Envelope No. 3 Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) Reports (With One Item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports

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Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope No. 3 Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) reports (with one item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports

Date Created 02/03/1968

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0865-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit DECLASSIFIED PEP ST/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 3\e. firm* KK>*(J .3 £-' By {?!.&.&.

Dear Mr. Secretary-General, Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council Resolution 2k2 (196?) of 22 November 196? for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement. In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the erw— two Governments to meet with me£ for conferences within the framework of the Security Councir^l Resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation.

Yours sincerely,

Gunnar Jarring Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East DECLASSIFIED ^_gMl^2|, 28aDEC 1984 By /??,£. Q. Dafce

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

1. The present deadlock in the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote agreement between the parties to the Middle East conflict is formally due to different interpretations of the object of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 196?. The Israeli contention is that the Security Council Resolution is a framework for agreement on the implementation of the provisions of the Resolution. The contention of the UAR is that the Security Council Resolution is intended for immediate implementation, which implies a precondition of Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in connexion with the June War. It has lately been stressed in Cairo that this includes also the Jordan part of Jerusalem and that there should be no doubt that evacuation of "every inch of Arab soil" is intended. Only after complete Israeli withdrawal would the UAR Government be willing to enter into a next stage which is the setting of a time-table for a speedy implementation of the resolution. 2. We thus have the Israeli conception that a solution should be realized through negotiation between the parties. It is accepted that such negotiation could be conducted under the auspices - 2 - of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, on condition that this implies also joint meetings between the parties. On the other hand, the UAR conception is that no negotiations should take place. The provisions of the Besolution should "be implemented directly. The UAR agrees to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General acting as a go-between the parties for the practical arrangements in connexion with the implementation of the Resolution. To agree to talks would imply surrender, according to the UAR conception. 3. Furthermore, Israel understands the Resolution to contain provisions for the replacement of the cease-fire arrangements "by permanent peace, negotiated accepted and contractually ratified by the States concerned in accordance with normal international practice (S/8494). The UAR conception is that the Security Council Resolution does not contain provisions for a peace- treaty, or for other contractual arrangements. After - or in connexion with - the implementation of the different provisions of the Resolution, the Security Council could give guarantees for the inviolability of the provisions implemented through separate resolutions. 4. Jordan, which originally followed the UAR line, has recently retreated to a less rigid line, although maintaining that their moderation is conditioned by a UAR acceptance of joint talks between the parties - 3 - under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Jordan has indicated willingness to send a representative on a ministerial level to New York for such negotiations without the precondition that Israel should have expressed her readiness to implement the Resolution - i.e. without Israeli withdrawal before the "beginning of such talks. The Jordan "moderation" is, however, blocked "by the UAR refusal to take any steps before Israel has declared her readiness to implement the Resolution - i.e. to evacuate all Arab territories occupied since the June War. 5. With the firm attitudes taken by Israel and the UAR there seems to be no possibility for "breaking the deadlock without their announcing substantial changes in their positions. The UAR conception that the acceptance of "negotiations" or "talks" would mean surrender to Israel contrasts with Israel's conception that evacuation of the occupied territories would deprive them of the possibility of negotiating secure frontiers. Against this background and against what has been said earlier in this memorandum, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the status quo will continue with Israel occupying Arab territories while the Arab countries concerned prepare themselves militarily for their recapture - Israel at the same time building up militarily against such an eventuality In the meantime, the activities of the Palestine Liberation movement and other Arab organizations will continue, probably on an increased scale, within the "boundaries of Israel and in the occupied territories, inciting Israel to new retaliation moves. 6. This situation may continue for a considerable time without a military confrontation on a large scale, "but with continuous incidents embittering the atmos- phere. The Ara"bs apparently are not ready for military action of the kind indicated above. In the meantime, in Cairo and elsewhere in the Arab world they are looking forward to the US elections, in the hope that these might cause a change in the American attitude to Israel; the attitude of Prance to the Arab Middle East is also considered to be encouraging; Israel is watching developments in Egypt, looking for weaknesses there and in other parts of the Arab world. These are signs that would indicate a continued interest in or hope for a political solution; but simultaneously, the military build-up will be accelerated, the bitterness and hatred will increase. If no peaceful solution can be found a new Middle East wair seems inevitable.

20 April 1968 DECLASSIFIED T/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 * I r

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

p.]

1. A conclusive report to the Secretary-General should preferably toe short and concise and give the reasons for the present deadlock "betwen the parties, i.e. their different interpretations of the object of the Security Council resolution of 22 November. Reference ought to be made to the verbatim records of the Security Council debates of March and April and other Security Council documents wherein the parties have made clear their position on the general problem. This would, at least to some extent, exclude unnecessary debate, based on the contents of the report. 2. A Security Council debate on the report would probably._ concentrate on the central question if the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 is intended to be implemented or if it is a framework for negotiation on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. 3. In all probability the UAR will ask the Security Council to pronounce itself on this question by passing a resolution "in clear language" that the object of the 22 November resolution is implementation - speedy and straightforward. if — ' • - 2 -

4. The Security Council would hardly Toe able to/ resolve that the resolution is not to "be implemented. The probability is that the debate would end in a consensus of some kind. However, it is difficult to see how this would solve the deadlock over the different interpretations of the object of the resolution of the parties concerned. 5. In all probability the Security Council in connexion with a debate of this kind, do its utmost to preserve the 22 November resolution, the unanimous acceptance of which was obtained after much compromise, perhaps not to be arrived at a second time. In that case a Special Representative of the Secretary- General wotild have to continue his activities, or renew them, on practically the same basis as before. 6. The question is thus if really any positive results can be achieved through a new Security Council debate and some new pronouncements in it on the main problem of differences and deadlock. A debate in the General Assembly would be even less constructive and would mainly serve propaganda purposes.

20 April 1968 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

P.M. on "Secure Boundaries"

The question of the meaning of "secure boundaries" has been raised several times with the Israelis by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. No indication has ever been given - except for the Gaza Strip - about Israel's real intentions as to secure boundaries. It has been explained that these cannot be presented until negotiations with the Arab countries concerned have come into effect. The following indication about Israel's intentions seem however to be relevant. 1. Egypt a. The Gaza Strip should remain in Israeli hands. b. Vague indications about some area or areas in the Sinai that would be kept or exchanged against present Israeli territory. 2. Jordan a. East Jerusalem to be kept, but agreement with Jordan on free access-and the custodianship of the Moslem holy places. b. The Latrun area to be kept by Israel. c. Certain Jordan areas east of Tel Aviv to be kept by Israel. d. Annexation of the hills on the North West Coast of the Dead Sea, in order to strengthen Israel's position on the southern flank.

20 April 1968 0-4, a " TIME TABLE

1. Withdrawal 2. Re-opening of the Suez Canal 3. The refugee problem 4. Secure boundaries 5. Declaration of termination of belligerency

TiJlTHBRAWAL (A) United Arab Republic Israeli withdrawal from the UAR territory to be completed within months.

Demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula from a line beginning km. east of the Suez Canal up to a line 10 km. inside Israeli territory. UN observers with means for aerial inspection to observe demilitarization for a period until both parties agree on its termination.

A special team of UN observers at the Tiran Straits to remain until both parties agree on its termination.

The Gaza Strip, after Israeli evacuation, to be placed under UN custodianship for a period of 10 years. A port to be built at Gaza and put at the disposal of Jordan. Special arrangements for unhindered communications from Jordan through Israel to this port.

(B) Jordan Israeli withdrawal to be completed within one month from all territories occupied by Israel, except where special -2-

arrangements have been agreed upon by Israel and Jordan.

The whole West bank to be demilitarized up to a line km. inside Israeli territory. UN observers with means for aerial inspection to observe demilitarizati&n of area and also to have right of observation up to a line km. east of Jordan River.

UN supervision to continue until after mutual agreement between Israel and Jordan.

A special commission to find a solution for the future status of Jerusalem and the problem of the Holy places.

A special force (UWEF) with means for aerial inspection to be stationed in the territory now occupied by Israel, which would have to be demilitarized up to a line 10 km. inside Israeli territory.

Termination of the force or its transformation into a group of UN observers only after agreement between the parties.

(D) Lebanon UN observers to be stationed on the present boundary line. Termination after mutual agreement by the parties.

RE-OPEMING OF SUEZ CAMAL As soon as Israeli evacuation of Sinai has begun and Israeli troops have withdrawn 50 km. from the Canal, UAR to begin work on the clearance of the Canal. / »• • * UN observers to bejstationed on this 50 km. line until Israeli evacuation complete.

The stranded ships to be released as soon as the clearance of the Canal so permits.

Final re-opening of the Canal and evacuation of last Israeli soldier to co-incide.

UAH will inform Security Council of re-opening of the Canal and confiim the free passage for all ships, including Israeli ships, which fact will be noted and guaranteed in a Security Council resolution.

A Security Council resolution of the same kind to be adopted regarding free passage for all ships including Israeli ships through the Tiran Straits.

THE REFUGEE FEOBIEM A special commission to be appointed by the Secretary-General for the study of a solution of the refugee problem in all its aspects, with special reference to cost factors and to means of finance. This commission to draw up a plan, based on the UN resolutions on the refugee problem, for a settlement within a ten year period.

SECUEE BOUNDARIES Joint meetings between the parties to arrive at agreement on secure boundaries.

DECLARATION OF TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY The parties to the Middle East conflict to issue a joint declaration, addressed to the Security Council, of termination of -4-

all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threate or acts of force.

The Security Council to take note of these declarations and • of the general terms of settlement, to declare that they constitute the basis of a just and lasting peace in the region and that they are binding on the parties and to guarantee the terns of the settlements. UNITED NATIONS ^^ NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

MATIDNS NEWYDRK •

REFERENCE:

5 July 1968

To : U Thant Secretary-General From: Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary-General Herewith the Jarring note and hand- written memorandum to you which was received in my office from the Swedish Mission at noon on 5 July. There is little or nothing new from the talks with Riad and Eban. The view of Kosygin and Gromyko on the issuance of a report "by Jarring is interesting. / *-*-. a-^-*--j a. 4-4L^ 2t_^ 6*~^-r^—»—ju. «-« «—*—< v ^-Ofc-<>-«^ -. ^C«Jrta-4s.^ /. tf JiL»... , "£&*_ ^h£*~*+>~A- «r^~ **- ^a «-* < ^-o^^h . ^ ^-*Y*-°- ^

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-** ^r ^^-y>J ^_ ^ i, « 1 AUGUST 1968 v ~-—° R I

PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION

Establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within s ecure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.

Guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area.

Achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.

Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. -2-

of war which has existed for the last twenty years into a state of peace* UAR; Will not accept a "peace-treaty". The resolution does not require signature of a "peace- treaty". UAR is ready to issue a declaration of termination of state of belligerency, simultaneously with ~ Israel, but not a joint declaration. Such a declaration can be issued at any time - e.g. upon the first stage of withdrawal of Israeli forces - and should enter into force upon withdrawal of Israeli forces. These declarations to be endorsed and guaranteed by the Security Council or by the four Great Powers. UAR will not accept direct negotiations between the parties, but accepts indirect negotiations through the Special Representative, Prospects; if agreement is reached on the implementation of all the provisions of the resolution, especially withdrawal of Israeli troops, it should not be excluded that the UAR could agree to a joint meeting for the signature of a joint declaration of termination of belligerency or an instrument which ends the state of war which has lasted for the last twenty years, Woprospects of diplomatic relations or other inter-State official relations - at least not to begin with. Another possibility seems to be to have the parties make pledges in the Security Council which in its turn would have to endorse the pledges thus given.

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT Israel: Withdrawal in connexion with negotiations. The ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION

Israel: Accepts the resolution by the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East; Israel is willing to seek agreement with each Arab state on all the matters included in the resolution; the resolution, thus, is to be considered a "package-deal".

UAR: Accepts the resolution for immediate implementation "from A - Z, as a package-deal, as a whole"; withdrawal of Israeli troops no longer a precondition; no priority for the different provisions of the resolution; the Special Representative should present a time-table for the implementation of the resolution. Modification: no objection by the UAR to "plan" or "programme1* instead of "time-table". This substitution probably acceptable by Israel. UAR-Israel: Both parties accept that the provisions of the resolution be dealt with as a "package-deal".

THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES TO THE DIFFERENT PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION Establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East Israel: A contractual, juridical peace-treaty, to be negotiated in direct negotiations between the parties and signed by the parties. Modification; initial negotiations could be indirect, through the Special Representative, to be followed by joint meetings under the auspices of the Special Representative. Prospects; "peace-treaty16 to be substituted by a binding instrument which contractually engages both parties and which thereby changes the state

/ • • • • boundaries not necessarily identical with the present cease-fire line. Modification: Israeli conditions for withdrawal from. Sinai would be a guarantee that Sinai would never be used as a base for attack on Israel; that Israel was granted immediate free passage througl the Suez Canal and that special guarantees hereto were given; furthermore, that Israel was given free passage for her ships through the Tiran Straits, combined with a special guarantee that it would remain•free. Prospects; Israel has taken note of my proposal for a partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal in order to make it possible for the UAR to begin work on the re-opening of the Canal - no indication as yet as to their position. UAR: Complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from every inch of Arab soil, including Jerusalem. Modification; UAR would accept a partial withdrawal of - e.g. 30 - 40 kilometres - Israeli forces from the Suez Canal in order to enable work on the reop- ening of the Canal. In general, UAR does not insist on full withdrawal. It can take place in stages in connexion with agreement on the other provisions of the resolution. UAR would accept a UN force to cover the withdrawal of Israeli forces and this UN force could remain afterwards in Gaza.

