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Home , 1982 Lebanon War, Amos Yaron, Anwar Sadat, Bassam Shakaa, Bernard Avishai, Camp David

Camp David’s Shadow: The , , and the Palestinian Question, 1977-1993

Seth Anziska

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2015

© 2015 Seth Anziska All rights reserved

ABSTRACT

Camp David’s Shadow: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Question, 1977-1993

Seth Anziska

This dissertation examines the emergence of the 1978 and the consequences for Israel, the , and the wider . Utilizing archival sources and oral history interviews from across Israel, , , the United States, and the

United Kingdom, Camp David’s Shadow recasts the early history of the peace process. It explains how a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict with provisions for a resolution of the Palestinian question gave way to the facilitation of bilateral peace between

Egypt and Israel. As recently declassified sources reveal, the completion of the Camp David

Accords—via intensive American efforts— actually enabled Israeli expansion across the Green

Line, undermining the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty in the occupied territories. By examining how both the concept and diplomatic practice of autonomy were utilized to address the Palestinian question, and the implications of the subsequent Israeli and U.S. military intervention in Lebanon, the dissertation explains how and why the Camp David process and its aftermath adversely shaped the prospects of a negotiated settlement between and

Palestinians in the 1990s. In linking the developments of the late and with the

Madrid Conference and in the decade that followed, the dissertation charts the role played by American, Middle Eastern, international, and domestic actors in curtailing the possibility of Palestinian self-determination.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... ii

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter One: Envisioning a Middle East Settlement, 1976-1977 ...... 34

Chapter Two: The Failed Promise Of Geneva, 1977-1978 ...... 91

Chapter Three: Preventing a Palestinian State: The Autonomy Talks, 1979-1980 ...... 163

Chapter Four: Neoconservatives Rising: Reagan and the Middle East, 1980-1982 ...... 217

Chapter Five: The Limits of Lebanon, 1982-1984 ...... 268

Chapter Six: Alternatives to the PLO?: 1985-1988 ...... 324

Conclusion: A Stillborn Peace, 1989-1993 ...... 352

Bibliography ...... 375

i Acknowledgements

This dissertation grew out of questions I started asking over thirteen years ago, and I have incurred many debts in the hunt for answers along the way. As an undergraduate at Columbia

University, I was lucky to take a historiography seminar with , who then generously agreed to supervise an independent study on the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His guidance and mentorship ever since—from advising my senior thesis to sponsoring this doctoral dissertation—went above and beyond all possible expectation. I have learned a great deal from him not only about the Middle East, but also about the importance of scholarship that is engaged with, and informed by, the world beyond the academy. Elizabeth Blackmar taught me how to formulate research questions, how to find my way inside the archives, and how to write my way outside of them. Her exemplary training set me on my way, and her insights helped sharpen this project at crucial junctures to bring it to completion.

Coursework and teaching with Anders Stephanson exposed me to the conceptual challenges of international history, and his penetrating approach to U.S. foreign relations enriched my understanding of and its practitioners. A seminar in American Political

Development with Ira Katznelson brought Political Science into fruitful dialogue with U.S. history, and Ira’s incisive feedback on papers and chapter drafts inestimably sharpened the formulation of my argument and underscored the importance of writing with a measured tone.

The remaining members of my dissertation committee supported this project with enthusiasm.

Ron Zweig offered research advice, spirited conversation about Israeli history, and a scholarly community at NYU’s Taub Center. Dan Kurtzer sat for a formal interview about his experience in the Reagan administration, enduring the historian’s attempt to understand and explain policymaking, including his own role in the story that follows.

ii In Columbia’s history department, it was a privilege to work with Mark Mazower, Sam

Moyn, Michael Stanislawski, and Rebecca Kobrin, while farther afield I benefitted immensely from conversations with Linda Kerber, Gershon Shafir, Derek Penslar, David Myers, Marilyn

Young, Gabi Pieterberg, William Quandt, George Chauncey, Ron Gregg, Jon Randal, Lawrence

Wright, Sylvain Cypel, Jacob Norris, Andrew Arsan, Osamah Khalil, Paul Chamberlin, and the late . I have valued the continued engagement and support of my Oxford supervisors,

Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan, and have been the beneficiary of George El-Hage’s formidable

Arabic training many years ago.

The research for this dissertation was carried out across several continents, made possible by generous funding from Columbia’s Middle East Institute and Institute for Israel and Jewish

Studies; a field grant from Columbia’s Center for Democracy, Toleration and Religion; a GSAS

International Travel Fellowship; a Boren NSEP Graduate Fellowship for International Study at the American University of ; a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship at the

Hebrew University of ; a Research Exchange Fellowship at the School of

Economics; and a Dissertation Completion Fellowship from the Society for Historians of

American Foreign Relations. A Wexner Foundation Graduate Fellowship in Jewish Studies supported my doctoral studies early on, and continues to provide an exceptional community of friends and colleagues deeply invested in the issues raised by this work.

In Atlanta, Keith Shuler, Brittany Parris, and Amanda Pellerin assisted with my research at the Carter Library, while Sarah Anne and David Minkin offered hospitality. In ,

Kelly Barton and Shelly Williams guided my work at the Reagan Library, while Evan and Alison

Anziska and their family provided a second home. In Stanford, Carol Leadenham assisted at the

Hoover Institution Archives, and Judy and Milt Grinberg put me up in sunny Palo Alto. Mary

iii Curry assisted with sources at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., and Ariana

Berengaut offered a place to stay and lots of encouragement.

In Jerusalem, Helena Vilensky, Galia Weissman, Louise Fischer and Arnon Lamfrom welcomed me at the Israel State Archives and answered every query with pleasure (and more files), and Ziv Rubinovitz, Rami Shtivi, Dror Bar Yosef, Iris Berlatzky, Ori Rub, and Moshe

Fuksman-Sha’al did the same at the Heritage Center. Bernard Avishai, Sidra

DeKoven Ezrahi, Gerhom Gorenberg, Amos Goldberg, Omri Ben Yehuda, Eitan Buchvall, Amit

Mandelkern, Yoav Alon, Maya Katzir, Jeremie Bracka, Michelle Lesh, and Hagai and Judith

Tamir offered insights, friendship, and conversation.

At the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, Jeanette Serouphim and Mona Nsouli provided invaluable help, and Ramzi Mezher, Wael Lazkani, Lina Mounzer, Kristine Khouri,

Mazen Khaled, Karam Nachar, Eyad Houssami, Jowe Harfouche, Meris Lutz, Omar Christidis,

Josh Hersh, and Andrew Lee Butters helped me settle and kept me coming back to Lebanon. A chance visit to the Arab Image Foundation and meeting with Akram Zaatari proved fortuitous, shaping my approach to history in exciting new ways. In London, the Department of

International History at LSE hosted me while writing up, and Virginia Forbes, Ahmad Khalidi,

Natasha Gill, Daniel Levy, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Jill Waters, Lisa Jepson, Davina

Mendelsohn, Rebecca Steinfeld, Charlie Keidan, Dimi Reider, Dania Akkad, and Julian

Weinberg pulled me away from my desk.

Fellow graduate students back in New York, especially Rosie Bsheer, Victoria Phillips,

Stephen Wertheim, Simon Stevens, Simon Taylor, Tsolin Nalbantian, Liz Marcus, Suzy

Schneider, and Tom Meaney offered support and solidarity, while Natasha Wheatley was a roommate, confidant, interlocutor, and so much more.

iv Many friends and colleagues provided historical documents, bounced around ideas, and offered critical feedback on various aspects of the project, including Tehila Sasson, Ahmed

Dailami, Avi Raz, Noa Schonmann, Dan Strieff, Dirk Moses, Simon Jackson, Sewell Chan,

Victor McFarland, Nathan Kurz, Shay Hazkani, Nadim Bawalsa, Laila Ballout, Daniel Zoughbie,

Maher Bitar, Jessica Marglin, Jennifer Johnson, Raffaella Del Sarto, Kristen Loveland, Zev

Nagel, Olivia Sohns, and members of the Siyagh reading group. Even when I seemed to vanish from the earth, Brook Armstrong, Daniel Altschuler, Allen Gillers, Lea Neubert, Florian

Hoffmann, Nahid Siamdoust, Rebecca Klein, Marc Grinberg, and Shadi Hamid managed to find me. Fredrik Meiton watched this project from the start, enduring all the highs and lows, with abiding friendship and fantastic humor.

My family has been a constant source of love and support, no matter where all my questions took me. It is a tribute to their openness and curiosity (and Suzanne’s last minute copy editing) that I could find my way through it all. I met Tareq Baconi on the way to start researching in earnest, and without him, I never would have finished. He has opened my eyes to the world in ways I am still coming to appreciate, with endless patience, laughter, and love.

v Introduction

On the evening of 3 April 2014, Jimmy and attended the gala opening of a new play staged at Washington’s Arena Theatre, entitled Camp David. Conceived by Carter’s

White House media advisor Gerald Rafshoon, the production focused on the role of the 39th

President and his counterparts in Israel and , Prime Minister Menachem Begin and

President Anwar al-, in the negotiations of September 1978. The play recounted the thirteen fraught days during which the foundation of an enduring Egyptian-Israeli peace was forged.

Upon entering the theatre, the former President and First Lady received a rousing standing ovation from the audience, which included past members of the Carter administration and leading figures in Washington’s political establishment.1

It was a telling moment, one that took place in the midst of yet another round of failed negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When asked about U.S. Secretary of State

John Kerry’s exhaustive attempts to revive the peace process under President ,

Carter praised Kerry for making a “heroic effort” to achieve peace. After watching the performance, Carter remarked that the “main lesson that will come from this play is that peace is possible.”2 This assertion, from the man who gambled his entire presidency on Arab-Israeli peace, was a reminder of the tenuous but dogged persistence that has characterized U.S.

1 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Carters Return to Capital, On Stage,” New York Times, 2 April 2014; and Lucy McCalmont and Patrick Gavin, “ Raves over Camp David Play,” Politico, 3 April 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/jimmy-carter-camp-david-arena-stage-washington-dc-105373.html (accessed 28 Jan 2015). The play starred Ron Rifkind as Begin, Khaled Nabaway as Sadat and Richard Thomas as a young Jimmy Carter. Rafshoon, who directed media coverage during the summit itself, produced the play as a means to further burnish Carter’s legacy. “Acolytes hope,” Stolberg reported, that the play “will be a powerful reminder of the signature triumph of the Carter presidency and perhaps revive the decades-long effort to rehabilitate him.”

2 See McCalmont and Gavin, “Jimmy Carter Raves over Camp David Play.”

1 diplomacy toward the region. In American public consciousness, the Camp David Accords endure as a moment of rare triumph for an administration beset by accusations of domestic neglect and growing American weakness abroad.3 Under Carter’s guidance, the United States acted as an effective broker to secure a peace that has persisted as the cornerstone of regional politics for over thirty-five years.

But from the vantage point of Palestinian nationalists in Beirut and in the streets of other

Arab capitals at the time, Camp David appeared very differently. Having struggled to achieve political recognition in the aftermath of dispersal and regional violence, leaders of the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) viewed Sadat’s agreement with Begin as an abandonment of their cause. Sidestepping the question of Palestinian self-determination in the and Gaza

Strip, territories under Israeli occupation since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Accords had secured bilateral peace for Egypt and suggested the negotiation of local autonomy for Arab residents under Israeli occupation. While moving towards the endorsement of a political settlement that would provide the basis for territorial sovereignty alongside Israel in the 1970s, the outcome of Camp David seemed to foreclose the possibility of eventual statehood. After diplomatic gains in and recognition by President Carter that they deserved a “homeland,”

Palestinians now found themselves shut out of the incipient peace process and consigned to the sidelines as Egypt negotiated what little political future Palestinians might possibly have.

The persistence of Palestinian statelessness as well as the broader context of political upheaval in the Middle East in the decades that followed begs a revisiting of Camp David’s

3 The Carter presidency has been the subject of critical revision. See Betty Glad, An Outsider in the : Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (Cambridge: Press, 2014); and Daniel Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York: , 2015).

2 precise historical significance. While it secured the first treaty between Israel and an Arab state, the Accords also served to undermine a political resolution of the Palestinian question and bolstered expansion in the West Bank and . When framed in this way, a moment of seemingly incontrovertible diplomatic promise raises several interrelated questions: How did the emergence of the Accords and the autonomy talks that followed forestall the possibility of Palestinian self-determination? To what extent did the U.S. role in facilitating

Arab-Israeli negotiations adversely shape Palestinian political aspirations? How did Israeli leaders view the Palestinian issue, and what vision did they have for the fate of the occupied territories and the inhabitants who lived there? Why did Arab leaders—particularly the Egyptian government of Anwar al-Sadat—entertain a limited autonomy model? Could PLO leaders have avoided the crippling political fate of Camp David and the consequences of its military aftermath during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon? Did internal political developments in the United

States—both the neoconservative turn from Carter to Reagan and the active engagement of domestic Jewish communal leaders—shape foreign policy towards this issue? Did the context of the play a role in these developments, and if so, how might global events have circumscribed the effectiveness of U.S. and international diplomacy? Having achieved recognition by the early 1990s, what accounted for the PLO’s failure to end the Israeli occupation and secure sovereign statehood? Why was the attainment of Palestinian political rights well after the end of the age of decolonization so hard to achieve? Finally, what might developments in this period tell us about the underlying viability of a two-state solution to end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians?

This dissertation begins to answer these questions by tracing the fate of the “Palestinian question”—what I am describing as the diplomatic negotiations over Palestinian self-

3 determination on the international stage—from its emergence as a central feature of any Middle

East settlement in the late 1970s to the onset of the peace process that brought Palestinian leaders to the negotiating table in the early 1990s. It provides the first study based on primary sources of how Palestinian self-determination was conceptualized and debated by American, Israeli,

Egyptian, and transnational actors in this period, a crucial time in the broader international history of the twentieth century Middle East. Drawing on access to newly declassified records and research in over two dozen official and private archives, as well as oral history interviews across Israel, the West Bank, Lebanon, the United States, and the , the dissertation is positioned across geographic divisions, disparate historiographies, and scattered repositories in , Hebrew, and English, giving voice to a cross-section of local agents, ideologies and external powers.

My dissertation argues that the tendency to valorize Camp David has obscured the structural patterns enshrined by these early negotiations. It has led scholars of the region to decouple more recent diplomatic and political failures from the historical antecedents that produced them. By reassessing the negotiations that led to the summit and its consequences, the project complicates the dominant interpretation of Camp David as “heroic diplomacy.”4

Examining the years between Jimmy Carter’s November 1976 election and the signing of the

Oslo Accords in September 1993, Camp David’s Shadow seeks to explain how the initial articulation of a comprehensive framework for Middle East peace at a revived Geneva

Conference gave way to a narrower agreement between Egypt and Israel at Camp David,

4 Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Routledge, 1999).

4 accompanied by autonomy talks that intensified Israel’s hold on the occupied territories and eviscerated the possibility of self-determination for the Palestinians.

While an Egyptian-Israeli settlement was indeed a significant achievement, it was reached at great and recurring expense. For Israel, the primary outcome of the peace treaty was the end of the traditional military rivalry with a neighboring Arab state. But it also helped secure legitimacy for the extension of Israeli state sovereignty beyond the 1967 borders. For the

Palestinians, Camp David was a crucial moment of disenfranchisement. It marked the first instance of post-1948 discussion of their plight on a global scale, but excluded them from negotiations to decide on their political fate.

The dissertation further explores how Israel’s expansionist ambitions in Lebanon were fostered in the aftermath of the Camp David negotiations. It links the political efforts to defeat

Palestinian with the military destruction visited upon a country already crippled by civil war. Among those who lost their lives during Israel’s invasion were hundreds of innocent

Palestinian civilians massacred by Phalange militiamen in Beirut’s Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, who were granted entry into the camps by Israeli forces who had prior knowledge of

Maronite plans to ‘correct’ the demographic challenge posed by the unwelcome Palestinian presence in the country. Drawing on newly available Israeli government documents, and secret records obtained through a lawsuit involving the massacre, my dissertation provides new texture and detail to understanding how and why events transpired as they did in Beirut, and what the events of 1982 mean for the broader history of this period.

U.S. officials, unwittingly drawn into the tragedy of Sabra and Shatila, first conceived of their diplomatic engagement regarding the Palestinian question as a promising way to peacefully resolve Israel’s conflict with the . Drawing on the new opportunities provided by the

5 election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, these officials worked to overhaul the prevailing approach to regional peacemaking by launching an initiative for a comprehensive settlement at a revived

Geneva Conference. Instead, Egypt’s desire for bilateral peace as a means to secure Western backing and Israel’s willingness to return the in exchange for security and continued presence in the West Bank proved to be more significant. Despite American misgivings, the success of the Egyptian-Israeli bilateral peace and domestic constraints before the 1980 U.S. election privileged the narrow ends proffered by Israel at the autonomy talks launched in the spring of 1979. These discussions drew the U.S. more firmly into the role of external mediator in the Middle East, acting essentially as a salve to Israeli security concerns.

Throughout the negotiations, Israeli leaders from the Labor and parties demonstrated incredible focus on achieving targeted political ends. The skill with which they practiced diplomacy, managing to divert U.S. and Arab efforts away from securing Palestinian self-determination towards more limited rights for Palestinians, was remarkable. The rhetorical framing of the Palestinian question in the narrowest possible terms provided a logic to the negotiations around Camp David and the autonomy talks that followed, which have continued to inform the structure and content of Palestinian political life today. By seizing on particularly narrow language and limited categories to engage with the Palestinian question, Israeli officials successfully eviscerated the possibility of sovereign statehood.

Jimmy Carter’s replacement by , and the attendant ideological and political transformations of the 1980s on the American domestic scene, further exacerbated the

Palestinian plight. Under the guise of a Cold War revival in the Middle East, U.S. officials became implicated in the vicissitudes of the Palestinian predicament in Lebanon, and subsequently pursued alternatives to direct engagement with the PLO. The eventual recognition

6 of the organization, as Cold War concerns diminished and international acceptance of Palestinian self-determination grew stronger, emerged after years of neglecting the physical transformations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli settlements, which Carter had strenuously opposed, were no longer deemed illegal in the Reagan White House. The ensuing 1991-1993 negotiations in Madrid and Washington left the Palestinians with little space to maneuver, as the territory on which they hoped to establish sovereign rule had already been truncated, and the rights afforded to them amounted to little more than the autonomy proposals first introduced by Menachem

Begin in 1977.

In recounting this history, my dissertation demonstrates how a confluence of international diplomacy, shifting regional politics, and local developments on the ground between 1977 and

1993 produced an outcome that foreclosed a national solution to the Palestinian question while extending Israeli sovereignty inside the occupied territories. If we want to understand why the

Palestinian question remains among the most vexing problems of international diplomacy, we must revisit the years in which the very terms of political engagement were substantively debated by U.S., Israeli, British, and Arab officials. After providing background in the next section as to the reemergence of the Palestinian question in the late 1970s, the subsequent section describes the individual chapters of the dissertation and then elaborates on methodology, sources, and the wider historiography that informs this project.

The United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Question, 1948-1976

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States assumed a position of prominence in the Middle East, filling the power vacuum left by departing colonial powers.5 The guiding

5 See Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (:

7 motivation behind U.S. involvement in the region after 1945 shifted away from rhetoric defending self-determination, which characterized ’s Fourteen Points, to a more strategic interest in securing access to oil resources and containing the .6

Ideological support for , a modern national movement seeking the establishment of a

Jewish state in Palestine, could also be found in the White House and Congress. This support conflicted with more pragmatic attitudes in the departments of State and Defense and the Central

Intelligence Agency. President Harry S. Truman, much to the consternation of some of his advisors, was the first foreign leader to recognize the newly created state of Israel in 1948.7

Over 700,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from territories that became Israel in the course of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, an event they describe as the , or “catastrophe.”8

American policymakers focused exclusively on the humanitarian needs of these refugees rather than the political dimension of their dispossession. This approach was reflected in the extensive support for the refugee resettlement work of the Relief Works Agency

(UNRWA). It also shaped the course of American relations with Israel and the Palestinians in the ensuing decades, as the burgeoning refugee population in the neighboring Arab states of

Lebanon, and faced the consequences of prolonged statelessness.

Beacon Press, 2009); and Osamah F. Khalil, “The Crossroads of the World: U.S. and British Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Construct of the Middle East, 1902-2007.” 38:2 (April 2014): 299-344.

6 On Wilson’s promise, see Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

7 On changes in the Pentagon’s attitude towards Israel, see Irene Gendzier, Dying to Forget: The Foundation of United States Policy in the Middle East: Oil, Palestine and Israel, 1945-1949 (New York: Press, 2015). On Truman, see the controversial book by John Judis, Genesis: Truman, , and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014) and the important critique by Bernard Wasserstein, “Revisiting Zionism,” The National Interest, March/April 2014.

8 On 1948, see Ahmad H. Sa’di and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds., Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and , The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

8 U.S. support for Israel was not inevitable or historically consistent in the early years of

Israel’s existence. Rather, it only took on its “special” characteristics later on.9 In the wake of

1948, the U.S. generally displayed an even-handed stance toward Israel and the Arab world as part of a broader Cold War strategy. During the administration of President Dwight

D. Eisenhower, this approach dovetailed with the , a strategy aimed at wresting individual Arab countries away from the Soviet Union.10

Eisenhower’s approach to the Middle East culminated with his forceful opposition to the

British, French, and Israeli Tripartite Aggression during the of 1956. The President’s critical stance was a result of persistent concerns that Israeli actions were undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East.11 The U.S. imposed against Israel, even threatening to expel the country from the United Nations and disassociate from it politically.12

An explicit alliance with Israel could have undermined relations with Arab states. As Secretary of State noted, “backing Israel might be very costly to vital United States national interests.”13 Although⁠ Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula during the Suez campaign, he also acknowledged the legitimacy of Israeli security concerns.

John F. Kennedy’s arrival in the White House heralded a shift in U.S. policy towards the

Middle East, with the new president taking bold steps to engage with adversaries like President

9 See Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

10 See Osamah Khalil, “Pax Americana: The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948-2008,” The New Centennial Review 8:2 (2008), 4; and Salim Yaqub, Containing : The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

11 See Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Khalidi, Sowing Crisis.

12 See Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948: A ‘Special Relationship?’” Diplomatic History, 22:2 (1998), 233.

13 Quoted in Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948,” 234.

9 in Egypt in a bid to promote regional stability.14 Yet the shifting reality of the Cold War also pushed the U.S. much closer to Israel, and Kennedy began to treat the young country as a bulwark against growing Soviet interests in the Middle East. To this end, U.S. policymakers stressed shared values with the and offered military and economic aid to assert regional influence. Kennedy, in the view of one Israeli scholar, “was the first president to define U.S.-Israeli relations as special, to take seriously Israel’s security problems, and to provide Israel with major defensive arms.”15 As Warren Bass details in his aptly named study of this period, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel

Alliance, Israel managed to introduce a nuclear program despite Kennedy’s deep concern with proliferation.16

The 1967 War and its Aftermath

The replacement of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion with in 1963 and the onset of Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency further strengthened U.S.-Israeli relations.

Eshkol gave way on nuclear development and allowed periodic U.S. inspection of the Dimona

Reactor in return for greater military coordination and aid. Johnson, who was personally “warm and admiring” toward Israel, supplied the country with direct arm shipments, including Skyhawk

14 Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also the critical review of Simon Stevens, “Non- and the United States,” H-1960s (August 2014).

15 Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948,” 236-237.

16 See Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). As Avner Cohen shows, they did so by deceiving the Americans, who only found out during the Johnson administration. See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

10 aircraft with strike capability.17 Having also supplied arms to and Jordan,

Johnson’s alignment with Israel was seen as a move to counter Soviet regional influence.

Johnson’s focus on Vietnam may have shifted the Middle East to a lower priority, but the outbreak of a full scale Arab-Israeli war in (“the Six Day War”) moved the region and the fate of U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states to center stage. America’s political backing “enabled Israel to realize its military aims free of the threat of Soviet intervention.”18

Israel’s swift victory in the 1967 war was a watershed moment, not least because it secured control of Arab territory in the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan

Heights.19 Johnson decided there should not be a return to the status quo, supporting Eshkol’s bid to retain the territories until the Arab states recognized Israel and made peace.20 This stance was codified in November 1967 via UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was understood internationally as a guideline for pursuing an exchange of “,” but according to some opinions did not call for a full withdrawal from all the territories. The resolution also did not refer to the Palestinians directly, calling for a “just settlement to the refugee problem,” without mentioning the fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.21 The creation of the first settlements in the aftermath of the 1967 war augured the start of a decades-long occupation that

17 See William Quandt, Peace Process American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 23; and Bar-Siman-Tov, 238.

18 Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948,” 240.

19 On 1967, see Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War (New Haven: Press, 2012); Wm. Roger Louis and , eds., The 1967 Arab- Israeli War: Origins and Consequences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East (London: Picador, 2008).

20 William Quandt, “Forty Years in Search of Arab-Israeli Peace," Macalester International 23:9 (2009), 25. On Johnson and 1967, see Olivia Louise Sohns, “Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Arab-Israeli Conflict” (Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 2014).

21 On the making of 242, see Nigel Ashton, “Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,” The International History Review, advance access 18 March 2015.

11 would indelibly mark U.S. involvement in the region.22

Even with its expansive territorial aspirations, Israel was seen as a regional ally capable of defending U.S. interests in the Middle East. The election of President challenged this new reality. Nixon was suspicious of Washington’s tilt toward Jerusalem, and equally suspicious that missteps in the Arab world had undermined U.S. strategic interests in the

Middle East. Soon after he entered office in 1969, he told Secretary of State William Rogers that he sought an “even-handed policy,” including Israel’s return of the territories occupied in 1967, but he faced opposition both from Israel and members of his own administration.23 National

Security Advisor , who opposed Nixon’s plan for a regional peace settlement, stated, “The longer Israel holds its conquered Arab territory, the longer the Soviets cannot deliver what the want.”24

A crucial development in U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states followed after

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death in . The new Egyptian president,

Anwar al-Sadat, pivoted his country westward, seeking to align with the U.S. rather than the

Soviet Union.25 In a bid to force a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sadat launched the

1973 October War against Israel. As historian Craig Daigle has argued, Sadat wanted to create a

“crisis of detente” so as to break the region’s status quo. Following an Arab attack on the

22 For the best account of the origins of the settlement project and their growth during this period, see Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006).

23 Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 17.

24 Ibid., 72.

25 See James Stocker, “Diplomacy as Counter-revolution? The ‘Moderate States’, the Fedayeen and State Department Initiatives Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1970,” Cold War History 12:3 (2012): 407–428; and Paul Thomas Chamberlin's review of Stocker in H-Diplo, no. 381 (January 2013). On Sadat, see David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber and Faber, 1981).

12 morning of Yom Kippur, the holiest day on the Jewish religious calendar, Israel’s leadership sought U.S. aid to turn the tide of the fighting. A massive American airlift of tanks and airplanes reversed the Egyptian and Syrian advances, and further solidified close U.S.-Israeli relations.

This close relationship was challenged by the mid-1970s when OPEC’s oil embargo ignited an energy crisis that hampered global economic development.26

With Nixon distracted by the Watergate scandal, Kissinger negotiated the terms of agreement to end the war. They were passed as UN Security Council Resolution 338, which called for a “just and durable peace in the Middle East” along the lines of UN Security Council

Resolution 242 after the 1967 war. Kissinger, as Nixon’s envoy and later as Secretary of State to

President , pursued a step-by-step approach to achieve a diplomatic solution between

Israel and its neighbors. But these attempts at negotiating a comprehensive solution favored a piecemeal approach that separated the Palestinian issue from broader regional concerns.27

Palestinian national aspirations, which were emerging as a central point of contention between

Israel and the Arab states, were ignored by Kissinger’s diplomatic initiatives, which included the reaching of a between Israel, Syria, and Egypt. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union convened a short-lived in December 1973, which included representatives from Egypt, Jordan and Israel, but did not achieve a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The consequences of 1973, therefore, may have strengthened U.S.-Egyptian and U.S.-

26 On the 1970s and the oil crisis, see Thomas Bortelsmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton: Press, 2013); Victor McFarland, “Living in Never-Never Land: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Oil in the 1970s” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2014); Sargent, A Superpower Transformed; and David Wight, “The Petrodollar Era and Relations between the United States and the Middle East and North , 1969-1980.” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 2014.

27 For an essential study of Kissinger’s deliberate creation of step by step diplomacy and the onset of conflict management rather than conflict resolution towards the Arab-Israeli arena, see Salim Yaqub, “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Frederik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds, Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 227-248.

13 Israeli relations, but prolonged regional conflict indefinitely.28

The Reemergence of the Palestinian Question

By the late 1970s, a small number of American officials and international experts began to recognize the necessity of limited Palestinian rights, fueled by the broader wave of decolonization around the globe.29 The election of President Jimmy Carter in 1976 helped crystallize this paradigm shift. The Carter administration took a regional, rather than strictly Cold

War, approach to Israel and the wider Middle East, marked by a concern with localized political dynamics and awareness of the need to deal with the Palestinian issue head on.30 Carter asserted that the Israel-Palestine dispute was at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict and should be tackled directly. He also spoke openly of the need for a “Palestinian homeland” in 1977, making him the first U.S. leader to use that term.31

Carter’s critics bitterly opposed such an approach, fearful about the emergence of a

Palestinian state. The military activity of the PLO and other Palestinian nationalist groups had raised the global profile of the Palestinian struggle since the late 1960s, but also generated widespread condemnation due to the Palestinian use of violent tactics to achieve nationalist ends.

28 On the Syrian intervention in Lebanon that ensued, see David Wight, “Kissinger’s Levantine Dilemma: The Ford Administration and the Syrian Occupation of Lebanon,” Diplomatic History, 37.1 (January 2013): 144-177.

29 See Victor V. Nemchenok, “‘These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government’: United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977-1979,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 20:4 (2009): 595–618. For the rise and growing visibility of the PLO in the international context of the late 1960s and early 1970s, see Paul Thomas Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

30 On Carter’s regional approach to foreign policy, see Glad, An Outsider in the White House; , Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983); and Cyrus R. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). Also helpful when it comes to the Middle East are Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); and Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985).

31 President’s News Conference, Clinton, Mass., 12 May 1977, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7495.

14 Nevertheless, by singling out the Palestinian question for substantive consideration while engaging Israel on the need for permanent territorial borders, the Carter administration helped reshape the parameters of any eventual settlement.

Chapter one examines how the U.S. first conceived of a comprehensive settlement in the early months of 1977, consulting with Israeli and Arab leaders and developing a plan to revive the Geneva Conference that Kissinger had facilitated in 1973. Menachem Begin’s subsequent election as Israel’s sixth Prime Minister in 1977 represented a decisive challenge to U.S. aspirations for peace in the region. Begin was a revisionist Zionist with deep-seated ideological opposition to Palestinian territorial rights. He was also a believer in settlement expansion in the occupied territories, which he pursued with the help of Sharon, his agriculture and defense minister, and later Israel’s eleventh Prime Minister. Roughly five thousand Jewish settlers lived in the West Bank when Begin entered office; the number of settlers continued to rise to over eighty thousand by the late 1980s.32 By examining Israeli, Arab, and American positions on territorial withdrawal, settlements, and Palestinian participation in the nascent negotiations, the first chapter provides context for the emergence of the more limited bilateral peace eventually negotiated at Camp David.

Chapter two examines the path that led to Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s unprecedented November 1977 trip to Jerusalem. It shows how the comprehensive goals of the

Geneva Conference were replaced by direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, explaining how the

Palestinian issue was sidelined in the process. After months of wrangling, and direct U.S.

32 For background and figures on the number of settlements and settlers, see Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire; Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007); Ann Mosely Lesch, “Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-1977,” Journal of Palestine Studies 7.1 (1977): 26-47; and Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Base Project 1987 Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social, and Political Developments in the West Bank (Jerusalem: West Bank Data Base Project, 1987).

15 mediation, Begin and Sadat’s intensive diplomacy yielded a bilateral peace. This began with the

Camp David Accords, facilitated by painstaking American arbitration on 17 September 1978, and leading to the signing of a formal Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty on 26 .33 The treaty ensured the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, but Begin’s price was the retention of the West Bank, which he referred to by the biblical name of “Judea and Samaria.” The peace treaty also included more military and economic aid to Israel than had been given under any previous administration: $10.2 billion over four years, a little less than half in grants.34 Egypt and

Saudi Arabia also received military aid and security guarantees, highlighting the spectrum of U.S. allies in the Middle East. Egypt’s deal with Israel was decisive in that it eliminated any serious

Arab military challenge to Israel, while establishing the principle of Palestinian self-rule in the territories, and the structures and processes for possible attempts at peacemaking.

Chapter three examines the Palestinian autonomy talks that were launched in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. I argue that the concept of autonomy emerged as a primary means of preventing Palestinian statehood. Conceived by Begin and Israel’s Likud leadership, autonomy enshrined limited individual rights while precluding territorial control or the possibility of statehood. The autonomy meetings, convened by Egyptian and Israeli diplomats under U.S. supervision, were held intermittently in the Middle East and Washington, D.C., between May 1979 and June 1982. Although from their inception they excluded representatives of the PLO and local Palestinians, the talks were the first sustained political consideration of

33 The better known of the two final accords, A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, provided the basis for a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace deal. Sadat sought the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt after Israeli forces had captured the area in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and Begin sought normal diplomatic relations and the opening of the to Israeli ships.

34 Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948,” 251. On the troubling consequences of this military aid, see Andrew J. Bacevich, “Egypt in the Rearview Mirror,” Los Angeles Times, 20 August 2013, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-bacevich-egypt-military-policy-20130820-story.html (accessed 10 March 2015).

16 Palestinian self-determination after 1948. The history of these negotiations demonstrate how the

Palestinian failure to achieve self-determination—often cast as a function of internal divisions within a fractured national movement—was also a direct byproduct of external decision-making in the early years of the peace process. Rather than delineating a set of principles that would simultaneously ensure Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli security across either side of the 1967

Green Line, the successive rounds of negotiations solidified Israeli control in the territories and blurred the demarcation of a border.35

Ronald Reagan’s victory in November 1980 signaled a return to global Cold War geopolitics, reconstituting the Middle East as a site of contestation between the U.S. and the

Soviet Union. Chapter four examines the domestic and regional consequences of this turn.

General , Reagan’s hawkish Secretary of State, articulated a policy of “strategic consensus” between the U.S., Israel and pro-American Arab governments. Given the limits of regional cooperation, the Reagan administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding enshrining bilateral cooperation with Israel on 30 November 1981. This alliance included military cooperation between the U.S. and Israel, and American policymakers afforded Israel the special status of an ally for the first time. As William Quandt, a leading scholar of U.S. foreign policy and former NSA advisor on the region has written, “the entire relationship was given a strategic rationale that had previously been missing.”36 Despite this alliance, divergent interests emerged in the 1980s, beginning with Reagan’s decision to sell Airborne Warning and Control

35 There has been a great deal of skepticism in recent years about the efficacy of the 1967 border as a basis for negotiations, or the practical possibility of a two-state solution. I argue that we must look closely at the period between 1977-1993 to understand how the very possibility of this border eroded. See, for example, Yehouda Shenhav, Beyond the Two-State Solution: A Jewish Political Essay (London: Polity, 2012); Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, The One State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); and Sari Nusseibeh, What is a Palestinian State Worth? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). The mechanics of this blurring are explained in architectural terms by Eyal Weizmann in Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2012).

36 Quandt, Peace Process, 289.

17 Systems (AWACS) and F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

Reagan’s ideological battle against the Soviet Union and its perceived proxies included the Lebanon-based PLO. This shift in global orientation encouraged Israel’s Defense Minister,

Ariel Sharon, and Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, to launch the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. In chapter five, I examine Israeli and American conduct in Lebanon using a host of newly available sources, underscoring the extent of the alliance as well as its demonstrated limits. The invasion was initially framed as an attempt by Israel to contain Palestinian attacks on its northern border towns, but it quickly escalated into a full-scale effort to expel the PLO as well as Syrian troops and influence from Lebanon, and to remake the country as Israel’s Christian ally. Evidence discovered in the notebooks of U.S. diplomat conclusively demonstrates that

Secretary Haig was informed of Israel’s war plans by Defense Minister in the spring of 1982, granting the Israelis a clear “green light” to proceed. One central Israeli aim was to ensure a military defeat of in light of the failed outcome of the autonomy talks. Tensions in the Israeli-American relationship emerged most visibly during the

June invasion and the summer siege of an Arab capital by Israel. The bombings of Beirut disturbed President Reagan deeply, leading to a vocal confrontation with Prime Minister Begin.

Unfolding events in Lebanon resulted in American reengagement in negotiations over the

Palestinian question and the launching of a peace plan. Reagan’s diplomatic envoy, Ambassador

Phillip Habib, brokered the PLO’s evacuation from Beirut at the end of August. The ascent to the

Lebanese presidency of Israel’s hand-picked Maronite ally, Bashir Gemayel, seemed to provide a window of stability for progress along the comprehensive lines that Carter had first articulated.

The President unveiled the “Reagan Plan” in a primetime address on 1 September 1982. Building on Carter’s approach, he acknowledged that implementation of the Camp David Accords had

18 been slow. “Israel exists; it has a in peace behind secure and defensible borders; and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those facts,” the President remarked.37 Reagan continued: “[W]e must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs and Israelis.” The central question, he said, was “how to reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” For Reagan, this meant “self-government by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in association with

Jordan,” as well as “the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel.”38 The Reagan Plan reflected a return to the notion of comprehensive peace; however, it did not support the outright creation of a Palestinian state, opting instead for Palestinian self-government in association with

Jordan. Begin was incensed with the new plan issued by the White House. He and his cabinet issued a swift rejection, and the Reagan Plan became the last serious attempt to broker a solution to the conflict in the 1980s.

Along with this brief moment of diplomacy, U.S. and Israel military involvement in

Lebanon increased in the wake of President Gemayel’s 14 September 1982 and the

Sabra and Shatila massacre that followed. Reagan redeployed American Marines to Beirut out of guilt over the failure to protect Palestinian civilians slaughtered in the city’s refugee camps, which was followed by further bloodshed. In October 1983, the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks by Syrian and Iranian proxies led to the death of 241 U.S. servicemen, the highest number of American military deaths in one day since the . Having grown resentful of the Israeli and American presence in their country, local opposition metastasized into

37 Quoted in and Barry M. Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (New York: , 2001), 260.

38 “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East,” The Public Papers of the President: Ronald W. Reagan, 1981-1989 (hereafter PPPRR), 1 September 1982. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRL). http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/90182d.htm (accessed 10 March 2015).

19 the birth of , an Iranian-backed paramilitary organization that emerged as a key player in the region during the early 1980s. U.S. and Israeli standing in the region swiftly plummeted, creating a vacuum that was filled by the rise of Syria and contributing to the ongoing violence of the civil war. The 1982 war underscored the overreach of the Begin government, which set out in part to defeat Palestinian nationalism and inadvertently strengthened the resolve of its leadership.

For the PLO, civilian casualties during the Lebanon war and the group’s departure from

Beirut underscored increasing political marginalization. Their pursuit of self-determination, however, had long been moving from armed resistance to political engagement on a global scale.

Despite ongoing U.S. diplomatic efforts to sideline the organization throughout the 1980s, chapter six highlights how the attempts to engage with the Palestinian question on non-national terms and the exclusion of PLO resulted in a resurgence of political activism in the occupied territories and the ensuing outbreak of the (uprising) in December 1987. These developments fueled the rehabilitation of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination, and reframed the context in which U.S. and international diplomacy had been dealing with the

Palestinian question. In one of President Reagan’s final acts in office, the U.S. government agreed to begin a dialogue with the PLO.

The Palestinian leadership, exiled to , was “more surprised than the Israelis” by the

1987 Intifada. It was entirely generated from within the territories, and was a spontaneous unplanned eruption. Long maligned by Israel and the U.S. as a terrorist organization, the PLO emerged as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Its longstanding leader, Yasser

Arafat, formally accepted UN Resolution 242 in December 1988, acknowledging Israel’s right to exist and renouncing terrorism. The PLO’s recognition of Israel and acceptance of a negotiated settlement had begun to emerge in the mid-1970s, and was implicitly endorsed as part of the

20 November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Arafat’s accompanying public statement in Geneva ended on a triumphal note: “Victory is at hand. I see the homeland in your holy stones. I see the flag of our independent Palestine fluttering over the hills of our beloved homeland.”39

As I argue in my conclusion, Arafat’s optimistic view of political redemption was based on a faulty foundation. In the decade since Palestinian demands were first subject to negotiations on the road to a Geneva Conference, the core elements of a political settlement had been forestalled. The 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords that soon followed were constrained by the structural transformations produced over the prior decade. By closely tracing the historical contestation over the question of Palestinian self-determination, territorial sovereignty, and Israeli settlement expansion in these years, this dissertation demonstrates how the emergence of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at Camp David actually eroded the possibility of a just settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Years before the onset of the Madrid and

Oslo process of the early 1990s, the possibility of political sovereignty for the Palestinian population under Israeli occupation had already been truncated.

While visible evidence of this occupation is well documented, the evolution of its intellectual, legal, and political architecture is only recently coming under sustained scrutiny.40

By examining the genesis of negotiations prior to Camp David and the repercussions in the decade that followed, my dissertation suggests a rethinking of the conventional periodization of

39 Paul Lewis, “Arafat, in Geneva, Calls on Israelis to Join in Talks, New York Times, 14 December 1988.

40 Some leading examples are Azoulay and Ophir, The One-State Condition; Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The and the Occupied Territories (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Raja Shehadeh, Occupier’s Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988); Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); and Weizman, Hollow Land. Ra'anan Alexandrowicz’s 2011 documentary film, Shilton Ha’Chok [The Law in these Parts] painstakingly reconstructs the development of the legal regime in the territories during this period.

21 the peace process to more directly account for the 1970s and 1980s.41 There is a lack of serious attention to the diplomatic constraints that impeded Palestinian self-determination in these earlier decades, omitting their impact on the contemporary condition of statelessness. The failure of the peace process has underscored the devastating twin impact of prolonged Palestinian political disenfranchisement alongside the physical encroachment of Israeli settlements on the ground in the occupied territories. But practitioners and the public alike often neglect the history of this failure. A scholarly study based on primary sources from the period itself helps explain how and why the Palestinian question emerged in such a fashion, and may go some distance in explaining why a meaningful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians remains elusive.

Rather than offering a totalizing view of American diplomacy as a deliberately destructive and imbalanced arbiter between unequal parties, my work suggests a more contingent unfolding of events, constrained by domestic factors, various ideologies, the structure of negotiations, and the individual choices of Israelis, Palestinians, and a panoply of Middle Eastern and transnational actors.42 These developments transpired in particular contexts and as a result of mitigating circumstances, which I have tried to account for in the research and writing of the dissertation. Even with the relative advantage of historical hindsight and the extensive sources now available to researchers, there are multiple ways to analyze and narrate the origins and

41 Accounts of the peace process generally begin with the events of the 1990s, eliding the historical antecedents that shaped the emergence of negotiations. See, for example, , : The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005); Aaron David Miller, The Much Too : America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Bantam, 2008); , Innocent Abroad: An Innocent Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009); and Daniel Kurtzer, ed., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

42 For trenchant critiques of American involvement in the peace process, see Naseer Aruri, Dishonest Broker: The Role of the United States in Palestine and Israel (Boston: South End Press, 2003); , The Fateful : The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Haymarket Books: 2015); , Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Vintage, 1996); and Rashid Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013).

22 consequences of events in this period, particularly in a contemporary context still being shaped by its various political outcomes.

Methodology and Sources

This dissertation is conceived within the field of international and global history, and seeks to contribute to scholarship in modern Middle Eastern history, U.S. foreign relations,

American political history, and Israel/Palestine studies. By examining this period using sources obtained in the Middle East, the United States, and farther afield, my work situates the central strands of an emerging peace process within regional and international contexts. By providing an empirical study of relations between the U.S., Israel, Egypt, the Palestinians, and other Arab states between 1977 and 1993, it charts new territory in the history of U.S.-Middle East relations and the global Cold War. More broadly, by incorporating transnational dimensions, including the role of domestic Jewish leaders, various political and nongovernmental organizations, and local activists, the dissertation contributes to the emerging “new international history” in significant ways.

In Israel, I examined newly opened collections on the Camp David negotiations, the autonomy talks, U.S.-Israel relations, Jewish diaspora politics, and the at the

Israel State Archives. The generous declassification policy and excellent records form the Prime

Minister’s division and the Ministry of yielded many revealing documents, in both Hebrew and English, a rich source base for this period. I also examined the private papers of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at the Menachem Begin Heritage Center in Jerusalem.

These records, including copious correspondence, policy formulations, and detailed exchanges between Begin’s advisors, served to strengthen my Israeli source base. At a crucial stage in my

23 research, I was given access to privately held top secret documents obtained from the Kahan

Commission of Inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The provenance of these documents, and the revelations they yielded, are discussed in chapter five.

To recover the political voice of Palestinians, I examined archival material available exclusively in Lebanon, at Beirut’s Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS). This archive contains extensive documents, and bulletins published in Arabic and English by various

Palestinian factions throughout this period. The IPS also holds a full series of the PLO’s news agency reports, issued daily during the height of the and an invaluable source for understanding how Palestinians navigated the Israeli and American military presence.

In Lebanese archives, including the Arab Image Foundation and the UMAM Documentation and

Research Center, I located invaluable material about the civil war and the 1982 invasion. In addition, I consulted the private papers of the Palestinian Delegation to the Madrid and

Washington talks, which are partially available online on the website of the Institute for Palestine

Studies, and privately held by one of the Palestinian advisors to the talks.43

In the United States, I conducted extensive research at the Carter and Reagan Presidential

Libraries in Atlanta, GA, and Simi Valley, CA, as well as the National Archives and CIA repository (CREST) in College Park, MD. I also consulted private papers at ’s

Howard Gottlieb Archival Research Center, Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Archives,

Yale University’s Manuscript Division, the , and the National Security

Archive in Washington D.C. For the domestic influence of a key interest group, I consulted the collections of leading American Jewish organizations, including the Dorot Division of the New

York Public Library, the American Jewish Congress papers at the Center for , the

43 See Papers of the Palestinian Delegation to Madrid, Institute for Palestine Studies, http://www.palestine- studies.org/resources/palestinian-delegation (accessed 10 March 2015); and Private Collection of Rashid Khalidi.

24 archives of the American Jewish Committee and the Joint Distribution Committee in New York

City.

For the broader international context of the late Cold War and a non-American perspective on Israel, the Palestinians, and the wider Middle East, I drew on newly opened files at the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew. These include the papers of British

Prime Ministers James Callaghan and , the extensive files of the Foreign

Office, and records of various European diplomatic initiatives that passed through London.

Lastly, I conducted over two-dozen oral history interviews with retired diplomats, politicians, communal leaders and military veterans across the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, the

West Bank and Lebanon. While not all the interviews have been quoted directly in the dissertation, several served as background for pursuing various avenues of archival research. I also consulted existing oral history collections across all these location, including the Liddell

Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College London, the Institute of

Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Columbia University’s Center for

Oral History, and several online repositories.44

Contributions to the Literature

In the field of modern Middle Eastern history, this dissertation contributes to local

44 Oral history is indispensable for fleshing out document based primary research, filling in narrative gaps, and challenging the hegemonic nature of memoirs. The methodology behind this technique has been the subject of a burgeoning field of scholarship in recent years. In the course of reading existing oral history collections and conducting interviews of my own, I have benefited immensely from the suggestions and critiques of several works: David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum, eds., Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology (Nashville: American Association for State and Local History, 1984); Edward D. Ives, The Tape Recorded Interview: A Manual for Fieldworkers in Folklore and Oral History, 2d ed. (Knoxville: The University of Press, 1995); Eva M. McMahan and Kim Lacy Rogers, eds., Interactive Oral History Interviewing (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994); Alesandro Portelli. The Death of Luigi Trastulli: Form and Meaning in Oral History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral History Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006); and Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

25 histories in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt, as well as international perspectives on the region. Such a global approach to the study of the Middle East has already transformed our understanding of the late Ottoman period and the process of Arab state formation, but it has only just begun to yield insights into the second half of the twentieth century.45 The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanese civil war are two areas that can benefit from this international treatment. The extensive but inward looking literature of these topics, much of it limited to narrow concerns, often elides their wider significance in a global and comparative perspective.

Several leading U.S. foreign relations scholars have drawn attention to the influence of the U.S. in the Middle East during the second half of the twentieth century.46 Yet among the available studies of American involvement in the region during the late 1970s and 1980s, many are memoirs by participants themselves or studies published in the midst of events without access to government documents and relevant archives in the U.S. or the Middle East.47 While

45 For some of the best recent examples, see Cyrus Schayegh, “1958 Reconsidered: State Formation and the Cold War in the Early Postcolonial Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 45:3 (2013): 421–443; Chamberlin, The Global Offensive; Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Caused the Six Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Khalil, “Crossroads;” Ussama Makdisi, Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 1820-2003 (New York: Public Affairs, 2010); Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism; and Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: From the Algerian Front of the Third World’s Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). On the methodological benefits of this international approach, see Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (2000): 567–591. On U.S.-Middle East history more broadly, see Ussama Makdisi, “After Said: The Limits and Possibilities of a Critical Scholarship of U.S.-Arab Relations,” Diplomatic History 38.3 (2014): 657-684.

46 Among them, see Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente; Matthew F. Jacobs, Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East; Warren Bass, Support Any Friend; William B. Quandt, Peace Process; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: Press, 1985); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003); Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis; and Joel Migdal, Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). Journalists have contributed to this history as well. See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, , and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005); Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East- from the Cold War to the (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009); and , : Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage, 2007).

47 For relevant memoirs, see Carter, Keeping Faith; Brzezinski, Power and Principle; Vance, Hard Choices; Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and

26 more recent work has focused attention on developments in the Persian Gulf and the shifting

American posture towards the region, relations with Egypt, Israel, the Palestinians, and Lebanon remain areas that require closer attention.48

Within postwar U.S. political history, there has been a steady flow of excellent work on human rights as a political category mobilized for policy ends,49 Cold War modernization theory and developmentalism,50 the global transformations in financial markets and resources of the

1970s,51 and the social and cultural transformations of the 1980s.52 Much work remains to be done on the Carter and Reagan presidencies, although the rise of the right and domestic political

Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984); George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993); Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990). On Lebanon, see also Raymond Tanter, Who's at the Helm?: Lessons of Lebanon (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1993); and , From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

48 On the shifting U.S. posture, see David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-year Conflict with (New York, N.Y: Penguin Press, 2012); Olav Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,” Cold War History 4:3 (2004): 21–55; William E. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8:2 (2006): 52–82; and Ezra Davidson, “Visions of Political and the American Military Presence in the Middle East---From Carter to Reagan” (Ph.D. diss., , 2011). For a focus on the Reagan era as a proving ground for the second Bush administration, see Mattia Toaldo, The Origins of the U.S. War on Terror: Lebanon, and American Intervention in the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2013).

49 On the resurgence of human rights in the 1970s, see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); and Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue.

50 See David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); David C. Engerman, Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (: Press, 2003); and Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

51 Sargent, A Superpower Transformed; Bortelsmann, The 1970s; and Victor McFarland, “Living in Never-Never Land.”

52 See Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).

27 development is increasingly well studied.53 In particular, the shifting nature of U.S. internationalism in the 1970s and 1980s requires further attention, given the crucial moment of transition between the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan and the link with Israel and the Palestinian question.

This moment, as the anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani has argued, marks a deep systemic passage from a doctrine of containment to one of .54 It was a surprising shift given Carter’s background and initial approach to global affairs. In 1976, then Georgia Governor

Carter campaigned on the promise of “a foreign policy that reflects the decency and generosity and common sense of our own people,” attempting to position his administration as an arbiter of human rights and restraint.55 Yet by his closing months in office, the exercise of America power and its concurrent limitations were on full display. As Derek Buckaloo argued in an essay on

Carter’s policy, the application of a human rights approach “was more apparent than real.”56 Beneath all the rhetoric of change after the failures of Vietnam, the Carter administration found itself hamstrung by the hostage crisis in Iran and greater militarization in light of renewed

Soviet aggression.

53 See, for example, Jefferson Decker, “Lawyers for Reagan: The Conservative Litigation Movement and American Government” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2009); Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York: Norton, 2009); and Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making f Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

54 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 124.

55 Quoted in Derek N. Buckaloo, “Carter’s Nicaragua and Other Democratic Quagmires” in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 246. For an extensive study of Carter’s foreign policy, a leading account remains Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986).

56 Bucklaloo, “Carter’s Nicaragua,” 248. For another example of Carter’s mixed legacy on human rights, see Christian Philip Peterson, “The Carter Administration and the Promotion of Human Rights in the Soviet Union,” Diplomatic History 38.3 (2014): 628-656.

28 Scholars of the Cold War have demonstrated that heightened tensions in the early 1980s emerged in part as a reaction to Carter’s policies. Revisionist critics of the Carter administration now argue that the 39th President played an influential role in increasing American defense spending and formulating a more aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union.57 In the view of

William Odom, the military attaché to Carter’s National Security Advisor, there were clear signs of a policy review process to prepare for a U.S. strategic pivot to the Middle East.58 The events of 1979 fueled this shift, from the overthrow of the of Iran to the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan.59 By the 1980 State of the Union address, the articulation of a “” signaled a more muscular American posture towards the international arena.60 This would only increase during the early years of the Reagan administration.

Much of the first wave of scholarly literature on the 1980s focused on Reagan’s leadership in the European theatre and the attendant unraveling of Cold War bipolarity.61 For

American triumphalists writing in the 1990s, this was a natural point of departure; the oppositional story of democracy victorious over fit well within a moment of U.S.

57 See Olav Njolstad’s chapter “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War” in Olav Njølstad, The Last Decade of the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2004): 196-225; and Brian J. Auten, Carter’s Conversion the Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008).

58 Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command.”

59 That fateful year also saw the escalation of further global conflict, from revolution in Nicaragua to the revelation of a Soviet brigade in . A strong case for rethinking historical periodization in the Middle East can be found in Hamit Bozarslan, “Revisiting the Middle East’s 1979,” Economy and Society 41:4 (2012): 558–567. See also Christian Caryl, Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

60 For evidence of continuities with the muscular approach of the Reagan years, see , The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present (New York: The New Press, 2008); and Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006).

61 For an overview of the schools of thought that have developed about Reagan’s role in ending the Cold War, see Beth A. Fischer, “U.S. Foreign Policy under Reagan and Bush,” in Melvyn P. Leffler, ed., The Cambridge History of the Cold War Vol. 3: Endings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 267–288. See also Anders Stephanson, “Cold War Degree Zero,” in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, eds., Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 19-50.

29 global ascendency.62 The passage of time has put a damper on this view, with the attacks of 11

September 2001 refocusing scholarly attention on histories of the periphery during the 1980s.63

The earlier insistence on a bifurcated Cold War/post-Cold War periodization scheme for organizing the late twentieth century is now seen as eliding the critical role of the United States in fomenting and exacerbating regional violence at the end of the Cold War.64 From Latin

America to Africa, international historians have become more explicit about the need to locate the genesis of contemporary social and political problems within a period of ostensible American triumph.65

The Reagan era had a far-reaching impact on the Global South, especially the Middle

East. In re-examining flashpoints like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Lebanon against the

62 A forerunner of this approach was Frances Fukayama, “The End of History?.” The National Interest (Summer 1989): 3-18. A useful collection of essays critiquing Cold War triumphalism is , ed., Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History after the Fall of Communism (New York: Norton & Co., 2004).

63 See , The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2008); and Lloyd C. Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad. On the place of the 1980s, see Olav Njølstad, ed., The Last Decade of the Cold War. For incisive accounts of the Cold War and its conclusion, see Melvyn P. Leffler, For the South of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); and James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

64 See Ann Douglas, “Periodizing the American Century: Modernism, Postmodernism, and Postcolonialism in the Cold War Context,” Modernism/modernity 5:3 (1998): 71–98; and Anders Stephanson, “Simplicissimus,” New Left Review 49 (January-February 2008): 147-156. Journalist James Mann also criticized this bifurcation in Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), tracing the rise of American power from the aftermath of the Vietnam War to the second Bush administration.

65 See, for example, Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: 's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim; Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 2013); Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop; and Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis. Two important review essays have emphasized this shift as well. See Michael J. Hogan, "The "Next Big Thing": The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age," Diplomatic History 28:1 (2004): 1-21; and Thomas W. Zeiler, "The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field," The Journal of American History 95:4 (2009): 1053-1073. Not all historians agree, however. , a leading Cold War scholar, was adamant that his recent synthetic work was not an “attempt to locate roots, within the Cold War, of such post-Cold War phenomena as globalization, ethnic cleansing, religious extremism, terrorism or the information revolution.” See Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, xi. A valuable critique can be found in Tony Judt, “A Story Still to be Told,” The New York Review of Books, 23 March 2006.

30 backdrop of this international history, Middle East specialists can help explain how the region was actually a central site of Reagan’s foreign policy in the closing years of the Cold War.66 In this regard, my work seeks to temper a triumphalist narrative of U.S. foreign relations in the

Reagan era.67 While the archival challenges of working on the history of the 1970s and 1980s are significant, the opportunities for new interpretative frameworks to look at the relationship between domestic politics and global phenomenon are eminently rewarding.

Finally, in its approach and source base, this dissertation contributes to the growing field of Israel/Palestine Studies.68 Renewed attention to the conjoined moment of Israeli state formation and the onset of the Palestinian nakba in 1948 underscores the need to position the

66 Odd Arne Westad has forced a necessary reckoning with Western military intervention in the Global South, but his work has avoided the Arab-Israeli arena. I would argue that it is a prime example of a region where “Cold War ideologies and superpower interventions…helped put a number of Third World countries in a state of semi- permanent civil war.” See Westad, The Global Cold War, 4, 398. For a recent outline of how to approach the region in the post-1945 era, see Paul Thomas Chamberlin, “Rethinking the Middle East and North Africa in the Cold War,” Roundtable, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 43:2 (2011): 317–319.

67 The impact of the Reagan years on the redirection of foreign policy has received scant scholarly attention. See John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006); Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture in the Reagan Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); John Patrick Diggins, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007); James Graham Wilson, “How Grand was Reagan’s Strategy, 1976-1984?” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18 (2007): 773-803; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: Harper, 2008); Gail E.S. Yoshitani, Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980-1984 (Texas A&M University Press, 2011); and Doug Rossinow, The Reagan Era: A History of the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). For a useful review of works that attempt to rehabilitate the Reagan legacy, see Russell Baker, “Reconstructing Ronald Reagan,” The New York Review of Books, 1 March 2007. In a 2012 British Academy lecture, Arne Westad called for greater attention to Reagan’s legacy and the changing nature of U.S. power in the 1980s. See “Ronald Reagan the Re-Constitution of American Hegemony,” 28 November 2012, www.britac.ac.uk/events/2012/Reagan_and_American_Hegemony.cfm (accessed 10 March 2015).

68 This field, which I view as an amalgam of scholarly engagement in both Israeli and Palestinian history that utilizes local sources and is keenly sensitive to the complex interplay of culture, society, politics and language between both locations, is growing in remarkable new ways. See, for example, Lital Levy, Poetic Trespass: Writing Between Hebrew and Arabic in Israel/Palestine (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Jonathan Gribetz, Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab Encounter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel’s Liberal Settler State (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014); Liora Halperin, Babel in : Jews, Nationalism, and Language Diversity in Palestine, 1920-1948 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); and Hillel Cohen, Tarpat/1929: Shnat Ha’efes B’sihsuh Hayehudi-Aravi [Year Zero of the Jewish-Arab Conflict] Keter Publishing & Ivrit, 2013.

31 imbricated and the Palestinians in direct conversation with one another.69

Historians of Israel and Zionism have looked anew at the nineteenth century for explanations of how communal and religious tensions first emerged in a late Ottoman context, and they have turned their attention to British Mandatory rule as an incubator of national divisions during the age of European colonialism.70 More recently, there has been a focus on the contradictions that plagued Israeli state formation and the dichotomous treatment of Arab citizens in an era of decolonization, as well as the transformative nature of occupation in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip following the 1967 War.71 But scholars have largely ignored the formative impact of the post-1967 era, which fortifies the link between Israeli territorial expansion and the ongoing condition of Palestinian statelessness.

I am acutely aware that I write across fields saturated with polemical debates about the very possibility of objective scholarship on this particular topic, a conundrum that has only grown in recent years.72 But if the revisionist debates of Israeli and Palestinian scholarship have taught us one thing, it is the power of historical discovery to reshape narratives of the past and shed constructive light on the debates of the present day.73 Inspired in part by the more settled

69 For a global reframing of 1948, see Rashid Khalidi “1948 and after in Palestine: Universal Themes?” and the entire special issue of Critical Inquiry 40:4, Around 1948: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Global Transformation, edited by Leela Gandhi and Deborah L. Nelson (2014). On situating 1948 in the context of forced migrations, see Alon Confino, “Miracles and Snow in Palestine and Israel: , a History of 1948,” Israel Studies, 17:2 (2012): 25-61.

70 See, for example, Jonathan Gribetz, Defining Neighbors; and Jacob Norris, Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905-1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

71 See Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers; Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry; and Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire.

72 On objectivity, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question; and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

73 On the attendant debates of the New Historians, see Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27:3 (1995): 287-304; and Zachary Lockman, “Review: Original Sin,” Middle East Report, 152 (May-June 1988): 57-64.

32 but no less contentious debates that animate Cold War historiography, perhaps it may now be possible to conceive of a ‘post-revisionist synthesis’ on the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the decades long peace process that has accompanied it.74 By taking seriously the collision of the Palestinian question with U.S. and international history, it may also be possible to move away from narrow debates and situate this critical topic in a wider scholarly frame. My hope is that this dissertation makes a modest contribution in that direction.

74 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the ,” Diplomatic History 7:3 (1983): 171-190.

33 Chapter One: Envisioning a Middle East Settlement, 1976-1977

I don't think that there can be any reasonable hope for a settlement of the Middle Eastern question, which has been extant now on a continuing basis now for more than 29 years, without a homeland for the Palestinians. The exact definition of what that homeland might be, the degree of independence of the Palestinian entity, its relationship with Jordan, or perhaps Syria and others, the geographical boundaries of it, all have to be worked out by the parties involved. But for the Palestinians to have a homeland and for the refugee question to be resolved, is obviously of crucial importance.

-Jimmy Carter1

Introduction

Chapter one examines the period between the election of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in

November 1976 and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s visit to Washington in July 1977.

It charts the emergence of a new American approach to peacemaking in the Middle East, premised on a resolution of the Palestinian question and full peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. After early consultations with key Middle Eastern leaders, the Carter administration proposed a comprehensive regional peace plan that would build on the Geneva Conference, a gathering of key parties that had met briefly in the aftermath of the 1973 War. This meeting, which was intended for the second half of 1977, would include the Soviet Union and revive negotiations on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It would also address the issue of Palestinian representation, through a joint delegation with other Arab states or a measure of PLO participation that was the subject of intensive negotiations.

While all parties agreed to work towards Geneva, their divergent positions on the key issues of contention resulted in a far more modest outcome. The expansive planning for a regional settlement soon gave way to the much narrower—albeit significant—bilateral peace

1 Carter made this comment at a press conference in Clinton, Massachusetts, on 12 May 1977. For the full text see http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7495 (accessed 10 March 2015).

34 treaty between Egypt and Israel negotiated at Camp David. In tracing the articulation of initial positions during the opening months of diplomacy in 1977, this chapter offers the first study of

American-led efforts utilizing primary sources drawn from the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East.

Upon close reading, these documents reveal how the formulations of Israeli and Arab views about a nascent peace process were fundamentally at odds with one another. The Palestinian question, which the Carter administration singled out as a core element of the conflict, was effectively removed from viable diplomatic consideration in the process.

As the aims and procedures of Geneva were debated in Washington and the Middle East, the occupied territories emerged more firmly under Israeli state control. Settlement expansion in the West Bank, which had taken root under successive Labor governments after the 1967 war, would accelerate in the transition to Likud rule in 1977. Palestinian political sovereignty, long at the heart of both PLO and Arab demands, was elided by Israel’s strategic and ideological priorities. The Carter administration, mindful of the consequences of these developments, attempted to address the dual question of Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli settlements directly, only to be rebuffed by the government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

Carter’s Election and a New U.S. Approach to Arab-Israeli Peacemaking

The origins of a new U.S. approach to Middle East peacemaking surfaced during the

1976 presidential campaign. Gerald Ford, the Republican incumbent, had successfully concluded a second Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement (Sinai II) under the direction of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in . Israeli Prime Minister , a Labor party leader and decorated commander of the Israeli army, had been elected to office in the wake of the 1973 . Rabin, primarily concerned with rebuilding Israeli military

35 deterrence, entertained Ford’s efforts for peace. Alongside Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat, who had been seeking to move his country towards U.S. patronage ever since assuming the presidency in

1970, the two leaders helped ensure the success of Kissinger’s .2 The resulting interim agreement called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Egypt and Israel, further withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula, and the establishment of a UN buffer zone in the area. It would not solve regional instability at large, but it provided for limited gains at a critical moment in Egyptian and Israeli internal political development.3

Ford’s Democratic opponent, Georgia governor Jimmy Carter, had grander plans for U.S. foreign policy in the Global South.4 Carter was viewed as a political outsider and foreign policy neophyte, but he also ran for office at a time when Cold War détente was under assault and human rights were emerging as an alternative basis on which to formulate the basis of U.S. internationalism.5 In articulating an electoral platform, Carter sought to revive U.S. standing in the Middle East while demonstrating his deep commitment to Israel. In the summer before the election, Carter stood proudly with a blue-velvet yarmulke on his head in a large New Jersey synagogue to deliver a campaign speech on the region.

The has always meant a great deal to me. As a boy I read of the prophets and martyrs in the Bible- the same Bible that we all study together. As an American I have admired the State of Israel and how she, like the United States, opened her doors to the homeless and the oppressed....All people of good will can agree it is time- it is far past time- for permanent peace in the Middle East…A real peace must be based on

2 See Yaqub, “The Weight of Conquest”; and Louise Fischer, “Turning Point on the Road to Peace: The Government of Yitzhak Rabin and the Interim Agreement with Egypt (Sinai II),” Israel Studies 19:3 (2014): 55-80.

3 Kissinger’s approach was the kernel of the later Camp David deal; at least insofar as the Egyptian-Israeli aspect was concerned.

4 On the U.S. relationship with the Global South during this period, including the role of the UN and criticism of Israel, see Sean Thomas Byrnes, “The United States in Opposition: The United Nations, The Third World, and Changing American Visions of Global Order, 1970-1984” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 2014).

5 See Sargent, A Superpower Transformed; and Schulman and Zelizer, Rightward Bound.

36 absolute assurance of Israel’s survival and security. As President, I would never yield on that point. The survival of Israel is not just a political issue, it is a moral imperative.6

Notably, Carter had been urged by his campaign staff to appeal to Jewish voters who had remained at best indifferent or at worst suspicious of his candidacy for higher office. Many

American Jews were skeptical of Carter’s southern roots and were wary of supporting an untested politician with no experience in Middle East policy.7

Carter stressed a shift away from Kissinger’s gradualist approach to regional peacemaking, which focused on territorial withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. “A limited settlement,” Carter argued, “leaves unresolved the underlying threat to Israel. A general settlement is needed— one which will end the conflict between Israel and its neighbors once and for all.”8 This comprehensive tone, which sought a resolution with countries like Jordan,

Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, marked a more expansive regional agenda while privileging

U.S. relations with Israel. But the Georgia governor’s support for the Jewish state extended well beyond political expedience. In his memoir, Keeping Faith, Carter later reflected on a 1973 visit to the country.

In my affinity for Israel, I shared the sentiment of most other Southern Baptists that the holy places we revered should be preserved and made available for visits by …I considered this homeland for the Jews to be compatible with the teachings of the Bible, hence ordained by God. These moral and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable.9

6 Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of Representatives, The Presidential Campaign 1976, vol. 1 part 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 216-217.

7 Two prominent Jewish political activists involved with the campaign affirmed this sentiment. See “Reminiscences of Stuart Eizenstat,” Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy Project, 11 May 1977 (Columbia University: Center for Oral History), 4-8 (hereafter CCOH); and “Reminiscences of Rita Hauser,” 27 January 1978 (CCOH), 16. See also Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 98-99.

8 The Presidential Campaign 1976, 217.

9 Carter, Keeping Faith, 281. For studies of Carter’s religious motivations, see Paul Charles Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus (Westport: Praeger, 2004), Ch. 3; Randall Balmer, Redeemer: The Life of Jimmy Carter (New York: Basic Books, 2014); and Darren J. McDonald, “Blessed are the Policy

37

In matters of policy, as well as personal faith, Carter felt strongly that regional stability in the

Middle East depended on U.S. alignment with Israel.

Critics argue that Carter’s religious blinders and limited experience in the Middle East precluded a more substantial engagement with divergent Arab perspectives.10 As the President declared in his memoirs, “I had no strong feelings about the Arab countries. I had never visited one and knew no Arab leaders.”11 At the same time, Carter took issue with Palestinian political disenfranchisement, growing out of his domestic orientation towards greater civil rights and equality.

The continued deprivation of Palestinian rights was not only used as the primary lever against Israel, but was contrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of both our countries. In my opinion it was imperative that the United States work to obtain for these people the right to vote, the right to assemble and to debate issues that affected their lives, the right to own property without fear of its being confiscated, and the right to be free of military rule. To deny these rights was an indefensible position for a free and democratic society.12

During the campaign, Carter did not shy away from raising the Palestinian plight with his ardently pro-Israel audience. In the same New Jersey synagogue speech, Carter remarked on the

“humanitarian core” that animated the question of the Palestinian struggle. “Too many human beings, denied a sense of hope for the future, are living in makeshift and crowded camps where demagogues and terrorists can feed on their despair.”13

Makers: Jimmy Carter’s Faith-Based Approach to the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Diplomatic History, advance access 14 August 2014. Also see Carter’s own religiously inspired work on this conflict, The Blood of Abraham.

