DOCSLIB.ORG

Envelope No. 3 Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) Reports (With One Item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Envelope No. 3 Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) Reports (With One Item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 9 Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:37:26 PM S-0865-0001 -09-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0001 -09-00001 Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope No. 3 Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) reports (with one item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports Date Created 02/03/1968 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0865-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit DECLASSIFIED PEP ST/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 3\e. firm* KK>*(J .3 £-' By {?!.&.&. Dear Mr. Secretary-General, Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council Resolution 2k2 (196?) of 22 November 196? for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement. In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the erw— two Governments to meet with me£ for conferences within the framework of the Security Councir^l Resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation. Yours sincerely, Gunnar Jarring Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East DECLASSIFIED ^_gMl^2|, 28aDEC 1984 By /??,£. Q. Dafce STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 1. The present deadlock in the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote agreement between the parties to the Middle East conflict is formally due to different inter- pretations of the object of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 196?. The Israeli contention is that the Security Council Resolution is a framework for agreement on the implementation of the provisions of the Resolution. The contention of the UAR is that the Security Council Resolution is intended for immediate implementation, which implies a precondition of Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in connexion with the June War. It has lately been stressed in Cairo that this includes also the Jordan part of Jerusalem and that there should be no doubt that evacuation of "every inch of Arab soil" is intended. Only after complete Israeli withdrawal would the UAR Government be willing to enter into a next stage which is the setting of a time-table for a speedy implementation of the resolution. 2. We thus have the Israeli conception that a solution should be realized through negotiation between the parties. It is accepted that such negotiation could be conducted under the auspices - 2 - of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, on condition that this implies also joint meetings between the parties. On the other hand, the UAR conception is that no negotiations should take place. The provisions of the Besolution should "be implemented directly. The UAR agrees to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General acting as a go-between the parties for the practical arrangements in connexion with the implementation of the Resolution. To agree to talks would imply surrender, according to the UAR conception. 3. Furthermore, Israel understands the Resolution to contain provisions for the replacement of the cease-fire arrangements "by permanent peace, negotiated accepted and contractually ratified by the States concerned in accordance with normal international practice (S/8494). The UAR conception is that the Security Council Resolution does not contain provisions for a peace- treaty, or for other contractual arrangements. After - or in connexion with - the implementation of the different provisions of the Resolution, the Security Council could give guarantees for the inviolability of the provisions implemented through separate resolutions. 4. Jordan, which originally followed the UAR line, has recently retreated to a less rigid line, although maintaining that their moderation is conditioned by a UAR acceptance of joint talks between the parties - 3 - under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Jordan has indicated willing- ness to send a representative on a ministerial level to New York for such negotiations without the pre- condition that Israel should have expressed her readi- ness to implement the Resolution - i.e. without Israeli withdrawal before the "beginning of such talks. The Jordan "moderation" is, however, blocked "by the UAR refusal to take any steps before Israel has declared her readiness to implement the Resolution - i.e. to evacuate all Arab territories occupied since the June War. 5. With the firm attitudes taken by Israel and the UAR there seems to be no possibility for "breaking the deadlock without their announcing substantial changes in their positions. The UAR conception that the acceptance of "negotiations" or "talks" would mean surrender to Israel contrasts with Israel's conception that evacuation of the occupied territories would deprive them of the possibility of negotiating secure frontiers. Against this background and against what has been said earlier in this memorandum, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the status quo will continue with Israel occupying Arab territories while the Arab countries concerned prepare themselves militarily for their recapture - Israel at the same time building up militarily against such an eventuality In the meantime, the activities of the Palestine Liberation movement and other Arab organizations will continue, probably on an increased scale, within the "boundaries of Israel and in the occupied territories, inciting Israel to new retaliation moves. 