ships of all nations. The parties would further agree upon security arrangements for the Sharm al-Shaykh area which would assure to their mutual satisfaction that such freedom of navigation is irrevocably guaranteed. Point 8 The UAR would affirm that, in its exercise of jurisdiction over the Suez Canal, the ships of all nations, including Israel, will have the right of freedom of navigation without discrimination or interference. Point 9 In order to bring about a just settlement of the refugee problem, both parties would accept the principle that the refugees from the war of 19^8, who are under the mandate of UNR¥A, would have the choice between repatriation to Israel and resettlement with compensation. Both parties would recognize the practical need to implement such a settlement through mutually acceptable procedures and conditions setting forth the arrangements under which repatriation and resettlement would take place as well as, for those to be repatriated, the quota to be admitted annually to Israel in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations with respect to the Palestine refugees. The procedures, conditions and annual quota would be worked out under Ambassador Jarring

Point 12 In defining their agreement to establish peace and terminate all claims or states of "belligerency: 1. Both parties would agree that no aggressive action by the armed and other forces — land, sea, or air — of either party would "be undertaken or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other. 2. Both parties would agree to undertake to do all in their power to ensure that acts of hostility and belligerency whether by government agencies, personnel, or private persons or organizations will not originate from and are not committed from within their respective territory. Point 13 The final accord would "be recorded in a document which is to be signed by the parties and Immediately deposited with the UN. After the parties have deposited such a document, the Secretary General of the UN would be requested by the parties immediately to inform the Security Council and all UN member States to that effect. In the implementation of the final accord, it would be understood by the parties that their respective obligations would be reciprocal and interdependent. J!rom the moment of deposit, the document would become binding on the parties and irrevocable, and implementation and observance by the parties of the provisions of the accord would begin. -T-

~~Point Ik Both parties would agree that the final accord, including the map or maps delineating the final boundaries, would be submitted to the Security Council for its endorsement.~~

# * # *

It would be understood that France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would submit and support an appropriate Security Council resolution and pledge that they would concert their future efforts to help the parties abide by all of the provisions of the final accord. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION

~~Date: FROM: 18 Nov. 1970 DE: Gunnar Jarring~~

~~CR. 13 (1IU64) -7/ f'/i~~

~~New York, 18 Hovasber 19?0~~

I have the honour to refer tora ylette r of 7 August addressed to the Secretary-General, referred to in document S/9902, in -which I informed h&a of the agreement of your Government and of the GoverniBents of Jordan a$id the United Arab Republic to the holding of discussions under ley auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement en the establishment of a ,Just ana lasting peace "between the perti«s» As you will recall* I issued em 21 Aisgust 19?0 an invitation to the parties to take part in discussions opening at Kew York on 25 August 1970* Mbassader Tekciah, «ho '»as Israeli representative for tte initial stage of the dise\issi

~~His Ibceellency Mr, Atfoa Eban Minister for Foreign Affairs e/o Permeneat Hiesion of to the United 11 Sast 70th Street - 2 -~~

and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 2k2 (1967). Wien X met you last on 5 November 1970* to consider the question of Israel's return to the discussions, 1 noted your concern about the influence of the debate of the General Assembly on the Middle East question and of its resolution 2628 (XXV). I wish to assure you in this connexion that I ata proceeding on the basis that there is no change in my mandate, which I continue to regard as having been defined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), You will understand, I know, my desire to make a positive report to the Seeretary-*Qeneral about the progress of our discussions, I aia accordingly inviting your Government to reconsider its position on the question and to resume its participation in the discussions. In this connexion, I wish to state that I have already been informed by the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic of their continued willingness to participate* I take this opportunity to inform you that, pending a reply from your Government to this appeal» I am returning to my post in Moscow. I hope that your Government will find It possible in the near future to respond favourably to this invitation, in which case I shall be available to return to Hew York at twenty-four hours' notice. Yours sincerely.

~~Gunnar Jarring Special Bepresentative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East New York, 3.8 Hovejaber~~

Slap* I have the honour to inf oria you that I have today addressed a letter to the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs in which I once again appealed to his Government to resume participation in discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967)* In that connexion, I keep in mind the willingness of the Governments ©f Jordan and the tfeited Arab Republic, as expressed to me by yourself and your colleague from the United Arab Kepublie, to continue to participate in such discussions. I take this opportunity to inform you that, pending the receipt of a reply from Israel, It is my intention to return to nsy post in Moscow* I wish to emphasize, however, that I am ready to return here at twenty-four hours1 notice on receipt of the Israeli reply* Yours sincerely,

~~Gunnar Jarring Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East~~

His Excellency Dr. Muhammad H» EW?arra .Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations 866 United Rations Plaza Room 550-552 New York, W.Y. 10017 York, IS Kmtasfcer

Sir* I have thetooujoisE *t o Jisfcerm you that I hs-te today a l«tt&r to the Israeli Minister for Fterelgfc ££f«£rs in vhieh I once again appealed, to his Sewerm©at to resume participation in disetjgslesis fcr the purpose of reack&*g agreement cm the of a Just sasa lasting peace in e#eer3&aee with Seeiiri^sr Council

t&a£ cojaiextspi, S keeg> in mica. tJte villirîees of the of Jea^ton aiai tlie Unites .As-afc B^sti&lle, ®s repressed to iae Igr yeurs^Lf dsod $®ay colleague frcaa Jordan* to ecEtlme to partieipsfee 3u esfiji ÎssttSîcws. J tsê tfets qpôrtualty to Infism yea thst, peudfe^ the of a reply fy&s Israel, it is sgr isteKfeiCR to retsaam to ^r post J» Moseow* I wigfe to esE^h&sisej, lioweti^p, ^sat I am rssaSy to rettim here at t«e^3M^@ur heiirtB* »c*ic^ cai r«c©ipt «f the Israeli

~~of the to the Middle~~

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©f tfte United te tdie Ifeitea l?atioas 36 last 6tfeh Strictly confidential''1*

Telegraphic communication for Secretary-General U thant and Under- Secretary Eunche, UK, from Ambassador Jarring, Moscow "For TTthant and Bunche from Jarring SECRET I refer to my message of December 22. During my meeting with Mahmoud Riad UAR intention to seek peaceful solution was again stressed. Riad's concern was above all if Israel this time really had the intention to go to serious talks. Necessity of action in Security Council would much depend upon progress of talks during January. If talkes started early January and there were indications of serious Israeli intention to find a solution there would alse be a basis for continued ceasefire. My general impression of conversation with Riad was genuine UAR wish to have talks resumed soonest possible"

~~Received December 28, 19?0/ MISSION OF1 TO THE UNIT1EB5 NATIONS SECRET~~

~~The following communication received from Ambassador Jarring:~~

~~"For Eunche and Berendsen from Jarring.~~

~~Arriving 1 January Scandinavian Airlines flight number SK 911 arrival time 17-50. Grateful accomodation Drake Hotel as usual.1'~~

~~Received on December 28, 1970, at 10.00 AM. ./*. SECRET~~

~~The following communication received from Ambassador Jarring:~~

~~"Secret for IT Thant and Bunche from Jarring.~~

US Ambassador here in MOSCOTRT paid me visit Saturday 26 in order to inform of present American thinking on Middle East question, Beam told me State Department was looking forward to discussing various suggestions immediately after my arrival Few York. He said US was ready play active role diplomatically to support me. Beam stressed that commitments made by both sides on August 7 "t° US proposals still stand. This meant that UAR and Jordan were committed to the principle of recognizing Israel's right to exist as a state and to live in peace within secure and recognized borders and that Israel had committed itself to the principle of withdrawal in accordance with resolution 242. Further US felt that much of the specific phraseology contained in October and December -69 US proposals would prove useful. Beam mentioned that formulation on peace which would satisfy Israelis although it falls short of what they want. US also felt UAR would buy peace formulation contained in these documents. Jordan had already given positive indication to it. After my talks had been resumed US would discuss idea of guarantees within four powermeetings. Beam further expressed belief it would be better after a short time to move talks from Hew York to Cyprus and return to foreign minister-level. It would make it more difficult for Israel expMn suspending participation and their cooperation than if talks continue UN-representative level New York."

~~Received on December 28 at 10.00 AM, 1970, UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK.N.Y. 10022~~

~~6 January, 1971. His Excellency Dr. Gunnar Jarring, United Nations, New York.~~

~~My Foreign Secretary has asked me to convey to you the following personal message: • . "At the time when you are resuming your • .' •' oM^ssion as Special Representative in the Middle~~

: East/' I would like'to send you my best v/ishes for your success in this difficult task. •.-.'. . As. you .know, King Hussein and. the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the UAR have recently been - in London. I urged all of them to seize this opportunity to make progress towards a settlement. ' I cannot say that I detected much sign of willingness on either side. I believe therefore that we shall all of us have to show the greatest determination ",,and resourcefulness if progress is to be achieved. '••;".: - , • • /I had IlfeC-:

~~$&1J-'VW& l^VrfV.v'f.'~~

~~.> W^"*1/ t^V1^' •'"• ^%f$ife:^4n^ 2.~~

I had-hoped that It would have proved possible by now Tor the Four Powers to give you some agreed suggestions as to how the fundamental issues in the dispute might be resolved to the satisfaction of both sides. Unfortunately, this has not been possible. But I can assure you that the British Government is resolved to do everything possible to support you in your Mission. I am sure you will not hesitate to ask for any assistance, practical or diplomatic, which you Might find useful during this new round of talks. The Israel Government have told us of their suggestion that you should visit Israel soon. I do not, of course, wish in any way to trespass on your own preserves. But there seems to me to be merit In the suggestion that you should return both to Israel and Egypt at an early stage in your talks. I recognise that the first priority must be to find out what prospects there are of real progress on thy substance of the issues in dispute. But I would hope that you /would

~~(:[v'-'S!S~~

~~j*. 3.~~

~~would a^T'je uhat a viwit to the re^:. v/hore there have been such import; ,nt chan in the last fevv months, GO;J].('! 'ixj ushf.il .:-.;-j of this ^rocesa. With rene./ed ^orjd /tr-jiu-js. Alec L~~

~~(—^y»*^V~~

~~(G.T. C~~

~~• Ipi, '-*••-"* • ]_3 january 1971 !/f VI Compariso' n of the papers of Israel and the United Arab Republic—*/~~

1. -Establishment of a just and lasting peace Israel speaks of a just and durable peace as the paramount aim of the Security Council resolution and seeks a declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict as finally terminated (l). The United Arab Republic also speaks of the necessity of establishing a just and lasting peace. 2 . Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied by it during the conflict Israel lists as an essential the withdrawal of military forces from territories lying beyond positions agreed to in the peace treaty (5). The United Arab Republic regards as essential that the Israeli aggression should be terminated and that the Israeli armed forces should be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 19&7 lines (l). It regards the withdrawal of Israeli forces as one of the main prerequisites for a just and lasting peace. It further feels that Israel should repudiate its policy of territorial expansion (2). 3. Termination of all claims and states of belligerency Israel presents this principle in the form "termination of all states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency" (6). Israel regards the termination of belligerency as requiring each State to ensure that no warlike act or violence originates from or is committed in its territory against the other (7), that acts of blockade, whether maritime or economic, be terminated (8), that there should be no participation in hostile alliances directed against the other State (lO), and that there should be non- interference in the domestic affairs or foreign relations of the other State (ll) The United Arab Republic accepts this principle as stated in the resolution, namely, "termination of all claims and states of belligerency" (U). The United Arab Republic has not commented, apart from the question of passage through waterways, on the specific topics raised by Israel in this connexion.