10 See Kathleen Christison’s thoughtful chapter on Carter in Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 157-194; as well as Janice J. Terry, “The Carter Administration and the Palestinians,” in Michael W. Suleiman, ed., U.S. Policy on Palestine From Wilson to Clinton (Normal, Ill.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995).

11 Carter, Keeping Faith, 282.

12 Ibid., 284.

13 The Presidential Campaign 1976, 220.

38 While Carter’s initial framing of this issue was largely in the context of human rights, it still signaled a willingness to engage more directly with the question of Palestinian aspirations in political terms.14 Throughout the campaign, and during his early years in office, Carter consistently used language that avoided the notion of Palestinian statehood.15 Such a position fit well in mainstream American political discourse, which did not countenance the idea of state sovereignty for Palestinians.16 The Israeli political leadership would further quash any effort to engage with Palestinians as a national group, although European leaders had joined the growing international consensus to support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by the late 1970s.

In the U.S., only a small number of policymakers had begun to recognize the necessity of limited

Palestinian rights, fueled by the broader sweep of decolonization in the Global South. Carter’s victory helped accelerate this shift, as delineated by his transition team prior to inauguration.

Outlining the new administration’s priorities in late 1976, Carter’s foreign policy advisors stressed that the U.S. had to be “engaged in a protracted architectural process to reform and

14 See Nemchenok, “These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government.” On the complicated US relationship to self-determination, see Bradley R. Simpson, “The United States and the Curious History of Self- Determination,” Diplomatic History 36:4 (2012): 675-94.

15 As early as 1977, ran an in depth article advocating statehood. Edward R. Sheehan, “A Proposal for a Palestinian Statehood,” New York Times, 30 January 1977, SM5. Carter was not in agreement with this idea, speaking only of limited recognition. Take, for example, a remark at a Presidential news conference in early 1978: “We do not and have never favored an independent Palestinian nation, but within that bound of constraint, how to give the Palestinians who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip some voice in the determination of their own future, is an issue still unresolved.” The Public Papers of the President: Jimmy Carter, 1977-1981 (hereafter PPPJC), 9 March 1978. The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30473 (accessed 10 March 2015).

16 Carter’s position shifted drastically after he left office. See Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); and William Quandt’s review, “Palestine, Apartheid, and Jimmy Carter: Reading Past the Title,” Journal of Palestine Studies 36.3 (Spring 2007): 89-93. For his critics, see Joseph Lelyveld, “Jimmy Carter and Apartheid” in The New York Review of Books, 29 March 2007, and Kenneth W. Stein, “My Problem with Jimmy Carter’s Book” Middle East Quarterly, (Spring 2007): 3-15.

39 reshape the existing international system.”17 In the realm of the Middle East, they stressed the need to pursue a comprehensive settlement instead of interim agreements. Zbigniew Brzezinski,

Carter’s designated National Security Advisor, said this would mean “a settlement in which the

Arab countries trade full normalization of relations with Israel for return of territories occupied in 1967, with such changes as may be mutually agreed, and some form of self-determination for

Palestinians on the West Bank.”18 Rather than put forward detailed American proposals or

“impose” a solution from the outside, Brzezinski believed that the U.S. should encourage negotiations among the parties and work to broker a settlement along the lines of UN Security

Council Resolution 242.

Soon after the election, Brzezinski composed an exhaustive brief on the ten major goals of a Carter foreign policy, which became a working blueprint for the four years of the administration. Goal number six focused on obtaining a comprehensive settlement in the Middle

East, “without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the reentry of the Soviet

Union into the Middle East could not be avoided.”19 Brzezinski was a Soviet specialist, and while strategic Cold War concerns played a far less important role than they had under President

Ford or would under President Reagan, the administration was still working in the context of a

U.S.-Soviet power struggle.20 In the transition period before entering the White House, Carter met with former Secretary of State Kissinger and conveyed off the record that “he would try to

17 Memo, “Foreign policy priorities for the first six months,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Gardner and Henry Owen to Governor Jimmy Carter, 3 November 1976. Box 9, folder 19, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library (hereafter YUL).

18 Ibid.

19 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 54-55.

20 On Brzezinski’s statecraft, see Charles Gati, ed., Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

40 avoid going to a Geneva Conference out of concern for the role the Soviets might play there.” 21

This stance evolved as the administration grew less dependent on Cold War constraints that had guided foreign policy in the early 1970s.

There were two major influences on the development of Brzezinski’s views about the

Middle East. The first, like Carter, was a trip to the region in the summer of 1976, right before the presidential election. This visit convinced Brzezinski that security for Israel would depend on formalized borders, close to the 1967 . Such a conclusion came into conflict with

Israeli settlement expansion in the wake of the 1967 War, which would pose an even greater challenge after the election of a Likud government in 1977.22 Brzezinski’s second major influence was participating in a 1975 Middle East Study Group hosted by Washington’s

Brookings Institution. It was a notable gathering that sought to articulate an alternative for the region through a collaborative effort between ‘pro-Israel,’ ‘pro-Arab,’ and non-aligned parties.23

According to one member of the study group, the Brookings report grew out of the realization that Kissinger’s step-by-step approach to Middle East diplomacy was not working.24

In formulating their position, the Brookings study group report called for an integrated settlement that would include security for Israel and a territorial withdrawal to the 1967 Green

21 Memorandum of Conversation between President Elect Carter, Vice President Elect Mondale, Secretary Kissinger, Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger and David Aaron, 20 November 1976, Plains, Georgia. Box 8, folder 6, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664), YUL.

22 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 84.

23 Members of The Brookings Study Group consisted of policy advisors, academics, and communal leaders, including Morroe Berger, Robert R. Bowie, Zbigniew Brzezinski, John C. Campbell, Najeeb Halaby, Rita Hauser, Roger W. Heyns (Chairman), Alan Horton, Malcolm Kerr, Fred Khouri, , William Quandt, Nadav Safran, Stephen Spiegel, A.L. Udovitch, and Charles W. Yost. Toward Peace in the Middle East: Report of a Study Group (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

24 “Reminisces of Rita Hauser,” 22 January 1978 (CCOH), 9-10; interview by author, New York, NY, 11 January 2006.

41 Line. Most notably, the document argued for some form of Palestinian self-determination.25

Rather than a simple matter of human rights, the assembled experts drew a line between the need for permanent Israeli borders and the importance of framing the Palestinian question in national terms. Rita Hauser, an international lawyer and former fundraiser for Richard Nixon, emphasized the importance of the Brookings study to Carter’s foreign policy. “[Carter] took this report and he read it, and he campaigned on it, and he made it his Bible.”26 In the view of another participant, the report stated openly “what those in government could not say about the need for a comprehensive solution that would involve the Palestinians.”27 Although Carter did not endorse independent statehood for the Palestinians either during the campaign or during his initial months in office, he recognized that something had to be done about their political plight.

Brzezinski himself had coauthored a 1975 article in Foreign Affairs that asserted the centrality of the Palestinian issue and called for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip.28

In his first meeting with Israeli officials as NSA advisor, Brzezinski got a sense of how far apart his own views were from leading voices in Israel. General and Israeli

Ambassador met with Brzezinski on 31 January 1977 and discussed the contours of a peace settlement. While Dayan spoke about interim avenues with Syria and Jordan, he felt

25 “There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestinian state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestinian entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.” Toward Peace in the Middle East, 2. One author of the report recalled a clear consensus that the national aspirations of the Palestinians had to be addressed, regardless of the exact terminology used. William Quandt, phone interview by author, 16 March 2006.

26 “Reminiscences of Rita Hauser,” 22 January 1978 (CCOH), 20.

27 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 165.

28 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Francois Duchene, and Kiichi Saeki, “Peace in an International Framework,” Foreign Policy 19 (Summer 1975): 3-17.

42 peace with the Arab world was “far off,” although an “end to the state of war” might be possible.29 Dayan took the Arabs seriously in their readiness to sign peace treaties, “but Israel is not willing to pay the price.” Dayan acknowledged this left Israel in an “awkward position” with regards to U.S. and world opinion.30 When it came to territorial division, Dayan was clear that the West Bank, unlike the and the Sinai Peninsula, posed non-security related challenges. “Israel has every right to be there,” Dayan remarked, “Any division of the area is unacceptable…A West Bank-Gaza state is not a solution.”31 Dayan would soon be appointed

Foreign Minister, and helped negotiate the Camp David Accords, although in January 1977 he made it clear that “if Israel were offered peace tied to full withdrawal, he would oppose peace.”

Like Brzezinski, Carter’s new Secretary of State, , was convinced of the need to address the question of Palestinian self-determination. His personnel appointments and focus on the comprehensive elements of peace reflected such an approach.32 In his memoir,

Vance wrote eloquently of the Palestinian plight.

Ejected from their homes, embittered, radicalized, living in squalor and desperation, the Palestinians remained the central, unresolved human rights issue of the Middle East. The President and I were convinced that no lasting solution in the Middle East would be possible until, consistent with Israel’s right to live in peace and security, a just answer to the Palestinian question could be found, one almost certainly leading to a Palestinian homeland and some form of self-determination.33

29 Memorandum of Conversation between Dayan and Brzezinski, Washington. 31 January 1977, 2:30-3:00 PM, Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1977–1980 (FRUS), Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977– August 1978. Ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 2 (Doc).

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Vance appointed his own Middle East specialists, with the seasoned diplomat Roy Atherton as Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian affairs (later to become ambassador at large for the Middle East negotiations), and Harold Saunders as Director of Intelligence and Research and later Atherton’s successor in the Near East Department. Both men had been involved in Arab-Israeli affairs for over fifteen years.

33 Vance, Hard Choices, 164.

43 Commenting on UN Security Council Resolution 242, Vance focused on how the document only dealt with the Palestinians as a refugee problem, not a political group seeking self-determination.

The international community, “did not, at that time, focus on the question of a Palestinian state.

It was only in 1969 and 1970 that serious attention began to focus on the Palestinian people and their aspiration for a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza.”34 As Paul Chamberlin has elaborated in his work on the Palestinian national movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the PLO had gained international prominence by the middle of the decade through a combination of diplomatic overtures and violent acts of political terrorism on the global stage.35 Yet moderating influences within the Palestinian national movement had also grown more influential, generating measured support for a negotiated settlement with Israel.36

Palestine, the PLO Information Bulletin published in Beirut, noted the movement’s growing international prominence. Describing hard won victories in the United Nations, the magazine’s editors asserted the centrality of the Palestinian cause to regional stability even as mounting violence in Lebanon’s civil war was generating new complications.37 But U.S. policy towards the Palestinians had sidelined possible avenues of diplomacy with the 1975 introduction of a blanket ban on discussions with PLO leaders. PLO leader singled out Henry

Kissinger, the architect of this ban, for his intransigent approach. “We must admit that Kissinger has achieved a remarkable success in his counter-attack…If the imperialist forces are unable to

34 Ibid., 160.

35 Chamberlin, The Global Offensive.

36 See Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and Helga Baumgarten, “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2005,” Journal of Palestine Studies 34:4 (2005): 25–48.

37 “Twelve Years…Palestine Lives,” Editorial, Palestine: PLO Information Bulletin, 3.1 (January 1977): 4-5. All copies of Palestine were accessed in the library of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Lebanon [hereafter IPS].

44 liquidate the Revolution, then they are not averse to taming it or trimming its wings, turning it into a disarmed, restricted entity, void of the active militant spirit which disturbs the dreams of the imperialists and Zionists.”38

Notwithstanding such combative rhetoric in externally focused publications, the PLO was making quiet inroads with Western diplomats. British Embassy officials in Europe, the U.S. and the Middle East had regular “discreet and informal contact with the PLO,” including monthly lunches between the Middle East desk officer in London and Said Hammami, the PLO representative in the city.39 Although the Israelis were against these contacts, British officials stressed the importance of hearing their ideas and “feed[ing] ideas directly to them.”40 In and Belgium, the PLO had attained some official recognition, and the organization was gaining ground with the German government as well.41 It was in this international context that the U.S. government set out to formulate a position of its own.

“Possible Elements of a Middle East Settlement”

International observers of the new U.S. administration voiced private skepticism about the possibility of any action that would demonstrate a more critical line towards Israel. “Israel is enormously dependent on the United States,” British Ambassador John Mason wrote from Tel

Aviv, “but the scope for the new U.S. Administration to use this dependence to force the Israeli government to concede points which they judge vital to their security is subject to severe

38 “1977: The Year of Giving and Revolutionary Dignity,” Palestine, 3.1 (January 1977): 6-7.

39 “Contacts with the PLO,” Confidential Memo, Roger Tomkys, 14 January 1977, “Status of the PLO in the UK,” FCO 93/1134, United Kingdom National Archives, Kew, London (UKNA).

40 Ibid.

41 In June 1980, the nine member economic committee of the EEC would agree to acknowledge the Palestinian right to self-determination and PLO involvement in any peace initiative as part of the Venice Declaration.

45 constraints.”42 In spite of these pressures, the National Security Council settled on the possibility of a second Geneva Conference by the late fall of 1977, agreeing that the U.S. should negotiate large and seemingly intractable policy questions prior to that date.43

Carter’s advisors pinned the failures of Kissinger’s earlier shuttle diplomacy on his unwillingness to confront the Israelis directly on a permanent settlement. Brzezinski argued that despite all the possible criticism, a breakthrough would only occur if the American government took a harder line against Israel by demanding the establishment of permanent borders. While the administration was willing to confront Israel, a serious policy clash over permanent borders could not be sustained indefinitely. “Given the centrality of the U.S. pipeline to Israel’s survival,”

Brzezinski remarked, “most Israelis would instinctively shrink back from overt defiance of the

United States, provided they were convinced the United States meant business.”44 During the first policy review committee meeting to discuss the American approach to negotiations,

Brzezinski, Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and Vice President Walter Mondale contemplated available options.45 Brzezinski suggested an informal process to define the range of agreements ahead of the Geneva meeting. Unlike Kissinger’s “step by step approach,” the

NSC advisor argued for a settlement followed by “a long process of implementation.”46

In February 1977, State Department experts outlined the elements of a possible comprehensive settlement in a closely held secret memo circulated to the President, Brzezinski,

42 “The Israel/U.S. Relationship,” Mason to White, 12 January 1977, “Political Relations between Israel and the USA,” FCO 93/1151, UKNA.

43 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 87.

44 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 88 (emphasis in original).

45 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 4 February 1977, FRUS, Doc 3.

46 Ibid.

46 and Vance.47 The details of the plan covered Israel’s relations with Egypt, Syria, and the

Palestinians, as well as the fate of Jerusalem and maps of possible permanent borders. In thinking through the approach to a settlement, Egypt was viewed as a key component, but “a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace is not in the cards.”48 Rather, an agreement with Sadat was intended to proceed along with Syrian participation, with State Department advisors hopeful that

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad could endorse a settlement and provide “explicit acknowledgement of Israel’s right to exist.” The initial idea was for Syria to support a solution to the Palestinian question as well, which would include a “practical solution of the refugee issue” and “recognition of a final, sovereign border between Israel and a Palestinian entity.”49 In return,

Syria would regain control over the Golan Heights, captured in 1967, and full diplomatic relations would be established between the two countries.

In the West Bank and Gaza, the details of the possible agreement focused on a viable resolution that would balance Palestinian national aspirations with Israeli concerns. Several political configurations were offered, but two “extreme outcomes” were eliminated. The first was a “reconstitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on a pre-1967 basis,” which would fail to address Palestinian self-determination, and the second was “a radical Soviet-armed PLO- dominated state on the West Bank and Gaza,” which would be “unacceptable to Israel and could be a destabilizing force in the region.” To facilitate a possible arrangement, the study suggested

47 “Possible Elements of a Middle East Settlement,” February 1977, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA (hereafter JCL). This February 1977 document, nearly 50 pages long and likely authored by Hal Saunders with INR input, was circulated by William Quandt, and contains extensive handwritten notes by Carter. It was released to the author in the summer of 2013 after a Mandatory Review request (MR-NLJC-2010-022) and further context was provided by Quandt, email to author, 26 August 2013.

48 Ibid, “Israel-Egypt Introduction.”

49 Ibid, “Israel-Syria Introduction.”

47 that the areas from which Israel would withdraw “would be administered by the Palestinians and would have a recognized Palestinian political identity.”50

Expanding on this political structure, the memo envisioned a Palestinian homeland linked to Jordan in loose confederation, with an elected administration supervising the police, courts, a capital, flags, taxation and passports. The Palestinians would be allowed “” without heavy military equipment crossing the Jordan River. Jordan would be responsible for foreign policy and defense and could intervene for internal security matters. Any arrangement would rely on political and economic relationships between the Palestinian entity and Jordan, with Palestinian representatives participating in negotiations and approval being secured by local referendum.

In essence, an interim Palestinian administration would work with Jordan to set up this confederation, cooperating with the United Nations prior to internal elections. Carter wondered whether a Palestinian commitment to the terms of a peace agreement—including “Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state,” would require PLO participation at a Geneva Conference, a matter of some debate in the ensuing weeks.51 But the initial plan called for an agreement on the West

Bank and Gaza signed between Israel, Jordan, and “Palestinians accepted by these Arab governments and the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people (presumably the Palestinian representatives in the negotiations).” Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would also associate themselves in the pursuit of this political entity “constituting a homeland for the Palestinians.”52

50 Ibid, “West Bank, Gaza and the Palestinians: Introduction.”

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid, “West Bank, Gaza and the Palestinians.”

48 The territory captured during the 1967 war had not been formally annexed by Israel, complicating the daily lives of Palestinians and inflaming Arab public opinion. In dealing with the establishment of permanent borders, the memo sought a first stage withdrawal to the 1967 lines excluding a fifteen-kilometer strip along Jordan and the Dead Sea with West Bank access via Jericho, extended to embrace Israeli settlements in and the Latrun salient. A further ten-kilometer strip would remain under Israeli control along the western boundary of the West

Bank north of Latrun, the settlement bloc, and a two-kilometer strip either side of the Jerusalem corridor. After a second stage of withdrawal, Israel would still retain Hebron and half the area north of Latrun.53 Demilitarized security zones would follow in the West Bank,

Gaza, and a portion of the Jordanian side of the border, with Israeli surveillance stations on high points over the and UN observer posts at the border crossing. This peace would require mutual recognition, “free access” for Israelis and Palestinian entity residents in each other’s territory, and eventual diplomatic recognition. If Israel would not withdraw from most of the territories without mutual security offers from the U.S., the proposal recommended a separate treaty to come to Israel’s defense in the event of aggression.

Jerusalem, long a central point of contention in negotiations, was to be adjudicated with particular criteria in mind. These included the requirement that the city would be “undivided physically,” with the Jewish population remaining part of Israel. Israelis would control Jewish areas in what was described as their capital, although the plan stipulated that “no authority has sovereignty over [the] entire city.”54 The proposal for Jerusalem included a Jewish mayor and

Arab deputy, Jewish and Arab Community Councils, respective courts and schools, unhindered

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid, “Jerusalem summary.” Later, the report expanded: “It is important, but probably not such an imperative, that the local Arab entity, whatever it may be, has its capital in Jerusalem as well.”

49 access and an international commission under the UN to oversee free operation and use of religious institutions.55 As for the settlements that housed 40-50,000 Jewish inhabitants in the

East Jerusalem neighborhoods of and Neve Yaacov, what the report called “Jewish housing projects in Arab Jerusalem,” options included representation on Jewish or Arab councils or the abandonment of these settlements and the movement of people and institutions “to the

Jewish part of the city.”56 In addition to these detailed agreements, the memo called for UN endorsement and U.S. and USSR association with the comprehensive settlement as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. Both superpowers would refrain from supplying certain categories of weapons, and the Middle East parties would join the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).57

Among the most charged issues that the secret memo addressed was the longstanding dilemma of the Palestinian refugee problem. According to Carter’s Middle East advisors, it

“would be resolved primarily through compensation and resettlement in the West Bank-Jordan area, with only token repatriation to Israel.”58 In detail, the principles of a settlement included the acknowledgement of injustice, the stipulation that “refugees have right to homes but developments since 1948 affect practicality,” and “where not practicable to return, compensated instead.” Carter, who had closely commented on this plan, scribbled on the side “Most will not want to live there—this is my guess.”59 Furthermore, the memo stated that Jews who left Arab countries have claims, “but not against Palestinians.” A special Israeli-Palestinian/Jordanian

55 This would apply for Jerusalem and Hebron.

56 Ibid, “Jerusalem.” The report added “the idea of abandoning them would probably reduce to near zero the already slender chances of Israel agreeing to any solution of this sort.”

57 Ibid.

58 The number suggested was 10,000 a year.

59 Ibid.

50 Commission under UN auspices, intended to organize refugee choices, screen returns, and calculate compensation, would facilitate the practicalities. The actual movement of the refugees would be done under direct UN auspices, via a Refugee Resettlement and Development

Commission that would initiate development for resettlement and eventually subsume the operations of the long established United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA).

As a statement of the opening U.S. position on a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in early 1977, the State Department memo was a striking document. Its contents, which have since returned as the central components of any negotiated settlement, outlined the beginnings of what at the time was an equitable solution to Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and the wider

Arab world. On the cover note of the entire memo, which had been distributed on National

Security Council stationary to only eight people “aware of its existence,” Carter wrote the following:

In general, this probably asks too much of Israel. Let’s stick to our specific items: a) ‘67 borders & minor adjustments; b) real peace; c) Palestine homeland; refugee problem resolved; d) no specifics re Jerusalem; no PLO contact absent UN 242 endorsement, etc. J.C.60

What eventually emerged during the Camp David negotiations was a far different proposal, focused primarily on Egypt, with more limited provisions for Palestinian autonomy. The intervening developments, as this chapter explains, illustrate how the administration’s ambitious agenda was supplanted by a limited Egyptian-Israeli peace in September 1978. This gap between the Carter administration’s initial vision and the contours of Begin’s agreement with Sadat defined the boundaries of Middle East peacemaking at the end of the 1970s, a pattern that carried

60 Ibid, cover note, Carter’s handwriting.

51 over into the 1980s and framed the emergence of the Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords in the early 1990s.

Vance to the Middle East

To initiate movement on the administration’s new approach to the Middle East, Secretary

Vance made plans for an extensive trip to the region in February 1977. A series of meetings was also arranged in Washington at the President’s behest throughout the spring, including Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in March, Egypt’s President Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein in

April, and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Fahd in May. The U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem,

Michael H. Newlin, wrote to Vance of the “real possibility” of peace given Arab willingness to recognize Israel’s legitimacy in exchange for territorial withdrawal along the lines of UN resolution 242. “The complicated and interrelated problems of peace, withdrawals, security, a

Palestinian entity, and the future of the PLO, while truly formidable, do not appear inherently insoluble.”61 Newlin was also aware of the irony that inhabitants of the themselves would be excluded from the negotiations. Like many U.S. diplomats who confronted the Arab-Israeli issue, he spoke presciently of the gap between theoretical possibilities and actual practice, which might be “more than the combined political will of Israel, the Arabs, the U.S. and the rest of the world can overcome.”62

Vance’s first stop was in Jerusalem, where he lunched with Prime Minister Yitzhak

Rabin, Defense Minister , Foreign Minister and several leading

61 Newlin to Vance, “Is Peace Achievable? A View from Jerusalem,” Consulate Jerusalem to Department of State, Telegram 00206, 10 February 1977, 1977JERUSA00206, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1979/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), National Archives and Records Administration, 2. http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=32004&dt=2532&dl=1629, accessed 10 March 2015.

62 Ibid., 6.

52 diplomats from both countries in Rabin’s office. Rabin spoke of Israel’s readiness for territorial compromise to advance peace, but it would “not be a total withdrawal to the 1967 borders.”

Changes to sovereignty and questions about the control over territory would be subject to negotiation.63 Defending the situation in the occupied territories, Defense Minister Peres spoke of an “Open Bridge” policy facilitating population movement between the West Bank and Jordan, and praised the rise of employment and improved living conditions among local residents. Peres also complemented Jordan’s shadow role in the West Bank, where it was paying local salaries of public officials and supporting municipalities. In Gaza, Peres spoke proudly of Israeli housing schemes and employment opportunities for Palestinians. “It is the most tranquil part of the area under Israeli administration…Israel feels that whatever happens, it must behave as a responsible government and permit a normal life for the Gazans.” As Peres told Vance, “Israel hopes to maintain a humane presence in the territories.”64 In his evening telegram to the State Department in Washington reporting on his talks, Vance recounted Rabin’s views about normalization with

Arab states and the establishment of “defensible borders” rather than withdrawal to the 1967

Green Line.65

Arriving in for meetings on 17 February, Vance joined Deputy Egyptian Prime

Minister Ismail Fahmy and his advisors to discuss the state of U.S.-Egyptian relations and the peace process. As Vance stressed, “the U.S. hopes to be a facilitator of peace, it has no plan and has come to learn.”66 This underscored the American approach to the region during the early months of the administration, gathering information and gauging positions rather than suggesting

63 Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, 16 February 1977, 12:30 PM, FRUS, Doc. 7.

64 Ibid.

65 Telegram from Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State, 17 February 1977, 0101Z, FRUS, Doc 8.

66 Memorandum of Conversation, Cairo, 17 February 1977, 12:30-2:30PM, FRUS, Doc 9.

53 parameters for diplomatic negotiations. Fahmy stressed the importance of engaging with the

PLO, which the U.S. had already done in the context of security procedures in the Lebanese civil war. Fahmy had met with PLO leader Yasser Arafat that very morning, and pledged to push the organization to revise its Charter in order to attend Geneva. But Fahmy stressed to Vance that he

“could not and would not wish to negotiate for others, including the Palestinians.”67 Fahmy elaborated on the willingness to reach a comprehensive settlement with Israel, including full recognition in exchange for complete withdrawal and “secure boundaries.”

In his meeting with President Anwar al-Sadat and Vice President that evening, Vance was assured that for the first time in over twenty five years Arabs and Israelis

“both now have full confidence in the U.S. and in President Carter” to act as a mediator.68 Sadat spoke of his own efforts to reach out to the U.S. from the time he came to office in 1970, recalling his statements of support for a peace agreement with Israel and his proposals to complete one in a swift manner.69 He also recalled his decision to order Soviet troops out of

Egypt and his work with Kissinger on the Disengagement Agreements for the Sinai. The

Egyptian President was caustic about the Soviet Union, saying they had “nothing to offer except their ability to undermine and create chaos so that the Arabs will have to ask for Soviet assistance.”70 As for the Palestinians, Sadat believed they should have a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip connected by a corridor running through Israel. Foreign Minister Fahmy related his discussions with Arafat and emphasized their increasing moderation, again stressing their

67 Ibid.

68 Memorandum of Conversation, Cairo, 17 February 1977, 7-8:45 PM, FRUS, Doc 10.

69 Sadat stressed that his February 1971 proposal was “essentially the same as what in fact had happened after the October [1973] war.” As Craig Daigle argued in The Limits of Détente, 1973 was Sadat’s effort to break logjam of détente.

70 Memorandum of Conversation, Cairo, 17 February 1977, 7-8:45 PM, FRUS, Doc 10.

54 willingness to change the language of their Charter at the Palestine National Council meeting in

March.

Vance reflected on the dissonance of meeting with Israelis one day and Egyptians the next in his telegram to Carter in the White House that evening. “The suspicion and distrust of each other’s intentions are profound and are matched by an almost total inability on each side to understand the other’s political realities.”71 The Israelis sought a peace process at a “measured pace,” stressing their need to retain some Arab territory for security purposes and opposing a separate Palestinian state or dealings with the PLO. The Egyptians viewed PLO participation and the establishment of a Palestinian state as “the crux of the problem,” and were willing to find creative ways to ensure their participation in Geneva.72 Sadat privately assured Vance that he was deeply committed to a peace deal, and “he said he could bring the other Arabs along by virtue of his substantial influence.”73

Before returning to Washington, Vance shuttled to , Beirut, and finally , where he met with President Hafez al-Assad on 20 February.74 Assad, like King Hussein of

Jordan and President of Lebanon, agreed that a comprehensive solution to the

Middle East conflict was a necessity. He was adamant that a withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 war signified the areas in their entirety. “Even if a state of war continued for hundreds of years with clashes every other year, Syria would not give up one inch

71 Telegram from Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State, Cairo, 17 February 1977, 2356Z, FRUS, Doc 11.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 For summaries of the meetings with King and President Sarkis of Lebanon, see FRUS, Docs 12-13.

55 of its territory under any pretext or condition,” Assad stressed.75 Privately, Vance spoke with

Assad about the Arab states finding common ground on the Palestinian issue.76 Back in his room at the Hotel Meridien that evening, Vance scribbled out the areas of agreement and division that had emerged during his visit to Arab capitals. All the parties were willing to go to a Geneva

Conference in the second half of 1977, he wrote, and they are prepared to have substantive discussions on the “core elements of a final settlement: peace, withdrawal, resolution of the

Palestinian question.”77 The disagreements that Vance described centered on the method of resolving these issues, and the question of PLO participation.

At a National Security Council meeting in Washington on 23 February, Vance reported back on his trip to President Carter, Vice President Mondale, NSC Advisor Brzezinski, and several other senior officials. He reiterated the common agreement on going to Geneva for an overall settlement, and the “essential” U.S. role in facilitating these discussions. The question of withdrawal divided the Arabs who were demanding full pull back from the 1967 lines, and the

Israelis, who held onto the notion of secure recognized borders. As Vance relayed, there was

“little consensus” on the Palestinian question, “even among the Arabs.”78 America’s role, the

NSC meeting participants agreed, was to help the parties articulate their positions and to outline general principles governing a settlement. Brzezinski stressed the need to deal with substance

75 Memorandum of Conversation, Damascus, February 20, 1977, FRUS, Doc 15.

76 Vance recounted this private conversation, of which there is no record, at the 23 February NSC meeting below.

77 Handwritten notes, 20-21 Feb 1977, Hotel Meridien Damas, Box 11, folder 30, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664), YUL.

78 Minutes of a National Security Meeting, 23 February 1977, 9-9:35 AM, FRUS, Doc 16.

56 ahead of Geneva, like the need to separate a discussion of security and sovereignty and a

“sharper definition” of the Palestinian issue.79

In their discussion of the Israeli position, Carter wondered about the impact of an impending election on foreign policy, and the willingness of any Israeli government to recognize the PLO. Vance suggested more U.S. willingness to grant visa applications to PLO spokesmen wanting to travel to the U.S., “a limited sign we are prepared to move off dead center.” Carter entertained the idea, raising his concern about U.S. conformity with the Helsinki Agreement.

“Can we keep people like this out of our country? This is not so much a question just of the PLO, but we have to be clean on the human rights issue.”80 In his follow up memo to Carter on the meeting, Brzezinski argued that permitting the PLO to come to the U.S. would be a “major concession” requiring something in return.

We must be careful that this step which will add to the PLO’s prestige is carefully timed to support our other efforts in the Middle East. The moderate Arabs are making an effort to get the PLO under control and, in effect, to diminish their stature somewhat. This is in our interest, and we should not undercut them by suddenly giving the PLO a big public shot in the arm.81

On the margin of the memo, Carter wrote “I agree.” Lastly, Brzezinski advised Carter, Israel

“must be made to understand that Geneva is not a substitute for stalemate.” Rather than attend and let the conference stumble, Carter’s upcoming Washington talks with Israeli Prime Minister

Rabin should emphasize movement on substantive issues, “with us not shy in encouraging this movement with substantive thoughts of our own.” Carter underlined “not shy” on his copy of the

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid. On Helsinki, see Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

81 Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, “Follow-up on NSC Meeting on the Middle East,” 23 February 1977, FRUS, Doc 17.

57 memo, writing that “we should play a strong & discreet role, but first we must decide what we want—ultimately & step-by-step.”82

Rabin to the White House

Yitzhak Rabin’s March visit to the White House presented an opportunity for the two leaders to discuss the substance of a possible settlement. In his morning meeting with Carter, the

Israeli Prime Minister emphasized an approach to territorial compromise that did not denote full withdrawal, especially in the West Bank. At the same time, he stressed that the territories were not being annexed. “Under international law, these are administered territories under Israeli control, but they are not part of our sovereign territory. We believe that their future is still to be decided in negotiations.”83 When pushed by Vance to respond if Israel required or claimed sovereignty in occupied territories like the Golan Heights, Rabin was noncommittal. “We may claim it, but we have not annexed any other territory. We have left it open.”84 This indeterminate response enabled Israel to retain control indefinitely, and would carry over in more concrete ways during the Begin government that followed Rabin’s.

The talks also highlighted the difficulty in convincing Israel to yield on the Palestinian question. In Rabin’s view, there should be two states, Israel and a ‘Jordanian-Palestinian state,’ not an independent Palestinian entity between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

We believe in two states: Israel, as a Jewish state, although we have a non-Jewish minority of one half million which enjoys all rights….East of Israel there should be a Jordanian-Palestinian state. How the Palestinian identity is worked out within that state is

82 See ibid, and notes 4 and 5, emphasis in original.

83 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington 7 March 1977, 11AM-12:30PM, FRUS, Doc 18.

84 Ibid.

58 not our business. It is up to them. But we want two states. It can consist of two entities, but there can only be one state.85

Carter pushed Rabin, asking about a possible U.S. model of two states within a federation, where

Jordan would control defense and foreign policy and the West Bank state would be demilitarized.

Rabin reiterated “there can be no third state,” a position which underlined the limits of Israeli willingness to accommodate any Palestinian national entity with attributes of sovereignty.

President: You use the word state as meaning a nation with sovereignty? Prime Minister Rabin: Yes. On the question of negotiations, these must be between governments.86

In his memo to the President that evening, Brzezinski noted Rabin’s clear positions and encouraged Carter to “make clear to Rabin that we want greater specificity…we are prepared to support Israel in a genuine search for peace, but that he should have no illusion about the United

States indefinitely supporting a stalemate.”87

Rabin had also made it clear that forging any agreement with the PLO at a possible

Geneva Conference was also out of the question, as the organization refused to recognize Israel or accept UN Resolution 242.88 These procedural difficulties would complicate preparations for a possible conference, given the Arab demands for Palestinian participation. In a side meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, Vance broached the possibility that the PLO could amend its charter to accept Israel and adopt UN Resolution 242, to which Allon responded, “a

PLO that accepts 242 would no longer be the PLO.”89 As Vance’s visit to the Middle East

85 Ibid. See also Vance, Hard Choices, 170.

86 Ibid.

87 Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 March 1977, FRUS, Doc 19.

88 William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 41.

89 Ibid.

59 underscored, the administration was already pursuing the possibility of PLO reform, discussing modes of engagement with the organization in successive talks with Arab leaders.

During the second extended session between Rabin, Carter, and senior advisors from both countries, Carter more firmly articulated the American position on territory and the Palestinian question. “Your settlements in the occupied territories are illegal…Your control over territory in the occupied regions will have to be modified substantially in my view.”90 As for the PLO,

Carter remarked, “We, of course, deplore terrorism, but even we sometimes have had to swallow our pride. We talked to the North Koreans and the French talked to the FLN…we don’t know of any Palestinian leaders other than the PLO.” He called for greater Israeli flexibility on moving towards Geneva with Palestinian representation, and Rabin’s response evinced frustration with such an activist U.S. stance. “I hope that you, Mr. President, will not take clear substantive positions before negotiations.”91

In Rabin’s view, the Israeli position on the Palestinian issue could be separated from the question of PLO representation, which he opposed. But Carter and Vance made it clear that the issues were intertwined, and the U.S. government would not shy away from either. As Carter concluded,

My only goal is to bring about a permanent peace in the Middle East…Our attitude has been stated, but we will be just as insistent in dealing with the Arabs. We will insist that they recognize you, that they open their borders, and that they end belligerency. But I do not intend to tell them where the borders should be…We want a partnership with you in peace, and I understand how difficult it will be for you to accept the proposition that the Arabs really do now want peace.92

90 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 8 March 1977, 10:35-11:30 AM, FRUS, Doc 20.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

60 Personal accounts of the visit underscore the deep divide that was emerging between the United

States and Israel.93 Rabin recalled his meeting with some disdain in his memoirs. “It seemed to me that Carter was set on the Brookings report and intended to ‘sell’ it to me piecemeal.”94 In

Rabin’s opinion, “the Brookings plan had absolutely nothing in common with Israel’s views about final borders.”95 The Israeli Prime Minister was especially frustrated with Carter’s insistence on frank talk and clear objectives, growing “increasingly concerned about the effect his ‘new style’ would have on our region.” “If he publicized his views on the Middle East,”

Rabin noted, “he would bring comfort to the Arabs and weaken Israel’s negotiating position.”96

Carter also felt uneasy about his meetings with Rabin. Ten days later, aboard Air Force

One, he told a domestic affairs advisor “he liked Rabin but didn't think Rabin liked him.” In private talks in the residence, Carter had asked Rabin about a possible peace, and promised that

“he could raise with Sadat any point on behalf of Israel that Rabin wanted.” But Carter had been

“disappointed” by Rabin’s “lack of response.”97 The tensions generated by Rabin’s visit also worried leaders of the American Jewish community, who had already scheduled a meeting with

Secretary Vance to discuss his trip to the Middle East.

93 For accounts of the meetings from pertinent memoirs, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 90-91; Carter, Keeping Faith, 286-288; Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 292- 300; Vance, Hard Choices, 168-173; and Quandt, Camp David, 44-49.

94 Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 294.

95 Ibid., 296.

96 Ibid.

97 Notebooks of Stuart Eizenstat, 17 March 1977. Box 2, Stuart Eizenstat Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter LOC). .

61 On the evening of Rabin’s departure, a delegation from the Conference of Presidents of

Major Jewish Organizations gathered in the State Department with Secretary Vance.98 Rabbi

Alexander Schindler, the President of the organization and a renowned leader of the Reform movement, expressed concern over Carter’s comments at his press conference with Rabin. Vance assured the Jewish leaders that the special relationship with the U.S. and Israel was as strong as ever. But his assurance did not last very long.

A Palestinian “Homeland”

During a town hall meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts, just ten days after the talks with

Rabin, Carter replied to a reporter’s question on the Middle East by saying “there has to be a homeland provided for the who have suffered for many, many years.”99

Carter’s choice of the word “homeland”—which was actually invoked with similar language in both the Brookings Report and the State Department secret memo putting forward a comprehensive proposal—elicited a great deal of public criticism from Israeli and American

Jewish leaders.100

The concept of a “homeland” implied certain inalienable rights for Palestinians, addressing the refugee issue and acknowledging Israel’s role in fomenting the 1948 nakba. Many supporters of Israel took issue with the view that Palestinians were an actual nation, a position that persisted well into the 1990s.101 Palestinians themselves had moved away from using the

98 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington 9 March 1977, 6:45PM, FRUS, Doc 21.

99 See the epigraph to this chapter.

100 The issue remained a topic of conversation more than two months later, at a subsequent meeting of American Jewish leaders in the White House. See Memorandum of Conversation, 16 May 1977, 3:15-4:15PM, FRUS, Doc 34.

101 See the controversy over Joan Peters and her claims about the Palestinians in From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); and Edward W. Said and

62 term “homeland” in favor of the phrase “independent national state,” which reflected a grudging willingness to live side by side with Israel.102 Carter attempted to counter the public outcry, saying “he never called for an independent Palestinian country,” and expressing support for the idea that “if there is a Palestinian entity established in the West Bank…it ought to be associated with Jordan.” 103 Brzezinski, too, reassured Israeli officials that the speech was far more innocuous than they imagined, calling Ambassador Simcha Dinitz to clarify that the word change was not monumental.104 One administration official, however, portrayed the incident as deliberate, arguing that the President wanted to move the negotiating process forward in his first year.105

Despite the fact that almost seventy percent of American Jews had cast a vote for Carter in the 1976 election, deep suspicion lingered with regard to the administration’s policy towards

Israel. Carter’s Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, had recognized this threat and worked to rectify it, along with other members of the administration such as domestic policy advisor Stuart

Eizenstat and Jewish communal liaison Mark Siegel.106 Time magazine printed scathing reactions

Christopher Hitchens, eds., Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (London: Verso, 1988).

102 Henry Tanner, “Why Not a Homeland or a State for the Palestinian Refugees?” New York Times, 10 April 1977, E1.

103 PPPJC, 16 September 1977.

104 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 91. Both Carter and Vance ignore the Clinton Town Hall speech altogether in their memoirs.

105 In Quandt’s view, Carter was “impatient with fine diplomatic distinctions, with the taboos surrounding certain ‘buzzwords,’ and with the unimaginative and repetitive nature of many of the discussions of the topic.” See Quandt, Camp David, 49.

106 See the breathtaking White House memo “Jewish Identity, Zionism and Israel,” which demonstrated increased executive branch awareness of the need to be cognizant of domestic Jewish concerns in the articulation of foreign policy. The memo’s author, Jewish communal liaison Mark Siegel, remembers scrambling to finish it for Jordan, who feared that domestic support was ‘slipping away.’ Referring specifically to the “homeland” statement, Siegel wrote that “the Jewish community here is in almost morbid fear of a separate, politically independent Palestinian entity on the West Bank of the Jordan River. The fear and disgust of the PLO reaches almost Nazi-hating quality of

63 to the “homeland” comment from leaders of the American Jewish community, with sources commenting that “Carter’s pronouncement seems both premature and imprecise.”107

Outside of the United States, Carter’s remarks were welcomed as a sign of American seriousness in advancing towards Geneva. In the British Foreign Office, talking points were prepared for Foreign Secretary David Owen that emphasized agreement with Carter’s statement.

“We consider that the Palestinians should have a land of their own,” Foreign Office official

Michael Weir wrote. “How this should be realized is one of the maters for negotiations between the parties.”108 For the Palestinian leadership in Beirut, there was praise for Carter’s declaration, but also skepticism. The PLO Information Bulletin recalled a history of declarations that had not brought substantive change on the ground, while seeing Carter’s statement as a “step forward in

U.S. Middle Eastern policy, and an encouragement for the Palestinian people in their resistance to Zionist expansion and settler colonialism.”109 PLO activists sought more specific reference to

emotion. The American Jewish community was therefore terribly concerned by the President’s reference to a Palestinian homeland.” The memo also made several recommendations to reach out to American Jews, who were convinced “that the State and Defense Departments are populated with anti-Semitic Arabists.” As Siegel suggested, “a token of ‘objectivity’ must be introduced into the departments, even if it is the placement of one obviously sympathetic, non-career person, in each. At the very least, this will give the lobby someone to bitch to that they feel will at least listen.” A similar suggestion was made regarding the National Security Council and the White House, in line with the belief that a better explanation of administration policies would have long-lasting strategic benefits. As Siegel concluded, “above all, they [American Jews] must come to feel that their voices have been heard and that they have been part of the process. Only then could they be called on to help sell the result to their people and the Hill.” Mark Siegel, “Jewish Identity, Zionism and Israel,” 13 November 1978, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, 1977-1980, JCL. http://research.archives.gov/description/142156 (accessed 10 March 2015). For an excellent case study of the political fallout from these tensions, see Daniel Strieff, “Arms Wrestle: Capitol Hill Fight over Carter’s 1978 Middle East ‘Package’ Airplane Sale,” Diplomatic History, advance access 9 March 2015.

107 “Carter, the World and the Jews,” Time, 27 June 1977, 9.

108 M S Weir to Private Secretary, 10 March 1977, Middle East, PREM 16/1340, UKNA.

109 “The Palestinian Homeland,” Palestine, 3 (May 1977), IPS.

64 the location of this homeland, and insisted on an independent state rather than a “federated or a confederated Palestinian union with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.”110

The negative reaction in the domestic press was largely the result of a mounting perception that Carter was taking sides in the Middle East debate, to the detriment of Israel’s national interest. Brzezinski admitted in his memoir that without any Arab concessions, such a remark “helped to create the impression that the new administration was tilting away from

Israel.”111 Coupled with a decision not to sell cluster bombs to Israel or allow the sale of Kfir bombers to Latin America, the Carter administration appeared to have distanced itself from its alliance. By June 1977, the perception that Israel was being unfairly targeted by the administration led members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to compile a list of twenty-one grievances, demanding the dismissal of Carter’s Middle East experts.

The White House was inundated with letters attacking Carter’s “pro-Arab” policies.112

As a constituency long engaged in political activism, the American Jewish community had been working tirelessly to tighten its support among Congress and among sympathetic allies in the White House, building a powerful lobby to steer its agenda.113 This domestic mobilization

110 PLO activists also praised Carter’s broader appeal for human rights, which they felt would “help relieve the sufferings of all oppressed peoples of the world, including the Palestinians. It will be a great contribution toward a new world, without wars, a world of peace, a just peace.” See ibid.

111 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 91.

112 Tivnan, The Lobby, 104.

113 For background on the growth and effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobby, see I.L. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981); George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham: Press, 1990), esp. Ch. 7; Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Hyperion, 1994); Lee O’Brien, American Jewish Organizations and Israel (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986); and Tivnan, The Lobby. On public opinion see Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987) and Elia Zureik and Fouad Moughrabi, Public Opinion and the Palestine Question (London: Croom Helm, 1987). For more critical views of the Israel lobby, see Richard H. Curtiss, Stealth PAC’s: How Israel’s American Lobby Seeks to Control U.S. Middle East Policy (Washington D.C.: American Educational Trust, 1990); Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Press, 1985); and John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

65 was rooted in the psychologically damaging effects of Israel’s military losses in the surprise attack of the 1973 war, which still hung over Jewish organizational life. While the activism of

American Jewry provides one important transnational dimension to the role of interest groups and ethnic politics in the making of foreign policy, the domestic unrest also indicated deeper discontent with Carter’s departure from Cold War priorities around the globe. The emergence of a foreign policy anchored by an appeal to human rights bolstered the claims of neoconservative critics who worried that the U.S. had ceded ground to the Soviet Union.

In 1977, the Middle East still featured as a successful departure from the approach of earlier decades.114 Brzezinski provided an assessment of progress in early April, explaining that

U.S. priorities consisted of coordination with principal allies and a “North-South dialogue” to deal with “wider human needs.”115 The possibility opened up by Carter’s statement in Clinton,

Brzezinski asserted, created a “flexible framework for dealing with hitherto intractable issues.”

The parties would see that the U.S. was serious about its peacemaking efforts, which could lead to more substantive negotiations with one another. “This is a significant step forward from

(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Also see , The Crisis of Zionism (New York: Times Books, 2012); and Michael E. Staub, Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish in Postwar America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Internally, see the crucial “eyes only” memo by Hamilton Jordan to President Carter, “Politics and Foreign Policy,” June 1977, FRUS, Doc 38. This document lays out an incisive, well- reasoned and comprehensive diagnosis of American Jewish political attitudes towards Israel, Congressional voting trends, responses to Carter’s approach, and recommendations for the easing of Jewish communal anxieties by the White House.

114 See “Weekly National Security Report #7,” Brzezinski to Carter, 1 April 1977, Box 41, Brzezinski Donated Collection, JCL. “The public clearly understands that the Carter foreign policy is derived from an affirmative commitment to certain basic human values. Moreover, you have defined these values as “human rights,” which is both broader and more flexible than such words as “” or “freedom.” This gives our foreign policy a wider appeal, more in tune with the emerging political consciousness of mankind—which is concerned both with liberty and equity.”

115 Ibid.

66 almost anything that the United States has said on the subject for at least ten to fifteen years,” the

NSC Advisor concluded.116

Arab Dissonance

Continuing the series of meetings that Vance had initiated in the Middle East, Carter hosted Egyptian President Sadat at the White House for his first face-to-face conversation with an Arab leader. At their discussion in the Cabinet Room on 4 April, the connection between the two men was immediate. Sadat spoke of the common principles shared by the two villagers, both from religious backgrounds. “You have to be optimistic if you are a farmer,” Carter replied.

“You have to always believe that things will be better next year.”117 Their discussions about the

Palestinian issue, representation at Geneva, and Egypt’s willingness to pursue a permanent peace with Israel were frank and far-reaching. Sadat was eager to establish his unique role for Carter. “I am the only leader in the Arab world who can take real steps toward peace…No other Arab leader, even in Jordan, will go as far as I will.”118 Underlying Sadat’s optimism about peacemaking, however, was an acute concern about the state of Egypt’s economy and the need for greater Western investment to bolster the country’s domestic and regional security.119

On 19 April, the Policy Review Committee convened in the White House Situation Room to discuss the state of the administration’s Middle East policy. The focus on Geneva was

116 Ibid.

117 Memorandum of Conversation, 4 April 1977, 11:10 AM-12:30 PM, FRUS, Doc 25.

118 Ibid.

119 Egypt’s Minister of Economy raised these concerns in discussions the following day. See Memorandum of Conversation, 5 April 1977, 10:45-11:45AM, FRUS, Doc 27. On domestic transformations in Egypt, see Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Yoram Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

67 reiterated, and the CIA agreed to prepare a study on militarily defensible borders for Israel as close to the 1967 lines as possible. Rabin had announced his resignation from office on 8 April, as a consequence of a bank account scandal involving his wife while he was Ambassador to the

UN. As the assembled experts discussed different configurations of a future Israeli government, none predicted the imminent rise of the Likud government and Menachem Begin to power, focusing instead on Shimon Peres and the growing influence of the National Religious Party and the settlement movement of . The possibility of direct contacts with the PLO was also discussed, and Brzezinski supported the effort in exchange for their acceptance of

Resolution 242.120

As complicated as the question of PLO representation might have been, it was the composition of a defined territorial entity for Palestinians that ran through all these initial consultations of 1977. King Hussein of Jordan visited the White House after Sadat, and Carter pushed him on the specifics of Jordanian-Palestinian relations in the West Bank.121 It remained unclear how sovereignty for Palestinians in the West Bank would affect , and how to achieve an independent entity given the dominance of the PLO. As King Hussein argued, “The PLO prefers its own state before discussing the future, and they realize the need for close links with us. The PLO is the creation of Arab summits, not the choice of the Palestinian people.”122 These inter-Arab disagreements about the nature of Palestinian self-determination persisted during bilateral discussions with the Egyptian and Syrian leadership.123

120 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting on the Middle East, 19 April 1977, 3-4:40 PM, FRUS, Doc 28.

121 Memorandum of Conversation, 25 April 1977, 11:05AM-12:15 PM, FRUS, Doc 30.

122 Ibid.

123 This was the case with British and American diplomats. For the former, see “Record of a Discussion between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the at the Barrage, Nile Delta, 26 April 1977,” PREM

68 Among the most difficult issues to address was the fate of the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War. During his first meeting with Syria’s President Assad in Geneva’s Intercontinental

Hotel, Carter raised the matter directly. “How do you see a practical solution?” he asked Assad.

“I don’t believe that Israel can agree to take all of the Palestinians into their territory. What does

Arafat have in mind that is practical?” Assad searched for an answer. He felt that any Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would be too small to accommodate the refugees, and Israel would have to accept some. Carter asked him how many there were. Assad was taken aback, whispering to his Foreign Minister about the numbers of Palestinians in each Arab country. “I am anxious to provide you with a reply, but I don’t want to mislead you.”

The conversation turned to the possible formations of a Palestinian homeland, and Assad admitted the internal dissonance between King Hussein and the Palestinians. Carter sensed the

Arab states “do not favor a fully independent Palestinian nation. It could become radicalized with a Qadhafi-like leader. The Soviets might gain influence there.”124 Assad explained the divergent schools of thought, one that saw Jordanian hegemony over the West Bank and Gaza preventing the emergence of a Palestinian state, and the other saw a demilitarized entity for

Palestinians as part of a Jordanian state. “These propositions would divest the Palestinians of anything allowing themselves to demonstrate their own personality,” Assad concluded. But the problem for Carter was not merely a question of internal Arab confusion on how to manage the fate of the Palestinians. A sea change in Israeli politics, marked by the arrival of a right wing government to power, would soon challenge any possible semblance of Palestinian national sovereignty inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

16/1370, UKNA. For the latter, see Carter’s meeting with President Assad of Syria, Memorandum of Conversation, Geneva, 9 May 1977, 3:50-7PM, FRUS, Doc 32.

124 Memorandum of Conversation, Geneva, 9 May 1977, 3:50-7PM, FRUS, Doc 32.

69

Menachem Begin and the “Greater Land of Israel” Policy

The sweeping victory of the right wing Likud party and Menachem Begin’s ascendency to Israel’s highest office in May 1977 was by all accounts a surprising development. Long relegated to the opposition, Likud’s victory overturned decades-long Labor dominance in Israeli politics.125 The party’s election platform had provisions for dealing with the Arabs in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which stemmed from a liberal nationalist approach to the minorities question. It spoke of a choice to adopt Israeli citizenship, which would provide full rights and include voting for the . Alternatively, if Arabs in the territories chose not to take up Israeli citizenship, they would retain full rights without voting. In either circumstance, the electoral platform stated that the “Arab nationality in Eretz Israel will enjoy cultural autonomy,” a term that would emerge as a central tenant of Begin’s approach to the Palestinians while in office.126

In an interview during the lead up to the election, Begin stressed the impossibility of a

Palestinian state, and asserted that the central difference with his party and Labor was over the return of the territories.

To whom are we going to give it back? [In 1948] King Abdullah invaded this country from Jordan, he killed our people, destroyed our synagogues and he occupied part of it. Then in the early ‘50s he annexed it. Nobody recognized that annexation but Britain and . The U.S. never recognized it. So give what back? It doesn’t belong to them.127

125 See Ilan Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: Israel’s Move to the Right (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). On the political dynamics behind 1977, see Uri Cohen and Nissim Leon, “The Mahapach and ’s Quiet Revolution: Mizrahim and the Movement,” Israel Studies Review 29.1 (2014): 18-40.

126 “Extracts from Likud’s Election Programme,” Private Papers of Menachem Begin, PM20, Menachem Begin Heritage Center, Jerusalem (hereafter MBC). “Eretz Israel” in this context means the entirety of the biblical “Land of Israel,” including all of Israel and the Palestinian territories.

127 “We cannot give up Judea and Samaria,” Interview with Menachem Begin, undated, Private Papers of Menachem Begin, PM20, MBC.

70

Begin’s views, as extreme as they may have sounded to critics on the left, were not at all surprising to anyone paying attention to his long career in the opposition.128 Yet his reemergence as a leading statesman rankled liberals who had always envisioned Israelis politics along Labor lines. In his memoir, Carter recalled watching an interview when Begin was running for Prime

Minister, in which the candidate “stated that the entire West Bank had been ‘liberated’ during the

Six Day War, and that a Jewish majority and an Arab minority would be established there.” At the time Carter exclaimed, “I could not believe what I was hearing.”129 Yet this position was not new; Begin, the settler movement, and even left leaning politicians in Israel like Levi Eshkol and

Golda Meir had been arguing along these lines for a decade.130

While the Likud’s hold on the West Bank would be framed in more absolutist terms than the preceding governments, Carter had already warned Labor leaders of the dangers of settlement expansion in the occupied territories before the election. Grasping the political significance of land seizures, the President asked Brzezinski to raise the issue of the newly chartered Mes’ha settlement with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz in April 1977. As the State Department pointed out,

“We are particularly concerned about Mes’ha because it appears to set a precedent for settlement all over the West Bank, whereas previously, settlements had been limited to thinly-populated areas like the Jordan Valley.”131

128 For crucial interviews with Begin during his early months in office, see files in PM16, MBC.

129 Carter, Keeping Faith, 295.

130 See Raz, The Bride and the Dowry.

131 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 16 May 1977, “Israeli Settlement at Mes’ha and Vance-Allon Meeting,” Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS). Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale 2015.

71 At a photo op with Ambassador Samuel Lewis, the new American envoy to Israel,

Carter’s talking points stressed the critical juncture of 1977 for Middle East peacemaking, a moment that required Israel to be “as forthcoming as possible in taking flexible positions on the territories and on the Palestinian issue.”132 Lewis was told to reassure Israeli leadership about

U.S. support for a key ally, while confronting the Labor government with the difficult territorial choices it had avoided since 1967. Among Carter’s key points in the briefing was a clear statement of frustration. “We cannot understand how Israel reconciles its desire for improving the atmosphere for peace with its policy of establishing new settlements in the occupied territories,” Carter stated. “We will continue to make our opposition to these policies known.”133

On 18 May, Vance received a memo from the State Department reporting on the

“stunning defeat” of the Labor party with the projection of Likud’s large electoral victory. The

Tel Aviv embassy reported on the “uncertainty” of U.S.-Israeli relations as a major factor in

Labor’s poor showing. “The Israeli electorate foresees hard times ahead and has prepared to batten down the hatches by taking a strong swing to the right.”134 Officials in Washington feared that Begin’s election would herald the end of a comprehensive peace plan for the region. After news reached the White House, William Quandt recommended a policy review in light of the political realignment.

Much of our strategy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has been predicated on the assumption that a strong and moderate Israeli government would at some point be able to make difficult decisions on territory and on the Palestinians…The Arabs will no doubt read the Israeli election results as signifying an end to the chance of getting to Geneva

132 Memorandum, “President’s Meeting with Ambassador Samuel Lewis,” Brzezinski to Carter, 4 May 1977, Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 34, JCL.

133 Ibid.

134 Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Geneva, 18 May 1977, 0531Z, FRUS, Doc 35.

72 this year, and possibly the end of any hope for a political settlement…all in all, the short- term looks rather bleak in the Middle East.135

In his suggestions about how to handle the Likud victory, Quandt argued that the U.S. government should not indicate any disappointment, instead sticking to the plans for Geneva and inviting Begin to Washington in the event he was chosen as Prime Minister. Nevertheless,

Quandt wrote, “Israeli voters should know that a hard-line government will not find it easy to manage the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Intransigence must be seen to carry a price tag, but we should not be seen as the bully. Begin should be allowed to make his own mistakes.”136 On a note of optimism, Quandt suggested that American public support for a Likud government would be less than for Labor, giving the U.S. government “room for maneuver.”137

Carter adopted this cautious approach to the Israeli elections in his conversations with allies. He told British Prime Minister James Callaghan that regardless of the change in administration, the U.S. would continue to pursue efforts for a comprehensive peace. If the Likud government was intransigent, Carter told Callaghan, the U.S. might have to move away from a commitment to Israel. “If Begin and his new Government should prove to be adamant against a genuine and sincere search for a peaceful settlement then it would certainly be a reason for us to modify our own commitment to Israel.”138 Callaghan discussed the possibility of internal splits

135 Memo, William B. Quandt to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 18 May 1977. Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 34, JCL.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid. Another set of suggestions was offered by Carter’s Jewish communal liaison, , on 23 May. After speaking with Israeli officials and Jewish communal leaders, Lipshutz suggested the U.S. convey its views frankly and privately to Begin via a trusted emissary, and on the matter of sovereignty in the West Bank, offered support for a plan for a “territorial agreement whereby a significant number of Arabs would remain and perhaps even increase as citizens of Israel but also that a significant number of Israelis would become citizens of an Arab controlled nation which would include Samaria and Judea.” See “Israel Election and Related Matters,” Robert Lipshutz to Carter, 23 May 1977, Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 34, JCL.

138 “Text of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America on Saturday 21 May 1977,” PREM 16/1370, UKNA.

73 within British and American Jewry over the election, mentioning Jewish leaders with whom he regularly consults, “But I have rather kept away from them this week whilst they are suffering from shock.”139 Carter agreed, noting similar dynamics in the U.S. “If it became obvious that there was a choice between Begin and an unpopular government on the one hand and the security of Israel on the other there is no doubt that they would go with the security of Israel.”140

Carter and Callaghan, whose relationship was warm and trusting, spoke of plans to meet

Begin and the mutual concerns over his views. Callaghan had met him in 1974, and found him

“extremely charming,” and “extremely hard line.” “He fought very bitterly against us and has the respect that old enemies have,” Callaghan told Carter. Carter voiced concern over Begin’s more recent “unwarranted” statements about settlements in the West Bank (“or Judea as he calls it”).

“He could at least have kept his mouth shut for a few weeks,” Carter remarked. Callaghan’s response was revealing. “But it is unrealistic to expect him to do so. He has been saying this for

30 years…I don’t think he will modify that policy unless you can apply some leverage.”141 The two allies discussed plans to coordinate policy, and to consult on their meetings with Arab leaders as well.142

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid. Brzezinski also encouraged Carter along these lines in his report on the Israeli Cabinet Formation, making what he termed a “perverse” observation: “The electoral outcome may not be actually all that bad…Begin, by his extremism, is likely to split both Israeli public opinion and the American Jewish community...Before too long, we may have a situation in which the opposition in Israel finds it convenient to identity itself with your views, while both Israeli public opinion and significant portions of the American Jewish community will be blaming Begin for unnecessarily straining the U.S.-Israeli relationship.” NSC Weekly Report #13, 20 May 1977, Brzezinski donated material, Box 41, JCL.

141 “Text of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America on Saturday 21 May 1977,” PREM 16/1370, UKNA.

142 Carter told Callaghan he was “favourably impressed with the Arab leaders…they may be wonderful con artists but my impression is that they genuinely want to make some progress.” Callaghan agreed, singling out President Assad of Syria. “Personally, I liked him best of all. He has got a tremendous sense of humor and he is relaxed, he is young, he is vigorous and he seemed quite sure of himself.” See ibid.

74 These substantive British and American criticisms gained new urgency during the profligate settlement expansion of the Begin premiership. In his first speech to the Israeli

Knesset as Prime Minister on 20 June, the Israeli Prime Minister declared “the government will plan and establish and encourage settlements, both rural and urban, on the land of the homeland.”143 This policy was squarely at odds with both international legal precedent and

American national interest, clear lines that would erode over the next decade. During Begin’s tenure, Jewish settlements in the occupied territories expanded at an unprecedented rate. Israel’s

Gush Emunim movement, or “Bloc of the Faithful,” had grown in political strength after the

1967 War, with its members establishing settlement outposts across the West Bank.144 The movement called for the reclamation of land in the territories, labeled by their biblical name,

Yehuda v’ Shomron (Judea and Samaria). While expansion had started under the Labor governments in the aftermath of the 1967 War, it took off rampantly under the Likud.145

Among the PLO leadership in Beirut, Begin’s election and his policies on the territories affirmed deep antipathy for Zionist ideology. “It is a confirmation of the long-held PLO line that

143 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 20 June 1977, DDRS.

144 For background on Gush Emunim and the settlements, see Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land; Michael Feige, Settling in the Hearts: Jewish Fundamentalism in the Occupied Territories (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009); Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Robert I. Friedman, Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement (New York: Random House, 1992); Gazit, Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire; William Wilson Harris, Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980 (Chichester: Research Studies Press, 1980); Lesley Hazleton, “Israel: The Sticking Point,” The New York Review of Books 25(11), 29 June 1978; Sarah Yael Hirschhorn, “City on a Hilltop: The Participation of Jewish-American Immigrants within the Israeli Settler Movement, 1967-1987” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2012); Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); David Newman, The Impact of Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985); David Newman, “From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of Gush Emunim and the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics and Society,” Israel Studies, 10:3 (Fall 2005): 192-224; Mordechai Nisan, Israel and the Territories: A Study in Control 1967-1977 (Israel: Turtledove, 1978); and David Weisburd, Jewish Settler Violence: Deviance as Social Reaction (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989).

145 This is the central point of Gorenberg’s work, but he stops in 1977. My dissertation is offering new Israeli, American and British evidence of just how destructive this later period was.

75 unmasks the fascist and aggressive nature of the ,” wrote the editors of the PLO

Information Bulletin. “It proves the rightness of the PLOs attitude, that Zionist expansionism and aggression cannot be deterred by mere words.”146 Under a headline article, “Begin: A Turn for the Worse in the Middle East,” the PLO’s magazine recounted the massacre of Deir Yassin, a notorious episode in the 1948 War committed by the , of which Begin was the leader.147

Without embellishment, the magazine reported that for Begin, “the Palestinian issue does not exist.” As statements from his book The Revolt and subsequent remarks made clear, Jewish right of settlement in Judea and Samaria was indisputable. Arabs who lived there would at most gain cultural autonomy, a solution that would leave them without political sovereignty. This forceful

Israeli stance would persist throughout the negotiations ahead of Geneva, upending U.S. efforts to address the question of Palestinian political sovereignty in a meaningful way.

Formulating a Negotiating Position

For his last initial consultation with Arab heads of state, Carter welcomed Saudi Crown

Prince Fahd to the White House on 24 May. Fahd was seen as a lynchpin of the peace process, given his financial support for the PLO and Arab leaders, and his ability to set a moderate agenda.148 The President had been encouraged by Brzezinski and Vance to indicate a willingness to work with the Saudi leader on efforts to reach a settlement, providing security guarantees and attesting to U.S. friendship with the Gulf monarchy. Fahd himself was a great advocate of close

U.S.-Saudi ties, and sought to reconcile his interest in fostering this relationship with emerging

146 Palestine, 3 (June 1977), IPS.

147 An accompanying article by Faris Glubb, “Menachem Begin The Man of Dair Yasin,” put his picture alongside those of and Yigal Yadin. See Ibid.

148 On preparations for Fahd’s visit, see “Your Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd,” Brzezinski to Carter, 17 May 1977, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NLC-128-6-15-1-6, JCL.

76 Saudi leadership in the Arab world.149 During the opening session between Carter and Fahd, the

U.S. President stressed the close alignment between the two countries, telling Fahd “there is no other country with whom we have closer or more friendly relations than Saudi Arabia.”150 Fahd articulated the Saudi position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and stressed his willingness to follow the U.S. lead in negotiations. He explained, however, that Saudi and the other Arab states would not agree to a joint Palestinian entity with Jordan, rather favoring an actual homeland.151 In their private conversation the next day, Fahd agreed to “induce the PLO to endorse United Nations

Resolution 242” which would be a prerequisite for U.S. discussions with the PLO. The Saudi

Crown Prince reiterated his commitment to the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement in the months ahead.152

Fahd’s departure concluded the administration’s extensive outreach to Middle Eastern leaders in the first half of 1977. In early June, U.S. officials began to strategize domestic outreach and consolidate efforts in order to articulate the essential elements that a comprehensive peace required. “The case must be carried to the American people as a whole, including the

Jewish community,” Brzezinski advised the President. “This means stressing not only that a settlement is good for Israel, but also emphasizing explicitly that the national interests of the

United States require a settlement.”153

149 Secretary Vance’s description of internal Saudi state development and the intensifying U.S.-Saudi relationship is revealing as an indicator of their growing influence in U.S. Middle East policy in the late 1970s, and in particular the role of oil pricing in this relationship. See ibid.

150 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 24 May 1977, 10:55AM-12:30 PM, FRUS, Doc 36.

151 Ibid.

152 Notes of a Meeting, “Private Conversation between President Carter and His Royal Highness Prince Fahd Bin ‘Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud,” 25 May 1977, FRUS, Doc 37.

153 NSC Weekly Report #16, Brzezinski to Carter, 10 June 1977. Brzezinski Donated Collection, Box 41, JCL. Emphasis in original. The White House also convened a Policy Review Committee meeting on to plan next steps. See Minutes, 10 June 1977, 10-11:30AM, FRUS, Doc 40.

77 While the Carter administration was planning its next steps, the Israeli Foreign Ministry was assessing options for the new government in Jerusalem.154 Begin announced a set of guidelines for his government’s approach to key issues, revealing his principled commitment to settlement in the entirety of Israel and the territories. Begin’s guidelines asserted “the right of the

Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and inalienable,” and called for an increase in the

“setting up of defense and permanent settlements, rural and urban, on the soil of the homeland.”155 At the same time, Begin’s 15 Points included agreement to attend the Geneva

Conference, and an invitation to Israel’s neighbors “to conduct direct negotiations for the signing of the peace treaties between them.”156 This dual approach, expressing a willingness to negotiate bilaterally without the Palestinians while delimiting the contours of those negotiations in a manner that asserted Israeli sovereignty in the occupied territories and expanded settlement building, emerged as a hallmark of Israeli diplomacy under the Begin government.

To dispel negative publicity about this approach, Begin’s close confidant Shmuel Katz and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz met with Brzezinski and several others in the White

House.157 Katz was a founder of the Herut party and co-founder of the Movement for Greater

Israel in 1967, a group that advocated for permanent settlement in the occupied territories.158

Katz affirmed Begin’s position on abiding by UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, although he took issue with the notion that the question of a Palestinian homeland or refugee

154 See the secret memo, “Sedrat ha’mifgashim bein manhigei arav v’nasi Carter,” [Order of the meetings between Arab leaders and President Carter], 7 June 1977, MFA-5988/13, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter ISA).

155 NSC Memorandum, “Official Positions of Begin and Yadin,” William Quandt and Gary Sick to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 June 1977. Brzezinski NSA Material, Country Files- Israel, Box 34, JCL.

156 Ibid.

157 Other attendees included William Quandt and David Aaron. See Memorandum of Conversation, 10 June 1977, 4- 5 PM, FRUS, Doc 41.

158 He would later quit his job because of differences with Begin over the peace process in 1978.

78 compensation fell under the aegis of these resolutions. On settlements, about which Brzezinski explicitly asked, Katz restated the Likud position “on the basic right of the Jewish people to

Western Palestine as a whole.” He invoked international law, arguing that the rejection of the

1947 partition plan by the Arabs “restored the full legal basis” for Israeli claims to the territories.

Asserting a commitment not to preempt negotiations, Katz stressed that settlement building would continue. Brzezinski asked him about building in areas populated by Arabs. Katz acknowledged some controversy on this matter, but stressed that the Likud was hoping to persuade Arabs not to force an Israeli withdrawal.