RECOGNITION Israel: Recognition in connexion with a "peace-treaty". Prospects: "peace-treaty" to be substituted by a binding instrument which contractually engages both parties and which thereby changes the state of war which has existed for the last twenty years

j . • •. -4-

into a state of peace; "recognition" no doubt as a special clause in such an instrument.

UAR: Ho recognition. The UAR does not consider the resolution to include diplomatic recognition. The resolution does not contradict the Khartoum resolution.

SEGUES BOUNDARIES

Israel: To be negotiated. The Gaza Strip to be retained by Israel. Modification: see conditions for withdrawal from Sinai. Prospects; have suggested to Israel UN administration of the Gaza Strip - no reaction.

UAR: Secure boundaries with Israel would be synonomous with the 4 June boundaries; recognition that the Gaza Strip is not UAR territory but no question of ceding the Gaza Strip to Israel. The Gaza Strip is Arab territory and its future can only be decided by the Arabs themselves. Prospects; have suggested to the UAR, UN administration of the Gaza Strip - no negative reaction; rather a certain interest. A UN force would be accepted in Gaza after withdrawal of Israeli forces.

DEMILITARIZATION:

Israel: Demilitarization of the whole of Sinai. No demilitarization of Israeli territory. Prospects: have suggested UN observers of demilitarization; a special group of observers at Sharm-el-Sheikh: no definite reaction except that guarantees would have to be given that withdrawal of observers could not take place as was the case with the UNEF forces in 196?. UAR; Demilitarization accepted on condition that a corresponding part of Israeli territory would be demilitarized. Modification? UAR accepts demilitarized zones on both sides of the boundary line. Prospects; UN observers would be accepted, also at Sharm-el-Sheikh, but probably only for limited period.

GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH IMTERMATIQMAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA

(A) TIRAM STRAITS; Israel; Free passage for Israeli ships combined with special guarantees. UAR to make declaration de- claring Tiran Straits an international waterway. Prospects; Guarantees would include Un supervision - probably more, UAR; The principle of free navigation accepted upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai and Gaza, The question could be referred to the International Court at The Hague. If so, the UAR Government would permit all Israeli shipping pass until a decision had been taken.

(B) THE SUEZ CANAL; Israel; Immediate free passage for Israeli ships through the Canal together with special guarantees hereto,

/ * •. • UAR; The UAR will open the Canal for navigation after Israeli withdrawal from Sinai alone. The passage of Israeli ships through the Canal is connected with the end of the refugee problem. If an agreement could be reached with regard to the solution of the refugee problem and if the implementation of that agreement required some time, Israeli goods could be permitted to pass through the Canal, which means that the UAR would abrogate the measures which were applied in the past. Free passage for Israeli ships after a solution to the refugee question had been found. Prospects; free passage for Israeli ships would not have to await a total solution of the refugee problem; primarily, it would be the question of finding a plan for a solution of the refugee problem which could be accepted by the parties or, as it has been expressed in Cairo, "after the problem of the refugees 'is taken in hand for solution1 Israeli ships could pass through the Canal".

ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM Israel; The problem is not an Israeli-UAR problem, but it has to be taken into consideration also with the UAR as it is part of the "package-deal" contained in the resolution, UAR; The refugee question is part of the "package-deal" and therefore connected with the Suez Canal problem. Prospects; general indications that the most important aspect of the refugee question would not be repatriation, but compensation and rehabilitation. ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION

Israel; v. UAR Jordan: v. UAR-Israel

The position of the parties to the different provisions of the resolution Establishment of a .lust and lasting peace in the Middle East Israel: v. UAR. Jordan: Ready to issue a declaration of termination of the state of belligerency, simultaneously with Israel, but not a joint declaration, Prospects: Jordan would be willing to attend joint meetings with the Israelis under my auspices if some positive steps had been agreed upon during indirect talks through me. It seems to me that Jordan would now be willing to such a procedure, even if UAR did not agree hereto. The Jordan formula would be the following: the parties have agreed that the following subjects could be discussed jointly: (i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Arab occupied territories (this wouldinean an Israeli declaration of intent to withdraw) ; (ii) establishment of secure and recognized boundaries (as soon as the Israelis informed me about their proposal as to the future boundaries, this question could be discussed); (iii) establishment of demilitarized zones; (iv) termination of belligerency (and the other provisions connected with this in the resolution) that for the sake of the implementation of these inter-related subjects the specialr epresentative shall establish contacts and hold discussions in the form the implementation of the resolution may require. / «• • * WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE HECENT CONFLICT

Israel: withdrawal in connexion with negotiations, Jordan: the same, but Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem unconditional (cf. the Jerusalem question).

RECOGNITION:

Israel; Recognition in connexion with a peace treaty. Jordan: No de jure recognition. Prospects: Jordan probably would be more flexible if an acceptable agreement on all the provisions of the resolution could be attained.

SECURE BOUNDARIES Israel: To be negotiated. Israel1s attitude toward territorial questions primarily controlled by security considerations. (Implicit in Israeli statement (during Ball's visit) that security considerations did not apply to the situation in Jerusalem). If serious discussions developed between Israel and Jordan, a settlement could emerge under which Jordan would get back not all, but a great deal, of what it had lost. Israel envisaged a Hashemite regime on both sides of the River Jordan, sovereign over most of the people and most lands on the former West Bank. In addition, certain non-territorial concessions would be given, allowing access of people and outlet to the Mediterranean.

Jordan: Willing to accept boundary rectifications; under no circumstances can East Jerusalem be considered a secure boundary question. -3-

DEMILITARIZATION

Israel; Israel would insist on demilitarization of those parts of the West Bank which had to be given back to Jordan.

'Jordan: Would accept demilitarization and in all probability UN observers.

THE JERUSALEM QUESTION Israel: The problem of Jerusalem has to be solved within the context of a unified Jerusalem remaining the Israeli capital. At the same time, the great significance of the city to the Moslem world and to Jordan is recognized. It is recognized that the Moslem world cannot accept Israeli control over the Moslem Holy Places. Therefore, the Government of Israel would "stretch its imagination" and would be flexible, in working out a suitable arrangement for the city.

Jordan: Jerusalem has to remain in Jordan possession. Jerusalem is not only a Jordanian responsibility: Jordan is caretaker of Jerusalem for the whole Moslem world. If Israel, in the beginning of negotiations with Jordan put as a condition that Jerusalem remain in Israeli hands, the talks would immediately be broken off. There will be no compromise on Jerusalem, Prospectst Jordan could consider free access for the Israelis to the Holy Places and/or inter- nationalization of Jerusalem, but in that case of the whole of Jerusalem, i.e. including the West side of Jerusalem. An international regime for the Holy Places would also be a possibility but on condition that Jerusalem was administered / *«»• -4-

by Jordan as earlier.

ACHIEVING A JUST SOLUTIOM OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM Israel; Nothing is knowi about the Israeli position on repatriation - as to the number of Arab refugees that could be accepted, Jordan; General indications that the most important aspect of the refugee question would not be repatriation, but compensation and rehabilitation. */."'; -""—r—^—~^ ~ :

Summary "of Foreign Minister Efoan'a Remarks to £siba@®ador Jarring October 15, 1968.

In continuation of our pr^viou© conversations and of nsy addree® in th© General Assembly on October 8, 1968, w© wish to explore further th® possibility o£ promoting agreement between the U&R and lsra®i on th© establishment of a just arid lasting peae®. Jm effort should now b© made to ®sspr©ss the specific views of th@ UAR and Israel Government® on certain questions involved in the replacement of the 20 year old state of war by final peace.

A main obstacle in advancing th© discussion between the U&M ^nd I©ra©l has bean th© @bs©nc® so far of any between the parti©® such as was envisaged in the General*e Report of March 29, 1968. But, as 1 said in the General Assembly on October 8, w© are ready in the msantiiaa to exchange ideas and clarifications through you on certain matters of substance with the UAH. ^t this preliminary stage, my government does not have before it a precise and authoritative formulation of the U&R'® viewpoint on specific matters at issue. &t various tiiae©, we have received orally from you and through other channels impressions of Egyptian policy which have not always b©en wnifona. •2-

It would be of value If our two 'governments were able to study each other's policies with th© precision which can only cots© from th^ir own authoritative statements .

I now com© to ©xplain the views which Israel has developed on the matters at issue between th© parti©©,

(X) The Establishment of a Just and Lasting Peace... _. •_ _ ... .. W© hold that "a just and lasting is more tnmn the absence of hostilities or than a. "declaration of non-belligerency51, or than a "political settlement"* When th© term "p@ace" is \ssed in an international document , it 'has the precis® amassing which attaches to it in international law,

In the present intcsrnationai eont@3£t# it clearly involves a radical transformation o£ ©H the previous relationships befcw^ssn the UAR and Israel? for none of thesa has ever b©sn interpreted by the parties or by anyone ©Is© as "peace".

In th© Security Council Resolution (24,2} , "the eatablishmeiit of a just and lasting peac©" is the oparativ© provision within which the other principle© should b§ "included", fh® principles Bet 4«t in Paragraphs (i) and (ii) of that Resolution ar@ subordinate to th® 'establish- of pesc@. This point is so fundamental that, in Israel *0 vi«w, the agr©

(2) Agreement . The peace itself and all it® provisions should on th© agr©@m@nt of th© parties concerned. This concept is specifically stated in the Resolution from Which you d@riv© your K3Bnd&t0 arid was repeatedly str©s@©d by its original sponsors and siapporters. In any case, it ©merges from the sovereignty of th© csontracting parties snd from thsir Charter rights and responsibilities* Th© Resolution does not afosolv© th© parties from their duty and right to s©@}£ agreement on all aspects of th© peacemaking process,

Unilateral declaration© by th© parti©© are not a substitute for agreement between th@m, nor ar© proposals or assurances by outside governments or agenai©sp When th© parties hav@ r©aeh©<3 agre^saent, it,, would b@ natural for their agr©©Hi©rit to receive international ©ndors®m©nt and support. Bat th© r©up€>r»aibility for btailding tho peac© rests on th© directly -4-

transition from war to peace should in our view b© contractually expressed in treaty form. The signed instrument embodying the establishment of a just and lasting peace should set out the detailed understandings of our governments, contain a map of th© agreed territorial and political boundary between Egypt and Israel, announce the final termination of the conflict and of the state of war, and specify that the obligations of msonber states to each other under the Charter apply to the relations between the U&R and Israel.

(3) Secure and Recognised Boundaries and Disposition of ,&rm@d ForcjsijL, _..

"Secure and r©cognissd boundaries" are not the previous armistice demarcation lines. This was clear wh@n Egypt and Israel signed the Rhodes agreement of 1949 o£ which Article V stateds

"Ths Armistice Demarcation Lina is not to be construed in any sense as. a political _or. t@rritpgiaX boundary and is delineated without prejudice to the rights, elaims and positions of either party as regards th© ultimate settlement of the Palestine The term "secure and. recognized boundaries'-' first occurred in the 1967 discussions of the Security Council in a United States draft resolution on which the United States* representative stated, inter alias

"Historically, there have never been any secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the armistice lines of 1949 nor th® cease-fire lines of 1967 have answered that description, . . . Secure boundaries cannot be determined by unilateral action of- any of the states, and thsy cannot be imposed from the outside. . , . S©GW3r© Boundaries must b© mutually worked out and r

Wa desire to se@lc agreement with the u&R on a secure and recognised boundary within a fraKiework of permanent peace, and would welcome an official indication of the U&R's willingness to ©@sk such agreement. Within the framework of peae©, cease-fire lines should be replaced by permanent, secure and recognised boundaries, and th® disposition of forces be then carried out in full accord with the boundaries agreed under the final p©ac®« obviously. -6-

any agreement must take into special account the problems of security and the need for permanent and effective measures for freedom of Israeli navigation.

; (4) _6ecu r ity Agreement & ,

The peace Kiust b© such as "to enable ovary state in the area to liv© in security". In addition to the establishment of agreed territorial boundaries, we should discuss other agreed security arrangements designed to avoid th@ kind of vulnerable situation which caused a breakdown of the psace in the sussnar of 3.967. 'The instrument est&bliehtng peace should contain a pledge of mutual

(5) Freedom of Navigation in International Waters...... ,._.______m .. ,:.,,. _..,.. ______

Our two governments should dsel&re that sine© the Sues Canal and the Gulf of &qaba ar© international wat&rw&ys, it is their policy to ensure that thay and other state® exercise free passage for their shipping. Freedom of passage should b© secured by appropriate and porsaanent means capable ©f ensuring against any renewal, of blockade and interference. Th© Ejaintenane© of maritime belligerency even mft©r the Security Council's Resolution of September 1, 1951 was largely responsible for subsequent hostilities and for th© coilaps© of the Armistice reglm©* It is therefor© essential that our agreement on thi© point should now be clear and explicit, In particular, th©ra has recently b©@n ambiguity on the 0&R*s attitude to tha question of free passage in th& Su&s Canal. tFh@ international position is that wh@n th© €&n©l i@ opened, it should bs immediately and unconditionally open without discrimination to the ships of nations including thos@ of xeraeJL. Th©r^ is no justifiafol® thii§ iaaue ^sid the rafwge© problem, ths solution of Which ssu©t» at b€i8t, tak® several year©, AS long sgo as J.9S1, tli® g©curlty- Coxmcil r©jeet@d th@ clmi® that these issue® wer© lnterdS|^nd©nt. Similarly, there is no ground / for distinguishing between X@ra©l flags and cargoes.