*/ References in parentheses are to the points in the papers of the parties. The items are listed in the order in which they are referred to in Security Council resolution 2^2 (1967). - 2 -

4. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area Israel considers that this principle should "be acknowledged by the parties in explicit terms (2). The United Arab Republic accepts the principle as stated in the resolution (5).

5. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force Israel approaches this question as being one of the establishment of secure, recognized and agreed boundaries (3). The United Arab Republic accepts the principle as stated in the resolution (5).

6. Just settlement of the refugee problem Israel calls for provisions laying down the obligations accepted by the parties towards the settlement of the refugee problem (9). The United Arab Republic calls for a just settlement for the Palestinian refugees. That requires respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with United Nations resolutions (3).

T. Freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area Israel calls for the termination of all maritime blockade, discriminations or interferences (8). The United Arab Republic is prepared to guarantee freedom of navigation in waterways (4).

~~A.. - 3 -~~

8. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political Independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones Israel refers to "other arrangements for ensuring security" (h). The Ignited Arab Republic suggests that the Security Council might decide upon the necessary security arrangements, which might include the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would also participate and the establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders.

9. Peace document Israel believes that peace must be expressed in a binding treaty (12). The United Arab Republic does not comment on this point. Previously it expressed the view that all instruments of peace should be signed by the parties and addressed to the Security Council; the endorsement by the Security Council of those documents would constitute the final multilateral document (S/10070, Annex I, page 17, Answer to Question 11). PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS

~~NEW YORK~~

~~AIDE-MEMOIRE~~

On November 22, 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, and accordingly the Secretary General designated Your Excellency as his Special Representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieveapeace- ful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

During your contacts with us, which started on December 18th 1967, we have confirmed to Your Excellency our readiness to implement the resolution as a "package deal" and our willingness to carry out our obligations as stipulated therein. We have explai- ned this in our reply to your questions handed to you on March 27th 1969. This reply was included in the report submitted by the Secretary General to the Security Council (document S/10070), on January 4th 1970,

Our readiness to implement Resolution 242 emanated from respect for the will of the international community and our compliance with the United Nations Charter. We have also welcomed all the international efforts exerted to achieve a peaceful settlement, declared our support of the French initiative of January 16th 1969, and accepted the ^nerican initiative Submitted on June 1970.

~~'~t' ^ki - 2 -~~

All our international contacts were aimed at achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East established on the firm basis of justice and not dictated by the threat or use of force or as a result of territorial expansion. Hence our position remained that the settlement necessitates that Israel respects the Charter of the United Nations and its decisions and implements the Security Council Resolution in full. Each party to the conflict should pledge to abide by its obligations, and the settlement should not reflect the weight of conquest or the consequences of the use of force against United Nations Member States.

Reaffirming our desire for peace and for continuation and success of your mission, we have stated our position in the communication submitted to Your Excellency on January 15th 1971, which was based on the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242 in order to achieve a peaceful and durable settlement, (Annex "1") .

Prom our experience, during the long time which lapsed since the begining of your mission, it has become evident that Israel refuses to implement the Security Council Resolution and continues to seek to impose its terms from a position of strength thus blocking the progress of your mission.

Firmly beleiving in the importance of achieving a just and lasting peace in the area, and because of Israel's persistence in its refusal to implement the Security Council Resolution, and being concerned about the continuation of your mission, we have submitted the issue to the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-fifth session. The General Assembly adopted Reso- lution 2628 on November 4th 1970 which expressed serious concern that Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) has not been implemented, and reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that consequen- tly territories thus occupied must be restored. The resolution reaffirmed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates the withdrawal of the Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the conflict, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and recognized that the respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the Middle East. The resolution also called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contacts with Your Excellency with a view to carry cut at the earliest possible date your mandate for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution in all its parts. In adopting this resolution the United Nations nave onco more stressed the importance of achieving a peaceful settlement in accordance with the Security Council Reso- lution, thus rejecting Israel's policy which is based on the use of force to impose an Israeli settlement in the area, disregarding tha Socurnty Council Resolution and the United Nations Charter.

Upon the adoption of that resolution on November 4th, the United Arab Republic government declared its readiness to resume contacts with you and instructed its representative accordingly. On the other hand, Israel has always refused to comply with the Security Council Resolution, rejected all international efforts deployed towards achieving a peaceful settlement in the area, and continues to occupy Arab territories.

In these occupied Arab territories, Israel persists in carrying a policy of repression, expulsion and collec- tive punishment against the inhabitants, adopting various administrative and legislative measures including the use of armed force to impound the property of these inhabitants. It continues to establish settlements in the occupied territories whose indigenous Arab inhabitants are replaced by new immigrants. The General Assembly and the Security Coun- cil adopted several resolutions calling on Israel to abide by the provisions of the United Nations Charter, norms of international law and relevant international agreements which obligates Israel to respect the rights of the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories. Nevertheless, the repressive measures being currently perpetrated by Israel - 4 -

in these territories clearly reveal its persistance in the policy designed to change their Arab character, establish Israeli settlements and create a fait-accornpli with a view to consolidating its occupation. This brings further evidence of its expansionist policy. This explicitly indicates that the peace claims of the Israelis are merely intended i_o dilude world public opinion.

We consider that the two Israeli notes of January 10th and 27th 1971 which were submitted to Your Excellency reveal that Israel persists in its refusal to implement the Security council Resolution since Israel does not commit itself to withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied in June 1967. Je also consider tiiat peace referred to by Israel in its notes remains meaningless as long as Israel evades the total withdrawal fron the Arab territories. Israel's refusal to commit itself to withdraw from all the Arab territories is a confirmation of the expansionist de- signs for the realization of which it had launched its 1967 aggression.

Israel's deliberate ommission in its notes of peace guarantees, the open opposition by its leaders to the stationing of United Nations peace keeping forces in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate to guarantee peace, and its opposition to the establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders, clearly underline Israel's rejection of a just and lasting peace.

In its notes, furthermore, Israel does net commit itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement to the refugee problem, resolutions which were adopted by the General Assembly during the past twenty-two years, the last of which was Resolu- tion 2672 of December 8th 1970.

In adopting a position based on the use of armed force aiming at dictating its terms on the Arab States in order to realize its expansionist design, Israel is obs- tructing the achievement of the peaceful settlement stipulated in the Security Council Resolution. — 5 —

The continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories is an act of aggression that consti- tutes a breach of peace in the area and seriously endan- gers world peace. Israel's adamant refusal to implement the Security Council Resolution makes it incumbent on the Council/ in exercising its responsibility under the Charter, to take the necessary measures required to assist Your Excellency in the discharge of your mandate and the implementation of its Resolution 242, thus, securing the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the Arab occupied territories and establishing the requisite guarantees to ensure that international peace and security will not be endangered. ANNEX 1

~~Excerpts from the Aide-Memoire handed to Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the Special Repre- sentative of the Secretary General to the Middle East on 20 January 1971 (document S/10083).~~

~~"In order to reach such a settlement (just settlement in the Middle East) in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council Resolution, it is necessary that :~~

1. The Israeli aggression be terminated and the Israeli armed forces be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 1967 lines, as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 which reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security; 2. Israel declare its repudiation of the policy of territorial expansion which it has pursued at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States. This policy is repeatedly expressed in the statements made by Israeli leadres. 3. A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must be reached. This can only be realized through Israel's respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. 4. The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in waterways. 5. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. 6. Guaranteeing of peace and the territorial invio- bility and political independence of every State in the area. — 2 —

The Security Council may decide upon the necessary arrangements which would provide security to all States in the area. These arrangements may, inter alia, include: A. The establishment of a United Nations peace- keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate0 B. The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders. ^obruary 1971

~~ii-.rj.-ji •JiiTATicii cy b^gui^Y ccui'.cn. IL.JSCLUTI I~~

Israel blocks the efforts of Ambassador L-unnar Ye Jarring to promote agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between the two parties as manifested in their two papers dated 9 January 1971 and 1 .February 1971 because: 1, Israel refuses to cornnit itself to withdrawal from all (V*H~,x Arab territories it occupied in June 1967* Israel's O reference to peace remains meaningless as long as it evades the total and unconditional withdrawal from Arab territories» Is Israel ready to accept the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war embodied in Resolution 242 and therefore commit itself to withdrawal from occupied Arab territories? 2. Israel's disregard of the principle of total withdrawal as it applies to J"e3:usalern; the measures it adopted towards unilaterally changing the character of the City, in defiance of pertinent Security Council resolutions; as well as its systematic attempts toward the Judaization of the city, confirm its expansionist policy and contra- / diet its expressed interest in a peaceful settlement. 2.

~~Is I:3r;..el willing in clear •:. nu. e>:< llci o t jj?.-.L tc:~~

a,, rescind the i.'-Mj'nir,-:; rJ::;.!:. •.-: ^ -it:ri:.t character ci' t1^ Oj.tr.- <.f .. ;ru::; .-."! _r., < r. coi:, ]."_'..•.• T.ICO vi.!:'!.: r'•.;"' -rv,-.:: L -j'.-ci .rit;^ J'-a;io.;.] resolutici;s. I). roncurice t'.v? intoi:- ;'.r.o j. c._-t ui ot;/t-'M.:-.-i^t::: made by various l^r; oli officials r^tjardi.ir the future of Jerusalem in the context of a peaceful settlement': c. ao'ree that (Jerusalem is r:uuj-vct to i/.i1 provisiouc of security wou:.cll ;^s.i.:l uticn 2^2 and othor pertinent r^^olnfclons re* • rdi]

the inadi:iic£ji"bility of jc.tuicitio?i of territory by vjyr or bj: v:ei{_:r.t of conquest". 5. Israel has failed to express a definite view regarding peace guarantees through measures such as the stationing of UI:i peace keeping forces and the establishment of demilitarized zones.

~~Is Israel prepared to make a definite coi.jnit-~~

~~ment on these tv;o integrally related matters?~~

4, Israel has not shown any readiness to coiuihit itself to the implementation of LT. resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem as outlined in those resolutions. Since the recognition of the rights of the lalestinian Arabs is an indispensable element In L'ie establishment of a peaceful settlement, is Israel

prepared to undertake such ccrmaitments on these matters? II 1. For its part the Government of Jordan confirm3 again and without any reservation its readiness to fullj implement Security Council liesolution 242 and accepts all responsibilities deriving frojn it in seeking the

~~establishment of a tjust and lasting peace. The Jor- danian Government seeks a lasting peace to restore~~

conditions of security arid justice i,-. the area. It is, therefore, imperative that as .ambassador Jnrring continues his effort to promote agreement, yractickl steps be taken to this effect. -i.t the same time it is obvious that polemics and rhetorical citations must be avoided in favour of clearly defined assurances relevant to implementation of Security Council Reso- lution 242. In the present circumstances time is of the essence and must not be wasted. 2. The Government of Jordan is convinced that the essential first step towards pqace lies in the Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories. Israel should explicitly commit itself to withdrawal. 5. Within the framework of a peaceful settlement, Jordan is ready to resj^ect and acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every dtate in the area, as well as their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of .i'\..rce. ..'Mo v-?cu:s: a. t11e uii ef j u 1 v o c a 1 re' uo. 1 -_•• tit;n of -_< 12. .-die:: j 3 u 1' territorial expansion, b. the will to establish a peaceful otir.os--^ are based upon justice, c. the acknowledgement of the right of every ,'jtate in the area to live in peace, d. the readiness of every ,-Jtate to a. snae the cLliga- tions of conditions of peace., e. Implicit in the above and subject to the implementation of these principles is the termination of conditions of conflict arid the establishment of a juct and lasting peace.