If I can give you the vision that I have, after forty years of contacts with the Arabs, I would try to convince the Arabs in Western Palestine that their greatest chance for security and prosperity, without loss of their cultural identity and with local autonomy, lies in a unitary state under an Israeli government, with the right to citizenship for those who want it, or they can remain Jordanian citizens. If an Arab entity of any kind is formed west of the Jordan River, it would be a threat to Israel.159

Brzezinski pushed Katz to explain how such a vision squared with the demographic reality of a possible eventual Arab majority over Jews. Katz spoke of the hopes among the Likud for mass immigration “so that we could at least keep the ration in our favor.” He refused to accept any proposition that a mere Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines would yield peace with the Arabs.

“We believe that the 1967 borders constitute a death trap.”160

Israeli diplomat first invoked the memory of Auschwitz when discussing the limits of the June 1967 ceasefire, later conceiving of Katz’s “death trap” refrain.161 Its invocation in the White House meeting served to buttress Likud pessimism about a full withdrawal from the

159 Memorandum of Conversation, 10 June 1977, 4-5 PM, FRUS, Doc 41.

160 Ibid.

161 On the tangled history of the phrase “Auschwitz borders,” see Robert Mackey and Elizabeth A. Harris, “Israeli Settlers Reject the ‘Auschwitz Borders’ of 1967,” New York Times, 19 May 2011, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/israeli-settlers-reject-the-auschwitz-borders (accessed 10 March 2015).

79 West Bank. Rather than concede that peace required giving up land, Katz reinforced the notion that Israel would emerge more vulnerable, lecturing his American interlocutors about the conflict, which he argued “stems from the Arab refusal to recognize our existence in any area.” “You know,” Katz concluded, “100 years ago Palestine was almost empty. Most of the Arabs came after the Zionists already made the area livable. There was no such thing as an Arab-Palestine that existed for 1300 years before we came.”162

Despite these irrefutable warnings of the Begin government’s ideological moorings and uncompromising commitment on settlement expansion, Carter believed he had to try and bring the Israeli leader into his own political orbit. The President sent a warm note of congratulations to Jerusalem and invited Begin to the White House in July 1977. “I would welcome your ideas on how progress towards peace can best be achieved. I believe it important that we meet at an early date to establish a personal relationship and exchange views on the negotiation of a peace settlement and on other matters of mutual concern.”163

In advance of Begin’s visit, an NSC discussion paper and Policy Review Committee meetings generated a strategy for U.S. diplomats.164 U.S. officials decided to keep the focus on elements of a comprehensive settlement and an Israeli endorsement of Security Council

Resolution 242 along favorable lines, while trying to elicit restraint on the settlements. To open space for negotiating, U.S. officials also reached out to President Sadat of Egypt to encourage

162 Memorandum of Conversation, 10 June 1977, 4-5 PM, FRUS, Doc 41.

163 Letter, Jimmy Carter to Menachem Begin, 20 June 1977, A-4155/1, ISA. Brzezinski sent his own personal note of congratulations to Begin, who he had met in a year prior to the election. He praised Begin’s “candor and forthrightness,” expressing confidence that talks would be fruitful. See Brzezinski to Begin, personal note, 21 June 1977. Brzezinski Material, Country File- Israel, Box 34, JCL.

164 See “Discussion paper for PRC meeting on Middle East,” 22 June 1977, Brzezinski Donated Collection, Box 24, JCL; “Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting on the Middle East,” 25 June 1977, 9:30- 11:15 AM, FRUS, Doc 43; and “Summary of a Policy Review Committee meeting, 5 July 1977, 3:30-5:15 PM, FRUS, Doc 47.

80 public statements reaffirming his commitment to a comprehensive peace with Israel.165 Several leading U.S. Senators endorsed Carter’s approach, with a bipartisan letter signed by Robert Byrd,

Abraham Ribicoff, Edward Kennedy, and others.166

To shore up domestic support for U.S. efforts in the Middle East, Vice President Walter

“Fritz” Mondale convened a meeting with Secretary Vance, Brzezinski, and Jewish leadership on

6 July. Vance provided updates about his meetings with Arab leaders while Brzezinski affirmed three basic points: “1. We will not deceive Israel nor the Jewish community; 2. We will not betray the fundamental moral problems Israel faces; and 3. We will not compel or threaten

Israel’s security.”167 The necessity of reiterating these points was a function of growing anxiety among Jewish leaders. Rabbi Alex Schindler, the aforementioned head of the Conference of

Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, spoke of a perception of the “erosion of America’s commitment to Israel…mere verbal promises and words from the Arab world are not reassuring to Israel or the American Jewish community.”168 Carter, who also attended the meeting, tried to reassure the participants that the U.S. would not impose a settlement and that he would personally work with Begin when he came to Washington later that month.

Begin Visits Washington

165 Draft Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, undated, FRUS, Doc 44.

166 Letter from Senate Leaders to Jimmy Carter, 28 June 1977. Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File Israel, Box 35, JCL.

167 Memorandum for the Files of a Meeting with President Carter Re: Meeting with Jewish Leadership—July 6, 1977, FRUS, Doc 49. This meeting was reported in full—and positively—to Israeli Embassy officials in Washington by Jewish liaison Mark Siegel. “Everyone said good things, including Brzezinski. The President was excellent and could not have been better.” See Zvi Rafiah, “Divrei ha’Nasi bfgishato im hamanhigim hyehudim,” [The President’s Remarks in his Meeting with Jewish Leaders], MFA-5988/13, ISA.

168 Ibid. See also Morris Abram’s memo to Carter, “Why Portions of the American Jewish Community are Concerned with the Present Posture of U.S./Israeli/Arab Relations,” 5 July 1977, Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 35, JCL.

81 Begin arrived in the U.S. for his first face-to-face meeting with Carter on 19 July 1977.

During the morning discussion in the White House cabinet room, Carter laid out the central principles of the U.S. approach to the Middle East conflict, which included a comprehensive peace based on UN resolutions 242 and 338, a resolution of territorial boundaries, and the question of the refugees. “We have said a homeland tied into Jordan,” Carter told Begin, “but we have no plan.”169 Carter concluded his opening remarks to Begin with a reflection on the

American role. “I am sure that not every side completely trusts us. We will try to act as best as we can. We will be eager to see you and your own neighbors negotiating directly. We have no desire to be intermediaries.”170

The Israeli Prime Minister used the occasion of this first bilateral meeting to launch into a swift historical review of the Jewish fight for Palestine, typical of his grandiose rhetorical style.

He first recalled the Israeli victory in 1948, during which time he was a leader of the Irgun , a group that had a direct hand in the infamous and other wartime atrocities.

It is true that some 450,000 Arabs left. We did not want them to go. I myself wrote a pamphlet appealing to the Arabs not to flee. Their leaders told them to leave, promising them that they would take over Tel Aviv once the Arab victory had been won.171

Begin also recalled the feeling of existential threat and rapid Israeli victory in the June 1967 War, leaving President Carter a small map outlining the short distance between the Green Line and

Israeli population centers. It was Begin’s way to illustrate the “mortal danger” of his country returning to the pre-1967 lines. “Such a restored situation could mean the mutilation of our

169 Meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, 19 July 1977, 11:00 AM, A-4155/2, ISA, 2. This was not entirely true; see the February 1977 plan above. For the U.S. account of the meeting, see Memorandum of Conversation, 19 July 1977, 11:15 a.m.-1:10 p.m, FRUS, Doc 52.

170 Ibid., 3.

171 Meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, 19 July 1977, 11:00 AM, A-4155/2, ISA, 6.

82 country,” Begin remarked.172 Choking up as he continued reviewing the history of Jews unable to defend themselves, Begin added, “This is our concept of national security, Mr. President. Our fathers and mothers got killed because they were Jews. We don’t want our grandchildren to suffer the same fate.”173

Carter, sidestepping the emotional aspects of the discussion, was encouraged by Begin’s apparent willingness to proceed to a Geneva Conference on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and

338. Such a position opened the door for Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein to participate in regional negotiations. Yet Carter also saw major differences that would have to be resolved, most notably on the question of continued settlement expansion.

As far as you and your people are concerned, the question of the West Bank is going to be important as an open subject for discussion. The attitude of your government at permitting new settlements- these very well might prevent the peace conference itself. I recognize how important the decision is to you. One of the acute concerns here has been the attitude of you and your government to the West Bank that almost closes off future negotiations.174

Carter also explained that he had notified the PLO through Arab leaders “that if they would fully endorse the UN resolutions and acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, we would begin to talk and listen to their positions.” “This is a very difficult thing for us,” Carter added, “it is our impression that the Israeli people would be prepared to talk to them if the PLO acknowledged Israel’s right to independence.”175 In terms of the mechanics of the peace conference itself, Carter suggested that perhaps the Palestinians not be invited to the opening of Geneva “but that the question of the

172 Ibid., 8.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid., 11.

175 Ibid., 12. In the weeks prior to Begin’s visit, PLO Chairman Arafat relayed a message to President Carter “implying the PLO’s willingness to live in peace with Israel.” His condition was a “U.S. commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian “state unit entity.” See Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated, FRUS, Doc 51.

83 refugees be put on the agenda.” Begin, invoking Jewish historical suffering as a counterweight, quickly added, “Both the Arab and the Jewish refugees.” The President replied he had no objection.176

Like Rabin before him, Begin agreed to a Jordanian delegation representing Arab inhabitants of the West Bank as long as PLO members did not participate. “We too are

Palestinians,” Begin said, “We are prepared to agree that in the Jordanian delegation there should be Palestinian Arabs. We will not investigate their private credentials- but not the PLO.”177 The

Israeli Prime Minister then invited his adviser Shumel Katz to discuss the Palestinians and the refugee question. Turning to Carter and his advisors, Katz pulled out a large map of the Arab states and Israel. “Every child in the Arab states is taught from an early age (now there are new text books recently surveyed) that this triangle (Israel) must as a patriotic duty and a moral imperative be eliminated as a decisive and immoral element in the Arab world.”178 It was a message that would recur with great frequency in meetings between Likud politicians and their

American counterparts.

In the working dinner that evening, Begin’s toast was a reflection of his deep-seated belief in the shared values between Israel and the United States. “We are a guardian of human liberty and democracy in the Middle East,” Begin proclaimed, marveling at the peaceful

176 This issue of Jewish refugees from Arab lands would play a recurring role in the settlement of the refugee question, and was once again invoked by John Kerry in April 2014. For more on the Jewish refugees and their claims, see Yehouda Shenhav, “The Jews of , Zionist Ideology, and the Property of the Palestinian Refugees of 1948: An Anomaly of National Accounting,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31:4 (November 1999): 605-630.

177 Meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, 19 July 1977, 11:00 AM, A-4155/2, ISA.

178 Ibid., 13.

84 transition from his predecessor in a region where such shifts were so often marked by violence.179 The Israeli Prime Minister summed up his view of why there was still no peace.

It is an historical conflict. It is not a territorial problem. For 19 years, there was no peace, for 19 years, we didn’t have the second part of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, not one day of peace. The question arises: why not? Were it a territorial conflict, there was no reason not to make peace with Israel. These are historical conflicts. We came there. We have come there by right of our ancestors. But it was not recognized and time and again attempts were made to destroy us…We don’t hate our neighbors. We don’t want to humiliate them at all. We never wanted to defeat them. We never wanted to wrong them. But we had to defend ourselves.180

This distinction between historical and territorial conflict was another persistent feature of

Begin’s approach to any resolution of the Palestinian question. The Arab inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, as Begin would always call the Palestinians, would never be seen in national terms.

Before the beginning of formal talks on the morning of 20 July, Carter and Vance relayed their negotiating positions to Begin via New York Senator Abraham Ribicoff. Any territorial withdrawal would have to consist of “mutually agreed and recognized borders on all fronts,” and a settlement would have to include “provisions for a Palestinians entity.” Such an entity would not be militarized, and just as the February study had recommended,

There will be provisions for an open and economic and social relationship with Israel. Means should be sought to permit self determination by Palestinians deciding their future status like trusteeship for five years in which Israel would be co trustee with Jordan of West Bank along lines of functional plan suggested by Dayan. At the end of five years a plebiscite of West Bank would determine what future would be and how to relate to Jordan and Israel.181

While these elements of a possible settlement accounted for Palestinian aspirations in national terms, such a model also necessitated the deferral of actual sovereignty for a discrete period.

179 Begin-Carter toasts, U.S. Information Services, 21 July 1977, A-4155/2, ISA.

180 Ibid.

181 Paper- U.S. position conveyed to the Prime Minister via Ribicioff, 19 July 1977, 8 PM, A-4155/2, ISA.

85 Although Begin may have signaled a degree of flexibility about Geneva in his meetings with Carter, his stated territorial limits tell a more intransigent story. Declassified Israeli records reveal that on 13 July, Begin sketched out his “peace principles,” which he delivered privately to

Carter and in writing to Secretary Vance at the White House. The Israeli Prime Minister indicated a clear willingness to withdraw forces substantially in the Sinai as part of a peace deal with Egypt, and seemed prepared to withdraw forces from the Golan Heights in the context of a peace treaty with Syria.182 But the West Bank and Gaza were not ever part of his negotiations.

Concerning Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, our position is that we shall not place them under any foreign rule or sovereignty on the basis of two factors: One, our people’s right to the Land; it is our Land as of right. Two, our national security, which concerns the defensive capability of the State and the lives of our civilian population.183

On the evening of 19 July, after a private meeting with Begin, Carter made notes about these various provisions and Begin’s approach to expansion.

He will try to accommodate us on settlements—Wants to carry out Mapai plan at least. Will give us prior notice. I suggested that they wait until after Geneva talks and restrict new settlers to existing settlements. This is difficult for him—Will stay on Golan. I told him Syria won’t agree. W Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem. ‘no foreign sovereignty’-Sinai- ‘Substantial withdrawals.’184

182 The extent of this withdrawal is unclear; the Hebrew and English handwritten documents, as well as the official translation leave room for interpretation: “We shall stay on the Golan Heights and be prepared for a withdrawal of our forces from the existing line in the context of a peace treaty and the determination of the permanent boundary between Syria and Israel.” A direct translation of the existing Hebrew handwriting could also be rendered “We shall stay on the Golan Heights but be prepared for a withdrawal…” Neither makes clear the willingness to withdraw in full. See Hebrew and English versions of “Israel’s Peace Principles: Conveyed Privately by P.M. Begin to President Carter, Washington 19.7.77; and in Writing to Vance,” A-4313/1, ISA.

183 See handwritten and typed versions, Hebrew and English, “Israel’s Peace Principles: Conveyed Privately by P.M. Begin to President Carter, Washington 19.7.77; and in Writing to Vance,” A-4313/1, ISA.

184 See note 3, Memorandum, Brzezinski to Carter, 19 July 1977, FRUS, Doc 54. Emphasis in original. Mapai was the predecessor to the Labor Party, and their settlement plans were less extensive than Likud, although significant in their own right. See Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire.

86 Given these clear limits on the possible negotiations at Geneva, it is difficult to imagine how any diplomatic endeavor spearheaded by the U.S. could proceed without addressing this central dilemma.

Despite these constraints, U.S. officials ceded ground on public discussion of the territorial question in their discussions with Israeli counterparts. During the final meeting between U.S. and Israeli officials on the morning of 20 July, Carter announced that he had agreed not to talk openly about Israeli withdrawals to “the 1967 lines with minor adjustments” before checking with Begin. As they discussed preparations for their joint press conference,

Carter asked that Begin mention UN Resolutions 242 and 338. “As far as our agreement that I will not mention minor modifications in the 1967 lines, I hope that you will not say that you have my commitment not to talk about that.”185

At no time during his subsequent discussions with Carter or Sadat—in the lead up and aftermath of Camp David, as well as during the autonomy negotiations—did Begin ever relent on his basic stated principle of ‘no foreign sovereignty’ for the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and

Jerusalem. It was a position he had taken for many years, well before the 1977 election that brought him to office. Notwithstanding Begin’s clear exposition of official Israeli government policy, the U.S. would consistently voice its opposition to the building of Israeli settlements in the territories. Two days after Begin’s visit, Carter was shocked to hear that the Israeli Prime

Minister had returned home and legalized three West Bank settlements, declaring them

“permanent.” Secretary Vance sent a critical telegram to the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe

185 Memorandum of Conversation, 20 July 1977, 10:05-10:40 AM, FRUS, Doc 57. See also Carter’s letter to Begin affirming he would not speak publicly on the 1967 lines, but if asked by Arab leaders for American views on borders, the U.S. would state them. Carter to Begin, 1 August 1977, PM72, MBC. This position, according to Vance, showed that even through the U.S. “would consult closely with Israel, we were not going to concert with it against the Arabs.” Vance, Hard Choices, 186.

87 Dayan, who had been working with the White House on this issue. “”Particularly coming at this time,” Vance wrote, “any new settlements, wherever located, would tend to confirm the fears of the Arabs that the new Israeli government intends to pursue an essentially annexationist policy with regards to the West Bank.”186 Vance reiterated the U.S. belief, as Carter told Begin, “there should now be a moratorium on any Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.”187

Responding to a public barrage of questions about this provocative move at a press conference, Carter was forthright in his approach. “I let Mr. Begin know very clearly that our government policy, before I became President and now, is that these settlements are illegal and contravene the Geneva Conference terms. Mr. Begin disagrees with this.”188 Deftly trying to steer away from an outright break with Israel, Carter posited that Begin was continuing the policy of Labor governments, and expressed his hope that this shift was not “insurmountable.”189

But all indicators pointed to an inevitable collision course on this very issue. While the settlements in question had existed before Begin’s victory, the declaration of permanence secured government subsidies and further legitimized Israeli claims in the occupied territories.190

These settlements would remain a primary bone of contention throughout the negotiations. They were both the mirror and negation, in effect, to the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty.191

186 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 25 July 1977, 2330Z, FRUS, Doc 59.

187 Ibid.

188 PPPJC, 29 July 1977.

189 In an interview with Time magazine on 1 August 1977, Carter reiterated the productive nature of his talks with Begin and stressed that “We never mentioned nor insinuated anything about legalization of existing settlements.” See the original text of the interview, sent to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a corrective to the printed edition. MFA-6862/2, ISA.

190 Bernard Gwertzman, “Carter Asserts Step on Israeli Settlers is Obstacle to Peace,” New York Times, 29 July 1977, A1. The New York Times tracked this ongoing debate over settlements well into 1978, writing in January that “four successive American administrations have opposed the settlements as obstacles to a peace agreement, but the Carter administration has pressed the issue more forcefully then its predecessors.” See Terrence Smith, “Israel is Said to Have Altered Dayan Pledge to Carter on Settlements,” New York Times, 31 January 1978, 3.

88

Conclusion

In the private papers of Cyrus Vance, stored at Yale University’s Manuscripts and

Archives repository, there are several undated and handwritten notes from Vance’s time at the

State Department. A significant number of these papers deal with the Camp David Summit and the signing of the Middle East peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, offering a unique window into Vance’s negotiating acumen as he juggled the various expectations of both parties in discussions around the peace talks.192 Deftly managing disagreements between Carter, Begin, and Sadat about the modalities of a settlement, Vance’s iterations of divergent positions and his attempts to meet multiple demands evince a diplomatic style that was thoughtful and persistent.

One of these notes, which appears to have been written hurriedly on multiple sheets of small White House stationary, is marked by forceful handwriting, slightly larger than Vance’s generally condensed prose. It is undated, but likely written in late 1978 or 1979, and it articulates the central conundrum of American engagement with the nascent peace process extending back to the early months of 1977 described in this chapter. The note reads as follows:

We are dealing with basic conceptual difference:

1) Our approach is from point of view that Israel must ultimately turn over West Bank to Arab sovereignty, once borders, security arrangements and political status are agreed. Israeli approach is from point of view that it does not agree to ultimate Arab sovereignty, even as part of Jordan. It sees West Bank as permanent self- governing colony.

191 Palestinians were consistently critical of the settlements, quoting Begin’s expansionist comments on the cover of July’s PLO Bulletin. See Palestine, 3:10 (July 1977), IPS.

192 Vance remains an understudied figure in the history of U.S. diplomacy. One recent exception is Mary DuBois Sexton, “The Wages of Principle and Power: Cyrus R. Vance and the Making of Foreign Policy in the Carter Administration,” (Ph.D. diss., , 2009).

89 Fundamentally, what is needed is for Israel to relinquish now its claim to sovereignty and refocus issue on security (which would require fundamental reversal of Begin’s political ideology).193

In laying bare the core divergence between the U.S. and Israeli position on sovereignty, Vance provided the explanation of why any attempt at resolving the Palestinian question as part of a comprehensive peace initiative would ultimately fail if the issue of control were left in dispute.

As Vance astutely observed, it seemed misguided for any party to advance negotiations without addressing the structural pattern enshrined in these early months of consultations.

The rhetoric of the Israeli leadership, under both Rabin and Begin, clearly opposed foreign sovereignty in the occupied territories, in contrast to Arab demands and the essence of the U.S. position, as this chapter has demonstrated. There would never be a “reversal” in Begin’s political ideology. It was consistent throughout his time in office, at least when it came to the

West Bank, where territorial withdrawals were precluded from the start. The return of the Sinai

Peninsula to Egypt was a different case, as Begin’s own initial views suggested, and as the eventual signing of a peace treaty with Sadat would underscore.

The negotiations over the Camp David Accords—largely on Begin’s terms, as the following chapter will elaborate—was in this respect a diplomatic triumph for Israel. But it was not entirely a triumph for the United States if the views of Carter and his advisors in 1977 were to be believed, and certainly not for the Palestinians or the Arab states purporting to represent them. The Egyptian position, as Sadat’s imminent trip to Jerusalem and negotiating stance at

Camp David would indicate, helped to eviscerate a national outcome for the Palestinians. It is to these developments that chapter two now turns.

193 Undated handwritten note, “Notes: governmental and international meetings, daily priorities, and official matters,” [1 of 4], 1977-1980. Box 10, file 24, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664), YUL.

90 Chapter Two: The Failed Promise Of Geneva, 1977-1978

It looks as though our Geneva scenario has been considerably modified and the new track has, obviously, a heady odor of Israeli-Egyptian bilaterals.

-U.S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis to the State Department1

I most sincerely hope that you will not further push me into a corner because I would like to maintain my moderate balance. Otherwise, I have nothing to lose but my Kufiyah.

-PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to Jimmy Carter2

Introduction

With negotiations dragging in the fall of 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s frustrations with the slow pace of regional peacemaking precipitated a path-breaking trip to

Jerusalem. But in spite of the crucial reordering of regional politics that ensued between Israel and Egypt, Sadat’s visit and the subsequent move to negotiations at Camp David were rooted in diplomacy that foreclosed the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty. In addition, the Israeli announcement of an autonomy plan for the “Arab inhabitants of Judea and Samaria” recast the discourse around the Palestinian question in a manner that struck down the possibility of self- determination. In examining the early practices that curtailed a comprehensive peace, this chapter provides the context for understanding how the onset of the Camp David process drew on terms of reference that precluded a national outcome for the Palestinians.

In his memoir, Cyrus Vance provides background to understand the emergence of a negotiating model that deferred this possibility of Palestinian self-determination. “Despite our differences with the Israelis on how to solve the Palestinian problem, the president and I shared

1 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, 23 November 1977, 2150Z, FRUS, Doc 157.

2 “Message from Yasir Arafat,” Brzezinski to the President, 10 January 1978, NSA Brzezinski material, Collection 7, Box 49, JCL.

91 their concerns about a radicalized Palestinian state. We concluded that some form of transitional arrangement was needed so that the Palestinians could demonstrate whether they were prepared to govern themselves and live peacefully besides Israel, while remaining under international supervision to ease Israel’s fears.” Vance’s own initial ideal was transitional, a “UN trusteeship under joint Israeli-Jordanian administration, leading to a plebiscite and Palestinian self- determination after several years.” While such a concept was to undergo “considerable revision and development,” Vance writes that it was “one of the roots of the Camp David arrangement for

Palestinian autonomy during a transitional regime.”3

In outlining such a transitional agreement, Vance drew on a longer history of external powers mediating the Palestinian question. Like the British approach to the Arabs in the mandate era earlier in the century, the U.S. would promote a time bound solution that would have the

Palestinians “demonstrate whether they were prepared to govern themselves.” The central problem with this approach—an outdated colonial model that would prove ineffectual in the aftermath of decolonization—was the powerful hold of the Israeli state on the territories since

1967. Conceivably, under the Labor settlement plan, or even Moshe Dayan’s conception of

Palestinian self-rule, it might have been plausible to prepare the West Bank and Gaza for a political solution outside the realm of Israeli control. But the ideology of the Likud, and Begin’s clear pronouncements on continued Israeli military and political control of the territories, ensured that the emergence of the autonomy arrangements would be predicated on the prevention of foreign sovereignty.

The trajectory of the discussions between the U.S., Israel, and the Arab states for the duration of 1977 accordingly precipitated a decision by President Sadat to focus his efforts on bilateral negotiations with Begin. As U.S. diplomats slowly got behind these efforts, the

3 Vance, Hard Choices, 187.

92 emergence of the Camp David Accords would clarify that the fate of the Palestinians was tied to

Begin’s narrow conception of autonomy. The outline of a transitional autonomy model—in both

U.S. and Israeli iterations—contributed to the advancement of a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace that deviated from the comprehensive vision of Geneva first articulated in early 1977. As the concept of autonomy was further clarified, and as Arab and Palestinian opposition grew, the logic and momentum of negotiations superseded warnings that the outcome might favor the desideratum of the Begin government. Sadat’s willingness to proceed along these lines, largely a byproduct of his domestic considerations and Egypt’s desire to secure Western backing, flew in the face of wider Arab concerns.

This chapter examines the expansive negotiations for a Geneva Conference and the limited outcomes they produced. The mechanisms of international diplomacy in late 1977, as new sources reveal, yielded to narrow Israeli positions rather than Carter’s bold formulation on a comprehensive peace. The PLO, struggling with its own acceptance of UN Resolution 242 and a desire to engage directly with the Carter administration, found itself excluded from negotiations.

Critics of the U.S. role in the peace process have long lamented an imbalanced American stance in negotiations, but new evidence deepens and complicates an understanding of the broader road to Geneva and its importance to regional peacemaking. As previously closed records now make clear, the erosion of a comprehensive track and the movement on settlement building went hand in hand, deferring sovereignty for Palestinians and paving the way for more troubling consequences in the early 1980s.

The Bumpy Road to Geneva

93 Against the backdrop of Begin’s July 1977 visit to the White House, the Carter administration worked to hammer out a set of draft principles for a revival of the Geneva

Conference. Secretary Vance traveled once again to the Middle East to discuss these ideas with

Arab and Israeli leaders in August, with the intention of finalizing discussions at the UN General

Assembly in New York in September and issuing invitations for a conference before the end of

1977.4 While fallout from Begin’s announcement on settlement permanence in the West Bank and Carter’s public statement on settlement illegality under international law trailed Vance through Middle Eastern capitals, he focused his efforts on achieving a unified Arab position on the Palestinian question. This issue was of particular concern to U.S. officials, who had been examining various perspectives on Palestinian self-determination and the status of the West

Bank.5

In a colorful description of Secretary Vance’s trip across the Middle East, his wife

Grace’s diaries provide a crucial record of several stops along the way. Replete with character descriptions of Israeli and Arab leaders and witty observations about the diplomatic dinners and local political intrigue, Grace’s diaries also provide a window into the dominant American view of negotiations. “Do hope some progress toward peace can be made on this trip. Depends on

Begin and PLO mostly,” she wrote.6 Secretary Vance carried with him five draft principles.

These included a compressive settlement based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338; the establishment of peaceful relations between Israel and the Arabs; phased withdrawal “to secure and recognized borders with mutually agreed security arrangements;” and a “non-militarized

4 See Vance, Hard Choices, 184.

5 Ibid, 185-186.

6 Diary of Grace Sloane Vance, entry on 31 July 1977 from , Egypt. See “Trip to Middle East July 30, 1977-August 12, 1977.” Box 17, folder 1, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664), YUL.

94 Palestinian entity with self-determination by the Palestinians.”7 During the course of the visit, all the parties accepted the first two, while the others were fiercely debated and the final two were rejected in full by Israel.

Given how contested the procedural questions had become, Vance suggested alternative methods of Palestinian participation in Geneva, and his own formulation for possible PLO acceptance of UN Resolution 242. The Secretary also raised his proposals for Palestinian self- rule. In discussing “an interim ‘trusteeship’ over the West Bank pending some form of self- determination,” Vance decided to shift his language to “transitional administrative arrangements” after Syrian and Lebanese leaders found his trusteeship model distasteful.8

The expressed interest in such a transitional agreement, as did King Hussein of

Jordan and Prince Fahd in Saudi Arabia. But the PLO Executive Committee voted to oppose an endorsement of 242—which would concede acceptance of Israel in secure and recognized borders without the guarantee of a homeland.9 These discussions were leaked to the press and the

Israelis before Vance’s arrival in Jerusalem, where the Begin government was adamantly opposed to discussions with the PLO. Each time U.S. diplomats spoke openly about the possibility of PLO reform or engagement, the Israelis invoked Henry Kissinger’s commitments not to recognize or negotiate with the organization. Such a narrowing of diplomatic options would circumscribe American negotiators throughout the planning of Geneva.

7 Memo, “Summary of Vance’s Middle East Trip,” Gary Sick to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 12 August 1977, CREST (NLC-6-50-3-7-0), JCL.

8 Ibid. As Vance recalls in his memoir, “Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam objected to the term ‘trusteeship’ reminding us of the Arabs’ experience with foreign rule under League of National mandates.” See Vance, Hard Choices, 187.

9 The Saudis passed on U.S. language to Arafat for a PLO Executive Committee vote, which ultimately came out against the endorsement. See Vance, Hard Choices, 189.

95 Grace Sloane Vance’s depiction of the Jerusalem visit provides some sense of how Israeli officials were approaching the Palestinian question. After being taken to settle in at the King

David Hotel by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and his wife, Grace was taken on a visit to Yad

Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust memorial. Her guide that day was Gideon Hausner, the lead prosecutor in the trial of . Hausner took Mrs. Vance through the Avenue of

Righteous Gentiles, marking non-Jewish heroes who had saved Jews during the war. She was shown photographs and documents of the Nazi killing of Jews, and the overall plans of Adolf

Hitler’s Final Solution. Grace writes that she “was told two times by Hausner and later by Mrs.

Dayan that Israel can never again be taken in by enemies- that Nazis and PLO both dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Therefore, no compromises can be made.” Grace recalled being

“drained” by the visit, “too sad to comment on whole period.” “But,” she added, “did feel that [I] was leaned on heavily re PLO problem through visit to this memorial.”10

At a Knesset dinner in honor of Secretary Vance that evening, she was seated between

Dayan and Begin, and she described the Israeli Prime Minister as “his usual pleasant dinner self, rather pixie, from time to time.”

But when he rose to his feet to make toast, surprise, surprise. Had with him copy of PLO manifesto vowing destruction of Israel, which he read aloud with appropriate comments—then Sec. 242, with appropriate comments; compared PLO to Nazis, swore eternal opposition to those who would destroy Israel.11

The continuum linking the PLO with a broader history of anti-Semitism had been asserted in earlier meetings between Carter and Begin at the White House. Vance’s visit only drove home the ideological gulf separating American and international perspectives on Palestinian nationalists, and the dominant attitude of the Begin government in Jerusalem.

10 Diary of Grace Sloane Vance, 10 August 10, 1977. Box 17, folder 1, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664), YUL.

11 Ibid.

96 At his opening meetings with the Israelis on 9 August, Vance reported on the visits with

Arab leaders and their various reactions and suggestions on the issue of Palestinian representation at Geneva. He also told Begin about the discussion around Palestinian self- determination. “Most of them were thinking about some international transitional administrative regime for a transitional period of undetermined length to be negotiated among the parties,”

Vance explained. “At the end of that transitional period there would be under international supervision a plebiscite conducted which would provide for self-determination.”12 Vance explained that there were many suggestions of what the plebiscite would deal with, including the option of a constituent assembly to determine the relationship between “such an entity” and its neighbors, but other variations were possible.

In his response, Begin’s uppermost concern was the content of the PLO Charter and the organization’s opposition to the creation of Israel.13 The Israeli Prime Minister spoke in forceful terms about the violence of the PLO towards Israeli civilians, leveling criticism at the U.S. government for their supposed willingness to shift positions on the Kissinger agreement. “We unhesitatingly call this organization ‘genociders.’ Their aim is to destroy our country, our people, and their method is to kill civilians.”14 As for the possibility of Palestinian participation in

Geneva, Begin argued for a distinction.

We can under no circumstances agree to the participation in the Geneva Conference of such an organization as the PLO is. We agree to the participation of Palestinian Arabs. This is the proper expression; not Palestinians, because we are all Palestinians.

12 Minutes of a Meeting between Begin and Vance and delegations, 9 August 1977, 5:30 PM, Jerusalem, MFA- 6862/2, ISA.

13 Begin spoke passionately about the Charter deeming the Belfour Declaration and Israel’s creation “null and void” and he singled out the charter’s reference to as a religion, “not a nationality,” as a means of undercutting the historical claims to statehood that underpinned Israel’s creation. On this distinction between nationality and religion in both Palestinian and Zionist discourse, see Gribetz, Defining Neighbors.

14 Minutes of a meeting, 9 August 1977, 5:30 PM, Jerusalem, MFA-6862/2, ISA.

97 Palestinian Arabs is a Jordanian delegation and we will not search their pockets for their credentials…PLO is excluded and will forever be excluded. They want to destroy our country, and we are not going to discuss with them our self-destruction…15

These persistent tensions around the question of Palestinian representation and Israel’s concerns about the PLO occupied a great deal of the bilateral discussions in the Carter White House.16

Among the other topics that surfaced during Vance’s time in Jerusalem was the settlement issue. For many Israelis and their supporters abroad, the capture of the West Bank,

Gaza Strip and all of Jerusalem in June of 1967 was greeted with ecstatic revelry, seeming to fulfill the redemptive hopes of messianic Zionism.17 At the same time, the expansion of Israel’s territory raised profound political and demographic questions for Israeli leaders. During cabinet discussions about the future of the newly occupied territories in the weeks after the war, the issue of how to manage the Palestinian population took on central importance. A “decision not to decide,” as explained by the historian Avi Raz, ensured control over the territories themselves while avoiding a political resolution to the national or territorial fate of the Palestinians.18

15 Ibid.

16 NSC Advisor Brzezinski contended with similar dynamics in his August meetings with both American Jewish leaders and former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Abba Eban. See “Top Secret Meeting between Brzezinski and Jewish leader, 3 August 1977” [Hebrew], MFA-6862/2, ISA; and “Eban-Brzezinski Conversation, 3 August 1977” [Hebrew], MFA-6862/2, ISA. The Eban meeting is particularly significant in the content of Brzezinski’s suggestion of alternative models for dealing with the West Bank, and agreement that the Jordan River served as Israel’s military boundary while articulating models of cohabitation that would enable Palestinians to have Jordanian citizenship under local Palestinian governance and Israelis to have freedom of movement throughout the territories without building settlements. Dayan mentions this meeting at the plenary session in Jerusalem on 10 August, but no record of it is identified. See “Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, 10 August 1977, 9:45 AM-12:10 PM,” FRUS, Doc 81, note 19.

17 See Yeshayah Leibowitz, Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire; and Tom Segev, 1967.

18 Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, 44. In his incisive study, Raz documents the Israeli treatment of Palestinian refugees after 1967 and demonstrates that there was a deliberate attempt to appropriate the captured territories (the “dowry”) while permitting as few Arab inhabitants as possible to remain (the “bride”). The implications of this broader Israeli strategy in the Arab world is examined by Avi Shlaim in “The Iron Wall Revisited,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41:2 (January 2012): 80–98. For more on the changing role of the West Bank after 1948, see

98 In his meeting with Vance, Begin, whose government adopted an entirely different line than the U.S. on settlement legality, asked , the Attorney General, to read out a memo asserting his position. Barak explained that the provisions of international law only dealt with the forced transfer and removal of a population in occupied territories caused by movement of population into the territories, which he argued was not the case in the building of Jewish settlements.

Article 49 must be understood against the background of World War II. It was aimed in part against such horrors at the barbarous extermination camps in occupied Europe to which Jews and others were taken by the Nazis and in part against the displacement of the local population with a view to making room for the German invaders.

Bearing in mind both the provisions of the Article and its legislative history it is clear that the situation envisaged by Article 49 does not apply to the Jewish settlements in question. No Arab inhabitants have been displaced by Jewish settlements or by these peaceful villages and townships.19

After hearing the Israeli position articulated by Barak, Vance replied “our legal advisors have come to a different conclusion.” Begin interjected a final word before a brief adjournment of the meeting. “Perhaps one day we have a meeting between our legal advisers and your legal advisers and there is no doubt they will reach a disagreement.” The verbatim text notes that the collective response from the assembled delegations was “laughter.”20

In the official U.S. report on Vance’s visit, NSC member Gary Sick recalled the increase in settlement activity that surfaced in the discussions, including Begin’s legalization of three settlements and indication he would limit activity to another “‘six or eight’ settlements to be established on land within present military bases or on government-owned land.” Dayan assured

Avshalom Haviv Rubin, “The Limits of the Land: Israel, Jordan, the United States, and the Fate of the West Bank, 1949--1970” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2010).

19 See full transcript of the Israeli version, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 10 August 1977, 9:35 AM-11AM, MFA-6862-2, ISA.

20 Ibid.

99 the Americans that these might be closer to the center of the West Bank, posing no problem to an eventual peace settlement since they could be moved. “From all indications,” Sick wrote, “Dayan believes there will be no real difficulties so long as present inhabitants are not displaced.”21

The report of a private meeting about settlements between Vance, Ambassador Sam

Lewis, Begin, and Dayan on the morning of 10 August expands on the content of these sensitive bilateral discussions. As Dayan explained, “We cannot stop settlements altogether, or even suspend new settlements for any substantial period of time. Such an effort would not be sustainable, just as the British effort to limit or suspend immigration into Israel during the

Mandate period never proved enforceable or sustainable.”22 In explaining Israeli policy, Dayan promised that the settlements were located within 25 kilometers of the Green Line near

Jerusalem, not in populated Arab areas. Vance asked for an explanation of why this was necessary, and Begin invoked historic arguments and referred to the “wonderful youth generation” especially religious Israelis, “determined to till their historical lands.” He also explained that unlike his Labor party predecessors, he would not wink at illegal squatters but was being “straightforward” and “honest.” “What we ask for you,” Begin told Vance, “is not your blessing but your understanding. Now you know what we intend to do. Please talk to President

Carter and explain our position.” Vance assured Begin he would talk to Carter when he returned,

“but I said that the President already understands this problem but is deeply convinced that any new settlements will greatly complicate the peace-making process.”23

21 Memo, Sick to Brzezinski, 12 August 1977, CREST (NLS-6-50-3-7-0), JCL. See also the State Department report, “Telegram from the Department of State to the White House, 12 August 1977, 1310Z, FRUS, Doc 89.

22 Telegram from Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, 17 August 1977, 1949Z, FRUS, Doc 82.

23 Ibid.

100 In making the Israeli case for continued settlement building, Dayan asserted that these policies were compatible with long-term U.S. efforts towards Geneva. The Foreign Minister provided a flat assurance that no settlement would be an impediment to a peace agreement, promising that the Israeli government would move such a settlement. This logic served as a justification for building while negotiations were ongoing, rooted in official practice since 1967.

“There had never been an Israeli government which did not authorize new settlements, that the ongoing settlement process of the land is and will remain a fundamental principle for the Jewish state,” Dayan concluded. All the vocal criticism, he assured Vance, was focused on the “taking of new lands from Arab hands, and that no such thing would be occurring.”24

Dayan’s defense of the settlements emanated directly from the office of the legal advisor to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, .25 To justify their logic, Israeli legal experts like Rosenne navigated a series of High Court decisions about the settlements and formulated an alternative reading on the Geneva Conventions and the status of the occupied territories under international law.26 This approach came into sharper focus during the negotiations over Palestinian autonomy, as chapter three explains, and was endorsed by neoconservative U.S. legal scholars. But the discussions in 1977 demonstrate how the initial

24 Ibid. As Vance later wrote, “I pointed out that even though he was suggesting putting civilians into already existing military bases, this too would violate international legal principles. It is the fact of moving civilians of one country into occupied territory that constitutes the legal violation.” See FRUS, Doc 89, emphasis in original.

25 See “Jewish Settlements in Administered Territories [Hebrew and English],” 10 August 1977, MFA/6862/2, ISA.

26 For an extensive explanation of how this legal thinking developed, along with maps and transcripts of the High Court decisions to bolster the view of scholars claiming the legality of occupation, see the entire file, “Hitnachluyot: P’sak Hadin Hamaleh” [Settlements: The Full Ruling]: 11/74-11/79, MFA-9336/10, ISA.

101 articulation of these ideas was presented to the Americans, and further developed in the months that followed.27

This Israeli official consensus on settlements was inextricably linked with an emerging conception of limited autonomy for Palestinians, a dual approach to the contested sovereignty of the territory itself and the political rights of the inhabitants who lived there. Begin’s 1977 election as Prime Minister of Israel, as chapter one explained, had shocked the Labor party dominated politics of the country.28 An heir to revisionist founder Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Begin was a believer in the “Greater Land of Israel” ideology that encouraged Jewish settlement in the West

Bank. Seeing this territory as central to Israeli identity, he always referred to it using the biblical names of “Judea and Samaria.”29 When these areas were conquered by Israel in 1967, Begin was deeply opposed to granting Arab inhabitants political rights or any form of territorial control that could lead to Palestinian statehood.30

But running counter to this exclusivist line of thinking was Begin’s more inclusive conception of nationalism, based in part on the European model of Giuseppe Garibaldi and

Giuseppe Mazzini, who had elevated a progressive version of the nation-state that should provide

27 In his memoir, Vance explains that after laying out the conceptual idea of a “West Bank-Gaza transitional international regime leading to a plebiscite and Palestinian self-determination,” Begin “completely rejected” the idea, “as well as the principles concerning withdrawal on all fronts and a Palestinian entity.” But as Vance suggests, the idea lodged itself into Begin’s mind in some form, leading to the official Israeli presentation on autonomy in December 1977. See Vance, Hard Choices, 189-190.

28 See Alan Dowty, “Zionism’s Greatest Conceit,” Israel Studies, 3:1 (Spring, 1998): 1-23; and Nadav G. Shelef, “From ‘Both Banks of the Jordan’ to the ‘Whole Land of Israel:’ Ideological Change in Revisionist Zionism,” Israel Studies, 9:1 (Spring, 2004): 125-148.

29 Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy. See also Avi Shilon, Menachem Begin: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); and Sasson Sofer, Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

30 Minutes, cabinet session, 19 June 1967, A-8164/8, ISA.

102 individual rights to minorities.31 Autonomist thinking, as the historian Dimitry Shumsky emphasizes, has a rich precedent in Jewish history, as a vehicle for a cohesive minority group to organize itself culturally and politically, albeit with limited sovereignty. It figured prominently in the Zionist approach to political formations in Palestine, along with statist perspectives.32

Together, the influence of Jabotinsky’s “Greater Land of Israel” revisionism and the discourse of liberal nationalist thinkers fed Begin’s emerging conception of Palestinian Arabs as a minority rather than a self-determining political entity. This tension engendered a shift in Begin’s thinking by the time he was elected Prime Minister ten years later.33

To understand the emerging Israeli view of autonomy, Begin’s perception of the

Palestinians—as distinct from the PLO—is therefore instructive. For the Israeli Prime Minister, the PLO was Israel’s “implacable enemy” while the problem of Jews and Arabs living together and “the human problem of the refugees” was another matter.

We would like that wound which was opened in 1948, not as a result of our guilt whatsoever—Their leaders asked them to flee and promised them to come victoriously to Tel Aviv. We didn’t want to create that problem of refugees, but we know that in cruel wars, such problems always arise, and this should be healed. 34

31 See Colin Shindler, The Triumph of Military Zionism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 12; and Giuseppe Mazzini, A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and , ed. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

32 See Dimitry Shumsky, “Brith Shalom’s Uniqueness Reconsidered: Hans Kohn and Autonomist Zionism,” Jewish History 25, nos. 3-4 (2011): 339-53; and “Leon Pinsker and ‘Autoemancipation!’: A Reevaluation,” Jewish Social Studies 18, no. 1 (2011): 33-62.

33 Ziv Rubinovitz and Gerald Steinberg chart the development of Begin’s idea of cultural autonomy, refined in a speech at the French Parliament in December 1976: "Of course, we must present a positive plan to solve the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in our country, our state. We have one. We will allow free choosing of citizenship to the Arab nation, which we acknowledge. After liberating Samaria and Judea we shall not do the injustice the Germans did when they occupied Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, when they forced their nationality on the inhabitants of these territories. The Arab inhabitants will have free choice. And one law will apply to them and to the Jewish inhabitants. If they become citizens – they will also vote for the Knesset; if they prefer being residents and not citizens – they will have all rights except the right to vote for the Knesset. The Arab minority will have cultural autonomy…” Cited in Rubinovitz and Steinberg, “Menachem Begin’s Autonomy Plan: Between Political Realism and Ideology” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Israel Studies, University of , June 2012), 8.

34 Meeting between Begin and Vance, 10 August 1977, 11:20 AM, MFA-6862/2, ISA.

103

The distancing of Israel’s leadership from guilt over the making of the refugee problem enabled

Begin to present the Palestinians in a humanitarian light, rather than in national terms. As a minority in need of protection, the Palestinians in the territories should be provided with economic opportunities and housing, but not political rights.35

“We want to solve the problem and we did quite a lot in the Gaza Strip for the humane solution of this problem,” Begin emphasized. “Now they have proper houses, permanent jobs, have an income. Of course, we know that there are refugees on the other side; so the Arab countries should take care of them.”36 Dayan added that the refugees from Gaza were working in

Israel and increasingly tied together with the Jewish population. “We don’t like this business of the Gaza Strip with refugees and everything. I can’t see any other way but being combined with

Israel, providing them with work and surrounded with Israeli settlements.”37 When observers reminisce about the ease of travel between the territories and Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, before the outbreak of the first Intifada, Dayan’s seemingly benevolent approach is foremost in their mind. But what is missing from the nostalgia about a veritable golden age of occupation is the degree to which the territory was being transformed in the process.38

35 This denial of responsibility for the making of the refugee problem was a familiar trope in Israeli political life, even as leading figures like Yitzhak Rabin spoke openly of the state’s role in the creation of refugees. See S. Yizhar, Hirbet Hizeh (Jerusalem: Ibis Editions, 2008); and , “Between Remembrance and Forgetting,” Jewish Social Studies, 7:1 (Fall 2000): 1-62. In her recent biography of David Ben Gurion, Shapira writes of his order of expulsion. See Anita Shapira, Ben-Gurion, Father of Modern Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 171.

36 Meeting between Begin and Vance, 10 August 1977, 11:20 AM, MFA/6862/2, ISA. Dayan expanded on the need to offer refuges housing outside the camps, as well as the option of Israeli citizenship.

37 Ibid.

38 Begin said to Vance, “And also if you go via Judea and Samaria, perhaps you won’t see for miles on end one Israeli soldier. We don’t interfere in their lives.” See meeting between Begin and Vance, 10 August 1977, 11:20 AM, MFA-6862/2, ISA. For how this really looked, see Amos Gitai’s film of the occupied territories during the invasion of Lebanon, Yoman Sadeh [Field Diary], 1982.

104 The suggested status of the inhabitants in the territories, as Begin explained to Vance in

Jerusalem, was “complete cultural autonomy, municipal and religious autonomy, not to interfere with their lives at all.” Rather than force citizenship upon them, the option of Israeli citizenship and voting in the Knesset elections would be extended. “It would be completely on the basis of equality of rights,” Begin explained, comparing those Arabs who did not take citizenship to

Jewish residents in Israel who were also non-citizens. “So it will be complete equality of rights of Arabs and Jewish residents or Arab and Jewish citizens,” the Prime Minister told Vance.39

By situating the Palestinian question as a national minority issue, Begin was stripping away claims of self-determination in favor of a narrow focus on the individual as a loyal citizen to the state of Israel, like the Arab citizens within the 1967 borders.40 His attitude towards the

Arabs was reflected in an interview he gave to the Israeli Yediot Ahronot in early

September.

Ze’ev Jabotinsky wrote: “I relate to the Arabs as to every nation with a degree of respect and indifference.” – That is, what he wanted to say was: If it’s a matter of love then I love my own people. As far as all the others are concerned, I respect them, but I cannot relate to them as I do to my own people. I want to say that I have a profound respect for the Arab nation. The Arab nation made a very great contribution to human culture. It is true that it has had a period of decay. But that is something that has happened to other powerful nations as well…In my opinion, the past decade has seen a growing rapport between the Arabs living in Israel and ourselves. Unpleasant incidents from time to time notwithstanding, I believe that the two people can live side by side in mutual respect based on understanding, peace, economic and social progress, and the building up of this country to a state of glory.41

39 Begin relied on nationality in the “tradition of Eastern Europe…not in the position of citizenship as accepted in the west.” See meeting between Begin and Vance, 10 August 1977, 11:20 AM, MFA-6862/2, ISA.

40 On the troubled history of these citizens between 1948-1967, see Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers.

41 See Interview with the Prime Minister by Rafael Bashan, 12 September 1977, PM16, MBC.

105 This benevolence towards Arabs writ large, rather than Palestinians as a distinct national group, underpinned Begin’s insistence on the possibility of coexistence within a Jewish state with Arabs as a minority.

The PLO and 242

After consulting with President Sadat of Egypt and reporting on his visit to Israel, Vance returned to Washington.42 He explained the positions of each leader he met in the trip and told

Carter that if there was no serious movement to Geneva by September, the U.S. strategy of consulting with all the parties and bringing them together for comprehensive negotiations would falter.43 Carter agreed, and was especially encouraged by the consensus emerging from the Arab states. He was aware of the divergent position of the Israeli government on the key issues, however, writing in his diary that “the Israelis are going to be typically recalcitrant, but the more we go public with a reasonable proposition the more difficult it will be for them not to make an effort.”44 This underlying antipathy towards the Begin government characterized much of the administration’s private correspondence, evincing impatience with the ideology of the Likud party in light of the consistent U.S. efforts to work towards Geneva.45

42 See Memorandum of Conversation with Sadat, 11 August 1977, 3:30-4:40 PM, FRUS, Doc 87; and Telegram from Vance to Department of State and the White House, 11 August 1977, 194OZ, FRUS, Doc 88. On his way home, Vance stopped in London and met with Prime Minister Callaghan at , where they discussed Palestinian representation at Geneva and general impressions of the Israeli and Arab leadership. See “Note of a Meeting to discuss the Middle East,” 13 August 1977, PREM 16/1371, UKNA.

43 Vance, Hard Choices, 190.

44 Jimmy Carter, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 83. In a private letter, Carter asked Begin for a draft of an eventual treaty as envisioned by his government to move away “from generalities toward specifics, expressed in written form.” “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel,” 14 August 1977, 2309Z, FRUS, Doc 90.

45 American Jewish leader Hyman Bookbinder noted this pattern in a report to the Israeli government of his talks with Hamilton Jordan and Robert Lipshutz. See “Report of Bookbinder meeting with Jordan,” [Hebrew and English] 12 August 1977, MFA-6862/2, ISA.

106 The administration’s frustration was not reserved for the Israelis alone. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1977, there were extensive backchannel conversations with leading

Palestinians—and PLO leader Yasser Arafat himself—to clarify the organization’s possible acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242. While the PLO had been seriously considering the adoption of 242 for some time, concern had surfaced that recognition of Israel along the lines of the resolution without some indication of a national outcome to the Palestinian question would play the “trump card” without tangible benefits.

In writing to U.S. Ambassador Richard Parker in Beirut, Secretary Vance asked him to make clear to Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian academic and interlocutor between the administration and the PLO, that there would be a great benefit to PLO acceptance of 242.46 The U.S. had spoken openly of its support for a Palestinian homeland, in effect recognizing “that the

Palestinian question is not just a refugee issue but one involving the political status of the

Palestinians.” Vance wanted Khalidi to communicate to the PLO that the U.S. government was serious about self-determination, and that even with the reservations about 242’s elision of the

Palestinian question (it did not refer to the need for a homeland) the U.S. would open official contacts if the PLO accepted the resolution. Vance warned Khalidi that if the PLO did not take action, “it will risk seriously overplaying its hand and may end up with nothing and find itself on the outside looking in while the negotiating process goes forward.”47

The discussions around PLO acceptance of 242 that ensued sheds light on the reasons for

Palestinian exclusion from the Geneva process and further demonstrates how that practice carried over to the Camp David Accords a few months later. Parker replied to Roy Atherton, the

46 See Telegram from Department of State to Embassy in Lebanon, 17 August 1977, 0153Z, FRUS, Doc 93.

47 Ibid.

107 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, via a letter recounting the extensive conversation between PLO leader Yasser Arafat and freelance journalist . Arafat expressed willingness to make a deal, but not on the basis of Carter’s proposal. “There is a limit to my moderation,” Arafat said, “Please tell Atherton and Quandt I have a red line.” Arafat referred to the concessions of Sadat, who could not survive without accounting for the

Palestinians. “People call me a politician, but I am a revolutionary—a realist who believes in facts. Maybe Carter can solve the problem…but settling the problem without the Palestinians is like cooking something without leaving it to stew.48 In Arafat’s view, the Palestinians had demonstrated a great deal of moderation by agreeing to establish their national authority on a small piece of land, “23 percent of Palestine.” He spoke of the PLO’s legitimacy and willingness to accept 242 as long as it dealt with the Palestinians “as a people with national rights and aspirations and not as refugees.”49 This insistence on the Palestinians as a nation was fueled by the PLO’s suspicion of American diplomacy and the Israeli position that surfaced during

Vance’s visit.50

In analyzing the reasons behind the PLO reluctance to endorse 242, the CIA expanded on the tensions in the Palestinian national leadership. Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, and Soviet pressure was being brought to bear on the organization to sign, while the Syrians advised the PLO not to accept it. The PLO Executive Committee ultimately bowed to Syrian pressure, despite the efforts of moderates who wanted to begin a dialogue with the U.S.51 Attempts to meet the

48 Letter from Parker to Atherton, 19 August 1977, FRUS, Doc 96.

49 Ibid.

50 For the PLO view of Vance’s visit, see “Palestine is the Core,” editorial, Palestine (August 1977), IPS. The Israeli government’s view on the PLO and 242 based on the Cairo Conference of 1968 can be found in Meir Rosenne’s report, “The PLO’s Stance in Relation to Resolution 242,” 14 August 1977, MFA-6862/8, ISA.

51 “CIA Intelligence Information Cable,” 20 August 1977, FRUS, Doc 97.

108 American requirements continued in the wake of the PLO decision, moving closer to Walid

Khalidi’s formulation.52 Carter was informed of this moderating shift in the hopes that it could serve as an opening towards Palestinian representation at Geneva.53

The administration’s trusted backchannel to Arafat was Landrum Bolling, a former journalist and President of , a Quaker institution. Bolling held extensive conversations with the PLO leadership in Beirut, sending summaries and full notes back to the

White House.54 In his meeting with Arafat as well as senior PLO leaders at the apartment of

Arafat’s secretary, Um Nasser, Bolling was told that the organization did not reject UN 242 but that there had been a great deal of pressure to do so.55 The Palestinian leadership voiced frustration at the shifting U.S. position on Geneva, first offering a dialogue and participation on the basis of support for the creation of a Palestinian state, then promising only dialogue and a trusteeship “over a disarmed, vague Palestinian ‘entity.’ This plan was regarded as scheme to destroy rights of Palestinians.”56

When Bolling pushed Arafat to publically support 242, the PLO Chairman gave a

“lengthy” and “tortured” explanation, admitting that he was “suffering from Arab blackmail.” He was denounced for making concessions by leaders who try to be “more Catholic than the

Pope…more Palestinian than Arafat.” The leadership was working on a new formulation to satisfy the Americans, and promised to get back to Bolling. As one of his “moderate” contacts,

52 Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 23 August 1977, 0930Z, FRUS, Doc 98.

53 Memorandum, Brzezinski to Carter, 30 August 1977, FRUS, Doc 99.

54 See Memo from Brzezinski to Carter, 19 September 1977, FRUS, Doc 104.

55 This included Abu , Farouk Kaddumi, Abu Hassan, Dr. Issam Sartawi and Sabry Jiryis. See “Summary of Conversations with Arafat,” 17 September 1977; and Tab B, Full Notes on Conversation with Arafat, 9-12 September 1977. FRUS, Doc 103.

56 Ibid.

109 who was close to Arafat, told Bolling, “If only the Americans will promise they will give their support to our claim to a state, we will give them anything they want from us.”57 As Bolling told the White House, Arafat was being pushed hard by the Syrians, and was struggling to define the nature of an eventual state.58 Arafat’s own position, however, focused on the vagueness of the

U.S. assurance and the language being employed by Vance. “What do the terms mean:

‘homeland,’ ‘national rights,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘entity?’ The United States should make up its mind what its policy is on the question.”59

Arafat explained that the UN Resolution everyone wanted him to sign was rooted in a post-1967 negotiating model that excluded the Palestinians from consideration. He wanted

Bolling to understand the pressure of navigating critics who denounced any move to recognition and the possibility that some Arab leaders might go it alone with the Israelis. Arafat doubted this, having spoken with Sadat and Assad and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. “The truth is the Arab governments are stuck with us and they cannot leave us if they wanted to. That, of course, is the scheme the Israelis are counting on, but it won’t work.”60 As Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem and the

Camp David negotiations would soon make clear, bilateral peace would exclude the Palestinian question.

Among the most insightful aspects of the PLO meeting was Arafat’s description of the intensely contested internal mechanisms of the organization, which he described as a “true democracy.” There was room for many different views, including moderates like Issam Sartawi

57 Ibid.

58 Bolling raised the question of why President Assad was attacking Arafat, suggesting the possibility of a desire to control the PLO, restoring his image with “Leftist and hard-line elements in the Arab world,” currying favor with the Russians, or perhaps deflecting internal criticism. See Ibid.

59 Tab B, Full Notes on Conversation with Arafat, 9-12 September 1977. FRUS, Doc 103.

60 Ibid.

110 who reached out to Jewish progressive forces with PLO authorization. Sartawi, who was later assassinated by the virulently anti-PLO organization, was bitterly attacked by more extreme members and certain Arab states. “Certainly,” Arafat told Bolling, “we have our rejectionist elements in the PLO and they are free to express their views. I do not try to suppress them, but they do not control the PLO.”61

The exchange highlighted an inherent problem with PLO governance, as Bolling pointed out to Arafat. “If you allow such glaring contradictions to be expressed with regard to crucial policy matters, you should not be surprised if you are misunderstood.”62 The multitude of voices, as both Arafat’s meeting and Bolling’s analysis made clear, undermined Palestinian policy formulation.

A great deal of Arafat’s time and energy goes into efforts to keep everybody on the reservation. And an outsider has to wonder: Why bother? By the very structure of the P.L.O, the assorted extremist groups get representation in the various organs of the P.L.O. out of proportion to their numbers. By the free-wheeling ‘democratic’ tradition of the P.L.O., each faction has extraordinary freedom to go its own way in setting policy, committing acts of violence, and interpreting the P.L.O. to the world. It is a mad, mad situation.63

Neither did this internal panoply of voices translate into a consistent public PLO stance, hampering U.S. and international efforts to include them in the negotiations. Israeli opposition

61 Tab B, Full Notes on Conversation with Arafat. Bolling questioned Arafat about the Syrian control of Saiqa, a small group within the PLO which rejected Arafat’s leadership. He explained that “they have to live with my leadership.” On the affect of internal dynamics on Palestinian participation in negotiations, see Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process,” International Security 33.3 (2008/9): 79-109.

62 Tab B, Full Notes on Conversation with Arafat, 9-12 September 1977. FRUS, Doc 103, emphasis in original. Bolling was referring to public statements by hardline factions opposed to negotiations or acceptance of 242.

63 Tab C “Some reflections on the Current Status of the PLO and of Various Palestinian Attitudes and Opinions,” 16 September 1977, in FRUS, Doc 103.

111 did not help matters, but PLO exclusion was not solely a result of external pressures. The internal evolution of the movement, in this respect, must be accounted for as well.64

Sovereignty and Settlements

As the Carter administration worked to find ways of bringing Palestinians to the negotiating table, the Israeli and Egyptian leadership were consulting secretly to advance their own bilateral interests. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, disguised with a wig, mustache, and dark glasses, flew to and met with Sadat’s Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Hassan Tuhami, at

King Hassan’s palace on 16 September. Tuhami, a confidant of the Egyptian President, presented

Sadat’s precondition for peace, which was the “evacuation of Arab occupied territories.”65 This would be the only condition for Sadat meeting Begin. The Palestinians, Tuhami stressed, “should be left to Egypt and the Arab nations,” who would see to it they were not radicalized. Sadat’s emissary was confident that the two parties could reach an agreement, barring Israeli retention of the territories. “Places are negotiable. Administration is negotiable. But sovereignty is not.”66

64 Bolling also discussed the realities in the West Bank and the possibility of alternatives to the PLO, for which he saw no viable options. He described the doubts and apprehensions among Palestinians, “fear that Arafat and his team may not be quite up to the leadership role that would be required of them if independence should come; worry that extremists attached to the P.L.O. will do more foolish things that will produce consequences for the Palestinians under Israeli occupation; doubt that the Israelis will ever willingly leave the West Bank on any terms whatever.” See Tab C, “Some Reflections,” FRUS, Doc 103. Despite the limits and mistakes of the PLO itself, Vance’s overall framing of the issue highlights the contradictions of the U.S. position. Claiming that Carter’s use of the word “homeland” denoted peace and withdrawal was not altogether correct; the U.S. was not fully committed to this position, let alone Israel and Egypt. Even if they had been, 242 is a UN Security Council Resolution, not Vance’s private reading of the U.S. position. In return for this very shaky commitment, the PLO would be able to talk with the U.S., which still left their political future up in the air. I am grateful to Rashid Khalidi for his reading of these documents. This also comports with the wider literature on the 1970s. Self-determination, as the historian Bradley Simpson has argued with regards to the Carter administration, often meant less than the sum of its parts. See Bradley R. Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 1970s,” Humanity 4:2 (2013): 239- 260. One risks anachronistically backdating a contemporary understanding of the concept without situating it as a product of particular circumstances in the late 1970s.

65 “Highlights from Meeting of September 16, 1977,” A-4313/4, ISA.

66 Ibid.

112 This was the central principle of the Arab states in the discussions about the West Bank and

Gaza Strip, as well as the other territories captured by Israel in 1967.

The Israelis were operating under altogether different expectations. In his draft peace treaty prepared for Vance that month, Dayan had already provided the basic position of his government on the occupied territories in relationship to Jordan.

A) In Judea and Samaria equal rights and full coexistence should be ensured between Jew and Arab. B) No part of this area should be subject to any foreign rule or sovereignty. C) Any settlement should take Israel’s security needs fully into account. In this context our position is that Israel’s security on the eastern borer should be based on the Jordan River.67

Dayan traveled to Washington shortly after meeting Tuhami to discuss modalities towards

Geneva and the settlements with Vance and Carter. His positions in the draft peace treaty were questioned, and Dayan responded that there were no “musts” in Israel’s paper, but rather it served as a basis for exploration.68 The conversation about the West Bank in particular, and the issues of foreign sovereignty and local autonomy, further illustrated the incompatibility between

Israel’s hold on the territories and the negotiation of a comprehensive peace.

Dayan explained that while Israel “would avoid discussing sovereignty” it would only construct settlements in places where there were “security concerns.” He hoped to work with local Palestinians, like mayors not affiliated with the PLO, to determine what the population wanted. Jordan, as Dayan believed, would one day be Palestinian, and they would rule both sides of the river. While not specifying Israeli sovereignty for the area, he preferred that the issue be deferred until practical questions would be answered on the ground, like “who will repair the

67 Dayan to Vance, 2 September 1977, MFA-6864/15, ISA. In this copy, located in the files of Moshe Dayan, the source of each of these three principles is listed with their corresponding backer in Hebrew: A) Dayan; B) Begin; C) Yadin.

68 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister, 19 September 1977, 12-2:20PM, FRUS, Doc 105.

113 roads.” Vance wondered if leaving this question of sovereignty unresolved might be possible through the introduction of a local administration. As the summary of the conversation between the Israelis and Americans suggested, the result would lead to the type of autonomy that Begin soon came to support.

Israel would have military posts, but these posts would not interfere in the daily life of the population of the West Bank. Settlements would also not interfere. Arabs could work in Israel or not, as they want, and Israelis could travel to the West Bank, as they want. Israel would not run the West Bank schools, providing the schools were not used for inciting terrorism, if the West Bank Arabs don’t want to use Israelis technicians and facilities, that is up to them, Israel won't force them.69

Dayan concluded that he would ask the West Bankers what they themselves wanted, but like

Begin also insisted, “a Palestinian state is out of the question.”

U.S. Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, a perceptive diplomat who sensed the inconsistencies in this approach, pushed Dayan farther with a hypothetical scenario of a terrorist attack on an Israeli military installation in the mountains of the West Bank.

Israeli intelligence says this is a terrorist cell based in . What would Israel do? Dayan replied that Israel would go and search and get them. Lewis replied, “This means Israelis retaining security responsibilities?” Dayan said, “Theoretically if the local forces would do it we would leave it to them, but in practice they won’t. It would be farfetched to think that they would.”70

The modus vivendi that Dayan was suggesting, neither a Palestinian state nor control by

Jordan—with de facto Israeli control over security—solidified into precisely the non-national reality that would persist for several decades.

In Carter’s subsequent discussion with Dayan, the President reaffirmed the U.S. view that settlements were illegal. At the same time, he acknowledged that Dayan’s promise of limited expansion in only six existing settlements would be preferable to Israeli Minister of Agriculture

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

114 and settlement czar Ariel Sharon’s plan for more extensive building.71 This back and forth discussion, which characterized so much of the Israeli-American meetings over the course of

1977, never fully resolved the status of the territories themselves.72 As Carter’s questions and follows ups to Dayan made very clear, the Israeli Foreign Minister sought to defer any real consideration of the future of the West Bank, much like the Israeli leadership’s “decision not to decide” on their fate in the aftermath of the 1967 War.73 Instead Dayan suggested models of splitting off the territorial question from joint discussion of the refugees, or returning to the status of the West Bank at a later date.

Numerous accounts of Carter’s presidency point to personal animus between the

President and Begin, and an obsessive American focus on Israeli misdeeds.74 Yet much of administration’s frustration stemmed from the substance of the interactions with Israeli leadership. Carter recognized that the Israeli position was intended to undermine the very principles on Palestinian self-determination that he articulated when he first arrived in office.

71 See both “President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan of Israel, 19 September 1977, 3:30-5PM,” FRUS. Doc 106; and “Meeting of Foreign Minister Dayan with President Carter, 19 September 1977.” Brzezinski Donated Collection, Box 13, JCL. Dayan discussed the specifics of the six “” settlements in question (involving and settling the land) that would be subject to growth, stressing that “settlements will not decide boundaries and if a settlement is beyond the final border, it will either be removed or we will get an agreement with out neighbors.” Responding to criticism that Sharon would publicly compromise this limited growth with “dramatic announcements” about expansion while Begin and Sharon would remain silent, Dayan deferred to Begin. “I am not in charge of settlements. You should ask the Prime Minister his views and he would make an official announcement.”

72 The White House even prepared a draft “Aide Memoire” on the settlement question for the Israelis, recording the U.S. position on the private meeting with Dayan, which included no “new civilian settlements beyond the 1948 Armistice line for a period of at least one year” [emphasis mine] and mandating Israeli settlers would have to join the Israeli army and live on the six existing military installments without their families. The memo also reasserted the U.S. position on settlements being illegal under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and considered the West Bank and Gaza to be occupied territory to which UN Resolution 242 applied. See Quandt to Brzezinski, “Aide Memoire,” 20 September 1977, Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 35, JCL.

73 Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, 44. These were actually the words of Menachem Begin in a cabinet remark on 10 September 1967. See Raz, 301, note 101.

74 See the aforementioned reactions to Carter’s publication of Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid.

115 William Quandt, in his role as NSC analyst on this issue, prepared a short study for interim rule in the West Bank and Gaza that highlighted the risk of not addressing their future directly.75 The

American concern about the future of the territories remained consistent in broad policy discussions as well as private meetings with the Israelis. Before concluding his meeting with

Dayan, Carter again raised the problem of Israeli settlement policy. “How the settlement issue is handled in public causes me concern. If Hussein and Sadat want peace, and I assume that they do, it is hard for them to listen to your talk about thousands of new settlers, about no foreign sovereignty over the West Bank, and about the West Bank being part of Israel.” In Carter’s view, this approach “almost forecloses the chance of a Geneva Conference.” The President told Dayan, with great frustration, “I was really angry watching Sharon on television saying that there would be hundreds of settlers, maybe in the millions. That is not what Prime Minster Begin had told me, or what you have said.”76

The intentionally opaque nature of Israeli policy on this core issue of contention was clear to Carter and members of his administration, as well as Arab interlocutors. In conversations with Jordanian diplomats some days later, Dayan’s proposal of continued Israeli control in the territories was heavily criticized. “It would amount to helping Israel achieve its goal of staying in the West Bank,” argued Abdul Hamid Sharaf, the Minister to the Royal Jordanian Court.77

Sharaf suspected the Palestinians would therefore come to Jordan, since they held Jordanian

75 Memo, Quandt to Brzezinski, “An Interim Regime for the West Bank and Gaza,” 9 September 1977. Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 35, JCL. This report, which called for new administrative structures and a settlement freeze, is remarkable for anticipating the consequences of indefinite control of the territories. Quandt suggested a referendum on an eventual agreement in which Palestinians living in the territories could exercise self- determination, in line with the U.S. position.

76 President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan of Israel, 19 September 1977, 3:30-5PM,” FRUS, Doc 106.

77 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 September 1977, FRUS, Doc 112.