(6) Refugees.

Our position was set out in my statement to the General Assembly which reads inter alias "ONE; & Conference of Middle Eastern States ©houldl ba convened, together with the governments contributing to rafug©© relief and the Sp©cialis@d &g©nei«§© of United Nations in ordesr to chart a . if-

five-year plan for the solution of refuge© problem in the framework of a lasting peace and the integration of refugees into productive life. T^his Conference can be called in advance of peace negotiations.

"TODs Under th© peace settlement Joint Refuge© Integration and Rehabili- tation Commissions should foe established by th© signatories in ordar to approve agreed projects for refugee integration in th© Middle East, with regional and international aid. .

It would be useful for us to know whsth&r the U&R government is .ready to join in discussions on the re£ug@® problacn now within th® framsworlc mentioned In ONE above.

(7) Termination of Claims of States of Belligerency and Respect and Acknowledgement of [email protected]_ etc,

This provision in Resolution 242 refers to on© of the important matters to be fulfilled in tha establishment of pmce. Tanaination of belligerency is not •9-

in Itself a substitute for the establishment of p&aca. Since there were no relation® of peace between our two governments b©for© th© belligerency b©gan, there is no established status quo ante bellura Which woxild become operative when belligerency is t ©ruinated , Our relationship should therefore be defined affirmatively and not only negatively. The establishment of peace and the mutual recognition of sovereignty would involve the cessation of all maritime interference as well as of boycott measures and pressure© on third parties. It would also require the annulment of reservations made by th© U&R on the inapplicability to Israel of their obligations «nd©r international, conventions to which they have adhered. , the contracting parties would not ba free to or Condon© the xss© of their territory for araad groups or organisations which threaten each other's security sovereignty.

The aeknowl@dg®m©nt of and resp©at for sovereignty, etc, should be declared reciprocally and by name, i.e., "The U£R acknowledges and respects Israel's sovereignty, etc. and vies versa". This is essential since i- in the past the U&R has siad® general statements concerning "every state" while staking explicit or implicit reservations concerning •10-

(8) The Resolution of the Security Council November 22, 1967

On October 8 Israel statad in the &s&emfolys

accepted the Security Council's resolution for th© ©atablishment of a just and lasting pasc@ and declared its readiness to negotiate agreasa&nts on all th© principle© mentioned therein. W@ hold that the Resolution should b© iiapl©m©!ite.d through negotiation, agre©ia©nt and the joint sig«at«r© and application of appropriate treaty

Th© formulation w©@d is entirely in with ths terms of tha Resolution itself . W© hold, do th© sponsors of the a^eoiution, that "tha Evolution ia riot ©elf "-©sescut'ing" <> It Is, therefor®, dependent ©n the attainment of agreement. &n ©solicit ©tatesaent by Israel on this point has become all th© more ©Bsential since October 10 when th© n&R Foreign Minister described th© Resolution in the following tenass

Security Council on 22 Kovssaber 1967 approved that I©rasl withdraw it© forces froxa th® it has occupied as a result of ita a

-11-

The words underlined do not occur in the Resolution and war® in fact-suggested in and rejected foy the Security Council and. General Assembly. Israel cannot with integrity make or condone declarations which leave room for the belief that in accepting the Resolution for negotiation it lias accepted such unfounded interpretations*

The history of th® Egyptian-Israeli relationship illustrates th& dangers arising froia imprecise undertakings. For example, In signing the 1949 agreement both w@ and United Nation© representatives involved in th© negotiations assumed that thare would-be fr©@ navigation for Israel In international waterway©. Because this was not sxpr&esly 0tat®d* misunderstand ings ©rose which had is strong effect on subsequent hostilities. Ifoe saiR© occurred with the imprecise "hopes and expectations'* in 1957, At Lausanne in 1949* a "protocol" was signed as a basis for discussion, and © few days latsr the Arab countries laid claim to the greater part of Israeli territory. In the light of this history and on other grounds, we should not again sign documents or declarations with conflicting and unspecified int@rpr©tat ions. * -12-

•• 1^-ie correct and. authoritative interpretation of the Resolution is that it is a framework of principles recommended und©r Chapter VI of th© charter t© guide the parties in their efforts to reach agreement. In these efforts, the Parties must also be governed by their obligations under the Charter and under the principles of international law.

(9) The, FeacQmlcinq .Process.

These positions are put forward in a serious effort to advance the mutual clarification of views mnd iss«©s« When the U&R position on these specific problems is put on record, it would become possible by precise comparisons to estimate the nature and scop© of our differences and to eonslder how the p©ac©raaking ©ffort might th©n be advanced. Even if our respective positions sre now apart, their precise enunciation may help to bring us closer to substantive progress.

In that spirit I am ready to continue to be Available for further contact with you in pursuit of your mission.

October 15, 1968. CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN's REMARKS TO AMBASSADOR JARRING 4 November 1968

In my communication to you of 15 October 1968, T outlined Israel's views on eight specific matters, and added:

"These positions are put forward in a serious effort to

advance the mutual clarification of views and issues. When

the UAR position on these specific problems is put on record,

it would become possible by precise comparisons to estimate

the nature and scope of our differences and to consider how the

peacemaking effort might then be advanced."

The UAR reply to Israel's communication of October 15 leaves un- answered the following questions on which I would welcome Mr. Riad's clarification.

One: Is the UAR willing to establish a Just and lasting peace with Israel and does it accept the definition of tha t concept given in my communication of October 15? If not, what is the UAR definition?

Two; Does the UAR accept the need for agreement between itself and Israel? In particular, does it accept the authoritative interpretation of the Security Council Resolution, as follows: - 2 -

"It is recognized that all aspects of the resolution

must be accepted by the parties and that there should

be agreement on all of them and on the programme under

which all of them will be put into effect. " (A/PV 1693 PP

36-37)

Three: Does the UAR agree with the authoritative view of the term "secure and recognized boundaries", as indicating a concept different from the previous armistice lines which were described in the 1949

Agreement as follows:

"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed

in any sense as a political or territorial boundary and is

delineated without prejudice to the rights, claims and posi-

tions of either party as regards the ultimate settlement of

the Palestine problem."

Consequently, would the UAR be prepared to seek an

agreement with us for replacing the cease-fire lines by a secure and recognized boundary acceptable to both our Governments ?

Four: Would the UAR join us within a context of peace in working out arrangements which would give security against the kind of

vulnerable situation which caused a breakdown of the peace in the summer of 1967?

. .. ,- _^_ _ - - 3 -

Five: What would be the precise policy and action of the

UAR regarding passage of ships of Israel flags from the day on which the

Suez Canal is opened?

Six; What is the UAR's reaction to the refugee proposal in paragraph (6)(i) of my communication?

Seven: Does the UAR agree to the interpretation given in paragraph (7) of my communication of the implications and consequences of terminating belligerency and acknowledging Israel's sovereignty, etc. ?

If not, what is the UAR's interpretation of these terms?

These questions were not put rhetorically or polemically. We are entitled to ask them, for they constitute the main elements of the Security

Council Resolution which the UAR invokes as the basis of our exchanges.

A substantive answer to them would enable my government to make further progress in formulating views and proposals. There cannot be any justifi- cation for a refusal to define precise positions and attitudes on the central themes of the Resolution (242). To "accept" a Resolution while refusing to spell out its implications would be an unreasonable attitude unworthy of the high issues at stake.

Mr. Riad's memorandum contains the statement that Israel has refused to declare its acceptance and its readiness to implement the Security

Council Resolution. This is not the case as will be clear from Paragraph III - 4 - below. The crux of the matter is not that Israel refuses "acceptance" and "implementation", but that it emphasizes "agreement". Yet, the need "to promote agreement" is stated in the Resolution itself, while the idea of "implementing" it without agreement is not only impossible but also contrary to its purpose and to the rights and obligations of the parties under international law. Israel's emphasis on agreement is valid and legitimate in terms of the Charter j. as well as of the Resolution itself0 The Israel declarations on acceptance and implementation as subject to agreement are more soundly based than those of the UAR which

ignore the vital provision of agreement. Indeed, the UAR gives the

impression that it regards the implementation of the Resolution as com- patible with the negative Khartoum declaration which has been officially repeated since Resolution (242) was adopted. If the UAR does not insist

on the Khartoum formula, we should welcome a clarification of the point.

Ill

This leads me to make the following comment on Mr. Riad's Ques-

tion A; I can reply affirmatively, namely, that having accepted Resolu-

tion 242 for the establishment of a Just and lasting peace, we are ready to

enter into discussions with the UAR under your auspices in an effort to

achieve mutual agreement on ways to implement it. The Resolution, being

not self-executing, should be a subject for discussion and agreement

between the parties 0 r ' - 5 -

Question B is formulated by Mr. Riad in such a way as to attempt

to elicit from Israel a confession of "aggression". This is an unacceptable

formulation. Even if we disagree, we should formulate our questions and

answers in objective language. Israel has not committed any "aggression".

It has been resisting continued aggression since the Egyptian armed attack

in May 1948 which has been followed by an uninterrupted policy of overt

war directed against it.

On the substance of the matter, the UAR question on withdrawal

is linked with the need to agree on secure and recognized boundaries.

Accordingly, my government desires to clarify its views on this matter. Our

policy is that the secure and recognized boundary should be determined by

mutual agreement between the parties as part of a permanent contractual

peace which binds both parties. Within the context of such a peace treaty,

the conflict between the UAR and Israel would be liquidated, and there would

be freedom of passage for Israeli as well as of other flagships through the

Suez Canal as soon as it is opened to navigation. When the UAR announce

specific readiness to establish a permanent peace with Israel, we shall be

ready to discuss with the UAR the agreed determination of the boundary

between the two countries. Within the framework of peace, the cease-fire

lines will be replaced by permanent, secure and recognized boundaries

and the disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with

what is agreed. You may futher inform Mr. Riad that in negotiation with ', • - „ - - 6 -

the UAR on the secure and recognized boundary, Israel's attitude will be

governed by considerations of security including the maintenance of full

protection of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran.

I now come to discuss the process whereby our clarifications should

be carried forward.

* In my speech on October 8 and my communication on October 15,

I outlined in detail Israel's position on the matters mentioned in the Security ,

Council Resolution (242) and offered a nine-point peace program for considera-

tion. In the present communication I have specified the considerations which

govern our approach to the secure and recognized boundary with the UAR.

I have also made a declaration about the implementation of the Resolution

by negotiation and agreement.

On the other hand, we do not yet have any definition of the UAR

attitude on the seven questions enune rated above. We have not been told

whether it aims at a genuine peace; what are its views on the nature of

the peace; what its action will be on Israel's flagships in the Suez Canal

when opened; what it understands by the acknowledgment of Israel's sovereignty

and independence; how it proposes to reach agreement on the determination - 7 - and recognition of permanent state boundaries; or how it proposes to seek agreement on the refugee question. Nor do we know if the UAR interprets its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution as an obligation to establish permanent peace with Israel by seeking agreement on the matters at issue. It is important that these matters be clarified. I suggest that the following possibilities be considered.

ONE: The simultaneous presence of the Foreign Ministers at United

Nations Headquarters creates an opportunity to pursue the objective of meetings between the parties under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. This idea was mentioned by the Secretary General in his 29 March report.

TWO: Until such time as the UAR is ready for this, I wish to state that my government has reaffirmed the decision mentioned in my address of

October 8 "to continue to be willing to exchange views on certain substantive matters through Ambassador Jarring". In this context, I suggest that the next stage should be a UAR formulation of its positions on the seven questions mentioned above, which relate to the Security Council Resolution.

On studying and comparing our respective positions we could pursue discussion and mutual clarification to the extent possible in the preliminary stage.

We will give the UAR reply our detailed consideration. — 8 —

I shall continue to be available in the light of the Israel Govern- ment's decision to give the first priority in its international relations to the maintenance of cooperation with you in fulfilment of your mandate for the promotion of agreement between the parties. The patient pursuit of avenues leading to permanent peace is a vital international objective.

Recent events along the cease-fire line have emphasized its urgent importance. Any party\taich chooses to break off the effort would assume heavy responsibility. International experience in other conflicts illustrates the value of perseverance, even in moments when divergences seem broad. ROUT4NG SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TOs The Secretary-General A: FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDS NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION

Date: FROM: DE: 7 Nov. 1968 Gunnar Jarring CR. 13 (11-64) PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

7 November 1968

Your latest contacts reveal that Israel is still unwilling to commit itself to the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November, 1967, and that it continues to refuse to withdraw its forces from the Arab territories it has occupied as a result of its aggression on June 5, 1967• This is the same position it has adopted since you have started the discharge of your mission, We consider that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates that, as a point of departure, there must be a definite commitment to implement the Security Council resolution. On our part, we have affirmed that we accept that resolution and that we are ready to implement our obligations arising therefrom. The 22nd of November resolution, which was un- animously adopted by the Security Council, has laid down the peaceful settlement for the situation in - 2 - the Middle East. This resolution emphasized the paramount principle inherent in the Charter, namely, the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war; and it affirmed that Israel must withdraw its forces from the Arab territories it has occupied as a result of its aggression on June 5, 1967* Until now, Israel has not declared that it shall fulfill this essential obligation. On the contrary, it is pursuing, in the occupied territories, a policy which makes it clear that it is still bent on territorial expansion. Responsible Israeli officials do not hesitate in announcing this policy. The Defense Minister of Israel declared on the 17th of October last that, "¥e must settle the Golan Heights, fortify the Sinai Peninsula, and integrate the West Bank and Gaza economically and organizationally in Israel. " Israel's withdrawal from all the territories it has occupied is equally an obligation incumbent upon it by virtue of its signature to the Armistice Agree- ments it has concluded with the Arab States in 1949. — 3 —

The Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967 has dealt with other questions, namely:

"Termination of all claims or states of "belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized "boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

The resolution affirmed further the necessity:

"(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."

rr' - 4- -

The implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution would lead to the achievement of the peaceful settlement laid down "by-the Security Council. We have proposed that you set-up a timetable for the implementation of all the provisions of this resolution. In the light of our experience with Israel, characterized by its traditional policy of denuncia- tion of its international obligations, be they contractual or deriving from the Charter, we have also proposed that the Security Council should undertake the supervision of and guarantee the implementation of the 22nd November resolution. The question of refugees is among the basic questions provided for in the Security Council resolution. Israel's refusal to implement the numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in successive sessions, from 194-8 to December 1967, has only led to the failure to solve this question. Its attempt to find another formula to consider the refugee question would only tend to obstruct the

.-.-.• i . ••• • K*. I ']• ' ' i'-S*." - • • • • . - 5 - implementation of the General Assembly resolution on this question, and add another obstacle to the implementation of

the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967.

