The Atkin Paper Series Saving peace: The case for amending the Egypt-Israel peace treaty Dareen Khalifa, ICSR Atkin Fellow February 2013 About the Atkin Paper Series Thanks to the generosity of the Atkin Foundation, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) offers young leaders from Israel and the Arab world the opportunity to come to London for a period of four months. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide young leaders from Israel and the Arab world with an opportunity to develop their ideas on how to further peace and understanding in the Middle East through research, debate and constructive dialogue in a neutral political environment. The end result is a policy paper that will provide a deeper understanding and a new perspective on a specific topic or event. Author Dareen holds an MA in Human Rights from University College London, and a BA in Political Science from Cairo University. She has been working as a consultant for Amnesty International in London. In Egypt she worked on human rights education and advocacy with the National Council for Human Rights, in addition to a number of nongovernmental human rights organisations. Dareen has also worked as a freelance researcher and as a consultant for a number of civil society organisations and think tanks in Egypt.Additionally, Dareen worked as a Fellow at Human Rights First, Washington DC. She has contributed to several human rights reports, The Global Integrity Anti-Corruption report on Egypt, For a Nation without Torture, and the Verité International Annual Report on Labour Rights in Egypt. Editor Dr Peter R. Neumann Director, ICSR Editor Dr Ahron Bregman King’s College London Editor Jeni Mitchell King’s College London Editorial Assistant Katie Rothman ICSR To order hardcopies or contact the editor, please write to [email protected]. All papers in the Atkin Paper Series can be downloaded free of charge at www.icsr.info Introduction his paper examines the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and the prospects for revising the treaty in light of the 2011 popular uprising in TEgypt and the subsequent political changes that are currently sweeping the region. The issue of revising the treaty has been raised extensively in Egypt since the 2011 ‘Eilat incident’, in which unidentified gunmen attacked Israeli soldiers and civilians near the Red Sea resort town of Eilat, triggering a serious escalation in violence. Israel launched three nights of air raids on the Gaza Strip and pursued gunmen across the Egyptian border, killing six Egyptian soldiers and generating a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. In response to an outburst of public anger, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military faction serving as interim leaders of Egypt following the revolution, considered the possibility of annulling or amending the treaty (an act that, from a legal perspective, cannot be taken unilaterally by any party to the treaty). In a radical shift from the policies of the just-ousted President Mubarak, former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf announced shortly after the incident that the peace treaty with Israel ‘is not sacred’ and could be amended. However, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry later declared that Cairo was committed to preserving the treaty ‘as long as Israel was committed to its obligations literally and in essence’.1 The killing of Egyptian soldiers by Israeli forces represented a nadir within an already deteriorating relationship. Egyptian-Israeli relations have acquired the highest level of uncertainty and ambiguity since the 1970s, as manifested in a series of incidents – such as protestors in Cairo ransacking the Israeli Embassy, and the approximately fifteen militant attacks sabotaging Sinai pipelines that export gas to Israel – as well as the gradual reduction of trade with Israel. These developments reflect the growing negative public sentiment towards the Egyptian-Israeli relationship and the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, culminating in calls for the amendment of the treaty. Mohammed Seif al-Dawla, an adviser to current Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, has announced that amending the treaty is ‘a matter of time’ and that he would submit a proposal for introducing changes to the treaty. However, President Morsi has confirmed that his government will respect and uphold Egypt’s international commitments, including the peace treaty. Meanwhile, Israeli anti-Islamist concerns mounted after the inauguration of President Morsi in June 2012. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman described the revision of the treaty as a ‘slippery slope’, and later told an Israeli radio station that Egyptians were ‘deluding themselves and deluding others’ in discussing treaty revision.2 The conflicting statements and the uncertainty accompanying the political situation in Egypt – especially with the erosion of security in the Sinai Peninsula, which has acted as a buffer zone between the two countries for over thirty years – has highlighted concerns over treaty revision and the ability of the new Egyptian 1 government to uphold its obligations with respect to containing the security situation in Sinai. The political and social transformations in the Middle East following the ‘Arab uprisings’ represent a unique opportunity for the peace process. Although the Israeli government tends to portray recent developments in the Arab world as a threat to Israel and to the 1979 peace treaty, in my opinion the prospects of harnessing these developments to foster lasting peace in the region are much greater. It is more likely that the new, popularly elected Arab regimes will try to maintain their commitment to peace with Israel while simultaneously endeavouring to please the angry masses in their countries who demand foreign policy adjustments in light of Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people. That compromise could be achieved through the revision of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. This paper explores the underlying reasons for revising the treaty; the elements that could and/or need to be changed and possible demands from Egypt; and the implications of such amendments. I also seek to identify the effect such a revision would likely have on Egyptian-Israeli relations and on the peace process. 2 ‘There can be no war without Egypt and there can be no peace without Egypt’. Former Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat (1970 –1981) n 26 March 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty, the first of its kind between an Arab country and the state of Israel. This peace treaty Oended the state of war between the two nations, constrained both parties from carrying out any hostile activities, and demilitarised the Sinai Peninsula. Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from the Sinai and deploy them along the internationally recognised border, and to relinquish the settlements, military bases, infrastructure and oil fields that it had acquired. This created a permanent border between the two countries and initiated a process of normalisation of diplomatic and economic relations. The 1979 peace treaty contained nine articles, along with a military annex stating the terms of Israeli withdrawal and the security arrangements, and another annex detailing how the two parties would deal with each other in terms of their economic, social and cultural relations. Additionally, both parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the United States that stated the obligations of both parties in case of any violations of the security agreement, and the role that the United Nations (UN) would play in supervising the implementation of this annex (for example, with respect to verification in limited force zones, the establishment of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones). The agreement also incorporated the American aid that would be provided to Egypt in the form of military and economic assistance, which has averaged approximately $2 billion a year since 1979. Military aid has arrived via a funding stream known as Foreign Military Financing; amounting to approximately $1.3 billion since 1987, it enables Egypt to purchase American-manufactured military goods and services. The agreement also provided for the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and recognition of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran as international waterways. The Straits of Tiran is the narrow sea passage, roughly 13 kilometres wide, between the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas; it had been a source of tension between the two countries and was one of the main reasons for the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1976 (after Egyptian President Jamal Abd El Nasser decided to close the Straits to all ships flying the Israeli flag). Finally, and most notably, the treaty also made Egypt the first Arab country to officially recognise the state of Israel. 3 It is important to understand that by the end of the 1960s, Egypt had suffered a number of setbacks, including the defection of Syria from the United Arab Republic, the crumbling of the Egyptian army after it launched an unjustified war in Yemen, and more significantly, defeat at the hands of Israeli forces in 1967 – all of which contributed to a crumbling economy and a sense of national defeat. When President Anwar Al Sadat took over in 1970, he worked to distance Egypt from pan- Arab grievances, after a long period of unwinnable wars undertaken by Nasser under the slogans of pan-Arabism and a united Arab front. Sadat realised that the time had come where constant wars were not going to achieve any direct, on-the-ground gains for Egypt. In an unprecedented act, Sadat decided to conduct the first official visit of any Arab leader to Israel, signalling to the world that a new era of Egyptian foreign policy towards the peace process had begun. His act garnered significant criticism regionally, and much admiration internationally. For that, and for the subsequent successful peace negotiations, Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.