116 nationality and would not want to stay in the West Bank. The Israelis, in Sharaf’s view, would talk about negotiations being open, but they would never be prepared to seriously talk about the fate of the territories. The physical changes on the ground signaled that Arab critics of the Begin government were right to express concern. And as conveners of Geneva, the U.S. was partially responsible for enabling this dynamic.

Domestic Pressures and the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué

One possible explanation of the American failure on settlements was rooted in the domestic constraints under which the U.S. was facilitating the Geneva talks. Criticism was mounting from two distinct constituencies at odds with the administration over its Middle East policy. The first was the leadership of the American Jewish community, which had moved decisively closer to supporting the Begin government, and the second were Cold War conservatives, who bitterly opposed détente and dismissed Carter’s new focus on human rights.

They railed against the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the negotiations, a stance that bolstered the growing movement of hawkish democrats into the Republican camp and fueled the strength of an emerging neoconservative ideology in foreign policy circles.78 The preparations for a

Geneva Conference lay at the crux of this growing domestic opposition, which helps explain the degree of political capital that a comprehensive peace was expending.

Many American Jews had lingering suspicions about Carter, an unknown entity who was never quite embraced by them on the campaign trail.79 Beginning with the President’s support for a Palestinian “homeland” in early 1977, a series of perceived missteps raised further hackles

78 See Justin Vaisse, : The Biography of a Movement (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2010).

79 See the “Reminiscences of Stuart Eizenstat,” 11 May 1977 (CCOH), 5. Eizenstat recalls uninformed concerns by some Jewish voters that he was “anti-Semitic.”

117 from the leaders of major American Jewish organizations. After the twin exultation and dread of the 1967 and 1973 wars, American Jewry was grappling with the nature of communal support for

Israel in the late 1970s. Stalwart liberal groups like the American Jewish Congress and American

Jewish Committee had traditionally supported the Labor led governments of Levi Eshkol, Golda

Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin. These leaders were generally viewed favorably within liberal

American Jewish constituencies.80

Menachem Begin’s election had posed a particularly difficult problem for the moderate rhythms of American Jewish political life in the 1970s. After extensive internal deliberation, a decision was made to support Begin and rally behind his government as a means of bolstering

Jewish support for Israel regardless of who was in power. Rabbi Alexander Schindler, the leader of the Reform movement, explained this rationale.

We were never pledged to a Party as American Jews. We were not members of the Labor alignment by any manner of means. We were pledged to a cause—the cause of Israel’s security. We were motivated by a love for the people of Israel. But it is impossible to express that support by fighting the leader of that country. At that point Begin was the only Prime Minister Israel had.81

It was a risky move, bound to alienate more liberal voices within American Jewry. As one authority on the history of American Jewish politics has explained, “instead of publicly differing with Begin’s policies, they [Jewish leaders] began to circle the wagons to defend against Jimmy

Carter’s policies.”82 Alongside contrarian voices within the public sphere, several leaders of

80 See Marc Dollinger, Quest for Inclusion: Jews and Liberalism in Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

81 “Reminiscences of Rabbi Alex Schindler,” 22 December 1977 (CCOH), 29. One Israeli intellectual active in the confidentially remarked “just when American Jews should have been more critical of what was going on in Israel, a major American Jewish leader- a self proclaimed dove- throws his support to Begin. It was positively whorish” Tivnan, The Lobby, 112. At a meeting in late October, , the President of the , told Secretary Vance that Shindler “used to be more of a dove,” but he “sold out his principles because of his ambitions.” Memorandum of Conversation, 27 October 1977, 3:30 PM. FRUS, Doc 138.

82 Tivnan, The Lobby, 111.

118 major Jewish institutions were also critical of this move, signaling a growing fracture in the nature of domestic support for Israel.83 The approach of supporting the ruling government at any cost emerged in this period as the blueprint for American Jewry’s future relationship with both

Israel and the United States executive branch.84

The anxiety among Jewish leaders towards the administration’s Middle East policy had been growing since a July meeting with President Carter. In a September memo for Hamilton

Jordan and Robert Lipshutz, two Jewish leaders warned of a “growing crisis over Israel policy which is boiling just below the public political surface.”85 The primary concern was the attempt by the Carter White House to reach a formula with the PLO and initiate contacts with the organization. Invoking the 1975 Kissinger agreement, critics worried that there had been too much movement towards a possible official dialogue. “The Palestinians appear to be far more popular in the Administration than in the country at large.” Furthermore, these critics argued, the administration was too vocal on the settlement issue, and was developing “an image of harshness towards Israel.” “Starkly put,” the authors concluded, “despite its rhetoric on human rights, [the

Carter administration] is seen as less friendly to the Israeli democracy than its predecessors.”86

83 See J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside The American Jewish Establishment (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 210. On internal cleavages, see I.F. Stone, “Confessions of a Jewish Dissident,” The New York Review of Books 25:3, 9 March 1978; and Baruch A. Levine, “Israel and Dissidence,” The New York Review of Books, 25:7, 4 May 1978.

84 See Tivnan, The Lobby, 175-177. Tivnan does a thorough job explaining how groups like AIPAC worked to garner bipartisan support for any elected government in Israel rather than take specific sides on a political issue. This has now unraveled, as the reactions to ’s March 2015 Congressional speech attest; and more disturbingly, in the battles over organizations like the and J Street. See Jane Eisner, “Anatomy of a Smear,” The Forward, 10 March 2015.

85 See “Reasons Why the Jewish Community and Other Israeli Supporters are Disturbed by Administration Actions and Inactions Since the July 6 Meeting,” Memo, Edward Sanders and Roger Lewis to Hamilton Jordan and Robert Lipshutz, 19 September 1977, Hamilton Jordan Files, Box 35, JCL.

86 Ibid.

119 The simmering discontent gave way to visceral outrage over a joint U.S.-Soviet

Communiqué issued in New York on 1 October 1977. While it had been suggested that the

Soviet Union would be kept out of pre-Geneva discussions, Brzezinski felt they should be consulted to launch the Geneva Conference before the end of the year. Vance echoed this sentiment, reporting to Brzezinski that the Soviets had moderated their position and were not insisting on a separate Palestinian state.87 In Cold War terms, given the broader geopolitical landscape of the 1970s, the communiqué was a very significant departure for both the U.S. and the Soviets. It was the first joint statement on the Middle East by the two powers.

Most of the language in the Communiqué emanated from United Nations Resolution 242, but it went farther in articulating a future for Palestinians.

The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.88

For the first time, the U.S. was officially calling for the full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 Green

Line while asserting the importance of Palestinian self-determination. It also stressed the importance of dealing with sovereignty, which was at the heart of a resolution to the Palestinian question.

87 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 108.

88 “Joint Statement by the Governments of the U.S. and the USSR, 1 Oct. 1977,” full text in Yehuda Lukacs, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Reader 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 16.

120 The Israeli government was extremely displeased with the announcement.89 The opposition extended well beyond Begin’s Likud party. Yitzhak Rabin, who was now a Knesset member in the opposition, told an Israeli interviewer that the statement reflected a shift in gravity between the U.S. and Israel that “we have not experienced since the end of the 6-Day War.”90 He felt Israel was being coerced into a political solution, undermining all the diplomatic efforts since

1967. Rabin blamed both the Carter administration and the Likud government for policies that would lead to the imposition of an external solution, denouncing a move to Geneva on these terms. Rabin’s efforts to forestall a comprehensive peace during the negotiations with Henry

Kissinger after the 1973 war now seemed poised to collapse, with Israel being pushed back to the

1967 borders.

An advance copy of the statement was provided to Israel’s Foreign Minister, Moshe

Dayan, who did not immediately raise any criticisms. In his memoirs, Dayan argues that Carter had assured him that he would be careful to use the term ‘entity’ and not ‘state’ in the context of addressing the future of the Palestinians.91 Neither term was used, but the formulation exceeded the limited Israeli vision for the conference. In talks with Carter a few days after the statement,

Dayan focused on Israeli opposition to a Palestinian state, again revealing the extent of his government’s ongoing claim to sovereignty in the occupied territories. “For us it is unthinkable

89 “Israel Reacts to Statement,” New York Times, 2 October 1977. The Times reported that it “intensified the growing apprehension here that the United States was on a path toward accepting the Palestine Liberation Organization.” See also “Summary of the President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, 4 October 1977, FRUS, Doc 124.

90 “Rabin Reaction to U.S.-Soviet Statement,” 2 October 1977. Hamilton Jordan Files, Box 35, JCL.

91 Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 64-74. See also Dayan’s speech to the Knesset on 13 October 1977 defending Geneva on the grounds that Israel did not have to agree to everything ahead of time, and reiterating the basis of Israel’s stance on the territories: “B) No part of these territories will be ceded to foreign control or sovereignty; …it is the position of Israel that the Eastern border be based on the Jordan River.” Dayan to the Knesset, 27th Meeting, 13 October 1977 [Hebrew], A-4313/1, ISA.

121 to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, and turn those areas over to the Palestinians, even if they are in federation with Jordan,” Dayan explained. “We must come to terms with the

Palestinians who live there, and we must keep some of our military installations and some of our settlements, and we must continue to be able to buy land.”92 For Dayan, even the most flexible arrangements with the Palestinians were predicated on the continuation of an Israeli presence in the same geographic space.

Dayan invoked the language of security to justify Israeli fears of a PLO presence on its borders, impassionedly seeking Carter’s guarantee not to endorse a national outcome for the

Palestinian question. “We do not say the Palestinians have nothing to say about their future. We have to come together. But if we have to pull out our military installations, that would be unacceptable. We will not negotiate over a Palestinian state.” This fear of Palestinian statehood underpinned Dayan’s entire rationale for opposing the communiqué. “We can talk about partition, or living together, or autonomy, but not pulling out altogether.” He worried the U.S. and the

Soviets would “try to impose a Palestinian state.” More than the issue of Jerusalem, Dayan implored, this pressure to go to Geneva on U.S. and Soviet terms would “force us to do something that would lead to the destruction of Israel.”93

While framed as opposition to a PLO controlled Palestinian state, Dayan’s opposition to the Joint Communiqué was clouded by the Israeli assertion of indefinite political sovereignty in the territories.

We can talk with Palestinians about the future of the West Bank, and about how we can live together and how we can do everything. We are not asking for Israeli sovereignty there. We don’t want to annex the territory. We want to know what their interests are,

92 Summary of the President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, 4 October 1977, FRUS, Doc 124.

93 Ibid.

122 other than having a state and sovereignty of their own. We want to live together in the territories and we don't want to give them back.94

Dayan was both telling the Americans that Israel’s basis for negotiations at Geneva rested on the fundamental premise of continuing de facto control over the very space that was being contested, while seeking an American endorsement of such a position. Like the tactical avoidance of negotiating the fate of the territories after 1967, Israeli leaders were in fact proffering comprehensive negotiations as a means to secure additional territory.

The Israeli position on the Communiqué was mirrored by the outcry among American

Jewish leaders. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) widely distributed a scathing critique of the document, claiming it disregarded U.S. commitments to Israel and undermined prospects for a negotiated settlement.95 Mark Siegel, the White House liaison with the American Jewish community, wrote of its “devastating effect” and told Hamilton Jordan that it had “driven Jimmy Carter’s stock in the American Jewish community substantially below any

U.S. President since the creation of the State of Israel.”96 During discussions with Vice President

Mondale and Hamilton Jordan, Hyman Bookbinder, the Washington Representative of the

American Jewish Committee, targeted the phrase of “legitimate rights,” which had until then not been part of the formal American foreign policy lexicon.

Obviously you do not apparently really understand what those words mean. The mistake you make is you go to the dictionary to ask what those words mean. That’s not where you look up that phrase. That phrase is not in the dictionary. The individual words are. Those words in context are: Palestinian rights means to the Jewish community the destruction of Israel. And by being willing to leave those words in the document you betrayed an insensitivity and a lack of awareness, and you’ve just got to make up for it.97

94 Ibid.

95 “The United States, The Soviet Union and a Middle East Peace,” October 1977. Hamilton Jordan Files, Box 35, JCL. Jordan’s note on top points to distribution to Brzezinski and NSA analyst David Aaron.

96 Siegel to Jordan, 3 October 1977. Jordan Files, Box 35, JCL.

97 “Reminiscences of Hyman Bookbinder,” 9 December 1977 (CCOH), 58-59.

123

Bookbinder’s insistence that the articulation of rights for Palestinians signaled the destruction of

Israel formed the core of a deeply rooted fear of Palestinian nationalism among American Jews.

Such an instinctive inability to see the Palestinians as anything other than a threat to Jewish national interests may have been bolstered by successive incidents of Palestinian militancy in

Israel and against Jewish targets, but it also tapped into a cultural milieu of suspicion and existential fear that propagated mythologies denying Palestinian existence well into the 1980s.

Communal anxieties, as expressed by Bookbinder, also fit within the idiom of Cold War national security concerns, linking Jewish political interests with neoconservative priorities in the

Middle East. One Jewish Democratic activist remarked that Jews feel Carter is “using Israel as a bartering tool to get concessions from the Soviet Union on much broader issues, like arms limitations and trade and so on. At this moment, most Jews hope he’ll be a one term President.”98

The Joint Communiqué had outraged American Conservatives, who decried a shift in U.S. policy to include the Soviets in negotiations. The right flank of the Democratic Party, along with their

Republican colleagues, saw the statement as an indication of détente’s weakness. These democratic critics of Carter’s foreign policy included Eugene Rostow, a founder of the

Committee on Present Danger. Rostow maintained regular contact with members of the Carter administration, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, who he regularly corresponded with and visited in the White House.

Rostow’s fear of Soviet military expansionism underpinned his opposition to Carter’s policies around arms reduction. Yet he and his colleagues, including the arms expert and negotiator Paul Nitze, were invited in August to meet with the President about SALT II, the

98 Terence Smith, “Growing Alarm Among U.S. Jews Threatens Carter’s Mideast Policy,” New York Times, 30 October 1977, 34. See also “The Jews and Jimmy Carter,” Editorial, New York Times, 6 November 1977; and Letters to the Editor, 13 November 1977.

124 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks signed in 1979. The visit, Rostow felt, was an attempt to orchestrate dialogue between hawks and doves in a White House “staffed almost entirely by pronounced doves.”99 The group suspected they were being “used” to bolster Carter’s claim of speaking with hawks, and they were not favorably impressed by the President’s performance.

“The Presidents personality and style came through as pathetic, almost pitiful,” Rostow wrote in a personal account, referring to the meeting as “claptrap.”100

In a far more gracious letter to Carter in September, Rostow reported on a meeting of his board with Samuel Huntington, a member of the National Security Staff. The shared discussion of the administration’s Soviet policy included Huntington’s assessment of Soviet interests in the

Middle East as part of the Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18) on U.S. national security.

Era II in Soviet-American relations, starting with the October 1973 war in the Middle East, is considered to be more dangerous for us than the period that preceded it, and that the operating premise of PD-18 is that the Soviet Union will take advantage of every opportunity for the expansion of its power and influence unless deterred by unacceptable risk.101

Against this backdrop, the October announcement of a joint Communiqué disturbed conservatives because it signaled a partial reentry of the Soviets into the Middle East. The lingering perception that Carter was soft on communism would trail the President in the midterm elections and into the 1980 campaign.

In spite of these criticisms, the joint statement underscored the fundamental difference between Carter’s foreign policy and that of previous administrations. In William Quandt’s view,

99 Eugene Rostow, “Memorandum for the files, meeting with President Carter, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor.” 4 August 1977, The White House. MS1024, Ascension 1985-M- 004, Box 4, Eugene Victor Rostow Papers (MS 1024). Manuscripts and Archives, YUL.

100 Ibid.

101 Rostow to Carter, 19 September 1977, MS1024, Ascension 1985-M-004, Box 4, Eugene Victor Rostow Papers (MS 1024), YUL.

125 the President was essentially reformulating the American position on the Palestinians, even while

“the humanitarian question of refugees and the demands of highly politicized Palestinian nationalists engaged in armed struggle were not sharply differentiated in his mind.”102 Though it remains unclear whether Carter fully grasped the consequences of his linguistic departure, a different context in which to frame the issue of the Palestinians had now emerged. This shift was a domestic political risk, but Quandt confirmed that while Carter “spoke out publicly in favor of real peace for Israel, his instinct for fairness seemed to tell him that some nod toward Palestinian rights was also warranted.”103 It was a bold move, albeit with serious electoral repercussions.

Jody Powell, the President’s press secretary, worried “this could be the biggest, most sensitive political problem we face in 1980.”104 With time, and political heat, his statements on the

Palestinians became more “circumspect,” eventually replacing support for a homeland with opposition to an independent Palestinian state.105

Sadat’s Trip to Jerusalem: Bravery or Betrayal?

In negotiations with the Arab states and the Israeli delegation to the UN General

Assembly in New York in late September, Vance continued to discuss the points of contention

102 Quandt, Camp David, 60-61.

103 Ibid. This dueling instinct for honesty and political feasibility played out in the drafting of Carter’s speech to the World Jewish Congress in November, where Quandt advised against a “straight-forward, blunt approach” that would alienate the Israelis without political gain. See the two competing drafts in Quandt’s memo to Brzezinski, “President’s Speech to World Jewish Congress,” 31 October 1977, Brzezinski NSA material, Country File- Israel, Box 35, JCL. The final speech as delivered opted for more restrained language. See “World Jewish Congress Remarks at the Meeting of the General Council,” 2 November 1977, PPPJC.

104 Ibid.

105 Quandt, Camp David, 60.

126 between the parties over Geneva.106 Foremost was the future of the territories and the question of sovereignty, with the Israelis remaining opposed to a foreign power in the West Bank. Vance reiterated the U.S. belief in a Palestinian entity (not a state) preferably linked with Jordan as the best option, a position still at odds with Israel’s. To find a way out of this contradiction, Dayan suggested that parties refrain from defining the specific political formation under consideration.

“The subject can be mentioned…and each side can interpret it as it sees fit.” Vance agreed this was a constructive idea, “the subject could be put on the agenda but we would not say who would discuss it and we would not try to define it too clearly.” 107 Such a tactical move on

Dayan’s part fit with his endorsement of a Geneva working paper, which was swiftly shepherded through Israeli cabinet approval.108

The Geneva working paper, which had been developed in meetings with the Americans on 5 October 1977, called for the “negotiation and completion of peace treaties” between Israel and Egypt; Israel and Jordan; Israel and Syria; and Israel and Lebanon. The language for the territories, however, signaled a move away from political treaties. “The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian

Arabs.”109 Rather than seek to resolve the fate of the territories, they would be subject to a

106 This was in Vance’s hotel suite at the UN Plaza Hotel. See Memorandum of Conversation, 26 September 1977, 8:15 PM, FRUS, Doc 113. Vance also discussed Egypt’s emerging willingness to negotiate with Israel alone if Syria opted out of the Geneva Conference.

107 Ibid.

108 On the domestic context of Dayan’s role as a moderate alongside Begin, see “Peace negotiations and Israeli Coalition Politics,” 7 October 1977, Brzezinski NSA material, Country File- Israel, Box 35, JCL. This analysis found its way into Brzezinski’s weekly briefing to Carter. See Memorandum for the President from Brzezinski, NSC Weekly Report #32, 14 October 1977, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 41, JCL.

109 See “Working Paper on Suggestions for the Resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference,” multiple drafts [Hebrew and English], 18 September-15 October 1977. A-4313/1, ISA; and Working Paper, October 1977, Brzezinski NSA Material, Country File- Israel, Box 35, JCL. In meetings with the Americans, the Jordanians raised the question of sovereignty and pointed to ongoing efforts by the Israelis to promote local alternatives with

127 discussion, which deferred the West Bank and Gaza territorial question from consideration. The mechanics of diplomacy before Camp David, as this chapter is suggesting, had already begun to prevent the possibility of a political settlement to the Palestinian question.

Reactions to the Joint Communiqué and the planning for Geneva in the Arab world were largely favorable. Many saw the implied reference to the legitimacy of the Palestinian claims of sovereignty as a move by the Carter Administration towards “recognition of a Palestinian state.”110 Others remained skeptical of the possibility that Israel would ever participate in a

Geneva Conference. But the PLO expressed genuine excitement over the communiqué, across political factions.111 There was hope of a new resolution that might be passed by the UN Security

Council, one that would combine the main points of 242 with renewed demands for Palestinian self-determination.112

The Egyptian government endorsed the unfolding plans for Geneva, with Palestinians included in a wider Arab delegation. In discussions with Yasser Arafat, Sadat was rumored to have agreed that the head of the Palestinian delegation to the conference would be the American-

Palestinian scholar Edward Said, who was not affiliated with the PLO.113 Conveying his acceptance of the revised Geneva plans to Carter, Sadat expressed thanks and “deep conviction that you will use your influence through discreet diplomacy in order to reach an acceptable and

Palestinians on the basis of narrow autonomy. Vance felt that Geneva would be different, “they were thinking of something more.” See Secretary’s Bilateral with Jordanian Court Minister Sharaf, 1 October 1977, FRUS, Doc 121.

110 Marvine Howe, “Arabs Believe Israel Will Refuse to Join Geneva Talks,” New York Times, 4 Oct. 1977, 3.

111 See “PLO Welcomes Declaration,” New York Times, 2 October 1977; and “U.S.-Soviet Communiqué,” editorial, 1 October 1977, Palestine 3:14, IPS.

112 See the comments of Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO’s political department in “PLO Welcomes Declaration,” New York Times, 2 October 1977.

113 See “Oral Message from Egyptian President Sadat to President Carter,” 1 October 1977, FRUS, Doc 119.

128 constructive compromise.”114 Rather than get bogged down in procedure, Sadat and the

Egyptians had opted to move swiftly towards the Geneva Conference.115

Ever since his country’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan for Arab-Israeli peace in 1970,

Sadat had been looking to the U.S. as a regional patron. Carter’s active interest in securing a comprehensive settlement had encouraged Sadat, and the two had developed a close working relationship. But the Egyptian President did not like the petty procedural debates around

Palestinian representation and format of a hopeful summit. His frustration over the debates around Geneva between Carter, Begin, and the Arab leaders mounted in the wake of the Joint

Communiqué.116 Wary of jeopardizing the possibility of peace with “endless bickering over procedural issues,” Sadat proposed an international summit for peace in the Middle East to be held in Jerusalem in December, before the meeting in Geneva.117 This gathering would include the Soviet Union, China, France, the UK, the UN, and Yasser Arafat as the head of the PLO.

Such an international effort, Sadat believed, would constitute the bold gesture that was needed for peace. Carter disagreed, expressing his concern that it would lead to a public rejection.118

Instead of making an announcement about a new summit, Sadat’s speech to the People’s

Assembly in Cairo four days later contained an altogether different yet no less dramatic promise.

114 Telegram from the Embassy join Egypt to the Department of State, 19 October 1977, 1339Z, FRUS, Doc 133.

115 Foreign Minister Fahmy noted to U.S. Ambassador Eilts that Egypt did not want to be “fussy” in reconvening the Geneva Conference. Ibid, note 2.

116 On Sadat’s motivations, see Moshe Shemesh, “The Origins of Sadat’s Strategic Volte Face,” Israel Studies, 13.2, Summer 2008, 28-53; Ibrahim A. Karawan, “Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Revisited,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26.2 (1994): 249-266; Adel Safty, “Sadat's Negotiations with the United States and Israel: From Sinai to Camp David,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 50, 3 (1991): 285-299; and Martin Indyk, “To the Ends of the Earth”: Sadat’s Jerusalem Initiative (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1984).

117 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 3 November 1977, 2255Z, FRUS, Doc 141.

118 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 5 November 1977, 0129Z, FRUS, Doc 142.

129 The Egyptian leader vowed in emotional terms to “go to the Knesset itself” in order to secure

Israel withdrawal from the territories and legitimate rights for the Palestinians.119 PLO Chairman

Yasser Arafat, who Sadat described as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” was sitting in the audience next to Vice President Hosni Mubarak. As U.S. Ambassador to Egypt wrote from Cairo, Sadat’s offer to go to the Knesset was the first for an

Arab leader, but should be seen “as his way of dramatizing lengths to which he prepared to go to achieve peace, not as a serious possibility.” Eilts suspected that Arafat must have been wondering if Sadat was prepared to go to Geneva without the PLO. The Egyptian President’s boldness and risk taking reflected a decisive strategy he had pursued since the early 1970s, one that required action like the convening of Geneva. Without any movement, Eilts concluded,

“Sadat may find he has gotten out uncomfortably far beyond his Arab brothers.”120 This dual feature of Sadat’s position, boldness on the one hand and a betrayal of the Arab world’s stance towards Israel on the other, were laid bare in his unprecedented trip to Jerusalem ten days later.

Sadat’s visit, which began on Saturday evening 19 November, came after Begin extended a formal invitation.121 The decision to go to Jerusalem generated internal dissent in Egypt and led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Fahmy.122 Sadat’s trip was also met with wide disapproval in the Arab world, especially strident opposition from Syria. The PLO view, as reflected in the

119 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 9 November 1977, 2120Z, FRUS, Doc 144.

120 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 10 November 1977, 1540Z, FRUS, Doc 145.

121 Begin to Sadat, 15 November 1977, A-4313/5, ISA. For detailed coverage of the lead up to Sadat’s visit and the trip itself, see the special publication and release of new documents, “’No More War’: The Peace Plan of the Israeli Government and President Sadat's Journey to Jerusalem, November 1977. Documents on the Background to Sadat's Visit and the Israeli Government's Reaction, Israel State Archives, http://www.archives.gov.il/archivegov_eng/publications/electronicpirsum/sadatvisit/sadatvisit.htm (accessed on 10 March 2015). See also the original materials of Begin’s office file “Bikur Sadat B’Yisrael” [Sadat’s Visit to Israel], PM1103, MBC.

122 On Fahmy’s account of Egypt’s approach to peacemaking and his resignation, see Ismail Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

130 organization’s Beirut based mouthpiece, was to condemn Sadat’s decision. Officials believed it would only strengthen Begin’s hand, “a useless step which will give the Israelis prestige and recognition.”123 Beyond the symbolism, critics began to wonder, what exactly would Sadat be able to secure from Begin?124

The sheer visual power of an Arab leader landing at Ben Gurion airport, greeted by a retinue of Israeli officials (including a “smiling but formal” former rival ), captured global attention.125 Sadat and his entourage were driven up to Jerusalem, where they spent the evening in the historic . After attending Eid al-Adha prayers in Jerusalem’s Al-

Aqsa mosque on Sunday morning, Sadat made his way to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and then joined Begin for a visit to memorial of . In a remarkable speech delivered in Arabic in front of the Knesset that afternoon, Sadat spoke of a “durable and just peace.” While he did not mention the PLO by name, he stressed “there can be no peace without the Palestinians.”

The cause of the Palestinian People and their legitimate rights are no longer ignored or denied today by anybody…Even the United States, your first ally which is absolutely committed to safeguard Israel’s security and existence, and which offered and still offers Israel every moral, material and military support—I say—even the United States has opted to face up to reality and facts, and admit that the Palestinian People are entitled to legitimate rights and that the Palestinian problem is the core and essence of the conflict

123 “Sadat’s Visit,” Palestine, 3 (November 1977), IPS.

124 Even Carter was worried about the benefits of the trip. During a telephone conversation with Begin, who informed the President of Sadat’s visit, Carter told the Israeli Prime Minister, “There is the need for some tangible contribution for Sadat to take home. He has run high risks. There should be something tangible that he can take as a success.” See Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Carter and Begin, 17 November 1977, 3:53-4PM, FRUS, Doc 147. See also Vance’s instructions to Ambassador Sam Lewis in Tel Aviv. “Israelis must realize that Sadat must be able to show something for his acceptance of Begin’s invitation; otherwise he could be in deep trouble.” Telegram from the Department of State to the White House, 18 November 1977, 1510Z, FRUS, Doc 148.

125 Diary of Grace Sloane Vance, entry on 23 November 1977. Box 17, folder 1, Cyrus R. and Grace Sloane Vance Papers (MS 1664), YUL. 3000 journalists and broadcasters in Israel covered the event.

131 and that, so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimensions.126

In focusing so centrally on the Palestinian question, Sadat had reintroduced the concept of a permanent home into Israeli and broader public consciousness.127

During their working meetings in Jerusalem, Sadat revealed Egyptian impatience with procedural issues around Geneva and evinced a desire for substantive talks with the Israelis.

Both the Egyptian and Israeli delegations worded on a joint communiqué that was issued at a press conference by the two leaders at the Jerusalem Theatre. Praising Sadat’s “sincere and courageous move,” the statement proposed further dialogue between the two countries and movement towards negotiations, leading to the signing of peace treaties in Geneva with all the neighboring Arab states.”128 As Sadat described the main motive of his visit, it was “to give the peace process new momentum and to get rid of the psychological barrier that, in my opinion, was more than 70 percent of the whole conflict, the other 30 percent being substance.”129 Looking at the content of Sadat’s conversations with Begin, however, makes clear that the differences in

Israeli and Egyptian positions on the purpose of Geneva and the prospects for peace were no less contradictory than they had been before Sadat landed at Ben Gurion Airport.

In a 23 November meeting with Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan,

Ambassador Lewis asked for a report of Sadat’s private conversations in Jerusalem. Both Begin

126 , “Statement to the Israeli Knesset,” 20 Nov. 1977, in Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 143- 144.

127 After Sadat’s speech, the New York Times ran a three part series on the front page entitled “The Palestinians.” The first article took a close look at the different conceptions of statehood across the Palestinian populated Middle East, revealing a complicated multiplicity of views. James M. Markham, “Palestinians, People in Crisis, Are Scattered and Divided” New York Times, 19 February 1978, A1.

128 “Transcript of Joint Press Conference including the Agreed Communiqué Issued upon the conclusion of President Sadat’s Visit to Israel,” 21 November 1977, Ben-Elissar Files, A-4155/5, ISA.

129 Ibid.

132 and Dayan stressed his disinterest in the procedural issues around Geneva, and Dayan added that from Sadat’s point of view, “had he wanted to negotiate a separate agreement with Israel, we could sit down with Egypt and negotiate and sign. At the same time, he doesn’t want to do this separately.”130 While the contours of the conference were still uncertain, Dayan explained that for Sadat, “The Palestinian question comes first.” Lewis asked what the U.S. could do to help advance the process, and Begin and Dayan told him to wait until Dayan met secretly with

Tuhami, Sadat’s confidant, for another direct negotiating session in Morocco.

The Egyptian motivation for boldly coming to Jerusalem, Dayan explained, was not the return of Sharm el-Sheikh. “Sharm is desert and it won’t change the economy of Egypt. Their real target is to improve the economy of the country. In this connection much depends on

America.” Begin concurred, and added what Sadat told him in private about the state of the

Egyptian economy. “He said the problem was horrible and he complained about the military expenditure.” In light of these concerns, the aspirations of a comprehensive peace were bound to fall to the wayside. For Sadat, Dayan explained, “momentum does not lead directly to Geneva. I feel that Sadat is less anxious to go to Geneva with Syria, the Russians and the PLO. He is obviously very hurt by their attitude. They call for his blood.”131 Lewis, in his report to Carter, concurred that from Begin’s account “it looks as though our Geneva scenario has been considerably modified and the new track has, obviously, a heady odor of Israeli-Egyptian bilaterals.”132 For Begin and Sadat, Lewis nevertheless concluded, there was still a genuine belief that they were seeking to achieve a comprehensive peace. Reporting on these developments to

130 Top Secret Meeting of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs with Ambassador Lewis, 23 November 1977, 6PM, A-4155/5, ISA.

131 Ibid.

132 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, 23 November 1977, 2150Z, FRUS, Doc 157.

133 President Carter, Secretary Vance recommended the U.S. government continue down this path.133

Amidst the excitement over the trip to Jerusalem, the Palestinian question had fallen to the diplomatic wayside. In follow up discussions about how to address the Palestinian issue under these new circumstances, Sadat told U.S. Ambassador Eilts in Cairo that he sensed “the concept of an independent Palestinian state did not appeal to Begin or Weizmann.” As a compromise, Eilts reported, the Egyptian President was “toying” with the idea of turning the

West Bank over to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) established after the 1956 Suez

Crisis. It could be for a period of five years, and a plebiscite could be arranged “for self- determination.” Alongside the West Bank, Sadat proposed that the Gaza Strip become the “main weight” of a Palestinian state, to which he would even give part of the Sinai, including Egyptian

Fafah and the settlement of .134 Subsequently, Sadat was asked what self-determination would mean in this context, and he said “merely a plebiscite on the question of federation or confederation with Jordan.” Upon further reflection, he said West Bankers “should also be given the option of independence,” but it was not a real option as the PLO was losing ground.135

This stark retreat of the Egyptian leader from a staunch position as defender of a

Palestinian state drew regional ire from other Arab countries. Leaders from the PLO, Libya,

133 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, 24 November 1977, FRUS, Doc 158. Vance conveyed instructions to Eilts in Cairo to sound out Sadat on the relationship between bilaterals and the comprehensive track, concerned that Geneva would be undercut and the Arabs would fully break with Sadat. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 25 November 1977, 1546Z, FRUS, Doc. 159. See also the final NSC report on the Middle East for 1979, which stated “Our long-term objective of an overall peace settlement in the Middle East has remained constant. There have been changes, however, in the means to that end. By the end of the year, it was clear that Geneva was no longer as central to our thinking as it had been several months earlier.” See National Security Council Annual Report, undated, FRUS, Doc 165.

134 See Eilt’s report on Sadat’s visit and discussions, Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 23 November 1977, 1606Z, FRUS, Doc 155; and Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated, FRUS, Doc 164.

135 Telegram from Vance to the White House and the State Department, 11 December 1977, 0101Z, FRUS, Doc 170.

134 Syria, Algeria, and Southern Yemen met in Tripoli on 2 December to take action after Sadat’s visit. Rather than enact economic and diplomatic sanctions, the group formed a “resistance front,” issuing the Tripoli Declaration of 5 December. Egypt, in response, broke diplomatic relations with the four states.136 The major sticking point in this roiling Arab internal debate was Sadat’s seeming willingness to cede the West Bank in favor of a bilateral peace. Such fears were not unwarranted, given the signals that were being conveyed in private diplomatic discussions.

In reports from each Arab capital, U.S. ambassadors spoke of this shift towards bilateralism, with Ambassador Lewis explaining “the key obstacle to moving beyond a bilateral agreement with Egypt is the current Israeli position regarding the West Bank. While many in

Israel would agree to substantial withdrawals from the West Bank in return for peace, Prime

Minister Begin still seems reluctant to consider that possibility seriously.”137 In the opinion of the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Richard Parker, “something well short of the PLO maximum demands could eventually be sold to Palestinians, but he [saw] no signs that the Israelis [were] going to meet even minimalist demands.”138 In fact, Begin was thinking about a plan for the

West Bank, which had started to emerge in Dayan’s meeting with the Americans throughout

1977, and which he brought with him to Morocco in his meeting with Sadat’s confidant, Dr.

Hassan Tuhami. There would not be an Israeli withdrawal, Dayan told Tuhmai, but a new

136 Marvine Howe, “Arab Meeting Fails to Forge Joint Front Against Sadat Moves,” New York Times, 5 December 1977; and Marvine Howe, “Hard-Line Arab Bloc is Formed at Tripoli,” New York Times, 6 December 1977.

137 Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated, FRUS, Doc 164.

138 Ibid. Carter urged Begin to make a public statement showing Israeli willingness to withdrawal in principle from lands occupied in 1967 and to resolve the Palestinian question in a bid to help Sadat with his critics. See Message from the White House to the Embassy in Egypt, 9 December 1977, 1525Z, FRUS, Doc 166.

135 proposal was being prepared in Jerusalem.139 This would publicly emerge as Begin’s “home rule for the Palestinian Arabs” several days later.140

The Emergence of Palestinian Autonomy

Begin first presented his autonomy plan to President Carter in Washington during a visit on 16 December.141 The evening before, Vance and Quandt recommended that Carter not endorse it, but rather tell the Israelis to introduce it during the negotiations as their opening position on the Palestinian issue.142 In explaining his position that the proposal did not decide on sovereignty, Begin prefaced his remarks by reiterating that the autonomy plan he envisioned stipulated that an Administrative Council representing Arab inhabitants “will be able to deal with all the problems of daily life.”143 Israel would have to have the “right to deal with public order.”

He acknowledged the dispute over sovereignty. “We do claim sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We think this is the right of our people but Sadat says that the Arabs also claim

139 See the ISA publication and report [Hebrew] of Dayan’s visit to Morocco on 2 December 1977, http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov_Eng/Publications/ElectronicPirsum/DayanTuhami (accessed 10 March 2015).

140 Begin mentioned it to Vance on 10 December and said he would present it to Carter on his visit shortly after approval from the Defense Committee of his Cabinet. “I hope the President will accept my plan,” he said. “It is not a Palestinian state but it is a dignified solution for the Palestinian Arabs. It is home rule of the inhabitants, by the inhabitants, for the inhabitants.” See Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin, Jerusalem, 10 December 1977, 9:30-11:45PM, FRUS, Doc 168. Vance informed Carter of Begin’s intention, and suggested the President use this as an opportunity to advance the U.S. role in negotiations, without committing to Begin’s plan which Vance suspected “will not be satisfactory as a final solution of the Palestinian problem.”

141 Summary of the President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin of Israel, 16 December 1977, 9-10AM, FRUS, Doc 177. Stuart Eizenstat, who was in the room, noted that “Begin did almost all talking. Had maps. Seemed clearly pleased with his forthcoming position.” Box 4, folder 28, Stuart Eizenstat Papers, LOC. Begin’s plan had been approved by a Ministerial Defense Committee but awaited review by his Cabinet. For the full Israeli minutes of these meetings, see A-4155/6 and MFA-6862/11, ISA.

142 Memo, Dennis Clift to the Vice President, CREST (NLC-133-109-3-25-3), JCL.

143 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 16 December 1977, 9-10AM, FRUS, Doc. 177.

136 sovereignty. So there are two claims and we will leave the issue open. It cannot be solved for now.”144

In Begin’s mind, it was better not to contest sovereignty in negotiations, for neither side would budge. Rather, Israel should offer ideas to make peace a possibility, which in his view, could deal with “human beings.” He saw that Arab populations were living under oppressive conditions and believed Israel was poised to alleviate their condition, a shift that could be achieved with mechanisms of local rule. In terms of citizenship, Begin proposed that inhabitants could have freedom of choice where the situation remained unclear, like Jerusalem. “In Judea and Samaria, the Palestinian Arabs are already Jordanian citizens. This will not be changed.”

Begin, like Dayan, framed his position into terms of security. “If there are Arab guns on the green line, all of our civilians will be in mortal danger.”145

Begin then read out the twenty-one articles of his proposal, reproduced here in full:

______

Proposal146

December 15, 1977

Proposal Subject to the Confirmation of the Government of Israel HOME RULE, FOR PALESTINIAN ARABS, RESIDENTS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT

1. The administration of the Military Government in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be abolished. 2. In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district administrative autonomy of the residents, by and for them, will be established. 3. The residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will elect an Administrative Council composed of eleven members. 4. Any resident, 18 years old and above, without distinction of citizenship, or if stateless, is entitled to vote in the election to the Administrative Council. 5. Any resident whose name is included in the list of the candidates for the Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years old or above, is entitled to be elected to the Council. 6. The Administrative Council will be elected by general, direct, personal, equal and secret ballot.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 Reproduced from Attachment to FRUS, Doc 177.

137 7. The period of office of the Administrative Council will be four years from the day of its election. 8. The Administrative Council will sit in Bethlehem. 9. All the administrative affairs of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, will be under the direction and within the competence of the Administrative Council. 10. The Administrative Council will operate the following Departments: a. The Department of Education; b. The Department of Religious Affairs; c. The Department of Finance; d. The Department of Transportation; e. The Department for Construction and Housing; f. The Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism; g. The Department of Agriculture; h. The Department of Health; i. The Department for Labor and Social Welfare; j. The Department of Rehabilitation of Refugees; k. The Department for the Administration of Justice and the Supervision of the Local Police Forces; and promulgate regulations relating to the operation of these Departments.

11. Security in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities. 12. The Administrative Council will elect its own chairman. 13. The first session of the Administrative Council will be convened 30 days after the publication of the election results. 14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of citizenship, or if stateless, will be granted free choice (option) of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. 15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with the citizenship law of the State. 16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote for, and be elected to, the Knesset in accordance with the election law. 17. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who are citizens of Jordan or who, in accordance with the right of free option will become citizens of Jordan, will elect and be eligible for election to the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in accordance with the election law of that country. 18. Questions “arising from the vote” to the Jordanian Parliament by residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be clarified in negotiations between Israel and Jordan. 19. Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel. 20. Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. 21. These principles may be subject to review after a five-year period. ______

Responding to Begin’s presentation, President Carter invoked UN Security Council

Resolutions 242 and 338, which called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for secure borders and permanent peace. He acknowledged the Israeli view that withdrawal was not a total withdrawal, but notwithstanding this different interpretation, he asked the Israeli leader three questions. The first dealt with Israel’s commitment to withdrawal from the West Bank, even with minor adjustments. The second question dealt with Palestinian Arabs

138 from other countries, and the third question with sovereignty. Begin responded by repeating his concern about security and the incompatibility of the Green Line as a defensible border. In

Begin’s words, “If we withdraw to the 1967 lines, there will be permanent bloodshed…The 1967 line did not constitute a border.” Begin intimated that Israeli state sovereignty would end at the

1967 line, but security would extend to the Jordan River.147

Brzezinski, sensing the political problem that this position caused, then addressed the question of sovereignty. Begin insisted that it was merely a legal issue to be sorted out, and that a local administrative council could manage complex questions like land expropriation and immigration. These issues, as Begin saw them, were also caught up with security. “We could only accept new immigrants up to the point where our own security would not be affected.”

Vance interjected. “So this would be dealt with by the Administrative Council, subject to Israel’s view on possible security problems. The Council would not have total authority.” Begin agreed.

The Israeli Attorney General, Aharon Barak, interceded on the question of sovereignty, arguing that the Military Governor of the West Bank and Gaza would “delegate authority to the

Council in order for it to act,” rather than the Israeli state to avoid implications that Israel claimed sovereignty. Vance followed up, asking if the Military Governor reserved the right to revoke these powers. Barak said “in principle, yes.” Brzezinski responded then this would mean

Israeli sovereignty (“at least, de facto,” Vance added). Barak responded, saying that the Military

Governor was “not the sovereign authority,” a position the U.S. delegation had to think about.

The Attorney General’s argument rested on the notion that the territories were not occupied in the first place, undermining any claim they were under military rule. It was a tautological position, but a compelling one, and has enabled Israel to claim both control and non-annexation ever since.

147 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 16 December 1977, 9-10AM, FRUS, Doc. 177.

139 Begin planned to present his plan in full to President Sadat during his impending trip to

Sadat’s private residence in Ismailia. He added that autonomy’s success depended on collective

Egyptian, American, and British concession that there would be no Palestinian state. Before adjourning for the Sabbath, Begin provided hard copies of his plan to Brzezinski, Carter, and

Vance.148 Brzezinski asked Begin why Bethlehem and not would be the seat of the Legislative Council. Begin’s response revealed the ideological certitude that animated his plans and the contradiction of claiming to resolve the Palestinian question along more equitable lines.

It cannot be East Jerusalem, because Jerusalem is of Israel. And it cannot be Nablus either. Bethlehem is the best. There cannot be two capitals in Jerusalem. They should have their own proper capital. Bethlehem is the center of communications.149

Begin’s approach to Jerusalem, like his view on settlements and Jewish claims to sovereignty, remained consistent. It explains why the U.S. government found him to be a frustrating negotiator, as he rarely retreated from these views in his baseline assertions.150

Begin’s definitive attitude concerned Carter, who wanted to protect Sadat diplomatically.

If the autonomy plan were misread in the public sphere, Carter felt, it would undermine all of

Sadat’s good will. He told Begin after the Sabbath that the plan could appear positive but also it could very well appear empty, given Begin’s comments about the military governor and restoring Israeli control at will. “We believe that how these proposals are cast, and how your well-constructed ideas are interpreted, will be crucial.”151 The explanation that sovereignty would be limited to the 1967 borders, for example, seemed promising to Carter. It could be

148 This version is included above.

149 FRUS, Doc 177.

150 For a critical U.S. analysis of Begin’s autonomy plan, viewing it far less favorably in a report for Brzezinski, see Saunders cable, “Begin West Bank/Gaza Proposal,” 21 December 1977, CREST (NLC-16-110-3-26-1), JCL.

151 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 December 1977, 7:05-8:35 PM, FRUS, Doc 178.

140 subject to negotiations between Jordan, Egypt, and Palestinian Arabs “on a time scale commensurate with your development of a sense of security and trust in the Arabs.” Carter was

“gratified” by Begin’s apparent “flexibility” on this matter. But the President remained concerned that the interpretation of Begin’s plan could be negative and jeopardize Sadat’s reputation. In Carter’s view, if Begin and Sadat could agree, King Hussein would join the discussions, but Assad only much later. As for the PLO, Carter remarked that they had been

“absolutely negative, and I see no role for them to play in the present peace negotiations.”

As Begin delved further into the legal questions, the West Bank emerged a world apart from the flexibility he eventually showed on returning the Sinai. He would not agree to foreign forces, like the UN, guaranteeing protection in the territories. He invoked the German Jews of the Middle Ages, Schutzjuden, who paid for external protection.

We do not want to be protected Jews. We are disciples of Jabotinsky. We don’t want to be a Schutzjuden-Staat. We want to sustain our independence and to end the . People used to pity Jews. We want to live as a normal nation...A Jewish state should be an independent state. No one else should protect us.152

In linking his foreign policy to lachrymose readings of Jewish history, Begin codified Israeli national priorities in existentially woeful terms.

Such an approach was in line with Israel’s understanding of the immigration question as well. For the Israeli leadership, the return of refugees into the territories was another site of contestation. In the view of Attorney General Barak, when it came to the sovereignty point of view, “Israelis have the right to go to the territories. It is inconceivable that we can give the same right to the others.” The Americans saw this as another area of discord, and suggested a broader negotiation over the fate of the refugees, one that would involve both nations and deal with Arab

152 Ibid.

141 and Jewish refugees.153 If the refugee issue was not addressed, Vance concluded, “it will remain a festering problem, and will provide a breeding place for the PLO.”

As for the question of settlements, Begin did not see them having a special status, as

Arabs lived in Israel and Jews lived in the territories. “There is no problem. Of course, there are settlements, but we have a principle of symmetric justice. The residents of Israel can buy land in

Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and Arabs can get land in Israel. There will be reciprocity. They can come to Tel Aviv and buy land and build homes.” These logics of exchange, functioning on a basis that accepted the population transfers of 1948 and 1967 and equated them with Jewish settlement in the territories, cohered in Begin’s mind as a just solution to the political reality that had taken root in the West Bank and Gaza. They also spoke to his more liberal inclination in viewing Arabs as a minority in the European sense, not as a self-determining entity. Here Begin was truly devoted to his intellectual mentor, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, propagating a distinctly non- national view of the Arabs under Israeli rule.

Begin was buoyant about the reception of his autonomy plan in the U.S. On a visit to the

United Kingdom that included a stop at the Chequers Estate on his way back to Israel, Begin met with British Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary David Owen. He boasted to them that his plan for the West Bank had met with “wholehearted, even enthusiastic acceptance.”

Although Carter had initially been hesitant, after a tête-à-tête, Begin reported, he “accepted the plan for Judea and Samaria without qualification, except for a few problems with its judicial aspects.” Several senators and congressman, ex-President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and leading members of the Jewish community all supported the Israeli plan, Begin asserted.154 After he had

153 Ibid. This had been Dayan’s suggestion to Carter in New York.

154 Record of a discussion between Callaghan and Begin, Chequers, 20 December 1977, PREM 16/1729, UKNA. In a subsequent report to the Americans, Callaghan told Carter of Begin’s exuberance, stressing that he shared Carter’s

142 reiterated the main points of the proposal, Callaghan told Begin that his approach was

“remarkable and imaginative.” While disagreeing with Begin’s positions on security, and explaining that Sadat could not accept it straightaway, the British Prime Minister and his advisors saw it as a good starting point to the negotiations over the Palestinian question.

Begin in Egypt

During a Christmas day visit to Sadat’s Presidential residence on the banks of the Suez

Canal in Ismailia, the Israeli Prime Minister finally presented his autonomy plan to the Egyptians.

It was Begin’s first trip to Egypt, and Sadat’s warm welcome underscored its historic nature.

“This is perhaps the first time we sit together since Moses crossed the waters not very far from here…Let us here teach the world a new way of facing problems between two nations let us tell them that sincerity, honesty, goodwill and, above all, love can solve any problem.”155 Begin, likewise aware of the sense of occasion and the significance of the visit, also added a note of humor. “When Moses took us out of Egypt, it took him 40 years to cross the Sinai desert. We did it in 40 minutes.” After laying out the Israeli proposal on withdrawal from the Sinai, Begin turned to his proposal for “self-rule for the Palestinian Arabs.” He opened with the issue of sovereignty, which he acknowledged neither Israel nor other parties were willing to cede. Rather, by dealing with human beings and leaving the question of sovereignty open, Begin described the view, hoping the proposal would lead to a comprehensive approach. “I was more favourably inclined than I was when I sent you my original reactions,” Callaghan wrote. Begin, however, would have to go farther, “but that is what the negotiations will be for.” See Cable, Jim Callaghan to Jimmy Carter, 21 December 1977, PREM 16/1729. Begin had made an official state visit to the UK in early December, which rehabilitated his image in Great Britain, affirming Begin’s “strong desire to be recognized in Britain, not as a terrorist leader, but as the democratically- elected Prime Minister of a friendly country.” On a visit as a guest of Herut in 1972, se was “cold-shouldered by Anglo-Jewry and harshly treated by the press.” See Mason to David Owen, “Mr. Begin’s Visit to London 2-7 December 1977, PREM 16/1729, UKNA. For full details of Begin’s earlier UK visit, see PREM 16/1352 and 1353, UKNA.

155 Top Secret Meeting between Begin and Sadat at the President’s Residence, Ismailia, 25 December 1977, 12 noon, MFA-6864-2, ISA.

143 essence of his idea. “We give the Palestinian Arabs self-rule and the security.”

He read out the details of his proposal, which Sadat said he would take into consideration, pleased to have moved from procedural concerns to substantive negotiations.

Later that evening, having reviewed the Israeli proposals, Sadat returned to the second meeting with the Israelis and was more critical. On the question of the Sinai, Sadat opposed any restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty. “If I tell my people that my friend Begin said there will be settlements in Sinai and some defense force to defend them, they will throw stones at me.”156 As for the Palestinian question, Sadat continued, it was “a step, a real step…But it is not sufficient as yet.” He went on to describe the aspirations of Palestinian moderates for independence, and the tight spot Egypt found itself as their defender in the Arab world given all the opposition to his trip to Jerusalem. The two leaders agreed this difference was a “problem.” In revising the joint statement to the public about their meeting, Begin raised the issue of invoking 242 and withdrawal from the territories, which he could not sign onto given his divergent interpretation of the resolution.157 He also objected to the word “self-determination,” if it signified a state.

“This is the mortal danger of which I speak. We can use the word ‘self-rule.’”

Begin expressed his fears about security and the growing influence of the PLO on the borders, framing his explanation in Cold War terms and appealing to Sadat’s hostile view of the

Soviet Union. “Some of the PLO men are Soviet agents,” Begin remarked. “All of them,” Sadat replied. “But still I must lead the Arab world. It is the leadership of Egypt historically that has always prevailed. It is in your interest as well as ours.” In concluding their talks, Begin and Sadat returned to the concept of self-rule, reiterating his opposition “to a Palestinian state of Arafat and

156 Second session, 25 December 1977, 7PM, MFA-6864-2, ISA.

157 Begin cited the opinion of former British Prime Minister Howard Wilson and Arthur Goldberg, the American architect of the resolution, to support his claim that it did not necessitate a full withdrawal.

144 Kaddumi.” Sadat agreed, “As you know I have always been in favor of a link with Jordan- a federal or a confederal- would be decided before Geneva.”158 Begin therefore insisted the final declaration say self-rule from the Israeli point of view. “We will not wound them by saying anything else. Self-determination means a state and that we cannot accept.” Sadat again agreed,

“but tomorrow I will be accused of having sold the Palestinian Arabs to Mr. Begin.” Begin assured him it would not happen. “We must have the courage of decision.” Dayan added that neither side wanted a Palestinian state, nor were there existing leaders in the territories that could make one.

If either side committed in public to statehood, Dayan emphasized, Arafat would seek to come back to the territories, and the refugees would be transferred to Jericho, “a first stage for an attack on Israel.” Sadat concurred:

I quite agree with you about the question of security and that the extremists should not be permitted, since they will cause trouble for all of us, especially after the Tripoli Conference. There is Arafat and that fanatic [George] Habbash [sic]. He has declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. The difficulty is for me that I have to solve the Palestinian problem by self-determination. I fully agree with your problem about your security but…159

The Israelis pressed Sadat to negotiate the Palestinian problem independently with the Jordanians and the “Palestinian Arabs” in a manner that avoided self-determination. “We always speak with candor,” Begin remarked. “All of us understand that self-determination means a state. Therefore, we shall suggest self-rule or home-rule or autonomy…for the purpose of the declaration, let us speak in general terms about a just settlement of the Palestinian Arab problem. We may disagree as to what a just settlement is, but for now, let us agree on a just settlement.” Dayan explained

158 Begin would later tell Ambassador Lewis he was “surprised and struck” by Sadat’s agreement to his position that a Palestinian state was a threat. See Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, 1454Z, 27 December 1977, FRUS, Doc 180.

159 Ibid.

145 that Sadat could tell the Palestinian Arabs that Egypt would fight for self-determination as a face saving mechanism.

In the transcript of the meeting, a note explains that then twenty-minute private conversations ensued on each side, with Sadat inviting Begin to a side room to continue to discuss this matter. Begin told the Israeli delegation that Sadat is “apparently ready to agree to the wording ‘a just solution to the Palestinian Arab problem.’ And each side will then interpret the phrase as it sees fit.” Sadat soon emerged and told Begin that his advisors objected to such a formula, and they adjourned to meet the following morning, when the two delegations continued to debate the question of self-determination. The decision was ultimately made to announce two different views of the Palestinian problem at Begin and Sadat’s closing press conference. This would be in lieu of a written statement. There would be ministerial meetings in Cairo and

Jerusalem to prepare for Geneva, dealing with security and political issues respectively, and also the Palestinian issue.

The position of Egypt is that in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip a Palestinian state should be established. The position of Israel is that Palestinian Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza should enjoy “self-rule.” We have agreed that because we have differed on this issue it should be discussed in the political committee of the Cairo Preparatory Conference.160

In settling the Palestinian question via committee, along with preparing the bilateral Egyptian-

Israeli negotiations at a subsequent conference in Cairo, the two parties had effectively neutralized the question of Palestinian self-determination.

160 Press conference attended by President Sadat and Premier Begin, 26 December 1977, MFA-6864/2, ISA.

146 Having presented versions of the autonomy plan to the Americans, the British, and the

Egyptians, Begin announced it to the entire Israeli Knesset on 28 December 1977.161 Begin’s final version, like the earlier iteration above, was non-territorial, stressing autonomy through the election of administrative councils by Arab inhabitants of the territories. These councils’ purview were areas like education, housing, transport, agriculture and health. But in distinguishing between local administrative operations and sovereign control, security and public order would remain entrusted to Israeli authorities.162 Residents of these areas, regardless of existing affiliations, would be eligible for Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Israeli residents maintained the right to purchase land and settle the area, while the state of Israel reserved the right to exercise sovereignty in the territories.163 Begin was steadfast in his belief that such a version of autonomy would provide a solution in its own right, unlike American and Egyptian conceptions which imagined autonomy as a means to some greater form of Palestinian self-determination.164

In his Knesset speech announcing the plan, Begin implored “We have a right and a demand for sovereignty over these areas of Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel]. This is our land

161 Reprinted in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 218–220. For the internal Israeli versions that were discussed and approved by the Cabinet, see the multiple Hebrew and English iterations located in A-4313/6, ISA. The Hebrew version, as delivered, is “Tochnit ha’Shalom shel Yisrael” [Israel’s Peace Plan], PM136, MBC.

162 Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 219.

163 A copy of the original document on which Begin sketched his autonomy plan was donated by the deputy of his General Directorate to the archives at the Menachem Begin Heritage Center in Jerusalem. It shows a direct link between Begin’s original ideas in 1977 and the accepted starting point of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that began two years later. See “Proposals for the introduction of full autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, and for the preservation of the rights of the Jewish People and Israel’s security in these areas of Eretz Israel (Palestine).” Handwritten copy [Hebrew and English], Nadav Aner Donation, MBC.

164 Begin defended his views in a May 1977 Time interview: "We are ready to give the people of Samaria and Judea free option of citizenship. If they want Israeli citizenship, they will get it. If they prefer to keep their previous citizenship, they may. We are not going to force ours on them. They can have complete cultural autonomy and social and economic advancement, living in their homes. This is their homeland – living together with us. What is wrong with a Jewish majority living together with an Arab minority in peace, in human dignity, in equality of rights? I believe that we can live together. It is not an occupied country as people understand that horrible term. We let them live in their homeland." Quoted in Rubinovitz and Steinberg, “Menachem Begin’s Autonomy Plan,” 8–9.

147 and it belongs to the Jewish nation rightfully.” The Prime Minister opposed any engagement with the PLO, emphasizing that “We do not even dream of the possibility—if we are given the chalice to withdraw our military forces from Judea, Samaria and Gaza—of abandoning those areas to the control of the murderous organization that is called the PLO…This is history's meanest murder organization, except for the armed Nazi organizations.”165

As Begin’s autonomy plan emphasized, foreign and military policy would remain under

Israeli control, ensuring that any rights granted to the Arab inhabitants of the territories would be of an extremely limited nature. The “unilateral declarations” appended at the bottom of his draft plan made these limitations—which had surfaced already in meetings with the Americans—very clear.

A) Under no circumstances will Israel permit the establishment in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District a ‘Palestinian State.’ Such a state would be a mortal danger to the civilian population of Israel and a grave peril to the free world.

B) After the end of the transitional period of five years Israel will claim its inalienable rights to sovereignty in the areas of Eretz Israel: Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.166

Alongside his revisionist ideology and belief in a “Greater Land of Israel,” Begin’s visceral opposition to the PLO, which was a recurring theme in all his public and private discussions, shaped his strong rejection of a Palestinian state. He repeatedly shared with visiting diplomats the details of attacks by the organization on Israeli civilians.167 For Begin, autonomy was a

165 Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 219.

166 Cable, top secret, 3 May 1979, “Proposals for the Introduction of Full Autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs, Inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District and for the Preservation of the Rights of the Jewish people and Israel’s Security in these Areas of Eretz Israel (Palestine).” MFA-6915/11, ISA.

167 During one visit with U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis, in May 1979, Begin revisited in detail a recent attack in . See “Top secret meeting between Prime Minister Begin and Ambassador Lewis, Prime Minster’s Office, Knesset, May 7, 1979, 7:30 PM.” MFA-6915/11, ISA.

148 benevolent means to curtail Palestinian self-determination and deal with the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza in non-national terms. 168

From to Aswan

U.S. negotiators, in mediating between Sadat and Begin, unwittingly helped advance the autonomy plans that Begin had articulated. Carter spent New Year’s Day 1978 in Iran, where he was visiting the Shah as part of a nine day tour of six nations. At the Pahlavi dynasty’s Sa’dabad

Palace in Tehran, he met with King Hussein of Jordan, who was also visiting the Iranian capital.169 They opened the discussion with the question of the West Bank, and Hussein agreed to accept “a disarmed and demilitarized West Bank or Palestinian entity with a United Nations presence…as part of an overall settlement.” Carter presented the U.S. position, which preferred

“self-determination which does not involve a completely independent state.” Hussein said based on the territorial withdrawal and a resolution to the Palestinian problem, he could agree to participate in negotiations, but he also stressed his increasingly isolated position in the Arab world. “As soon as you raise the West Bank,” Hussein’s Minister Sharaf added, “the entire

Palestinian question becomes an issue…Jordan cannot absorb all the Palestinian problems. Their opponents would say that Jordan is talking for other Arabs without permission.” The negotiations in 1978 underscored how the Palestinians themselves had been stripped of real agency to represent their own positions, subsumed by both Egyptian and Jordanian concerns.

168 In recent years, several Israeli politicians have taken to lamenting the missed opportunity of Begin’s autonomy plan, which they believe would have maintained Israel’s Jewish character and circumvented international pressure to withdraw from the occupied territories. See Shenhav, Beyond the Two-State Solution.

169 President’s Meeting with King Hussein, 1 January 1978, 8:20-8:50AM, FRUS, Doc 182.

149 The growing disconnect between Begin’s view of autonomy and the limits of Egyptian and Jordanian legitimacy in representing the Palestinians was laid bare in Carter’s subsequent meeting with King Khalid of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. Carter shared with Khalid his discussion with Hussein and the overall progress in the Egyptian-Israeli discussions.170 Khalid was more receptive to the idea of a Palestinian state, even one with international guarantees like , and Carter stressed that the views he outlined about a Palestinian homeland related to Jordan was just a starting point. If the parties involved negotiated something closer to the Saudi view, the

U.S. would not object. For now, Carter stressed, Hussein was tied down by the Rabat Summit decision asserting the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Carter believed the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza might accept such a plan as well, but that “he could not speak for the Palestinians.”171

On his way home to the U.S., Carter stopped in the Egyptian city of Aswan, where he firmly asserted the Palestinian right to participate in determining their own future. The President met with Sadat to show his support ahead of the Cairo Conference and to discuss the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians. In his remarks to the press after the meeting in Aswan,

Carter addressed the Palestinian question directly. “There must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.”172

Relaying the rationale of his remarks to Vice President Mondale, who was meeting with Begin in

Jerusalem at the time, Vance explained the logic guiding Carter’s remarks. They were meant “to

170 Memorandum of Conversation, 3 January 1978, 5:35-6:33PM, FRUS, Doc 183.

171 Ibid.

172 See FRUS, Doc 187, note 5. Jimmy Carter, “Statement on Recognition of Palestinians, Aswan, Egypt,” 4 January 1978, full text in Lukacs, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 71.

150 strengthen Sadat’s hand against his Arab critics,” in a manner that both reflected the U.S. position and some evolution in American thinking “without prejudging the self-determination question in any significant way.” “It is not a viable position,” Vance wrote to Mondale, “to insist that the Palestinians should have no say whatsoever in their future status, given the general acceptance in world opinion of the concept of self-determination.”173 While acknowledging the necessity of engagement with the Palestinians, the Carter administration would still not speak with the PLO, who officially represented the entirety of the Palestinian national movement.

PLO leader Yasser Arafat, who had made efforts via third parties like Landrum Bolling throughout 1977 to open a dialogue with the Carter administration, attempted once more to impress upon Carter his commitment to engagement with the Americans. At a meeting with congressional members of the House International Relations Committee in Damascus, including

Congressman Paul Findley, Arafat and his PLO aides provided a message to Carter stressing his desire to maintain a moderate line, defending Carter’s policies against hardliners. Although there was no mention of the PLO at Aswan, Arafat professed a “glimmer of hope” in the statement.174

Arafat emphasized his own moderation, his support for Carter after the homeland remark in

Clinton, and wider attempts at moderation which had even led to the assassination of PLO envoy

Said Hammami in London.

The PLO Chairman stressed the Palestine National Council’s decision to participate in all diplomatic activities leading to a just peace and solution in the area, including the Geneva

Conference. “This moderate approach to the problem was pursued, not only at the level of the

Palestinian leadership, but also among the rank-and-file of the Palestinians. Had we not seen a

173 Telegram from Vance to the Embassy in Israel, 5 January 1978, 0006Z, FRUS, Doc 185.

174 Telegram from the Embassy in Syria to Embassy in Belgium, “Congressmen meet Arafat and Receive Message for Carter,” 6 January 1978, 1415Z, FRUS, Doc 187.

151 fighting and trustworthy leadership we would not have been able to maintain our moderate stance.”175 Arafat hoped that Carter “will not further push me into a corner because I would like to maintain my moderate balance. Otherwise, I have nothing to lose but my Kufiyah (Arab headdress).” It was a “self-serving” message, Brzezinski told Carter, “but may also contain a grain of truth.” In either event, the NSC Advisor noted, “our current posture of ignoring the PLO while concentrating on the Palestinian issue and encouraging moderate Palestinian voices to make themselves heard is the appropriate position for now.” This avoidance existed alongside tacit engagement with Palestinian leadership in Lebanon, which would only increase during the fighting of the Lebanese civil war. While deferring dialogue with the PLO for another decade, the Israeli and Egyptian pursuit of bilateral peace would continue without accounting for

Palestinian concerns, as the physical “homeland” of the Palestinians was transformed by

Sharon’s vision of settlement in the hilltops of Judea and Samaria.

By early January 1978, Israeli settlement expansion had fueled growing tensions, which the U.S. government had quietly tried to manage in 1977.176 In an unprecedented legal shift,

Begin argued that UN Resolution 242 did not apply to the West Bank. Sharon, in his powerful position as Minister of Agriculture, increased settlement expansion on the eve of Begin’s trip to the U.S. in March, igniting fierce domestic opposition in Israel. Defense Minister Ezer

Weizmann, visiting Washington ahead of Begin, telephoned the Prime Minster and threatened to resign. “If you do not stop those settlements,” Weizmann shouted, “I will personally come back

175 “Message from Yasir Arafat,” Brzezinski to the President, 10 January 1978, NSA Brzezinski material, Collection 7, Box 49, JCL.

176 See the NSC assessment on the Middle East at the end of 1977, “There is no doubt that American influence was instrumental in limiting and containing the scope of Prime Minister Begin’s settlement policy, and thereby defusing its disruptive effects on the peace process.” National Security Council Annual Report, undated, FRUS, Doc 165.

152 and do so.”177 Laurence Tisch, an American Jewish leader, criticized Likud policy publicly. “If

Begin insists on pressing the settlements issue, he will lose every last American. There is no justification for this position and Carter would not have dared propose the arms deal to Congress without the backdrop of settlements.”178

On 22 March, a heated meeting between Begin and Carter underscored the growing policy differences between the two leaders.179 The Israeli Prime Minister’s dismissive attitude towards UN resolution 242 had angered the Americans, and “Carter was clearly in a fighting mood.”180 The President delivered scathing remarks to Begin, telling him that he was “not willing to stop expansion or the creation of new settlements.” “You will not accept U.N. protection for the Sinai settlements,” Carter continued, “You will not politically withdraw from the West Bank; you are not willing to accept U.N. 242 on all its fronts.”181 In private meetings, pro-Israeli senators like and Clifford Case wholeheartedly agreed with the President that Begin should be taken to task for his irresponsible policies in the occupied territories.182

Congress had already been debating the settlements during hearings convened by the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on International Relations since the ascension of the Likud Party to power in 1977.183

177 Raymond Carrol, “Begin Under Fire,” Newsweek, 20 March 1978, 25.

178 See Arthur Samuelson, “The Dilemma of American Jewry,” The Nation, 1 April 1978, 361.

179 Terence Smith, “Talks Called Grim,” New York Times, 23 March 1978; “The Middle East Impasse,” New York Times, 24 March 1978. For the transcript see FRUS, Doc 232.

180 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 246.

181 Ibid.

182 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 247.

183 See U.S. Congress, House, Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations & on Europe and the Middle East, 95th Cong. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 12 & 21 September, 19 October 1977; and U.S. Congress, Senate, The Colonization of the West Bank

153 In spite of these troubling developments, Carter continued to believe that a regional peace deal was possible, and saw the U.S. as the ideal broker between the parties. In his diary at the time, the President noted that Sadat and Begin could not resolve basic problems like “the

Palestinian issue, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory, Israeli security, or the definition of a real peace,” without American assistance.184 “The process was breaking down again,” Carter wrote, “it remained necessary for the United States to continue playing a leading role in resolving the basic Middle East questions.”185

Negotiating Camp David

Sadat’s unflappable desire to secure U.S. backing led him to rethink his firm position on

Palestinian statehood first laid out during his Knesset speech in Jerusalem. In a 22 May memo to

President Carter, NSC deputy David Aaron highlighted this shift. “The central idea that he is now working with involves a virtual abandonment on his part of the concept of Palestinian self- determination or Palestinian statehood in return for an explicit Israel commitment to withdraw from the West Bank/Gaza.”186 Sadat’s flexibility impressed the Americans, who understood that the Egyptian premier would moderate his demands in order to achieve a viable settlement with

Israel. Carter’s legal counsel had already questioned the insistence of Sadat and fellow Arab leaders on Palestinian statehood. “They all fully recognize that it’s in their worst interest to see

Territories by Israel: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration & Naturalization, 95th Cong. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 17 & 18 October 1977.

184 Carter, Keeping Faith, 306.

185 Ibid. The suggestion that the U.S. more actively engage in brokering a settlement had been suggested earlier, most notably in a piece exploring the plausibility of American sanctions against Israel. Steven J. Rosen and Mara Moustafine, “Does Washington Have the Means to Impose a Settlement on Israel?” Commentary 64:4 (October 1977): 25-32. For a critique of the U.S. as an “honest broker” see Rashid Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit.