Ill 1. At the present stage, and with a viextf to achieving progress in the current discussions, it is expedient to be^in with the question of guarantees to all States concerned. The concept of guarantees is linked to the concept of withdrawal, which forms one of the bases of the concent of peace. ' -Guarantees constitute a fundamental condition for peace. 2. jJotal peace concerns all the parties. it can be attained through a commitment to implement each and every one of tl e principles and provisions embodied in Resolution 2^-2. This will be finalized in a package deal. J>. The Government of Jordan is ready to abide by its obligations in any arrangement arrived at, as provided •*• . •#, -~

in the Security Council Resolution ;'+£, .'..-nd in harmony with its obligations under interneticrir.l lav/, including the Ulv Charter, at the same time &S larval undertakes to carry out its obligations' under ^uch an arrangement, beginning with coinj-l-jte evc'cuation of occupied ^r&t territories. Jordan reiterates its re^dineHs to si^n an international instrument to this ^if-ict. AIDE MEMOIRE

The United Arab Republic has informed Your Excellency, that it accepts to carry out - on a reciprocal basis - all its obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this Resolution. Referring to your Memorandum submitted on 8 February 1971, the United Arab Republic would give a commitment covering the following: 1. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency. 2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's independence. 3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. k. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party and, 5- Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

~~The United Arab Republic would also give a commitment that:~~

~~6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention.~~

7* It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law. 8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations Peace- Keeping Force in the Sharm El Sheikh and, 9. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, the United Arab Republic would accept:

A. The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances. B. The establishment of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in which the Four Permanent Members of the Security Council would participate. - 2 -

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2k2 (1967). Hence Israel should give a commitment covering the following: (1) Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip; (2) Achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions; (5) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency; (k) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's independence;

(5) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; (6) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party and> (j) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and, (8) To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, Israel would accept: A. The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances. B. The establishment of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in which the Four Permanent Members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives these commitmentsthe United Arab Republic will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the afore-mentioned obligations as provided for in Security Council Resolution 242. The United Arab Republic considers that the just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council Resolution 2^2 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since the 5th of June 15 February 1971

~~the .cjiteeats r»aestM ..in aati the. tJniteft. .Ara BeKLic. 15~~

In reply to the request ecmtsfriecL In Mfaaassfios* Jarring *s aide- of 8 February 1961 for cejEjsitEents fros the Unites £r&Tj Republic, the United Arab Republic in its owi aide«m&8Gire tyansKltted to /tabaseador Jarring on 15 Feteuai-y 3,^1 fees rsepofided as to enter' The United Arab Reputale has statM that it is ree^- to enter into a peace sgreaeent vitih Isx-ael containlrc various Obligations specified "by it as provides, fear iu Security Council resolution of JL .cla.iigjs. cStaeg.. of The United Arab Republic fea^ stated t^Et it would give a ecssaitment covering that point,

United Arab Bepyblic Jms stated that it wouM give a covering respect for ana asdfena-jieageaent of each oblaer's indeperiderice., It does act mention epverei^fcy or territorial integrity, nor "polities!" It aay bs notei, hwever, that respect for Israel's is a reasoastble d^ltjcticai frcas respect fear Israelis independence frcas the eoMition^L readiness to enter into a peace agreement with it. Respect fear Israel's tes-ritorial integrity tz&y also fee inferred fr<3a the crarafiitjnaat to live in peace vithln secure auS. recognise Isoundaries aM tress the further ceBaaitiaesit to aeeept guersaitees for the territorial inviolability of evepy Sfcete in the

United Arab Republic vould give a ccsEmiteent covert^ ttiat fi^ of territories^ ^^ ginst ip|^^ .-K ^AniVhi 4 n nKMiTr! wivfi «i fif'ssrml't.Hsent covering this i>ofet« Mbn~inteyference in each other11a domestic affairs The United Arab Republic would give a commitment covering this point.

In relation to the satisfactory arrangements referred to in the coffimitJaents requested from Israel, the United Arab Republic has given further commitments as follows: (a) Establishiiaff demilitarized zones The United. Arab Republic lias stated that it would give a commitment that it would accept the establishment of demilitarized zones astride 'the borders at equal distances. (b) gractiGal security arrangements in the Sharm-el^Sheildi area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to accept the stationing of United Nations peace-keeping forces in the Shana~el-Sheikh area and has further stated that it would insure freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law. (e) Freedom of navigation through,,the Suez Canal The United Arab Republic would give a commitment that it would insure the freedom ©f navigation in the Suez Canal _in.T accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention.

In addition to the commitments expressly requested by Ambassador Jarring» the United jtoab Republic has said that it would accept the establishment of e United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in which the Four Permanent Members of the Security Council w0uld participate. In relation to the withdrawal cosanitment sought froa Israel „ the Baited Arab Republic feels that it should apply to the Gaza Strip, as well as Sinai. -5 *

~~The Uaited Jteefe Sepiiblic considers that Israel should also give a eaamitffient for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem 3a,acc~~

~~February 26, 1971~~

Pursuant to our meetings on 8 February and 17 February, I am instructed to convey to you, and through you to the United Arab Republic, the following: Israel views favourably the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all -..subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries* The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and the United Arab Republic should, inter alia, include the provisions set out below* Ao Israel would give undertakings covering the following: 1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between Israel and the United Arab Republic as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the United Arab Republic. 2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the United Arab Republic. 3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the United Arab Republic to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries* 4* Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel- United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, -2- recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 196? lines. 5» In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both Parties in this connection, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Governments directly involved on: a* Tbe payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property. b. Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region. Once -the obligations of the Parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue have been agreed neither Party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty. 6. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in ihe territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the United Arab Republic. 7* Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the United Arab Republic. 8* Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against the United Arab Republic and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other Parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the United Arab Republic. B. Itoe United Arab Republic undertakings in the peace agreement with Israel would include: 1* Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Israel as finally ended and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between the United Arab Republic and Israel« 2« Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel« 3, Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement* 4» The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of the United Arab Republic against the population, armed force s or property of Israel* 5* Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel. 6, An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal. 7* Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal

~~international relations of Israel0~~

80 Non-participation by the United Arab Republic in hostile alliances against Isiml and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other Parties which maintain a state of belligerency against Israel, The United Arab Republic and Israel should enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent, and containing the above undertakings* The Government of Israel believes that now that the United Arab Republic has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both Parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement* Stockholm, March 31, 1971.

~~Dear Secretary General,~~

~~I enclose a brief account of my meeting with the UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Paris. I shall keep you informed of what may transpire from our meeting in Moscow later on.~~

~~(G-unnar Jarring) /~~

~~His Excellency IT Thant Secretary General of The United Nations New York, N.Y. SECRET~~

~~Meeting with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in Paris, March 29, 1971, 16.30 - 18.20 hours~~

1. Present were also Ambassador Zayyat and Mohammed Riad. I expected no new proposals or new developments and I was correct in my assessment. The Foreign Minister repeated the basic UAR stand. Peace negotiations could not begin until Israel had replied positively to my aide-memoire of February 8th and given a commitment to withdraw from all occupied UAR territory. Riad stressed the necessity of the "package deal" in order to protect the legitimate interests of Jordan and Syria. We discussed the question of "minor rectifications" with these two countries which seemed to be an accepted concept. As to Syria Riad expected Damascus to accept a "paper" from me later on, containing proposals for a UN force on the Golan Heights. "Better a UN flag there than an Israeli flag" - this was the way he had advised his Syrian colleague.

2. The French Foreign Minister had raised the question of a UAR acceptance of partial Israeli withdrawal from the East bank of the Suez Canal in order to have the Canal reopened. Riad had replied to this that President Sadat's offer for partial withdrawal remained in force. But it was based upon the assumption of a prior commitment given to me of total withdrawal from UAR territory at a later stage; there had to be a time-limit for this total withdrawal in order not to give the Israelis ideas about retaining the remaining parts of Sinai for ever.

3. The French Foreign Minister had asked Riad about the UAR attitude to an "open" peace negotiation either in the Secu- rity Council or with the Big Four and under my chairmanship, if all other efforts should fail. Riad had been reluctant. He said that under such a procedure the first question which would come up would be the question of total withdrawal. If the Israelis continued with their refusal to accept withdrawal the Security Council and/or the Big Pour would be faced with contempt and humiliation. Iliad's question had been what action the Council and/or the Big Pour would take or could take in such a situation.

4. The most interesting is perhaps what was not mentioned during our conversation. Nothing was said about the cease-fire or its continuation; no threats of a renewal of the war; the possibility of retraction of the UAR offer to enter into a peace agreement with Israel was not mentioned; nothing was said about a Security Council meeting.

5. Riad informed me strictly confidentially that he would be in Moscow April 12 - 14 and wanted to @©ntinue his conversation with me there; he hoped he would be in a better position to tell me then what the ultimate UAR course would be. ~>& ft

~~MOYA.1L, VIEIMSH EMBASSY Moscow, April 15, 1971~~

~~My dear Secretary General,~~

~~According to the press statement which was issued before my departure from New York I was to return in the second half of April, or earlier if circumstances so warranted.~~

Although I would have preferred to approach this matter after I have had my conversation with Mr. Riad I feel I should send you these lines already now as we have a pouch for Stockholm which will be leaving today.

~~As I see the situation I have the following alternatives;~~

~~a) to return to Hew York in accordance with the press statement some time before May 1st, if there is some Israeli reaction to my aide-memoire of February 8 or not.~~

~~b) to remain in Moscow until there is some Israeli reaction.~~

~~c) to go to Hew York for a short period, e.g. a week or ten days, for consultations with you and then again return to Moscow, in the absence of an Israeli reaction.~~

~~Alternatives b) and c) would necessitate a new press statement. As to c) I would prefer to leave from here not~~

~~His Excellency U Thant Secretary General of the United Nations New York' 2.~~

~~earlier than May 5th - if possible.~~

~~We could correspond by cable, en clair, mentioning only the three different alternatives. I shall revert to the matter as soon as I have seen Mr. Riad.~~

~~With kindest regards Y~~

~~Gunnar Jarring ROYA1L~~

~~SWEDISH EMBASSY MOSCOW, April 16, 1 9?1~~

~~My dear Secretary General,~~

Upon my return to Moscow from Tokyo April 9th, I received from the U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam the en- closed"oral" message from the Secretary of State, Mr, Rogers. I feel it could be of interest to you to read it.