The United Arab Republic is still convinced that the

implementation of the Security Council Resolution would lead

to a state of peace in the Middle East. In order to reach

this goal, it is essential that Israel informs you that it

is ready to implement that resolution, and that it shall withdraw its forces from all the Arab territories it has occupied as a result of its aggression on June 5, 1967.

Its refusal to commit itself to this undertaking would

only mean that it persists in occupying the Arab territories,

a fact which constitutes a continued aggression against the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of three Member States

of the United Nations.

I wish to assure to you that I continue to be ready

for further contacts with you, and that the United Arab

Republic would continue to cooperate with you in the fulfill-

ment of your mission. Secretary-General IT Thant from Ambassador Jarring*

Here follows the text of the Soviet plan in unofficial translation:

Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries of Israel which will "be ready to take part in the realization of such a plan confirm their acceptance of the resolution of the Security Council of 22 November 1967 and declare their readiness to implement all its provisions. In doing so they agree that through contacts through Jarring there will be established a time-table and procedure for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories occupied by them during the conflict of 1967 and simultaneously an agreed plan will be drawn up for the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution, which has in view the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which every State in the area can live in security. The object of these contacts should be agreement on concrete steps for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in question. 1. Agreement should be reached on a simultaneous declaration by the Government of Israel and the Governments of the neighbouring Arab countries which will take part in the realization of such a plan about their readiness to terminate the state of belligerency existing between them in attaining a peaceful settlement after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. In connection herewith Israel declares her readiness to begin, at a fixed date, the withdrawal of her troops from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the conflict of 19&7« 2. On the day when the withdrawal of Israeli troops, which will take place in stages under observation of UH representatives, begins, the Arab countries in question as well as Israel will deposit in the United Nations corresponding documents about the termination of belligerency, respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries - all corresponding to the Security Council resolution. In accordance with an understanding reached through Jarring agreement will be found also on the provisions regarding secure and recognized boundaries - with the corresponding maps attached - for the guaranteeing of freedom of navigation throught international waterways in the area, for a just settlement of the refugee problem, - 2 - for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area - possibly through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. It should be borne in mind that such an understanding shall be considered in conformity with the resolution as a whole, which refers to all the aspects of a settlement of the whole area of the Middle East, in the form of a "package deal". 3. The Israeli troops withdraw during the following month - conditionally - from parts of theArab territories to fixed intermediafcaf lines in the Sinai peninsula, on the West bank of the river Jordan, and also from Syrian territory, from the Al Quneitra area. On the day when the Israeli troops reach thedbc earlier stipulated, fixed lines in the Sinai peninsula - for example 30-40 kilometers from the Suez Canal - the UAR Government will introduce troops in the Suez Canal zone and begin clearance of the canal for the resumption of shipping^ 4* During the second month - conditionally - the Israeli troops should be evacuated to the line which they held on 5 June 196?» where- after the administration of the respective Arab countries should be completely re-established in the territories thus liberated and their military and police forces reintroduced. On the day of the beginning of the second stage of the withdrawal of Israeli troops the UAR and Israel - or only UAR, in the case of agreement of its government - declare their agreement on the stationing of UH forces to the line of 5 June 196? in the Sinai peninsula, at Sharm-El-Sheik and in the Gaza strip, that is, the situation which prevailed in the region in May 19&7* The Security Council decides to send a TO force to the area in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Tiran straits and the Akaba Gulf for ships of all nations. 5. After the completion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the international boundary line the earlier deposited documents of the Arab countries and Israel definitively come into force, either through the intermediary of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document. The Security Council, on the basis of the provisions of the Charter of the United Uations, then decides on guarantees for the Arab-Israeli boundaries, not excludning the variant of guarantees by the four permanent members of the Security Council. Message for Secretary-General U Thant from ambassador Jarring, Moskow, dated December 31 •> 1968.

Semjonov asked me to see him in Ministry of Foreign Affairs this afternoon. He gave me lengthy appraisal of the situation in the Middle East which he described as of "great concern" to the Soviet Union. One year and a half had elapsed since Israels attack a- gainst their Arab neighbours but there were still no signs of a solution in the Middle East. The fact that the consequenses of Israels aggression have not yet been eliminated have effect on the world situation as a whole. There was no need to repeat all the facts to me said Semjonov. The recent events, i.e. the Is- raeli attack on Lebanon evoke indignation and displays new agg- ravation of the situation in the Kiddle East. The Soviet Union had during the whole conflict taken a consistant stand for a political settlement of the conflict. The Soviet Union had had steady contacts with the Arab countries and these contacts had contributed to a constructive evaluation of the possibilities of a solution of the conflict. It was well known that the Arab countries, especially the UAR, have officially accepted the Se- curity Council resolution of November 22 for implementation. The UAR was known to have proposed a stage plan for the implementation of the resolution. It was also well known that the UAR had taken a constructive stand to the American seven points presented to them by Bean Rusk. On the other hand Israel had not changed its position as to the implementation of the resolution. The aggressive attitude of Israel was leading it towards a gro- wing political and international isolation. Even those countries who earlier always had supported Israel now understood that the situation in the Middle East was closely allied with Israels extremist attitude. Certain shifts to a more sober approach to the Middle Eastern problems could be observed both with the Bri- tish and the American although it was not entirely clear how far they would go. There were statements both in the UK and USA that Israel had no territorial claims to Arab territories and that they were ready to accept the provisions of the resolution. There were statements by Israel that they were interested in peace in the Middle East and ready to observe the resolution. But the actions of Israel were not in keeping with such assurances. If Israel did not change one could not exclude a sudden turn of events which would not be in the interest of the countries of the Middle East and which would create a situation which would surpass the area. The Soviet Govern- ment in the presence of such conditions deemed it the duty of all states that were interested in the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East to adopt immediate and resolute steps to avoid a new explosion by means of attaining a speedy peaceful solution on the basis of the November resolution. The Soviet Government felt that the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General served these objectives and that his mission should be given all and worldwide assistance. The Soviet Union would, in pursuance of its peaceful policies and its policies of security, which had been demonstrated by its contributions to the settlement of the Vietnam conflict, do its best to avoid a new crisii in the Middle East. The major obstacle to such a solution was Israel's negative position. The Soviet Union now considered it necessary to address itself to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France and in personal messages to the OS President Johnson, to the President- elect Mxon, to General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Wilson. It was hoped that urgent steps would be taken so as to influence Tel Aviv to take a realistic stand to the issues. In order to facilitate the finding of a solution/the Middle East crisis the Soviet Union Government had prepared a new plan for a solution of it. These proposals were entirely based on the Sovember resolution* They took into consideration the elements which had appeared recently and which facilitated the attaining of a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

After handing me the Soviet plans, which follow in itheasjjg&t message in my translation, which I label "unofficial", Semjonov continued his statement as follows: The point with the Soviet plan was that the Soviet Union sought a solution which would not be imposed on the parties to the conflict but would give them assistance and help in attaining a peaceful solution on the basis of a complete and effective implementation of the November resolution* ROTA.1L, 0-3 Moscow, December 27, 1968. 2 annexes.

Confidential

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Llwellyn Thompson paid me a visit yesterday and handed over to me two memoranda on conversations in Washington regarding the situation in the Middle East, both of which I enclose in photocopies. The first memorandum, dated December 19> 19&8 contains the text of an "inofficial translation" handed to Under Secretary Rostow by the Soviet Charge* d'affaires Tcherniakov. The second memorandum, dated December 20, 1968 contains preliminary o'ral comments to the above text delivered by Mr, Ho stow to Mr.,, Tcherniakov. You may already have received these two memorandas from other sources but I feel it my duty to send them to you anyhow. I have not yet had an opportunity to see Mr. Gromyko who is just back from Cairo but I shall ask for an appointment within the next few days. On December 16 I met with First Y'ice Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Vice Minister Semyonov. We discussed the situation in the Middle East and I informed them in general terms of the developments there as I understood them after my last visit to the area. I have nothing new or special to report from these conversations.

His Excellency U Thant Secretary General of the United Nations, 3J e w 'York. - 2 -

I have no comments to make to the two memorandas which I now enclose. I would, however, like to draw your attention to the following passages: a) "Moscow agrees with the idea of rendering more active the mission of Mr. Jarring, who could put forward proposals by himself taking into account the positions of the sides known to him - the proposals which would facilitate bringing these positions closer" (point 4 of the first memorandum). Here I would immediately be up against Israeli opposition^ such an idea would however no doubt be acceptable to the UAR, I shall try to find out from the Soviet side what their real thinking is. "b) " As a matter of Soviet policy, is there anything wrong or insufficient in the Israeli statement that Israel accepts the Resolution and is ready to implement it by agreement? It is important that we clarify this question "between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. For us the resolution is not self-implementing. Under paragraph 5» implementation requires agreement of parties. Does U.S.S.R. agree? — etc." It will be most interesting to see what the Soviet attitude to this question will be.

r-/* *«>t\»j^

Gunnar Jarring Following are preliminary oral comments made by Undei Secretary Rostov to Soviet Charge Tcherniakov on December 20, 1968 regarding Soviet paper on Middle East delivered by Tcherniakov: A. With regard to paragraph one of Soviet paper, there should be no misunderstanding between U.S. and Soviets on significance of reference to armistice agreements in Eban paper to Jarring of November 5, 1967. The armistdce agreements clearly specified that armistice demarcation lines •were not definitive political and international boundaries but could be changed by agreement as part of transition from armistice to peace. We believe Israeli position as stated in ^ban's paper to Jarring is that Israel has no territorial clair.is as such, except for minor rectifications of armistice lines and arrangements to guarantee security and maritime rights. We cannot speak for Israel, however. P. Soviet paper makes no reference to questions put to Dobrynin on July 3 and November B regarding UAR willingness to make peace and to enter into an agreement establishing peace. It also makes no reference to Rostow1s suggestion of November R for a practical negotiating procedure by UAR and "Israel through. Jarrinr to deal with the issues of withdrawal, demilitarization cf Finai, and guarantee of maritime rights . The prime interest of th* T',>3. and U5x>R is in the establishment of peace as set forth in the resolution of November 22, 1967. This is the goal of the resolution and of ".' . policy from June 5, IP^7. The '.'AR position in this r^sDRCt is not clear ar'i these questions must be answered before further progress car be marie in implementing the resolution of November 22. 3. The '!.£. recognizes importance of problem cf withdrawal. We note -jobrym n1 s remarks on Arab distrust of Israeli intentions in this regard and on Israeli suspicions that Arabs do not intend peace. This is the key to the ; robleiri. Eban gave a functional defitiition of Israeli policy toward withdrawal and said that when tne Arabs make clear their intent to make peace, Israel will go into more detail on withdrawal. Secretary Rusk i.u bis November 2 conversation with Riad spoke of complete withdrawal from Finai, putting the question of Gaza to one sidr for the moment and saving the question of security arrangements and guarantees of maritime rights. Withdrawal would be subject to security arrangements, demilit irization, and guarantees of maritime rights. Israel aoes not want to b-3 put in a position of having to fight once more tc regain those rights. Our position is that Secretary Rusk f;ave Riad powerful assurances on withdrawal frorr, Sinai. We feel inat we too: a very Jig step in Secretary Rusk's talk with Riad and that UAH has not responded on the issues of cracial concern to us. D. The Israelis take position they do not have territorial claims as such but have legi :imate interests under the November 22 Resolution in questions of security and maritime rights, which could have territorial implications. Armistice lines are not final borders, but Dobryniri himself said minor rectifications possible. In any event U.S. position is clear. We have thus taken big step and UAR should make use of Secretary Rusk's position and also come forward with progress on the other side of equation namely, peace and a procedure for reaching it. E. U.S. cannot take position with UAR that no agreement possible until Syria included. Syria has not even accepted November 22 resolution. F. We do not understand sentence in Soviet document to effect that Israel has not "accepted" resolution. We thought debate on that topic was over. Israel has said to Jarring that it accepts the Resolution. Rostov gave a copy of the Israeli statement in this respect to Dobrynin. As a matter of Soviet policy, is there anything wrong or insufficient in the Israeli statement that Israel accepts the Resolution and is ready to implement it by agreement? It is important that we clarify this question between the U.S. and USSR. For us the resolution is not self-implementing. Under paragraph 3, implementation requires agreement of parties. Does USSR agree? Does Arab position reported in paragraph 3 of Soviet paper mean that implementation requires withdrawal first, negotiation later on other items in Resolution? Secretary Rusk took clear position on this with Riad. 0* ^7i For Secretary-General IJ Thant from Ambassador Jarring January 16, 1969

Primo. After my conversations in. Moscow and with Abba Eban my feeling is that it would be better for me to return to Few Tork in order to settle there the question of time and place for the next round of talks. All indications point to a suitable date for resumption of these talks first days of February. I suggest that I arrive in Sew York Monday, January 2?th. Secundo. I had two meetings with Eban. In general his attitude to Soviet plan was negative although he accepted that it contained an element of understanding for the necessity of reaching agreement on different provisions of resolution. I would, however, prefer tp give you a more detailed report when we meet in Few York. I would like to add that he came back to our private conversation in Mcosia early Seeember about which I reported in an un-numbered coded message.

o -

For Dr» Bunche from Ambassador Jarring January 17th, 1969

Frimo* I have received here US reply to the Sovjet plan. I suppose you already got it and that there is no need for me to send you a copy. Secundo. US charge told me that the French have proposed, in Washington, a meeting between the permanent representatives and the Secretary-General for discussion and coordina- tion of the present efforts to find a Middle Bast solution. The meeting should take place towards the end of the month. Please inform me soonest if this would make necessary a change of my arrival date. Cabinet

0f Cfit For Secretary-General TJ Thant or 3)r« Bunohe from Ambassador Jarring January 21st, 1969.