186 Memo, David Aaron to Jimmy Carter, 22 May 1978, DDRS.

154 that happen. I think their public posture is in their judgment required for the time being because of their own inter-Arab relationships.”187 In his own private assessment, Carter’s counsel argued that “the best outcome of all that is to end up in a federation of some type with Jordan.” Sadat’s political rhetoric demanding Palestinian statehood often masked naked self-interest, and the

Egyptian president frequently sidelined substantive discussions over Palestinian self- determination in order to hammer out a bilateral peace agreement.188

Throughout the summer of 1978, Washington tried to chip away at the entrenched Israeli position and restart formal talks with Egypt, which had broken off after bilateral meetings in

January. Vice President Mondale traveled to Israel in honor of the country’s thirtieth anniversary, reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement.189 Sadat also pressed Carter to facilitate a direct confrontation with Begin. After extensive internal discussion within the administration,

Carter agreed that his time was running out. In July, he discussed the possibility of convening a summit at the Presidential retreat in Camp David. He would push for a lasting peace deal as a broker between Sadat and Begin. Initially skeptical, the President’s foreign policy advisors ultimately came on board and Vance flew to the Middle East to privately invite both leaders to the U.S.190

Sadat and Begin readily accepted Carter’s invitation, hoping to cobble together a mutually beneficial agreement for Egypt and Israel. Preparations were made for a September summit, which would largely come to define the Carter Presidency. Immediately after the summit was announced, White House advisors began to reconfigure their comprehensive peace

187 “Reminiscences of Robert Lipshutz,” 15 February 1978 (CCOH), 25-26.

188 This would be the source of his tension with domestic advisors.

189 Terence Smith, “Mondale Visits Wailing Wall at Start of Mideast Tour,” New York Times, 1 July 1978.

190 For the texts of the letters, and the reports of Vance’s visit to Israel and Egypt, see FRUS, Docs 283- 289.

155 plan in order to focus on specific aspects of an agreement between Egypt and Israel, but also saw the opportunity to tackle interrelated issues like the fate of the West Bank and Gaza, the status of the settlements, UN resolution 242, and the fate of the Palestinians. Although the “odor of

Israeli-Egyptian bilaterals” was very much present, Washington had not fully abandoned the rhetorical commitment to securing a wider settlement.

In his formulation of a negotiating strategy for Camp David, Brzezinski told Carter that he would "have to persuade Begin to make some substantive concessions, while convincing

Sadat to settle for less than an explicit Israeli commitment to full withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination.”191 Beyond an agreement between Israel and Egypt, Brzezinski stressed

“general self-government for the Palestinians.”192 These preparatory memos clearly established the necessity of Israeli territorial withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a genuine settlement moratorium, and an adjudication of the Palestinian question, but offered less than the comprehensive elements of the February 1977 position. Brzezinski also urged Carter to get both leaders to accept the “Aswan language on Palestinian rights,” a reference to Carter’s statement in

Egypt that January. By combining the Aswan remarks with the new set of requirements for the

Camp David Summit, Brzezinski tried to solidify a new U.S. approach to resolving the conflict.

In briefly revisiting the Camp David summit in the remainder of this chapter, I am not attempting to rewrite the entire history of the thirteen-day gathering. There are several excellent accounts, from participants and journalists alike, and there are grounds for a more detailed historical narrative now that much of the primary source material is available.193 The central

191 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, 1 Sep. 1978, DDRS.

192 Ibid.

193 For the definitive study of Camp David from a U.S. perspective, see the work of William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. A remarkably compelling new narrative is Lawrence Wright, Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin and Sadat at Camp David (New York: Knopf, 2014). The latest volume of FRUS,

156 point to be made is that a tendency to only focus on the summit obscures what came before

September 1978 and the subsequent impact of the Camp David summit. It might therefore useful to contrast Brzezinski’s initial bold framing of the summit goals with the actual document signed at the summit’s conclusion. The Framework included specific language to “recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements,” the precise phrase that had raised such fury in the joint U.S.-Soviet Communiqué of 1977.194 Yet it explicitly did not include a reference to self-determination, the result of the diplomatic effort Begin and his advisors had made to secure its exclusion.

Along the lines outlined in his 1977 autonomy plan, Begin’s approach in the Camp David

Accords of 1978 was to reach the first ever peace deal with an Arab country while sidelining the comprehensive elements of a resolution to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.195 While Sadat spoke openly of a resolution of the Palestinian question in the West Bank, Begin and his advisors pushed to dislodge the autonomy issue from the final agreement. In this manner, the pursuit of a peace deal with Egypt became a means to avoid peace with the Palestinians. The autonomy provisions that eventually emerged from Camp David were viewed as a necessary concession to safeguard the success of the bilateral Israeli-Egyptian accords and preserve Israel’s hold on the

Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Ed. Alexander R. Wieland; gen. ed. Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014) covers Camp David, but was released in December 2014, leaving little time to fully examine all the documents for this dissertation. For another study based on primary sources, see the insightful work of Daniel Strieff, “The President and the Peacemaker: Jimmy Carter and the Domestic Politics of Arab-Israeli Diplomacy, 1977-1980,” (Ph.D. diss.: London School of Economics, 2013). Earlier studies include Eitan Haber, Zeev Schiff and , The Year of the Dove (New York: Bantam, 1979); Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Howard M. Sachar, Egypt and Israel (New York: Richard Marek, 1981); and Melvin A. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).

194 See “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” Sept. 17, 1978, in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader.

195 See Bernard Avishai, “Begin vs. Begin.” The New York Review of Books, 31 March 1979.

157 territories. Critics of the Camp David process gradually recognized this outcome, speaking out forcefully against Sadat’s “perfidy” towards the Palestinians.196

The end result of the Egyptian-Israeli-American negotiations in September 1978 was two

Camp David agreements: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the

Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. The latter led to the Israeli-Egyptian agreement signed in March 1979, while the former contained a framework for negotiations to establish an autonomous Self-Governing Authority (SGA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As it stated, “Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.” 197 The

Framework included specific language to “recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.”198 Exactly what this meant in political or territorial terms was left intentionally vague, forcing the parties to decide on a process guaranteeing full autonomy to Palestinians within a period of five years.199

196 Among the most piercing critiques of Camp David’s effect on the Palestinians was Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (London: Vintage, 1992), 182–238. Said argued that Sadat abandoned pan-Arab and Palestinian interests by making peace with Israel. Said believed that the treaty undercut the prospect of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and viewed the resulting autonomy proposal as a cover for Israeli domination over Palestinians in the promise of “continued national non-independence.” See also Zahid Mahmood, “Sadat and Camp David Reappraised,” Journal of Palestine Studies 15.1 (1985): 62-87; Fayez A. Sayegh, “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem,” Journal of Palestine Studies 8.2 (Winter 1979): 3-40; and Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestine Liberation Organization,” in William B. Quandt, The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1988), 261–278. Khalidi argued that at the time, the PLO deemed the Accords “an unmitigated disaster for the Palestinian cause.” A more generous reading of the Camp David framework, that it both provided a justification for a Palestinian state and the mechanism for achieving it, is Robert W. Tucker, “Behind Camp David.” Commentary 66:5 (Nov. 1978): 25-33.

197 “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” 17 September 1978, in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 223.

198 Ibid., 225.

199 As William Quandt explains, the key was to “refashion Begin’s autonomy plan into a proposal for an interim regime for the West Bank and Gaza that would offer the Palestinians a serious measure of self-government. The proposal would include a clear commitment to a second phase of negotiations toward the end of the transitional period to resolve the questions of borders, sovereignty and Palestinian rights in accordance with UN resolution

158 In brief remarks prior to the official signing, Carter reiterated the importance of an agreement on some form of Palestinian self-determination, reminding his audience “of the hopes and dreams of the people who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”200 During his address before a special joint session of the U.S. Congress, Carter expanded on the “painful human question of the fate of the Palestinians,” suggesting another way forward:

The Camp David agreement guarantees that the Palestinian people may participate in the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects…Israel has agreed, has committed themselves, that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people will be recognized. After the signing of this framework last night, and during the negotiations concerning the establishment of the Palestinian self-government, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area.201

Contrary to Carter’s assertion, settlements would burgeon soon after. Prime Minister Begin, insisting he only agreed to a three-month freeze, never actually conceded the Israeli “right” to build in the West Bank.

Several days after the signing of the Camp David Accords, the Israeli Prime Minister proclaimed on American television that Israel would remain in the West Bank indefinitely and continue its settlement program. This declaration flew in the face of the proposed five-year transition period and full settlement moratorium that had been agreed upon during the Summit.

Carter largely bowed out of a confrontation with the Prime Minister over this matter, declaring it

“just an honest difference of opinion.”202 Two weeks later, the President was asked about the inflexibility of the Israelis, and he reaffirmed that the settlements were indeed ‘illegal’ and ‘an

242—territory for peace—and Carter’s promise at Aswan that Palestinians should have the right to participate in determining their own future.” Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 212.

200 PPPJC, 17 September 1978.

201 PPPJC, 18 September 1978.

202 PPPJC, 28 September 1978.

159 obstacle to peace.’203 At the time, Carter saw the settlement setback as a secondary problem in light of what had been achieved. He did not believe that “this one issue, if unresolved expeditiously, would prevent the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.”204 In retrospect, while

Carter may have been right about the immediate impact of settlements on a bilateral deal, his reluctance to push Prime Minster Begin would enable years of unchecked Israeli expansion in the occupied territories.

In many accounts, Camp David represented the first moment since the establishment of

Israel that Palestinians were promised some form of self-government. This was viewed as a great advancement for the perennially stateless people.205 But while this semantic recognition of

Palestinian “rights” seemed a mark of progress, it did not in any practical way satisfy Palestinian aspirations for independence. The PLO Executive Committee announced its “total rejection” of the accords on 18 September 1978, and on 1 October, leaders from the territories declared autonomy was an “open plot” against Palestinian rights, especially self-determination.206 PLO

Chairman Yasser Arafat warned that any supporters of Sadat would “pay a high price,” later describing the autonomy idea as “no more than managing the sewers.”207

203 This point of contention has been a matter of some bitterness between Carter and Begin’s supporters. Carter asserted that his hand-written notes and those of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance prove Begin’s deception, a claim that Israeli witnesses vehemently deny. The best explanation of what transpired can be found in Quandt, Peace Process, 200–203. Elsewhere, Quandt notes, “Israel made no commitment to the eventual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza; nothing was said about Jerusalem; and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were nowhere mentioned, though the Americans were telling everyone that Begin had in fact agreed to a freeze for the duration of the negotiations on autonomy.” Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 225. See also the oral history of Ambassador Samuel Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (LOC).

204 PPPJC, 10 October 1978.

205 They had been promised it before in the 1939 White Paper and in UN General Assembly Resolution 181 in November 1947. See also Nemchenok, “These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government.”

206 Harvey Sicherman, Palestinian Autonomy, Self Government and Peace (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), 36.

207 Ibid, 35.

160 The PLO had reason to worry about Camp David. It was clear that neither the Israelis nor the Americans would support a PLO-run Palestinian state, calling into question the tangible outcome of the peace agreement beyond Egyptian-Israeli normalization. In his assessment of

Camp David, William Quandt explains that in signing the Accords, Israel secured retention of the West Bank. “For Begin, Sinai had been sacrificed, but Eretz Israel had been won.”208

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace that would include the Palestinian question from Washington to Cairo, Jerusalem, and PLO headquarters in Beirut through the end of 1978. It shows how the ambitious aims of the Carter White House to deal with the Palestinian question were stymied by Israeli opposition, Palestinian disarray over 242, domestic American constraints, and Egyptian interests in bilateral peace to secure the return of the Sinai. Alongside these diplomatic mechanisms, the territorial expansion in Israel itself further delimited the possibility of Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza. In acquiescing to Israel’s stance, U.S. policymakers and their Egyptian interlocutors served to undermine the prospects of a wider regional settlement at Camp David. Instead, as the meetings between Sadat and Begin in late 1977 illustrate quite clearly, a more limited autonomy plan emerged as the sole mechanism to address Palestinian aspirations. The fate of these talks, which opened in May 1979 and carried on until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, links the limited political status of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the territorial transformation itself.

208 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 256.

161 Beyond the particularities of the Palestinian question, historians of human rights and U.S. internationalism in the 1970s might consider the events described in this chapter in light of

Carter’s broader ambitions.209 Some scholars have revisited the Carter presidency with increasing sympathy for the constraints under which the U.S. President governed, and his modest accomplishments abroad. Camp David is often singled out as his greatest success. The Carter administration, it is argued, broke with decades of U.S. inaction by seizing on the terms of the debate over the Middle East, often unintentionally, overhauling them to fit with an alternative conception of the region. In this respect, the Carter administration was certainly the first to place the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the center of regional affairs. Yet this chapter has also illustrated the narrow extent to which the contours and possible solutions of Israel’s conflict with the Arab world were circumscribed by the diplomacy that led to Camp David, and the troubling consequences that metastasized in its wake. Foremost among them were the extensive negotiations over Palestinian autonomy, to which chapter three turns.

209 See, for example, Kenton Clymer, “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia” Diplomatic History 27.2 (April 2003): 245-278; David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, Diplomatic History 28.1 (January 2004): 113-143; William Michael Schmidli, “Institutionalizing Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1976-1980, Diplomatic History 35:2 (April 2011): 351-378; Sargent, A Superpower Transformed; and Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 1970s.”

162

Chapter Three: Preventing a Palestinian State: The Autonomy Talks, 1979-1980

The dismal fact is when Presidents Sadat or Carter speak comfortable words about the Palestinians and autonomy, their voices sound impotent and far away. When Begin speaks the Master’s voice is clear, and as far as the West Bankers are concerned, his police and soldiers seem all too soon to arrive and carry out his threats.

-Michael Hannam to Roger Tomkys1

Introduction

In the wake of the Camp David Accords, the diplomatic effort to address the Palestinian question emerged with the launch of negotiations over autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip. These talks, convened by Egypt and Israel under U.S. supervision, grew out of agreements made during the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed on 26 March 1979, and were held intermittently in the Middle East and Washington, D.C. between May 1979 and August 1982.

Although from their inception they excluded representatives of the PLO and local Palestinians—

Egypt purported to represent them, acceding to Israeli pressure on the format of negotiations, while Palestinians and several Arab states opposed negotiations altogether—the talks were the first sustained political consideration of Palestinian self-determination after 1948.

Despite their significance, the autonomy talks are largely absent from historical accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.2 Among the leading studies, Israeli historian Benny Morris dismisses autonomy as a “nonstarter,” while other scholars downplay or ignore the negotiations

1 Confidential memo 014/6, Michael Hannam, British Consulate General in Jerusalem, to Roger Tomkys, Near East and North Africa Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), file 2164, 12 February 1979 “Autonomy in the Occupied Territories-1979,” United Kingdom National Archives, Kew, London (UKNA).

2 In several crucial articles published soon after his stint in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research dealing with autonomy, Political Scientist Ian Lustick provided contemporaneous accounts that outlined the U.S. role in the talks. See Lustick, “Kill the Autonomy Talks,” Foreign Policy, 41 (1980-81): 21-43; “Israeli Politics and American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 1 December 1982; and his more recent intervention, “Two- State Illusion,” New York Times, 15 September 2013. In the course of my research, Lustick provided access to his private papers on autonomy, which are located at the University of Pennsylvania. 163

in the wake of Camp David.3 Dominant narratives of the peace process, as I have argued in the introduction, instead trace the beginning of a serious engagement with the Palestinian question to the Madrid and Oslo negotiation of the 1990s.4 Those who do examine this earlier period, like one recent study of the Carter administration’s approach, paint a more sympathetic portrait of

American attempts to create a process leading to “genuine Palestinian self-determination” by challenging the Begin government on settlement expansion and territorial withdrawal.5 But as I will suggest in this chapter, the U.S. role in the autonomy talks—and the very substance of the negotiations themselves—actively undermined the prospects of a solution to the Palestinian question.

By revisiting the neglected history of these talks using a range of newly available sources, this chapter seeks to explain the process by which Palestinian national aspirations were undermined in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. It reveals that the Palestinian failure to achieve self-determination—often cast as a function of internal divisions within a fractured national movement—was also a direct byproduct of political decisions made by Israeli diplomats and enabled by the American and Egyptian delegations to the autonomy talks. Without halting

3 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 488. See also Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 380- 83; William B. Quandt, Peace Process, 237-40; and Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

4 See the introduction, n. 41.

5 See Jeremy Pressman, “Explaining the Carter Administration’s Israeli-Palestinian Solution,” Diplomatic History 37:5 (2013): 1117-147. Others who have written about the autonomy talks did so without access to the primary records of the negotiations, which have only recently been opened to researchers. See , Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories (London: Frank Cass, 2003); David Newman and Ghazi Falah, "Bridging the Gap: Palestinian and Israeli Discourses on Autonomy and Statehood," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 22.1 (1997): 111-129; Harvey Sicherman, Palestinian Autonomy, Self Government and Peace; Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy; Gershon R. Kieval, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983); and Mark A. Bruzonsky, “America’s Palestinian Predicament: Fallacies and Possibilities,” International Security 6, no. 1 (1981): 93–110. One important study of autonomy’s ideological underpinnings, based on Israeli sources, is Ziv Rubinovitz and Gerald M. Steinberg, “Menachem Begin's Autonomy Plan: Between Political Realism and Ideology" [Hebrew], Public Sphere 6 (2012): 75-94. 164

ongoing settlement expansion, or providing substantive authority or sovereignty to local residents of the occupied territories, the talks served to prevent Palestinian state formation in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip. Autonomy, as a political, diplomatic, and conceptual tool utilized to solve the Palestinian question, became the ground upon which the Israeli government cemented indefinite control over the occupied territories without any expiry date or formal annexation.

Having examined the conceptual lineage of autonomy and its promotion by Israel’s Likud government in chapter two, this chapter turns to the actual preparations for negotiations and the trajectory of the talks in their formative early months. Negotiations were crippled by divergent aims and structural disparities, and their eventual collapse in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of

Lebanon marked the continuation of a political process of state prevention with the military goal of destroying the PLO. By removing the Palestinian question from serious diplomatic consideration from Camp David through the late 1980s, Israeli leaders were able to draw on alternative strategies for dealing with the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories within a non-national context.6 In the interim, land appropriation and settlement expansion rapidly undercut the basis of possible Palestinian statehood.

When the Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords emerged in the early 1990s, a viable political solution to address Palestinian self-determination and Israeli national aspirations in the same frame seemed possible.7 Yet as I argue in the conclusion of the dissertation, these efforts reproduced the narrow conception of autonomy put forth by Israel and the U.S. during negotiations a decade earlier. By examining the start of negotiations between Israel and Egypt over the fate of the territories, alongside European, U.S., PLO, and domestic reactions, this

6 This included the Village Leagues and other ideas discussed in chapter six.

7 See the conclusion, and Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage, 1998).

165

chapter traces the origins of Palestinian self-rule in negotiations held over a decade prior to Oslo.

Rather than a “nonstarter,” the autonomy talks are deeply embedded in the region’s history and stand out as a decisive moment of state prevention.8

Forging an Egyptian-Israeli Peace

Several months passed as diplomats from Egypt and Israel worked on the implementation of the September 1978 Camp David Accords. On 2 March 1979, Israeli Prime Minister Begin met with President Carter at the White House to discuss the final stages of the negotiations. The

Prime Minister was concerned that regional upheaval signified growing Soviet strength and a more precarious position for Israel in the Middle East. Citing Syrian and Iraqi consolidation and the presence of Soviet advisors in Damascus alongside the revolution in Iran, Begin proclaimed,

“We see this as an awakening of Islamic fanaticism, just as in the Middle Ages. It could be contagious.”9 The Prime Minister, invoking a refrain that would be repeated with increasing frequency in the 1980s, continued, “The United States has only one stable ally in the Middle East, and this is Israel, whose stability is inherent because it is a democracy.”10 Begin appealed to his

U.S. interlocutors as the guarantor of greater regional stability, telling the President, “Israel can do whatever is necessary to prevent Saudi Arabia from being taken over by Communism. We cannot lose Saudi oil to Communism…The world is in turmoil and the Soviets are taking over by proxy.”11

8 Morris, Righteous Victims, 488.

9 Summary of President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin, The Cabinet Room, 2 March 1979, 10AM-12:40 PM, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Collection, Subject File, Box 36, JCL.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

166

Turning his attention to the substantive disagreements over the negotiations with Egypt,

Begin emphasized the central role of autonomy in the treaty’s delay. He stressed his greatest fear:

We must be sure that no Palestinian state will emerge from the autonomy. People go around in Judea and Samaria and say to the Arabs that they should accept autonomy since it is only a first step towards a Palestinian state. We know this from reliable sources. Had we thought that out of autonomy a Palestinian state would arise we would never have suggested it. We will not accept a Palestinian state…We are speaking of autonomy, not sovereignty, not a state. After five years, the final status will be decided upon. We shall claim our sovereign right over those areas…What is a Palestinian state? Arafat was in Tehran. He took over our embassy. He raised a flag. He said: “I feel now I am near Jerusalem.”…We must have ironclad guarantees that there will be no Palestinian state. I believe, Mr. President, that you have said so in public.12

In Begin’s reading of Camp David, the notion of autonomy could never mean territorial autonomy, just limited individual rights for inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. “We are not talking about autonomy for or to the West Bank and Gaza, but only for the inhabitants. It is written so.”13

The Israeli leader was deeply concerned that the U.S. would attempt to secure territorial control for Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by agreeing to a more expansive view of autonomy. “If the self-governing authority provides full autonomy to the West Bank, this means that the territory has full autonomy, and Israel will have no right to be there. But we do have that right, because this is the land of Israel.”14 A heated back and forth ensued between Israeli negotiators and their U.S. counterparts over the exact meaning of Camp David, with Begin warning again that it only granted autonomy to “inhabitants” of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

12 Minutes of a meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Carter at the White House, Washington D.C., Friday 2 March 1979, 10AM. A-4156/6, ISA.

13 “Summary of President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin, The Cabinet Room, 2 March 1979, 10AM-12:40 PM,” Brzezinski Donated Collection, Subject File, Box 36, JCL.

14 Ibid.

167

not any territorial rights. “No one is trying to trick Israel by slipping in a word here or there,” an exasperated Carter replied, “We are not scheming against Israel; we are not trying to hurt you; and neither is Sadat.”15 Carter recognized the incompatibility of Begin’s vision with the reality on the ground. The land itself, in Israel’s configuration, was reserved for Jewish settlement and therefore separated from any autonomy arrangement.16

During his final effort to secure the peace treaty with Egypt, the U.S. President traveled to Cairo and Jerusalem several days later. His 11 March discussion with Begin and Israel’s

Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, underscored his growing concern that autonomy discussions provided cover for burgeoning settlement expansion in the occupied territories.

Carter told Begin and Sharon of his worry that the discussions over autonomy were advancing without Palestinian or Jordanian participation, which signaled, “in effect, that almost in perpetuity Israel can retain complete control over the West Bank area.” He added the concern that Sharon, with Begin’s explicit support, indicated he would put “a million Jewish settlers on the West Bank” which would make it “impossible” for the Palestinians to participate in the discussions. “I have no way of looking into your hearts and souls and see how deeply you want to proceed with the self-government that the Prime Minister himself proposed,” Carter told

Sharon and Begin. “But something has to be done to assure those who live on the West Bank and

Gaza.”17

15 Ibid.

16 This double process of de-territorialization and re-territorialization evokes the shifting forms of territorial control that characterized Eastern Mediterranean border zones in the mandate period, never fully resolved in the post-1948 West Bank. For a fascinating study of the “contrasting territorial logics” at work in the mandate-era Levant, see Cyrus Schayegh, “The Many Worlds of ‘Abud Yasin; or, What Narcotics Trafficking in the Interwar Middle East Can Tell Us about Territorialization,” American Historical Review 116:2 (2011): 273–306.

17 “Meeting between the President of the USA, Mr. Jimmy Carter and delegation, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin and delegation, 11 March 1979, 11:30 AM, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem.” MFA-6868/7, ISA. 168

The Israeli Prime Minister responded with a robust defense of his vision for autonomy, reinforcing the notion that it was compatible with settlement expansion and insisting it could not lead to a state. “I believe it is one of the most beautiful, human ideas ever proposed by Zionism and Judaism, because we were a persecuted people and we understand another people, and we want not to interfere in their daily affairs.” In using this rhetoric, Begin posited the quotidian needs of local residents as apolitical, in contrast to the more politically expansive, temporally dynamic, and developmental needs of Israel.

What we need is security, and may I respectfully say that if my friend, the Minister of Agriculture [Ariel] Sharon spoke about a million Jews in Judea and Samaria, he didn’t mean any wrong, Mr. President. The number of Jews living in Judea and Samaria is not an obstacle to the autonomy for the Arab inhabitants…Why can’t Jews and Arabs live together? In Haifa they live together; in Nazareth they live together. This is the idea: to live together. But the Arabs will have autonomy. We will not interfere with their affairs. We want to make sure that there is security and there is no Palestinian state.

Sharon, the architect of Israel’s settlement expansion as agriculture minister in the Likud government, reinforced Begin’s point. Drawing on a longstanding trope that denied Palestinian national identity, Sharon asserted that Jordan was the Palestinian state. “We want the autonomy; we are ready to go very far, but there will never be a second Palestinian state, and I think it is important to make it clear now, in order to prevent misunderstanding in the future.”18

Equating the settlers with Palestinian Arabs in Israel, Sharon asked Carter how he could prevent Jews from settling beyond the 1967 borders, given the number of Palestinian Arabs within Israel itself. “Altogether in this part of the world, I don't see any possibility whatsoever to draw any geographical line which can divide between Jewish population and Arab population, because we live here together.” Such logic of equivalence between settlers and the Palestinian citizens of Israel suggested a retroactive justification of population exchange and the

18 These quotations are all from the 11 March 1979 meeting transcript in MFA-6868/7, ISA. 169

simultaneous denial of an inter-state occupation beyond the 1967 borders. Nor did Sharon shy away from his boastful prediction of one million Jewish settlers in the territories.

Believe me, Mr. President, when I use this figure of one million, saying that in 20-30 years I hope that one million Jews will live there, Mr. President, I can assure you, they will live there. There’s nothing to do about it. They will live there and if we said that we believe that in Jerusalem, what we call the , it is a crucial problem for us, to have one million Jews, they will live there, and they will live in what we call the area of Gush Etzion, in Tekoah, in Maaleh Edomim. They will live there. There is nothing to do about it. We were very careful to settle Jews, and that is what we are doing now.19

The exchange of views highlights how Israel successfully delineated the limits of its position on

Palestinian autonomy while asserting the centrality of settlement expansion, and all in the context of U.S. led negotiations over a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

After a lunch break, the discussion turned to Carter’s view of an Israeli-Egyptian peace deal, and the President acknowledged that autonomy was a major point of contention.

I have got sense enough and now experience enough to know that the signing of a peace treaty is not the end all and the be all, that there are going to be difficult days ahead. Because my own assessment is that you have a different vision of the degree of autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs than do the Palestinian Arabs themselves or perhaps the Egyptians as well. And, as you know, we are pledged here again to act in the very difficult mediator role to help resolve these issues, and I think you would agree that we have never put any pressure on Israel. We have never forced or encouraged Israel in any way to sign an agreement that was detrimental to the best interests of your own country.20

Alongside these words of assurance, Carter warned Begin not to drag out the Knesset debate about the final language of the treaty or to get bogged down in the autonomy issue, because it would weaken Sadat. In the President’s words, “My belief is that the whole agreement might very well come apart.”21

19 Meeting between the President of the USA, Mr. Jimmy Carter and delegation, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin and delegation, 11 March 1979, 11:30 AM, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, MFA-6868/7, ISA.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

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On the following morning, Carter was offered the chance to meet the full Israeli cabinet to secure approval for a peace deal. Begin, flanked by his ministers, used the opportunity to reiterate his narrow view of autonomy.

It cannot mean sovereignty. It cannot mean a Palestinian state, neither today nor tomorrow. Because this is to us perhaps after the seriousness of the peace treaty the most vital issue we have ever faced with the peace making process. It should be clear to everyone that a so-called Palestinian state is out of the question for us. What we decided on at Camp David is autonomy, full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants. We want to implement it. It is our idea and I will say today in the Knesset to my colleagues and my opponents that I believe it is a fine concept of Judaism and Zionism, which proves our liberal approach to the problems of another national group. We recognize the Arab nationality in our country, as you know. In our identity cards, it is written Nationality: Jew, or Arab. We recognize the Arab nationality as such. And therefore it is no problem for us to recognize the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. We also have rights in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and this is what we wrote in the Camp David agreement.22

For Begin, there was no Palestinian identity specific or indigenous to historic Palestine. Rather,

Palestinians (“Arab inhabitants”) were a minority group in an Israeli nation that was entirely sovereign over all the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. Israel’s occupation would both expand its borders and serve as the definitive means to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state. Such an approach was distinct from Begin’s benevolent rhetoric about the Arab inhabitants of these territories, who he kept insisting would enjoy the autonomy arrangement.

On 14 March, Carter flew to Egypt and got Sadat’s agreement on the final language of the treaty. The decision was made to ratify the peace agreement and fulfill its comprehensive aspects regarding the Palestinian issue by starting autonomy negotiations within one month. This was affirmed in a side letter negotiated in Jerusalem before Carter’s departure and eventually

22 Meeting between Mr. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, and delegation, and the Government of Israel- Prime Minister Begin, and the Entire Cabinet. Monday 12 March 1979, 10:30 AM, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, MFA-6868/7, ISA.

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signed by Begin and Sadat.23 While Carter was in Egypt, Begin gave an interview with Israel

Radio Evening News expressing his optimism about the signing of a treaty and the prospect of autonomy. “There will be no border through Eretz Israel. And I think this is one of the finest concepts of Zionism and Judaism: we want to live in peace with our neighbors in Eretz Israel.”24

It was a frank and simple explanation of Begin’s longstanding position, predicated on the total erasure of the 1967 Green Line.

Carter finally witnessed the signing of a treaty agreement between Sadat and Begin in

Washington on 26 March 1979. While the deal was welcomed by Egypt and Israel, the PLO leadership was bitterly opposed. Speaking to a group of military recruits in Beirut’s Sabra refugee camp on the day of the signing, PLO Chairman Arafat vowed to “chop off the hands” of

Carter, Sadat, and Begin.25 As effigies of the three leaders burned in front of him, Arafat declared to loud applause, “I shall finish off American interests in the Middle East.”26

23 “The purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self governing authority (Administrative Council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Israel and Egypt…the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants...The letter also confirms our understanding that the United State government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.” See “Secret draft letter of Sadat and Begin, 3PM, March 12, 1979”; and “Letter, Carter to Begin, March 14, 1979,” MFA-6868/7, ISA.

24 Begin interview with Israel Radio, Cable, MFA-6868/7, ISA.

25 “Palestinians, Reacting to the Pact, Go On Strike and Denounce Egypt.” New York Times, 27 March 1979, 1.

26 Ibid, pg. 10. For the PLO’s official indictment of Sadat, see “Sadat-Quisling of the Arab World.” Editorial, Palestine, 5:5 (March1979), IPS. In the words of the editorial, Sadat “sold Palestine to the Israelis under the cover of ‘self-rule’ for the Palestinians living under occupation while neglecting the Palestinians living in the refugee camps for 30 years. Sadat sold himself, his people, the Palestinian People and the Arab lands in return for a mere 1.8 billion U.S. dollars…It is in fact not a peace treaty at all but a military pact between Egypt, Israel and the USA which has endeavored to recognize the region after the loss of Iran.”

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The Soviet Union was also furious with the signing of the treaty. In a personal letter to the U.S. President, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev outlined in some detail his deep antipathy towards the separate settlement between Israel and Egypt. Brezhnev accused Carter of “solving questions on the sly, bypassing the Soviet Union.”27 But Brezhnev’s most pointed criticisms concerned the fate of the Palestinians.

Let us face the truth. All what is happening now means an actual departure from a solution of the Palestinian problem. It was simply drowned in various political maneuvers which may appear subtle to someone but in fact are not in any way tied- neither from political nor from humane viewpoints- to the legitimate demands of the Arab people of Palestine. What kind of peace is that if more than three million people who have the inalienable right to have a roof over their heads, to have their own even a small state, are deprived of that right. This fact alone shows how shaky is the ground on which the separate agreement between Israel and Egypt being imposed by the United States is built.28

Brezhnev’s warning, like the expansionist assertions of Israeli leaders, would continue to resonate during the opening round of the autonomy negotiations, which followed two months later.

After the signing of the treaty, the Israeli-Palestinian issue moved out of focus in the U.S. as Carter’s foreign policy team tried to manage debilitating foreign policy crises like the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The President sent his advisors to Saudi Arabia and Jordan to try and smooth over criticism of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and he reduced his visibility in Arab-Israeli affairs considerably by appointing

Democratic operative Robert Strauss as his lead negotiator for the autonomy talks.29 The

27 Letter, Leonid Brezhnev to Jimmy Carter, 19 March 1979. Declassified Document Reference System (DDRS).

28 Ibid. For a useful retrospective summary of Soviet attitudes towards the accords, see Evgeni M. Primakov, “Soviet Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Quandt, The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, 387–409.

29 Among the points Carter wanted his National Security Advisor to emphasize to the skeptical Saudi and Jordanian leadership was “Palestinian rights.” See handwritten note, Carter to Brzezinski, 15 March 1979. Brzezinski Donated Collection, Box 14, JCL.

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President did not want to suffer through more of the gritty debates on the Middle East or expend further domestic political capital, already in short supply. At a foreign affairs breakfast with his top advisors, Carter suggested that Strauss take full control in implementing the Camp David treaty in order to mitigate political fallout and reduce Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s direct involvement. Vance’s angry response conveyed a sense that the President had largely given up on his comprehensive vision for Middle East peace. “There is Lebanon, there is the Palestinian question, there is the question of the U.N. Do you want me literally to do nothing? Mr. President,

I am not going to be a figurehead for you. If you don’t want me to do this, I am going to resign as Secretary of State.”30 Vance remained in office, however, and the autonomy talks were conducted at a distance from direct White House involvement.

Preparing for Autonomy Talks, Expanding the Settlements

Several days after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed, the head of Begin’s government office replied on his behalf to a critic of Camp David from the northern city of

Safed:

The Prime Minister believes that we have the right of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza and to fulfill that right. We left this question open to allow for the completion of the Peace Treaty…Our stance is that our army will remain in Judea, Samaria and Gaza…We acknowledge that we will expand existing settlements and establish new settlements. We are standing on this promise.31

In fact, soon after the Camp David Accords had first been agreed to by Egypt and Israel in 1978, a series of secret meetings were convened at the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv to

30 Quoted in Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 438.

31 Letter [Hebrew], Yechiel Kaddishai to Yedidya Yehuda, 1 , PM 184, MBC. Kaddishai repeated the same message in Begin’s name on 14 May to a settler from the Jordan Valley. See Kaddishai to Mrs. Oshrit Cohen, 14 May 1979, PM184, MBC.

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formalize a position on Palestinian autonomy.32 Several defense officials and Begin’s highest ranking aides worked on an implementable autonomy plan, which excluded a possible

Palestinian legislative body and maintained Israel’s military government in the territories. This formula, as reported by , stressed the overriding principle that autonomy

“not include the right to eventually create an independent Palestinian state.”33 The Post explained how Israel was claiming special water, land, and settlement rights, and emphasized that the plan followed Begin’s precept that “individual Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be given autonomy, but that the areas themselves should not be allowed to become collectively autonomous in the sense of constitutional democracies.”34

There were also extensive back door negotiations within the Israeli government to secure settlement expansion plans in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These new settlements were planned in a manner that would ensure Israeli control of the territories regardless of any peace deal or agreement on Palestinian autonomy.35 Ostensibly held to devise bargaining positions on the future of the 1967 lands, the settlement committee (also known as the “Ben Elissar

Committee” after the leading role played by Begin’s Director General, Eliyahu Ben Elissar), made several recommendations to Prime Minister Begin that evolved into actual policies

32 See declassified Prime Minister material A-4181, folders 9, 10, 17, ISA.

33 William Claiborne, “Israel Plans Narrow Arab Autonomy,” The Washington Post, 1 December 1978.

34 Ibid. A copy of the article, with handwritten comments affirming the reporter’s extensive claims, can be found in the office files of Begin’s Director General, Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, who chaired the meeting and was likely the source of the story. See A-4182/7, ISA.

35 These key documents on autonomy were recently declassified. See “Commission to prepare for Judea, Samaria and Gaza negotiations, minutes of the first meeting, October 1, 1978” [Hebrew], A-4181/17, ISA; “Timetable for establishing self-government in Judea, Samaria and Gaza” [Hebrew], letter from Dr. Binyamin HaLevi to Prime Minister Begin, 19 November 1978, A-4181/9, ISA; and “Settlement plan in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip” [Hebrew], letter from Shimon Ravid to Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, A-4181/12, ISA.

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implemented in 1979 and the early 1980s.36 These included the retention of 250,000 acres of

“state land” in the West Bank, Israeli control of underground water resources, and special jurisdiction for Jewish settlers in the territories.37

In the week before the first autonomy meeting began, the Israeli ministerial committee in charge of negotiations deliberated on its opening position paper. This report, approved by the full cabinet, stated explicitly that sovereignty for any proposed autonomous council should “derive from the Israeli military government in the occupied territories.”38 The position paper included two declarations that mirrored Begin’s first draft of the autonomy plan from 1977: 1) no establishment of a Palestinian state, and 2) an Israeli claim to sovereignty over the territories at the end of the period of autonomy.39 Begin had also mandated that the military government in the occupied territories would remain the source of any authority, assuring settler leaders that expansion would continue after a ninety day freeze, and signaling that sovereignty would ultimately rest with the State of Israel.40

Eliyahu Ben Elissar, speaking at a conference in 1997 to commemorate twenty years since Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem, explained the overall rationale of the Israeli position.

36 The Ben-Elissar Report was delivered on Dec. 28, 1978. Ben-Elissar would go on to become Israel’s first ambassador to Egypt after the 1979 peace treaty was signed.

37 See Claiborne, “Israel Plans Narrow Arab Autonomy.”

38 Pike, “Autonomy Negotiations,” 22 May 1979, Document 18, FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

39 Ibid.

40 The question of Israeli sovereignty in a possible autonomy regime was a central issue of contention in discussions with the lead Israeli legal advisors to the talks (later professors of law at Hebrew University), Ruth Lapidoth and Robbie Sabel. Both explained that the issue was not fully resolved among the Israeli delegation, which was a central reason for their collapse. It was also the underlying cause of Palestinian and Egyptian rejection, although neither Lapidoth or Sabel admitted as much. Ruth Lapidoth, interview by author, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 13 February 2012; and Robbie Sabel, interview by author, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 22 February 2012. See also Lapidoth’s writings on the talks, “The Autonomy Negotiations,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, 24 (Summer 1982): 99– 113; and “The Autonomy Negotiations: A Stocktaking,” Middle East Review 15, no. 3–4 (Spring/Summer 1983): 35–43.

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Autonomy would be granted to the Palestinian Arabs who lived in this territory—not sovereignty, but autonomy. Such autonomy would not be territorial, because territorial autonomy is oriented toward sovereignty. It would be personal autonomy. Each leader got what was most important for him. One got Sinai, and the other got the exercise of single sovereignty, Israeli sovereignty, over the territory between the Mediterranean and Jordan. The rest was very important, as well, and they simply did not get it.41

As the articulation of the official Israeli position, Ben Elissar’s statement is a testament to the underlying intentions and outcomes of the autonomy negotiations. It reveals how the conception of limited individual Arab rights by Israel was incongruous with the national sovereignty of

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, cementing de facto Israeli control and effective sovereignty beyond the Green Line as a central component of early Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. In the fall of 1981, as the autonomy negotiations reached another impasse, Foreign

Minister Yitzhak Shamir drew on this model for autonomy during an interview with Israeli radio.

The purpose of the autonomy scheme, that we have proposed, is not to create a state for a stateless people, and not to give a home to a homeless people. The Palestinian Arab people is not a stateless people and is not a homeless people. They already have their state, they already have their home and their country—it is called now Jordan. Jordan is a Palestinian Arab state. Its population if of Palestinian origin. Its culture, language and its mentality are all Palestinian.42

For Shamir, like Begin before him, autonomy served as a mechanism to deal with the Palestinian

Arabs in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza along non-national lines.

British and American Premonitions

Members of the British Foreign Office and officials at the U.S. State Department closely observed the course of these Israeli preparations in the early months of 1979. In a detailed

41 Jon B. Alterman, ed., Sadat and His Legacy: Egypt and the World, 1977-1997: On the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of President Sadat’s Journey to Jerusalem (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), 27.

42 “Raayon Sar HaChutz” [The Foreign Minister’s Interview], Kol Yisrael [Voice of Israel] 24 , MFA- 6898/6, ISA.

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confidential memo to Roger Tomkys, head of the Near East Directorate at the British Foreign

Office, the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, John Mason, outlined Israeli views of the autonomy talks. Mason wrote that while many in Israel believed the West Bank and Gaza were “inalienably their heritage,” some had recognized that they were “operating a hated colonial regime in the

West Bank and Gaza, and that the hatred is likely to grow.”43 At the same time, as Mason explained, “Four months after Camp David, there is today virtually no one in this country of any political persuasion who believes that the autonomy plan agreed there either could or should be implemented on the West Bank.”44 Some Israelis advocated a modified “Jordanian option” to get

King Hussein of Jordan involved in the West Bank, while supporters of a “Gaza first” option were vocal about trying to separate the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and securing Egyptian control over the area, a move that might initiate some limited degree of Israeli withdrawal from the territories.

J.C. Moberly, Tomky’s colleague in the Foreign Office, was doubtful that Begin could be pressured to agree to arrangements for a “Gaza first” option. “I think it is much more likely that we shall be faced with a long haul with no real progress for decades towards a comprehensive settlement short of attitudes being changed through the shock of a major war or some other cataclysm.”45 Britain’s Consul General in Jerusalem, Michael Hannam, whose equally stark view of autonomy opened this chapter, reported on the popular reaction among Palestinians, who viewed autonomy as a “threat” rather than a political solution. His cables to London noted that

Palestinians “gloomily take refuge in the feeling that the Jews are rowing against the tide of

43 Mason to Tomkys, 31 January 1979, Document 3, “Autonomy,” FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

44 Ibid.

45 Moberly to Parsons, Document 3, 9 February 1979, FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

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history and that someday they will be carried off downstream like Rhodesia, Taiwan, Iran and so on.”46 Such sentiments reflected British recognition of the passage of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, a point that seemed lost on Israeli officials speaking the language of colonial expansion well into the 1970s.47

This divergence between the prospects of Palestinian self-determination and the revisionist Zionism of Begin’s Likud government was stark. Begin had insisted that a Palestinian state would never emerge, demanding that any “self-governing authority” would be administrative and not legislative in nature, precluding the possibility of Palestinians declaring independence.48 In the view of Tomkys, “Begin…rejects the whole concept of a Palestinian people precisely because the existence of such people would, if acknowledged, call into question some of the moral ground for Zionism.”49 As he wrote to the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv,

“the Palestinian problem is unlikely to be resolved by any territorial compromise.”50 While the

Foreign Office was under no illusion that Israel would end its territorial occupation without pressure, officials concluded that the Camp David Accords might give the United States “a better lever to apply to Israeli policy,” and help start a move towards multilateral negotiations.51 But

46 Hannam to Tomkys, 12 February 1979, Document 5, FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

47 Even Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, reluctant to support outright Palestinian statehood given her Cold War priorities, was troubled by developments on the ground and entertained arguments from the Foreign Office supporting engagement with the PLO. Her recently released papers and material at the National Archives in Kew provide an incisive British perspective on the autonomy negotiations and offers a tacit refutation of many American policies. See PREM 19/295, “Situation in the Middle East: Part 2,” 21 September 1979- 9 and FCO 93/2055, “The Palestinians: Palestinian self-determination,” UKNA. For more on Thatcher’s views, see Nigel J. Ashton, “Love’s Labours Lost: Margaret Thatcher, King Hussein and Anglo–Jordanian Relations, 1979–1990,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:4 (2011): 651–677; and Neil Lochery, "Debunking the Myths: Margaret Thatcher, the Foreign Office and Israel, 1979-1990," Diplomacy and Statecraft, xxi (2010), 690-706.

48 Mason to Tomkys, 31 January 1979, FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

49 Hannam to Tomkys, 12 February 1979, Document 5, FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

50 Ibid.

51 Hannam to Tomkys, 12 February 1979, FCO 93/2164, UKNA. 179

Israeli and U.S. actions quickly undermined this sanguine assessment, as British officials watched with growing skepticism from the sidelines.52

Washington’s View

The British diplomats were not alone in voicing their doubts. In Washington, uncertainty surrounding the Palestinian component of Camp David had grown in the months between the signing of the Framework and the negotiation of a permanent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. At a cabinet meeting in January 1979, Secretary Vance raised the possibility of establishing relations with the PLO to generate substantive movement in the negotiations. Zbigniew Brzezinski recounts that Vice President Walter Mondale, an ally of Israel’s domestic supporters in Congress, was furious, while “[Political advisor] Ham[ilton] Jordan- always mindful of the influence of the

Jewish community in U.S. domestic politics- cheerfully quipped that perhaps one of us might want to be the first U.S. Ambassador to the West Bank, because in two years we would all be unemployed.”53 Compounding these domestic constraints, the and the start of the hostage crisis in February had rearranged Carter’s regional priorities, as his ambitious plans on the Arab-Israeli front gave way to modest goals that did not include sustained engagement with the Palestinians.

In a secret memo to the President ahead of their weekly foreign policy breakfast,

Zbigniew Brzezinski warned Carter of the need to re-inscribe a “broader regional strategy” and to be mindful of timing around the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. “We have been talking of the treaty as a step toward further negotiations on the Palestinian question. But equally important,

52 See the entire file on the autonomy talks, FCO 93/2164, released to the author and the public by Freedom of Information request from the UK Foreign Office.

53 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 278.

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the treaty could be the takeoff point for a more coherent approach to regional security problems.”54 Suggesting that an imminent trip to the region by the American Secretary of

Defense Harold Brown could help bring about this shift in focus, Brzezinski concluded, “We need to relate the peace negotiations to a broader strategic framework which takes into account the developments in Iran, the weakness of Saudi Arabia, the assertiveness of the Soviets, and the new alignments in the Arab World.”55

For Egypt, this new alignment was the cause of mounting concerns in the aftermath of

Camp David. Increasingly isolated and besieged by Arab denunciations of the peace treaty,

President Sadat sent his Prime Minister, , to the White House. In a meeting with

President Carter and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan on 25 February 1979, Khalil warned of the delay. “Unless we conclude an agreement now it will be difficult to do so in a month and impossible in two or three. Our region is threatened.”56 The specter of an Arab Summit before the conclusion of a peace treaty was worrying to Sadat and his advisors. “We cannot isolate ourselves from the Arab world,” Khalil remarked in the White House. Carter agreed, “The most stabilizing action would be an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Once it is done the other Arab countries cannot reject Egypt.” Turning to Khalil and Dayan, Carter concluded, “The United

States will accept whatever the two of you can accept; there is no U.S. position as such.”57

54 Secret memo, Brzezinski to Carter, “Secretary Vance’s Middle East Strategy Paper.” 1 February 1979. Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Collection, Subject File, Serial X, Box 36, JCL.

55 Ibid.

56 Secret Memorandum of Conversation, President Carter, Secretary Vance, Prime Minister Khalil, Foreign Minister Dayan, Brzezinski, The , 25 February 1979, 2:03-2:45 PM. Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Serial X, Box 36, JCL.

57 Ibid.

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Against the backdrop of these bilateral priorities in Washington, U.S. diplomats in the field monitored and reported back on the intentions of the Israelis ahead of the autonomy talks. A series of cables from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv were sent to officials in Washington and diplomats stationed throughout Europe and the Middle East, analyzing the Israeli objectives. The first, in March, tackled the Israeli position on water. “There is little inclination here to share even partial control of water sources with West Bankers,” wrote Richard Viets, a political officer at the U.S. Embassy, “notwithstanding possible suggestions of joint decision making in the Self-

Governing Authority (SGA).”58 Viets recounted past efforts of Palestinians to drill new wells, which were summarily refused. “Pre-1967 Israel has continued to expand its exploitation of the aquifer layer shared by Israel and most of the West Bank. While Arab water use in the West

Bank has been frozen by Israeli authorities…The GOI [Government of Israel] conveniently ignores the fact that Israeli occupation policy for the last 12 years prevented West Bankers from expanding their utilization.”59 It was possible, Viets argued, that joint decision-making could lead to joint control of water sources, or some form of Israeli custodianship over water sources during the proposed transitional period, but such a body “must be more than a sham which the

Israelis use to cover their sole control of decisions.”60

The core issue of contention in the talks would not be water, however, but a dispute over the proprietorship of land and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. American diplomats were fully aware that the settlement project had become a central component of the ruling Likud government, and had no expectation of a complete moratorium on building at the onset of

58 Viets to Washington, et al, “Autonomy Negotiations: The Israeli Position on Water,” 28 March 1979, Box 37, File 5 “Egypt-Political Material,” Papers of Hermann Eilts, Howard Gottlieb Archival Research Center, Boston University [PHE].

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

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negotiations.61 Instead they outlined the “optimum compromise” they believed could be achieved:

—Retention of almost all existing settlements, with a heavy price for removal of a symbolic few; —Defacto freeze on new settlements; —Settlements to be exempt from jurisdiction of SGA [Self-Governing authority] and directly linked to GOI [Government of Israel]; —In order to permit thickening of existing settlements some sort of shared GOI-SGA responsibility for allocation of public lands, with the Israelis having the final say.62

Such a low ceiling towards the outcome of the negotiations did not augur well for the possibility of any agreement on Palestinian autonomy that might ensure sovereignty and self-determination for the Arabs in the occupied territories.

The limits of the Israeli position, as outlined in this manner, emerged from the U.S. view of the settlement project. Officials divided settlement policy after the 1967 war into Labor and

Likud phases. The former, implemented between 1967-1977, tracked largely with the “Allon

Plan,” which allowed for settlements in areas deemed necessary for security purposes.63 This plan mandated a redrawing of the map to secure a permanent Israeli presence in the Jordan

Valley, Latrun Salient and the southern Gaza Strip (as well as the Golan Heights and approaches). On the grounds that a Jewish communal presence existed in parts of the West Bank before 1948, the Etzion Bloc and Kiryat Arba (Hebron) were included as areas marked for settlement growth. Beyond these areas, the government opposed settlements in areas of “dense

Arab population,” which Labor politicians argued would be returned to Arab sovereignty under a

61 Viets to Secretary of State, et al, “Autonomy Negotiations: Israeli Position on Land and Settlements,” 2 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid. The was named after Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yigal Allon, who published his view in Foreign Affairs. See Yigal Allon, “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,” Foreign Affairs 55:1 (October 1976): 38–53.

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final peace deal. In total, Labor led coalitions established thirty-six settlements in the West Bank and four in the Gaza Strip during the decade after the 1967 war.64

The Likud victory in 1977 changed the settlement calculus, as Begin and his ministers saw the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip “as a fulfillment of Israel’s historic destiny.”65 Undeterred by the heavy Arab presence in the West Bank highlands, the Likud sought to solidify the territorial gains of the war. In its first nine months in office, the government set up fourteen new settlements in the West Bank, mostly in the “Heart of Samaria” which had hitherto been off limits, and two in Gaza. Despite a year’s break (as American diplomats described, “to catch its breath”) and a three-month settlement freeze after Camp David, planning and building quickly resumed.66 While many Israelis opposed settlement in the heart of the West Bank, and even Labor leader Shimon Peres hinted that if his party were negotiating over autonomy, it would be prepared to abandon the settlements in the West Bank highlands, U.S. officials asserted that there would still be “strong public reaction to removing them.”67

Viets also made it clear that Israel’s Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, intended to increase building substantially, speaking of a “million Jews” in the West Bank by 2000.68 The

World Zionist Organization settlement department submitted its own “master plan” for a similar

64 Viets, “Autonomy Negotiations: Israeli Position on Land and Settlements,” 2 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE. See also Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire; and Raz, The Bride and the Dowry. Labor also established several settlements in the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula, the latter of which were evacuated as part of the Israeli- Egyptian peace deal.

65 Viets, “Autonomy Negotiations: Israeli Position on Land and Settlements,” 2 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE.

66 Ibid. At the time of writing his memo, Viets estimated fifty-five West bank settlements with 10,000 settlers, and seven or eight Gaza settlements with less than 1000. This did not include East Jerusalem.

67 Ibid.

68 Elsewhere it was reported that Sharon told President Carter that he wanted not one million, but two million. See American Consulate to Secretary of State, “Autonomy Negotiations: West Bank Attitudes Toward Land and Settlements,” 9 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE.

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model of expansion along these lines.69 Viets noted in his cable to Washington superiors at the

State Department that the Gush Emunim settler movement and its allies in the National Religious

Party (NRP) were pressuring Prime Minister Begin to provide “iron-clad assurances that settlement activity would continue during negotiations and under autonomy” as a means of securing their support for the peace treaty with Egypt.70

In addition to maintaining the right to expand settlements and control water resources, the

Israeli negotiating position was further premised on the maintenance of Israeli troop presence in the West Bank.71 This derived from security concerns about the external threats of Arab countries across Israel’s eastern border, and the internal threat of Palestinian nationalist groups.72

The opening Israeli negotiating position in the autonomy talks, Viets surmised, required:

The legal right of Israeli security forces to operate in the West Bank and Gaza…ultimate control over public order, political activity, political assembly and censorship…control over immigration…control of the prisons; and control over the return of refugees.73

As Viets expanded in another cable, Begin’s point of departure in the talks “conceives of autonomy as a permanent regime for territories under Israeli control, if not sovereignty.”74

Sharon, Viets concluded, “is committed to the permanent retention of Israeli control over the

69 This was known as the “Drobles Plan.” See Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 523-524.

70 Viets, “Autonomy Negotiations: Israeli Position on Land and Settlements,” 2 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE. See also the UK FCO report on internal pressure from an interview with Israeli Education Minister Zevulen Hammer, 3 April 1979, document 10, FCO 93/2164, UKNA. These primary sources comport with the incisive analysis of Gershon Kievel, who provided an explanation of the link between the right wing coalition politics and Begin’s expansion plans after Camp David. See Kieval, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

71 Viets to Secretary of State, “Autonomy Negotiations: Israeli position on IDF withdrawal, deployments and security options on the West Bank,” 13 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE. Viets outlined possible ways in which this footprint could be significantly reduced at no threat to Israel’s security.

72 Viets to Secretary of State, “Autonomy Negotiations: The Israeli Position on Internal Security and Public Order,” 25 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE.

73 Ibid.

74 Viets to Secretary of State, “Autonomy and the Israeli Negotiating Team,” 27 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE.

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West Bank and Gaza, which he believes can only be assured by immediate and massive settlement of those territories.”75

British diplomats confirmed and expanded on Viets’ conclusion, explaining the mechanism by which Israeli sovereignty would operate in the settlements.

Jewish settlements are to have police force of their own. Jewish residents with license to carry arms will be able to do so throughout the autonomous region. The Ministry of Communication is to control entire communications infrastructure: the administrative council will not be authorized to set up radio or television stations or to issue stamps…overall planning and control of water resources in whole area west of the Jordan will be in Israeli hands.76

Like their American counterparts, British diplomats were fully aware that the Israeli version of autonomy would necessitate the retention of full political sovereignty in the territories. Such an outcome would cement Israeli control and undercut the possibility that Palestinians would achieve any real sovereignty on the ground.77 Later iterations of Palestinian models for self-rule, such as the Palestinian Authority that emerged from the Oslo Accords, emanated from this central premise—a change of status for Arab inhabitants in the West Bank was dependent on the continuation of an ongoing Israeli presence in the settlements and overall Israeli security control in the occupied territories.

75 Ibid.

76 “Israeli Position on Autonomy Cabinet Debate,” 22 May 1979, Document 19, FCO 93/2164, UKNA.

77 Given this reality, the reflections of Israel’s leading legal negotiator at the talks, Professor Ruth Lapidoth, deserve closer attention. In her extensive writings on autonomy, and in a personal interview conducted with her on 13 February 2012, Lapidoth insisted that the failure of the negotiations was the fault of the Palestinians. As she wrote, “Although each case of autonomy is different, it seems that certain ingredients may generally be counted on to enhance the chances of success. 1. A regime of autonomy should be established with the consent of the population intended to benefit from it. (Thus, due to the objection of the Palestinians, the autonomy negotiations between Egypt and Israel from 1979 to 1982 were doomed to failure).” In light of Israeli preconditions, and the structural premise of continued Israeli sovereignty underpinning the talks, her position is startling. See Ruth Lapidoth, “Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements,” in The Bertelsmann Foundation, 2001, www.cap.uni muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf, accessed 10 March 2015.

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Settlement Legality

Israel’s consistent position on settlement expansion and continued sovereignty in the territories was bolstered by the advice of a leading U.S. legal scholar. Eugene Rostow, later a neoconservative appointee in the Reagan administration, provided justification based on research he published as the Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University.78 Rostow repudiated U.S. acceptance of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the case of the West Bank, arguing that the original postwar provisions against occupied territory were only intended for the case of

Germany and its neighbors, but “Israeli administration of the areas [West Bank and Gaza] has involved no forced transfer of population or deportations.”79 In Israel’s—and Rostow’s—view, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were “still unallocated territories of the Palestinian Mandate,” and

“Israel’s legal position with regard to its right of settlement in the West Bank is impregnable.”80

Dismissive of the Carter administration’s “enthusiasm for the so-called ‘Palestinian’ cause,”

Rostow instead provided an alternative argument for non-engagement that would shape the peace process for decades.81 Even Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Carter’s second personal envoy to the

78 Eugene V. Rostow, “‘Palestinian Self-Determination’: Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate,” The International Journal of Yale Law School 5, no. 2 (1979). An abbreviated version of this argument appeared as “Israel’s Settlement Right is ‘Unassailable,’” Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 19 September 1983. For more on Rostow’s background, see John Rosenberg, “The Quest against Détente: Eugene Rostow, the October War, and the Origins of the Anti-Détente Movement, 1969-1976,” Diplomatic History, advance access 28 August 2014; and the biography of his brother by David Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008). For the origins of Israeli legal thinking that justified expansion, see “Hitnachluyot: P’sak Hadin Hamaleh” [Settlements: The Full Ruling]: 11/74-11/79, MFA-9336/10, ISA.

79 Rostow, 160. See Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, for more on the forced Palestinian expulsion that did occur and Israel’s refusal to allow for return in the aftermath of 1967.

80 Rostow, 162. In a meeting between Joseph Burg, head of the Israeli autonomy delegation, and UK Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Douglas Hurd, Burg invoked this precise line of reasoning in defending Israel’s “strong legal basis for its claim to Judea and Samaria.” See “Record of a Meeting Between Mr. Hurd, Minister of State, and Dr. Josef Burg, Israeli Minister of the Interior, at the Knesset, Jerusalem, 11 December 1979.” FCO 93/2164, UKNA. Carter’s claim that settlements were “illegal” was also contested by a leading American Jewish organization, the Anti Defamation League. See cable, “Language of ADL Decision on the Settlements” [Hebrew], A-4179/2, ISA.

81 Rostow, 161. In a detailed congressional letter to the President in March 1985, six U.S. senators would adopt wholesale Rostow’s argument in opposing any peace initiative that involved a land exchange. See letter, Senator 187

autonomy negotiations, accepted this rationale. As he wrote in the memoirs of his government service, settlements were not “obviously illegal.”82 This semantic opening provided a reliable legal mechanism for Israeli leaders to argue their cause in Washington and other foreign capitals.83

Having conceded from the outset that a settlement freeze ahead of the autonomy talks was unlikely, U.S. officials also admitted that under the best of circumstances the negotiations would still give Israel final say on retaining the right to expropriate disputed land from Arab owners.84 Characterizing the views of local West Bank residents, officials at the American

Consulate in Jerusalem expounded on growing local fears:

Many Palestinians look at the future through the experience of the past and see the possibility of these Jewish settlers slowly transforming the West Bank bit by bit into Jewish controlled entity; first the Jerusalem suburbs, Jordan Valley, Etzion Bloc and Kiryat Arba, then the other close in planned towns like Givon, Ma’aele Adumim, . A process of nibbling away at the remaining bedrock of Arab Palestine, splitting it with Israeli-built roads connecting Tel Aviv with the Jordan Valley, engulfing the area from Bethlehem to and half way to Jericho, and eventually ghettoizing the Arab population centers such as Nablus and Hebron. This may indeed be a far-fetched fear but such fears and paranoia are rampant and effect the general mood of the West Bank.85

Jesse Helms et al to Ronald Reagan, 6 March 1985; and reply by J. Edward Fox, undated, casefile 081477, CO001- 07, WHORM: Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA (hereafter RRL).

82 Sol M. Linowitz, The Making of a Public Man: A Memoir (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 225.

83 Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, Simha Erlich, prepared an extensive defense of Israel’s settlement policy (citing Rostow) and noting in his introduction that “We will continue our settlement effort- as we have every legal and moral right to do, and as is incumbent upon us if we wish to protect the most elementary right of any individual or body politic: the right to live.” See Insight, published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1.3, 14 , MFA-6969/3, ISA.

84 In a cable on West Bank attitudes towards land and settlements, the American Consulate in Jerusalem acknowledged that a freeze was desired, and the Palestinian Self Governing Authority (SGA) control was a “sine qua non,” in order to preempt any Israeli civil authority in the territories. West Bankers, the cable added, feared the settlements and that the 10,000 settlers were seen as “the first wave of an unknown horde to follow.” See American Consulate to Secretary of State, “Autonomy Negotiations: West Bank Attitudes Toward Land and Settlements,” 9 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE. For more on the complex and contested nature of land ownership in the Israeli- occupied West Bank, see Document 12, FCO 93, UKNA; American Consulate Jerusalem to Secretary of State, “Autonomy Negotiations: Land and Settlements,” 24 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE; American Consulate to Secretary of State, “Autonomy Negotiations: Settlements—Legal Status of Land,” 9 May 1979, PHE.

85 American Consulate, “Autonomy Negotiations: West Bank Attitudes Toward Land and Settlements,” PHE. 188

Lamenting that for twelve years the U.S. had been opposing settlement activity as “illegal” and

“an obstacle to peace,” the Consulate reported that this was “ignored or rejected” by Israel. “The

Palestinian Arab instead sees the U.S. as apparently unwilling or unable to put the force of our policy behind these strong words and, to the contrary, pouring more and more economic and military aid into the country which flaunts our strictures.”86

American officials were supported in this assessment by the critical voices of leading

Israeli politicians who looked on this expansion in the West Bank with dismay. Analyzing the views of the “charismatic and flamboyant” Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan,87 the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv described his insistence that the negotiations should not be a period of “grab” to establish settlements “where we do not think a permanent settlement is necessary,” but rather they should enable a final policy to be determined on those existing settlements already built.88

Dayan’s vision, however, was not in alignment with the dominant view of the Begin government, and he was excluded from the negotiating team, precipitating his resignation soon after.

Despite the systemic problems that they outlined, U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem reminded

Washington “there is no Palestinian negotiating partner.” The Camp David process, in their view, would remain subject to strong opposition by West Bankers, along with the PLO, Jordan and the wider Arab world.89 Even the most cooperative Palestinian leaders remained skeptical of the

86 Ibid.

87 See dossier, Moshe Dayan, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 16 February 1979, CREST (NLC-25-114-3-3-2), JCL.

88 American Embassy Tel Aviv to Washington, “Dayan on Autonomy,” 2 April 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE. For the UK view on the makeup of the autonomy team, critical of Dayan’s exclusion, see “Preparations for the Autonomy Negotiations,” 17 April 1979, Document 11, FCO 93, UKNA.

89 “Autonomy Negotiations: West Bank Attitudes Toward Land and Settlements,” 9 April 1979, PHE. The rationale for going forward in light of this assessment was to strengthen moderates ahead of a possible West Bank election. The possibility of a “Gaza first” option remained as well.

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autonomy negotiations. In an interview with the New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis,

Gaza mayor Rashid al-Shawa noted deep reservations about the process that was unfolding.

Mr. Begin tells the world that the state land must be theirs, that they can settle wherever they want, that the autonomy is of people and not land, that there will never be a Palestinian state. With all this, what am I going to negotiate about? I understand going and talking about details if the principle is right. But when you deny me the principle— self-determination—what is there to discuss?90

As a preview of what negotiations ultimately wrought, al-Shawa’s concerns—along with other premonitions—underscored a fundamental incompatibility: the negotiation over Palestinian autonomy would exclude meaningful sovereignty and would be tied up with the Israeli retention of land and expansion of settlements.91

Gathering in the White House Situation Room on the eve of the first meeting of the autonomy talks, members of the Presidential Review Committee took up the position and role of the U.S. in the negotiations. Secretary Vance opened with his concerns about the settlements, and the need for Sadat to push the issue with Begin privately. “If we can’t get a total freeze, than we should at least try to get some limits for a given period of time…If this gets into the public debate, the rhetoric will kill the chances of any agreement.”92 Ambassador Strauss and Carter’s domestic advisors discussed criticism that the autonomy talks were serving entirely political purposes. In Strauss’s view, “There may be some perception growing that I was appointed simply to handle the domestic problems associated with the negotiations.” Brzezinski concurred,

90 Anthony Lewis, “Autonomy in Gaza?” International Herald Tribune, 10 April 1979.

91 There was also strong evidence of ongoing dispossession of Arabs and expropriation of their land. See American Consulate Jerusalem to Secretary of State, “Israeli Settlements and Dispossession of Arabs,” 11 May 1979, Box 37, File 5, PHE. In two articles attacking the concept of administrative autonomy, Israeli journalist Amnon Kapeliouk argued that “South African Bantustans have more prerogative and wider margin of maneuver.” Kapeliouk criticized Israel for establishing administrative councils exclusively for the settlements, enshrining occupation and separation. See International Documents on Palestine, folder “Feb-April 1979,” Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Lebanon (IPS).

92 Presidential Review Committee Meeting, The White House Situation Room, 17 May 1979, 9:30-10:30 AM. Brzezinski Donated Collection, Subject File, Box 25, JCL. 190

adding “There is a suspicion that this is all just domestic politics and that we are abandoning our domestic activity altogether…we’re losing on both sides, the Arab world is both polarizing and fragmenting.”93 Brzezinski’s concern about the domestic perception of the talks underscored a deeper ambivalence about the U.S. role in the negotiations. In the meeting summary, the

National Security Advisor is recorded as arguing for a more restrained approach as mediator.

“We should base our initial statement on the Camp David accords, allowing the Egyptians and

Israelis to go through an inevitable period of arguing over how Camp David should be implemented. At a later date, the U.S. could step in with proposals to help bridge the differences.”94

In actuality, the possibilities of U.S. bridge proposals were subsumed by the starting positions of Israeli negotiators. As the primary convener of the autonomy talks, U.S. officials— especially chief interlocutors like Strauss and later Sol Linowitz—were clearly aware that

Begin’s prevailing view was incompatible with diplomatic progress. In a 1982 CIA memo on

“U.S.-Israeli differences over the Camp David peace process,” a lead Middle East analyst revisited the limits of the Israeli position.

Prime Minister Begin asserts that the CDA [Camp David Agreements] rule out the emergence of a Palestinian state. In Begin’s view the agreements “guarantee that under no condition” can a Palestinian state be created. In practice, Begin affectively rules out any exercise of Palestinian self-determination except one that continues Israel’s permanent position in the West Bank…Begin’s view is that the SGA [Self-Governing Authority] should be a solely administrative authority regulating the affairs of the Arab inhabitants and leaving control of the territory and all key security issues with Israel. In sum, autonomy is for people not territory and therefore does not prejudice Israel’s territorial claims to the West Bank.95

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid, “Summary of Conclusions.”

95 Redacted author, “Memorandum on U.S.-Israeli Differences Over the Camp David Peace Process, 24 August 1982,” Declassified 24 September 24. CREST (CIA-RDP 84B00049R00160401004-1), NARA, emphasis in original. Private correspondence has confirmed the likely author was Robert Ames, the CIA’s top Middle East analyst, later killed in the 18 April 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut. 191

In his memoirs, Sol Linowitz reflected further on Begin’s rationale, pointing to the above logic that shaped the course of the failed negotiations:

Part of the problem with the concept of “full autonomy,” which was his, was the fact that it was only a concept, a large and principled gesture that would have to be limited, of course, by the reality of Israeli interests. And the philosophical roots of the concept lay tangled in Begin’s distinction between autonomy for inhabitants of the land (which was what he claimed he meant) and autonomy on the land itself.96

While these inconsistencies may have been apparent at the time, they inhered in the American approach to the autonomy talks, and resurfaced in successive rounds of negotiations, beginning with the first meeting in , continuing in Ronald Reagan’s plan for Middle East peace during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and extending to the formal peace talks of the 1990s and

2000s.

Fully aware of Israeli intentions on settlements, security, and other key aspects of life in the occupied territories, U.S. diplomats went into the negotiations thinking they might be able to mediate between the parties. But instead, American involvement would legitimize a profoundly consequential political discussion about the fate of Palestinian self-rule in the territories while the possibility of their territorial rights and sovereignty had already been appropriated by Israel.97

The First Round

96 Linowitz, Making of a Public Man, 227.

97 U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis, writing in a cable about land requisition, noted that “The fact is that that the GOI [Government of Israel], under the constant goading of Sharon and Gush Emunim, appears to be moving towards abandonment of its forbearance concerning seizure of private land for settlements.” Gilbert Kulick to Secretary of State, “Land Requisition for Settlements,” 27 April 1979, PHE.

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Egyptian and Israeli delegations met in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba on Friday afternoon 25 May 1979 for the first round of autonomy talks.98 Early that morning, the Israeli army evacuated the northern Sinai town of El-Arish in coordination with the , completing an agreement to begin negotiations one month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.99 Dr. Joseph Burg, Israel’s Minister of Interior, and General , the Egyptian Defense Minister, led their respective delegations in the talks, held at Ben Gurion University. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Carter’s

Special Envoy to the Middle East, Robert Strauss, headed the American delegation.100

Strauss, who had been Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and successfully completed the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations as U.S. Trade

Representative, was a political figure deeply sympathetic to Israel.101 According to an internal

Israeli memo, Strauss’s belief in Israel’s conception of its own security would ensure his loyalty on matters as sensitive as the fate of Jerusalem. “He is the man who will go to the President

[Carter] close the door behind him and say the city will not be divided into two, and we must find an acceptable solution to the problem. He will do this, of course, after he hears and discusses

98 Jordan was opposed to the structure of these negotiations, critical of Camp David like several other Arab states who reacted negatively to a bilateral agreement. King Hussein did not accept the invitation to participate, leaving Egypt in charge of the discussion over the fate of the Palestinians.