~~The UAE Foreign Minister arrived here yesterday and I expect to meet him today or tomorrow. I shall report on our meeting as soon as possible.~~

~~With kindest regards~~

~~,>, . / q.K^«~>-»ya Gunnar Jarring~~

~~His Excellency U Thant Secretary General of the United Nations New York' April h, 1971.~~

~~"Oral" Message from Secretary of State Rogers~~

As you know, we have been urging the Israelis during recent weeks in Jerusalem, Washington, and New York to cone forward with a response to your February 8 Aide Memoire expressed in positive, negotiable terms. V-re have instructed Ambassador Barbour this week again to make clear to -i'-irs. Heir that we consider the next move is up to Israel. Luring this same period we have undertaken special efforts to assure our own position is absolutely clear to the U.S. Congress and public. The net effect of these efforts, I believe, has been greater understanding and support in the United States of both our position and your own diplomatic initiative. There has been as yet no official indication to us of an Israeli decision in the matter of its reply to you. And yet I feel that as a result of both our official demarches to Israel and our efforts to make the record plain to the public, Israel has passed through the phase of initial reflex to your initiative and the Egyptian reply to a phase of more orderly and considered assessment of these developments, '/.e believe the Israeli Government and public have new food for thought and * \*

~~- 2 —~~

and that further consideration will undoubtedly be given to our views. This will require time, and we are well aware that the time factor weighs very differently on the two sides. I do assure you our own efforts with Israel and the other parties to preserve and enhance the momentum you have achieved will be unflagging and pursued with a sense of urgency. Warmest personal regards. MISSION ©IF SWEIDEIN T

~~The following telex-communication is received April 19th from Ambassador Jarring, Moscow:~~

"For U Thant from Jarring. After I had sent my letter dated April 15 I was informed of your going to Geneva 24 - 29 April, I have had meeting with Riad. Although noting specially new transpired I feel it would be helpful if I could meet with you in Geneva to report on this conversation and to discuss what steps to take next. From my point of view Sunday 25 or Monday 26 would be best dajc but other days also are acceptable." Secretary Rogers has indicated to Middle East governments (X^ . his interest in visiting the Middle East for about one week beginning May 1, following the Ankara CS'TTO meeting. If, as appears likely, ,the visit takes place, the countries to be "if visited would be Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic, and Israel. We will make clear both privately and publicly that the purpose of'.the visit, which the governments of the area have long urged the Secretary to make, is to demonstrate our continuing dedication to a peace settlement and our support for the Jarring mission. V/e shall also make clear that negotiations remain with Ambassador Jarring and the parties and that the Secretary is neither carrying new proposals.nor seeking to substitute the U.S. Government for Jarring as the focus of negotiations. Record of the meeting with Secretary of State Rogers held In the Secretary-General's office on Monday. 17 May 1971 at 11:00 a.m.

~~Present : United States Secretary Rogers Assistant Secretary Sisco Ambassador Bush Mr. McCloskey Mr. Wewlin United Nations Secretary-General U Thant Ambassador Jarring Dr. Bunche Mr. Berendsen~~

Mr. Rogers said that he was pleased to have the opportunity to meet with the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring and Dr. Bunche to convey to them a general idea of his journey to the Middle East. He had been concerned whether there might be some misunderstandings with the relations between his trip and the Jarring mission which was facing a difficult problem as a result of the Israeli answer to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. He had emphasized to all concerned that his visit was meant to be helpful and not to be an interference to the Jarring mission. He noted that his mission had received a favourable response—both officially and with the press—in London and Paris. His journey has had two main objectives namely, firstly, to impress on Israel to be more responsive to the Jarring initiative; and secondly, to see if it was possible to arrive at an interim agreement for the Suez Canal. Secretary of State Rogers then gave his impressions country by country. First he said that he had been very pleased with the situation in Turkey. The new Prime Minister seemed to very responsible and practical, trying to avoid repression but at the same time to show that he was running the country.

~~A. - 2 -~~

In Saudi Arabia he had had a good reception from both the king and the people. The young people in the government were quite impressive, being aware of their problems and hopeful of solving them. The Saudi Arabians have expressed their concern that an interim Suez settlement was likely to interfere with a final settlement, particularly as regards Jerusalem, which was their main preoccupation. Secretary Rogers believed that he had satisfied them that in the event of an interim settlement the United States would feel obliged to continue its pressure towards a final peace settlement. In Jordan, conditions had greatly improved. The King was in control of the whole country except for one small pocket controlled by the guerillas, but even there there was no active resistance. The street crowds in Aounan had "been very enthusiastic. There were a number of impressive young men in the cabinet. The King was ready to negotiate. The main problem was that of the refugees—old and new. There was a tragic situation in the refugee camps. The King knew well that there would be no satisfactory administration of his country until the refugee problems had been settled. Jerusalem was also among the main concerns of King Hussein, who was also worried about a partial settlement. Secretary Rogers said that here again he had emphasized that the interim settlement should be considered as a first step towards a peace agreement. On the whole the discussions have been satisfactory though King Hussein seemed to feel neglected and left out. The King was too courageous a man to be left out of the discussions. Secretary Rogers had promised that he would talk to Ambassador Jarring to see see if the King could be brought back to the picture. The King saw the necessity for boundary rectifications and he hoped for rectifications in his favour. Secretary Rogers mentioned the helicopter flight he made on the eastern bank of the Jordan. "Where the Ghor canal was operative, people had returned to the fields which were green, but not as green as in Israel. However below the point where the Canal had been bombed, the land was barren and there was a great opportunity for the re-establishment of refugees, if the Canal could be repaired. He had seen the remains of tanks at the site of the battle in the previous year between the Syrian and Jordanian tanks. As regards Lebanon, Secretary Rogers noted that the Government was not in a strong position. The country had become the main basis of operations for the fedayeen. whom the Prime Minister preferred not to take on. The Prime Minister sought assurances that Israel would not invade Lebanon and Secretary Rogers had reassured him on this point, while noting the possibility of retaliating raids. The visit to Egypt had removed the doubt which he had held on the desire of the Government and the people for a peaceful settlement. The welcome by the street crowds had been singularly warm and President Sadat had been very impressive and conciliatory—very different from Wasser. President Sadat had said clearly that as President of Egypt he could make decisions which could stick and that he would live up to them. Sadat was anxious that Egypt should be in a non-aligned position and not the scene of big-power confrontations. The President had made it clear that he would consider any reasonable proposal. Sadat did not expect miracles; what he was looking for was a peace agreement but he hoped that interim agreement on the Suez Canal would be of help in achieving a final agreement. Secretary Rogers had said that that was a point of view and hope which he shared. President Sadat had then insisted that there should be a provision in the interim agreement that that agreement would be a step in the full implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242. Secretary Rogers had told the President that he agreed on that but had noted that Israel was not likely to agree to accept the the Egyptian interpretation of resolution 2^2, since, if at that stage Israel was prepared to agree to complete and full withdrawal from Egyptian territory, there would be no need for an interim agreement. Secretary Rogers commented that President Sadat would naturally like to have an interim agreement referred to as a first step to complete withdrawal, while Israel would prefer no reference to the question at all. However, the Americans believed that if the other points, such as opening of the Canal, withdrawal of Israeli troops and supervision of the evacuated zone, could be settled, the question of the reference to a final settlement would not be a sticking point. Ambassador Jarring expressed doubt whether it would be possible to find agreement on a formula. Mr. Sisco believed that it might be possible to find a formula which would tie in the interim agreement with ongoing effort, under Ambassador Jarring"s auspices, for a final peace settlement. Ambassador Jarring did not believe that Israel would agree to a reference to a complete withdrawal from the United Arab Republic, since it had stated the contrary in commenting on his initiative of February 1971. Mr. Sisco said that he believednot only that the Israelis would agree that the interim agreement should be followed by ongoing conversations relating to withdrawal but that they would accept a provision that the line in the interim settlement was not the final line and that they would be prepared to make a further withdrawal in a final settlement. He had communicated this expression of the Israeli view to the Egyptians on his second visit to Cairo. The Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring asked if Secretary Rogers had inquired whether there would be an Israeli answer to Ambassador Jarring's memorandum. Secretary Bogers said that the question had been raised but there had been no indication that a reply would be forthcoming. However, - 5 - one must not assume that progress could not be made. There were possibilities of either annexation or use of land. If an interim settlement not inconsistent with resolution 242 could be made, then there was hope for further progress. Secretary Rogers recalled that President Sadat had told him that he would never give up an inch of land. He had asked the President whether he would instead sacrifice the general interests of his country and people. The Americans were not urging the Egyptians to give up land. However, in his flight over Sharm-el-^Sheikh, he could see the reasons for the Israelis' concern and emotion. Eventually the Egyptians should be able to say that they had got their land back, while Israel should feel that adequate provisions had been made for its security. Only a small amount of land was involved in Sharm-el-Sheikh and its access road. President Sadat had said that he was prepared to consider any proposal to get the land back including any reasonable form of security arrangements. On the Suez Canal question, there had been a long discussion about what to do with the evacuated land, to what extent the Israelis should withdraw and whether Egyptian troops should be introduced on the east bank. His meeting with President Sadat had lasted for three-and-a-half to four hours. The President had been very gracious and warm towards the United States. They had agreed on increasing mutual representation and he had agreed to work out a debt-rescheduling programme. After meeting with the Israeli authorities, Secretary Rogers had reached the conclusion that they were not so much intransigent as indecisive. The members of the Knesset, whom he had met, seemed very hard-nosed and he understood the problem of the Prime Minister in getting support. In his first meeting of three-and-a-half hours, on the evening of his arrival, with the Prime Minister and her colleagues, there had not beaimuch give. But on the following day, after a meeting of several hours with the Prime Minister and her

A- - 6 - senior ministers and later with the full cabinet, he was able to see a possibility for an interim agreement. The Israelis were ready to withdraw for a certain distance from the Suez Canal but they were adamant against an Egyptian military presence in the east bank* They accepted a police force and might accept a symbolic military force. He believed that something could be worked out. Secretary Rogers said that the Israelis were very concerned about Sharm-el-Sheikh, a concern he understood more after his flight over the area with General Bar-Lev. Sharm-el-Sheikh seemed to be worthless from the economic point of view, but it was clear that the Israelis must have some arrangement to insure passage through the Strait of Tiran, Mr. Siseo stressed that in his visits to Cairo, both the Secretary of State and himself had not heard threats of any kind or any mention of deadlines. The President had made clear that on this occasion he did not wish to make a mistake, nor to seek speed instead of clarity. The President had admitted that the ideas that Mr. Sisco had brought back from Israel were concrete and that for the first time he, Mr. Sadat, knew what the Israelis wanted. Mr. Sadat had said that he would study the Israeli ideas carefully and that an Egyptian reply would be forthcoming in a couple of weeks. Mr. Sisco had suggested to the President that he should describe the meetings to the press as useful but the President had insisted that they should be described "very useful". As regards the opening of the Canal, the Israelis wanted to be sure that the Canal, when cleared, would be open for the use of all countries including Israel and that there would not be a demand for further concessions from Israel at the time of opening. He had also been permitted by the Israelis to introduce to the Egyptians the concept that the extent of withdrawal would be affected by the length of the cease-fire. If a cease-fire was to last for, say, six months, - 7 -