Abba Eban is sending messenger to Copenhagen on Monday before my departure for Hew York with special message for me including his views on the continuation of my mission. Cabinet &f

January 23, 1969

For II Thant from Jarring, Britsh ambassador brought me message to-day from his Foreign Secretary, who is preparing reply to French proposal Big-Four meeting. Mr. Stewart had in mind propose that I attend meetings of theBlg-i-^our permanent representatives but wanted to have my opinion before making such a suggestion. My reply has been as follows. 1 would of course very much appreciate contacts with the permanent representatives during my stay in Hew York but had the feelig that my attending the meetings with all the publicity emanating therefifom might create wrong impressions with the parties to the conflict in the Middle Bast. I was fully convinced that the proposed Big-Four meetings did not aim at an imposed solution but nevertheless felt that their purpose was better served by my not participating in the meetings. Jeiurdlem, 2-4 January, 19o9.

PhHSOKAL

Dear Ambassador Jarring,

Since our last private- conversation I h.^ve given mere

consideration to the matters which we discussed. - 1 am sending

by separate cover my reactions to the Soviet proposal and the

French initiative. These are vitiated for us not only by the

current policies of their sponsors, but, still more, by their

central philosophy. The French proposal gives an unmerited

primacy to the Soviet proposal, and that proposal, despite some

semantic contradictions is firmly anchored in the idea of recon-

structing the "map of insecurity" which, as the United States

has said, was "the proximate cause of the war". Both the USSR

and France were quite external to the process of formulating

Resolution 242 and only joined it as a pisaller at the last

moment and often giving it an inadmissible interpretation.

It will be instructive to see hew the U1GH replies tu the

searching American analysis and question.

My main objective in writing to you now is to stress

the importance of the procedural decisions about to be taken in

connection with your mission. I believe that the main purpose

should be to explore the idea of "meeting under auspices" which

you discus seel early in 1968, The fiist stage would be in the > ^ convening of the foreign ministers in the same city for a round

^^ -I t

cf talks. 1 strongly advise a venue within a few hours journey,

from this area. Indeed, for me this is a condition for any

effective or consecutive cooperation. If we reach any meaning-

ful process of exchanging ideas on texts, it must be possible for

me to have constant contact and consultations with colleagues at

home. This is in the nature of our system of government. Apart

from this aspect it is only possible for me to give the Israel

Government a clear impression of possibilities and perhaps

changing prospects, if I can go to and fro between the place of

venue and Jerusalem without difficulties or Ic^g delay?. i-ro'n

this and other viewpoints i

bilities. Things are sometimes so delicately balanced ^at a

decision in favour of proximity to the area may nave decisive

effects,

I am consulting with my colleagues on the material with which

I shall come to the next round of talks, I confess that Nasser's

last speech could not have been much different if its sole and

deliberate aim were to undermine your mission,. ,ne consequence is

that I shall have to seize you with the problem cf the relationship

of the terrorist groups to the November 1957 Resolution and to

your mission - Israel would not be interested in a ""peace" with

Arab governments accompanied by a war against her waged by these

governments with irregular forces. The resolution is entirely

clear in this regard when* it provides for "the termination of all

claims or states of belligerency and for the right cf every state

in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries

free from threats or acts of force".. \

.Ambassador Evron will supplement this letter by some oral

observations. Ambassador Tekoah will reach i-:ew York by the end

of this week.

Yours very sincerely,

Abba hban R1.-.PLY RY FGRhlGiM MLNISTbR M:<. ABBA i;-^. it ^uhSTICNS BY KNESShT ivlh.ViBHHS, CONCERNING BIG PGAER DISCUSSIONS (J,

MIDDLE LAST - 22 JANUARY, 1969.

"On 30 December, representatives of the Soviet Union handed

Aides-Mernoires to the Governments of the United States, Britain and

France.. The Soviet Union made no effort to' convey its plan to the

Government of Israel, despite the fact that it affects the vital interests of Israel, and not of the Soviet Urio-r-,

In accordance with civilized custom in international relations, the Governments of the United States and -Britain took the trouble to consult with the Government of -Israel on the significance oi ^ olan affecting Israel's vital interests* Due to this action by the Govern- ment of the U.S. and Britain, the Government of Israsl was accorded the possibility of examining the Soviet plan, and I brought it for discussion before the Cabinet. Although this Soviet plan several times notes the need for a solution to be achieved by agreement, yet the entire value of this concept is negated by the fixing of principles and goals contradicting the concept of agreement, and belonging to a settlement which Israel under no circumstances can accept even as a basis or frame-work for discussion.

The summarizing and decisive sentence in the Soviet document explicitly defines the purpose of the plan in these words; "The

situation in this area which existed in May .1967 shall be restored".

And indeed the remainder of the paragraphs of the plan confirms this summary. The plan explicitly demands the withdrawal of the Israel - 2 -

defence forces to the lines which existed before 5 June, and the entry of the administration, pol ice and armies of the Arab states into all the areas to be evacuated by Israel. Therefore, whoever looks at a map of the Middle East, pol itical and military as'it existed on

4 June will gain an exact impression of the situation which the

Soviet Union desires to restore fully at this time. The need for

Arab armies to be stationed at all points where they were in that unhappy and g]corny month of May, is the central point in the Soviet plan. This fact is stressed many times. The reality in May 1957, regarded by peace-loving mankind a's a nightmare whose recurrence must be prevented, appears to the Goveiriment of the Soviet Union as a desirable end to be fully and rapidly brought about once again. The

Soviet plan calls for the opening of the Suez Canal to international shipping without specifying its opening to vessels flying the Israel flag. The plan does not present any suggestion containing any continuation of effective and sustained defence of Israeli shipping in the

Straits of Tiran. Similarly, the plan does not demand the establishment of permanent peace by agreement in contractual form. Strong emphasis is laid in the Soviet plan on the need to introduce Egyptian armed forces to all sectors and the Suez Canal,, As the Knesset is aware, the situation prevailing in the region in May 1957, led directly to a war which resulted from the aggressive designs generated by Egypt and which was joined in by other Arab state?. The Government of Israel is fully determined never to revive the situation which placed Israel's security and her very existence in terrible jeopardy.

Therefore, immediately upon learning of the Soviet plan, I informed the world public and government of the unreserved opposition of

the Government of Israel to'this plan, which came to our knowledge

indirectly but accurately. We also informed the governments of

the world of the bitter absurdity of the idea of basing the pursuit

* 'of pea-ce on a Soviet plan, that is to say., on a document drawn, up

in wioscow, in cooperation wJth Cairo, without Israel's association,

in other words, by two governments, the Soviet and the Egyptian,

bearing the awful responbility for creating the conditions that led

to a bloody war by shattering the framework of relations that had

existed for 10 years. - " '

I w.jll admit that we regard with severe suspicion any Soviet

plan, by virtue of its being Soviet. But this suspicion growr and

finds logical and solid affirmation through a clear and careful

.analysis of the pragraphs of the plan designed fully to restore

the danger from which we were spared at such a high cost in blood.

It is true that the Soviet plan advocates implementation in stages

as a package deal. 3ut.since.the plan.leads in the direction of new

wars and not towards peace, I have not developed any interest in the

question whether the journey to the abyss will be in one stage or

two. Israel will study any plan in the light of its final results

and not of the stages and procedure of its implementation. We shall

accept any reasonable path leading to agreed peace treaties and shall

reject any path leading back to the pile of explosives which blew up

in //ay 1967.

The question asked here also related to the reply from the

United States to the Soviet proposal, and also to France's initiative. "'

i"ne Government of the U.S. informed us that its reply to the Soviet i i proposals was conveyed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, to

j • the Soviet Representative on 15 January. Israel is not accustomed i to publishing documents of other governments, but the Government of

j . tgypt does not regard itself as bound by civil i?.eci international

i , • rules, and as a result the contents were published in an Egyptian j, \ • i ' official publication as was done with restricted Israeli documents I i ! , . • conveyed to Egypt through .Ambassador Jarring.

It is known to us that the reply o-f the Government of the U.S.

to the Soviet Government is anchored in the principles which the

. President of the U, S. announced on 19 June, 1967, and on 1C Septem-

ber, 1968. I see great importance in a reafJirmation of the healthy

principles of peace and coexistence in the existing political

circumstances. From what is known to us, and from what has been

published in Washington and Cairo on the attitude of the United

States the importance of the following points should be noted:

1. The obligation imposed on the A., ab governments to prevent

acts of terror leading inevitably to reprisals so that both terror and

reprisal constitute violations of the cease-fiie in the U.S. view.

2, The Security Council Resolution does not demand that the

withdrawal of Israel forces be to lines identical with the lines of

4 June, or lines which existed on any other elate. Neither do the

boundaries of peace need to reflect the extent of the occupation.

. ;•' The Security Council Resolution under the U.S. interpretation demands

a withdrawal from areas taken in the late hostilities to secure and

recognized boundaries to be fixed by agreement between the parties in accordance with pragraph 4 of the Security Council Resolution dealing with the establishment of peace.

3. As for the Soviet comment that the situation prevail inq

in May 1957 should be restored along the Israel-Egyptian border, the

U.S. replies that this situation was the direct cause of the war and hereceforth there should be progress towards peace and not a return to the armistice.

These brief remarks cf mine are only a small part of the

contents of the /American reply but for obvious reasons 1 shall limit myself to them, and this'too, only after they have already been made public. The importance of these 'principles requires no emr-ha riz inq.

Their re-formulation serves the cause of international peacu and justice. The principles and formulations naturally obligate only

the Government of the U.S. but Israel has taken note of them. We know it to be the intention of the British Government to reply this week to the Soviet plan and I am in touch with the British Foreign • ,

Secretary through'-the usual diplomatic channels to ensure thrl Israel's" attitude should be known and explained.

Several days after the publication of the initiative of the

French Government concerning a meeting of representatives of the

four powers to discuss the Middle East the Government of France

conveyed to us the text of the statement it sent to the Governments of the U, S. , the Soviet Union and Britain, Mo discussions took place » between the Governments of France and Israel on this subject. But when the French proposal was published and after consultations in

the Cabinet 1 remarked in public on the following three main points: 1. The French initiative explicitly qives a special status to the Soviet plan - that plan designed to res>dre exactly the situation of ,/ay 1967 which menaced Israel's existence and international peace and security,

2. In the proposed discussions the sovereign states of our region, whose responsibility it is to consolidate the peace, would not take part regularly and continuously.

3. Of the four powers whose .convening \ r, proposed one has

severed, relations with Israel and another has imposed unilateial

sanctions against her. and acted, to. prevent honouring contracts con-

cluded in good faith. , .

It is therefore clear why Israel pr&t'brr to carry out her

contacts for clarifying the prospects of peace in frameworks which stress the responsibility of the states of the region to promote agreement on the establishment of a permanent, peace between them, and these include the mission of Ambassador Jarring.

In my lates.t contacts with. Ambassador Jarring I favoured the renewal of his active mission in the month of February. I shall discuss with rny Cabinet colleagues the principles and ideas which we

shall crystallize and define in preparation for this renewed activity.

I hope the prospects of the mission will not be hurt by any initiatives

taken outside its framework. Israel is not desisting and will not desist from her study of any prospect of true peace and from time to time she gives expression to her most positive thoughts on this subject. We shall act thus in future too. The nc-ed for patient and

sustained efforts for peace is very much present. The prospects have , •*• *'* ' "

been hurt In recent days by two phenomena: ihere is a tendency in

the world press, not without inspiration, to describe the tension

in the area in exaggerated terms SB though a general collapse of

the ceasefire were imminent. Unfounded, versions are put abroad,

especially by the Soviet Union, of stories of imaginary troop con-

centrations arid false and imaginary rlans of attack. Secondly, the

Egyptian ruler has outdone even himself in expressing his refusal to

establish a true and honourable peace with Israel. And in truth the

deep signi f icance. ol the Soviet plan becomes exposed by the sce.ech

delivered by the Head of the tqypti'an state on 21 January. Gamal

Abdel Nasser trots out the' following' clan: In the first phase the

blockade imposed anainst Israel in f/ay 19'S7 should be restored.