99 This was agreed to in the joint Begin-Sadat letter of 26 March 1979 that accompanied the signing of the Israeli- Egyptian treaty.

100 Full minutes of all the autonomy meetings have now been declassified in the Israel State Archives, providing verbatim transcripts of the discussions. All official meetings were conducted in English, although side meetings and bilateral discussions between Israeli and American diplomats were often recorded in Hebrew. Legal memorandum and internal Israeli cabinet discussions that are crucial for understanding the background Israeli analysis and strategy towards the talks are also available in Hebrew. See relevant files in A-4155 and MFA-6898, ISA.

101 In his diary, President Carter had remarked upon Strauss’ initial selection: “If anyone can keep these negotiations on track and protect me from the Jewish community politically, it’s Bob Strauss.” See entry for 24 April 1979, Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, 315. On Strauss, see Kathryn J. McGarr, The Whole Damn Deal: Robert Strauss and the Art of Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

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Israel’s position and feeling on the topic.”102 Burg, the leader of Israel’s National Religious Party, was selected in part to safeguard Begin’s coalition allies, but also as a signal that the Prime

Minister viewed the autonomy issue as an internal Israeli domestic problem, not a matter for the

Foreign Ministry to deal with.103

Moshe Dayan, stung by his exclusion from the leadership position of the committee, tendered his resignation in October. His resignation letter cited Israel’s relations with Arabs in the territories as the cause, and for the final two years of his life, he worked to promote unilateral autonomy for Palestinians while ending Israeli military control in the West Bank.104 As Dayan recalled in his memoirs, “I…did not believe that Israeli sovereignty could be imposed on these

Arabs against their will.”105 Dayan’s preference was not territorial compromise or the creation of a Palestinian state, but full autonomy for Arabs within Israel, either in connection with Israel or

Jordan. He refused to advocate for Israeli annexation of the territories, and disagreed with members of the government who supported the appropriation of Arab land.106 It was a curious

102 Letter [Hebrew], Zvi Rafiah to Israeli Ambassador to U.S., Washington, 26 April 1979, Subject: Bob Strauss, A- 4339/6, ISA.

103 This is confirmed by Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, the Director General of Begin’s office, in his memoir, Lo Od Milhama [No More War] (Or Yehudah: Sifiyat Ma’ariv, 1995), 199.

104 Defense Minister Weizmann resigned as well. “After twelve months of sterile autonomy negotiations, Weizmann concluded that Begin had no intention of implementing the autonomy arrangements ‘because his desire for annexation under the old Herut dream ultimately overcame the visionary in him that would strive for peace.’” Kieval, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 163. Kieval argues it was the National Religious Party that pushed Begin away from moderation on autonomy— and left Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann furious. See Kieval, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 161. See also Weizmann’s interview with Tom Brokaw where he discusses the failures of the Camp David process. “Broadcast excerpt for the Israeli consulate,” 11 May 1981. A-7384/3, ISA.

105 Mosh Dayan, Breakthrough, 303.

106 Ibid, 305. The extent of Dayan’s conversations with Palestinian notables, and his alternative ideas for their political future, is discussed in his memoir on 306-320. For an incisive study of Dayan’s approach to the Palestinian question, see Nathan Yanai, “Moshe Dayan on the Palestinian Problem: His Proposal for Unilateral Implementation of the Camp David Autonomy Plan (1980-1981),” in Reeva S. Simon, ed., The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J.C. Hurewitz (New York: Middle East Institute, Columbia University, 1989).

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position for the general who had convinced Israelis after the 1967 war that they could somehow retain the territories without compromising the democratic character of the state.

Speaking on behalf of Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil, who was unable to attend,

General Ali opened the meeting. He invoked President Sadat, who “has emphasized repeatedly that the Palestinian problem is the heart and crux of the entire conflict.” Ali articulated guidelines to underpin the talks, emphasizing the need for Palestinian participation in determining their own future. “Only the Palestinians themselves can make such a decision, for self-determination is their God-given right. Our task is merely to define the powers and responsibilities of the self- governing authority with full autonomy and the modalities for electing it.”107 In a method parallel to the Israeli use of autonomy, the Egyptians thereby deployed a sacralized yet abstract concept of self-determination, as distinguished from procedural, yet politically decisive responsibilities, as a means to defer direct engagement with the Palestinians.108 This tactic served their immediate agenda as benevolent protectors of Palestinian rights, even as Sadat had all but cast the Palestinians aside in signing a bilateral treaty with Israel.

The absence of Palestinian participation in the autonomy meetings, which continued until their conclusion in 1982, was noted from the inception. In his opening remarks, Vance addressed it directly. “We regret the absence of the Kingdom of Jordan and of Palestinian representatives from these proceedings today…We want to make it clear that the invitation for them to join us remains open. At the same time, their absence need not check the progress of these

107 “Meeting of committee on autonomy, Friday 25 May 1979, 2:45 PM, Ben Gurion University, Beersheba.” A- 4318/1, ISA.

108 On the contradictory uses and meanings of self-determination, and the importance of examining its variegated history, see Bradley R. Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 1970s.” For a parallel case, see also Simpson’s article "Denying the 'First Right': The United States, Indonesia, and the Ranking of Human Rights by the Carter Administration, 1976-1980," International History Review 31, no. 4 (2009): 788-826.

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negotiations.”109 U.S. diplomats, despite Vance’s plea, privately supported Palestinian exclusion from the negotiations. In one secret conversation between Israeli Minister Burg and U.S.

Ambassador Strauss, the two men agreed to proceed without Palestinian representation.

Burg: Sadat said perhaps we can go ahead for the moment without Palestinians. In the world Palestinians means PLO and this is poison for us …

Strauss: As far as we are concerned we agree that for the moment, for the next few months, we can get along without Palestinians … . We must put the dowry together and assume that we will find the bride.”110

Although Vance stressed the American belief that “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” such consent was markedly absent in the case of the occupied

Palestinians. “We believe that the Palestinian people must have the right for themselves and their descendants to live with dignity and freedom, and with the opportunity for economic fulfillment and political expression,” Vance had remarked in his opening speech. He had also accounted for the . “We must make a start to deal with the problem of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza. They too must know that an accepted and respected place exists for them within the international community.”111 Like much of the Carter administration’s rhetoric and approach to human rights, it was, in the words of one critic, “more apparent than real.”112

As vacuous as the Egyptian and American endorsements of Palestinian self-determination may have been, they were met with an overwhelmingly negative Israeli response. In his opening

109 “Meeting of committee on autonomy, Friday , 1979, 2:45 PM, Ben Gurion University, Beersheba.” A- 4318/1, ISA.

110 Excerpt from “Secret: Record of a meeting held on Tuesday , 1979 between Dr. Burg and Mr. Robert Strauss,” A-4316/7, ISA.

111 “Meeting of committee on autonomy, Friday May 25, 1979, 2:45 PM, Ben Gurion University, Beersheba.” A- 4318/1, ISA.

112 Buckaloo, “Carter’s Nicaragua,” 248. 196

speech, Burg remarked that at the heart of autonomy “lies the conviction that the Palestinian

Arabs should and must conduct their own daily lives for themselves and by themselves.” But he stressed a conceptual distinction. “What I must make clear and what must be understood from the outset is that autonomy does not and cannot imply sovereignty … we must, by definition, reject a-priori an independent Palestinian statehood. Israel will never agree, and indeed, totally rejects the propositions, declarations or establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.”113 Israel’s overarching priority, as successive rounds made clear, was to keep the talks in motion and embed a hegemonic definition of autonomy without enabling Palestinian sovereignty or statehood.

Burg’s position throughout the talks rested on a dramatic narrative of Israel’s security needs. “No hostile element or agent or force dare control the heartland of this land to threaten the lives of its city dwellers and villagers and thereby hold a knife to the jugular vein of Israel.”114 In

Israeli diplomatic parlance, Palestinians often denoted the PLO, and as Begin himself would tell

Strauss, “The PLO is beyond the pale of human civilization.”115 Until the conclusion of the negotiations, then, no Palestinians would participate in a discussion about their own future, nor would a joint Jordanian delegation that might mitigate concerns about PLO involvement. A confidant of Burg at the time, American Jewish leader Henry Siegman, later recalled discussions during which the Israeli Minister of Interior admitted the mere existence of the talks was a mechanism for “shooting the dog” of Palestinian autonomy.116

113 “Meeting of committee on autonomy, Friday May 25, 1979, 2:45 PM, Ben Gurion University, Beersheba.” A- 4318/1, ISA.

114 See the meeting minutes of May 25, 1979 in A-4318/1, ISA.

115 See Strauss-Begin talks, Sept. 12, 1979, A-4316/7, ISA.

116 Henry Siegman, “Hurricane Carter,” The Nation, 4 January 2007; and personal interview with the author, Pound Ridge, NY, 14 January 2012. 197

Egypt’s View of Autonomy

Given the overarching Israeli aim in the autonomy talks, and America’s supporting role,

Egypt’s position and the PLO reaction require further explanation. In tracing the records of both parties, historians must confront a more limited primary source base, a result of the asymmetrical nature of negotiations over the Palestinian question. This disparity is also the result of restricted

Egyptian access for this period and the absence of state institutions and systematic record keeping in the case of the Palestinians.117 Nevertheless, PLO traces within U.S. diplomatic records as well as official Palestinian publications yields a more complete account of the talks.118

Some crucial Egyptian records were also provided to the Palestinian delegation ahead of the

Madrid Conference talks, and have been consulted as well.119

To mark the one-year anniversary of the signing of the Camp David Accords, the

Egyptian government sent Vice President Hosni Mubarak to Washington to participate in a meeting with President Carter and Israeli representatives. In a private conversation, Mubarak and

Egyptian Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal gathered with President Carter, Secretary Vance, National

Security Advisor Brzezinski and Ambassador Strauss to discuss Egypt’s economic, military and

117 For more on the latter, see Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), xiii; and author interview with Yezid Sayigh, 25 July 2012, Beirut, Lebanon. The press and other sources at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut offer a corrective, as demonstrated for an earlier period by Chamberlin, The Global Offensive.

118 In reading ‘against the grain’ in this manner, I draw on the example offered by Ranajit Guha in his introduction to Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). By using the Israeli and American records creatively, as Guha did with British colonial records, we can better appreciate how power is deployed, and as Burg and Strauss show above, who may be excluded.

119 I was given access to these documents [in English and Arabic] by Rashid Khalidi, a member of the Palestinian delegation. Khalidi drew on some of them in his book Brokers of Deceit, and a portion have been uploaded to the website of the Institute for Palestine Studies as an open source archive. http://www.palestine- studies.org/resources/palestinian-delegation (accessed 10 March 2015). When drawing upon the documents, either the private collection or the selection on the IPS website, I have cited them as Papers of the Palestinian Delegation to the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations (PPD).

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political concerns. Mubarak’s priority was economic; in light of Egypt’s isolation from the Arab world since Camp David, the country was relying on the U.S. for hard currency and extensive wheat imports. Listing items like maize, animal fats, rice and chicken, the Egyptian Vice

President outlined a “crisis” facing his country, which was now dependent on American aid. “It is the food of the people. If Egypt could buy it elsewhere it would do so, but it can’t,” Mubarak stressed.120

Turning to military concerns, Mubarak warned of the growing threat from Soviet influence in the Middle East and the attendant risks of Egypt’s marginalization. The country needed more equipment, including Phantom jets and modern F-4’s, to ensure continued stability against neighbors like Libya. Mubarak also asked for destroyers and more naval equipment to bolster his country’s power and the position of its primary patron. “Egypt is keen to keep the image of the United States in good shape…a worsening image would be detrimental to both of us.” Linking Egypt’s fate with America’s regional influence, Mubarak then turned to the autonomy talks, imploring the Americans to reach a “precise conclusion.” In Mubarak’s view,

Sadat felt the U.S. had to convince Begin to move, “so that the Arab world (the Saudis and other moderates) would know something is being done.”121

In his response to Mubarak, Carter stressed the need for a more coordinated Egyptian position on autonomy. “Sometimes it is difficult…to be more forceful—[as in] protecting

Palestinian rights, promoting the autonomy talks, preventing settlements—than [is] Sadat. It is hard when we take a strong position, and Sadat is more accommodating.” It was clear from

Carter’s remarks that the Egyptian stance in the negotiations had demanded even less from Israel

120 Memorandum of Conversation, “Mubarak meeting,” The Cabinet Room, 17 September 1979, 1:38-2:30PM. Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, JCL.

121 Ibid.

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than the United States. “Begin is stubborn and courageous. He will say no if he means no; yes if he means yes. On several occasions, we [the U.S.] have been more forceful in carrying out the

Camp David accords than has Egypt,” Carter warned. On the difficult issues like the fate of

Jerusalem, settlements and the Palestinian question, Carter felt Egypt and the U.S. had to align their approach. “We both need to be forceful, in public and in private. Jews in America constantly say: why are we tough when Sadat doesn’t care?” Egypt, in Carter’s view, seemed to abdicate responsibility on a number of the broad issues emanating from Camp David. Referring to a recent Israeli cabinet decision permitting Israelis to buy Arab land in the West Bank, Carter turned to Mubarak. “What is the Egyptian position? We don’t know.” Mubarak, as the meeting notes indicate, simply “agreed.”122

Egypt’s seeming acquiescence on the central issues confronting the future of the

Palestinian question extended to the level of more minute debates in the autonomy negotiations.

During the sixth round of talks held at the San Stefano Hotel in the Egyptian coastal city of

Alexandria, Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil got into a disagreement with his Israeli interlocutors over the mechanisms for implementing autonomy on the ground.123 Egypt believed that any Self-

Governing Authority should have legislative, executive and judicial powers, while the Israeli position was limited to budgetary and regulatory powers. The Israelis also insisted on inserting language that emphasized autonomy was only for inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza “and not to territory.” Khalil knew this was a ruse to strip autonomy of all meaning, arguing that in the

Camp David Accords “it was never mentioned that it [will] apply to inhabitants and not

122 Ibid.

123 Minutes of session 2, committee on autonomy, San Stefano Hotel, Alexandria, Sept. 26, 1979, 6:45 PM. MFA- 6897/5, ISA.

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territory.”124 Yet despite his reservations, Khalil acceded to the Israeli interpretation of Camp

David, particularly on the question of Palestinian statehood. “We have to be careful in our phrases,” Khalil remarked to Burg. “I cannot come and say powers and responsibilities that could lead to forming an independent Palestinian state.” Burg quickly replied, “On this I would go along with you. This is the point.” It was a clear indication that even for Egypt, the outcome of the autonomy talks cohered with Israeli and American priorities to avoid the possible emergence of a Palestinian state.125

Khalil was aware of the perception his acquiescence would generate outside the negotiating room. “We don’t like that this will grow out and leak and then the Palestinians will say, well you have already accepted the thesis that the Self Governing Authority and the responsibilities and so on will apply only to the inhabitants and not to the land…”126 This acknowledgement that autonomy would preclude the creation of a Palestinian state matched the position of Sol Linowitz, the lead U.S. negotiator who replaced Ambassador Strauss in later rounds of negotiations. In a private letter to one critic of the ongoing talks, Linowitz stressed,

“Both Egypt and the United States have emphatically stated to Israel that they (and we) view such an autonomy as precluding the creation of an independent Palestinian state.”127

The PLO Responds

124 Ibid.

125 All quotes in this paragraph are from “Minutes of session 2, committee on autonomy, San Stefano Hotel, Alexandria, 256 September 1979, 6:45 PM.” MFA-6897/5, ISA.

126 From the 26 September 1979 transcript in MFA-6897/5, ISA.

127 Ambassador Sol Linowitz to Esther Baruch, 4 , “Correspondence 1980, A-G.” Box 51, Folder 12, Sol M. Linowitz Papers, Manuscript Division, LOC. Linowitz was a seasoned diplomat who had previously negotiated the Panama Canal Treaty for Carter in 1977.

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In light of these underlying assumptions guiding the negotiations, the PLO was bitterly opposed to the talks from the outset. At the time, there was tremendous pressure on American diplomats to avoid engagement with members of the organization. U.S. relations with the PLO had been heavily curtailed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 1975 agreement on non- recognition.128 When two Carter administration officials mentioned offhandedly to a

Congressional subcommittee that the U.S. might seek to engage with the organization, Begin drafted a cable to Vance invoking the agreement: “I would naturally assume, that the United

States Government, even without consulting us, would wish to refrain from having any contact with this terrorist organization whose method is the murder of innocent civilians, women and children, and whose purpose is the destruction of the state of Israel.”129

The PLO instead turned to engagement with Europe as a means of furthering diplomatic inroads and speaking out against the talks. On 6 July 1979, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat arrived in for extensive meetings with Austrian Chancellor and West German

Chancellor . Arafat asserted that Camp David had destroyed the possibility of a

Geneva Middle East peace conference and any chance for a comprehensive settlement.130 Israeli

Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan told Kreisky, who was Jewish, that the meeting was “a demonstrative act against the State of Israel and the Jewish people,” and the Israeli cabinet pulled its ambassador from .131 But the welcomed the Kreisky talks, and the PLO

128 Kissinger had pledged to the Israelis that the U.S. would not deal with the PLO unless the organization acknowledged Israel's right to exist and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. For detailed analysis of this agreement and its historical context, see Osamah Khalil, “Oslo’s Roots: Kissinger, the PLO and the Peace Process,” Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, September 2013.

129 Letter to Secretary Vance, secret final draft, 29 April 1979, 2 PM, MFA-6915/11, ISA. The officials were Hal Saunders and Herber Hansell.

130 Haliyat, Journal of the Center for Documentation and Research, Lebanon, Vol. 15, pg. 278, IPS.

131 Ibid., 279. 202

issued a bulletin stating that the meeting “represents an increasing European awareness of the failing of U.S. policy in the Middle East.”132 Arafat’s diplomatic success in Austria bolstered his international standing, and reports of the PLO Chairman’s “cheerful and hopeful mood” circulated in the Carter White House.133

For the PLO leadership, following the talks from a distance in Lebanon, the implications of autonomy were distressingly clear. Arafat conveyed his views to the U.S. government via a secret back channel.134 The PLO Chairman, seeking global recognition of the Palestinian plight, recognized that the PLO had to shift from armed resistance to a negotiated settlement. But he described the Camp David Accords as nothing more than “meaningless negotiations about some permanent colonial status for the Palestinians under Israeli rule.” The PLO leader warned of the

“massive build-up of U.S. arms to both Israel and Egypt, and preparations of another Arab-

Israeli war which Begin is doing everything to provoke though his attacks on South Lebanon.

That is not a treaty for peace—it is a treaty for war.”135

Arafat was equally dismissive of autonomy, which he called “a farce,” instead suggesting an alternative path. “If there is a clear platform for serious, comprehensive peace negotiations,”

132 Ibid., 280. See also “Chairman Arafat in Vienna,” Editorial in Palestine, 5.13 (July 1979), IPS. On 3 French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and was quickly backed by Great Britain as well.

133 See “Summary of two evenings of talk with Yasir Arafat- July 24, 25, 1979,” undated report, NSA Brzezinski Material, Box 49, File 6, Palestine Liberation Organization 5/79-10/80, JCL.

134 Despite a ban on direct diplomatic communication with the PLO put in place by Kissinger in 1975, the CIA maintained regular contact with members of the organization. See , The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames (New York: Crown, 2014). For more on the back channel, see the records of U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon John Gunther Dean at the Jimmy Carter Library. As Dean writes in the finding aid, “What emerges from all these papers is that during the period 1979 – 1980, the U.S. authorities in Washington considered the PLO and Mr. Arafat valid interlocutors on matters pertaining to the over-all problems of the Near East and not only to security interests related to Americans in the region.” Donated material, Ambassador John Gunther Dean, JCL.

135 “Summary of two evenings of talk with Yasir Arafat- July 24, 25, 1979,” undated report, NSA Brzezinski Material, Box 49, File 6, Palestine Liberation Organization 5/79-10/80, JCL.

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Arafat remarked to U.S. officials, “we will of course take part.” In Arafat’s view, that platform include three major points.

1) Human rights for the Palestinians; 2) The principle of the right of return for the Palestinians; 3) The right of the Palestinians to have our own state.136

In the wider context of an emerging discourse on human rights in the 1970s, the PLO demands echoed similar political struggles across the globe. For more than a decade, Arafat upheld these demands, eventually securing the PLO’s return to the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the signing of the Oslo Accords. But this eventual acceptance of limited self-rule through the establishment of the Palestinian Authority diluted the central elements of the Palestinian national struggle, bumping up against the ceiling of autonomy first laid out by Begin in 1977.

Autonomy into the 1980s

Domestic considerations in the U.S. coupled with several crises abroad, including the onset of the Iranian revolution, precipitated Carter’s disengagement from the autonomy talks by the end of 1979.137 Given Carter’s heightened awareness of American Jewish communal concerns on the eve of the 1980 election, their perspective on the autonomy negotiations requires explanation.138 Dayan’s resignation early in the autonomy negotiations had been an especially troubling indication of the Begin government’s increasingly rightward shift. In his Chairman’s report to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, an umbrella group of

American Jewry, Jewish leader Theodore Mann voiced concerns about Israel’s stance. He noted

136 See “Summary of two evenings of talk,” NSA Brzezinski Material, Box 49, File 6, JCL.

137 Successive rounds, however, continued into the early 1980s, as chapter four details.

138 As Carter noted in his diary on 12 October 1979, “We are concerned about the Mideast talks becoming stagnant, which may be the best state for them until Sadat gets his land back and we solidify our political support among American Jews.” Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, 361. 204

the signs of an “annexationist cabinet” coming to power, one whose ultimate goal would be extending Jewish sovereignty in the West Bank. Mann voiced worry that this would divide

American Jewry, spawning fights over settlements, “essentially a peripheral issue.” Rather,

Mann wrote, “Jews should—must—debate fundamental religious and moral issues, and issues that bear on their survival as a people…the issue on which all other issues hinge, is whether Jews regard sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza as being in their interest.”139

In Mann’s view, which he shared with other Jewish leaders, this was not a question of

Israel’s right to sovereignty in the West Bank. “I think most of us – all of us – would agree that

Israel’s right is as good or better than anyone else’s…the issue rather is whether it is good for the

Jewish people…to attempt to achieve such sovereignty.” The Chairman was rather open to the competing positions on sovereignty, with many Jews invoking a religious right to the territories, while others felt it should be “abjured because of the equally deep religious view that Jews should not rule over 1,200,000 Arabs who do not wish to be ruled by them, no matter how benignly.”140

The underlying hesitancy voiced by Mann concerned the wisdom of airing such a divisive debate in public, which he felt would be taken advantage of “by the President, the State

Department, and Congressmen who are critically important to Israel.” The choice to avoid this conversation publicly stemmed from its potential impact on the negotiations. “Our very success in having helped to create such a remarkable ally for that beleaguered nation of Israel, is what imposes restraints upon us in speaking out.”141 Ultimately, the calculus of Mann and his fellow

139 “Report of Theodore Mann to the Conference of Presidents, November 8, 1979,” enclosure sent to Israeli Ambassador , Washington D.C, 15 November 1979. A-4328/11, ISA.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

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Jewish leaders contributed in part to a silencing of dissent and a rightward shift in American

Jewish political life, a trend that directly affected the Palestinian question in the aftermath of

Camp David and continued to undermine the fate of Palestinian national self-determination in subsequent years.142

Ambassador Linowitz continued to work diligently to reconcile the central divisions between Egypt and Israel in a bid to achieve some tangible results for the Palestinians.143 During a meeting in Cairo in January 1980, the Egyptian and Israeli delegations presented Linowitz with varying models of autonomy to break the deadlock over the permissible degree of Palestinian self-rule. Israel’s model was entirely functional— the establishment of what was called a “Self

Governing Authority (Administrative Council)” for Palestinians to deal with shared issues, while residual sovereignty remained with Israel. This functionalism reflected a persistent employment of autonomy as a political and discursive tool to diminish the possibility of sovereignty. Egypt’s autonomy model, however, was based on the mode of civil administration used by the Israeli military government, and was intended to provide Palestinians with actual power for self-rule, in the form of exclusive authority over land and inhabitants. Conceptually, the Egyptian model was

142 Some months after Mann’s memo, Carter would write in his diary that “Begin is driving Israel into almost complete isolation among the nations of the world and even alienating a lot of American support that has been the salvation of Israel until now.” 23 July 1980, Carter, White House Diary, 450. For more on the internal political transformations of American Jewish political life during this period, I benefitted from the private archive of Henry Siegman, former Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress (1978-1994); the American Jewish Committee Oral History Collection, Dorot Jewish Division, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations; the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and the American Jewish Congress Archives at the Center for Jewish History, New York, NY.

143 See Paul Hoffman, “Israel Debates Palestinian Self-Rule as Negotiations with Egypt Near,” New York Times, 20 May 1979, 12; David K. Shipler, “Toughest Mideast Peace Issue: Palestinians,” New York Times, 22 March 1980, 3; and “The ‘Autonomy’ Stall,” editorial, New York Times, 18 April 1980, A30.

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akin to a mandate for the development of an eventual independent state after an interim waiting period.144

Linowitz selected the Israeli model as the basis for continuing negotiations, and the

Egyptians reluctantly agreed. Secret documents reveal prior meetings between the U.S. and

Israeli delegations to prepare and adopt the Israeli position paper, with U.S. Ambassador James

Leonard telling Israeli representatives “We will ask you, and even suggest to you, some formulations in conformity with what you gave to us.”145 Egypt’s acquiescence reflected Sadat’s underlying personal trust in the U.S. ability to extract concessions from Israel during the course of the negotiations. Leading members of Sadat’s delegation at Camp David had, however, attacked this confidence. Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, warned Sadat about the autonomy provisions of Camp David just before resigning in . “We are only deceiving ourselves if we say this project will end in the realization of a just solution to the

Palestinian cause, for Israel will use it as an instrument and a source of support to liquidate the issue in accordance with its expansionist intentions.”146

144 Sicherman, Palestinian Autonomy, Self Government and Peace, 45. For the full record of all these crucial January meetings, see the verbatim transcripts in MFA-6897/6, ISA. In a sign of the significance of this contestation over the autonomy models in the meeting of the “Powers and Responsibilities” working group, excerpts of the discussion and the full model presented by the Israelis was provided to the Palestinian delegation at the Madrid talks. These were discovered in Rashid Khalidi’s box files from Madrid. See PPD; and for the original, “Meeting of Working Group on Powers and Responsibilities of the Autonomy Committee,” 16 January 1980, 10:45AM, Mena House, Cairo. MFA-6897/6, ISA.

145 See “Record of a meeting which took place at the Minister of Interior on Sunday, January 27, 1980, at 5:00 PM.” A-4316/10, ISA.

146 Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel, The Camp David Accords: A Testimony by Sadat's Foreign Minister (London: KPI, 1986), 366. When the Israelis first presented their version of a Self Governing Authority Model (Administrative Council), alongside detailed flow charts of the various categories and divisions, Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Ezzat Abdel Latif, the leader of the Egyptian Working Group, replied in brief. “I would like to put on record and at once that as a model for full autonomy, what has been presented to us is totally rejected by us. We consider it unacceptable because of many reasons. We find that it is based on a false assumption, that there will be powers shared or jointly administered by the Autonomy and Israel, which we do not accept; that there will be residual authority kept by Israel, which we reject…In fact, the underlying philosophy of such a plan, such a model, is the perpetuation of Israeli control on the West bank and Gaza and the continuation of its illegal occupation, which is totally unacceptable to us…What has been introduced to us now represents a step backward and not a step forward. 207

While Kamel’s warnings evoked the skepticism of other critics like Brezhnev, Sadat was primarily concerned with achieving a peace deal with Israel and with securing U.S. backing for internal reforms in his country. He believed Egypt in the post-Nasser era was “encumbered with worries and problems,” and that its public utilities were “in a state of collapse.”147 These domestic concerns fueled Egypt’s turn away from Soviet patronage in the wake of the 1973 war, and culminated in Sadat’s decision to pursue a bilateral agreement with Israel.148 But the

Egyptian president also became increasingly vocal about Begin’s intransigent stance towards implementing Camp David. In conversations with Carter during the summer of 1980, Sadat demanded the Israeli Prime Minister agree that “Jerusalem is negotiable, stop the settlements, and take care of the human rights of the Palestinians.” Recording this conversation in his diary,

Carted noted: “I don’t believe he [Begin] will do any of these things, and has dug himself a hole very damaging to Israel.”149

There was some follow-up bilateral discussion about actual Palestinian participation in the implementation of Camp David, most notably in a series of meetings between Sadat, Carter, and their respective Egyptian and American delegations in Washington during a visit in the spring of 1980. As Ambassador Linowitz raised the prospect of Palestinians joining in the

It represents rather a regression than an advance and as such it makes mockery of Camp David, the Camp David framework and the Joint Letter and of the whole peace process.” See “Meeting of Working Group on Powers and Responsibilities of the Autonomy Committee,” 16 January 1980, 10:45AM, Mena House, Cairo. MFA-6897/6, ISA; and additional copy in PPD.

147 Kamel, The Camp David Accords, 367.

148 On the impact of 1973, see Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente. On domestic opposition to peace with Israel in Egypt, see Dominic Coldwell, “Egypt’s ‘Autumn of Fury’: The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process between 1973 and 1981” (M. Phil. Thesis, , 2003).

149 2 August 1980, Carter, White House Diary, 453. Recently declassified CIA analysis of Sadat’s position on autonomy in 1981 sheds further light on the evolution of the Egyptian view. “Sadat does not want a fully independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. He fears such a state would be pro-Soviet and a threat to regional stability.” See “Egypt: Sadat, Israel, and the U.S.: An Intelligence Memorandum, Secret.” July 1981, CREST (CIA- RDP06T00412R000200340001-1), NARA.

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negotiating process, Osama El-Baz, an Egyptian advisor, astutely remarked that their participation without “either a commitment that Israel would withdraw completely or under some other shield for their fears – i.e. of Israeli de facto control—then the outcome to the negotiations would either be the status quo or occupation.”150 In El-Baz’s view of the Palestinian position,

“they believe there is a disincentive to join Camp David…It is the prevailing view among many

PLO members and on the West Bank and Gaza. They see the best alternative as waiting, and maybe getting a better deal.” Brzezinski then dryly remarked, “When the Palestinians see the map, it will not be a better deal.” As the negotiations continued that spring, it was clear that

Israeli de facto control in the territories had been secured. Moreover, U.S. negotiators were often present and participating in discussions with the Israeli leadership when this jurisdiction over settlements and the wider West Bank was boldly asserted.151

This diplomatic environment and Sadat’s domestic preoccupations contributed to a feeble

Egyptian stance in the negotiations. In a further indication of the increasingly asymmetrical nature of the autonomy talks, the Egyptians were often excluded from key meetings between the

Israeli and American delegations. Records of these bilateral meetings highlight a pattern by which Palestinian concerns were rendered subsidiary to Israeli priorities. Among these priorities was ensuring that negotiations over possible Palestinian autonomy did not undermine the physical expansion of settlements in the occupied territories.

150 Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President’s Third Meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al- Sadat, The Cabinet Room, 9 April 1980, 10:10-11:43 AM, Brzezinski Donated Collection, Box 37, JCL (emphasis in original).

151 See in particular, the discussion between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin and their delegations in the Cabinet Room on 15 April 1980, 10:31 AM-12:07 PM. Brzezinski Donated Collection, Box 37, JCL. PLO representatives watched these developments with biting criticism. See, for example, the editorial, “Autonomy Talks in Deadlock,” Palestine 6.2 (), IPS. “The Palestinian people are not in a hurry. We waited thirty-one years and we can wait more. They can continue building settlements with U.S. dollars, they can set for their schemes for the Palestinian cities and towns as they are doing now in Hebron; but Palestine will remain ours.”

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One example of what this linkage enabled can be found in the minutes of a meeting between U.S. Ambassador Linowitz and the full Israeli delegation in Jerusalem on 2 September

1980. Turning to the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, Linowitz asked Ariel Sharon to explain the status of settlement development and the rationale of expansion in light of their sensitive role in the autonomy talks. “We are finishing the skeleton,”

Sharon answered, anticipating the announcement of four further settlements. In one of the clearest expressions of what these settlements were intended to achieve, Sharon then outlined his aims.

You have to take into consideration, and again I am saying why I believe we have to hurry, why I believe that we have to finish it before the coming elections in Israel: the facts that were created in the areas, the skeleton, the map that exists practically in the area now does not allow any more and will not enable in the future any territorial compromise. I don’t see any possibility of territorial compromise. There are many possibilities of political answers or, let’s say modifications, but I cannot see any territorial compromise. I don’t see now any area that can be handed to anybody having this skeleton practically in the area.152

The “skeleton” Sharon helped design and implement on occupied Palestinian land was a means to ensure none of the territory could ever be ceded to the Arab inhabitants. This framework of the settlement project, and its deployment as a prerequisite even for diplomatic discussion of autonomy, was explicitly meant to prevent any cession of territory by Israel, or the creation of a

Palestinian state, interlinked objectives that have been achieved and maintained up to the present day.

This dialectic—working internationally to deploy autonomy as a means of dealing politically with Palestinians on the one hand, and locally developing settlements to extend Israeli

152 “Meeting between Ministerial Committee for Autonomy talks and U.S. Special Ambassador, Mr. Sol Linowitz, Sept 2, 1980, 11:30 AM, Cabinet Room, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” A-4316/14, ISA. On Sharon’s role as “master builder” of the settlements, see David Landau, Arik: The Life of Ariel Sharon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 153-81.

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territorial sovereignty on the other—clearly illustrates the mechanics of a transformative occupation at work. Sharon’s affirmation to Linowitz in the autonomy meeting of September

1980 was merely the instantiation of this process within the U.S.-Israel bilateral discussion.

American diplomats were fully aware of the consequences. As Linowitz later wrote in his memoir, “Palestinian autonomy would have little meaning if Israel could continuously redefine its security needs with reference to the land supposedly under the self-governing Palestinian authority.”153 Despite these retroactive misgivings, minutes of the autonomy meetings in which

Linowitz participated clearly demonstrate that when confronted with Israeli actions, the leading

U.S. diplomat was unable to halt or reverse expansion in any meaningful way.

Succumbing to foreign policy missteps and economic troubles at home, Carter lost the

1980 presidential election to former California Governor Ronald Reagan.154 Clashes with the

American Jewish community over Israel and the Palestinian question, which had contributed to his defeat in the New York Democratic primary against Edward Kennedy, drove a larger number of Jewish voters than ever to the Republican Party.155 Linowitz, with the encouragement of both

153 Linowitz, The Making of a Public Man, 226.

154 For more on the significance of the election, see Elizabeth Drew, Portrait of an Election: The 1980 Presidential Campaign (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981). Jewish voters abandoned the President in droves during the campaign, reverting to the suspicions that they had harbored in 1976. This shift frustrated Carter’s campaign staff immensely. As Drew wrote in her election diaries, “they know that the problem arises out of mixed signals from the administration over its policy towards Israel- the hapless U.N. vote last March, and hints seeming to come from Brzezinski’s office that after the election the U.S. will be tougher towards Israel.” See Drew, Portrait, 318.

155 Carter, who had managed to win over seventy percent of the Jewish vote in 1976, only mustered forty five percent in 1980, an all time low for a Democrat. See Tivnan, The Lobby, 134 and Aaron Rosenbaum, “Woo and Woe on the Campaign Trail,” Moment, Jan.-Feb. 1981. In his diaries, Carter displays some bitterness over the results. Recording a meeting after the election with Al Moses, a liaison to the Jewish community, Carter wrote “I told him I was really disgusted with the American Jewish community, making these kind of demands [on AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia]…the Jews didn’t even give me a majority…I told him I was not bitter about it, which I’m not, but that I would never understand it….I would have been better off if I had ignored them, I think.” 15 November 1980. In his accompanying editorial notes from 2010 Carter adds, “I still have deep regrets about the fact that I alienated many American Jews during my time as president…when I pressed Israel, during and after my presidency, to withdraw from other occupied Arab territory as a necessary prerequisite to peace, I was considered by some Jewish Americans to be anti-Israel.” Carter, White House Diary, 485.

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Carter and President-elect Reagan, returned to Israel in December 1980 for another round of talks. The regional context in which negotiations were transpiring had been transformed by the hostage crisis in Tehran and the outbreak of the Iran-, while the West Bank itself was in the throes of upheaval. The PLO-aligned mayor of Nablus, , had been deported, and a Jewish yeshiva had been opened in Hebron. Linowitz held several private meetings with

Begin, imploring the Israeli Prime Minister to work harder for a resolution, but there was no progress.156

In his final report to President Carter, Linowitz outlined the state of negotiations and assessed the prospects of their success in a new administration. He told Carter that much had been achieved in the talks, aside from five core issues: “1) Source of power; 2) Water and land rights; 3) Jewish settlements; 4) Security; and 5) East Jerusalem.”157 Given the effort that had been expended in dozens of meetings, this extensive list underscored the effectiveness of Israeli tactics in negotiating autonomy along such narrow lines. There was a slim possibility that these issues would be tackled anew in the shifting ideological context of the Reagan White House.

Carter, who had sacrificed a great deal of political capital by offering limited support for some form of Palestinian self-rule during his tenure, was bitterly disappointed with the failure of the autonomy talks. During his final meeting with Israel’s ambassador to the U.S., Ephraim

Evron, the outgoing president lamented the state of affairs. “I don’t see how they [Israel] can continue as an occupying power depriving the Palestinians of basic human rights, and I don't see how they can absorb three million more Arabs into Israel without letting the Jews become a

156 Cable, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, 16 December 1980, RAC Project Number (NLC-16-121-7- 22-9), JCL.

157 Ambassador Sol Linowitz to President Jimmy Carter, “Progress in the autonomy negotiations,” RAC Project Number (NLC-128-9-5-7-8), JCL. An alternate, sanitized version, withholding Linowitz’s concerns about the future prospect of the autonomy talks under Reagan, was released to the public. See Box 10, Folder 5, Jan-July 1981, Sol M. Linowitz Papers, LOC.

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minority in their own country. Begin showed courage in giving up the Sinai. He did it to keep the

West Bank.”158 It was a clear-eyed assessment, borne out by the rhetoric and policies of the

Israeli government throughout the negotiations, both of which had been condoned by the acquiescent mediation of Carter’s own administration.

Conclusion

The trajectory of the autonomy negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza Strip examined in this chapter should be seen as a continuation of a longer diplomatic endeavor to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel’s vision of autonomy was dependent on the extension of state sovereignty throughout the occupied territories, a mechanism of “de facto annexation” that blurred political boundaries and perpetuated conflict with the Palestinians.159

Looking back at the origins and outcome of the talks, there are multiple reasons why the U.S. and Egypt sustained these successive rounds of negotiations. Carter confronted domestic pressures and resurgent Cold War concerns in the Middle East, and conveners of the talks exhibited a pattern of systemic alignment with Israeli negotiating tactics. Egypt’s move away from the Soviet Union, extending back to the 1973 War, had generated an internal preoccupation with domestic reform and a disregard for wider Arab political aims. For both countries, simply holding the autonomy talks was presented as a marker of progress and a continuation of Camp

David’s success. The negotiations sustained the victory of bilateral peace for Sadat, drawing attention away from more hardline critics who had opposed Camp David for the very reason that

158 15 January 1981, Carter, White House Diary, 508.

159 See Ian S. Lustick, “Israel and the West Bank After Elon Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto Annexation,” Middle East Journal 35, no. 4 (1981): 557-77. 213

it undermined Palestinian self-determination. Autonomy’s legacy, therefore, forces a reassessment of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a moment of diplomatic triumph.

As damaging as the immediate failure of the autonomy talks may have been, the impact on later iterations of the Palestinian question have also been crippling.160 By conditioning

Palestinian political rights on a narrowly functionalist and non-territorial definition of autonomy alongside continued Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories, the talks served to undercut any basis for possible Palestinian statehood. Begin’s autonomy plan, as both records from his time in office and later discussions make clear, became the basis for the U.S. and Israeli negotiating positions— and the birth of the Palestinian Authority— in the years that followed.161

The link between the autonomy talks and the Oslo Accords is almost entirely absent from scholarly and diplomatic studies of the peace process. But in the view of former Israeli Knesset member and political scientist Naomi Chazan, Camp David

Indirectly curtailed the prospects of territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza. By furnishing a conceptual distinction between peace and territories they actually encouraged Israeli settlement. By minimizing the sense of urgency previously associated with the occupation they deferred negotiations on alternative solutions. And by leaving the notion of Palestinian autonomy purposefully vague they permitted the gradual elaboration by various Israeli leaders of functional autonomy as a palliative to the demand for self-determination.162

A detailed look at the autonomy negotiations in this chapter elucidates the dynamics that have served to prevent the emergence of Palestinian statehood for well over three decades.

160 In his detailed autobiography on Palestinian political life, and in an interview, Sari Nusseibeh traces Begin’s autonomy to his failed 1987 contacts with Moshe Amirav of the Likud party, discussed in chapter 6. See Sari Nusseibeh and Anthony David, Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 253–263; and author interview with Sari Nusseibeh, 29 February 2012, Jerusalem.

161 See my discussion of this point in the conclusion.

162 Naomi Chazan, “Domestic Developments in Israel, 1978-1988” in Quandt, The Middle East, 9.

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The talks also reveal a great deal about the nature of Israel’s expansion beyond the 1967 borders, and the diplomacy that has sustained it. The very idiom in which the talks were rooted— autonomy not sovereignty, limited self-rule— exacerbated conditions on the ground and dismantled the political mechanisms for a just resolution to the Palestinian question. Like the notion of self-determination that featured in the mandate system after World War I, autonomy for the local inhabitants of the occupied territories was diluted to a point where it signaled indefinite Israeli control rather than a means to eventual self-government.163 The context of

Israel’s rule over the territories, which began well after the end of empire, the mandates, and the major waves of decolonization, can shed new light on the relationship between late-twentieth- century occupation and the persistence of prolonged statelessness. In large measure, the blueprint for the limited degree of Palestinian sovereignty that might ever be reached in a negotiated settlement was first sketched out by Begin, Burg, Sharon and members of the Israeli negotiating team, as well as through the acquiescence of U.S. and Egyptian diplomats working alongside them.

In recovering the history of the autonomy talks, the rationale and political-conceptual dynamics animating Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the territories become clearer, as does the tacit, and often explicit, acceptance and encouragement of this behavior by other actors.164

163 Autonomy had long been used as a technique of foreign indirect control across the British Empire, from the Princely States of India to West Africa under High Commissioner Frederick Lugard. See Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922); Michael Crowder, “Indirect Rule: French and British Style,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 34, no. 3 (1964): 197-204; Kevin Grant and Lisa Trivedi, “A Question of Trust: The Government of India, The League of Nations, and Mohandas Gandhi,” in R.M Douglas, Michael D. Callahan and Elizabeth Bishop, eds., Imperialism on Trial: International Oversight of Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 21–43; and Andrew Porter, “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” in Andrew Porter and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 199 – 222.

164 This is in addition to Israel’s resurgent right, whose political leaders now embrace formal annexation and invoke autonomy for Palestinians. See David Remnick, “Letter from Jerusalem: The Party Faithful,” The New Yorker, January 21, 2013; Dani Dayan, “Israel’s Settlers are Here to Stay,” New York Times 25 July 2013; Zvika Krieger, 215

By emphasizing individual rights and de-territorialized autonomy, rather than allowing for collective self-determination after Camp David, the Israeli government and their compliant U.S. and Egyptian counterparts helped solidify a non-national, non-statist arrangement for

Palestinians.

Finally, the autonomy negotiations highlight the wide gulf that separated the benevolent rhetorical intentions of U.S. policymakers and their actual conduct as mediators. In the words of former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis, who discussed this period in an oral history interview, “I think, we perhaps tried to play this role of honest broker, mediator, catalyst, participant, partner, whatever you'd want to describe it--we wanted to play it only with carrots.”165 As the role of Robert Strauss and Sol Linowitz attest, Israeli negotiators asserted the limits of their respective positions and secured American support in the process. Looking back on autonomy from the contemporary vantage point of a fractured Palestinian polity, we can more clearly discern how the historical absence and active prevention of sovereignty endures as a primary obstacle to Palestinian self-determination.166 As the following chapter will demonstrate, the rise of the Reagan administration further accelerated this trend.

“Dani Dayan’s War: Can Israeli Settlers Control both the West Bank and Themselves?” The Atlantic, 3 August 2012; and Tal Kra-Oz, “The New One State Solution,” Tablet Magazine, January 7, 2013. Kra-Oz, describing one right wing political gathering, writes “Indeed, a strain of casual pervaded the discussions…Haetzni, the pioneer of the settler movement, said he would be willing to allow for a limited Palestinian autonomy, but stressed the need for clear separation, so as ‘not to let them mix with us, not to let them debase us.’ MK [Member of Knesset] Aryeh Eldad of Otzma LeYisrael (“Strong Israel”) spoke optimistically of the Hashemite Kingdom’s coming collapse as part of the Arab Spring. Once that happens, a Palestinian government in Jordan is guaranteed, and the Arab population in the West Bank is welcome to stay in their villages but vote only for the Jordanian parliament. Or, better yet, to move there.” Israel’s Minister of the Economy, , also called for “autonomy on steroids.” See “With Peace Talks Dead, Right-Wing Turns to Talk of Annexation,” The Forward, 29 April 2014, http://forward.com/articles/197304/with-peace-talks-dead-right-wing-turns-to-talk-of/ (accessed 15 July 2014).

165 Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. For more on Lewis as a diplomat, see Craig Daigle and Tamara Wittes, “Peacemaking as Interstate Diplomacy: Samuel Lewis,” in Mona Fixdal, ed., Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

166 In light of this, Edward Said warned of empty Palestinian declarations of statehood in the late 1990s. See “A Real State Means Real Work,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 397: October 1-7, 1998. 216

Chapter Four: Neoconservatives Rising: Reagan and the Middle East, 1980-1982

Although we had moments of progress, and at times we managed to bottle up at least temporarily the savagery that forever lies beneath the sands of the Middle East, the region was still an adders’ nest of problems when I moved out of the White House eight years later. And along the way it had been the source of some of my administration’s most difficult moments. -President Ronald Reagan1

Introduction

The protracted negotiations over Palestinian autonomy in the Carter White House were sustained by a sympathetic if misguided view about the eventual fate of Palestinian self- determination. But like much of Carter’s foreign policy, this diplomatic initiative was met with an entirely different ideological context in January 1981. Ronald Reagan’s electoral victory signaled a transformation in American domestic politics, one that had been roiling the

Republican Party since Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential defeat.2 A rethinking of U.S. economic policy alongside deep-seated social and cultural shifts marked the 1980s as a decade of conservative resurgence, during which Reagan’s approach to foreign policy inaugurated interventionist policies in the Middle East that recast American’s relationship to the region.3

This chapter examines U.S. policy towards Israel and the Palestinian question in the period between Reagan’s election and the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It first turns to the rising neoconservative influence in the Reagan White House, detailing how hawkish

1 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 407.

2 On the remaking of American conservatism, from Goldwater to Reagan, see the works of Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: National Books, 2001); Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scriber, 2008); and The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2014).

3 On Reagan’s domestic impact, and the broader economic and cultural transformations of the 1980s, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture. For an overview of the schools of thought that have developed about Reagan’s role in ending the Cold War, see Beth A. Fischer, “U.S. Foreign Policy under Reagan and Bush,” in Melvyn P. Leffler, The Cambridge History of the Cold War Vol. 3: Endings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 267–288. 217

reactions to Camp David reordered U.S. priorities in the autonomy talks. The revival of a Cold

War framing of events in the region intensified a strategic alliance with Israel and marginalized

Palestinian nationalists as agents of Soviet influence in the Middle East.4 The Reagan administration also inaugurated a shift in the U.S. approach to international law with regard to settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For Israeli leaders in Jerusalem, this welcome embrace empowered a more robust expansion plan in the occupied territories and assertiveness abroad, marked by the 1981 and the bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor.

As the events of 1981 and early 1982 make clear, the transition from Carter to Reagan also accelerated the erosion of the already slim possibilities of a diplomatic solution to the

Palestinian question. By rejecting Carter’s approach and insisting on a globalist framing of local dynamics, Reagan and his advisors sealed the fate of the Palestinian autonomy talks, deferred the possibility of U.S. engagement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and signaled acquiescence in Israeli expansion in the territories. These developments were linked to the explicit support in some quarters of the administration for Israel’s military aims in Lebanon against the PLO, the focus of chapter five. At a decisive juncture in the international history of the Middle East, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Reagan’s policies aggravated Arab attitudes towards the United States and further underscored the troubling consequences of the Camp David Accords for the Palestinians.

4 For contemporaneous accounts of Reagan’s impact on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, see the final chapter in Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); and William B. Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error," Middle East Journal 38:2 (1984): 237-254. See also Juliana S. Peck, The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question: The First Thousand Days (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984); Naseer Aruri, "The United States and Palestine: Reagan's Legacy to Bush," Journal of Palestine Studies, 18.3 (Spring 1989): 3-21; and Helena Cobban, “The U.S.-Israeli Relationship in the Reagan Era,” Conflict Quarterly (Spring 1989): 5–32. 218

The Reagan Revolution

Hailing from the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Ronald Reagan staked out his candidacy in staunch opposition to both big government and communism.5 Conservatives seized on the expansion of Soviet influence, especially the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, as proof of the Cold War’s full-blown revival, skewering Carter in the campaign and drawing ideological advocates of anti-communism away from the Democratic Party. A large part of this growing unease with foreign policy under Carter stemmed from contentious debates over the

‘lessons’ of the Vietnam War, with liberal Democrats arguing that it had been needlessly prolonged, and critics on the right like Reagan seeing the American withdrawal and subsequent collapse of South Vietnam as an “indication of détente’s cowardice.”6 Reagan, alongside more muscular Democrats like Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and a retinue of budding neoconservatives including Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, “transformed détente from a badge of honor to a political expletive.”7 Liberal Democrats, as the political historian Julian

Zelizer argues, succumbed to these charges of weakness from the right, ultimately leading to the destruction of a centrist American foreign policy and the intensification of military intervention

5 For background on Reagan, see Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan (New York: Random House, 1999); and H.W. Brands, Reagan: The Life (New York: Doubleday, 2015). For insight on Reagan’s own thinking, see Reagan, An American Life; Ronald Reagan and , The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007); and Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal his Revolutionary Vision for America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).

6 Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, Rightward Bound, 236.

7 Ibid., 242. For an incisive study on how the domestic politics around détente paved the way for Reagan’s 1980 victory, see Julian E. Zelizer, "Detente and Domestic Politics," Diplomatic History 33, no. 4 (2009). Also useful is Mario Del Pero’s work on Kissinger’s realism as a response to domestic politics; its rigidity, Del Pero argues, foreshadowed the strength of neoconservatism and its American exceptionalist framing, which ultimately defeated Kissinger. See Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

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that would soon follow.8 This “Return to Militarism” in U.S. foreign policy, as the historian

Gaddis Smith labeled it, has implications that extend well beyond the 1980s and the end of the

Cold War.9

Leading hawks among the Democrats, including Norman Podhoretz, Elliot Abrams and

Jeane Kirkpatrick, exemplified this transformation in their migration to the Reagan camp. Now commonly referred to as “neoconservatives,” this group was disillusioned with Carter’s weakness abroad and what one former member dubbed his “crackpot moralism,” and they gained significant access in the Reagan White House.10 The group’s collective views on the Middle East were reflected in the pages of the staunchly pro-Israel Commentary magazine. Carter’s hands-on approach to resolving the conflict was characterized in the magazine as appeasement.11

8 Julian Zelizer, “Conservatives, Carter, and the Politics of National Security” in Schulman and Zelizer, Rightward Bound, 265-87. John Lewis Gaddis situates this transitional moment in containment’s broader history. See chapter 11, “Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Completion of Containment” in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 342-79.

9 Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years, 9. In a telling New York Times op- ed by George F. Kennan in February 1980, the noted diplomat and ‘father of containment’ wrote: “Never since World War II has there been so far-reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the capital. An unsuspecting stranger, plunged into its midst, could only conclude that the last hope of peaceful, non-military solutions had been exhausted- that from now on only weapons, however used, could count.” Quoted in Smith, 247.

10 Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 145. A leader of the group was referring to himself and fellow dissident liberals as “neoconservatives” by 1982. See Norman Podhoretz, “The Neo-Conservative Anguish over Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times Magazine, 2 May 1982. For one of the most influential neoconservative critiques of Carter’s foreign policy, see Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary, Nov. 1979. For more on the history and intellectual roots of the neoconservatives and their impact on Reagan, see Vaisse, Neoconservatism; Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New York: Times Books, 1986); John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Stefan A. Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans; and Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

11 See, among others, Norman Podhoretz, “The Future Danger,” Commentary, April 1981; Menahem Milson, “How to Make Peace with the Palestinians,” Commentary, May 1981; and Robert C. Tucker, “The Middle East: Carterism without Carter?” Commentary, .

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The new President and his advisors began to promote a global struggle against communism, recasting regional conflicts as proxy subsets of the larger Cold War. In one study of the group, Jacob Heilbrunn observed that the “neoconservatives thought of themselves as

Reagan’s intellectual shock troops, a kind of guerilla army staking out positions that he himself shared, especially in his first term.”12 Clearly discernable in the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and heightened interventions in Latin America, this global Cold War lens was applied to American foreign policy in the Middle East as well. On the Arab-Israeli front, leading advisors began promoting “the idea that Israel was a vital Cold War ally of the United States and that Palestinians were tools of the Soviet Union in its campaign of international terrorism.”13

Such an approach spoke directly to Reagan, especially after the humiliation of the Iranian hostage crisis, which had generated a desire for leadership that could speak out forcefully against the rising scourge of terrorism. Under the growing influence of these anti-communist ideologues,

Reagan’s worldview reconstituted the Middle East as a site of contestation between the United

States and the Soviet Union.

Strong ideology, however, did not always make for good governance. Allies and critics alike have described Reagan’s White House and his foreign policy team as “dysfunctional” during the first six years of the administration.14 Infighting between advisors has often been papered over by Reagan’s admirers, but in the view of one expert, “when it came to the management of the foreign policy apparatus of the U.S. government, Reagan’s record is almost

12 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, 168.

13 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 198. The Israelis described Reagan’s views in parallel and positive terms soon after he was elected. See “Ronald Reagan: Ha’Nasi Hanivchar shel Artzot Ha’Brit [Ronald Reagan: The President Elect of the United States], 5 November 1980, MFA-8652/3, ISA.

14 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 211.

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certainly the worst of any modern President.”15 This was borne out by the large turnover in critically important foreign policy positions throughout Reagan’s eight years in office.

Among the initial group of foreign policy aides appointed in 1981, Richard Allen was chosen to lead the National Security Council, but was soon replaced by Judge William P. Clark

Jr., a trusted confidant of the President. General Alexander Haig, chief-of-staff in the Nixon

White House and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe, was chosen as the first

Secretary of State, and Caspar “Cap” Weinberger, a former Vice President of the Bechtel

Corporation and Nixon appointee, was appointed Secretary of Defense.16 Reagan, who preferred a backseat approach to policymaking, trusted this inner circle to articulate his views on international affairs. Yet they often disagreed on questions related to the Middle East, with Haig adamant in voicing his consistent support for Israel while Weinberger pushed for engagement with moderate Arabs and resisted the use of military force as a tool of foreign policy.17 These divisions would prove to be a serious impediment to decision-making early on in Reagan’s tenure.18

Among State Department career Foreign Service officers, this ideological cast within the new administration was very troubling. As Nicholas Veliotes, the Assistant Secretary of State for

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, later remarked on the early period of the Reagan administration, there was “a determination to globalize everything in the Middle East.” The

15 Ibid., 212.

16 For more background on their approach to foreign policy, see Rothkopf, Running the World, 210-28. Also relevant, but less reliable, are Haig, Caveat; and Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1990). For a crucial study of the Weinberger Doctrine, see Gail E.S. Yoshitani, Reagan on War.

17 Quandt, Peace Process, 247.

18 Interview with Howard Teicher, 19 June 2013, Washington D.C.

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reason, Veliotes explains, is that “they believed that the Carter administration had not been tough enough on the Russians. They thought that that is why there was a Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, and other things. In part, if your analysis of the Middle East always started from the

East-West focus, you could obscure the regional roots of the problem.”19 Against the backdrop of this globalist outlook, the “” emerged as a statement of U.S. foreign policy aims.

The Reagan Doctrine was an interventionist policy of arming anti-communist resistance movements in an effort to “roll back” Soviet-backed governments in Latin America, Africa and

Asia.20 The doctrine was met with the stark realities of events on the ground. Reagan’s

“offensive in the Third World,” as the historian Odd Arne Westad called it, left a string of damaging interventions in its wake.21 In the Middle East, it also played a central role in the administration’s retreat from dealing with the question of Palestinian self-determination.22 Both the internecine violence of the Lebanese civil war and the outbreak of the first Palestinian

Intifada undercut the Reagan Doctrine and gradually forced a return to Carter-era restraint in executing foreign policy. This reversal occurred as the administration’s sweeping anti- communist rhetoric gave way to growing accommodation with the Soviet Union during Reagan’s

19 Interview with Nicolas Veliotes, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

20 For a detailed study of the Reagan Doctrine, see Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism and Policy.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, March 2006 (36:1), 75-88. An incisive contemporary account from the period can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, “Reagan Abroad,” The New York Review of Books, 4 February 1982.

21 See Odd Arne Westad, “Reagan’s Anti-Revolutionary Offensive in the Third World” in Njølstad, The Last Decade of the Cold War.

22 Hermann Eilts, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt at the time, said this about the impact of Reagan’s election on the autonomy talks: “Then came a new Administration with a different sense of priorities. The whole idea of autonomy talks that flowed from Camp David was given short shrift…and the Reagan administration, it seemed, really didn't care. It had strategic consensus and the Soviets on its mind, things of that sort.” Oral history of Hermann Eilts, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

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second term in office.23 But early on in the first term, the U.S. relationship with Israel and the

Palestinians highlighted the extent of the departure from Carter’s vision for comprehensive peace in the region.

Israel: A Strategic Ally

When it came to the Middle East, Reagan’s abiding affinity was for Israel. His memoirs reflect this. “I’ve believed in many things in my life, but no conviction I’ve ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel.”24 During an early meeting about the Middle East, one participant remembers the candidate talking fondly about Exodus, a wildly popular movie based on the novel by Leon Uris that celebrated the miraculous victory of Israel over the Arabs in 1948. Reagan’s approach to the conflict initially reflected these sympathies, which he would capitalize on during the campaign.25

On 3 September 1980, Reagan addressed a group of Jewish Americans at the B’nai B’rith

Forum in Washington, D.C., shortly before his victory. His speech that day focused on

America’s relationship with Israel, and is revealing as a harbinger of Middle East policy in the initial months of his administration.

While we have since 1948 clung to the argument of a moral imperative to explain our commitment to Israel, no Administration has ever deluded itself that Israel was not of permanent strategic importance to America. Until, that is, the Carter administration,

23 See Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997); and James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Viking, 2009).

24 Reagan, An America Life, 410.

25 Rita Hauser, interview by author, New York, NY, 4 April 2008. On the American embrace of Uris’ novel, see M. M. Silver, Our Exodus: Leon Uris and the Americanization of Israel’s Founding Story (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010).

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which has violated this covenant with the past. Can we now have confidence it will honor a covenant with tomorrow?26

Reagan’s speech was an extensive repudiation of Carter-era policy, from the notion of a comprehensive settlement to the inclusion of the Soviets in the 1977 peace negotiations. The

Governor took aim at the “ambiguities” of the Camp David autonomy talks, suggesting that

Jordan should act as a sovereign state to oversee the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 rather than allow for indigenous Palestinian self-determination. He heavily criticized American arms sales that were made to Saudi Arabia and Jordan for the threat they posed to Israel, and upheld the indivisibility of Jerusalem as the country’s capital. In

Reagan’s view of the region, “let it be clear that the cornerstone of our effort and of our interest is a secure Israel.”27

Seizing on American Jewish disillusionment with Carter’s record on the Middle East,

Reagan’s B’nai B’rith speech played on the strong pro-Israel sentiment of his audience, especially in singling out the PLO for condemnation.

We live in a world in which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word “liberation” into its name can thereupon murder schoolchildren and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas, or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.28

The Republican candidate vowed to uphold the 1975 U.S. agreement with Israel concerning PLO non-engagement until the organization renounced its charter which called for Israel’s destruction.

In Reagan’s view, only then could the PLO become “truly representative of those Arab

26 Address by Ronald Reagan to the B’nai B’rith Forum, 3 September 1980, folder “Israel Settlements 1981,” box 90494, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

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Palestinians dedicated to peace and not to the establishment of a Soviet satellite in the heart of the Middle East.”29 Election pamphlets distributed by a newly organized pro-Israel Coalition for

Reagan-Bush highlighted the missteps of Carter’s Middle East policy for American Jews.30

Once in office, Reagan outwardly embraced the pro-Israel constituency he courted during the election.31 The Office of Public Liaison, led for several years by future Senator Elizabeth

Dole, expended considerable energy reaching out to Jewish communal leaders and listening to their concerns. In a series of extensively researched memos to the President’s senior advisors,

Dole outlined a “Jewish Strategy” for the administration and sought to capitalize on the disproportionate number who had voted for Reagan in 1980.32 She arranged high-level meetings for communal leaders with the President, although as one participant explained, “They [the administration] never paid the slightest attention, in substance to what these people had to say.

Nobody viewed them as anybody knowledgeable, as anybody who made any kind of difference, so it was always handholding.”33

Far more significant than the administration’s domestic outreach was the extent to which the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel was codified in the early years of the administration. In his memoirs, Secretary of State Alexander Haig described a radical rethinking of American priorities in the Middle East. To address concerns about the Soviet Union and the

29 Ibid., 12-13.

30 Electoral pamphlet, Coalition for Reagan Bush, undated, CO001-07, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

31 See the report of a meeting between Secretary of State Haig and Jewish leaders Howard Squadron, , David Korn and Yehuda Hellman, 24 February 1981, 9AM, A-4328/11, ISA.

32 The background, goals and details of each leadership meeting can be found in the folder “Jewish Strategy,” OA 5456, as well as OA 6410 and OA 8120 in the Elizabeth Dole Files, RRL.

33 Rita Hauser, interview by author, 4 April 2008.

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“fear of Islamic fundamentalism,” Haig instituted a policy of “strategic consensus.”34 In Haig’s view, this policy had the dual aim of fighting communism and bolstering moderate Arab states, while upholding Israel’s security.35 The U.S., according to this new order, was “pitted against the

Soviet client states of Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization.”36

Reagan clearly saw Israel as part of this anti-communist strategic consensus that would keep Soviet influence in the Middle East at bay. Well before he entered office, Reagan described

Israel as an asset against the Soviet Union. “Without this bastion of in the heart of the area,” the former Governor of California wrote in the Washington Post in 1979, “the

Kremlin would be confined to supporting militant regimes against pro-American conservative governments which would not be able to divert the attention and energy of the radicals away from themselves by using the ‘lightening rod’ of the ‘Zionist state.’” Regan himself would end up supporting conservative governments, like Saudi Arabia, apartheid South Africa and Latin

American dictatorships, while framing a turn away from the rhetoric of human rights in strategic terms. In explaining this policy in the Middle East, Reagan wrote that “our own position would be weaker without the political and military assets Israel provides.”37

To strengthen the U.S.-Israeli relationship in the context of a renewed Cold War,

Secretary Haig made his first trip to Egypt and Israel as Secretary of State in April 1981. Reports had already surfaced of Reagan’s plans for a military presence on the ground in the Persian Gulf,

34 Alexander Haig, Caveat, 170.

35 Quandt, Peace Process, 248–249. For detailed attention to Haig’s views on strategic consensus, see chapter two of Peck, The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question; and Cobban, “The U.S.-Israeli Relationship in the Reagan Era.” For the Israeli view of Haig, see “Alexander Haig v’Hamizrach Ha’Tichon” [Alexander Haig and the Middle East], 27 January 1981, MFA-8467/4, ISA.

36 Crist, The Twilight War, 64.

37 Ronald Reagan, “Recognizing the Israeli Asset,” The Washington Post, 15 August 1979.

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and the emergence of a wider approach that “subordinates the regional quarrel between Arabs and Israelis to the global rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States.”38 At his opening meeting with Prime Minister Begin and his advisors, Haig articulated such an approach in addressing the rising tensions in the Lebanese city of Zahle, close to the Syrian border. Syrian aggression against the Christians living in the town, a subset of the civil war that had been raging throughout the country since 1975, was portrayed as part of a broader Soviet struggle for increased influence in the region.39

This worldview was not limited to regional struggles, but shaped discussions over the autonomy negotiations and the Palestinian question as well. Begin was eager to draw on the Cold

War framework as a justification for his views about autonomy, reminding Haig that he had already spoken on several occasions of a promise of “autonomy, not sovereignty.” Haig agreed.

Begin then reminded the Secretary of State of Israel’s deep opposition to a Palestinian state.

It would be a mortal danger to us. It would be a Soviet base in the Middle East, after all the Soviets achieved: Mozambique, , Ethiopia, invading Afghanistan, etc. In the heart of the Middle East there would be a Soviet base. Unavoidably the Judea, Samaria and Gaza District and those settlements would be taken over by the PLO and the PLO is a real satellite of the Soviet Union.40

The inclusion of the PLO into the Soviet orbit solidified the link between Palestinian state prevention and shared U.S.-Israeli foreign policy goals in the Cold War. During the dinner for

Secretary Haig that evening at the King David Hotel, the interdependence of both states was reiterated by Haig as part of the U.S. “national interest,” with Israel positioned as playing “an

38 Joseph Kraft, “A New Middle East Approach,” 5 March 1981, A-7383/10, ISA.

39 Meeting between Begin, Haig and delegations, 5 April 1981, 4:45PM, MFA-7083/12, ISA.

40 Ibid.

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essential role in protecting our mutual strategic concerns against the threats of the Soviet Union and against the threats of its many surrogates.”41

This mutual interest between the U.S. and Israel was further underscored by Haig’s effort to initiate a strategic dialogue beyond military channels. The Secretary of State presented the idea during his meeting the next morning, part of an effort to develop a regional strategy in the

Middle East. Haig suggested that key State Department personnel, including Robert McFarlane and General Vernon Walters, act as liaisons with the Israelis.42 They would meet with their

Israeli counterparts in Washington and Jerusalem, under the cover of relations with other local and European powers. Haig said that the “interrelationship” must be “carefully guarded, but it must be launched with an attitude of mutual confidence between the two of us.”43 These meetings, which continued throughout the summer and fall of 1981, culminated in the formalization of a strategic alliance between the two countries.44

The occasion for this agreement was Begin’s first official visit to the White House in

September. At the welcome ceremony on the South Lawn, Reagan delivered gracious opening remarks that echoed the new approach of his administration.

We know Israelis live in constant peril. But Israel will have our help. She will remain strong and secure, and her special character of spirit, genius, and faith will prevail… rest assured that the security of Israel is a principal objective of this administration and that we regard Israel as an ally in our search for regional stability.45

41 Toasts by FM Shamir and Secretary of State Haig after Dinner Hosted by FM Shamir, King David Hotel, 5 April 1981, A-4341/1, ISA.

42 See Meeting between Shamir, Haig and their delegations [Hebrew and English], 6 April 1981, 9:45 AM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem. MFA-6890/2, ISA.

43 Ibid.

44 For full records of these top-secret meetings between McFarlane and Israeli officials, see A-7384/6, ISA.

45 “Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel,” 9 September 1981, Public Papers of President Ronald Reagan, RRL.

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In the lead editorial on the morning of Begin’s first visit, The Washington Post warned Reagan to be wary of an “endorsement of [Begin’s] evident goal of annexing the West Bank.”46 A New

York Times editorial earlier that week spoke of the forgotten promise of the Camp David

Accords to provide self-rule for Palestinians. “Guaranteeing Israel’s security is not the same as underwriting an annexation of the West Bank.”47 Both newspapers pushed for engagement with the Palestinian question and greater political rights in the occupied territories.

During their first meeting on 9 September, the American and Israeli delegations agreed to launch a written document outlining strategic cooperation. The remarks by Defense Minister

Ariel Sharon reflected an expansive Israeli vision of its Cold War strategic value to the U.S. in the Middle East.

Sharon: Israel can do things, Mr. President, that other countries cannot do. We have the stability of a real democracy. We are on the Mediterranean. Israel is a country positioned from which we can both act in the Mediterranean theatre and in Africa. We are capable of embarking upon cooperation immediately. We have American equipment which we can put at your disposal in the shortest time. We have the needed infrastructure, including military industry, other industries, airfields and so forth. We have a long arm strategic capability, as for example, Entebbe and Baghdad…”

Reagan: As I said in the other room, we are allies and we share common values. The meetings you will have with Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Haig will reflect this.48

One American participant recalls seeing Secretary Weinberger “blanch visibly” at Sharon’s presentation, which outlined Israeli military assistance as far east as Iran and as far north as

Turkey. Weinberger was wary of any sign that the U.S. was turning away from key Arab states, particularly the Gulf countries. “Everyone on the American side was shocked by the grandiose scope of the Sharon concept for strategic cooperation. It even included use of Israeli forces to

46 “Welcome, Mr. Begin” The Washington Post, 8 September 1981.

47 “True Grit with Mr. Begin,” New York Times, 6 September 1981.

48 Top Secret Meeting between President Reagan and PM Begin at the White House, Washington DC, 9 September 11:10 AM (1981), A-7384/9, ISA.