6. This situation may continue for a considerable time without a military confrontation on a large scale, "but with continuous incidents embittering the atmos- phere. The Ara"bs apparently are not ready for military action of the kind indicated above. In the meantime, in Cairo and elsewhere in the Arab world they are looking forward to the US elections, in the hope that these might cause a change in the American attitude to Israel; the attitude of Prance to the Arab Middle East is also considered to be encouraging; Israel is watching developments in Egypt, looking for weaknesses there and in other parts of the Arab world. These are signs that would indicate a continued interest in or hope for a political solution; but simultaneously, the military build-up will be accelerated, the bitterness and hatred will increase. If no peaceful solution can be found a new Middle East wair seems inevitable. 20 April 1968 DECLASSIFIED T/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 * I r STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL p.] 1. A conclusive report to the Secretary-General should preferably toe short and concise and give the reasons for the present deadlock "betwen the parties, i.e. their different interpretations of the object of the Security Council resolution of 22 November. Reference ought to be made to the verbatim records of the Security Council debates of March and April and other Security Council documents wherein the parties have made clear their position on the general problem. This would, at least to some extent, exclude unnecessary debate, based on the contents of the report. 2. A Security Council debate on the report would probably._ concentrate on the central question if the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 is intended to be implemented or if it is a framework for negotiation on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. 3. In all probability the UAR will ask the Security Council to pronounce itself on this question by passing a resolution "in clear language" that the object of the 22 November resolution is implementation - speedy and straightforward. if — ' • - 2 - 4. The Security Council would hardly Toe able to/ resolve that the resolution is not to "be implemented. The probability is that the debate would end in a consensus of some kind. However, it is difficult to see how this would solve the deadlock over the different interpretations of the object of the resolution of the parties concerned. 5. In all probability the Security Council in connexion with a debate of this kind, do its utmost to preserve the 22 November resolution, the unanimous acceptance of which was obtained after much compromise, perhaps not to be arrived at a second time. In that case a Special Representative of the Secretary- General wotild have to continue his activities, or renew them, on practically the same basis as before. 6. The question is thus if really any positive results can be achieved through a new Security Council debate and some new pronouncements in it on the main problem of differences and deadlock. A debate in the General Assembly would be even less constructive and would mainly serve propaganda purposes. 20 April 1968 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL P.M. on "Secure Boundaries" The question of the meaning of "secure boundaries" has been raised several times with the Israelis by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. No indication has ever been given - except for the Gaza Strip - about Israel's real intentions as to secure boundaries. It has been explained that these cannot be presented until negotiations with the Arab countries concerned have come into effect. The following indication about Israel's intentions seem however to be relevant. 1. Egypt a. The Gaza Strip should remain in Israeli hands. b. Vague indications about some area or areas in the Sinai that would be kept or exchanged against present Israeli territory. 2. Jordan a. East Jerusalem to be kept, but agreement with Jordan on free access-and the custodianship of the Moslem holy places.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Envelope No. 3 • Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) Reports (With One Item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports
    UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 10 Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:37:27 PM S-0865-0001 -10-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0001 -10-00001 Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope No. 3 • Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) reports (with one item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports Date Created 21/08/1970 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0865-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit '*s f- New York, 21 August 1970 Sir, I should be grateful if you would forward the following message to your Minister for Foreign Affairs: "CM-'JIT HJ "I have the honour to refer to my conversation of 0 August 1970 with .Ambassador El-Farra, at which I requested him to ascertain the views of your Government concerning the site, timing and other arrangements.for the forthcoming discussions to be held under my auspices, and to my letter of 12 August 1970, in which I expressed certain views concerning the site of, and level of representation at, cuch meetings. "I have now had the opportunity to consider the views of the parties on this question, including the information concerning your position provided "by Ambassadors Lil-Forra and Sharafj and feel that I should now make a recommendation to the parties as to the place and timing of the meetings. 1 therefore propose that the place for the initial meetings should be New York and that the opening date should be Tuesday, 215 August 1970.
