Israel's Wars, 1947-93
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Israel’s Wars, 1947–93 Warfare and History General Editor Jeremy Black Professor of History, University of Exeter European warfare, 1660–1815 Jeremy Black The Great War, 1914–18 Spencer C. Tucker Wars of imperial conquest in Africa, 1830–1914 Bruce Vandervort German armies: war and German politics, 1648–1806 Peter H. Wilson Ottoman warfare, 1500–1700 Rhoads Murphey Seapower and naval warfare, 1650–1830 Richard Harding Air power in the age of total war, 1900–60 John Buckley Frontiersmen: warfare in Africa since 1950 Anthony Clayton Western warfare in the age of the Crusades, 1000–1300 John France The Korean War Stanley Sandler European and Native-American warfare, 1675–1815 Armstrong Starkey Vietnam Spencer C. Tucker The War for Independence and the transformation of American society Harry M. Ward Warfare, state and society in the Byzantine world, 565–1204 John Haldon Soviet military system Roger Reese Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800 John K. Thornton The Soviet military experience Roger Reese Warfare at sea, 1500–1650 Jan Glete Warfare and society in Europe, 1792–1914 Geoffrey Wawro Israel’s Wars, 1947–93 Ahron Bregman Israel’s Wars, 1947–93 Ahron Bregman London and NewYork First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, NewYork, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2001. © 2000 Ahron Bregman All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bregman, Ahron. Israel’s wars, 1947–93 / Ahron Bregman. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1.Arab–Israeli conflict. I.Title. DS119.76.B74 2000 956.04–dc21 99-054115 ISBN 0–415–21467–X (hbk) ISBN 0–415–21468–8 (pbk) ISBN 0-203-13244-0 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-17978-1 (Glassbook Format) In memory of my great uncle Ahron Friedman killed in the 1948 War of Independence Contents List of maps x Preface xi Abbreviations xiv 1 The 1947–9 war 1 2 A nation-in-arms 1949–67 26 3 The six bad years 1967–73 41 4 War and peace 1973–9 66 5 War in Lebanon 1982 95 6 Intifada 1987–93 118 7 Conclusions 134 Notes 138 Select bibliography 163 Index 166 ix List of Maps 1 Palestine 1947: the UN Partition Plan 8 2 Israel 1949: armistice lines 22 3 The 1967 Six Day War: Israel’s conquests 60 4 The 1973 Yom Kippur War: the Syrian front 88 5 The 1973 Yom Kippur War: the Egyptian front 91 6 Lebanon,‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ 6–11 June 1982 109 x Preface This book is the result of a suggestion made by Jeremy Black, general editor of Warfare and History, who thought that an account of Israel’s wars would be a useful addition to the series. Its publication was delayed by an invitation to act as a consultant and write the companion book for a six-part BBC Television documen- tary about the Arab–Israeli conflict (The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs). This has proved a benefit since, in the course of my work on the series, I came across material which I could never otherwise have obtained. Israel’s Wars, 1947–93 is, first and foremost, an overview of Israel’s wars with the Palestinians and Arabs. I start with the 1947–8 Jewish-Palestinian struggle for pos- session and mastery of the land of Palestine, and conclude with the Israeli–Palestin- ian confrontation which took place between 1987 and 1993, the so-called Intifada. In between I examine Israel’s wars with its Arab neighbours, principally Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the PLO in Lebanon, in the years 1948, 1956, 1967, 1968–70, 1973 and 1982. Israel’s Wars is not, however, only about battles and fighting, but also about the people of Israel, a nation-in-arms, who are, it is often said, ‘soldiers on eleven months’ annual leave’. By looking at almost five decades of Israeli– Palestinian– Arab conflict we can see that the Israelis, in spite of tremendous difficulties, have for many years demonstrated an extraordinary willingness to carry the burden, pay high taxes, endure long military service, and fight both in wars and between them. But after, and as a result of, the Six Day War of June 1967, as I will demonstrate, Israelis became more critical of their leadership, dissent grew, and there was also a pronounced tendency to reject the idea that preparations for war need always be at the expense of social services and justify indifference towards domestic problems. Still, in spite of growing dissent and criticism, the Israelis remained, in the post- 1967 war period, loyal to their leadership, always rallying