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assist the U.S. in case of uprisings in the Gulf emirates,” observed U.S. Ambassador to Israel

Samuel Lewis.49 The struggle between Israel’s expansive vision of strategic cooperation and the tempered enthusiasm of U.S. officials was linked to competing interests across the Middle East.

One of the primary beneficiaries of U.S. Cold War strategy in the region was now Saudi Arabia, a country that defense officials like Weinberger hoped, like Egypt before it, would move closer towards the West. This duality bred a great deal of tension. Israeli leaders and American Jewish organizations vocally opposed the sale of F-15 fighter jets and Airborne Warning and Control

Systems (AWACS) to Riyadh, threatening to undermine an emerging regional constellation.50

Given these competing interests, Israeli leaders had given a great deal of thought to their presentations in Washington before leaving Jerusalem. On the question of the autonomy for the

Palestinians, which remained subject to protracted negotiations, Begin’s advisors encouraged those traveling to the U.S. to refrain from dealing with debates over sovereignty in the West

Bank or Jerusalem. “The United States should be urged (only for the purpose of deferring these difficult matters) to adopt positions consistent with those of Israel.”51 During a breakfast meeting between the two delegations on 10 September, the Israelis followed this line precisely. Dr.

Joseph Burg, the head of the Israeli autonomy delegation, told Reagan about the “philosophy” of the autonomy talks, which ranged between two extremes. “We do not want to be absolute rulers of more than one million Arabs and secondly, we cannot afford a Palestinian state. It would be a

49 Interview with Samuel Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. See also Crist, The Twilight War, 57.

50 Reagan insisted to Begin that Saudi Arabia could be “brought around” to the U.S. orbit. “If we turn away from Saudi Arabia, we may well turn them towards the Soviet Union as the major country to be connected with. If we seek peace we must make sure that they see us as the major power to depend on rather than the Soviet Union.” Reagan promised Begin that he had Israel’s interests in mind in pursuing the arms sales. “If not, we will take corrective action.” See Top Secret Meeting between President Reagan and PM Begin at the White House, Washington DC, 9 September 11:10 AM (1981), A-7384/9, ISA.

51 Memorandum, “Suggestions Regarding Begin Visit,” September 1981, A-7384/9, ISA. See also “Talking Points in the U.S.A,” September 1981, A-7384/9, ISA.

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communist state, irredentist, and a danger to our lives.” Burg recounted the Israeli conception of self-government and the progress on technicalities in the talks he convened with the Egyptians.

But we did not make progress on one important matter and I can put that into a mathematical formula. Autonomy is not sovereignty. Sovereignty minus x is autonomy. Our problem was to determine the size of x. For Egypt, autonomy was seen as a corridor to an Arab state and for us, instead of an Arab state, a substitute for an Arab state.52

In presenting the Israeli view of progress on autonomy, Burg invoked the U.S. role in facilitating an advancement of the talks. Haig responded that he found Burg’s presentation “very helpful,” and that “What Dr. Burg has said is very close to our thinking.”53

On the PLO, Begin’s advisors voiced concern about possible indirect U.S. engagement on matters relating to Lebanon, and encouraged the idea that the links between the organization and the Soviet Union be emphasized. “P.L.O. statements promising Soviet bases in a Palestinian state, supporting Soviet positions, and attacking the United States, cannot be repeated too often.”54 All of this was framed in a manner that would speak to Israel’s role as an ally in the global anti-communist struggle, which appealed to Reagan’s own thinking about foreign policy.

Concluding his talks with the Israelis, Reagan summed up the American view on the Palestinians.

We will never negotiate with them until they recognize the right of Israel to exist and abandon the present position. Until then, we shall never negotiate with the Palestinians. I hope all of you are as happy as we for these last two days. And I hope there will be many such ones in the future.55

It was a summation reflecting the ascendant view at the White House on the nature of the relationship between Israel and the United States in early 1981.

52 Breakfast meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin at the White House,” 10 September 1981, 9:10 AM, A-7384/9, ISA.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

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While leading supporters of Israel like Secretary Haig were pleased to formalize a strategic relationship along these lines, conservative critics like worked to strip it of real content. On 30 November 1981, the administration signed the Memorandum of

Understanding with the Government of Israel, promoting strategic cooperation to deal with the

Soviet threat. It encompassed joint military exercises and preventative threat measures, emphasizing the importance of a unified front against communism.56 As Lewis recalls,

“Weinberger managed to have it signed in the basement of the Pentagon without any press present, so that it didn't get any attention. The Israeli press was fully briefed and made a big thing out of it, but there were no photographs of Weinberger signing this document with Sharon-

-they might have been used in the Arab world to undermine his position.”57

In forging a strategic alliance with Israel, the Reagan administration turned a blind eye to the more troubling aspects of the Likud agenda, such as settlement expansion and the prevention of Palestinian self-determination.58 But not long after the signing of the Memorandum in

December 1981, a major crisis erupted when Begin decided to extend Israeli law to the Golan

Heights through implicit annexation, and the agreement was suspended.59 Critics of Israel in the administration were furious, with Weinberger exclaiming, “How long do we have to go on bribing Israel? If there is no real cost to the Israelis, we’ll never be able to stop any of their

56 For the full text of the Memorandum, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 238–239.

57 Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

58 The White House also got past its strident reaction at the Israeli bombing of Iraq’s Osirik nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981, which Israeli archives now reveal elicited furious America opposition, even from neoconservatives like UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick. See Israel State Archives A-7384/4, 6, ISA. See also Begin’s emotional letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on the suspension of arms supply after the attack, comparing Israel’s preventative actions against nuclear weapons with the failure to stop Zyklon B poisoning during the Holocaust. Begin to Weinberger, 10 June 1981, A-7384/4, ISA.

59 For the administration’s angry reaction, see folder “Golan Heights 1982,” Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

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actions.”60 Reagan took decisive action by freezing millions in potential arms sales, infuriating the Israeli Prime Minister. Begin responded directly to Ambassador Lewis. “Are we a state or vassals of yours? Are we a banana republic?” he exclaimed. “You have no right to penalize

Israel….The people of Israel lived without the memorandum of understanding for 3,700 years, and will continue to live without it for another 3,700 years.”61 This angry reaction, like the sensitive discussions over the bombing of the Osirik nuclear reactor in Iraq, did in fact reveal the existence of tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship in the early Reagan years.62

Autonomy’s Demise

The Reagan administration would be far more receptive to Israeli interests in the autonomy negotiations, which came to a close early in the first term. Secretary Haig, attempting to break the impasse between the Israelis and Egyptians in the talks that had continued since Sol

Linowitz’s last serious effort in 1980, convened a meeting of Israeli officials in Jerusalem to articulate baseline positions in January 1982.63 Among the topics under consideration was the concept of sovereignty and how to manage divergent views—the Egyptians demanding the relinquishment of Israeli sovereignty with Israel asserting it should be maintained. “Can we find a way,” Haig asked, “to put sovereignty issues aside, away from both Israel and the Self

Governing Authority (SGA) during the transition period?” Shamir saw no problem with sovereignty whatsoever. “It is not part of the autonomy scheme,” remarked the Foreign Minister.

60 Quoted in Haig, Caveat, 328.

61 Ibid., 329.

62 This strain is evident in a personal letter from Reagan to Begin after the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding in the wake of the Golan Heights Law. See Reagan to Begin, 8 January 1982, A-4342/1, ISA.

63 Meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir and Secretary of State of U.S.A., Mr. Alexander Haig. 14 January 1982, 11:30 AM, Jerusalem. A-4342/1, ISA.

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“We will start to discuss it in three years after reaching an agreement.” U.S. diplomats were wary of this approach, given Egyptian concerns over residual Israeli power in the territories.

Elyakim Rubinstein, Israel’s Legal Advisor, offered the official view of his government as an antidote. “We do believe that the source of authority, legally speaking, is sort of in the shadows but is under us in the five years, and, of course, it would have some practical implications with the security things, with the Jewish settlements and so on.” But despite these potential issues, Rubinstein did not want to bother with international agreements or treaties.

“Who needs them? This is something which just would waste the time and there is no problem, real problem, that necessitates it.” Likewise, Rubinstein argued, there should not be a separate

Palestinian currency for the autonomy, “because currency is a symbol of sovereignty.” People would be comfortable with Israeli and Jordanian currency, he argued, denoting the thinness of

Israel’s autonomy proposal. “Let’s push the thing through without sticking into it new inventions, things like stamps and whatever. These things are considered symbols of sovereignty and in practical life it won’t hamper anybody if this won’t exist.” Haig, who had set out to bring the parties closer together on the most divisive issues that had stalled the talks, could not see why the

Egyptians raised objections. “I must say, I don’t feel that we have a problem with this thing. It’s sort of an airbag; the more you punch it, the less is there.”64

In practical terms, Haig wanted to know how the parties would deal with a question relating to sovereignty. “Let’s leave the devil [to] rest,” Rubinstein remarked. Dr. David Kimche, the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreed this was a “non-issue.”

Sovereignty, which had been subject to a great deal of debate after Camp David, was now an afterthought. “I mean, on no account are the Palestinian Arabs going to be represented by

64 Ibid.

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anybody in the UN or in foreign capitals, neither by us or anybody else.”65 For Kimche, the real practical issue was security, and that was worth the effort of negotiating. Haig wanted to know the Israeli position on the internal security role of the SGA. “How can Israel define its security needs in a manner which minimize[s] any interference with the powers transferred to the SGA and the impact of the Israeli security forces on the daily lives of the inhabitants?” The Israelis envisioned a strong local police force, but not one that would deal with “internal security” involving “problems of terrorism” beyond the scope of the police.66

Haig understood these needs for Israeli military guarantees and envisioned the evolution of a police force that would deal with day-to-day law enforcement. He wondered about the introduction of arms into the territories, which the Israelis had allowed into village authorities for self-defense. Would citizens in the autonomy regime have a right to bear arms, and how would they navigate concerns like control over search and entry and the fate of infiltrators and terrorists? Israel’s response revealed how committed the government was to maintaining control over these areas. “The fight against terrorism would be our responsibility, whatever it wound include,” said Dr. Y. Ben-Meir. Haig asked if it would involve the “deployment of your security forces that are enclaved in the territories?” Rubinstein replied that he assumed so, “the answer would probably be yes.” Shamir agreed. “All what concerns [the] fight against terrorism will be our responsibility.” Haig extended his question to whether Israeli armed forces would move into the territories for other purposes. “I would hope you wouldn’t ask for that, because it is politically dynamite, in any point of view, and hard to justify.” This would be normal troop

65 Meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir and Secretary of State of U.S.A., Mr. Alexander Haig. 14 January 1982, 11:30 AM, Jerusalem. A-4342/1, ISA.

66 Ibid.

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rotation, the Israelis insisted. “We are not going to freeze things,” said Rubinstein.67 As Deputy

Secretary Assistant of State Wat T. Cluverius IV and Geoffrey Kemp of the NSC, who accompanied Haig to Jerusalem, later reported to the Director of the CIA, there was no “give” on the Israeli position with regards to autonomy, including the size of Israeli military presence in the territories.68

Underlying Haig’s visit was a contestation over the nature of the autonomy regime’s scope over the territory itself or merely the inhabitants. In the U.S. and Egyptian view, there had to be some room for territorial autonomy, yet the Israeli model precluded such an option. Instead, the Israelis embraced a call for open borders and movement, and Haig questioned whether it would work, given the possible security concerns. The U.S. Secretary of State suggested that checkpoints might have to be introduced into such an arrangement. “There will be no frontiers between the autonomy and the other side, because the autonomy is for the inhabitants,” Shamir responded. “It is not two countries. It is not a matter of two states.” The Americans questioned how this could work in practical terms, given the asymmetry of power over the territory and the practical matter of who would control movement. Cluverius told the Israelis that they would face a problem around entry and exit.

Since you now control the territories, you control what comes into Israel. You can tell the farmers, 100 tons of melons into Israel. Under SGA he is going to decide for himself how to grow. You are going to have to control what he sends in and you are not going to be able to go to the farmer to tell him what to do if he is an autonomous farmer.69

67 Ibid.

68 The two emphasized Sharon’s position on this matter: “The continuing security role of the Israeli security forces, whether military or civilian, would continue in Sharon’s definition to be widespread. This also contradicts the Egyptian and Palestinian conception, which envisages security responsibility largely reverting to local Arab police authorities.” See “Memorandum for the Record. Claverius and Kemp to the Director of Central Intelligence,” 19 January 1982. CREST (CIA-RDP84B00049R001303220026-8), NARA.

69 Ibid.

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As a mechanism for limited self-rule in the territories, these were the sorts of practical questions that Americans wanted the Israelis to consider. Having heard Egyptian suspicions about the modalities of physical control, it was clear to State Department officials that the Israelis had not navigated all the consequences of their own autonomy provisions.

Haig’s visit was also an opportunity for the Israeli and American leadership to discuss joint initiatives in the global struggle against communism. Sharon remained heavily invested in his promise to the Americans during the Washington visit that Israel could provide military and development assistance across Africa and developing countries farther afield. This included troop training in Zaire and Gabon, as well as large scale agricultural and development initiatives throughout areas of the continent not under Soviet control. “I believe our goal should be to save these countries, and one may save them by being there, by working there, by developing there,”

Sharon stated.70 He proposed partnering with the Americans, given the Israeli technical know- how and equipment, including seeds, fertilizers and machinery.

Haig was positively inclined towards this initiative, telling Sharon that “the more you do to take these developing states and bring them in what I call the Western industrialized family, the better we like it. We have a converging interest, and that includes left-wing states because I don’t think these black leaders in Africa are idealized. They might in the beginning claim to be

Marxists but we have learned that very often they are not.” Haig encouraged Sharon’s efforts, but said they would need to meet further as it was a matter of common resources given U.S. involvement in these areas through the Peace Corps and U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) programs. More pressingly, Haig suggested, was Israeli assistance in

70 Meeting of Sharon and delegation and Haig and delegation, King David Hotel, Jerusalem, 3PM, 14 January 1982, A-4342/1, ISA.

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other places. “You can go into countries that would not want us. They would want you and be happy to take you tomorrow.”71

In concluding his talks with Sharon, Haig returned to his concern with the fate of the autonomy talks, about which he was “pessimistic.” There was a growing feeling in both Egypt and Israel that autonomy was unachievable, and this was a “very dangerous attitude to develop.”

Haig specified the concerns on the mind of the Egyptians, namely “that things are happening on the West Bank and continue to happen that are creating a de facto annexation.” Haig himself did not believe it, but told Sharon “I think we have to be very, very sensitive to it…I would urge you to look very carefully on whether or not you could take some additional steps.” These steps related to free transit in the West Bank, particularly with mayors and journalists. The Egyptians were hearing concerns from local Palestinians about a “deterioration” and Haig wanted to convey to Sharon his concern. “I think you ought to have a look and see what you could do in good conscience, without unacceptable risks, that will improve the climate…I am offering this advice as good offices, not claiming to know better than you do.”72

Haig specified the earlier discussions on security, and the need to provide the Egyptians with tangible answers on the Israeli position. He assured Sharon that the Israeli model would succeed. “I must tell you that my discussion in Cairo on the subjects of security led me to believe they are very comfortable with what I think your own thinking is,” Haig remarked to Sharon,

“and I don't think it will be a problem in [the] autonomy category.” Sharon assured Haig he was ready to present the Israeli views and was impatient to secure a deal. “I believe one can achieve autonomy….To every American representative who came here to this country, I have repeated again and again that we could have achieved that already.” Sharon wanted to see the autonomy

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid. 239

talks advance on Israeli terms, and told Haig he had taken steps to enable implementation, including the replacement of military personnel in the territories with a civilian administration.

The primary concern, as Israeli officials had long warned, was anything resembling statehood. “We will not allow a situation that in Judea, Samaria and Gaza there will be a second

Palestinian state or a corridor to a second Palestinian state, and we will not accept terrorist activity,” Sharon remarked. The Defense Minister repeated to Haig the opportunity presented by the Israeli plan.

If I could have advocated to the Arabs, I would have told them: people, take this autonomy; you have never been offered anything better than that. You were under first Iraqi occupation, then Jordanian and Egyptian, for 19 years. You were never offered anything like that, take it, you are going to run your own lives.

Increasingly, Sharon claimed, there were dissenters from the PLO, local Arabs seeking cooperation with Israel.

More and more people are coming and asking us for weapons to protect themselves from terrorist organizations and not because they like us—some of them would like King Hussein back, some would like an independent state—it’s not because they like us, they are not collaborators-but they understand that the PLO is not the only and sole representative of the Palestinian people and we see that as an important change and development.73

In the Israeli view, reiterated to the Americans throughout Haig’s visit, autonomy was both a means to accommodate alternatives to the PLO and to avoid self-determination.

Prime Minister Begin, consigned to his house with a broken leg, reminded Haig during a personal visit of the Israeli rejection of Sadat’s early concepts before Camp David like the division of Jerusalem or the full withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 lines. “We then worked on a new paper, which was the Camp David Accords. It was now absolutely impossible to return to

73 Ibid. 240

the former document,” Begin remarked.74 The distance between the scope of the initial idea of a comprehensive peace and the reality of the stalled autonomy talks was evident at every turn of

Haig’s visit.

Given that he had traveled to Jerusalem to meet with the autonomy negotiators, the U.S.

Secretary of State sat with Dr. Burg and the entire delegation on the morning of his departure. He apologized for revisiting the content of his meetings the day before with Sharon and Begin, but told those gathered that “I recognize that this is the real autonomy group, and as somebody said when we came in, it appears to be becoming the largest industry in Israel.”75 Haig reviewed the status of the talks since the departure of Carter’s envoy Sol Linowitz, and the stops and starts that owed to several factors, including the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in Cairo in 1981.76 As a result of the stalemate, Egypt had hardened its position, demanding that any agreement be

“acceptable” to the Palestinians and the Arab world. In practice, this signaled a return to the principle of self-determination, which Sadat had first presented when the discussion of the

Palestinian question was raised in 1977. Haig told the Israelis that he had rejected this, since

“Camp David and the Peace Treaty were not arrived at under such a conception, but rather the conscience of the individual parties involved in the negotiations.” Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s new

74 The Prime Minister also inferred that Carter himself agreed with the Israeli rejection of these concepts, recalling his remark that “They are also unacceptable to the U.S.” See “Meeting between Secretary Haig and the Prime Minster at the Premier’s Home in Jerusalem, 14 January 1982, A-4342/1, ISA.

75 “Meeting between the Minister of Interior, Dr. J. Burg, Chairman Committee on Autonomy and USA Secretary of State, Dr. Alexander Haig,” 15 January 1982, 10:45 AM, MFA-7068/13, ISA.

76 Anwar al-Sadat was gunned down on 6 October 1981 during the annual Egyptian victory parade to mark the Egyptian army’s performance in the 1973 war. The assassins, led by Khaled Al-Islambouli, were members of .

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President, eventually agreed to abandon his position “in practice” and renew efforts on the talks.77

The Israeli delegation wanted to bring the autonomy negotiations to a swift close, on their own terms, before the imposed deadline of April 1982. Haig shared a desire to keep the autonomy talks in motion and conclude an agreement, while cognizant of the regression after

Sadat’s passing. There were practical reasons that the issue had come to a stalemate, but also deep-seated cultural differences between the two parties that had made it difficult to see eye to eye. He urged his Israeli hosts “to remember the differences in society” between Israel and Egypt.

“You have a very sophisticated, educated, enlightened, communicative society. Everybody knows and understands what is going on. They may not draw the same conclusions from this fact.

But that is not true in Egypt; never has been; never will be.”78

Haig’s was a derisive view of the Egyptians, reflecting the Secretary of State’s internal biases and greater comfort with the Israelis, but also the natural manifestation of a U.S.-Israeli relationship that was rooted in perceived shared interests and a common sense of values. In his diplomatic efforts, Haig saw the Americans playing a positive role by impressing upon Mubarak

“the imperative of keeping this peace process alive.” He was also aware of the local resentments toward his initiative, but asked the Israelis to adapt.

You know, as a third party coming into this maze, I found in both capitals the same attitude: here comes the American from Washington, looking for concessions and both sides staked out their positions in that regard. This is understandable. We are not looking for concessions. What we are looking for is ingenuity, to enable us to settle questions…We have been at this for years. There isn’t an awful lot that is mysterious and I basically believe it is doable.79

77 “Meeting between the Minister of Interior, Dr. J. Burg, Chairman Committee on Autonomy and USA Secretary of State, Dr. Alexander Haig,” 15 January 1982, 10:45 AM, MFA-7068/13, ISA.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

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This determined approach captured both the lofty instincts of U.S. diplomacy towards the region and the acute shortcomings, as Haig’s visit merely hardened the prevailing sense of distrust and disinterest in solving the Palestinian question.

In a follow up letter to Reagan after Haig had departed, Begin stressed his compliance with the Camp David Accords, but rejected any possibility that self-determination for

Palestinians would be on the table. He again invoked Carter’s acquiescence that it would be

“totally unacceptable” to the United States, and recalled Sadat withdrawing his document as they continued to negotiate the Camp David Accords over thirteen days in September 1978. “There is no ‘self-determination’ there, there is no Palestinian state there, there is no participation of the

PLO there. There is autonomy, full autonomy, for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria

(generally but mistakenly called ‘West Bank’) and the Gaza District.”80 The Egyptians were trying to return to the pre-Camp David model, and this was “impossible” for Begin. If such a position had succeeded, he told Reagan, “there would not have been a Camp David Accord.”81

As the mechanics of this stage of post-Camp David diplomacy now reveal, Israel had emerged in the Reagan era with a new strategic rationale to entrench their global Cold War standing, their regional position, and their internal hold over the occupied territories. This helped the Likud leadership counter Palestinian demands for self-rule, not only in the context of opposing foreign sovereignty, but also in the context of supporting the U.S. regional concerns from a Cold War perspective.82 By enabling a new strategic rationale to underpin bilateral ties, the Reagan administration empowered Israel to redefine political and strategic relations in the

80 Letter, Begin to Reagan, 18 January 1982, A-4342/1, ISA.

81 Ibid.

82 The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs North America division conducted extensive analysis of Reagan’s views and noted this favorable departure from Carter. See MFA-8467/1, 4, 5, 15 and 8652/2, 3, 4, ISA.

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occupied territories and the broader region at a decisive juncture. These views helped solidify a longstanding attempt by Israel to expand settlements in the occupied territories and dismiss the

PLO as a Soviet proxy. This approach denied the Palestinians substantive political standing while abetting the imminent invasion of Lebanon.

The PLO: A Soviet Proxy

In January 1980, Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, commissioned an in-depth study of “U.S. Relations with the Radical Arabs.”83 The top-secret document was sent to select officials in the Carter White House, including the President and

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Written in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the memo outlined the ways in which America could improve its relations with the Islamic world. The Brzezinski study pointed out that U.S.

“relations with the radical Arabs are in large measure a function of our attitude toward the

Palestinians and their most widely recognized representative, the PLO.” Since 1975, the U.S. government had agreed not to engage with the organization until they accepted relevant UN

Resolutions and recognized Israel. Carter’s advisors argued that, “As long as we maintain our present position on the PLO and as long as the Palestinians do not see an independent state in their future, progress on these other fronts is likely to be limited.” The study concluded that the

“Palestinian issue will reappear as the touchstone of the quality of our relations with the radical

Arabs.”84 The prescience of the Carter administration’s memo was startling. But the new

83 Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Relations with the Radical Arabs,” 16 January 1980, folder 1, “Soviet and Middle East,” box 4, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

84 On 23 April 1986, Dennis Ross, a young NSC analyst, received a copy of the report from his former boss, Paul Wolfowitz, then the Ambassador to Indonesia. In the margins, Wolfowitz had scribbled a series of disparaging comments, calling the overall conclusion of the study “BS.” See ibid.

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administration would be far less receptive to these ideas. During the November 1980 presidential campaign, when Reagan was asked whether he thought the PLO was a terrorist organization, he answered affirmatively while also making an important distinction. “I separate the PLO from the

Palestinian refugees. None ever elected the PLO.”85

Across the Middle East, local conflicts had generated clashes over the Palestinian question in the wake of the Camp David Accords. Israeli air strikes on Palestinian guerilla strongholds in Lebanon had intensified, exacerbating tensions in the Lebanese civil war. In the

West Bank, Israeli troops had opened fire on Palestinian demonstrators at Bir Zeit University, underscoring the harsh realities of continued occupation and fomenting local resistance.86 For

Israel’s leaders, the primary goal remained the suppression of Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories and the prevention of any PLO influence; this took the form of a plan to increase Hashemite control across the Jordan via ill-fated Village Leagues and mayoral elections that tried unsuccessfully to exclude PLO-affiliated politicians.87

In a new White House highly suspicious of Carter’s approach to the Palestinian question, the recognition that Palestinians were central to regional peace was eclipsed by an uncompromising view of the PLO. Richard Allen, Reagan’s NSC advisor on the Middle East, was the central figure in articulating the administration’s policy toward the organization. During an interview on the ABC news program 20/20, Allen labeled the group a “terrorist organization”

85 “Msibat Itonaim-Reagan” [Reagan’s Press Conference], 6 November 1980, MFA-8652/3, ISA.

86 Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace: A Personal Account (New York: Touchstone, 1996); and Sari Nusseibeh with Anthony David, Once Upon a Country.

87 On the Village Leagues, see chapter six. For more on the Israeli version of a “Jordanian Option,” see Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (London: Allen Lane, 2007).

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until “it provides convincing evidence to the contrary.”88 According to Allen, moderate factions within the organization had little bearing on the administration’s overall stance. “I’ve heard descriptions that identified Arafat as a moderate. But we’re certainly wanting in hard proof that this is the case. One man’s moderate is another man’s terrorist.” Asked about Soviet influence in the region, Allen remarked “It’s difficult to assess the relationship with the PLO because there are various component parts…But, overall, I think it’s fair to say the Soviet Union is supporting the main aims of the PLO.”89

The Reagan administration continued to struggle in their formulation of a clear position on the PLO through the end of 1981. Raymond Tanter, another NSC staffer focusing on Middle

East issues, wrote to Richard Allen in November, “the President should not brand all of the PLO organizations as terrorists since the PLO includes a number of social and political institutions.”90

He cited the CIA’s Palestinian Handbook, which recognized non-terrorist entities like the PLO

Research Center and the Palestine Red Crescent Society. Tanter composed a primer on this issue for a Presidential press conference, highlighting the distinction between individual humanitarian agencies and the PLO as a whole. In it, he emphasized that there would be no negotiations until relevant UN resolutions were accepted alongside an affirmation of Israel’s right to exist.91

Despite this antipathy towards peace talks, there were voices advocating engagement at the time. In letters to his Middle East aides, critics of Reagan took issue with the exclusion of an essential party to the conflict. They argued that the long-term interests of American policy in the

88 Transcript of complete interview given by Richard Allen to “20/20 The ABC News Magazine,” 2 April 1981, folder “PLO 1981,” box 90220, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

89 Ibid.

90 Memo, “The PLO and the President’s Press Conference,” Raymond Tanter to Richard V. Allen, 9 November 1981, folder “PLO 1981,” box 90220, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

91 Ibid.

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region necessitated a dialogue, but officially the administration stood its ground.92 Unofficially, there is ample evidence of direct low-level contact between Americans and moderate members of the PLO. A series of newspaper articles in the summer of 1981 revealed ongoing talks since

Henry Kissinger’s time in office, with Reagan’s contacts primarily facilitated through the CIA and the American Embassy in Beirut.93 The administration also had less formal contacts with moderates through interlocutors like John Mroz, the Director of Middle East Studies at the

International Peace Academy in New York. Mroz’s congenial relationship with Isam Sartawi, a leading Palestinian voice of moderation, is clear from letters provided directly to Geoffrey Kemp,

Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council in the

White House. Sartawi had passed along to Mroz official PLO documents distributed by Arafat, which were given to Kemp in their original Arabic.94

Internal Executive Branch discussions further reveal a more nuanced understanding of the PLO and its moderating elements than Allen’s public remarks. In an August memo to Kemp,

Landrum Bolling outlined a more realistic view of the complicated Palestinian situation. Bolling, an important back channel contact with the PLO under both Carter and Reagan, underscored the growing rift between Palestinians in the West Bank and the PLO in Beirut. He noted that the sense among West Bankers was that “there is still no coherent, unified Palestinian strategy for ending the occupation and bringing peace.”95 They blamed a quarreling leadership in Lebanon

92 Letter, Congressman Paul Findley to Richard V. Allen, 10 July 1981, folder “PLO 1981,” Box 90220, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

93 “U.S., PLO: 7 Years of Secret Contacts,“ Los Angeles Times, 5 July 1981, 1; “U.S., PLO Reportedly have Custom of Secret Dealings,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 6 July 1981, 1-A.

94 Letter, Isam Sartawi to John Mroz, 27 May 1981, folder “PLO 1981,” Box 90220, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL. For more on this secret channel, see Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 205.

95 Memo, “Continuing Strains among the Palestinians,” Landrum Bolling to Geoffrey Kemp, 14 August 1981, folder “PLO 1981,” box 90220, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL. 247

for stunting political progress and criticized cross border terrorism because it provided justification for the ongoing Israeli occupation. But there was a consensus position that backed the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people, seeing it as the kernel of an independent state. Bolling, unlike Allen, stressed these positive developments. “Palestinians accept Israel as a permanent fact in the Middle East. They know that Israel is here to stay, and they are prepared to live with it. Almost no Palestinian thinks or talks anymore about the abolition of the State of Israel.”96

Like Brzezinski before him, this nuanced assessment of the Palestinians by an area expert competed with more ideologically motivated advisors in the White House. Douglas J. Feith, a protégé of the administration’s hawkish Soviet expert, Richard Pipes, was among the new conservative voices in the National Security Council.97 In a largely redacted memo concerning

U.S. relations with the Palestinians, Feith suggested an uncompromising approach that aligned with the administration’s global Cold War aims. The administration should take action that would demonstrate the “coherence” of three “chief foreign policy promises and themes: 1) to combat international terrorism; 2) to counter the Soviet Union’s use of subversive proxies; and 3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies.”98 Feith reiterated the 1975 Ford administration agreement not to negotiate with the PLO until it recognized Israel and accepted

Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and he pointed to a section of Secretary of State

96 Ibid, 3.

97 For background on Feith, see Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, 255-258.

98 Memo, “U.S. Policy toward PLO,” Douglas J. Feith to Norman A. Bailey, 28 Aug. 1981, folder “PLO 1981,” box 90220, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

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Alexander Haig’s Senate confirmation testimony, where Haig singled out the PLO as a “pretty tough hardcore group of terrorists.”99

Many other policymakers shared this view, and several attacks in the 1980s would only reaffirm the dominant belief that there was no negotiating partner among the Palestinians. This was asserted regardless of the fact that rejectionist factions among the Palestinians, such as the

Abu Nidal organization, were responsible for much of the violence. As several experts on

Palestinian political history have argued, the PLO had mainly shifted to a diplomatic track by the late 1970s.100

The View from Beirut

The degree of hostility towards the PLO in Washington and as exhibited in the ongoing

Egyptian-Israeli autonomy negotiations registered in the active Palestinian press flourishing in

Beirut at the time. During this period of resurgent Palestinian politics in the “state within a state,” several PLO factions were issuing popular newsletters that addressed the nationalist struggle, inter-Arab politics, and attitudes towards Israel and the United States. One of those leading weeklies was Al-Hadaf (“The Target”), founded in 1969 by , an acclaimed

99 Ibid., 4.

100 See Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State; and Helga Baumgarten, “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism.” A leading study of the role of violence in the Palestinian national movement is Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). On the consequences of non-engagement with the PLO, see Chamberlin, The Global Offensive, 256. For a different European view on how to engage with the PLO, see the Venice Declaration and the “European Initiative” of the Nine as well as Lord Carrington’s meetings with American Jewish leaders, at which he stated that he “personally opposed terrorism but for the past two years has spent more time negotiating with ‘so called’ ‘terrorists’ (or ‘freedom fighters, depending on who is describing them’) than he has with non-terrorists.” “Meeting with Lord Carrington,” 28 February 1981, A-4338/11, ISA. At a meeting with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean François-Poncet, Jewish leaders expressed similar concern about the French position, and the French Minister stated that while he advised PLO representatives to recognize Israel’s “right to exist in a formal manner,” his country was “prepared to deal with the PLO, because somebody must,” even as he sought good relations with Israel and the American Jewish community. See “Meeting with Jean François-Poncet,” A-4338/11, ISA.

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Palestinian writer and spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Kanafani was born in Acre and forced into exile in 1948, and was later recruited by Dr. George

Habash into the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), a left-wing pan-Arab organization whose membership evolved into the PFLP. Although assassinated by the Israeli Mossad alongside his niece in a Beirut car bombing in 1972, Kanafani’s influence on Palestinian politics and letters was far-reaching.101

Al-Hadaf continued to appear after Kanafani’s assassination and throughout the

Lebanese civil war, unrelenting in its critique of what it characterized as American neo-imperial aspirations in the Middle East and Arab states that were seen as selling out the Palestinian cause.

Its coverage of Camp David, the Carter-Reagan transition and the 1982 Israeli invasion of

Lebanon provides a non-Fatah inflected view of PLO politics at this critical juncture in

Palestinian political development. Reagan himself, in the eyes of Al-Hadaf, was restoring the use of force as the primary tool of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Along with Secretary

Haig, the President was portrayed as a radical departure from Carter and the U.S. human rights agenda. Al-Hadaf’s pages argued that Reagan was primarily animated by the conviction that “the

Soviet Union is the source of most of America’s problems in the world,” and his central aim was

“neutralizing Soviet danger.”102 From the perspective of Palestinian activists in the Global South,

Reagan offered little hope for improving America’s standing abroad.

The reports in Al-Hadaf were an accurate reflection of these early months of the first term, when attention to regional conflict was replaced by a re-inscription of Cold War strategies. By

101 Kanafani coined the term “resistance poetry” which would shape the work of Arab literary giants like . For more on Kanafani’s life and works, see Hilary Kilpatrick’s introduction to Ghassan Kanafani, Men in the Sun and Other Palestinian Stories (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

102 “President Reagan Delivers Important Message in the White House,” (Il-Rais Reagan yusalam risala muhima fi beit il-abyad) Al-Hadaf, No. 522: Vol. 12, 24 January 1981, IPS.

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mid-February 1981, the paper was forcefully attacking the new President for ratcheting up military pressure in the region and resorting to ideological positions that situated the Soviet

Union as the prime antagonist in the Middle East.103 The brunt of Al-Hadaf’s fury, however, was directed at Israel and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Under a grotesque cartoon of Begin, face deformed, blood dripping from his hands, and a dagger at the ready, the paper attacked Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and Begin’s undermining of Palestinian national identity.104

The linkage between Begin’s settlement expansion and the Regan administration was evident in the changing U.S. position towards the legality of ongoing building projects in the West Bank.

Enabling Settlements

Throughout Carter’s presidency, U.S. policy on the settlements was “clear and consistent.”105 They were considered illegal under international law and detrimental to the peace process, and the administration opposed both new settlements and expansion of those already built.106 During the 1980 campaign, Reagan took a very different stance. In an interview with

Time magazine on 30 June 1980, the California Governor was asked whether he would “try to persuade Israel to stop settling on the West Bank?” His response underscored a clear difference with Carter.

103 “The Reagan Administration is Threatening,” (Idarat Reagan tu’hadad). Al-Hadaf, No. 525: Vol. 12, 14 February 1981, IPS.

104 “Begin Government Increasing Settlement Activity,” (Hukumat Begin tas’ad min il-nisha’t il-istitani) Al-Hadaf, No. 524: Vol. 12, 7 February 1981, IPS.

105 Peck, The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, 11.

106 This position was based on Article 49 of the Fourth Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which states clearly “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territories it occupies.” See International Committee of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Geneva: 1949), 172.

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Frankly, I don’t know the answer to that. Under U.N. Resolution 242, the West Bank was supposed to be open to all, and then Jordan and Israel were to work out an agreement for the area. Under those terms, I do not see how it is illegal for Israel to move in settlements.107

In the week after his inauguration, Reagan would expand on this new position after lawmakers in

Jerusalem approved three new West Bank settlements. When the President was asked about the expansion during a press conference, he replied:

As to the West Bank, I believe the settlements there— I disagreed when the previous administration referred to them as illegal, they’re not illegal. Not under the UN resolution that leaves the West Bank open to all people— Arab and Israeli alike, Christian alike. I do think now with this rush to do it and this moving in there the way they are is ill-advised because if we’re going to continue with the spirit of Camp David to try and arrive at a peace, maybe this, at this time, is unnecessarily provocative.108

While recognizing that settlement expansion might be detrimental to fully implementing Camp

David, the President was careful not to preclude Jewish presence in the area. A Congressional letter requesting clarification of Reagan’s exact policy received a noncommittal note of appreciation.109 A more pointed inquiry about the policy shift from the Chairman of the Palestine

Congress of North America was shuffled to the Office of the Public Liaison.110

This Israeli expansion in early 1981 mattered a great deal to the fate of the autonomy talks with Egypt and raised pointed criticism from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Kamal Hassan Ali. In a letter to Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and future Prime Minister

Yitzhak Shamir, Ali invoked the understanding reached at Camp David about a settlement moratorium while negotiations were ongoing. In Ali’s view, it was both “illegal and

107 “An Interview with Reagan,” Time, 30 June 1980.

108 “Excerpts from President Reagan’s Answers in Interview with Five Reporters,” New York Times, 3 February 1981.

109 Letter, Congressman Carl D. Pursell to Ronald Reagan, 25 February 1981; reply by Max Friedersdorf, 2 May 1981, FO, casefile 007580, WHORM: Subject File, RRL.

110 Letter, Samih K. Farsoun to Ronald Reagan, 23 February 1981, ND 016, casefile 007358, ibid.

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inconceivable to use this illegitimate and trumped up anachronism in the name of so-called

Israeli security, as a pretext to cover up Israel’s policy of annexation.”111 The Egyptians were furious that the Israeli government was claiming to negotiate a solution to the Palestinian question while pursuing a “ruinous policy” of “settlements and more settlements.” As this

Egyptian diplomat explained, this was “an incitement to hatred, a provocation, and an added source of tension among the Palestinian and Arab population.”112 In such an atmosphere, the shift in the American position away from longstanding assertions of settlement illegality proved to be damaging and consequential.

In asserting the settlements as part of a broader security arrangement for Israel, the Begin government pushed Secretary Haig and the Americans to endorse their expansion. During Haig’s

April visit, Sharon laid out his conception of Israel’s security needs in a series of slides. A defensive stance necessitating retention of the occupied territories was at the heart of his explanation.

I want to emphasize that the West Bank, the Judean and Samarian mountains and the Golan Heights are the backbone of the State of Israel as far as its defense is concerned, not only for the deployment of troops but for its early warning capability, command and control capability and anti-air defense system. As long as we have our military troops posted there we can adopt a defensive strategy.113

This legitimating argument, which Haig was sympathetic to, contributed to the administration’s shift on the question of legality. At the National Security Council, Middle East expert Raymond

Tanter wrote a vigorous defense of the Reagan administration’s new approach.

The settlements are legal, but the issue is properly a political question, not a legal question. The USG [United States Government] has recognized no country’s sovereignty

111 Letter, Kamal Hassan Ali to Yitzhak Shamir, 19 February 1981, A-4182/17, ISA.

112 Ibid.

113 Meeting between Begin, Haig and delegations, 6 April 1981, 10:50 AM, MFA-6890/2, ISA.

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over the West Bank since Britain controlled the area under the Palestine Mandate. The issue of sovereignty is open and will not be closed until the actual parties to the conflict formally consent to a peace agreement. In the meantime, there is no law that bars Jews from settling in the West Bank. No one should be excluded from an area simply on account of nationality or religion. An ambiguous response concerning the legality of settlements inadvertently causes more press interest than either: 1) a finding that settlements are legal or 2) a statement that the legal question is irrelevant.114

What was most surprising about this newly articulated legal position is that government officials had become fully aware of the extensive damage caused by the settlements, yet still continued to justify their expansion.115

Despite evidence of the settlements’ detrimental effects, there was a strong neoconservative influence on the lax approach to the issue in the White House. Douglas Feith had previously denounced Carter’s insistence that settlements were an obstacle to peace, arguing that the problem was Arab intransigence. In Feith’s view, “If the Jews have a claim to Judea-

Samaria at least as rightful as that of the Arabs and if the purpose of the Israeli settlements there is to stake this claim then it may be that Israel’s stand on the West Bank is not irrational after all.”116 Significantly, Feith deliberately used the biblical names for the occupied territories,

‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria,’ the default parlance of religious nationalists and Likud party politicians in

Israel. This united a strategic argument with a neoconservative legal one.

A rightward shift had seized the intellectual currents of American politics and foreign policy during the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly when it came to discourse around the

114 “Thoughts on Legality of Israel’s West Bank Settlements,” memo, Raymond Tanter to Richard V. Allen, cc: Douglas Feith, 3 Aug. 1981, CO074, casefile 037386, WHORM: Subject File, RRL (emphasis in original).

115 For a clear statement of Reagan’s shift, ten years later, by a State Department official, see David A. Korn, “U.S. Views on Israeli Settlements have Shifted,” Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 1 October 1991, www.nytimes.com/1991/10/01/opinion/l-us-views-on-israeli-settlements-have-shifted-684291.html (accessed 10 March 2015).

116 Quoted in Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, 151.

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Israeli-Palestinian conflict.117 It was a time when a highly respected Democrat like Daniel

Patrick Moynihan could be admired for rejecting the Geneva Conventions when it came to the settlements. In a noted article for Commentary at the beginning of 1981, Moynihan lambasted the

United Nations for its condemnation of Israel. Singling out U.S. support for a Security Council resolution that had reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the West Bank,

Moynihan argued that the treaty was intended to criminalize deportation and territorial occupation in Nazi , and its invocation in this case “played, of course, perfectly into the

Soviet propaganda position.”118

This rightward shift was also a feature of Israeli political life in the early 1980s. Begin narrowly won a second election on 30 June 1981 with forty eight seats to the Likud, forming the nineteenth government of Israel. As demonstrated in his earlier interactions with Carter and

Sadat, the Israeli Prime Minister had a very clear and consistent view of continued territorial control by Israel on all the land west of the Jordan River. He never hid his views from the public, speaking about them at an annual ceremony held at the gravesite of Ze’ev Jabotinsky on the day of his second electoral victory. “Western Eretz Yisrael is all under our control. She is no longer divided. No piece of territory will pass to non-Jewish control, to foreign sovereignty.”119 The

Likud leader’s position on continued sovereignty and settlement expansion, as chapter three

117 This rightward shift is delineated in a volume of essays edited by Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, Rightward Bound. For its impact on the discourse around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 223-41; and Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

118 Daniel P. Moynihan, “Joining the Jackals: The U.S. at the U.N., 1977-1980,” Commentary, Feb. 1981. For more on Moynihan’s intellectual leanings on Israel and close affiliation with neoconservatives like Norman Podhoretz, see Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right, 138-142. A flattering study of Moynihan can be found in Gil Troy, Moynihan’s Moment: America’s Fight Against Zionism as Racism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

119 “Dvarim al kever rosh Beitar” [Words at the Gravesite of Beitar’s Leader], 30 June 1981, PM136, MBC.

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explained, was bolstered by the advice of Eugene Rostow, who provided justification based on research he published as the Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University.120

The consequence of embracing this semantic and legal shift was borne out in practical terms by the Reagan administration’s policy towards settlements, which expanded at a rapid pace through the 1980s. Five thousand Jewish settlers lived in the West Bank when Begin entered office in 1977, and over eighty thousand by the late 1980s. In the interim, commuter towns and bypass roads for settlers bisected the actual ground upon which Palestinian sovereignty could be achieved, as a matrix of Israeli control was consolidated that by some accounts would prove irreversible.121 In February 1982, Ambassador Lewis cabled an urgent memo to Shultz in

Washington and more than a dozen American embassies and consulates throughout the Middle

East and Europe. Lewis provided a detailed account of recent developments in the West Bank, writing that “settlement activity goes on at an accelerated pace, although in new and potentially more serious directions.”122

In a sober and matter of fact style, Lewis recounted the method of land appropriation that had taken over nearly a third of the area, describing the process by which Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries were being extended southward over the Green Line toward Gush Etzion, now one of the largest settlement blocs in the West Bank. He also outlined the manner in which Israel’s

120 Rostow, who had served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Lyndon Johnson, was a prominent Democrat who was an active member of the liberal anti-communist Coalition for a Democratic Majority and a founder of the Committee on Present Danger. He was later brought into the Reagan administration as the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the highest-ranking Democrat inside the administration. His younger brother Walt was the National Security Advisor to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and Eugene had an abiding interest in the Middle East, having helped draft UN Security Council resolution 242 during his time at the State Department. He was viewed in the administration as an authority on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

121 A contemporaneous study of the expansion can be found in Peter Demant, “Israeli Settlement Policy Today,” Middle East Report, no. 116 (1983): 3–29.

122 Cable, Sam Lewis to George Shultz et al., 2 February 1982, folder “Israel Settlements, 1982,” box 90494, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

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Ministry of Defense “pre-settlements” were transformed into permanent civilian settlements, a process that bypassed any earlier pledge of a slowdown by Begin.

Since the Likud victory in 1977, the settler population outside of the Jerusalem area had quadrupled from about 5,000 to 20,000, and in the Gaza Strip the number of settlements had doubled. In the summer months of 1981 alone, 7,000 settlers had moved into the West Bank.123

Lewis reported on plans by the World Zionist Organization to increase the Israeli settler population to 130,000 within five years by expanding existing settlements rather than building new ones from scratch. He highlighted how such an increase was being organized in a cost- effective manner to create urban communities where settlers would work in Israeli cities and live in cheap spacious homes over the green line. Lewis also pointed to an important demographic shift taking place, with the newest settlers moving for economic rather than ideological reasons.

In the most glaring section of the cable, the American ambassador delved into the act of territorial acquisition itself, explaining how thousands of acres were being declared state-owned or Jewish-owned private land and “taken over de facto for settlement purposes.” Encouraged by the exorbitant demands of settlers who had recently been evacuated from the Yamit region settlements in the Sinai as part of the Israeli-Egyptian peace deal, West Bank settlers were caught in a “land rush,” often resorting to questionable methods in order to purchase land parcels. Few officials in Israel really knew the exact area under Israeli control, although the government had built a “massive infrastructure” of roads, power lines, military installations and power systems

“thoroughly locked into Israeli grids” that was intended to create a system of dependence on

Israel proper.124

123 These are Lewis’s numbers; for a slightly different count, see Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land, 99.

124 Cable, Sam Lewis to George Shultz et al., 2 February 1982, folder “Israel Settlements, 1982,” box 90494, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL. On the evacuation of Yamit, see Michael Feige, Settling in the Hearts, 196-211. 257

Lewis captured the ultimate aim of this entire settlement endeavor in his cable, telling

Shultz and the others, “The goal has been to create a matrix of Israeli control in the West Bank so deeply rooted that no subsequent Israeli government would be able to relinquish substantial chunks of that territory, even in exchange for peace.” Concluding with an assessment of the growing support for these settlements among Israelis, Lewis decried the lack of protest and explained how announcements of new expansion is “met with virtual silence” and how “the majority of Israelis have come to accept the settlements in the occupied territories as a fact of life.” Finally placing these developments alongside the stalled autonomy talks, the ambassador explained how the presence of a large number of Israeli settlers undermines the possibility of a

“self-governing authority developing into an embryo government of an independent PLO-state- in-the-making.”125 It could not be more evident to U.S. officials that any resolution of the

Palestinian question was impossible under these circumstances.

Reagan himself was personally aware of the consequences of this expansion. In his diary entry on 14 February 1983, the President wrote: “Valentine’s Day. Had a brief on the West Bank.

There can be no question but that Israel has a well thought out plan to take over the W.B. [West

Bank]”126 In his memoirs, Reagan later wrote that settlements were a “continued violation of UN

Security Council Resolution 242” and that Egyptian President Mubarak told him that these settlements “were inflaming the Arab world and reducing the momentum that had started to build up in favor of the September initiative.”127 But as late as 1988, upon hearing that Israel was planning new settlements, all Reagan could muster was “We are going to try and talk them out of

125 Ibid.

126 Reagan and Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 130.

127 Reagan, An American Life, 441.

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that.”128 This permissive stance was the culmination of negotiating patterns enshrined since the initial pursuit of a Geneva Conference in 1977 that accommodated ongoing Israeli building, stripping away any semblance of political sovereignty for Palestinians while promoting continued settlement expansion.129

Despite their misgivings, during countless Congressional hearings and press conferences throughout these months, as well as conversations with the Israelis themselves, the administration seemed to acquiesce to Israel’s actions. During a crucial fact-finding meeting with Israeli officials on 28 January 1982, Secretary of State Haig raised the matter of land acquisition directly with Burg and the autonomy committee in Jerusalem. “I think the concept that Israel will have full control over all land Israel specifies for settlements or security use and will have a veto power over all other state lands poses an extremely difficult position,” Haig explained.130 It denoted that Israelis would build new settlements and enlarge existing ones during the transition period after an autonomy agreement. “It would be inconceivable that agreement could be arrived on that basis,” Haig argued. He understood the security role and

“traditional role” of the settlements, and was not attempting to dispute the existing eighty five settlements built since the 1967 war. He was, however, concerned with suspicions mounting in the Arab world and among Arabs in the territories “that what is underway is de facto annexation.”

In order to “arrest that conception,” Haig suggested a parallelism whereby existing settlements could be thickened but not expanded in territorial terms. Any land included in the autonomy for

128 Reagan and Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 577.

129 For records of these later meetings, and the role of Yitzhak Shamir in particular in promoting narrow terms as Foreign Minister, see MFA-6898/7, ISA.

130 “Meeting between Committee on Autonomy, Chairman Dr. J. Burg, Minister of Interior and USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig, 28 January 1982, 8:10 AM, Cabinet Room, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” MFA-6898/8, ISA.

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Israeli control due to security concerns “should not de facto be available for development by settlements.” Haig recognized this was difficult for Israel to hear, but he said that he had a “hard time objectively as an outsider contesting the concerns expressed to us by Egypt, Palestinians,

Arab populations, on this subject. I sincerely mean that.”131

In the substance and style of their response, Israeli officials demonstrated a deep commitment to settlement building both as a security mechanism to safeguard Israel proper, and a longstanding right inherent in the Zionist return to the land. While they were planning the return of the Sinai Peninsula that year, the West Bank was another reality altogether. For Burg, the head of the autonomy committee, Israeli settlements were an insurance policy “to prevent partition of this country.” He added in his response to Haig, “You agree that the existing ones should be thickened. Right?” “Right,” Haig replied. For Burg, limiting growth in such a manner would lead to a process of “degeneration.”

If you say to a certain body, and this is the State of Israel and the Nation of Israel, if you say, in this you are not allowed to grow; you can put on fat, you can thicken, but you are now allowed to grow, then it means that you are allowed to degenerate, because when you limit growth as such, then surely you invite the process of degeneration. I would say, of national despair.132

Haig agreed with Burg, telling the Minister of Interior “I am not insensitive to the compelling logic of what you have just said.” But he offered two practical considerations: the opposition that this would raise, and the need to move on an autonomy agreement while there was still an opening with Egypt. Haig suggested there was a way to manage the transition that would not undermine the growth of settlements, while not alienating the Arabs.

131 Ibid.

132 “Meeting between Committee on Autonomy, Chairman Dr. J. Burg, Minister of Interior and USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig, Jan, 28, 1982, 8:10 AM, Cabinet Room, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” MFA-6898/8, ISA. 260

Ambassador Sam Lewis, who had followed this issue closely, joined Haig in trying to convince the Israelis to shift their stance. Lewis told the Israelis he understood the “dynamics” of their “psychology” on this issue. “I have also been enormously impressed with what has been achieved in expanding Jewish population in the territories and would have to say that General

Sharon has demonstrated in his past incarnation that capacity for achievement.” Lewis observed that although the U.S. could not “keep up with what you do in this area,” it was clear from all previous meetings that “the present network of settlements that you have created in Judea and

Samaria, in particular, is the basic grid that you needed to achieve your objectives.” This should limit further expansion, Lewis noted, particularly with additional land being received for expansion. Haig’s suggestion would not “constrain” what the Israelis believed they needed to do in the coming five years, Lewis argued, but the psychological effect of the expansion also had to be taken into account.133

Haig chimed in after Lewis’ remarks, delineating the central problem he sensed the parties were facing. While Camp David and the U.S. did not accept the creation of a Palestine state, “Camp David does not endorse, nor do we endorse, the annexation of these territories.”

The result was a growing opposition to Israeli actions, which was undermining their credibility in the wake of Camp David. “Camp David does not say that annexation is the objective, just as it does not say, very clearly, that there is any hope or any objective of a Palestinian state. But you can’t have it both ways.” Burg disputed Haig’s characterization of Jewish settlements as annexation, invoking his own experience living in Prague during the German annexation of

Sudetenland. “I know what is annexation. Living in part of Eretz Israel is not annexation.”

Yitzhak Shamir, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced another distinction that might ease

133 Ibid.

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this tension. “The number of Israeli settlements in Samaria and Judea and Gaza has nothing to do with the autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Samaria, Judea and Gaza.”134 For Shamir, as the autonomy negotiations had always made clear, the status of territory could be separated out from the political rights of the individual. This arrangement, in practice, yielded a reality where territorial sovereignty was transformed while the inhabitants remained disenfranchised.

Sharon, the architect of these plans, brought the conversation back to the question of security, depicting the settlements as integral to Israeli defense. Sharon did not contest the Israeli right to live all over Israel, and he suggested that Palestinian Arabs had the same right. For him the central concern was security.

Settlements have been always part of our national security concept, and I am a great believer in this concept, being born myself on one of those settlements, and I can tell you that my mother—she is 82 years old—still sleeps with a gun under her pillow and that’s normal here. Everyone knows exactly his task. That is the immediate contribution of the settlements to Israel’s security.

But above and beyond, no doubt that these settlements are perhaps the strongest barrier that we have against any possibility of forming in the future a second Palestinian state, and by doing that, by having these settlements, that is the contribution, as I said, to the rest of the world.135

Sharon then added to his argument the Cold War concern about Soviet expansion in the Middle

East, depicting the settlements as both a solution to the Soviet “danger” in the long term and short-term confrontations with Arab states. Sharon also described the natural cohabitation between Jews and Arabs, and explained how in the wake of displacement and migration, Arabs had moved to Jerusalem and so Jews had moved to Samaria. The logic of population transfers, in

Sharon’s telling, justified the building across the 1967 borders.

134 “Meeting between Committee on Autonomy, Chairman Dr. J. Burg, Minister of Interior and USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig, Jan, 28, 1982, 8:10 AM, Cabinet Room, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” MFA-6898/8, ISA.

135 Ibid.

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Both Haig and Lewis reiterated their central concern, the perception of this expansion in the Arab world, and the open-ended nature of the Israeli position on security. Anything, it seemed, could be claimed for settlement in Sharon’s concept. “I don’t know if it’s true or not but certainly it is widely believed,” Lewis explained, “that today more than 30 percent of the land which was part of Judea and Samaria in 1967 is now exclusively under Israeli control, one way or another, and that this 30 percent is growing…that 30 percent figure is quite a threatening figure to any Palestinian. That is the suspicion problem we face.”136 Lewis clearly had deeper fears about the settlements, which he shared in his cables to Washington, but this meeting was intended to gently convey the substance of American thinking on the issue in the context of the autonomy negotiations without outright confrontation. It was the spirit of collegiality that prevailed, rather than a more hard-hitting approach that might engender Israeli resentment.

Prime Minister Begin, who had entered the meeting late, offered the definitive Israeli stance, underscoring just how protracted the settlement issue had become, and how difficult it would be to change course in a meaningful way. Begin opened with a confession, recalling the first time he met President Carter in the Cabinet Room, and Carter told Begin “we consider your settlements to be illegal and an obstacle to peace.” He had seen Carter more than ten times, and at each meeting, Carter repeated the message, “illegal and an obstacle to peace.” But Begin disagreed. “I answered: legal and not an obstacle to peace. He didn’t tire; I didn’t tire.”

Then the President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan, put an end to that debate. He said, the settlements are not illegal. A double negative gives a positive result. In other words, they are legal or legitimate. Now only the second question remains so far as the U.S. attitude is concerned: are the settlements an obstacle to peace or aren’t they? About

136 “Meeting between Committee on Autonomy, Chairman Dr. J. Burg, Minister of Interior and USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig, Jan, 28, 1982, 8:10 AM, Cabinet Room, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” MFA-6898/8, ISA.

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the legality, the debate is finished. That was stated by the President of the United States, of the day. And in my opinion, it is a very positive development.137

For Begin, who had long championed the greater Land of Israel ideology, settlements were not an obstacle to peace with the Palestinians. “On the contrary,” he added, “they are a great contribution to peaceful relationships between the Jews and the Arabs in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza District.” Without them, PLO fighters would come down from the mountains to the plains of Israel and carry out attacks on Jews. “If there are no settlements there, they can just come down.”138

Begin also painted an idealistic view of the Arab inhabitants’ relationship with the settlers. “They visit each other. They help each other. There’s never been a problem. The only place in which there are clashes from time to time is in Hebron—the only place.” The Prime

Minister recalled the rocky land in which settlements were built, never cultivated. “It was desert, untilled for so many years, but, of course, you can do something and we do something, in the pioneering spirit which you know so well from your own history and, therefore, sometimes the grey color turned into green.” Sharon added that these areas have little or no inhabitants, “the population is very small or doesn’t exist at all.” It was also the case, Sharon added, that these hilltops were state owned land. “I had tremendous difficulties when I tried to expropriate private land,” Sharon told the Americans, in light of the Begin’s government’s legal dispute over certain areas of the West Bank.139 As for the issue of credibility around the world, Sharon concluded, “if

137 Ibid.

138 “Meeting between Committee on Autonomy, Chairman Dr. J. Burg, Minister of Interior and USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig, 28 January 1982, 8:10 AM, Cabinet Room, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” MFA-6898/8, ISA.

139 The dispute centered around the Elon Moreh settlement, which was contested by Arab petitioners in front of the Supreme Court, who ordered the land returned in a ruling on 22 October 1979, which Begin accepted in deference to legal ruling, while shifting towards a policy of settling on state lands in the West Bank. On the significance to the Elon Moreh ruling, and the Israeli judicial system’s “contribution toward the Judaization of the West Bank” (in the 264

I will have to choose—I know it is a hard decision—between credibility and security—I will take security.”140

In articulating their positions in such a direct and genuine manner, the meeting was emblematic of the emerging Israeli stance on one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations. Haig, who had traveled to Jerusalem to seek a way out of the impasse around autonomy, concluded that practically the status quo was generating “paranoia” among the Arab inhabitants of the land.

I can tell you the paranoia is just mind-boggling. Mostly they are fed incorrect facts and they get that from the PLO…but one thing they say they know, and one thing they fear is that this is a formula –autonomy under the current arrangements, as they believe them to exist –that the land will all be gone.141

Haig argued that he simply wanted to deal “intelligently” with this issue “to overcome this paranoia” and achieve progress towards peace. As the meeting wrapped up, Haig expressed his appreciation for the substantive talks, admitting that he spoke with “uncharacteristic bluntness,” a function of the “mutual confidence” between both Israel and the United States. “It doesn’t mean that anyone feels they have a monopoly on wisdom,” Haig remarked. “It does mean that

words of Tom Segev), see the special publication (Hebrew and English) by the Israel State Archives, “The ‘Elon Moreh’ High Court Decision of 22 October 1979 and the Israeli Government's Reaction,” http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/exeres/2256A595-10F5-458E-ACB8- 7CDDBDF86634,frameless.htm?NRMODE=Published; Yaacov Lozowick, “What are the Settlements For?” 6 November 2012, Blog of the Israel State Archives, http://israelsdocuments.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/1979-what-are- settlements-for.html; and Tom Segev, “That Seventies Show: The Settlements Didn’t Begin with Begin,” Ha’aretz, 26 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/the-makings-of-history/that-seventies-show-the-settlements- didn-t-begin-with-begin.premium-1.472488 (accessed 8 March 2015).

140 “Meeting between Committee on Autonomy, Chairman Dr. J. Burg, Minister of Interior and USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig, Jan, 28, 1982, 8:10 AM, Cabinet Room, Government Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” MFA-6898/8, ISA.

141 Ibid.

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we give you some observations on our side which we hope you will contemplate in the context of the whole as it shapes up.”142

The parties left the meeting in agreement to continue negotiating autonomy through April

1982, without sticking to a hard deadline. Unsurprisingly, given the gap between the Israeli view of autonomy and Egypt’s own position, nothing would be agreed to in the subsequent months.

There were already murmurings of Sharon’s plans for a large-scale military operation in South

Lebanon, which would quickly emerge as the site of military action against the PLO.

Conclusion

As events in the early years of the Reagan White House make clear, the codification of a

Cold War alliance with Israel and growing hostility towards Palestinian nationalism undercut the elements of the Camp David Accords that sought to adjudicate the question of Palestinian self- determination. The rhetoric supporting a “homeland” that had animated Carter’s approach to the conflict was discarded along with the assertion of self-determination for Palestinians. This fit with a broader ideological shift away from the human rights emphasis of the late 1970s towards the global Cold War revival of the early 1980s. Israel and the Palestinian question were prime examples of the manifestations of this shift on the ground, among a wide array of foreign policy transformations in the Reagan White House.

While the new administration may have been subject to internal divisions and eventually retreated from its interventionist stance, the initial “rollback” of Soviet influence closed off the

142 Ibid. Haig was not the only friend of Israel to offer advice on the limits of autonomy. Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, traveled to Jerusalem in March and covered much of the same ground with Begin, to no avail. Carrington was more insistent than Haig, telling Begin that “Palestinian nationalism won’t go away,” and autonomy would never accommodate the Palestinian question. “Meeting between Prime Minister Begin and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Carrington,” Jerusalem, 31 March 1982, A-7375/7, ISA.

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possibility of progress in the autonomy talks and abetted Israeli expansion in the territories. The isolation of the PLO and a deepening U.S. alliance with Israel converged in Lebanon to leave the

Palestinians vulnerable in dramatic new ways, as the following chapter elucidates. More broadly, the reordering of American foreign policy in the Middle East revealed U.S. internationalism at a moment of transition. The move away from Carter’s regional focus to the globalist approach of

Reagan led to consequences that would continue to underpin many of the region’s conflicts well after the end of the Cold War.

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Chapter Five: The Limits of Lebanon, 1982-1984

Beirut has given Palestine what no other Arab capital has. It has given and given, without asking for anything in return. And it never would ask. Nor should we make it ask. We should pay it back of our own free will. -Yasser Arafat1

Everything began here. Not only the heroes and the symbols but the public rift, too, and the protest demonstrations, and the movement. Here, for the first time, was where thoughts of the futility of it all first began. -Ron Leshem, Beaufort2

Introduction

Lebanon’s civil war had been raging since 1975, well before the Israeli and American intervention that is the focus of this chapter. But the diplomatic collapse of the Palestinian autonomy talks in the months leading to the June 1982 Israeli invasion provided a rationale for the decision to target the PLO militarily across state borders. Members of the Reagan administration approved Israeli military action, although they were divided on the extent of the intervention that followed. The consequences, most distressingly in the context of the Sabra and

Shatila massacre of September 1982, underscored the risks of U.S. support for Israeli war aims.

While American involvement was upended by the tragic bombing of the U.S. Embassy and

Marine Barracks in Beirut, the failure of the Israeli-Lebanese peace accords and the PLO’s expulsion from the country triggered new forms of regional resistance and the resurgence of the

Palestinian question in the occupied territories themselves.

In the realm of historical scholarship, the 1982 Lebanon war largely remains a black box of Israeli, Palestinian, international and U.S. historiography. Despite its political significance and

1 3 July 1982. Quoted in Shafiq Al-Hout, My Life in the PLO: The Inside Story of the Palestinian Struggle (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 151-152.

2 Beaufort (New York: Delta, 2009), 305 268

contested legacy, most of the extant writing on 1982 has been left to journalists and the partisan memoirs of participants.3 Among Israeli scholars, the war is often described in traumatic terms.

In the words of the scholar Eyal Zisser, Israelis prefer to “forget and suppress” Lebanon.4 This view was somewhat altered during the thirtieth anniversary of the war in 2012, as newspapers, conferences and TV coverage offered more critical examinations. But as the historian Asher

Kaufmann has argued, there exists a deep silence and denial around the events in Lebanon. It is an “exonerated war,” and for some who selectively remember a formative military experience of early youth, it has even become a war of pride.5

Existing accounts of the war alternate between a critique of Israeli overreach,6 a focus on the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) actions during the summer siege of 1982,7 the

3 Among the best accounts by journalists are Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1986); , Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Jonathan C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Vintage Books, 1984). Memoirs, while useful in providing context and an insider perspective, are often problematic as objective historical sources. For Lebanon, see Ronald Reagan, An American Life; Haig, Caveat; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph; Tanter, Who's at the Helm; Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm; Elie Salem, Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon: The Troubled Years, 1982-1988 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); , : An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (New Milford: Toby Press, 2010); David Kimche, The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat and : The Quest for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Scribner’s, 1991); Raful Eitan and Eliot A Green, trans., A Soldier’s Story: The Life and Times of an Israeli War Hero (New York: S.P.I. Books, 1991); Israel Gefen, An Israeli in Lebanon (London: Pickwick Books, 1986); Al-Hout, My Life in the PLO; Jacobo Timmerman, The Longest War (London: Chatto & Windus, 1982); Dov Yermiya, My War Diary: Lebanon, June 5-July 1, 1982 (Cambridge: South End Press, 1983); Ariel Sharon, Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); and , Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). See also Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985. Rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Yezid Sayigh, “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 13.1 (1983): 24-65.

4 Eyal Zisser, “The 1982 ‘Peace for War’: Looking Back in Anger—Between an Option of a War and a War of No Option,” in Mordechai Bar-On, ed., A Never-Ending Conflict: A Guide to Israeli Military History (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 208.

5 Asher Kaufmann, “Forgetting the Lebanon War? On Silence, Denial, and the Selective Remembrance of the “First” Lebanon War, in Ben-Ze’ev, Ruth Ginio and Jay Winter, eds., Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

6 Arye Naor, Begin Ba’Shilton [Begin in Power] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1984); and Schiff and Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War.

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Phalange-led massacre in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps,8 and the shattering of

American naiveté with the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Barracks in Lebanon’s seaside capital.9 Few studies have managed to synthesize these various perspectives by situating the war in its local, regional, and international contexts. The dearth of available primary sources and 1982’s contested place in Lebanese, Israeli, American, and Palestinian history and memory partially explain this gap, although this is beginning to change.10

Drawing on range of U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian sources, this chapter explores the central role of the Israeli-American relationship in the lead-up to the war and during the fighting itself. It offers a reassessment of the motivations behind Israel’s conduct in Lebanon and the attendant U.S. involvement between 1982 and 1984. Newly available evidence demonstrates how an ideological alignment between Menachem Begin’s Likud government and the Reagan administration helped foment the invasion, while constraining Israeli actions during the war itself.

The aftermath of the Lebanon war, and U.S. attempts to restart negotiations on the

Palestinian front, yielded little in the way of a viable peace process. As the PLO leadership

7 Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Yezid Sayigh, “Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 12.4 (1983): 3-24; and Brynen, “PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 18.2 (1989): 48-70.

8 Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila: September 1982 (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre (Belmont: Association of Arab American Graduates, 1984).

9 David Crist, The Twilight War; and Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble.

10 Contemporary artists—not historians—have been at the forefront of this change. In Lebanon, see Akram Zaatari’s The Earth of Endless Secrets (Frankfurt: Portikus, 2010); A Conversation with an Imagined Israeli Filmmaker Named Avi Mograbi (: Sternberg Press, 2012); and Letter to a Refusing Pilot, Pavilion of Lebanon, 2013 Venice Biennale. For films, see Nadine Labaki’s Wa’hala l’wein? [Where do we Go Now?] (2011), and Ziad Doueiri’s West Beirut (1998). In Israel, see Samuel Maoz’s, Lebanon (2009) and Ari Folman’s (2008). An excellent documentary about the war is the Al-Jazeera mini-series Harb Lubnan [The War of Lebanon] (2007). For the leading account of the role of memory around the Lebanese civil war, see Sune Haugbolle, War and Memory in Lebanon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For newly available historical sources, as well as visual culture that fills in archival gaps, see the collection of the UMAM Documentation and Research Center, Harat Hreik, Beirut; and the archives of the Arab Image Foundation, Gemmayzeh, Beirut. 270

regrouped in Tunis, non-statist attempts to solve the Palestinian question and growing unrest in the occupied territories would lead instead to the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. A formative link can therefore be traced from the Palestinian presence in Lebanon prior to the 1982

Israeli invasion and the advancement of the PLO’s statist agenda after the organization’s expulsion.11

The

Having fled Jordan in the aftermath of “” in 1970, the PLO relocated to

Lebanon, shifting the center of nationalist politics to the Palestinian refugee camps inside the country.12 Yasser Arafat and the Lebanese Army had brokered the Cairo Accords in 1969, which authorized actions on behalf of the Palestinian national liberation struggle and guaranteed

Palestinian civic rights in Lebanon.13 The PLO leadership worked to create a “state within a state” through mass mobilization, paramilitary training and the control of services, bolstering its local standing. This growing influence on the ground encroached upon Lebanese sovereignty, and the

11 This link is suggested most explicitly in Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State; and Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press 1990). For excellent background on the Palestinians in Lebanon, see David Hirst, Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 2010); Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies; Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics; Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Tabitha Petran, The Struggle over Lebanon (New York: Press, 1987). Also extremely useful is Yezid Sayigh’s chapter, “The Palestinians,” in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds., The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): 125-155. Sayigh argues that the Cold War was perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of the Palestinian national struggle, and that the PLO utilized it to full diplomatic advantage. See also Elizabeth Thompson’s fascinating chapter on Palestinian leader Abu Iyad in Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013) to understand the “structural constraints of statelessness,” 244.