Israel would find it very difficult to withdraw for very many kilometres. It would "be possible to withdraw to a much greater extent if a formulation for a cease-fire without a definite deadline could be agreed upon. Mr. Sisco noted that the Egyptian reaction to this concept had "been that it had been a reasonable one. Secretary Rogers stated this point had been made clear by Defense Minister Dayan. To meet this preoccupation, the .Americans had been thinking of suggesting that the interim agreement should contain a provision that the cease-fire should continue to exist as long as the discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices continued. Mr. Sisco had hinted that in speaking to President Sadat. Sadat, of course, would not want to have a permanent cease- fire provision, while the Israelis would like one without a deadline. Once again, however, he did not consider that to be a sticking point. Mr. Sisco said that he had been able to tell President Sadat that the Israelis understood the Egyptian need to show its control of the evacuated territory. Dayan had expressly recognized the need for a civilian presence, for the stationing of police and for activities for reconstruction. Neither side had closed the doorsj however, there was not yet an agreement on the extent of withdrawal or on the nature of supervision of the occupied territories. He had before his visit been worried about the fact that the Israelis might insist on a "separate" agreement, but that was not their real attitude. In fact, in their desire to achieve a partial settlement as a step to a final peace settlement, the Israeli position was in many respect a mirror image of the Egyptian position. Secretary Rogers said that that was particularly so true of the younger ministers in the Israeli Cabinet, whose views he thought would eventually prevail. On the Egyptian side, Sadat realized that confidence should be built up. The President had not given up his major provision calling for complete withdrawal but realized that a - 8 - new atmosphere for a final agreement might be built up by a partial settlement. In the meantime President Sadat was not speaking about referring the matter to the Security Council or the four powers but wanted time to consider the matter further. Of course the Egyptians were not relaxed—the whole situation was on a short-time fuse—but there was no pressure for creating deadlines or military pressure for a decision. Secretary Rogers went on to say that,in view of the recent internal developments in Egypt, they saw that a further Egyptian reply would be delayed although he made it clear that he did not believe the President's ability to negotiate was impaired. In the meantime the Secretary wondered whether Ambassador Jarring could undertake some discussions with Israel and Jordan, on a basis not of written position but of oral discussions, perhaps on the question of refugees. Ambassador Jarring said that it would be very difficult to begin with negotiations concerning Jordan. It would be difficult to talk about Jordan without bringing up the Gaza question and this would, at once, raise the question of the Palestinians and create public excitement on their part. Ambassador Jarring noted that he had not yet submitted, in relation to Israel and Jordan, a paper similar to the one between the United Arab Republic and Israel. Mr, Sisco said that the Jordanians were not specifically anxious for a piece of paper. He noted that it would help the Jordanians if Ambassador Jarring brought up the question of Jerusalem, which they had raised with the Secretary of State. Ambassador Jarring said that he had always felt that the question of Jerusalem should be left to the very end of the negotiations. Secretary Rogers said that the situation in Jerusalem was like many other aspects of the Middle Eastern question. It was not possible to solve it all at once. However, it might be possible to find some arrangements of an interim nature vhich might better the situation. Perhaps there should be some agreement that the character of the city should not be changed. .Ambassador Jarring expressed the view that Jerusalem was within his mandate only as regards the question of the withdrawal of Israel. Otherwise, it was a matter with which the Security Council was dealing itself. Mr. Sisco considered that to be a too narrow interpretation of Ambassador Jarring's mandate. He agreed that the Security Council had given attention to the situation in Jerusalem on several occasions. However, not only the question of withdrawal, but also the question of finding a peaceful settlement for the future of Jerusalem was within the mandate of the Ambassador. Ambassador Jarring agreed that Jerusalem was within his mandate both as regards withdrawal and the determination of a final peace treaty. However, current aspects of the situation there were a matter for the Security Council. Mr. Sisco said that Ambassador Jarring's mandate in respect to Jerusalem was to achieve an overall settlement. He was surprised that the Ambassador did not regard himself entitled to deal with the question at the moment. The Secretary-General recalled that he had dealt with Israel about Jerusalem in accordance with several Security Council resolutions. It would be juridically inappropriate for Ambassador Jarring to start dealing with Jerusalem at this stage. Mr. Sisco agreed that it might not be appropriate to conduct a formal negotiation about Jerusalem at the present stage. However, Ambassador Jarring had had oral exchanges with the Jordanians and the Israelis during the period of his mandate. Perhaps in the past he had not raised the Jerusalem question because it was too difficult, but Mr. Sisco saw no reason why he should not raise it now in certain aspects, particularly as regards the holy places. - 10 -

Secretary Rogers said that he did not see why Ambassador Jarring should neglect the problems existing between Israel and Jordan. King Hussein had the feeling that he was being left out. Renewed oral exchanges might result in some partial agreement and keep the momentum up. Ambassador Jarring said that if he put the question to the Israelis - "What do you mean by secure and recognized boundaries?" - would he get a reply? Secretary Rogers said that he did not see why it was necessary to present the parties with formal papers at this stage. Even if it was not possible to solve the Jerusalem problem as a whole, it might be possible to obtain assurances that the character of the city would not be changed. Mr. Sisco suggested that Ambassador Jarring might consider telling the Israelis and Jordanians that he had been giving some thought to pursuing further discussions on the matters at issue between their two countries and that he wished to enquire whether they would be willing to pursue these discussions at the present time. He might in that connexion ask them on what aspects of the situation they would be able to concentrate in oral discussions. Ambassador Jarrinp agreed that it would be possible to do so; however, the matter was bound to come to the attention of the press and create a feeling of hopefulness in refugee camps which would soon die down, because it would not be possible to get very far. He questioned whether it was responsible to take such action at the present stage. Secretary Rogers suggested that it might be possible to talk about refugees and that perhaps the Ghor Canal might be completed, in which case it might be possible to settle 40,000 people, thus creating a certain momentum and possibility of further progress, instead of sitting and doing nothing., Mr, Sisco said that they were not pressing Ambassador Jarring to take action, but were thinking out aloud. The King was concerned and

~~A.. - 11 -~~

was looking for ways not to appear on the sidelines and one must give him a sense of participation. There were risks in initiating discussions, but there should be some way of carrying out a general exchange. However, the .Americans had not talked to the Israelis on this matter. Secretary Rogers thought that it would be possible to guard against too much optimism by "low-keying" it. Mr« Sisco repeated that neither side was anxious at this stage to have a concrete negotiation. Ambassador Jarring noted that he had promised the Jordanians that at the appropriate time he would present a similar memorandum as in the case of Israel and the United Arab Bepublie. However he had not yet done so, judging the circumstances inappropriate. He had received certain private hints that Jordan wished for an initiative on his part, but had waited for a public request. Mr« Sisco confirmed that Jordan was not seeking such an initiative at the present time. Ambassador Jarring added that a possible interim step lay in Israel accepting the return of the recently displaced persons to the West Bank. He asked if the United States would urge Israel to accept such persons, who amounted to some 250,000. Secretary Rogers noted that Ambassador Jarring was referring to the return of all the persons concerned. On the other hand, if the United States and the United Nations were to try, it might be possible to get Israel to accept say 25,000. This would create a certain credit and momentum. Ambassador Bush stated that public opinion in the United States would find it easy to identify with efforts to return displaced people and that would strengthen support for the Jarring mission. Secretary Ropers, returning to the question of Jerusalem, reiterated the hope that, based on Mbassador Jarring's negotiations, - 12 -

it might be possible to reach an interim agreement that the holy places should be protected. This would satisfy the Catholic Church, which was concerned about the matter. The Secretary-General. returning to the problem of the newly displaced persons, said that he had been pursuing the matter for two years, with no headway. He also noted with regard to Jerusalem that Israel was going ahead with the 'Master Plan' for the city and was thus changing its character. It was building apartment houses in many areas, in particular on the land surrounding Government House, which had not been returned to the United Nations. He could get no final reply to his representations on this matter. The Secretary-General asked whether President Sadat had had any reaction to the idea of having international shipping, including Israeli shipping, pass through a reopened Suez Canal. Mr. Sisco replied that in his 1st of May speech, President Sadat had spoken only of the opening of the Suez Canal and had said nothing about an Egyptian obligation to clear and operate it for use by all nations. In returning to Cairo he had carried a specific Israeli question to clarify that point. He expected an answer shortly. The Secretary-General enquired what was the position with regard to the stationing of Egyptian armed forces on the East Bank of the Canal* Mr. Sisco replied that President Sadat felt strongly that they should cross the Canal, while the Israelis were equally strong in their view that they should not. Both Secretary of State Rogers and he felt that there was flexibility in the positions of the parties on that matter. In particular, if arrangements were made for Egypt to cross the Canal, the Egyptians might accept more supervision. Secretary Rogers confirmed this and expressed his judgement that the matter would be worked out. Mr. SisGO said that the Americans felt that an augmented UMTSO would provide the necessary supervision. Mr* Bunche enquired whether the question of international supervision had been raised with the parties. Mr. Sisco replied in the affirmative. They had even discussed with the parties the question of joint operations. Summing up, Mr. Rogers said that both sides agreed that the Suez Canal should be opened; that there should be a withdrawal Of Israeli troops; that Egypt should be able to cross the Canal in some capacity; that the Canal should be operated by Egypt for Egyptian profit. There were, of course, details to be worked out on which it might seem that there was no hope for further concession. However, if one looked at what Mrs, Meir had said in the past she would not do and then agreed to, there was hope for an interim agreement. Ambassador Jarring enquired if there had been any sign of readiness by Egypt or Jordan to enter into direct negotiations. Secretary Rogers thought that if the Suez Canal was opened there would be closer negotiations. President Sadat wanted his country to be non-aligned and wished to get on with the question of improving his own country. Mr. Sisco considered him to be a very remarkable and impressive man. Secretary Rogers thought he was very strong-willed and nationalistic. Mr. Sisco said that he had seen President Sadat in part alone and in part in the presence of Prime Minister Fawzi and several other ministers. He confirmed that Fawzi seemed as anxious as the President for a peaceful solution. The Secretary of State« referring to the question of Pakistan, expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would do all, in his power to provide international aid for the persons affected by the events in the eastern part of the country. The Secretary-General said he had been trying to do this, but had found the Pakistani authorities very negative. He had been seeking to send a team of observers to East Pakistan, but so far only a UNICEF representative had arrived in Dakar. He was also concerned, and seeking the help of Prince Sadruddin Khan, for the three million refugees in exile in India. However, President Yahya Khan remained very negative towards international help, "While st.-i.li. trying to have help carried on by the United Nations family, he was trying to carry out political reconciliation through the good offices of a third party. Secretary Bogers noted that the Pakistani representative seeking rehabilitation aid in Washington had said that his country was willing to accept international co-operation, Mr. Sisco enquired whether the Secretary-General was ready to send a survey team. The Secretary-General replied that he was ready to send a team or a special representative, but even in that instance the Pakistanis were Edfcvery cooperative. Mr. Sisco was afraid that the Pakistanis were short-sighted since failure to provide international aid would increase pressure of public opinion in the United States for the United States Government not to provide necessary financial assistance,

~~The meeting rose at 12;45 P*m. IDE SU3ESBIE 7- ,~~

~~4j*^etjr.~~

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~~ri-71 * h•,.: '•' i The following message dispatched from Moscow on July 5 was : received by the Swedish Mission today: ;."•.!~~

"For Brian Urquhart United Nations from Jarring. Reference our telephone conversation Friday. Bush did not bring up matter about U Thant informning parties when Israelis had : been told of the four points from meeting June 24. Their ' reaction was so negative that no further information necessary. This was the impression I got. Sending report to U Thant soonest but owing to slow pouch connections it cannot be expected in New York until 12 or 13 July. When is U Thant expected back in New York?"