behind it in times of war. The turning point, however, came during the 1982 war in Lebanon when, for the first time in Israel’s history, national solidarity showed signs of breaking down, and while the battle was still in progress Israelis protested against the war, and xi PREFACE some even declared their refusal to take part in it. This unprecedented challenge and decline in the motivation of Israelis to serve gathered pace after the Lebanon war and reached a peak during the Intifada, the Palestinian revolt in the occupied territories between 1987 and 1993. I link this trend mainly to a reduction in the level of the external threat to Israel’s existence, and suggest that during the first two or three decades of the state, a strong sense of external threat, fresh memories of the Holocaust and collective ideals and priorities had stiffened the will of Israelis to serve, fight and sacrifice. This determination was strengthened by the leadership’s success in cultivating the image of Israel as a small defenceless state surrounded by evil Arabs bent on her destruction; and, ironically, by the Arabs themselves, who played into their hands by exaggerating their own military capability and talking of dismantling the Jewish state, wiping it out and driving the Jews into the sea. However, with the external danger subsiding, the gradual disappearance of the Holocaust generation and a general shift from collective ideals and priorities to individual ones, there was also a decline of will among Israelis to serve and bear the burden, as was made very clear in Lebanon in 1982 and during the Intifada. This book is intended chiefly for the use of university students, and is designed to be rather more than a chronicle of events. There are frequent pauses to examine how things operate and for what reasons; and I often go beyond the task of narrative and description to comment and explain, so that the reader can elicit from the sequence of events some better understanding of how things turned out as they did. The book also contains new – never before published – material. Perhaps most notable is the revelation that Anwar Sadat’s right-hand man (who also worked for Sadat’s predecessor President Nasser as confidante and member of his presidential staff) was an agent of Mossad, Israel’s secret service. I expose, for the first time, the documents he passed to the Israelis which became the foundation of Israel’s strategy before the Yom Kippur War (‘The Conception’) and claim that from being an agent working exclusively for Mossad, he later became a double agent and worked also for Sadat, who sent him, on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, to meet the head of Mossad in London and to mislead him regarding the time Egypt would open fire. I have always believed that while one can learn history from documents, articles and books, it can be better understood if heard from those who have made it, for motives and personalities are important in the making of history. And though a person’s recollection tends to be clouded by later events, oral history is still an important complement to the written word and to our better understanding of history. In the last decade or so, in addition to sieving through piles of written material, I have had the opportunity to meet many who have taken part in making the history about which I am writing here. Their names are too numerous to mention, but I wish in particular to thank the following, from whom I have xii PREFACE benefited most: Amos Amir, Moshe Amirav, Meir Amit, Moshe Arens, Ehud Barak, Haim Bar Lev, Mordechai Bar On, Benyamin Begin, Yossi Beilin, Yossi Ben-Aharon, Avigdor Ben Gal, Benyamin Ben-Eliezer, Yosef Burg, Warren Christopher, Ben Zion Cohen, Avraham Dar, Robert Dassa, Uzi Dayan, Abba Eban, Rafael Eitan, Miriam Eshkol, Yeshayahu Gavish, Mordechai Gazit, Eli Geva, Benjamin Givli, Mordechai Gur, Eitan Haber, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Isser Harel, Yair Hirschfeld, Mordechai Hod, Yitzhak Hofi, Yehiel Kadishai, Lou Keddar, David Kimche, Yitzhak LeviLevitza, Uri Milstein, Amram Mitzna, Uzi Narkiss, Yitzhak Navon, Benjamin Netanyahu, Marcelle Ninio, Meir Pail, Dan Pattir, Matityahu Peled, Shimon Peres, Leah Rabin, Yitzhak Rabin, Itamar Rabinovich, Gideon Rafael, Ran Ronen (Peker), Elyakim Rubinstein, Yehoshua Saguey, Yossi Sarid, Uri Savir, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Shlomo Shamir, Yitzhak Shamir, Yaacov Sharett, Ariel Sharon, Yisrael Tal, Avraham Tamir, Yair Tzaban, Ezer Weizman, Aharon Yariv, Re’havham Ze’evi, and Eli Zeira.