    [Show full text]
  • Middle East -1971 (See List of Items Appendix No. 7)
    UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 4 Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:43:51 PM S-0865-0003-04-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0003-04-00001 Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East -1971 (see list of items appendix No. 7) Date Created 01/01/1971 Record Type Archival Item Container s-0865-0003: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit x/, 7 Selected Confidential Reports on OA-6-1 - Middle East 1971 Cable for SG from Goda Meir - 1 January 1971 2 Notes on meeting - 4 January 1971 - Present: SG, Sec. of State Rogers, 0 Ambassador Charles Yost, Mr. Joseph Sisco, Mr. McClosky and Mr. Urquhart t 3) Middle East Discussions - 5 January 1971 - Present: Ambassador Tekoah Mr. Aphek, Ambassador Jarring, Mr. Berendsen 4 Letter from Gunnar Jarrint to Abba Eban - 6 January 1971 x i Letter to Gunnar Jarring from C.T. Crowe (UK) 6 January 1971 *6 Notes on meeting - 7 January 1971 - Present: SG, Sir Colin Crowe 7 Notes on meeting - 7 January 1971 - Present: SG, Mr. Yosef Tekoah 8 "Essentials of Peace"(Israel and the UAR) - 9 January 1971 9 "Essentials of Peace" (Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordon - 9 January 1971 Statement by El Tayalt - 13 January 1971 Minutes of meeting - 13 January 1971 - Present: M. Masmoudi, El-Goulli, Mr. Fourati, Mr. Jarring, Mr. Berendsen^ Letter from William P. Rogers - 15 January 1971 Letter - Middle East - 15 January 1971 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 For The Establishment of a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East - 18 January 1971 C H-^-^ ?-«-r-"~) Comparison of the papers of Israel and the United Arab Republic 18 January 1971 L " Notes on meeting - 19 January 1971 - Present: SG, Ambassador Yost, USSR - 1 January 1971 - Middle East Communication from the Government of Israel to the United Arab Republic through Ambassador Jarring - 27 January 1971 France - 27 January 1971 - Middle East Statement by Malik Y.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's Mission to the Middle East As Special Representative of the Secretary-General
    S-0865-0002-26-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0002-26-00001 Title Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's Mission to the Middle East as Special Representative of the Secretary-General Date Created 2211111967 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0865-0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image SgaueoSignature of PersonesnSbi Submit --------------------------- "<1' Ck" -Th . Cs .CtA.&u - - CC.- v4 I - 1ý S NI fýaT44 AliEN 4 if fleet PC A I £2 A [CC i'¾ C4 'SW A' - "CCC' S Stc -p -, -A C if ,,.C' :1. C* . 1' UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: U Tta~nt r,,nDATE: 22 November 1967 A: ~The Secretary-General)vvý1ýREEENE THROUGH:A S/C DE.- FR~OM: C . A. Stavropoulos DE: The Legal Counsel SUBJ ECT-- OBJET: Terms of Reference of the- Sertr Gnrls Representative for the Middle East 1. At your req~uest I am submitting herewith a preliminary analysis of the terms of reference of the Secretary-Generalts Representative for the Middle East. In this memorandum I am confining my comments to two important issues: (1) the functions of the Special Representative, and (2) the meaning of the term "States concerned". I have not in the present paper attempted. to analyze the "provisions and principles" in the resolu- tion which ý-provide the framework within which the Special Representative will operate. Functions of the Special Reoresentative 2. Security Council resolution 81/242?, adopted on 22 November 1967, in paragraph 3 "Reuet the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and.
    [Show full text]
  • Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Jordan After the 1948 and 1967 Wars: a Comparative Survey by Joseph Nevo
    Conflict Quarterly Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Jordan after the 1948 and 1967 Wars: A Comparative Survey by Joseph Nevo INTRODUCTION Until President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Jor­ dan was the one and only Arab state that had conducted direct, regular and serious, albeit confidential, discussions with Israel in order to reach a peace settlement. This happened following each of the two wars in which the Jordanian and the Israeli armies were engaged in direct confrontation. The purpose of this paper is to survey some aspects of the Jordanian-Israeli talks and to examine the permanent factors among the variable determinants in the web of Jordanian- Israeli relations. Two questions are particularly relevant. Of the fac­ tors that affected the negotiations after the 1948 war, which are still relevant twenty and thirty years later, and, what prospects regarding future possible negotiations can be deduced from the dead end of the 1950 talks? King Abdallah of Jordan had political discussions with the rep­ resentatives of the Jewish agency since the early 1930s. Both parties had a common foe: al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, mufti of Jerusalem and leader of the radical Palestinian nationalism. The contacts with the Jews became more intensive after World War II. In November 1947 Abdallah obtained the acquiescence of the Jewish agency for his am­ bition of many years, to take over the Arab parts of Palestine which had been allotted to the Arabs in the United Nations' partition scheme.1 The outbreak of hostilities in Palestine and the views of the other heads of state in the Arab League, somewhat impeded Abdallah's plans, but eventually he managed to reach his goal.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel I,.N 1971, for the First Time Since the Six-Day War of June 1967
    Israel I.,N 1971, for the first time since the six-day war of June 1967, the cease-fire was generally observed on Israel's borders throughout the whole year. There was only one brief outbreak of air hostilities over the Suez Canal. The Palestinian terrorist organizations, crushed by King Hussein of Jordan, started to regroup in South Lebanon, but carried out few serious operations. Severe measures to eradicate terrorism in the Gaza Strip, coupled with con- siderable improvements in the living standard of the local population and the refugees in the camps, were beginning to show good results. However, there was no progress toward a solution of the Middle East con- flict. Israel's Arab neighbors still refused to negotiate with her; the Jarring mission bogged down when the UN Secretary-General's special representa- tive presented terms for a settlement with Egypt that Israel could not accept; and United States efforts to promote an interim arrangement for the reopen- ing of the Suez Canal were unsuccessful. Prime Minister Golda Meir's talks with United States President Richard M. Nixon in December strengthened the friendship between the two coun- tries and produced a high degree of agreement, particularly on Israel's needs for modern jet aircraft and other military equipment. But relaxation on the external front was accompanied by a rise in domestic tensions. Tax burdens, largely due to great defense expenditure, weighed heavily on the ordinary citizen. There was general welcome for the unprece- dented immigration from the Soviet Union; at the same time, the grievances of the poorer segments of the population and young couples, who could not meet the high cost of housing, urgently demanded attention.