Parallel with this and subsequent to it the terror organizations

would proceed to destroy what was left of Israel after her retreat

'to the situation of Way 1957.

Israel will know how to stand up to such plots. But the

minimum she is entitled to demand from other governments and from

•world media of communication and information is that the Scviet-

hgyptian policy be described as it truly is, and not as they would

like to regard it. If there is a chance to change this dark policy

it is only through accurately exposing it and justly criticizing it.

Israel's pursuit of peace will continue even in these circum-

stances. But we should not belittle the difficulties in our path and ^ the complicated nature of international reality which hinders quiet

peace efforts carried out patiently in a balanced manner that must be

made." •ir

UNITED NATIONS HMm NATIONS UNIES

MIDDLE EAST MISSION

CONFIDENTIAL Nicosia, 6 March 1969

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

• • • * * I wish to forward herewith a copy of the memorandum which I received from Foreign Minister Riad during our meeting on 5 March 1969 and which was referred to in my two unnumbered cables of today's date.

Yours sincerely,

>-^-^.« ^T^^-^^f

Gunnar Jarring

II Thant Secretary-General United Nations lew York ^•*—*—fe-XxJ «*_i ^r-e1-^-. t\^L / J

' 'S'h.e United Arab Republic position with regard to the peaceful settlement approved by the Security Coun- cil in its resolution of 22nd November 196?» is well known to you through our previous contacts an<, our cosmunicatiomi submitted to you on September '•• , October !9tJV Noven&iar 7th and December 8th, 1968o It appears from these communications that:

{ 1, The United Arab Republic accepts the Security ;'. ' „ jS: • Council resolution of November 22 , l%?o • 2o The United Arab Republic is ready to implement its obligations emanating from that resolution 3o In car view, a time-table should be drawn up : for 'the implementation of all provisj ons of the ; resolution.} In this respect, I had bhe opportunity to communicate to you the Unitsd Arab • Republic views on ways and means for carrying out these provisions within the framework of ;' the time-tableo : ' 4o We have further stated that the implementation ; of the resolution should be carried out under • the supervision of the Security Council an«5 , guaranteed by ito ' 5o The 'Kaited Arab Republic remains convunced that rtfce implementation of the-Security Council resfl'litre ion will bring about peace in Jhe Middle Eastj that the achievement of this aim requires that Israel should implement the resolution and withdraw her forces from all arab territories occupied as a result of the 5t h of June 196? aggression*, 60 We have clearly stated that we welcome any initiative which might lead to a pe useful settlement in the Middle East throu«5h the implementation of the Security Council resolution In fact, we have accepted the Soviet proposals which constitute a time-table for the implementation of the Security Council resolution We have also accepted the French proposal aiming at holding meetings of the big fear powers representatives at the Security Council, to discuss the means for Implementing .'the resolution, the guarantees foi such implementation and in particular the Jiission of the special representative of the Secretary Generalo 7o The United Arab Republic has always expressed her readiness to cooperate fully with the special representative of the Secretary General in the discharge of his mission

The aforementioned policy regardir g the peaceful settlement approved by the Security Cour sil has been reiterated by the President of the United AJab Eopubllc on several occasions0

This is our position As to Israel's stand, she is still refusing to implement the Security Council resolution and carry out her obligations deriving from ita It is obvious that such a policy is determined "by Israel8s expansionist plan aiming at the annexation of arab territories through war, in violation of the United Nations Charter and in contradiction to the Security Council resolution which emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory "by war<>

Moreover, Israel no longer satisfied with the rejection of the Security Council resolution, acts now against it«

In my communication dated December 8 , 1968, I made clear Israel's expansionist aims as demonstrated by its leaders own declarations which express the policy laid down by world Zionism: The establishment of the Jewish Stato in Palestine, progressively expanding its territory through aggression and war0

Declarations made by Mr0 Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, in his interview with "Le Figaro" on February 5 » 19G9» unveiled quiete clearly Israel's ambitions in Jerusalem; the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and that Israel is unrelenting in its position on the occupation of Shana El Sheikho Ke had also alluded in a press conference on January 17 , 1969 to the intention of Israel to continue the occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh as well as of territories along the eastern ;iart of Sinai0

Declarations made by the Prime Min .ster of Israel, Levy Eshkol, in an interview with .she "Hewsweek" magazine dated February 17 , 1969, clearly reveal Israel expansionist plans0 He said:

"There will be no return to the situation pre- ceding the June warosoo we must discuss new borders, new r

arrangements.- The armistice agreements are des a and buriedo.,011 "what we say is that the Jordan River must "become r. security border for Israel with all what that implies, our army shall be stationed on the strip along that border"o He also said in the same interview:

"As to the Golan Heights, we will quite simply never give them up? The same goes for Jerusalem, Here there is no flexibility at all.00..o". As to Sinai, he said:

"At Sharra El-Sheikh, however, we n ist be in a position t< protect the access to the Strait of Tiran.o."

and this explains why Mr0 Eshkol chose to deride the establishment of demilitarized zones0 And when asked about the withdrawal in exchange of great powers Guarantee of a settlement;, He simply said: "lTo"0 As to the repatriation of the refugees, he said: "we cannot take them backoooo

Israel is and must remain a Jewish State0"

Thus the aggression committed agains b three Arab states on June 5 » 196? and the continued oc cupation of their territories, clearly reveal Israel's expansionist plan aiming at:

lo The annexation of Jerusalem;

2.0 The continued occupation of the Golan Heights in Syria; 3<> The continued occupation of the West Bank in Jorc 'in and its complete domination, practically tem.inating the Jordanian sovereignty in that part; 4-i The economic and administrative integ ration of the Gaza Strip into Israel; 5 a The continued occupation of Shara El-Sheikh and. the Gulf of Agaba area, as well as the continued military presence in eastern parts of Sinai; and 60 Tho establishment of Israeli sett lei i.ents in the occupied territorieso

Israel expansionist plan explains why the Special Eepresentative of the Secretary General has been unable so far to obtain a formal declaration by Israel indicating her readiness to implement the Security Council resolution and to withdraw her forces from all the arab territories occupied as a result of her 5 of June aggression. This means that Israel is still determined to continue the occupation of three Arab 'Stages territories, a fact which constitutes a continued aggress.', on against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of thr >.e member States of she United Nations.

Now that nearly a period of a year and a half has elapsed since the adoption of the Security Council resolution, this situation created by Israel* s policy led to a lack of progress in the mission of the Special Repre- sentative o^ the Secretary Generalo

It has become quite evident, that while the Prime Minister of Israel and her Foreign Minister have unveiled Isx*ael°s expansionist plan and her jolonialist ambitions, together with the fact that Israel has taken measures aiming at annexation of the arab territories, Israel is doing her utmost to obstruct the Security Council resolution to gain time in order to carry our her expansionist policyo To this end, Israel resorts to deceit, distort- ion and playing on wordso She declares her adherence to the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary General and her readiness to cooperate with him, but at the same time she rejects the peaceful settlement adopted "by the Security Council, thus creating a situation the continuance o:? which endangers peace and Security in the Middle East*

All this leads me to reiterate what I have previously emphasized in my letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 13 February 19G9 (Document S/9008), that the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, should take the positive step, necessary to repress the aggressor, to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to implement the peaceful settlement embodied in the Security nd Council resol-.tion of November 22 196? 0

I wish to assure you that I am prepared to continue my contacts with you and that the United Arab Republic will continue to cooperate with you in the discharge of your mission.

March 3th. 19k9 •**

• TO TMK ITK NATIONS lo

Message from Ambassador Jarring, Moscow, to Dr. Ralph Bunche on May 29th, 1969.

gueas is that tho Israeli opposition to the distribution of ny qiiestions to the months of tho Gecurity Council is l on the assumption that tl.ey would sonotine in the future to have guarantees tht'.t a document wLicl. thoy have .labelled "confidential" v/ould not be circulated Q" uccd in a pulDlic UIJ document or in some other UIJ tray. As far cs I I-no\7 tho Israelis have not been r.dherse to, and have certainly been aware of the extensive ezchango of irJTorr.u'itivo Material, including texts

v.iiich has taken place bctiveen the âD-ties and tho bi?j four and also other pov/erc. Z;ut \vheu the UII cones into the picture they seen to feel ot.'i.;r"ice and I car. only repeat that this uay be interpreted as a aai'oûard for confidentiality in fuiyure negotiations iu which tiie rjecêlary-Guneral :ind his special representative are, or will cono involved. From the last sentence of the draft it ia not clear to :':ie SKS what is neant by "infernal distribution" and whether ouch distribution has already ta!:en place." K.OYAJL SWIEIBISlHt EMBASSY Moscow, June 13, 1969.

' Confidential

My dear Mr. Secretary General,

Ambassador Rafael has approched me through the Israeli Ambassador in Stockholm asking me if I could meet Mr. Eban in some place in Europe around June 25 or between 6-8 July. Mr. Rafael writes: "I believe that many things have occurred since your last meeting with the Minister and it mighU be useful to have a confidential exchange of views which would enable him to bring you up to date on developments," As you will remember I told Mr. Eban at our last meeting that I would be available for a meeting with him whenever he wished. I have therefore replied to Mr. Rafael that I could see Mr. Eban either June 25 or 26 or July 6-8. My intention was anyhow to leave Moscow on June 23, in order to take some weeks of vacation. These I will spend in our place in Southern Sweden. I can always be reached either in our house (postal address S-26040 Viken; telephone number 042-36362) or through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, Knowing how anxious the Israelis a£e for security and secrecy about meetings of this kind I have preferred not to inform you by a coded message, which would have had to pass through several hands, but through this personal letter.

His Excellency IT Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, Hew York. I shall of course keep you informed at an as early date as possible about the time when the meeting will take place. And I would be most grateful for any information or advice which you feel I should have before I meet with Mr. Eban.

Gunnar Jarring ;Grunnar Jarring, Moscow.

Confidential

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations,

W e w York O'ft ROYAL MINISTRY FOR FOREIG-r, N .AFFAIR S Stockholm, June 24, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Secretary-General, Thank you for your letter of June 20, which I received yesterday upon my arrival in Stockholm. The Israeli Ambassador has informed me that Mr. E"ban would like to meet me in Geneva on July 7. He suggests that I should toe available for two days to which I have agreed. Mr. Eban further suggests that our meeting should foe kept secret until further notice. In Geneva we could reach agreement on the question whether the press should be informed about our meeting, or not. I shall not fail to keep you informed at the earliest possible date about our meeting.

Gunnar Jarring

The following message has "been, received from Dr. Jarring for Seer.Gen. U Thant or Dr Bunched

"I met with Sisco yesterday evening i Stockholm. He had requested the meeting from Moscow for the purpose of informing me of the result of the conversations with the Russians whom he had informed of his intention to meet me and keep me informed. Sisco left this morning for Washington. As he told me that he would visit the Secretary-General soonest after his return to the US and give him full information on his conversations I do not feel it necessary to send a report of what he had to tell me." 18 July 1969

Sir, The enclosed is a communication from Anb- Jarring transmitted by the Swedish Mission.

ksn Following message transmitted from Ambassador Jarring for the Secretary-General or Dr. Bunche;

"I met vdth Sisco yesterday evening in Stockholm. He had requested the meeting from Moscow for the purpose of informing me of the result of the conversations with the Russians whom he had informed of his intention to meet me and keep me informed. Sisco left this morning for Washington. As he told me that he would visit the Secretary-General soonest after his return to the US and give him full information on his conversations, I do not feel it necessary to send a report of what he had to tell me." ro £**>-*- (

A Suggested Alternative Course of Action to an Abrupt Termination of the Jarring Mission if and when Ambassador Jarring Decides that an Unbreakable Impasse has been reached

1. Ambassador Jarring will address a letter to the Secretary-General along the following lines: a. Informing the Secretary-General of the impasse and its nature; b. Indicating what, in Ambassador Jarring's view, would be required to break the impasse; c. Informing the Secretary-General that in the circumstances, since all efforts to break the impasse have been unavailing, he has decided to terminate his efforts as of , and to submit to the Secretary-General at that time his final report, which would cover fully his efforts and the positions of the parties. 2. On receipt of this letter, the Secretary-General would reply along the following lines: a. Express understanding and appreciation; b. Point out that an abrupt ending of the Jarring Mission at this time would be nothing short of disastrous; c. Implore Ambassador Jarring to carry on, specifying that he could, if he deemed it necessary and advisable and if his Government concurred, return to his post in Moscow for the time being, holding himself in readiness to resume his efforts promptly at a signal from the Secretary-General, whenever some possibility appeared of movement away from the prevailing impasse; d. Suggest that if Ambassador Jarring would agree to this course, it would be helpful to have from him in his letter of response to the -2-

Secretary-General*s appeal, an indication of what Ambassador Jarring would consider to be the minimum action necessary to break the impasse and get started a meaningful dialogue between the parties on substantive matters. 3. The Secretary-General in his letter would also ask Ambassador

Jarring to submit to him (a) a full report on his efforts to date which would include a resum<§ of the positions of the parties, and (b) a paper indicating what, in the view of Ambassador Jarring, would be the outlines of a reasonable, equitable and practical solution of the problems set forth in Security Council resolution 2^2(1967). It would be understood that these two papers would be held by the Secretary-General until such time as he and Ambassador Jarring might mutually agree upon their submission to the parties, the Security Council, or to both. ——— 13 Janvier 1970

Le re; leraent doit porter svtr toutes les dispo sitions de la resolution 2\\.?. et presenter un cnrnctdre global et indivisible, y\ucune de sea parties ne pourrr etre mise en oeuvre sans quo les sutrea le so'ent 6gslement. Enfin, le r.igleKerit doit conceriier to\ia lea pays diroctement re s s c a .

du Le re^lement devrait rnaulter d!un accord au- quel lea parties a !eff orceraient d'nboutir par I'entretrdse de M. JARRING. Get accord oouvrireit lea modolitea d'application concretes detoua leg points >'o In resolution* II se pr£aenteralt nous IP forma d'un ou plusieurs docunsnts dont lf adoption impliqueroit dea engagements de cnract^re d£finl» tif ayant forco oblipjatoire et aasortis des gerantiea appro- pri6oa des pays tiers.