~~'\ f ->i~~

~~His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, New York.~~

~~Dear Secretary General II Thant,~~

Ambassador Bush, paid me a visit in Tiken on July 2nd and gave me a briefing on the U.S. views of the present situation in the Middle East. He began by informing me of what had happened at the meeting of the Mg Four on June 24th. He gave me the text of the statement he had made on behalf of the U.S. Government on that occasion v/hich I enclose in photocopy - although you may already have received it. Ambassador Bush stressed the four points 1. that the U.S. remain dedicated to the search for just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on carrying out Security Council Resolution 2A2 in all parts and provisions 2. that the U.S. remain dedicated to the support of Ambassador Jarring's roll in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242, and specifically to his proposals of February 8 which the U.S. consider in accordance with his mandate« 5. that the U.S. consider the reply of the UAR to Ambassador Jarring's proposals to be positive 4. that the U.S. hope that Israel vail make a similarly positive reply. The last point was important and indicated that the U.S. would continue quietly to have Israel reply to my February 8 — 2 — proposals. Ambassador Bush, further informed me that the U.S. would continue their efforts aiming at a partial solution for the opening of the Suez Canal. Although they saw no signs of flexibility and no response in Israel they would press ahead with, a partial agreement on the Suez Canal. They had lately observed a hardening of both the Israeli and Egyptian positions on such a partial solution but they would nevertheless go ahead with an even more 'active' diplomacy than before. We would see the signs of this 'active' diplomacy in the near future (to me the word 'active' stands slightly in contradiction to 'quietly' above). The encouraging side of the picture was that both Israel and the UAH had indicated willingness to keep the possibilities of a partial agreement alive and that neither side wanted resumption of the hostilities. But Bush did not deny that grea.t diffi- culties in achieving a partial solution lay ahead and he did not expect any progress in the very near future. Maybe something could be achieved towards the end of August or just before the beginning of the General Assembly in September. Ambassador Bush felt that there was no desire from the UAH side for a meeting of the Security Council in the meantime and perhaps all debate on the Middle East question could be avoided until the General Assembly had begun its work. Ambassador Bush expressed concern about the Jordanian in- sistence on a Security Council meeting on the Jerusalem question. The Americans were however in touch with King Hussein and hoped that a way would be found to avoid bringing up the Jerusalem problem in the Security Council when the U.S. were taking active steps to achieve a partial solution of the Suez Canal question. A debate on Jerusalem in the Security Council would certainly not be helpful for the American endeavours. Ambassador Bush asked me especially to note the following passage in his statement to the Big Four: "We would be willing to consider discussing other questions if it can be shown that such discussions vrould actually contribute something to the objective we all share of trying to bring peace to the Middle East." I presume that this means that the Americans would be more willing than before to discuss the question of guarantees, within the meetings of the Big Four. As to the U.S. - Soviet relations Ambassador Bush told me that in Washington it had been noticed that the Soviet Union had felt concern about the U.S. efforts to achieve a partial solution on the opening of the Suez Canal; furthermore the. Russians had been concerned about the conversations between President Sadat and Secretary of State Rogers. This was understandable, said Ambassador Bush, but he wanted to stress that the U.S. vranted to cooperate with the Soviet Union in their search for a partial agreement which could lead to a solution for the Middle East in general. He wanted me to know that any interim agreement would have to have Soviet support. Bush reiterated the U.S. support for my mission. He did not indicate any American desire to have my mission reactivated in the near future. I suppose the Americans want to await the results of their present 'active' diplomacy before other steps are taken. My only comments were that I was in continous touch with the Secretary General and that I hoped to have an opportunity to discuss the situation in general with him in a not too distant future. In connection with his remarks on the Jordanian desire for a meeting of the Security Council on the Jerusalem question Ambassador Bush handed me^ a copy of the Israeli Foreign I.Iinister's reply to a question in the Knesset which. I enclose in photocopy. Ambassador Bush's only remark was that I might find, it interesting. After my return to Moscow I have met the UAR Ambassador here, Morad Ghaleb, who had been present at all the meetings which UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad had had daring his visit to Iloscow, which ended the day before my arrival, Ghsleb confirmed to me that the so called Bergus-plan had been discussed with the Russians who had been informed by Riad that it could not be accepted by Cairo as it only tended to create a new armistice line in Sinai with Israel in possession of most of Sinai for an unforeseeable future. The UAR insisted, now as before, on an Israeli declaration of intention of complete withdrawal from Sinai. This was the main question and. the Soviet Government was of the same opinion. I received from Ghaleb a copy of the 'Bergus paper' und the Egyptian reply to it. I enclose both in photocopies although you may already have received them from other sources. C-haleb furthermore told me that there1 was Egyptian-Soviet agreement that it would be of no practical use to bring up the Middle East question in the Security Council, at present or in the near future. It might be better not to use the Security Council for a Middle East debate but await the convening of the General Assembly. But both Egyptians and Russians agreed that the Jerusalem-question could not be put aside but had to dealt with urgently. I however got the feeling that no common Soviet- Egyptian line had been agreed upon. I yesterday had a conversation with First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov. From him I got the same impression - that there was no desire fo-r -a Security Council-meeting and that it might be better to leave the whole problem to the General Assembly. Mr. Kuznetsov stressed the importance of the TTnrted Nations' role in the Middle East question; even if there were American efforts at present for a partial solution it was important to keep the Middle East question inside the United Nations-; he again expressed support for my mission and hope that I would continue my efforts. He felt that it would anyhow be in the United Nations that a solution to the Middle East question would be found - sometime in the future. Mr. Kuznetsov expressed his hopes for your speedy recovery .which I convey to you with these lines. A-

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~~PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL 15 EAST 70TH STREET TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK, N. Y. 1 OO2 1~~

~~TRAFALGAR 9-3611~~

~~REPLY IN THE KNESSET BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS . MR. ABBA EBAN TO QUESTION BY KNESSET MEMBER ELIAHU SASSON 30 TUNE 1971~~

QUESTION: There have been reports in the press on the statement by the Pope on Jerusalem, the Holy Places and the status of the Christian communities. There have also been reports on reactions abroad to development projects in Jerusalem.

~~What are the steps taken by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to explain Israel's policy on Jerusalem and the Holy Places to foreign governments, including the Vatican?~~

What is the position which the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is explaining and proposes to explain, in contacts with foreign factors, on the rights and status of the Arab public and the Moslem and Christian communities in Jerusalem?

REPLY; On many occasions since June 1967, the Israel Government stated its position on the well-being, progress, integrity and development of Jerusalem and on the Holy Places. An authoritative statement of our position was conveyed in a Jfote which I sent to the Secretary -General of the United Nations on 10 July 1967.

~~These statements still hold good.~~

In the question before me, I am asked to go into the matter of the Holy Places and the Christian population in Jerusalem. With reference to statements expressing concern for the future of the Christian population in Jerusalem, I shall confine myself to clarifying our position and our policy:

1 . On 27 June 1967, the Knesset passed a law for the protection of the Holy Places. On the same day, the Prime Minister made the following declaration to the religious leaders in Jerusalem: "All the Holy Places in Jerusalem are now open to all who wish to pray in them and to the faithful of all religions without discrimination. " It is our intention to place the internal management and arrangements for the Holy Places in the hands of the religious leaders of the communities to Which these places belong in accordance with this pp^lcY/ the Suprei|p;;Moslem Council hplds jurisdiction over the Ei-Aqsa Mosque arid the Dome of the Rock, and ajl.other Moslem Holy Places, cemeteries and mosques. The Chief Rabbinate holds jurisdiction over the Western Wall and Jewish Holy Places, synagogues and cemeteries. The various Christian communities hold jurisdiction over the Christian Holy Places and religious institutions'in accordance with the accepted tradition. We have made and honoured agreements on .compensation for war damage to all the church institutions. The reference is to damage'inflicted from 1948 to 1967 due to wars initiated by the Jordanian 'Government. This compensation was.,pa id to" 17 Christian institutions, and totals IL 6 million. The Government is also taking steps to encourage pilgrimages by adherents of all faiths to the Holy Places, and this welcome custom is being observed in an atmosphere of peace, freedom and sanctity. Christian pilgrimage is increasing from year to year. Many religious leaders — especially Christians — have expressed approval of this policy.

2. An instructive feature relative to the situation of the Christian community in Jerusalem is to be found in the data on the extent of the Christian population. During the time of the Jordanian occupation subsequent to the Jordanian invasion in 1948, there was a sharp drop in the number of Christians in Jerusalem. The figures are as follows:

~~YEAR JEWS MOSLEMS CHRISTIANS~~

~~1948 100,000 40,000 25,000 1967 195,000 54,963 10,800 1970 215,000 61,600 11,500~~

~~It transpires that the great emigration of Christians under the Jordanian occupation (some 20,000 emigrated during that period) has come to a halt since 1967.~~

'- • • • ;•••' 3. In addition, the Jerusalem municipality has provided the Christian Churches and institutions with financial and technical aid for the furtherance of spiritual, artistic and cultural undertakings and to encourage construction and efficient maintenance. The institutions which'have enjoyed this support include: the Armenian Patriarchate, (The Church of) St. Pierre en Gallicante, the Soeurs de Sion ("Ecce Homo" Convent), the Franciscan Order, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, the Soeurs Blanches (Franciscaines de Marie), the Knights of Malta, the Evangelical Lutheran Church at Beit Jalla, Notre Dame de Sion and the Monastery of St. John at Ein Karem, the Catholic Church and community centre at Beit Hanina, and the American Institute for Holy Land Studies.

The world's first Roman Catholic Institute for Ecumenical Studies is now rising on a hill near Jerusalem — a project inspired by the President of Notre Dame in Indiana, Father Hesburgh. Professor Charles Moeller of the University of Louvain in Belgium will head this institution. Construction of a Greek Orthodox Church, near the wall of the Old City, which stood unfinished for many years, under the Jordanian occupation, is now being completed. IL 500,000 has been allocated for the rehabilitation of the Rockefeller Museum. Repair and restoration work has been made, with the help of the municipality, in the Armenian Church on Mt, Zion, the Monastery of Holy Sepulchre. The cornerstone has been laid for the Armenian Theological Seminary in the Old City. The University of Rome, with Vatican support and in cooperation with the Jerusalem Foundation, is planning the establishment of an Institute for Medical Genetics in Jerusalem. The Christian Churches are not subject to taxation and are exempt from customs duty and purchase tax. Furthermore, the right of every religious community to maintain its own schools and to determine their curricula is also guaranteed and honoured. New libraries and youth centers have been opened in East Jerusalem, and a vocational training center is planned for Beit Hanina. 4. Reports on these development projects are being conveyed to the Christian world through "Christian News From Israel" and other publica- tions .

5. I have given only an outline, of items chosen at random, concerning the development and progress of Christian institutions in Jerusalem. There is no contradiction or conflict between the manifold development taking..place within the Jewish population in Jerusalem — resulting from Government and municipal activity, and in view of the immense influx, the heart-wanning affection and the tremendous dedication of Jews throughout the world — and the honouring of the rights and furtherance of the development of the Christian population. In any event our policy is clear. The special and variegated composition of the population of Jerusalem is a deep rooted historical phenomenon, which the State of Israel recognizes, drawing its conclusions therefrom. A principal conclusion is maximum consideration for the character of the population and for all that goes on in the city, on every level of planning, both in the present and in the future.

Furthermore, the city's development will be planned with an eye to all the inhabitants and taking into consideration the urgent requirements of a lively, variegated and increasing population which is absorbing additional residents in a city whose rate of natural increase is among the highest in the world, and particularly high among the Arab residents. The city is open to the constructive initiative of Jews, Christians and Moslems the world over in the furtherance of its developments, especially of its cultural and spiritual assets, and in increasing the number of institutions and enterprises testifying to the city's historical uniqueness and special mission of promoting faith, progress and peace. Should Christian and Moslem circles, to whom Jerusalem is dear, manifest Initiative of their own, it will be welcome and they will benefit from Government support, just as they have been benefitting up to now. —4—

Our policy is: safeguarding the religious, cultural and social life of the city's population and of those who enter its gates, including Christian, Moslem and other pilgrims. One may hope that all those V to whom the well-being of Jerusalem is dear will fully appreciate these gains — achieved under far from favourable conditions — as well as the intention to continue to work in this direction, that harmony and mutual respect may reign in Jerusalem among the inhabitants and communities. The Jewish population is presently enjoying a welcome upsurge of devejopment and progress. However, one must not ignore the recovery and the prospect for development of the Christian population — which was the subject of this question and of my reply thereto.