    [Show full text]
  • The Middle East Crisis Arab-Israeli Conflict
    DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Sep 29 21:02:54 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Bluebook 21st ed. John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 403 (1970). ALWD 6th ed. Moore, J. ., The arab-israeli conflict and the obligation to pursue peaceful settlement of international disputes, 19(3) U. Kan. L. Rev. 403 (1970). APA 7th ed. Moore, J. (1970). The arab-israeli conflict and the obligation to pursue peaceful settlement of international disputes. University of Kansas Law Review, 19(3), 403-440. Chicago 17th ed. John Norton Moore, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," University of Kansas Law Review 19, no. 3 (1970-1971): 403-440 McGill Guide 9th ed. John Norton Moore, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes" (1970) 19:3 U Kan L Rev 403. AGLC 4th ed. John Norton Moore, 'The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes' (1970) 19(3) University of Kansas Law Review 403. MLA 8th ed. Moore, John Norton. "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes." University of Kansas Law Review, vol. 19, no. 3, 1970-1971, p. 403-440. HeinOnline. OSCOLA 4th ed. John Norton Moore, 'The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes' (1970) 19 U Kan L Rev 403 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
    [Show full text]
  • Items-In-Peace-Keeping Operations - Middle East - 1970 (See List of Items Appendix No
    UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:43:51 PM S-0865-0003-03-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0003-03-00001 items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - 1970 (see list of items appendix No. 6) Date Created 18/02/1970 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0865-0003: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit Selected Confidential Reports on Middle East 1970 H. 1 Middle-East 1970 - William Rogers, U.S. Sec of State - Press Middle-East 1970 I##'•'<&'3 Proposals for Action in the Middle East - 1970 L ° • ^* • },'4 Cease-Fire Appeal - Text of French draft - 1970 ^\t&*¥*5 From the P,R. of France - 13 January 1970 a*tfto £ • 6 From the P.R. of France - 13 January 1970 (translation) ftO*-I '*"<!_1 '• 7 U S Statement on Guarantee - 18 January - Four Power Talks ?' Note for File - 22 January 1970 Notes on meeting - 23 January 1970 - Present' SG, Ambassador Yost, Ambassador Buffum, Ralph Bunche 10) Situation in the Middle East - 2 February 1970 11) Notes on meeting - 6 February 1970 - Present- SG, Ambassador Yost, Ambassador Buffum, Ralph Bunche 12) Notes on meeting - 11 February 1971 - Present: SG, Ambassador Tekoah, Mr. Cahana, Mr. Urquhart 13 The Situation in the Middle East - 13 February 1970 Notes on meeting - 25 February 1970 - Present SG, Lord Caradon, Ra,lph Bunche 15) Notes on meeting - 26 February 1970 - Present SG, Ambassador Yost Ambassador Buffum, Ralph Bunche 16)'Notes on meeting - 27 February 1970
    [Show full text]
  • The United States Position Towards the Battle of Al-Karameh and Its Repercussions, March 21, 1968
    Athens Journal of History - Volume 7, Issue 2, April 2021 – Pages 163-184 The United States Position towards the Battle of Al-Karameh and its Repercussions, March 21, 1968 By Yousef Omar This paper explores the United States' position towards the battle for Al-Karameh and its repercussions on the 21 March 1968. It argues that even though American policy has always been completely biased in favor of Israel since Israel's founding on 15 May 1948, its position on the battle of Al-Karameh was at the time considered supportive of Israel, balanced with Jordan, and hostile to Palestinian organizations. The United States position in the research relies mainly on the documents of the US State Department (Foreign Relations of the United States FRUS) and on some of the minutes of the Israeli parliament (Knesset) sessions (Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meetings). This research dealt with an introduction to the crystallization of the Palestinian resistance after the defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War of 1967 as well as the policy of the United States towards the region after this war, its position on the escalation of Palestinian resistance from inside Jordan, and the dialectic of Jordan's control of its territories and borders. It also dealt with the incident of the bombing of the Israeli bus on 18 March 1968, and the escalation of tension, which eventually led to Israel attacking Jordan in the battle for Al-Karameh on 21 March 1968, the initial American reaction to it, and the subsequent issuance of Security Council Resolution 248 and its implications.
