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Case #2 United States of America (Respondent) Model International Court of Justice (MICJ) Case #2 United States of America (Respondent) Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. United States of America) Arkansas Model United Nations (AMUN) November 20-21, 2020 Teeter 1 Historical Context For years, there has been a consistent struggle between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 2018, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. embassy located in Tel Aviv would be moving to the city of Jerusalem.1 Palestine, angered by the embassy moving, filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2018.2 The history of this case, U.S. relations with Israel and Palestine, current events, and why the ICJ should side with the United States will be covered in this research paper. Israel and Palestine have an interesting relationship between war and competition. In 1948, Israel captured the west side of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians captured the east side during the Arab-Israeli War. Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948. In 1949, the Lausanne Conference took place, and the UN came to the decision for “corpus separatum” which split Jerusalem into a Jewish zone and an Arab zone.3 At this time, the State of Israel decided that Jerusalem was its “eternal capital.”4 “Corpus separatum,” is a Latin term meaning “a city or region which is given a special legal and political status different from its environment, but which falls short of being sovereign, or an independent city-state.”5 1 Office of the President, 82 Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem § (2017). 2 Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. United States) (I.C.J. Reports 2018 November 15, 2018). 3 Shlaim, A. (1977). The Study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. British Journal of International Studies, 3(1), 97-118. Retrieved November 3, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096792 4 “Statements of the Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion Regarding Moving the Capital of Israel to Jerusalem.” knesset.gov.il. Accessed November 3, 2020. https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/bengurion-jer.htm. 5 “Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem & the Occupation of Memory.” Columbia University: Advanced Architectural Design Studio VI (0AD). Teeter 2 On June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War broke-out and lasted until June 10, 1967. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan attempted to destroy the Jewish state with minor involvement from Iraq and Lebanon. After 36 hours of fighting, Israel captured the City of Jerusalem. After the third day of fighting, Israel captured the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and some of the West Bank. After capturing these lands, Israel focused its force on Syria and captured the Golan Heights. A ceasefire was signed between Israel and Syria on June 10. The war resulted in a victory for the State of Israel. The Six-Day War tripled Israel’s land size and added over a million Arab people under their domain. 15,000 Egyptians were killed, and another 5,600 were taken as prisoners. 6,000 Jordanians were casualties, according to King Hussein of Jordan. 1,000 Syrians died during the war. Israel had 700 casualties and 2,500 injured. Israel claimed to have a stronger tie to Jerusalem than any other country in the region.6 The Jerusalem law was passed by the Knesset in 1980 to establish Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel. The Supreme Court, home of the Prime Minister, and the Knesset (Parliament) are located in Jerusalem. Jerusalem is home to every seat of government.7 After the war ended, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242 and 338. Resolution 242 required Israel to withdraw all troops from the territory they conquered and acknowledged that Israel had no right to declare sovereignty over the land. In 1973, Resolution 338 was passed with the intention of a ceasefire in the Yom Kippur War and resulted in the fight continuing. After the fighting 6 “Six-Day War.” Accessed November 2, 2020. https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/six_days_eng.htm. 7 980 Basic Law- Jerusalem- Capital of Israel § (1980). Teeter 3 continued, the Security Council tried again with Resolution 339, which called for another ceasefire.8 In 1990, under the leadership of U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israel and the PLO signed several treaties called the Oslo Accords. This started the process of peace between the neighbors. Key agreements in the Oslo process were: Israel recognized the PLO, the PLO recognized Israel, recognized the Palestinians the right for self- determination, Israel would completely leave the Gaza Strip in 5 years, and the Oslo II Accord. The Oslo II accord allowed for the division of the West Bank into an area; the Palestinians were banned from 60% of the areas, the election of the Palestinian Legislative Council, the establishment of the Palestinian Police, and Israel would have to allow for safe passage from the strip to the West Bank.9 Jordan claimed sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 2003. Israel’s rebuttal was that Jordan had no sovereignty rights because an act of aggression acquired the land. Throughout the years of the state of Israel, the longest-serving Prime Minister is Benjamin Netanyahu. At the beginning of his second term (2009-current), Netanyahu stated that the only way freedom of religion could be ensured for all three of the major religions (Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) is through Israeli control.10 In 2018, the Knesset passed legislation requiring a two-thirds majority to transition any section of Jerusalem to another government. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said on multiple 8 “Security Council - Question of Palestine.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 3, 2020. https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/security-council/. 9 Indyk, Martin. “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East.” The Washington Institute: Soref Symposium, 1993. 10 Service, Haaretz, and News Agencies. “Netanyahu: Jerusalem Holy Sites Will Remain Israeli Forever.” Haaretz.com. Haaretz, January 11, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/1.5055284. Teeter 4 occasions that Jerusalem should be the capital of both Israel and Palestine but that “Under any peace agreement the capital of Israel will continue to be in Jerusalem."11 Until 1964, there was no recognized organization for the Palestinian people until the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). As part of the Oslo Accords, there was a mutual recognition agreement between the nations in 1993. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was formed. Hamas took control of the Gaza strip from the PLO in 2007 during the Battle of Gaza. The current leadership of the Palestinians claims sovereignty over the area that was once on the borders as of 1967, which would include East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is considered an occupied territory of Israel by the Palestinians. The PA passed a law declaring Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. Their official position is that the entire city of Jerusalem is considered an open city. An open city is a municipality that is not fortified or defended by any armed force by international law.12 PLO has developed a media campaign called Palestine 194. Palestine 194 strives for the acceptance of the State of Palestine as a full member of the United Nations. For this to happen, the U.S. has required that the PLO denounce all forms of terrorism. In November of 2012, the State of Palestine was given a non-member observer status of the United Nations.13 Palestine - United States Relations 11 “Netanyahu at Davos: Jerusalem to Remain Capital under Any Peace Agreement.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, January 29, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Benjamin-Netanyahu/WATCH- LIVE-Prime-Minister-Netanyahu-speaks-at-the-World-Economic-Forum-539789. 12 Ghanem, As'ad. "Palestinians in Israel — The Victory of Discourse vs. the Retreat of Politics." Middle East Journal 66, no. 2 (2012): 361-68. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23256688. 13 “Status of Palestine.” State of Palestine Mission to the United Nations. Accessed November 3, 2020. https://palestineun.org/status-of-palestine-at-the-united-nations/. Teeter 5 The United States of America has a difficult and complex relationship with the state of Palestine. The U.S. does not officially recognize the state of Palestine, however, accepts the PLO as the governing authority in the region following the Oslo accords.14 In October of 2018, the PLO closed their mission in Washington D.C. and the U.S. has no embassy or consulate in the region. The U.S. Embassy in Israel has a Palestinian Affairs Unit to watch and communicate with the PLO.15 The PLO was granted a presidential waiver to the Anti-Terrorism Act under the Reagan Administration to establish communications with the U.S. Discussion between the PLO and the U.S. ceased after the PLO refused to denounce an attack of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) under the George H.W. Bush Administration.16 Under the Clinton administration, the Oslo accords were signed in 1993, and the U.S. announced that they had re- established communication with the PLO. In the next few years, President Clinton allocated funds to build up the state of Palestine’s government under the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993 and again in 1995.17 Clinton became the first U.S. President to visit Palestine in 1998. Ties under the George W. Bush administration hardened with the establishment of the Palestine Economic Development Group, which would seek to establish better economic ties in the region.
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