~~1 July 1971~~

~~I? V~~

~~I £-' j Is*} ;_jj U Y y JL&.~~

~~i .9 Lit~~

~~J I U . » . >• » -J I / J~~

l».The UAH is prepared , as a first stage in the implementation of SO Res» 24-2 in all of its parts and provisions, to enter into an interim arrangement with Israel. This interim arrangement is to be concluded under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring as a stage in his mission to assist the parties in reac-ing agreement on a final peace agreement based on all the parts and-provisions of SG Res. .24-2,.- "' 2o The interim arrangement will contain undertakings by both parties to pursue, under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, negotiation's in an effective and expeditious manner looking toward the final peace

agreement envisaged in SG Ress24-2<> 3» Upon completion of the interim arrangement, Israel will withdraw its forces to a line running from A to B. Israel will further undertake t'o complete its withdrawal from Egyptian territory to the agreed and secure boundary established in the final peace agreements 4-0 As Israeli forces withdraw, Egyptian administration and control will be restored in that area of the Sinai peninsula running from the Suez-:Canal to a line running from X to Y (east of the three passes)» 5*. The area between lines AB and XJ, to be known as the Area Between the Lines, will be occupied and temporarily administered by military forces or observers established by the appropriate

organ of the United Nations0 6, Israel and the UAR may agree to restrictions and limitations on numbers of troops and tjgpes of armament each side will maintain in the ttone running from the Suez Canal to the line X Y and from the line A B to the international frontier between Egypt and Israel^ The implementation of this agreement will be supervised by military observers established by the appropriate organ of the United Nationso 7» ^ne interim .arrangement will provied for a six month.1 s cease

fire between the parties 0 The HAH will entertain-requests from Ambassado' .. r Jarring for limited extensions of this cease-fire if Ambassador Jarring feels it essential to the continuing progress of his mission* 8:* 'The UAJR will undertake to clear, open, and operate the Suez 0anal for the ships of all nations except for those nation claiming . , or-actually exercising belligerency against the UAE. The UAR will undertake", in the interim arrangement,, to grant freedom of passage through the Canal to Israeil ships and cargos, as soon as "the final "peace agreement is reached, and-Israeli withdrawal is completed, 9» Both parties will undertake to avoid hostile acts in the general ' - area of the Suez Canal and not to interfere in any way in the free and secure use of the Canal, as administered by the Egyptian Suez Canal authority, to international shipping.

~~V ,~~

~~\ Q V •*J >-^-W J1~~

. . 1, Both parties undertake to pursue, under the auspices of .Ambassador Jarring, negotiations in an effective and expeditious jmaiiner lacking toward the final peace agreement envisaged in .''.Security Council resolution 242 and the memorandum submitted "by the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the parties on the 8th of February 19?lo In accordance with the resolution' and the Jarring . memorandum Israel undertake to complete the withdrawal from Egyptian territory to the international frontier between Egypt and Palestine under the British mandate, -.-. 2« The United: Arab Republic is prepared, as a first stage

in the implementation of Security Council resolution No0 242 in all its parts and provisions to accept a partial with drawal of the Israeli- forces to be arranged under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring as a state in his mission to assist the parties in reaching agreement on a final peace agreement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution No, 242. 3« Israel will withdraw its forces to a line running from

~~A to B0~~

40 As Israeli forces withdraw, Egyptian administration and control will be restored in that area of the Sinai Peninsula running from the Suez Canal to a line running from X to Y . e'ast of the three passes* 5* The area between lines AB and XY, to be known as the area between the lines; will be patrolled by observers established by the appropriate organ of the United Nations* 6# Israel and the United Arab Republic may agree to restrictions and limitations on numbers of troops and types of armament each side will maintain in the zone running from the Suesr Canal to. the line XY and rom the line AB to the international frontier between Egypt and Israelo The implementation of this arrangement will be supervised by military observers established by the appropriate organ of the United Nations iHr'-'v^ V The partial withdrawal arrangement will provide, for a six month's cease fire between the parties. During this period, ft|';, the Special Representative of the Secretary General will draw 1 !!&'•'^ '.; I th".'"' e'•''". necessary. time-table for the implementation of all the 3&'V^'.^: '•,. •'..-,.•... • S^V ^arts and provisions of Security Council resolution No, 24-2 and . -,. withdrawa••.• l of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories. •.;•/•'"So The United Arab Republic will undertake &fee to clear, open and -~1-. :"••-: •-''- •' " " . " • • 'operate the Suez Canal for the ships of all nations in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention^, Israeli ships and cargoes will not pass through the ..Sues Canal untill the final peace agreement is reached and Israeli withdrawal is coppletede •9«- Israel will undertake to avoid hostile1 acts in the general area"of the Suem Canal and not to interfere in any way in the free and. secure use of the Canal, as administered by the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, to'international shipping,,

~~gp;':<; :^:" lf-:-:-~~

;:; J wmfiii|ilfe:-^m •"*?««,' •:•>' -',•,' v '';'•- - • ^.MlM^^^^^;^;^ Hoteg on a meeting with Sir Alec Douglas-Home '' £ State for Forsi' 'Affairs of the United; Kingdom.T held on Monday, £T September, ..at

~~Present i . Sir Alec Douglas-Home Sir Colin Crowe "'Mr. A. D; ParnonSj Assistant Und$r«-Seeretary of stat$ Mr* J.A.N. Garethaia, Principal Stcrstary to Sir~~

~~Ambassador Jarrisog Mr, I* E, Berendsen~~

Alec .Dpuglas^Home said that he had seen the Egyptians recently ia Cairo and found them obviously interested in peace with Israel* In fact, there were 101 reasons why they should wish to do so. !Zhey found attriaction in an interim arrangement but continued to insist that they could not yield an inch of soil. There was some difference between the positions of President Sadat, who was quits prepared to see two distinct phases, and that of Foreign Minister Eiad, who sought greater continuity. For his part. Sir Alec saw no-,, possibility of progress unless the parties get somewhat closer together than they had so far. Sir Alec added that when he had informed the E^ptians of the statement by Foreign Minister Eban to him, that the withdrawal would not necessarily stop after the first stage had been completed, this had been viewed by the Egyptians as a trap. A- Ambassador. Jarring said, that the essential difficulty was that the Egyptians would not agree to anything unless they were assured of complete Israeli withdrawal from their territory. In that respect, the Israeli reply to his initiative of 8 February, contained one sentence, namely, that they would not in any case withdraw to the pre-5 June line, which made it impossible for him to pursue his mission. SirAlecJpou^las-Home said that if the Israelis would state that they had no claim in Egyptian territory, progress could be resumed* Mr. Pardons said that perhaps the Israelis might be persuaded to make a statement that they had no territorial claim on Egypt but that they could not contemplate a withdrawal unless they were fully satisfied that that had no adverse effects on their security. Ambassador Jarring remarked in this connexion that the Egyptians had not asked for withdrawal before a treaty had been signed. 2hat had been their position since early 1968. It would, of course, be very good if the Israelis would make a declaration on the lines indicated, but he did not know whether they were willing to go that far. Sir Alec Douglaa~Home said that the Israeli statements on Sharm-el-Sheikh had indicated that Israel was asking not for sovereignty but for control over that area. Sir Alec said that otherwise the Egyptians appeared to be fairly calm but continued to Insist that 1971 was a key year and that they could not guarantee there would be no fighting if a solution was not reached. He felt that Egypt was feeling a considerable strain, both in maintaining its forces in the field and in keeping up its morale. : • ' •' • A- Ambassador Jarring said that he took the position that he had received a positive reply to his 8 February initiative from Egypt but that he had not received, any reply from Israel. If he were to regard the Israeli reply as a negative one, that would leave things in an even less hopeful state. Ambassador Jarring said that he had not suggested a final territorial settlement, but had spoken of a withdrawal to an international boundary . In so doing, he believed that he was interpreting the views of all fifteen members of the Security Council and t&ose of Secretary of State Bogers, that to the case of Egypt the resolution meant total withdrawal from territory. Sir ^ec _DQUglas>>Home expressed the view that Israel would continue to insist that an eventual frontier should emerge from discussions between the parties arrived at without preconditions. Mbaasador Jarring said that Israel had established its own preconditions in talks with him, that peace should be established with Egypt by means of a binding contractual treaty. 3&ey had now such an assurance and if they wish further progress they would have to pay for it by agreeing to withdrawal. If they would do so, it might be possible to demilitarise even the whole of Sinai. Mr., Parsons agreed with that view. Sir Alec Douglag*Home said that Israel felt determined not to accept dictation from the Great Powers nor from anyone else. !They must look for some change iu procedure* Mr. Parsons said that it mi^ht be possible to separate the question of frontier from that of withdrawal. Jarrin said that in his initiative he did not to dictate any boundaries "but to arrange for withdrawal to a boundary which was not described as ths "boundary of Israel.

~~%,.i Bagjlona agreed* He noted that the proposed withdrawal forstuia left "Gaza in Israeli hands, at least for the time being.~~

Jarring said that under his initiative9 he had not laid down the "boundaries which would be settled in further discussions. Moreover, he had envisaged a boundary commission. Mr^ _ Parsons stressed the view that the Israelis might be more f orth-coaing if that sight lead to more direct talks on the pattern, ,. Jarring said that the discussions had been taking place all along on the Hiod.es fonaula, except with the difference that the parties were established at several hotels in Manhattan instead of just one hotel,

^r>vj^on^ said that if the Israelis could have the assurance that 'the discussions vould be transferred to sane site in ths region and carried out iti the Etodes pattern, they Blight be sore receptive* •Mbassgtdor. Jarria^ said that he had never excluded the idea although he knew that Mr, Riad did not like it* Perhaps President Sadat would be jaore receptive. But before agreeing, to such discussions, Egypt m>uld have to have evidence that it eould shov to its public opinion, of a j-eal step forward. agreed. However,, his ovm assessment was that the Egyptians were in a rather wsak position and knew it said that the Israelis vere of the same opinion, but he felt that they could show generosity, •". '.,'' •--' • "' ' "' A- * 5 .

Mr. Parsons said that the Israeli philosophy was exactly the opposite, namely, to drag out the discussions as it -was felt that the Egyptians vould "be in a weaker position as the time passed* Ambassador; Jarring noted that the Aisarican discussions aimed at arriving at an interim Suez Canal settlement were proceeding* Sir Jleo^Pc^las^HotBe stated that the 3&S?ptians claimed that the talks had stopped. He had not, however, met the Secretary of State Bogeris. Ambassador Jarring said that he got the impression from the Americans that they still saw a possibility of an interim

Alec Eftufflas-~||ome said that the Egyptians were disappointed that they had not heard anything since Mr. Sisco's visit to Israel. Ambassador Jarring thought that the Americans might "be working hard on the Israelis*

MrifltÎterseas, hoped that that was the case. If so, it must be linked with a comprehensive settlement* SAr^êe.DgiîaB^Hopie said that the Egyptians vould not expose themselves to direct negotiations as they recognise that their position was too weak. /tobassadcir Jarring said that he felt he could make progress only if there was a declaration of a withdrawal from Israfel. In the meantime, it was better for him to take the position that he had no reply instead of a negative reply and wait for new developments. Otherwise the Egyptians would ask for a report from the Security Council, in which he would have to note the negative reply from Israel.

