UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 9 Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:37:26 PM S-0865-0001 -09-00001 Expanded Number S-0865-0001 -09-00001 Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope No. 3 Gunnar Jarring (Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East) reports (with one item from 1972) - Jarring's Reports Date Created 02/03/1968 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0865-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit DECLASSIFIED PEP ST/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 3\e. firm* KK>*(J .3 £-' By {?!.&.&. Dear Mr. Secretary-General, Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council Resolution 2k2 (196?) of 22 November 196? for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement. In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the erw— two Governments to meet with me£ for conferences within the framework of the Security Councir^l Resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation. Yours sincerely, Gunnar Jarring Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East DECLASSIFIED ^_gMl^2|, 28aDEC 1984 By /??,£. Q. Dafce STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 1. The present deadlock in the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote agreement between the parties to the Middle East conflict is formally due to different inter- pretations of the object of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 196?. The Israeli contention is that the Security Council Resolution is a framework for agreement on the implementation of the provisions of the Resolution. The contention of the UAR is that the Security Council Resolution is intended for immediate implementation, which implies a precondition of Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in connexion with the June War. It has lately been stressed in Cairo that this includes also the Jordan part of Jerusalem and that there should be no doubt that evacuation of "every inch of Arab soil" is intended. Only after complete Israeli withdrawal would the UAR Government be willing to enter into a next stage which is the setting of a time-table for a speedy implementation of the resolution. 2. We thus have the Israeli conception that a solution should be realized through negotiation between the parties. It is accepted that such negotiation could be conducted under the auspices - 2 - of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, on condition that this implies also joint meetings between the parties. On the other hand, the UAR conception is that no negotiations should take place. The provisions of the Besolution should "be implemented directly. The UAR agrees to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General acting as a go-between the parties for the practical arrangements in connexion with the implementation of the Resolution. To agree to talks would imply surrender, according to the UAR conception. 3. Furthermore, Israel understands the Resolution to contain provisions for the replacement of the cease-fire arrangements "by permanent peace, negotiated accepted and contractually ratified by the States concerned in accordance with normal international practice (S/8494). The UAR conception is that the Security Council Resolution does not contain provisions for a peace- treaty, or for other contractual arrangements. After - or in connexion with - the implementation of the different provisions of the Resolution, the Security Council could give guarantees for the inviolability of the provisions implemented through separate resolutions. 4. Jordan, which originally followed the UAR line, has recently retreated to a less rigid line, although maintaining that their moderation is conditioned by a UAR acceptance of joint talks between the parties - 3 - under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Jordan has indicated willing- ness to send a representative on a ministerial level to New York for such negotiations without the pre- condition that Israel should have expressed her readi- ness to implement the Resolution - i.e. without Israeli withdrawal before the "beginning of such talks. The Jordan "moderation" is, however, blocked "by the UAR refusal to take any steps before Israel has declared her readiness to implement the Resolution - i.e. to evacuate all Arab territories occupied since the June War. 5. With the firm attitudes taken by Israel and the UAR there seems to be no possibility for "breaking the deadlock without their announcing substantial changes in their positions. The UAR conception that the acceptance of "negotiations" or "talks" would mean surrender to Israel contrasts with Israel's conception that evacuation of the occupied territories would deprive them of the possibility of negotiating secure frontiers. Against this background and against what has been said earlier in this memorandum, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the status quo will continue with Israel occupying Arab territories while the Arab countries concerned prepare themselves militarily for their recapture - Israel at the same time building up militarily against such an eventuality In the meantime, the activities of the Palestine Liberation movement and other Arab organizations will continue, probably on an increased scale, within the "boundaries of Israel and in the occupied territories, inciting Israel to new retaliation moves. 6. This situation may continue for a considerable time without a military confrontation on a large scale, "but with continuous incidents embittering the atmos- phere. The Ara"bs apparently are not ready for military action of the kind indicated above. In the meantime, in Cairo and elsewhere in the Arab world they are looking forward to the US elections, in the hope that these might cause a change in the American attitude to Israel; the attitude of Prance to the Arab Middle East is also considered to be encouraging; Israel is watching developments in Egypt, looking for weaknesses there and in other parts of the Arab world. These are signs that would indicate a continued interest in or hope for a political solution; but simultaneously, the military build-up will be accelerated, the bitterness and hatred will increase. If no peaceful solution can be found a new Middle East wair seems inevitable. 20 April 1968 DECLASSIFIED T/AI/326, 28 DEC 1984 * I r STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL p.] 1. A conclusive report to the Secretary-General should preferably toe short and concise and give the reasons for the present deadlock "betwen the parties, i.e. their different interpretations of the object of the Security Council resolution of 22 November. Reference ought to be made to the verbatim records of the Security Council debates of March and April and other Security Council documents wherein the parties have made clear their position on the general problem. This would, at least to some extent, exclude unnecessary debate, based on the contents of the report. 2. A Security Council debate on the report would probably._ concentrate on the central question if the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 is intended to be implemented or if it is a framework for negotiation on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution. 3. In all probability the UAR will ask the Security Council to pronounce itself on this question by passing a resolution "in clear language" that the object of the 22 November resolution is implementation - speedy and straightforward. if — ' • - 2 - 4. The Security Council would hardly Toe able to/ resolve that the resolution is not to "be implemented. The probability is that the debate would end in a consensus of some kind. However, it is difficult to see how this would solve the deadlock over the different interpretations of the object of the resolution of the parties concerned. 5. In all probability the Security Council in connexion with a debate of this kind, do its utmost to preserve the 22 November resolution, the unanimous acceptance of which was obtained after much compromise, perhaps not to be arrived at a second time. In that case a Special Representative of the Secretary- General wotild have to continue his activities, or renew them, on practically the same basis as before. 6. The question is thus if really any positive results can be achieved through a new Security Council debate and some new pronouncements in it on the main problem of differences and deadlock. A debate in the General Assembly would be even less constructive and would mainly serve propaganda purposes. 20 April 1968 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL P.M. on "Secure Boundaries" The question of the meaning of "secure boundaries" has been raised several times with the Israelis by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. No indication has ever been given - except for the Gaza Strip - about Israel's real intentions as to secure boundaries. It has been explained that these cannot be presented until negotiations with the Arab countries concerned have come into effect. The following indication about Israel's intentions seem however to be relevant. 1. Egypt a. The Gaza Strip should remain in Israeli hands. b. Vague indications about some area or areas in the Sinai that would be kept or exchanged against present Israeli territory. 2. Jordan a. East Jerusalem to be kept, but agreement with Jordan on free access-and the custodianship of the Moslem holy places.