3° - --- Nous raconnaiasons 'toua le princlpe de I1 inad~ do 1' acquisition de territoiro par la force. II a'enauit logiquotuent que lea forces isra^liennes doivent, aous reserve des rectifications prevuea ci-npr^s, so retlrer da toua las terrltoirea occupes on Juin 196? juaqu'a, des frontiores suras ot reconnues dont le trnc6 ferait partio Int6f;rante do 1' accord entro les parties, k° ~ Rectifications , . ''ixe'es entre les parties, 003 rectifications seraient uineures et permettraie'it de " supnrimer les lies de nature ft entraver les coTimmicati cms terrestres Inter le urea ou la surveillance norrnnle de In frontiers. Cette concoptlo'i restrictive r^ponrl nu gone! de ne pss porter atteinte eu principe de I1 inodiiilgslbi litA da I'P qulsltlou de tei»ritolr»o per la force.

Ces zones pourrnient e ! re otobl1.es ' de port et d'autre de la frontier e, compte ten1' de lf importonce relative d«3S territoires nattonaux. L'nooord A Intervenir entre les parties contiendralt des Dispositions pernettent d1 assurer de man lore durable Is df'nv'.litarlsatlon de ces zone 3 •

Las angfigementa de pal'1; devrnient avo5.r un a la fois reciproque et irrevocnble. Ila vlse- rolont S. 6to'bllr entre les parties un ^tnt de pnix definitif excluant tout acte ou menace incompatible avec cet 6 tat, Us auraiemt un cnraotare irrevocable deg le d£pot de I1 00- •i cord aux Nations Uriies et entreraient en vigueur r\ une dnte a convenir, 3. -

7° - Refugioa. Lea refugi^s de 19I|8 dot vent pouvoir choisir librarrieut esntre le rapetrienent en larnel at In r£ installa- tion B.VGC compensetlon dona fl'outras pays, conf orrtu'nent au para.rrophe 11 de IR resolution 191+ do IVAssembl^e gfriSrele * L'cccord antre les parties determine roit das procedures et des conditions mutuellenent accf3ptnbles» ^es procrsnmea annudla sernient etcblis par une ooir.nlgalon spociale croee per le Coaaell de se cur It 6.

^° " LibGrte ..... da ^ na vi ff a_t ioii^ Le prlncipe do la Ilbcrt6 de navigation pour les naviros de tons les pays, y COT -iris Isrnel, a1 applique pour la Jordanie au Golfe d'Akaba et, en outre, pour la R.A.TT. au conal de Sues at au Detroit de Tiran.

_la ^ecurit e . ~" ~ L1 accord entre lea parties devrait disposer que chaque Tit at de la region a le dro.it de vivre en paix t\ 1'lntf'rieur r1.e front! Sree sureo et reoonnuos, a 1'abri de touts menace ou aote de force. Cctto forrnule viendrait comploter celle qui .figure au titre don engagements de pnix } elle ae reforcrait explicltemen-t nur diapoaitiona de la resolution 2l|,2 ainal qu*& cellea de lo Charte,/. JG/wke 'A/

13 January 1970

1. Nature of the settlement

The settlement must cover all the provisions of resolution 2lj.2 (196?) and "be of a global and indivisible nature. None of its parts must be implemented without the implementation of the other parts. Finally, the settlement must include all the countries directly concerned.

2. Form of the settlement

The settlement should result from an agreement which all the parties would endeavour to reach through Mr. Jarring. This agreement would cover the concrete implementation clauses of all the points raised in the resolution. It would take the form of one or several documents, the adoption of which would entail final and binding commitments with appropriate guarantees on the part of the third countries.

3. Withdrawal and boundaries

We all recognize the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. It is logical, therefore, that the Israeli forces must, subject to the rectifications referred to below, withdraw from all the territories occupied in June 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries, the delimitation of which would become an integral part of the agreement between the parties.

k. Rectifications

f These rectifications, to be agreed upon by the parties, would be of a minor nature; their purpose would be to eliminate such - 2 - anomalies which might hinder internal land communications or the normal surveillance of the border. This restrictive concept is consistent with the concern not to violate the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

5. Demilitarized zones

These zones might be established on each side of the border, taking into account the relative importance of the national territories. The agreement to be reached between the parties would contain provisions aimed at ensuring in a durable way the demilitarization of these zones.

6. Just and lasting peace

The peace commitments should be both reciprocal and irrevocable. They would aim at establishing between the parties a final state of peace excluding any act or threat incompatible with such a state. They would become binding upon the deposit of the agreement with the United Nations and would enter into force at a date to be determined.

T. Refugees

The refugees of 19^8 must be entitled to choose freely between repatriation to Israel or resettlement with compensation in other countries in accordance with paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 19^ (ill). The agreement between the parties would determine mutually acceptable procedures and conditions. Annual programmes would be set up by a special committee to be established by the Security Council. 8. Freedom of navigation

The principle of the freedom of navigation for all ships of all countries, including Israel, applies for Jordan to the Gulf of Aqaba and also for the United Arab Republic to the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

9. Bight of every State to existence and security

The agreement between the parties should stipulate that every State of the region has the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from any threat or act of force. This formula would be added to the one which deals with peace commitments; it would explicitly refer to the provisions of resolution 2h2 (196?) and to those of the Charter. ?/»i* .f^ &M^j, is** •i-u^y&l U^ ••*&

ititl ie It

t^smtjf b Xa w, v, w»»<. ». ~^-™ »Vww.«, «»••»«.-«» v»««^ fes S,fs is p€N!iL%JL©r3 ^o ®fsattTl>45tloa ^.f tflsssmss'isig e'a-ssiisB of *u"*i isAa^il;^! If It s@isi d©aifmbi© „ for tug smsSiissslilss ef tlMi prlnsipal eSfia&^PHesd* <2- c . <&*l/3>

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

TEXT OF REPLY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE SECRETARY

OF STATS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3.1L, ON ^A JULY, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary of State,

I have received your message of June 19th 1970, in which you referred to the critical situation in the Middle East and said that it was in our joint interest that the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and States of the area, and expressed your readiness to do your part towards this goal. You also urged others concerned to move with you to seize this opportunity.

In your message you also expressed the view that the most effective means to achieve a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security Council resolution 242 adopted on November 22nd, 1967.

It is to be noted that we as well as our friends, foremost of whom the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have called for the necessity of endeavouring to ensure the success of the mission of Ambassador Jarring to implement the Security Council resolution. We, together with our friends, have and are still exerting every effort to achieve this end.

The very critical situation in the Middle East is the result of the Israeli aggression and its occupation of Arab territories, Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands and its persistence in its aggression against the Arab peoples further aggravate the situation.

A.. - 2 -

The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5th, 1967 is fundamental to the achievement of peace in the area. The liberation of Arab territories is not only a natural right but a national duty. This right was reaffirmed by the Charter of the United Nations to which we all adhere. This has also been reiterated in the Security Council resolution when the Council emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and affirmed the necessity of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States in the area.

The people of the United Arab Republic which strive for development and a higher standard of living, consider that the achievement of peace is of primary concern. War can only obstruct construction and development. Furthermore.3the United Arab Republic has no expansionist aims. Israel, however, is seeking expansion and annexation of Arab territories. Israeli leaders openly declared that they waged the war for the purpose of expansion. To this day, their stated intention to annex Arab lands is reiterated in their successive declarations.

It is undoubtedly of great importance that the wish of the United States to strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and States of the area be realized. We believe that this would contribute to the consolidation of peace in the area. This could have been realized had the United States adopted a truly even-handed policy.

Furthermore, I am confident that you realize that to continue to ignore the rights of the Palestinian people who were expelled by Israel from their homeland, can in no way contribute to the achievement of peace in the area., and that to establish peace in the Middle East it is necessary to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

A.. - 3 -

By the unanimous adoption of the Security Council resolution on November 22nd, 1967, the international community provided an opportunity for the achievement of peace in the area. Israel's rejection of that resolution impeded the realization of peace and consequently war continued. Since we have consistently urged the implementation of the Security Council resolution, we attach great importance to your calling for the necessity of seizing this opportunity and implement the Security Council resolution, which could have established peace had it then been implemented.

I wish to reaffirm that we still believe that peace can be established by implementing the resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 22nd, 1967.

Since Ambassador Jarring began his mission in December 1967, we consistently stressed the importance that the parties to the conflict, as a first step, declare their acceptance

It should be noted that the United Arab Republic completely cooperated with Ambassador Jarring and has spared no effort to make his mission successful. It is also to be noted, in this respect, that on the 9th of May 1968, Dr. Jarring delivered to me certain suggestions similar to yours contained in your message. To his suggestions I replied on the same day by reiterating the acceptance of the United Arab Republic of the Security Council resolution and its readiness to implement it. I furthermore, - 4 -

responded favourably to his request and agreed to instruct the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations to meet with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to resume his contacts in accordance with the Security Council resolution and for the sake of its implementation. Moreover, and in the same reply, I suggested to Ambassador Jarring that he should draw a time-table for the implementation of the resolution.

For Ambassador Jarring to carry out his mission, Israel should have likewise declared that it accepted the Security Council resolution and was ready to implement it. Israel, however, refused and consequently Ambassador Jarring's efforts came to a stand still. It is therefore obvious that the responsibility for Ambassador Jarring1s inability to fulfill his task, in conformity with the Security Council resolution, falls on Israel.

France, in view of the deteriorating situation, and realizing that Ambassador jarring was not enabled to fulfill his task, proposed the Four Power meetings to implement the Security Council resolution and to assist the Secretary-General's Special Representative to carry out his task. Israel, however, by its persistent opposition obstructed the Four Power efforts.

As for the resolution adopted by the Security Council in June 1967 calling for the cease-fire, it is to be noted that, we respected it from the outset. Yet Israel never respected this resolution at any time and continued its aggression on the Suez Canal area, bombarded its cities and destroyed the economic installations. Once adopting the Security Council resolution of the 22nd of November 1967 which contained the peaceful settlement, the cease- fire resolution became linked with the implementation of the 22nd of November 1967 resolution; a fact which we indicated in our communications to the United Nations. - 5 -

The refusal of Israel,however, to implement Security Council resolution No. 242, led to the continuation of war and obstructed the peaceful settlement.

It is, therefore, clear that in order that Ambassador Jarring could carry out successfully his mission, Israel should declare unequivocally its acceptance and readiness to implement the Security Council resolution.

We also believe that for Ambassador Jarring to be able to achieve quick progress in the first stage of his work, the Four Powers should provide him with specific directives with regard to the implementation of the articles of the Security Council resolution and in particular the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the guarantees for peace.

We are ready to reaffirm to Ambassador Jarring our readiness to implement the Security Council resolution in all its parts, as well as designating a representative to discuss with him the implementation of the Council's resolution, and for enabling this to be achieved we are ready to accept a cease-fire for a limited period of three months, as proposed by you. We believe that the correct procedure with which this could be started, is to draw a time-table for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories. This was the point at which the previous efforts of the Representative of the Secretary- General were blocked, as a result of the obstacles which Israel put before him by refusing to implement Security Council resolution No. 242.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.

MAHMOUD RIAD MINISTER OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS - 6 -

Following is text of an oral message which Minister Riad handed at the same time.