A- _Sir.r Ce|iH.. Crowe reported that the Secretary-General had expressed the view that following the general debate in the Assembly the matter would "be referred "back to the Security Council, at which time the Ambassador would "tie asked to submit a final report. $hat would put an end to the Jarring Mission. Could the Arabs afford that? Ambassador Jarring noted that Mr. ESL-iZayyat had used the words "final report" in the recent Security Council debate. If such a report was asked for, the Arabs would have closed the door for further activity for his mission, particularly if they expected the report to contain proposals of his own for a solution, which would be the equivalent of "suicide". Ambassador Jarring noted that when speaking to Mr. Kusnetaov in Moscow recently, the latter had emphasized that resolution 2^2 must be the basis for any further resolutions on the Middle East question. Sir Also. Douglas-Home raised the question of Four-Power guarantee for a final settlement. Ambasaador Jarring expressed his personal opinion that the Israelis would like a United States guarantee, but not a United Nations one because to accept the latter would involve giving up its position that a United IJations guarantee was worthless.

Sirn..Alec.Itouglas-Horae' noted that the King of Morocco had also thought that the Four-Powers had no role to play in a final settlement. Sir Alec added that there was not much fun in guaranteeing a settlement in the Middle East. Mr.Parsons added that that would be particularly so if the United States were to give a guarantee to the Israelis and the U.S.S.R, to the Arab states. ..-"''

• ... / /*«< Ambassador Jarring said that he had arranged to make routine calls on the Middle East foreign ministers to find out if there v$r§ any new developments. Sir Alec ^uglas^Home said that he would be meeting Mr. Eban shortly and if anything came out of the meeting, he -would tell -Ambassador Jarring through Sir Colin Crowe. Ambassador Jarring stated that he did not see how he could undo his Initiative of 8 February but it might be possible to find a way around the impasse* Mr._ Parsons said that the United Kingdom did not wish .Ambassador Jarring to do so. He noted that when Mr. Eban had seen the Foreign Minister earlier lh the year, he was somewhat shamefaced about the sentence concerning non-iwithdraval to the pre-5 June line.

Sir 41eeL DQU^las*Hoffle believed that there were internal political divisions in Israel which makes it difficult for the Israelis to change their position. Ambassador Jarring agreed. He believed that the insertion of the words in question was part of a compromise in Israeli internal politics.

~~The mseting ended at iltQQ a.m. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION °* The Secretary-General~~

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PRO JET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION

~~Date: FROM: DE: 2 Oct. 1971 Ambassador Jarring~~

~~CR. 13(11-04 Kotea on a. meettnft with the Kinieter for Fereij%n Affairg of Israel held irt the off ice .on JErldey* 3. October 1971* at. 4. .go~~

~~Ereisentt E.E. Mr. Abba Efean Ambassador Yosef fe&oafe Mr, U tobassador Jarring &r. Guyer Kr. tfexjuhart Mr. Berendsen~~

The> SMiâBFy*4fenâ^ wedccsnefi Mr* Mr. BbgK referred to tfee letter which the Secretary-General had to MBI «m the Jeruselem problaa, noting that while the resolution obligatsd the Secretary-General to report on the problem to the Security Council it left open the question of how he would get his information, Mr. Eben urged reconsideration of the idea of appointing & commission. If the intention vas to get Israel to cancel its plans, there was no need for such & commission, and if the intention was to note that Israel ^ss anvilling t© comply vith the resolution, then the coffiinission was not needed nor would it "be weleoaed, Mr. Eban stated that he would write a letter to the Secretary-General giving Information about the position. On receipt of the letter, the Secretary-General might find that it was sufficient to aa&e a report to the Security Council. In any case, if the information was insufficient, the Secretary-General could consider further action. The Secretary-General might find that it -was not necessary to pursue the idea of & coraaission. The Secretary-general said that he had taken the action that he »H^«""«***«"**»«*«**"*™-«™»-*^"*"«*"***»^M«^W«» ',;> had in consultation with the President of the Security Council and stated that he had already consulted with the three States considered for the coEiBJlssion» namely, Italy, Argentina and Sierra Leone, to see If they would accept member ship on it. Sbr. Ebsn reiterated that he would reply to the Secretary-General in & way which would make clear the intention of the Government of Israel. Israel was not likely to coaply vith the resolution and to divide the City once more* but it would describe its intentions. It would be for the Council to decide if it was satisfied and to take what action it saw fit* As for the Governments which had been asked to take part in the ccanmission, he expressed doubt whether at least two of thea would agree to take part unless they knew that the commission would be welcomed by the Government of Israel* fhe Jlecjt^tsrff-^leneral agreed that a reply on the lines intended by Foreign Minister Efcan Jaight do for the report. It would be best if the reply put forward alternative suggestions. Mr. Ebap noted that »onaaHy a Member would receive a letter apprising it of the adoption of a resolution which concerned it* It would have been more satisfactory to Israel to have been able to reply to such a resolution rather than to a comunication suggesting a commission. The Secretary-^lenerai, after checking with his staff* noted that the cablegram ccnmnjmicating the resolution had been dispatched on the night of the resolution1® adoption. Mr. Offigff pointed out that the first was a formal communication, while the subsequent letter dealt with th© iKplementation of the resolution. jtebassadjpir Tekoah said that it would be simpler if Israel could react to the formal ecramunieation rather than to the present letter. Fir. Eban eaid that he would not then have to reply to the suggestion that a cosfflission should visit Israel but would confine his reply to a statement of the position of the Government of Israel on the question. The iSecretar^êneral said that it was up to the Israeli authorities to decide in which manner to reply. jjfay Guyer said that the Seeretary^General's position was uncomfortable in that he had already consulted with the President of the Security Council end hud been in touch with the three Delegations. Ambassador Tekoah felt that it was nevertheless better to reply to the resolution as such and not to the idea of receiving a cesatnissies. A.. Seeretary«ênerel said he would study the question further. t&v.jBban. tufting t$ the Middle last question in general, referred to his speech in the General Assembly on the previous day. He felt that there «as no ®bje<*tive necessity for a lack of activity in peace making aad felt that there should be instead eemfeant activity. He felt that S&ypt would wish to imintete the cease-fire. The military situation must seem lanattraefcive to the %yptians. 2ven limited harassment activity on. their part was dangerous as it would not necessarily evoke » Itatttei response, fhe Israeli authorities eoold set* ©f course, be certain of the internsi position in $gy$* but "believed that there was an unresolved power struggle, of which the capital trial of All Sabry and ninety other defendants showed the broad scale. Heiiy of the accused had been associated with the Soviet connexion. The Soviet authorities had displayed their annoyance with executions In the Sudan and vould no doubt be equally annoyed If there were executions in %ypt* He noted however that thers -was «o tradition of political executions in that country. Israel had beea eritieal of astpeets of Soviet policy, but it noted that the Soviet ynion like all the Qraat Power© "was urging the maintenance of the cease-fire, In Mr* Eban's view. President Sadat mated to have a continued cease-fire but needed a Canal agreement or setae other reason to justify it t© his pstfclts. There vere variotis possibilities for progress towards agreement. On the question of an interim agreement, Mr. Eban had heard eeaaething of the recent meeting between Secretary of $ta,te Rogers end Foreign Minister Hiad Infeshizsgfco nan d hoped to have a more substantial report 'triaen he met vith Mr. Rogers on k October. He did not know whether taavlns hesrfi the âctions of the ^yptian Foreign Minister and himself the Mexicans would vish to reams their efforts towards an interim agreement but he thought that they ought to do so. Mr* Sisco had allowed the 3B«feter to rua dovn, Beffieûat to the surprise of the Egyptians. The points of agreement between the parties were that the Canal should be opened; that Israel should withdrew, that after clearing the A- V

~~Canal it should tie op^ied to traffic* that the civilian population should refcara to the Canal gone} and that the eease»£ire sshouia be~~

The potots of disagreement were whether the Egyptian crossing should be silitary or civilian in nature aM the limit of the cease- fire* Israel Relieved that the eease-f ire should bs permanent, %ypt felt that it should be Halted in duration and the tfniteS States felt that it should be indefinite "but with a possibility of review, toother point of disagreement was the relationship between the two agreements, In that regard, the United States had stressed, th« view that %yj>t could not get in a» interim agreement what it wanted in a final egreemeat. 3?he &aeriesn view was that the inter Jus agreement should not prejudge the final egreeiaentj, t>ut shmiH contain a cojasitaent t>y the parties to merve on t«««erse the final agreement. Mr, E&em said that in hie statement on the previous day he had envisaged that the line of the interim agreement should not be the final line* He had spolsen of withdrawal for a distance of X ktLesnetres but had made it deer that that vae not the final withdrawal and that •that question should be taken uj> in discussions tinder the auspicee of &nbassaaor Jarring. f here v&re other points relating to en agreement whieh would have to be settled, but those were of a technical character* namely , the depth of withdrawal end the nature of the supervision of the agreement. Israel believed in a civilian crossing only, vhieh would eonf er sufficient prestige «»i President Sadat* Israel wanted separation between ttu& armed forces, vhicb. new existed because esf ^ae Caml. It would be quixoffcic if after an interim agreement the armed forces of the parties were in greater ixroxiteity thaa before* Instead, they should be divided by a belt of territory which would be Egyptian in the civilian sense. Israel slso wanted assurances that the fortifications existing on ita side ef the Canal should not be dismantled and. turned against itself. He repeated however that these were subsidiary a»d technical questions. — 5 •*

fif?. £baa> ellufiing to the power struggle in %ypt» said it reflected in a difference of attitude amongst the leaders on the question ©f en interim settlement. He had been told that President Sadat would like to see sueh a settlement* but that Foreign Minister Biaa was sceptical. !Ehe 8eoreta^r

Seweverf }!&r« Eb«a felt that %ypt "wanted farther efforts; to "be made. Mr* Iban went on to discuss the African peace initiative. He noted the contrast between the bilateral relations of the African Statee •with Israel, «feieh wre very eoardiel* and the multilateral attitu&es ef Aa?ab States, whi^h f«sr u^l&PBtaiaiatjle reasons -were of a ia«eh EMS?© partisan nstiore. He ncrtied that the four African Heads of ©fea^e tfho weare to vifelt Israel ®cs& %jrpt had been fertuitcusly delected,. Israel issfceuded to receive them and had "been in discussions vith the Foreigs Minivers concerned e350at errea^eiaents. Be understood that it was to Tse a "taissien d"infan repeated that Noveabea? trotUd be the appropriate time to ae&e proposals for the resumption of the Jsrring mission. In the suaaafciis^ it would be better for the Assembly to take up other it®ss on the egersaa. He de^ree&t^L soa© efforts by Latia Merican States to draft a resolution on the Middle last at that time, eventhough he considered Latin .America to be a mere objective continent than Africa on this question. • • . • 7 ' • ' . w

Mr. Ebsn then discussed the questiOR of Jews In the Soviet Union. He noted that some €»000 Jews had arrived in Israel froa that country in past year, caspared trtLth les© than 2»C60 in the previous year, The IMea had sho'wn greater res^KBislvsnesg in tlie matter, »oted that he lad. fceea flooded vith letters elaiaing that the T3hlted Mati0nei 'was doing nothing a^bout the question and had referred to it ia a recast speed** noted that there had "been great progress in the treatment of Jews in %ypt asjd that there had fceen seme progress in allowing Jews to emigrate f^oas Iraq, However, the situation in Styria was very bad ten or tw^Lve Jeers had lje@si receKt3y «rre«*ea«

~~|fe eu ^e^^e^^sn^faa,, said he hesd. issde r^s-esentaticais on this to the %riaa euthorftiee fe«t had so far had no re&ctien. said that the Fr^noh Qovst^mient was also trying but had~~

Mr. Iban aaM <^mt he was leaving for Strasbourg States had not rushed to the rostrum to attack hie speech in the general debate*

~~rase &t» 5*05. .B.«a.«~~

AmtassMor Jarring J&** JSP* Mr*