    [Show full text]
  • Jerusalem,1969-1974
    THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION BETWEEN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM, 1969-1974: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND IMPLEMENTATION CONTENTS Contents ........................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. vii A note on terminology ..................................................................................................................... ix Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ x Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. 1969: The Rise and Fall of the ‘Rogers Plan’ ................................................................ 12 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 12 Entering the Arena: Nixon and the Middle East, January 1969 ................................................. 14 Early Invitations: Prelude to the Two-Power Talks .................................................................... 18 The First Draft ‘Rogers Plan’, February 1969 .............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ambassador Jarring (Including Appointment, Terms of Reference, Travel)
    UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 25 Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:37:28 PM S-0865-0002-06-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0002-06-00001 Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope Number 1 - the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ambassador Jarring (including appointment, terms of reference, travel) Date Created 18/04/1969 Record Type Archival Item Container s-0865-0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit The Secretary-General CONFIDENTIAL IS April 1969 Bear Ambassador Yost came to see U 3?hant late yesterday afternoon, April 17th, to inform him about the two meetings of the Four Powers tfhich were held yesterday morning and afternoon at the US residence. !£&e two meetings consumed four hours, The atmosphere continues friendly. They first turned to items l(i) and (ii) of the Security Council resolution, withdrawal and end of belligerence. 5he OS and the British isished (i) and (ii) to be taken -up together hut the Sussiana were adamant on priority considera- tion for withdrawal. According to Yost, the French indicated a willingness to go along with a US fozm&a of withdrawal to agreed lines which would be subject to necessary adjustments in the old lines. The Russian position, of course, is for unconditional with- draTml to the pre-June 1967 lines, fhere was also discussion as to whether they should complete the consideration of item l(i) and (ii) "before proceeding to item 2(a), (b) and (c), involving international waterways, refugees and guarantees of territorial inviolability and political independence.
    [Show full text]
  • The War of Attrition in the Middle East, 1969 – 1970.*
    The War of Attrition in the Middle East, 1969 – 1970 THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1969 – 1970.* Karol SORBY Institute of Oriental Studies, Slovak Academy of Sciences Klemensova 19, 813 64 Bratislava, Slovakia [email protected] After the June War of 1967 the issue at stake was the return of territories occupied by Israel. The purposely ambiguous UN Resolution 242 became a controversial issue as each party stressed another part of the resolution. As the Israelis refused the equation “land for peace” and the withdrawal from all territories, the Arab states at Khartoum decided to adopt a unified position. The Arab states agreed to unify efforts to “eliminate the effects of aggression” – not eliminate Israel. Although they pledged not to negotiate with Israel, they looked to the superpowers – the USA and USSR – to resolve the dispute. The USA was all too willing to sit back and wait for the Arab states to come around. After all, the Arab States wanted their land back and all they had to do to get it back was to sign peace treaties with Israel. To re-engage the Americans, Egypt engaged Israel in the so-called War of Attrition artillery duels and aerial dogfights across the Suez Canal (solely within its own occupied territory). The US Department of State made an attempt to break the impasse announcing the Rogers Plan in December 1969. Both sides at first turned down the plan, but the escalation of war during the first half of 1970 and the threat of superpower involvement may have changed the situation.
    [Show full text]