ORAL MESSAGE:

I wish to inform you that the Government of the United Arab Republic accepts your proposal contained in your message of June 19th, 1970, that we subscribe to the statement proposed in your communication which; would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Dear Mr. Secretary of State: On 20th of June 1970, the American Charge d1 Affaires at Amman handed His Excellency Abdul Monem Rifa'i, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and now Prime Minister, your letter containing your new initiative for a peaceful settlement to the Middle East crisis. The present impasse in the way of the peaceful settlement to which you refer, and, which we are glad to note you are endeavor- ing to overcome, would not have arisen had it not been for Israel's intransigence, militant attitude induced by the military superiority it commands, its continued rejection of implementing the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and its refusal to accept withdrawal from all the Arab territories which it occupied since June, 19&7. ; I feel I must point out also, that it is the continued United States support, in various forms, which secures to Israel its present military superiority, that renders it intransigent in its attitude. Furthermore, Israel's territorial expansionist policy at the cost of the surrounding Arab countries is at the root of its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, thus raising obstacles in the way of Ambassador Jarring and preventing him from carrying out his mission, i.e., the implementation of the said resolution. My Government has considered your new proposal with special care and it is clear to it that this proposal does not vary in substance from that of the Security Council resolution 2*4-2, except that it calls for some procedural measures calculated to implement the resolution. The Jordan Government has always proclaimed its acceptance of the Security Council resolution and called for its implementation. Furthermore, it demonstrated its full sincerity in dealing with the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, in pursuing a positive and constructive course in the discussions with him. As regards these aspects, therefore, my Government finds nothing new in your letter to pre- clude it from accepting your proposal, its object being the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 and the resumption by Ambassador Jarring of his mission to contact the parties with a view to implementing the aforementioned resolution. Nevertheless, my Government in considering the resolution of the Security Council and the discussions with Ambassador Jarring regarding its implementation has always proceeded from two basic -2- starting points: First: the necessity of Israel's acceptance of the principle of withdrawal from all the Arab territories which it occupied since the fifth of June 1967 without exception, in accordance with the Security Council resolution 242 which affirms the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war. Second: the necessity to recognize the Palestinian people's full and lawful rights, which have been repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed by resolutions of the United Nations, and the imperative necessity for the exercise of their rights to ensure peace based on Justice and stability in the area. Accordingly, it is natural for my Government to continue to maintain its position regarding these two basic principles, in the firm belief that no progress towards a peaceful settlement is possible if these two sound principles are not fully respected. As regards acceptance of the ceasefire for a-period of three months, this is in line with what my Government has always observed and still continues to observe scrupulously. However, my country throughout the period following the Israeli aggression of June,1967* has been the object of armed aggression, attacks and raids by Israel. The numerous resolutions that the Security Council has repeatedly passed condemning Israel for these aggressions stand as vivid testimony that it is Israel that has repeatedly violated the ceasefire. Furthermore, escalation in the military activities on the Jordan-Israeli front is in truth due to the Israeli continued military occupation of the Arab areas, the oppressive measures it perpetrated against the Arab population, their persecution, ill- treatment and expulsL on from their own homeland; in addition to arson, destruction of villages, cities, plantations and other damage to our national economy as well as the killing of civilians and military personnel on the East Bank of Jordan resulting from air raids, bombing and shelling by Israel. It is these acts of aggression and oppression that have led the Palestine resistance movement to resort to their lawful and acknowledged right of self- defense and resistance against the occupation. Accordingly my Government, in its keen desire to maintain peace, based on Justice, agrees to the proposal contained in your letter of 20 June, 1970. With the expression of my highest consideration and respect. Yours sincerely, Antone Atallah Minister for Foreign Affairs TEXT OF LETTER OF - AUGUST l'j7C I1 ROM AMBASSADOR RABIN TO SECRETARY ROGERS

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honour to inform you that my Government's position on the latest United States peace initiative is as follows;

Having considered President Nixon's message of 24.7.70, basing itself on its contents and in strict adherence to its policy principles and authoritative statements, the Government of Israel has decided to reply affirmatively to the latest United Stages peace initiative, and to inform the United States that it may convey to Ambassador jarring that:

1. Israel is prepared in due time to designate a representative to discussions to be held under Ambassador Jarring' s auspices with the UAR (Jordan), according to such procedure and at such places and times as he may recommend, taking into account each side's attitude as to method of procedure and previous experience of discussions between the parties . • '

2. Israel's position in favor of a cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, in accordance with the Security Council's cease-fire resolution, remains unchanged. On the basis of clarifications given by the United States Government, Israel is prepared to reply affirmatively to the United States proposal for a cease-fire (for at least three months) on the Egyptian front.

3. The discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices shall be held within the framework of the Security Council Resolution (242) on the basis of the expression of readiness by the parties to carry out the Security Council Resolution (242) in all its parts, in order to achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace agreement between the parties which will ensure:

(A) Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israel of all claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, each of the parties will be responsible within its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military forces or para-military forces, - 2 -

including irregular forces, against the armed forces or against civilians living in the territory of the other party.

(R) Withdrawal of Israeli anried forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to secure recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements .

4. Israel will participate in these discussions without any prior conditions. Israel will not claim the prior acceptance by the other party of her positions, as Israel does not accept in advance the positions of the other parties as communicated publicly or otherwise. Each party will be free to present its proposals on the matters under ciscussion. 15 August 1970 SG:

These are copies of the letters that were handed to UAR, Jordan and Israel yesterday at 5 p.m. by Anib. Jarring. New York, 12 August

Sir* . ' I should fce grateful if you tJouM pass the following message to your Minister for FeoreSgn Affairs; "I have the honour to ref«r to the conversations •which I hatns had with the P&mssBt Bepresent&feive of your ecnmtry and those of t&e <^her Interested couaferies in order to

ascertain ths views of the parties ceneerai»s the sites timing and otlisr arrsEg^aents for the fortheossiag discussions

MI am ccsiscious of the iKpceFtaaee to "be attached to the forthcoming disetissioas end of the need to mirrfcain the •yiiich now feas "foefsn ©,tt&iaed. X teve iseHfctcmed. to your Pensa^seat Representative that I have famed tlie opinion ttot Hew York •would 1*e tbs isest site* -:. "One *>f the sioet c^jent reasons f cos: nsy csmelttsios is tfeat the fc^eiga miniefcers of the parties can tie 63cpeeted to

fce t» Hew Totfk for a period of» at least 9 several weeks froa the openlcg cC the General Assembly session. !I^s;ing into accotuat asry e^oerisnce at eas-liegr1 stages of ey missions I "believe tteat discussiotts ar© likely to be sore fruitful if they are

His Or*. MtttaimM 1. iaa'jr and Bepreseistative of the to the IMlted Nations -fi -•

at the foreign jsintsfeey^s level. I realise that It is sot po&0£&e to etivlssge the eoatimotts presence of the fferMgn ®iaistej?& at the atsetaasiOHSj ^bterêr they say tse hgld* Bo^s^ts it $ean8 to me a matter of special targaac ttet tfee foreign ministers ^©tilS "be present act oj&y durliig the Geseeeal Ass^>l3r periM* "but at the opening of the •Hfelefe I fcelieve sli©uld ta^.o place at a very early date, so that certain initial proMaas isa^ %& îtcldy resolvM and that the &&& tlie tirger,^ of the aiissussions should ê stressed

"I vish tfee^sfore to «^?ee)S the fina lajpe that at least at tfee ©pening 0tsge of the discussions aM later dwjjig the eourse of the Geaer&X Ass&sibly sesslOK ytmr Goves-JBrnent will "be rsppese&ted set the foeeiga Mltsisster's level, WJ ©m sending &a Meatlcal isessage to the Foreign Ministers ©f the other

Sir, th@ ^assttranees of agr highest

^ the to the MMdle «• 2 •*

at t&e foreign miniistscr's l&gr&L* X realise that it Is nofe possible ta eawrtsage the. CGat£n,t*aus presence or tSie foreign isiEjisters at the Siseussiaras, "«*hereirer the^r fee feeM. Hoauver, it seems to E© a sattsr of special tJmt the £ oreign @lnist€x*s sliouM Tse present not OH!^ dxs-ing the Oases-si Assembly period, Mt at the ope&iisg of the diecussioass ^hi^ I believe shotaH talse plaee at a very ^rly date, eo that estate initial psrcfelcsas sie^f t>e epick"!^ resolved aud that the th« tsrgen^r of the diseussieiis £dscaM be stressed

vish tlierefore to esprees tbe fi3?m Jwg»e tlrnt at least c^ealsg; stage of the dlsctassioas aaid later dwi$g the course <^ ttee Genercsl Assadbl^ sessicm jrotar Govemssent will be regafes^tsfced at the fereigsa ials4©ter*s level* "I &ta eeefiitjg s» identlesl message to tJae of

Sir, the assm-saces

Special E^resestettve of t&e to the Mi&aie East 12 August

"be grateful if you vould pass the to yo&* Mtaistsay for l^^ig® Affairs* **X liave the bDiaour to refer to the ecsmsrsaticns I hare had Mth the Fssmaaent Eepres«3tati'«e of yowr ceamtsy and those of the crf;&Ler lE&eireeted countries IB carte"", r to the views of tfee parties conci^nisig the slte^ other aafreaig^t^ate fcr tte

eeaascious of the iiaprar^sace to *b® attaeliai to the usslons asid of 1&s need to jsaisitain the nci=r lias %eon attained, t Jssve sentionea to your Permanent te& I hs#e fesneed the ^telcai that Hey York fee the 1»est sit®» "One of tlse isoat ecgent re^s

account scr esperieaie« at eaarlies- st^es cxf niy B5i66ion? I "believe that aiseussiass are likely to IjiS siere fruitful if they are j, 12 Asgust 1970

Sir, I should "be gretsful if you would pass tfce f ollosd&g to 3KH»? Minister £o r FeereJ&n ARPalr«j ''I have tlie itoaosr to refer to tfas eomrersstlons vhich I ha#© fcad td$h ttoe Persseneat Ssparesosfcativa: of your and those cjf the Gffshe^ fett^rested eomtries la e^Ssr to aseertate t&© views of the parties eafteerains tlie site, ofefeej* aarajjgSEStitB for the fcgrtbcoaius dlscuseioae

wl am eotsscioae of thst tsaportsnc^ to fee attach^ to tba •ferfe&eoming €isetissions aM of tfce seed to isaiBtats the wisieh TUB® Ism ts^ea attalrt^L, I have Bjastioiied to your Permanent ifetat 1 haw foarated the optelon that I*eu fork

of tJje feosfe ce&coit reas'c«i@ for u^ osnol'usicES is tfcat tfes f

Bis Br* a»i* e»f tJte to the United at tfee fcs-alga minister *s level. I realise that it is sot possible to envisage t&e contiauou© presence of tlie foreign raiaistsrs at the distiussicaas* wherever they may be held* Hmipeirer» it seesis to %& a setter of special tfeat 1jhe fore%R sisistsrs shoulei l>© present act c^xly the Ceneral Asstasbly period.s Isufc at tla& «^>eBii^ of the discussions, wtaieh I believe ghouM tafee place at a ^®ry eerly date, so that certain isitia! protdestas nay be quicKLy resolved aM that the fatucs-tsnce asid tlie iirgeiiey of the dijscusslcsis should bs stressed from 1^5$ tsîimâg* **I wish therefore to express the fine fecê that at least at ths openly stage of the dl&eusslejis aM later disring the course of the Gen^s3. AssasTjly session your Gov^rjanent will Ibe at tbs foreigii miniver fs l^svel* "I am aeMis^ m identical jnessage to tiie Foreign Ministers

Jarring"

? Sjbr» the asetaranfies of igy highest consideration,

B^presentative sf the to the Middle '¥-1

Sew York, 21 August 1970

Sir, -. - I should fee grateful if you would forward the following to your Kiuister for Foreign Affairs: "Sir* "I have the honour to refer to my conversation of 8 Aygufit l$ffO vith Mbassador Tekoahfl at which I requested him to ascertain the views of your GoverisneErfc concerning the site* tiding and other arrangements for the forthcoming discussions to "be held tmder ay auspices» and to my letter of 12 August 19TO> i» which I expressed certain views concerning the site of, and level of representation at, such meetings. **! have now had the opportunity to consider the views of the parties on this qwestion* including the information concerning your position which Jtoabassador Tekoah supplied orally on 19 August. I understand that Mbassador 2?ekoa& has already commmicated to you ay attitude on the questions at issue* particularly in the light of the considerable delay \jhich has occurred in setting a time and place for the nestings, nl feel that I should now isafee a recommendation to the parties as to the place sjid timing of the meetings* I therefore propose that the place for the initial meetings

His EKceH«noy Mr. Tosef TeJtoah -Sjiibassodor Esjtracxpdinasy aad Plenipotentiary Penaanent Bepreeeiatafcive of to the United Katione - 2 -

should be New York and that the opening date should be Tuesday, 25 August 1970. "I should be grateful if you could inform me that the date and time which I have proposed are agreeable to your Government and, if as I trust the answer is in the affirmative, by whom it vill be represented. "You vill note-that I have made no recommendation concerning the level of representation of the parties. I continue to hold the viey expressed in my letter of 12 August 1970 that the discussions would be most profitable if held at the Foreign Minister's level and it will be my aim to persuade all the parties to agree to that level of representation at an early date. At the present stage, however, it seems to be most important to begin the discussions vith the least possible further delay. "Highest consideration. "Gunnar Jarring" Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Gunnar Jarring Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East New York, 21 August 1970

Sir, I should be grateful if you would forward the following Message to your Minister for Foreign Affairs: "Sir, "I have the honour to refer to my conversation of 8 August 1970 with Ambassador El-Brian* at which I requested. hito to ascertain the views of your Government concerning the site, timing ana other arrangements for the forthcoming discussions to be held under lay auspices, and to ay letter of 12 August 197<3* in which I expressed certain views concerning the site of» and level of representation at, such meetings* "I have now had the opportunity to consider the views of the parties on this question* including the information concerning your position provided by Ambassador EL-Zayyat, and feel that I should now stake a recommendation to the parties as to the place and tiding of the meetings. I therefore propose that the place for the initial meetings should "be New York and that the opening date should be Tuesday, 25 August 1970. "It is my understanding that this proposal is agreeable to your Government*

His Excellency Dr. Hohsjsmed Hassan El*Zayyat Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Penuanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations "You will note that I have made no recommendation concerning the level of representation of the parties. I continue to hold the view expressed in ay letter of 12 August 19?0 that the discussions would be most profitable if held at the Foreign Minister's level and it is my earnest hope that your Government will find it possible to agree to that level of representation at an early date. At the present stage, however, it seems to fee most issportant to begin the discussions with the least possible further delay. "Highest consideration. "Gunner Jarring" Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of roy highest consideration*

Gunner Jarring Special Bepresentative of the Seeretaa?y-