12 This refers to the Jordanian Civil War, fought between the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat, and the Hashemite monarchy, led by King Hussein. For Israel’s role in the fighting, see Ziv Rubinovitz, “Blue and White ‘Black September: Israel’s Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970,” The International History Review, 32: 4, 687-706. On PLO infrastructure in Lebanon, see Cheryl A. Rubenberg, “The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 12.3 (1983): 54-78.

13 Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon, 30.

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Lebanese Army was eventually forced to renounce its control of certain areas in the country. As a result of these developments, the 1970s were a time of increased tension between the Lebanese and Palestinians, with the PLO solidifying its hold in the south of the country, venturing outside refugee camps and creating alliances with various Muslim groups. Open clashes with Lebanese

Christian forces broke out in the southern city of in 1975 and spread all over Lebanon, helping to ignite a fifteen-year civil war.14

For the Shia population in the south of Lebanon, the dual impact of the PLO presence and the rise of cross border skirmishes with Israel was profoundly dislocating. Long impoverished economically and disenfranchised politically, the Shia found their land appropriated by

Palestinian refugees and the entire region transformed into a land bridge for the “reconquest of

Arab Palestine.”15 The Palestinian national liberation struggle, as the scholar Fouad Ajami argued, took precedence over local concerns. “A grandiose ‘Arab Cause’ was pressed from remote places where the inhabitants had no voice of their own.”16 Unable to cope with the

Palestinian presence, the rise of Shia discontent fomented the rapid rise of Amal, which formed

14 The clashes were with the army and internal security forces, and it was Maaruf Saad’s local organization (allied to the Palestinians), rather than the Palestinians themselves, who were mainly involved. For more on the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War and its tortuous trajectory, see, among others, Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993); Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The Reconsidered (London: Tauris, 1988); and Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1983).

15 Imam Musa al Sadr, the prominent Iranian born cleric who had revitalized Shia politics in the south by establishing Amal and empowering a passionate constituency of supporters, was a leading critic. While Musa al Sadr had initially supported the Palestinian cause, shortly before his mysterious 1978 disappearance in Libya, he was quoted by Lebanese politicians Karim Pakradouni as saying “The Palestinian resistance is not a revolution; it does not seek martyrdom. It is a military machine that terrorizes the Arab world. With weapons Arafat gets money; with money he can feed the press; and thanks to the press he can get a hearing before world public opinion…The Shia have finally gotten over their inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Palestinian organizations.” See Fouad Ajami, "Lebanon and Its Inheritors," Foreign Affairs 63, no. 4 (1985): 785.

16 Ajami, "Lebanon and Its Inheritors," 784-85.

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the basis for the subsequent emergence of Hezbollah.17 These popular movements, byproducts of both internal turmoil in the 1970s and the external pressure of the Israeli invasion, would indelibly shape the course of Lebanese and Middle Eastern politics.

Israel’s leaders were also increasingly anxious about the growing power of Palestinian nationalism and the links between Palestinians inside the occupied territories and in the . By targeting the PLO in Lebanon and forcing its withdrawal, strategic thinkers in Israel believed Palestinian national aspirations for a homeland could be quashed and a pliant Maronite state could be established as an ally to the north.18 Begin and Defense Minister Sharon, who had differing conceptions of what to do in Lebanon, both sought to take advantage of the Cold War mindset in Washington. Members of the Reagan administration, as the previous chapter demonstrated, viewed the PLO as a Soviet proxy and were sympathetic to Israeli desires to target them militarily. Yet as the 1982 invasion and its aftermath would demonstrate, the Israelis overestimated their own capabilities. In the process, they sowed regional upheaval and drew the

United States into its largest quagmire since the Vietnam War.

Lebanon: A Site of Cold War Contestation

17 For an excellent overview on the interrelated dynamics and separate trajectories of both, see Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, updated ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Ironically, both organizations were supported by the PLO at different times.

18 On Israel’s motivations in Lebanon, see Kirsten E. Schulze, “Perceptions and Misperceptions: Influences on Israeli Intelligence Estimates During the 1982 Lebanon War,” The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16:1 (Spring 1996); and Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Liber, “Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon,” International Security 8:2 (October 1983). For more on the Maronite connection, see Laurie Eisenberg, “History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factor in Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon,” in Efraim Karsh, Rory Miller and Michael Kerr, eds., Conflict Diplomacy and Society in Israeli-Lebanese Relations (London: Routledge: 2010); Kirsten E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and Randal, Going All the Way.

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The PLO’s bases in Lebanon had been subject to heavy Israeli bombardment as part of

“Operation Litani” in 1978.19 Coming on the heels of the , the operation pushed the PLO northwards and increased tensions in the Lebanese civil war.20 But the Carter administration had pushed back against this operation and earlier Israeli military actions in

Lebanon.21 Further cross border exchanges of rocket fire from PLO members in the south left residents in the Galilee exposed, although a ceasefire put into place with American mediation in

July 1981 halted fire for ten months.

To garner Reagan’s support in reviving Israel’s military agenda in the border area, Prime

Minister Begin promoted a strategic Cold War argument while emphasizing humanitarian dimensions as well. Drawing on decades of a close Zionist alliance with the Maronite Christian community of Mount Lebanon, Begin saw himself as the savior of a besieged minority and promoted the view that the were the “Jews of the 1980s.” As he told the Israeli cabinet in April 1981, “Israel will not allow to happen.”22 Begin referred to accounts of

Christians killed and threatened by Palestinian groups, like the notorious 1976 massacre in

Damour, promising Maronite interlocutors to act as a protector.

19 For background on Operation Litani, see Morris, Righteous Victims, 501–505. The operation, seen as a precursor to the 1982 Israeli invasion, led to the establishment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On UNIFIL and the role of peacekeepers in Lebanon, see Naomi Weinberger, “ Options in Lebanon,” The Middle East Journal, 37:3 (Summer 1983): 341-369.

20 The Coastal Road Massacre was planned by Fatah leader Abu Jihad and included the prominent militant . It involved militant landings in Tel Aviv and the hijacking of an Israeli bus that led to the killing of thirty-eight civilians (including thirteen children). The attack was aimed at scuttling the peace talks between Sadat and Begin. On Palestinian objectives, see Yezid Sayigh, “Palestinian Armed Struggle: Means and Ends,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 16.1 (1986): 95-112.

21 See “Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State,” 24 September 1977, 1138Z, FRUS, Doc 111.

22 Meeting between Prime Minister Begin and U.S. Ambassador Lewis, Jerusalem, April 29, 1981, 12:15 PM. A- 7384/2, ISA. 274

In a meeting that month with U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis, Begin expanded on his approach to Lebanon. “Under no circumstances will Israel allow the Christians of

Lebanon in the 80s [to] become the Jews of Europe in the 40s. We cannot countenance it because we are a Jewish state.” Appealing to the protection of religious freedoms, Begin stressed, “The

Maronites are one of the most ancient Christian groups in the Middle East. It is inconceivable that we would stand by and allow the Christians to be destroyed.” Asserting his own leadership role against a historical backdrop of Jewish persecution, Begin remarked, “Today I am a proud

Jew. We were once helpless and massacred and now by divine providence we have the means to help other people whose destruction is being connived by a brutal enemy.”23

Alongside these ideological motivations, the Israeli decision to militarily target the PLO grew out of the failed Palestinian autonomy talks that had been launched in the spring of 1979. In

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon’s view, the lack of a diplomatic solution after the Camp David

Accords invited a display of force that would somehow defeat Palestinians in their Lebanese stronghold. According to Israeli historian Avi Shlaim, one of Sharon’s primary aims was the destruction of PLO military infrastructure in Lebanon and the undermining of the organization as a political entity, in order to facilitate the absorption of the West Bank by Israel. The second aim, dovetailing with Begin’s presentation of the Christian Maronites as the “Jews of the 1980s” was the establishment of a Maronite-led government in Lebanon, headed by Phalange leader Bashir

Gemayel, and the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries.24

23 Ibid. This line of argument about Maronite persecution at the hands of the Palestinians would continue after the invasion, with Begin sending Christian allies to meet with Ambassador Lewis at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and encourage the U.S. to help rescue Lebanon from Palestinians. As May El-Murr told Lewis about the PLO, “We simply have to cut off their head, like with a snake.” See Meeting held at the Embassy of the United States in Tel Aviv, 6 July 1982, Ambassador Samuel Lewis, Mrs. May El-Murr and Mr. Freddie El Murr. A-4321/4, ISA.

24 A third aim was the expelling of from Lebanon. See Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 395–407. 275

To achieve these aims, Sharon conceived two military plans with the code names of

“Little Pines” and "Big Pines." The former, intended for the Israeli army to go up to forty kilometers inside Lebanon, would target PLO installations. The latter was predicated on an invasion up to the Beirut-Damascus highway, just outside the capital, linking Israel’s troops with

Maronite forces. Big Pines was first presented to the Israeli cabinet on 20 December 1981, by

Begin, but rejected by the majority of ministers. According to Shlaim, Sharon and chief of staff , realizing that there was no chance in persuading the cabinet to approve a large-scale operation, adopted a tactic to implement "Operation Big Pines" in stages by manipulating enemy provocations and Israeli responses.25

There remains disagreement about the precipitating factors leading to the invasion itself, and the American role in triggering the war. While there had been PLO attacks on Israel’s northern border towns, they ceased after the July 1981 ceasefire brokered by U.S. Special Envoy in Lebanon Philipp Habib. Israel considered attacks outside of Lebanon, including the assassination of a diplomat in Paris and cross border raids from Jordan, as further evidence of the need to strike the PLO. Sharon first revealed the extent of his military plans to the Americans during a meeting with Ambassador Habib in December 1981 at the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

Habib’s assistant, Morris Draper, recalled this meeting during a ten year retrospective on

American involvement in Lebanon.

25 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 406. According to Lewis, “That was the first of several Israeli Cabinet meetings on the "Big Pines" proposal. Each time, it was deferred or not approved…After a while, Begin and Sharon concluded that their Cabinet colleagues were "weak-kneed, lily-livered faint hearts" who could not be persuaded to accept the total proposal. At that stage, Sharon recast the nature of the operation and convinced Begin that the Israelis needed only to project their force fifty kilometers into Lebanon to clean out the PLO artillery and Kaytusha rockets; thereafter, the Cabinet discussion until the war started was about a much smaller and less frightening operation than had been originally presented. It became, for discussion purposes, only an incursion, slightly larger than the one that took place in 1978.” Samuel Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. See also Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus, and War: Israel in Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

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Phil [Habib] and I and the Chargé of our Embassy Bill Brown, heard, as Sharon rather lost his temper and threw cold water over the plans we had for solidifying a sort of de facto cease-fire and came out and told us that if he’s in charge, this is what was going to happen. We, of course, kept this information very closely held, but got back to Washington and told everybody we could. Phil even told the President what was planned. And in graphic detail he described to Haig and people like Larry Eagleburger that we were going to see American-made munitions being dropped from American-made aircraft over Lebanon, and civilians were going to be killed, there was going to be a hell of a big uproar, and the United States- which didn’t look very good in the Middle East anyway at the time, for being so inactive—was going to take a full charge of blame.26

U.S. Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis corroborated Draper’s recollections, adding that “Habib and everybody else was thunder-struck by Sharon's plan, although I think our Embassy staff were not quite as surprised, except for the fact that Sharon was being so open about his views.”27

Habib reportedly asked Sharon what Israel would do with the thousands of Palestinians in the country, and Sharon allegedly replied, "We'll hand them over to the Lebanese. In any case, we expect to be in Lebanon only for a few days. The Lebanese Christians will take care of them.”28

Sharon’s revelation of expansive war aims, as one U.S. policymaker later explained, was intended “to prepare the Reagan administration for a large Israeli operation in Lebanon which was likely to occur.”29 It did not take much convincing. A few days before the invasion, Sharon came to Washington and explained in detail to Alexander Haig what he was planning to do. The notebooks of Charles Hill, a top State Department aide, clearly indicate that a “green light” was given for Israel’s actions. While recent scholarship still upholds Haig’s denial of having given

26 Morris Draper, “Marines in Lebanon A Ten Year Retrospective: Lessons Learned,” Quantico, VA, 1992. Courtesy of Jon Randal.

27 Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

28 Ibid. The Phalange of course, did “take care of them,” as was seen in the Sabra and Shatila massacre of September 1982. Further discoveries in the Israel State Archives reveal U.S. complicity and Israeli deceit during the massacre. See Seth Anziska, “A Preventable Massacre,” New York Times, 17 September 2012; and Rashid Khalidi’s discussion of the newly discovered documents in the “Preface to the 2014 Reissue” of Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War. For more on Sharon’s role in the 1982 war, see Uzi Benziman, Sharon: An Israeli Caesar (New York: Adama Books, 1984); and David Landau, Arik.

29 Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

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Sharon permission, the minutes of the meeting prove otherwise.30 Here is a transcription of the relevant sections in Hill’s entry that day:

Tuesday May 25

Ariel Sharon: Lebanon: … We see no alternative to entering and destroying terrorist bases. Don’t want war with Syria. Don’t want you to be taken by surprise. Tomorrow or three weeks, we just don’t know...I see no alternative.

Alexander Haig: On Lebanon, we understand your difficulties. I thought you intended deep, lasting attack. Now I sense a departure from that. We can’t tell you not to defend your interests. But we are living with perception. Must be a recognizable provocation. Once a resort to force, everything changes. Like the Falklands. Hope you’ll be sensitive to the need for provocation to be understood internationally. So we have to work this Lebanon problem. Make every effort to avoid it. We want Syria out of Lebanon more than you. It is a Soviet proxy...

Sharon: We are aware of your concern about size. Our intent is not a large operation. Try to be as small and efficient as possible.

Haig: Like a lobotomy.

[CH notation: A GREEN LIGHT FROM HAIG ON LIMITED OPERATION]31

In the days immediately following the invasion, American officials debated the extent to which the administration should endorse Israel’s “lobotomy.” Secretary Haig and Ambassador to the

UN Jeane Kirkpatrick felt that Israel should be left to destroy the PLO, which they saw as a proxy of the Soviet Union. The more cautious trio of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,

White House Chief of Staff James Baker, and National Security Advisor William Clark favored holding Israel to a more limited operation.32

30 Crist, The Twilight War, 109. For an earlier study on the green light, without access to Hill’s notebooks, see Ze’ev Schiff, “The Green Light,” Foreign Policy, No. 50 (Spring, 1983): 73-85.

31 Handwritten meeting notes, 25 May 1982, Notebook #17, Charles Hill Papers, Box 76, Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto, California (hereafter HIA), emphasis in original.

32 Detailed accounts of the administration’s policy debate over Lebanon can be found in William B. Quandt, “Reagan’s Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error”; and Tanter, Who’s at the Helm?

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The start of the invasion, on 6 June 1982, came in the wake of the attempted assassination of Israel’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom, , outside London’s Dorchester

Hotel.33 Although the PLO did not carry out the attack, it provided the internationally recognized provocation that Haig had insisted Sharon needed to initiate military action against the organization.34 Under the name “Operation Pace for Galilee,” Israeli troops moved into Lebanon across the northern border, and made sea landings near the southern coastal city of Sidon. The

Begin government’s officially stated war aim was to ensure the immediate cessation of cross border violence.35 But the invasion extended well beyond the forty-kilometer line Sharon had suggested, as Israeli troops headed towards Beirut, linking up with Maronite forces. The Israelis promised the Americans that they had no intention of staying in Lebanon and occupying the country, simply asserting they would not tolerate a return to the status quo of PLO shelling in the

Galilee region.36 Yet the extent of the invasion, and the prolonged occupation of the country, fomented violent resistance and drew in other Arab states to exacerbate a host of internal rivalries.37

Israeli actions were not fully accepted by the U.S. administration. On 8 June, two days after the invasion, Prime Minister Begin and Ambassador Habib met to discuss Israeli war aims.

Habib was one of the U.S. diplomats most concerned with Israel’s mounting bombing campaign in Beirut. Along with Ambassador Sam Lewis, the Americans argued with Begin that the PLO

33 Quandt, Peace Process, 250-254.

34 The attack was carried out by the violently anti-PLO Abu Nidal group.

35 See Zisser, “The 1982 ‘Peace for Galilee’ War’ in Bar-On, A Never-Ending Conflict. Begin admitted that 1982 was a war of “option” and it would cure “trauma of 1973” (195).

36 “Top Secret Meeting between Prime Minister Begin and Ambassador ,” Jerusalem, 7 June 1982, 5PM. MFA-7080/3, ISA.

37 See Hirst, Beware of Small States; and Schiff and Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War.

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was not responsible for the assassination attempt against Argov, and that the Israelis were exceeding the promise to stop at the forty kilometer mark of the invasion.

Habib: I have received a message from our embassy in Beirut. The city has no electric power, no gas. Men without uniforms are moving about with arms. It is a city of two million people. What I wish to ask is, can you stop the bombing of Beirut?

Begin: Did we bomb Beirut?

Habib: Yesterday.

Begin: We bombed the PLO headquarters and we do not know if Arafat survived it. He is a little Hitler. Those days are gone forever. Now we rely on our own strength.

Habib: What I am suggesting is that the bombing in that area be stopped. I know you bombed the headquarters but people get hurt and damage to property is inflicted. I know how you feel about hurting civilians.38

As Habib’s protestations made clear, the President and his senior advisors were beginning to recognize that their close alignment with Israel posed problems for U.S. Middle East policy more broadly. There was a growing fear in Washington that the Arab world would view American silence as a sign of complicity, or even a signal that the U.S. had helped to initiate the Israeli violence.39

Begin’s rhetoric, invoking comparisons between the PLO and the Nazis (something he often did during the war), isolated the Palestinian question in a larger historical frame of global anti-Semitism. This served to exclude the possibility that Palestinian lives could be seen in the same light as those of or Lebanese Christians. A similar pattern of dehumanization would surface on the eve of the Sabra and Shatila massacre in September of 1982, with the unceasing invocation by Israeli military strategists of ‘terrorists’ circulating in Beirut’s refugee camps during meetings with U.S. diplomats. The transcripts of those conversations, which took

38 “Top secret meeting between Prime Minister and Foreign Minister with Ambassador Philip Habib, at the PM’s office, The Knesset,” 8 June 1982, 5:45 PM. MFA-7080/3, ISA.

39 George J. Church, “The Shakeup at State,” Time, 5 July 1982. 280

place after the PLO withdrew from Beirut and guarantees had been made to protect civilians left behind, reveal that the Israelis misled the U.S. diplomats about the events in the city with deceptive claims about the nature of those remaining behind. The imprecise language helped forestall the deployment of to the refugee camps, enabling a prolonged massacre to continue. By targeting the Palestinian question in this way as a problem to be solved militarily—which began at the war’s inception—the Israeli government dismissed any viable claim the Palestinians might have to national self-determination.40

Such an approach also linked the war with the diplomatic efforts to sidestep the

Palestinian question in other unexpected ways. Surveying the likely outcome of the invasion eleven days after it began, the American Interagency Intelligence Assessment suggested that the

PLO would likely be weakened by the fighting, and that U.S. relations with moderate Arab states would be undermined. At the same time, the war would serve to strengthen Begin’s hand in the autonomy negotiations. Egypt had temporarily withdrawn from the discussions at the start of the war, removing the pressure on Begin to be more conciliatory to the Palestinians. If autonomy was restarted, U.S. analysts wrote, “Begin will press hard for the resumption of the talks on his terms, in part because he believes that the demise of the PLO as a military force in Lebanon will reduce pressures on West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to refuse to ‘cooperate’ with the Israeli administration there.41 In Begin’s approach, a hardline against Palestinian targets outside the occupied territories would create more pliable allies in the West Bank and Gaza. The hope that these allies would support limited rights and non-national solutions was misplaced. Instead, the

40 See Anziska, “A Preventable Massacre,” and the transcript of the 17 September meeting between Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, and U.S. Ambassador Morris Draper located in A/4317-3, ISA. On the guarantees made by U.S. officials, see Khalidi, “Preface to the Reissue,” Under Siege.

41 Interagency Intelligence Assessment: Likely Evolution of Lebanon Situation, 17 June 1982, CREST (CIA- RDP85T00153R000200050020-3), NARA.

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war would end up strengthening the call for self-determination in the territories, as the outbreak of the first Intifada later suggested.

Restraining an Ally

The Israeli Prime Minister was fully aware that U.S. support for his country’s actions was being tested in the early days of the war, and the disagreements intensified on the eve of Begin’s pre-planned visit to Washington.42 Reagan’s meeting with Begin was a tense forty-five minutes in the White House on 21 June with just the two leaders and their note-takers present. The meeting opened with the U.S. President’s assertion that the invasion had exceeded its stated goals of responding to PLO attacks with the incursion towards Beirut. America, Reagan implored, could not offer unconditional support to a “military operation which was not clearly justified in the eyes of the international community.” Even in light of the terrible attack on the

Israeli ambassador in London, Reagan argued, “Israel has lost ground to a great extent among our people…They cannot believe that this vile attack—nor even the accumulation of losses that

Israel has suffered from PLO terrorist activity since last summer—justified the death and destruction that the IDF brought to so many innocent people over the past two weeks.”43

Within his overarching anti-Soviet agenda, Reagan apparently believed – correctly or mistakenly – that the United States could simultaneously manage its long-standing friendship with Israel and its important alliances with wealthy anti-communist Arab states. But to succeed,

Reagan and his advisors needed Israel's cooperation. “Your actions in Lebanon have seriously

42 See “Meeting of Ministerial Committee, Presided over by Prime Minister Begin, with Ambassador Philip Habib, The Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem,” 13 June 1982, 5:30PM, MFA-7080/4, ISA.

43 Summary of the President’s meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, 21 June 1982, folder “Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records,” box 91987, file three, RRL.

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undermined our relationship with those Arab governments whose cooperation is essential to protect the Middle East from external threats and to counter forces of Soviet-sponsored radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism now growing in the region,” Reagan told Begin. “U.S. influence in the Arab world, our ability to achieve our strategic objectives, has been seriously damaged by Israel’s actions.44 The President tried to assure Begin that he would consult regularly with the Israeli government before taking positions that might be seen as contrary to

Israel's national interest, asking for the same consideration in return from the Prime Minister.45

Begin, using the same Cold War logic he deployed before the invasion, responded that

America would benefit if Israel drove the PLO out of Lebanon. Detailing the stockpiles of Soviet weaponry found in the south of the country, Begin told Reagan, “We now realize that this area has been turned into a Soviet base, the principal center of Soviet activities in the Middle East. It was a true international terrorist base.” Reagan, however, pushed Begin to account for the civilian casualties, which Begin replied were an exaggeration by a media “biased against Israel.”

The meeting between the leaders ended abruptly, a clear signal that the two countries’ interests were diverging and that America would not remain silent in the face of Israeli aggression.46 The

Israelis also lost a close ally after Haig was forced to resign for overextending his reach, replaced by George Shultz, a former Nixon Cabinet official and executive at the Bechtel Corporation.47

44 Summary of the President’s meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, June 21, 1982, “Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate, National Security Council: Records.” Box 91987/3, RRL.

45 Ibid.

46 For a detailed account see “Summary of the President’s Plenary Meeting” and “Summary of the Working Luncheon,” 21 June 1982, both in ibid.

47 On Haig’s resignation and conduct in Lebanon, see Stanley Hoffmann, “The Vicar’s Revenge,” The New York Review of Books, 31 May 1984.

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This tension in the U.S.-Israeli relationship increased markedly throughout the summer of

1982.48 As Ambassador Sam Lewis explained, “The sympathy of the administration, which up to early July, had been strongly pro-Israel, increasingly shifted towards the Palestinians.”49 Reagan himself was intensely disturbed by the barrage of TV images coming from Beirut as the Israeli army heavily shelled the Lebanese capital. As he wrote in his diary one evening in late July,

“Calls and cables back and forth with Lebanon. U.N. with us supporting voted 15 to 0 for a ceasefire and U.N. observers on the scene. Israel will scream about the latter but so be it. The slaughter must stop.”50

Despite Reagan’s personal revulsion and mounting international criticism, the Israelis ignored the ceasefire and the bombardment of Beirut intensified during the first week of August.

On Wednesday morning, 4 August, the entire National Security Council convened in the White

House Situation Room. Present at the meeting were Reagan, Vice President Bush, Shultz,

Secretary of Defense Weinberger, NSA advisor William Casey, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, Assistant Secretary of

State for Near Eastern Affairs Nicholas Veliotes, and a retinue of West Wing advisors.51 An all- out Israeli assault on West Beirut had begun the night before, and Shultz was concerned with the claim of de-escalation being made publicly by the Israelis in comparison to what Special Envoy

Philip Habib was actually witnessing on the ground. Habib had been ordered to help negotiate a peaceful evacuation of PLO fighters from the city to neighboring Arab states.

48 See for example the letter exchange between Reagan and Begin on 8 July 1982, in A-4178/4, ISA.

49 Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

50 Ronald Reagan, diary entry, 7/31-8/1/82 in Reagan and Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 95.

51 For the record of participants and detailed minutes, see “National Security Council Meeting,” 4 August 1982, 9:10-10:02 AM, NSC 00057 [Lebanon Situation] in Records, Meeting Files, NSC Executive Secretariat, RRL. 284

Shultz recommended drafting a Security Council Resolution that might condemn Israel, while developing a strongly worded letter to Prime Minister Begin expressing anger over the lack of cooperation, possibly suspending arms shipments and enacting unilateral sanctions.

Weinberger clarified that Israel had acted first against the PLO and Lewis reported that the air assault was even worse than the ground incursion in terms of damage. But Kirkpatrick dissented sharply: “The group should not lose sight of the fact that the PLO is not a bunch of agrarian reformers. They are international terrorists who are working against U.S. interests and committing acts of violence throughout the world, supported by the Soviet Union. We want them out and the U.S. should not throw away the possibility of getting rid of the PLO by taking measures against Israel which will inhibit, if not eliminate, the prospects of achieving our objectives. Clearly, once we have removed the PLO from Lebanon we can make fast progress in the peace process.”52

Kirkpatrick’s impassioned views resonated partially with the president, who was inclined to see events in the Middle East through such a Cold War lens, but at the same time he was viscerally affected by the impact of the violence. Weinberger, ever the cautious realist, “agreed with Ambassador Kirkpatrick regarding just who the PLO is.” But, he argued, “The U.S. must let

Israel know of the cost to Israel of its nightly activities.” In recounting the meeting, Nicholas

Veliotes remembered how “Jeane Kirkpatrick said to President Reagan that the Israeli victory in

Lebanon represented the greatest strategic turnaround in the West since the fall of Vietnam. And the meeting broke up shortly after because she had successfully pressed Ronald Reagan's buttons.”53

52 Ibid.

53 Veliotes, Frontline Interview, LOC. 285

As the meeting ended, a decision was nevertheless made to draft a strongly worded letter to Begin, which the president worked on for several minutes. Reluctantly agreeing to change the language from his customary ‘Dear Menachem’ to ‘Dear Mr. Prime Minister,’ Reagan concluded,

“There must be an end to the unnecessary bloodshed, particularly among innocent civilians. I insist that a cease-fire in place be reestablished and maintained until the PLO has left Beirut. The relationship between our two nations is at stake.” The President instructed his assembled advisors that the PLO should receive equal emphasis in public statements of blame, and implored them not to “tee-off only on Israel.” At 10:02, Reagan closed the meeting, “stating that he was extremely tired of a war whose symbol had become a burn baby [sic] with no arms.”54 As

Nicholas Veliotes recalls, “Reagan wasn't a simpleton. Reagan was going to defend Israel's right to defend itself. Reagan was violently anti-terrorist. He was very sympathetic to Israel. But he also abhorred senseless bloodshed.”55

On 12 August, an intense daylong bombing of West Beirut by the Israelis inflicted over five hundred casualties in what would be the last day of the summer siege on the Lebanese capital.56 Reagan’s diary reveals the depth of his anger and a growing rift between two stalwart

Cold War allies.

Met with the news the Israelis delivered the most devastating bomb & artillery attack on W. Beirut lasting 14 hours. Habib cabled – desperate – has basic agreement from all parties but can’t arrange details of P.L.O. withdrawal because of the barrage. King Fahd called begging me to do something. I told him I was calling P.M. Begin immediately. And I did – I was angry – I told him it had to stop or our entire future relationship was endangered. I used the word holocaust deliberately & said the symbol of his war was becoming a picture of a 7 month old baby with its arms blown off. He told me he had ordered the bombing stopped – I asked about the artillery fire. He claimed the P.L.O. had

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 For details on the siege and a periodization of the fighting, see Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege.

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started that & Israeli forces had taken casualties. End of call. Twenty mins. later he called 57 to tell me he’d ordered an end to the barrage and pled for our continued friendship.

Ambassador Habib eventually negotiated a ceasefire and PLO leader Yasser Arafat agreed to the withdrawal of his men from Lebanon.58 But the protection of Palestinian civilians remaining behind, which had been guaranteed by Habib in side letters to Arafat during the arduous negotiations, were blatantly ignored—with calamitous results—in the weeks that followed.

The Reagan Plan and Lebanon’s Unraveling

As part of the agreement brokered between the Government of Lebanon, Israel and the

PLO, a multinational force (MNF) was to be deployed to assist in the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut.59 On 25 August, eight hundred American Marines began to arrive in Beirut, equipped for a non-combat role of assisting the alongside French and

Italian military personnel to aid in the withdrawal. The mandate of the MNF was limited in scope, not intended to last more than thirty days. Reporting on the deployment to Congressional leaders,

President Reagan wrote “I want to emphasize that there is no intention or expectation that U.S.

Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities…Our agreement with the Government of

Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the U.S. forces.”60

57 Diary entry, 12 August 1982, Ronald Reagan and Douglas Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 98.

58 For a detailed study of Arafat and his decision-making during the war, see Rashid Khalidi, “The PLO’s Yasser Arafat,” in Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1988).

59 On the negotiations of the PLO withdrawal, see “Second Meeting between Minister A. Sharon, Mr. P. Habib, Mr. Draper, Mr. D. Kimche, and others, P.M, 8 August 1982.” A-4317/4, ISA; “Meeting between Prime Minister and Ambassador Philip Habib The Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, 11 August 1982, 10AM, A-4317/5, ISA; and “Meeting between prime Minister Begin and Ambassador Philip Habib, The Prime Minister’s Office, 15 August 1982, 8:30AM, A-4317/5, ISA.

60 Letter, Ronald Reagan to Thomas O’Neil Jr., 24 August 1982, Countries (CO) 86, file 081440, RRL. A duplicate copy of this letter was sent to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, , in ibid. 287

Keenly aware of domestic political pressure and Congressional opposition to military deployments abroad, the President was wary of overextending the Marine mission. Having just appointed his new Secretary of State, George Shultz, to review the overall strategy in Lebanon,

Reagan announced a formal peace plan on 1 September 1982, from his “Western White House” in Santa Barbara, California. This was Reagan’s first and only major speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict during his eight years in office. Building on Jimmy Carter’s Camp David framework,

Reagan acknowledged that movement on implementing the Camp David Accords had been slow even as Israel had completed its withdrawal from the Sinai. Noting that the “opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon,” Reagan recognized that “we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs and Israelis.” In the President’s view, the central question was “how to reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.”61 Secretary Shultz had already underscored the importance of a “solution to the Palestinian problem” in a meeting with Defense Minister Ariel Sharon several days before the plan was announced.62

To expand on the foundations of Camp David, Reagan called for a transitional period of

Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza to prove that autonomy posed no threat to Israeli security. Reagan’s plan, like Carter’s idea at Camp David, still fell short of statehood for Palestinians, but it explicitly countered Israeli claims of sovereignty. As the President remarked, “It is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent

Palestinian state in those territories, nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or

61 “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1 September 1982,” PPPRR, RRL.

62 Top Secret, Meeting between Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon with George Shultz, 27 August 1982, 4PM, A- 4342/10, ISA.

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permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.”63 Rather, Reagan called for negotiations based on the principles of land for peace enshrined in UN Resolution 242. The President added a guarantee that “the United States will oppose any proposal— from any party and at any point in the negotiating process— that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad. And, I might add, so is mine.” This last phrase of assurance was composed right before delivery, as is evident from the President’s handwriting on the original copy of the final draft.64

In one of the most surprising elements of the speech, Reagan singled out the expansion of

Israeli settlements over the Green Line. It was an issue that would emerge as the most contentious element of his proposal.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.65

The President made it clear that while the U.S. would “not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza...we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.” This middle ground—between the curtailment of Israel sovereignty and the prevention of Palestinian statehood—reflected the new U.S. position on the fate of the settlements.

In explanatory cables to world leaders, Shultz expanded on the central elements of the plan, particularly the issue of Palestinian autonomy.

63 “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1 September 1982,” PPPRR, RRL.

64 See draft copy, Presidential Address on the Middle East, 1 September 1982, 2 PM, file “Speechwriting: Speech Drafts,” box 49, RRL.

65 Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1 September 1982,” PPPRR, RRL.

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The term “self-determination” has, in the Middle East context, become a codeword for the formation of a Palestinian state. We will not support this exclusive definition of self- determination. Nevertheless, the President is totally committed to the proposition that the Palestinians must have a leading role in determining their own future.66

Rather than statehood, American policymakers envisioned a joint association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan, “a realistic and fair solution.” When it came to Israeli settlements, Shultz insisted, “Their ultimate future must be determined in the course of the final negotiations. We will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts.”67 Growing directly out of Carter’s diplomatic blueprint, the Reagan Plan was a startling departure for a President who had so strongly opposed his predecessor’s approach. The shift betokened a recognition that there would be a price to pay for a lack of engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian front. As Reagan himself concluded, “if we miss this chance to make a fresh start, we may look back on this moment from some later vantage point and realize how much that failure cost us all.”68

Israeli Reactions

Menachem Begin, having little time to savor his victory over the PLO after their expulsion from Lebanon, was embittered with the new peace agenda issued by the White House.

Ambassador Samuel Lewis recalls the Prime Minister’s anger when he hand delivered a draft of

66 Cable, George Shultz to UN Secretary General, 2 September 1982, folder “Arab-Israel Peace Process: Memos, September 1982,” box 90217, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

67 Ibid.

68 Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1 September 1982,” PPPRR, RRL. Sam Lewis viewed the Reagan Plan as a return to Camp David, but found it abysmally timed. One of the architects of the plan, Nicholas Veliotes, told me that no career experts working on the plan believed Begin and his Likud government would accept it; rather the hope was to get PLO-Jordanian acceptance and put pressure on Israel to face an election and bring the Labor party to power. Arafat initially agreed to work with Hussein and then after the PNC meeting in voted it down. E-mail from Nicholas Veliotes, 8 March 2012, and interview with Sam Lewis, 19 March 2012, McLean, VA, and interview with Nicholas Veliotes, 17 March 2012, McLean, VA. For an assessment of the Reagan Plan soon after it was announced, see Naseer H. Aruri and Fouad M. Moughrabi, “The Reagan Middle East Initiative,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 12.2 (1983): 10-30.

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the speech during a rare Begin vacation in the north of Israel.69 Agreeing to consult with his

Cabinet about the Reagan initiative, the Prime Minister “became increasingly angry as he talked…He took on an aggrieved mood of bitterness and of being treated unfairly.”70 Begin’s hope for a regional transformation along expansive Likud lines had been dashed. In a furious reply to Reagan’s speech, Begin lambasted the President’s characterization of settlements.

What some call the West Bank, Mr. President, is Judea and Samaria and the simple historic truth will never change. There are cynics who will deride history; they may continue their derision as they wish, but I will stand by the truth. And the truth is: Millennia ago, there was a Jewish kingdom of Judea and Samaria where our kings knelt to God, where our prophets brought forth a vision of eternal peace, where we developed a rich civilization which we took with us in our hearts and in our minds on our long global trek for over eighteen centuries and with it we came back home. King Abdullah [of Jordan] by invasion conquered parts of Judea and Samaria in 1948 and in a war of legitimate self defense in 1967 after having been attacked by King Hussein we liberated with God’s help that portion of our homeland. Judea and Samaria will never again be the West Bank of [the] Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which was created by British colonialism after the French army expelled King Faisal from Damascus...The Palestinian state will rise itself the day Judea and Samaria are given to Jordanian jurisdiction; then, in no time, you will have a Soviet base in the heart of the Middle East...a friend does not weaken his friend, an ally does not put an ally in jeopardy...For Zion’s sake, I will not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem’s sake, I will not rest. (Isaiah, chapter 62) — Menachem71

Begin convened his cabinet on 2 September, and they adopted a formal resolution that detailed several major points of opposition to Reagan’s speech. Israeli officials categorically rejected the

Reagan Plan, offering a limited return to the moribund autonomy talks.72 The grounds on which they would re-convene these autonomy negotiations disputed the rights of Palestinians in East

69 See Reagan letter to Begin, delivered by Lewis, 31 August 1982, A-4342/7, ISA. The accompanying talking points sent to Begin by Reagan were published in the New York Times, 8 September 1982.

70 Sam Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC.

71 Reagan to Begin, 5 September 1982, A-4342/7, ISA.

72 See Dan Meridor to Begin, 5 September 1982; and Begin to Reagan, 5 September 1982 with attachments, A- 4342/7, ISA.

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Jerusalem to vote in any West Bank or Gaza election, and precluded the possibility of Palestinian autonomy over land and water resources.73

This effort to curtail Palestinian political sovereignty was twinned with the continued insistence on settlement building on the territory itself. The Israeli ministers argued that the

Camp David Accords had only prevented expansion during a three-month transition period with

Egypt that ended on 17 December 1978.

Since then, many settlements have been established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District without evicting a single person from his land, village or town. Such settlement is a Jewish inalienable right and an integral part of our national security. Therefore, there shall be no settlement freeze. We shall continue to establish them in accordance with our natural right. President Reagan announced at the time that ‘the settlements are not illegal.’74

This defiant Israeli stance on settlements persisted throughout the 1980s, without any direct or substantive American intervention after the announcement of the Reagan Plan. The Carter

Administration had faced similar intransigence after the Camp David Accords, and Begin and

Sharon had elicited sharper words from U.S. officials over settlement expansion. But the gap between the rhetoric in Washington and the reality on the ground in the West Bank underscored the weak nature of the opposition to what by the early 1980s had become an “irreversible” phenomenon of settlement expansion.75

73 Cable, “September 2 Israeli Cabinet Communiqué on President Reagan’s Middle East Speech,” folder “Arab- Israel Peace Process: Cables, September 1982,” box 90217, Geoffrey Kemp Files, RRL.

74 Ibid.

75 See Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, “Israeli Policies in the West Bank,” 28 October 1982, CREST (CIA-RDP84B00049R001202830034-4), NARA. This CIA report discusses the work of Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, whose pioneering research warned of the new reality being created in the West Bank. Benvenisti, the CIA analysis explained, “argues that Israel is acting not as an occupier but as a power moving toward establishing permanent sovereignty.” Emphasis in original. See also Benvenisti’s essay “The Turning Point in Israel,” The New York Review of Books, 13 October 1983.

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American intelligence officials warned that any initiative by the administration to revive the autonomy component of Camp David would be met by an Israeli rejection.76 In outlining the features of the 1 September address for Prime Minister Begin, Reagan had Lewis reiterate U.S. support for the Camp David Accords while also expanding on transitional measures that the

American government would now directly support. These measures, intended to transfer authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the territories, included a definition of full autonomy “as giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land and its resources.” Such a position on the issue of autonomy went well beyond the ceiling imposed by

Begin’s interpretation of Camp David’s autonomy provisions.77 The Americans also articulated support for Palestinian participation in the elections of a West Bank-Gaza authority, a real settlement freeze, and Palestinian responsibility for internal security.

The official directive that Lewis delivered to Begin re-stated American opposition to the dismantling of existing settlements, but also outlined clear opposition to Israeli control of the territories. “It is our belief that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved through Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza.”78 In assuring Begin that statehood was not in the cards for the Palestinians, Lewis offered an explanation of the concept of self- determination.

In the Middle East context the term ‘self-determination’ has been identified exclusively with the formation of a Palestinian State. We will not support this definition of self- determination. We believe that the Palestinians must take the leading role in determining their own future and fully support the provisions in Camp David providing for the elected

76 See “U.S.-Israeli Differences over the Camp David Peace Process,” 24 August 1982, CREST (CIA- RDP84B00049R001604010004-1).

77 “U.S. Positions to be conveyed to Prime Minister Begin on behalf of the President,” 31 August 1982, A-4342/7, ISA. In the Israeli view, which formed the basis of the negotiating positions with Egypt, autonomy was only for individuals and not for territory.

78 Ibid

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representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement in the final status negotiations.79

This fine line between the U.S. endorsement of Palestinian statehood and the restrictive Israeli approach to Palestinian autonomy was the direct byproduct of the Camp David negotiations. The announcement of the Reagan Plan seemed to threaten the Israeli position on the Accords, with officials in Jerusalem worried that the U.S. had “jeopardized” its stance on the negotiations.

Ambassador Samuel Lewis defended the U.S. assertion of particular views in meetings with

Israeli diplomats. As Lewis explained, the “U.S. is no longer a mediator, to broker ideas back and forth. We are now asserting our own ideas anchored in what we believe in the Camp David

Accords. Even at Camp David we were not a broker. We had our own ideas.”80 Israeli officials were dismayed with this approach. , a leading Israeli diplomat who was present at Camp David, told Lewis that his more expansive understanding of the Accords

“pushes up the Palestinian issue, and we do not like it.”81

The Sabra and Shatila Massacre

The prospects of the Reagan Plan’s success were short-lived, both as a result of Israeli opposition and the unfolding events in Lebanon. After meeting Begin to present the contours of the Reagan Plan, Ambassador Lewis did not know that the Israeli Prime Minister departed for a secret rendezvous with Bashir Gemayel, the Lebanese President-elect and close ally of the Israeli government. Still furious over the Reagan Plan, the Israeli Prime Minister greeted Gemayel

“brusquely” and began to demand the signing of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. As

79 Ibid.

80 “Meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Israel,” 13 September 1982, 11:30 AM, A-4342/8, ISA.

81 Ibid. 294

Lewis was told later, “Begin told Gemayel that Israel had now won him the Presidency and had ridden his country of the PLO fighters; it was therefore time to sign a peace treaty.” The Israelis believed that Gemayel would comply, but his domestic position was precarious. He tried to tell

Begin “that such a treaty would need time” and that “he had to proceed cautiously” given all the

“political fence mending that he had to undertake.” As Lewis recounted, this position “got under

Begin's skin; he became furious.” Begin spoke to Gemayel “in very demeaning and authoritarian terms; he was obviously very upset that his Lebanese allies were not being compliant.” The

Israeli Prime Minister felt “betrayed” given what Israel had done for the Phalangists and the

Christians. “That session in Nahariyya changed Gemayel's views of the Israelis,” Lewis explained. “He viewed them as much more sinister than he had before. All the Lebanese were shocked by Begin's behavior to their new President.”82

On 14 September, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in a massive bomb explosion at the

Phalange Headquarters in East Beirut’s Achrafieh neighborhood. The man who detonated the bomb, Habib Shartouni, was affiliated with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP).

Shartouni and the SSNP saw Gemayel as a traitor who had sold their country to Israel. The close involvement of the Syrian intelligence services in the assassination shattered any remaining

Israeli grand plans for the emergence of a Lebanese state remade under the leadership of a strong

Christian ally. Syrian involvement in the civil war had further complicated the Israeli war aims.

They fought intensely in the first few weeks of the war, maintaining the support of important

Lebanese factions, which they deftly employed against the Israelis and the U.S. in 1982 by

82 Lewis, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. This was confirmed to Rashid Khalidi in 1983 by former Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam, who had met Germayel after this meeting with Begin. Gemayel was very concerned, and told Salam that he feared that he could not trust some of his closest aides, trained in Israel, fearing they were more loyal to Israel than to him.

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reconfiguring local alliances and generating opposition to the prolonged occupation of the country.

Defense Minister Sharon, a close confidant of Bashir’s, reacted to his assassination by pushing forward into West Beirut with IDF units. Prime Minister Begin explained to the

Americans that this was a limited precautionary measure, and that “the main order of the day is to keep the peace. As long as peace is kept, the people can be brought together to talk. Otherwise, there could be pogroms.”83 That same afternoon, in Washington, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.

Moshe Arens was called to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz about Israeli actions in

West Beirut. With information that had been procured by Charlie Hill, Shultz’s executive assistant, the Americans had intelligence that Sharon had moved his troops into the city. Shultz told Arens that this “appears to be a provocative act” and “is counterproductive.” U.S. credibility was “being eroded,” and the Secretary concluded “we are upset but we have been quiet until now.” Arens insisted the Israelis did not want to deceive the Americans, and that these were merely precautionary measures, as Israel “did not have ambitions in Beirut, not in the West, not in the east, and not in Lebanon at all.” Shultz responded tersely: “Your activity in West Beirut will engender a situation where Israel is controlling an Arab capital.” There would be

“psychological” consequences.84

Arens, toeing the line of military strategists in the field, replied that Israel was already in control of Sidon and Tyre without such consequences. “What is the alternative to our actions?”

The Secretary was adamant that Israeli control over a city like Beirut was a “major” issue. “We

83 Meeting between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Ambassador Morris Draper at the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, 15 September 1982, at 11:30 hrs. MFA-6875/11, ISA.

84 Cable from Israeli embassy-Washington to Jerusalem office [Hebrew], 15 September 1982, 6:30 PM. A-4317/3, ISA.

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know that for you [Bashir’s] assassination is painful, perhaps more than it pains us, but you are obligated to act for the quiet of Beirut.” To avoid the appearance of a “provocation,” Shultz demanded from Arens that the Israelis “pull your forces back…the Lebanese have to deal themselves with their problems.” But as Arens insisted, “In West Beirut there are 2000 militants from al-Murabitun85…it seems that there also remains the murderers of Bashir.” The Israelis were convinced that the Lebanese Army was not capable of acting in their place. Shultz was not moved, adding that PLO members were no longer posing a challenge in Beirut, and reiterated his strong sentiments to Arens.86

With Shultz attending to visiting Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos the next day, 16

September, U.S. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger continued the tense discussions with the Israelis over their consolidation of forces in West Beirut. Eagleburger read from talking points that described Israeli behavior as “contrary to a series of assurances” made by the Begin government, stressing that “Israel’s credibility has been severely damaged here in Washington by recent Israeli actions in West Beirut.”87 Eagleburger told the Israelis that they must pull back, and conveyed U.S. support for a Security Council resolution opposing Israel’s actions. “I want to reiterate strongly that the occupation by Israel of an Arab capital is a grave political mistake with far-reaching symbolic and concrete implications of the most dangerous sort.”88

85 This militia, the Independent Nasserite Movement (INM), was a part of the Left leaning Lebanese National Movement (LNM) which helped defend the PLO from IDF attacks on Southwest Beirut until the end of the 1982 siege.

86 Cable from Israeli embassy-Washington to Jerusalem office [Hebrew], 15 September 1982, 6:30 PM. A-4317/3, ISA.

87 “Pgishat Eagleburger-Arens” [Eagleburger-Arens Meeting], 12:45PM, 16 September 1982, A-4317/5, ISA. The note taker at the meeting was Benjamin Netanyahu, who worked for Arens at the Israeli embassy. Netanyahu voiced concerns that U.S. claims of Israeli “deception” would end in a “shooting war with each other, and that’s not good for either of us.”

88 Ibid.

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Arens contested the American claim of Israeli deception, and defended the IDF’s moves as a prerequisite for maintaining order after Gemayel’s assassination. “Our common objectives are attainable,” Arens stressed, “but we’ve got to work together and not at cross-purposes. We should avoid this openly confrontational mode. If you think this will scare us, you’re wrong.”

For the Israeli Ambassador, the U.S. approach to the Middle East was only conflating Lebanon’s complexities with the Palestinian question.

Before the Palestinian problem can be addressed we’ve got to clear up the situation in Lebanon. First things first! Rather than tying these two things in a package we should take them one by one. Coupling the Lebanese situation with the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza may get you some short-run success, but in the long run we won’t get anywhere.89

In situating the events in Beirut as distinct from Reagan’s approach to the peace process, Arens was hoping to isolate the Palestinian question, when in fact the invasion centered on a military solution to the power of the PLO. And despite the organization’s expulsion from Beirut, the events of 1982 had in some crucial ways strengthened the Palestinian cause.90

The U.S. had committed its military as part of a limited multinational force to assist in the

PLO evacuation that August. Immediately after the PLO’s departure, Secretary of Defense

Weinberger ordered the U.S. Marines back to their ships. He was itching for the military to leave the country. Deeply cautious in the wake of the Vietnam War, the U.S. defense establishment resisted wars with no definitive end, a central tenet of Weinberger’s Pentagon leadership.91 The

Marine departure on 10 September precipitated the rapid departure of French and Italian forces,

89 Ibid.

90 See Sayigh, “Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War.”

91 This would later evolve into the Powell Doctrine, as James Mann demonstrates in his study of the Bush foreign policy team, Rise of the Vulcans. For Weinberger’s own annunciation of the “Weinberger Doctrine” and its link to Vietnam, see Miller Center, “Interview with Caspar Weinberger.” , 19 November 2002, 16-17. http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/oralhistory/caspar-weinberger, (accessed 10 March 2015).

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both of which had intended to stay longer. Without any external protection, the Christian

Phalangist militias were free to terrorize Palestinian civilians who remained behind after the evacuation.

Between the evening of September 16 and the afternoon of September 18, Phalange militiamen launched a cold-blooded attack on defenseless Palestinian civilians in the Israeli controlled Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. These forces had marshaled at the Beirut airport, a major Israeli staging point, and were ushered through Israeli lines into the camps, which were surrounded by Israeli forces. The Phalange militiamen raped, killed, and dismembered at least

800 women, children and elderly men while Israeli flares illuminated the camps’ narrow and darkened alleyways.92 The Israeli cabinet had met on the evening of 16 September and officials were informed that Phalange fighters were entering the Palestinian camps. Israel’s Deputy Prime

Minister, David Levy, worried aloud about the consequences of Phalange actions in the wake of

Gemayel’s assassination. “I know what the meaning of revenge is for them, what kind of slaughter. Then no one will believe we went in to create order there, and we will bear the blame.”93 Sharon himself told Cabinet members of the Phalange movements, stressing that “The results will speak for themselves...let us have the number of days necessary for destroying the

92 The most thoroughly documented and reliable source, which contains the names of each victim, puts the number over 3000. See al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila; and Rosemary Sayigh, “Seven Day Horror,” Badil, Spring 2001. http://www.badil.org/en/component/k2/item/1121-seven-day-horror (accessed 8 March 2015). Other accounts include , “The Beirut Massacre: The Four Days,” New York Times, 25 September 1982; Alain Ménargues, Les Secrets de la Guerre du Liban (Paris: Albin Michel); and the startling German documentary, Massaker (2004), produced by Monika Borgmann, Lokman Slim and Hermann Theissen, which interviews the Phalange executioners.

93 This account is adapted from Anziska, “A Preventable Massacre.” For Sharon’s remarks at the Cabinet meeting on 16 September 1982, during which he discussed the occupation of West Beirut and securing of the camp exteriors, see partial transcript, Documents (n. 112 below), 271-288. On the official reaction to the publication of these documents, see Yaakov Lozowick, “Sabra and Shatila: One of Israel’s Darkest Hours,” 19 September 2012, Israel’s Documented Story, Israel State Archives, http://israelsdocuments.blogspot.com/2012/09/sabra-and-shatila-one-of-israels.html (accessed 8 March 2015).

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terrorists.”94 This insistence that only terrorists were to be found in the camps belied the actual reality of those who had remained after the PLO evacuation. News of civilian deaths in the camps began to filter out to Israeli military officials, politicians and journalists overnight.

The following day, on 17 September, Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir hosted a meeting with Habib’s assistant Morris Draper, Sharon and several Israeli intelligence chiefs.

Shamir reportedly heard of a “slaughter” in the camps that morning, but he did not mention it to those assembled.95 Instead, the discussion focused on the Israeli insistence that “terrorists” who stayed behind in Beirut needed “mopping up.” Sharon browbeat Ambassador Draper, who demanded the IDF pull back from the areas it occupied in West Beirut so the Lebanese National

Army could take over. Sharon exploded at Draper’s suggestion. “I just don’t understand, what are you looking for? Do you want the terrorists to stay? Are you afraid that somebody will think that you were in collusion with us? Deny it. We denied it.” Draper was insistent and pushed for definitive signs of an Israeli withdrawal. Sharon cynically told him “Nothing will happen. Maybe some more terrorists will be killed. That will be to the benefit of all of us.” He agreed to a gradual withdrawal, but only after a 48-hour period, since the Jewish holiday of Rosh Hashanah was starting that evening.96

Draper warned Sharon that this prolonged presence would enable the Lebanese to “go and kill the Palestinians in the camps.” Sharon replied: “So, we’ll kill them. They will not be left there. You are not going to save them. You are not going to save these groups of the international terrorism (sic).” Draper, caught in Sharon’s rhetorical onslaught, responded, “We are not

94 Kahan Commission Documents, 287.

95 See the transcript of the meeting between Shamir, Sharon, and Draper, 12:30 PM, 17 September 1982, A-4317/3, ISA.

96 Ibid.

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interested in saving any of these people.” Mr. Sharon declared, “If you don’t want the Lebanese to kill them, we will kill them.” Draper caught himself and backtracked, reminding the Israelis that the United States had painstakingly facilitated the PLO exit from Beirut “so it wouldn’t be necessary for you to come in.” He told Sharon, “You should have stayed out.” Sharon exploded again. “When it comes to our security, we have never asked. We will never ask. When it comes to existence and security, it is our own responsibility and we will never give it to anybody to decide for us.”97 Acquiescing to the delayed withdrawal, U.S. diplomats effectively provided

Israel cover as the Phalange fighters remained in the camps, slaughtering civilians until the following morning.

The language of terrorism and security had long underpinned the Israeli justification for taking direct military action against Palestinians, with no distinction made between PLO fighters, who had already been evacuated, and innocent civilians who remained in the camps. In the broader sweep of Israel’s approach to the Palestinians, the 1982 invasion served to blur this distinction even further, linking a diplomatic approach to sidelining the Palestinian question that had taken hold at Camp David with the military approach of quashing Palestinian identity in a more permanent fashion. America’s role in abetting this process, as the new evidence from 1982 now reveals, was both a moral stain and a strategic disaster, undercutting U.S. influence in the region and precipitating further military involvement in the Lebanese civil war.98

Sabra and Shatila was a turning point in the war, and it radically altered global perceptions of Israeli and U.S. actions in Lebanon, and the very nature of the Palestinian question. Many supporters of Israel abroad were paralyzed by the invasion of Lebanon and its

97 Ibid.

98 On the U.S. reaction to the revelations of the massacre, see “Arens-Shultz meeting,” 18 September 1982, 8:30PM, MFA-6875/11, ISA; and “Shultz/Arens conversation, 20 September 1982, 11PM, A-4317/3, ISA.

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aftershocks, and Sabra and Shatila intensified these feelings. Begin had described the invasion as a “war by choice,” which was an anathema to the defensive ethos of the dominant Zionist narrative that animated Jewish support for Israel.99 Rita Hauser, a prominent Republican Jewish activist, later remarked that “It was shameful, it was shocking…People were really horrified, they were shocked at it. Many Israelis were. It’s simply something that Jews, Israelis are not supposed to do.”100 Other leaders of the Jewish community rallied to Israel’s defense. As Julius

Berman, the Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations wrote in a press release soon after the massacre,

The history of the Jewish people is too full of massacres and pogroms, and the injunctions of Jewish law are too powerful a force in Jewish consciousness to have permitted or even countenanced a Jewish role in this awful incident. Any suggestion that Israel took part in it or permitted it to occur must be categorically rejected.101

This defensive stance fit within a post-1967 frame that absolved Israel of agency in instances of diplomatic of military overreach, especially in connection with the Palestinians.102 But for some modern Jewish historians, as well as revisionist Israeli scholars, the global reaction to the war raised piercing questions about the nature of Jewish power and the meaning of political Zionism in the modern age.103

99 This was in a speech to the Israeli National Defense College on 8 August 1982. See the entire Hebrew transcript of the address in document 181, Menachem Begin: The Sixth Prime Minister [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2014), 590-596. On the relationship between Zionism and military power, see Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

100 Rita Hauser, interview by author, 4 April 2008.

101 See “Statement by Julius Berman, Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations,” 20 September 1982, MFA-6892/1, ISA.

102 Despite the trying consequences of the massacre among Jewish leaders in the U.S., the atmosphere between improved by early 1983, to the point where Shultz was assuring a range of Jewish leaders that there was no American shift “in dedication to Israel’s security.” See Kenneth J. Bialkin, “Memorandum of Meeting at State Department,” 11 January 1983, A-4328/12, ISA.

103 See David Biale, Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History (New York: Schocken Books, 1986). Sharon himself spoke in grandiose terms of Jews learning to wield power in discussions with Pierre and Bashir Gemayel. 302

The war also affected the broader context in which the Palestinian question was viewed.

As several scholars have argued, the Palestinian quest for self-determination was in fact rendered visible once again on a global scale, despite Israeli hopes that it would disappear from view.104

Hussein Agha, a Fatah activist close to Arafat, later remarked that Sabra and Shatila was a “wake up call.” It was a reminder, he said, “that you are dealing with a people. You are not dealing with a bunch of terrorists.”105 Strategically, it also served to bolster Palestinian politics. Ahmad

Khalidi, an authority on Palestinian security affairs, observed that the massacred signaled “a crack in the shield of Israel’s moral authority, a crack in the shield of Israel’s military prowess.”

In Khalidi’s view, “the net result was a liberation for the PLO.”106 This shifting perception was evident in the American media, where Israel found itself derided for overstepping a moral red line. The major Jewish organizations registered complaints with the White House about the use of Nazi imagery in U.S. newspapers to criticize Israeli behavior, including cartoons of Begin plotting a “final solution” to end the Palestinian refugee problem.107

Internally in Israel, a commission of inquiry, the Kahan Commission, was established to investigate Israeli responsibility in the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Begin appointed the commission, which was led by Israel’s Supreme Court Chief Justice Yitzhak Kahan, after the opposition rallied against the government’s lackluster response to the massacre. The findings of

“How to create power and how to convey its presence is the great test. We were 18 million, six million were exterminated. After 40 years we are close to 15 million. We learned how to use the power we have, but we are still not ourselves.” See “Minutes of a Meeting between the Defense Minister and Pierre and Bashir Gemayel,” 21 August 1982, Kahan Commission Documents, 2-4.

104 See Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine; and Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters. Historian Paul Chamberlin situates the roots of this shift in the 1970s. See The Global Offensive.

105 Hussein Agha, interview by author, 17 March 2008.

106 Ahmad Khalidi, interview by author, 17 March 2008.

107 The ADL complaint and accompanying cartoons can be found in folder three, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, Michael Gale Files, RRL.

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the report were issued in early February 1983, exonerating the Israeli government of immediate responsibility but finding particular leaders indirectly responsible for allowing the Phalangists into the camps.108 Begin, Shamir and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan were censured, and Defense

Minister Ariel Sharon, as well as the Director of Military Intelligence Yehoshua Saguy and the

Division Commander in charge of Beirut, , were forced out of their posts in disgrace.

The Kahan Commission report excoriated Sharon’s conduct in Lebanon, in particular his negligence in the massacre, a criticism that Sharon bitterly contested for the rest of his life.109 In the midst of the political recrimination after the massacre, Sharon insisted that his actions were in line with longstanding Israeli policy and alliance with the Christians in Lebanon, telling a meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 24 September that it was hypocritical to blame him for Sabra and Shatila when the Labor government knew about a

Christian massacre of Palestinians in the Tel al-Zaatar camp in 1976 and still supported them in

1982.110 Sharon’s primary defense was to blame the Phalange militiamen, and not the IDF, who remained outside the camps during the massacre.111

108 For the full text of the report, see Doc. 104, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut,” 8 February 1983, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Historical Documents, Volume 8, 1982-1984. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook6/pages/104%20report%20of%20the%20commiss ion%20of%20inquiry%20into%20the%20e.aspx (accessed 8 March 2015). On the reaction to the report and the government debate about accepting its findings, as well as the and violence that accompanied these debates, see Yaacov Lozowick, “Secrets from Israel’s Archives,” Tablet, 21 February 2013, http://tabletmag.com/jewish- news-and-politics/124809/secrets-from-israels-archives (accessed 8 March 2015); and further releases at the Israel State Archives, “Israel’s Cabinet Grapples with Sabra and Shatila,” Israel State Archives Blog, 21 February 2013, http://israelsdocuments.blogspot.com/2013/02/israels-cabinet-grapples-with-sabra-and.html (accessed 8 March 2015).

109 Sharon’s defense began soon after the massacre, as is evident in his meeting with Habib on September 23, “Meeting of Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and Ambassador Philip Habib, 23 September 1982, 6:30 PM, A- 4317/3, ISA. See also Sharon’s lawsuit against Time magazine for libel (a hard copy is in Machon Jabotinsky, Tel Aviv); and Dov Weisglass, Ariel Sharon: A Prime Minister [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: , 2012).

110 See excerpts from Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee 24 September 1982, protocol 118, 11-43 (222-228 in Kahan Commission Documents below). Sharon said to MK Yitzhak Rabin, who had criticized him, “We (the Likud party) did not criticize you (Labor) for supporting the Christians. I am talking about the moral aspect. You kept on supporting (the Christians) even after the (Tel Za’ater) massacre. The information about the massacre and its cruelty was in everybody’s possession, including in the newspapers and in AMAN’s reports. We had already known what 304

But new evidence from the Kahan report, and the secret appendices that have not been released to the public, paint a more incriminating picture of Sharon and wider Israeli official eagerness to invite the Phalange militia into Beirut.112 This was part of Israel’s longstanding discussions with Maronite leaders to “clean the city out of terrorists” as part of the political agenda in Lebanon.113 Critically, these plans were not limited to PLO fighters, as evident from statements concerning Palestinian refugees as well. The refugees were first discussed in a secret meeting with Bashir Gemayel, Chief of Lebanese Military Intelligence Johnny Abdu, and leading Israeli and Lebanese officials at Sharon’s ranch on the late evening of 31 July.114

Sharon explained that he would be insisting on a peace agreement with the Lebanese government and had to address the question of the Palestinian refugees left behind in Beirut.

Bashir told the Israelis “We’ll take care of everything and we’ll let you know soon.” Yehoshua

they have done with the weapons we supplied and the forces we helped them build. However, we did not criticize you.” To MK Shimon Peres, Sharon continued, “After Tel Za’ater, Mr. Peres you have no monopoly on morality...In Shatila the same moral problem which was raised by the Tel Z’atar incident still exists. The Phalangists murdered in Shatila and the Phalangists murdered in Tel Za’ater. The link is a moral one: should we get involved with Phalangists or not. You supported them and continued to do so after Tel Za’ater.”

111 See Sharon to MK Geula Cohen, ibid., 226-227: “The world could falsely accuse of everything, but what had provoked me was the attempt by some among us to exploit the massacre, which we had no hand in, in order to bring down the government, and this while certain American elements in Washington are trying to accomplish a similar objective.”

112 These crucial appendices contain top-secret intelligence information about the events around the massacre, and were given to me by William Quandt. The provenance of these documents is not fully established, but after close examination I am satisfied with their authenticity and view them as essential and necessary contributions to the historical record, bearing in mind the balance between privacy of individuals, harm to reputation, and the public right to know about the events. See “Notes Prepared by Kahan Commission Staff, Excerpts of Conversations, Testimonies, Cabinet Discussions, et al [Hebrew and English], 328pp, Private Collection of Seth Anziska, courtesy of William Quandt.” [Hereafter Kahan Commission Documents, KCD]. I am grateful to attorney Michael Kennedy for consulting on the legal dimensions of these documents, phone conversation, 29 June 2013.

113 KCD, 9-11. Other officials knew of the planned introduction of the Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps. See ibid., 33.

114 See the minutes of the “Meeting between Bashir Gemayel and Johnny Abdu with the DM,” 1 August 1982, Home of Ariel Sharon, KCD, 234-243. In another crucial meeting with Gemayel on 12 September, Sharon was told that “conditions should be created which would lead the Palestinians to leave Lebanon.” See “Was there awareness of the possibility of a massacre?,” Notes of the staff of the Kahan Commission, KCD, 83. For more on this crucial meeting with Gemayel, see Sharon’s testimony in ibid.,100-102.

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Saguy, the Israeli intelligence chief, responded “The time has come for Bashir’s men to prepare a plan to deal with the Palestinians. I understand you are getting ready to deal with it and you need to prepare a plan.” Sharon added a final note. “The Jews are weird but you must agree about the issue—we don’t wish to stay there and take care of the issue.”115 By presenting the Palestinian question in such a manner, Sharon invited Gemayel and the Phalange to do Israel’s bidding in the refugee camps of Beirut.116

Excerpts from the restricted testimonies of the Kahan Commission underscore that members of the Israeli military and intelligence organizations knew in advance what the

Phalange were intending to do to the Palestinians. According to the testimony of Colonel Elkana

Harnof, the Phalange revealed that “Sabra would become a zoo and Shatila Beirut’s parking place.” Harnof added details about acts of brutality and massacres relayed to Defense Minister

Sharon as early as 23 June.117 On that same day, a report was passed to Foreign Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Sharon attesting to the Christians “terminating” 500 people in the evacuation of West Beirut. Mossad Director and others met with Bashir and the description of the meeting contains harrowing evidence of what was intended for the Palestinians throughout Lebanon.

Bashir adds it is possible that in this context they will need several “Dir Yassins.” But N. Admoni stresses that as long as the IDF is around, the Christians will have to refrain from this type of action. Bashir explains once again that he will act at a later stage since a

115 Ibid.

116 Such a pattern extended back to early July, when during a meeting between Sharon and Gemayel at Lebanese Forces Headquarters in Beirut, Bashir asked the Israelis “whether we would object to him moving bulldozers into the refugee camps in the south, to remove them, so that the refugees won’t stay in the south. The DM [Sharon] responded by saying that it was none of our business. We do not wish to handle Lebanon’s internal affairs.” See “Meeting between Defense Minister Sharon and Bashir Gemayel at the Lebanese Forces’ Headquarters in Beirut, 8 July 1982,” KCD, 294-295.

117 See “Col. Elkana Harnof’s testimony,” 22 November 1982, KCD 78.

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Christian state would not be able to survive if the demographic aspect will not be dealt with.118

As Admoni explained to the Kahan Commission, “Bashir had a very spontaneous speaking style.

He was preoccupied with Lebanon’s demographic balance, and discussed it a lot. When he

(Bashir) talked in terms of demographic change—it was always in terms of killing and elimination.” The invocation of Deir Yassin—the notorious massacre site of Palestinians by

Irgun fighters in the 1948 War which sowed fear and dispersal—was an apt metaphor for the behavior of those who disliked the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and wanted to see them disappear.

When pressed by Chief Justice Kahan about Phalange intentions with regards to

Palestinian civilians, Yitzhak Hofi of the Mossad explained the Israeli reply to Gemayel. “We told him we thank him very much, but that we have no intention that the solving of the Lebanese

Palestinian problem would be made at the expense of the State of Israel…”119 In light of these testimonies, and the nature of Israeli-Phalange relations during the war, the events of 1982 fit within a much wider attempt to vanquish the Palestinians, diplomatically and militarily, after

Camp David. A focus on Sabra and Shatila in particular sheds light on a line of thinking about

Palestinian identity that extends from the late 1970s through the autonomy negotiations, reaching tragic ends through the destruction wrought in Beirut.

Reactions to the Massacre

118 See “A Report passed to the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and others,” 23 June 1982, KCD, 79.

119 Testimony of Yitzhak Hofi, 20 October 1982, KCD, 81-83.

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The Israeli public debated the efficacy and morality of the Lebanon war in the wake of the massacre, and a nascent peace movement grew in strength.120 The rationale for the war, as

Begin’s rhetoric before the invasion made clear, had been couched in the frame of a humanitarian intervention. Begin had a deep sense of Jewish historical suffering and its intersection with Israel’s beleaguered position in the Middle East. By combining this appeal to rescue Israel’s Christian brethren with the re-assertion of Jewish power in the context of Cold

War geopolitics, Begin had linked Israel’s foreign policy with a highly nationalist interpretation of communal solidarity.121 In the purview of his wider relations with global Jewry, it was an approach that implicated Jewish communal support for Israel within a right wing Likud worldview.

During the war, Begin was widely maligned for yielding to Sharon’s aggressive agenda and for the moralizing tone in which he presented Israeli foreign policy.122 Having parents who were killed by the Nazis, Begin often invoked the Holocaust and the suffering of Jews as a

120 See Colin Shindler, A History of Modern Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 147–197; and Anita Shapira, "Begin in Power," in Israel: A History (Waltham: Brandies University Press, 2012). See also Thomas Friedman, “Israel’s Dilemma: Living with a ,” New York Times, 20 January 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/20/magazine/israel-s-dilemma-living-with-a-dirty-war.html (accessed 9 March 2015).

121 Leading Israeli voices, including Rabbi David Hartman, singled out this appropriation. “When Begin asked why the world didn't speak out when 'the Christians of Lebanon were being killed,' he was giving the Lebanese the image of the Jews of Eastern Europe. They were the Christians. We were fighting to save the Jews of Eastern Europe.'' Quoted in Thomas Friedman, “Israel’s Dilemma: Living with a Dirty War,” New York Times, 20 January 1985.

122 Begin has recently been the subject of rehabilitation by Israeli scholars, but the events of 1982 do not sit comfortably with some of the more hagiographic interpretations. A fawning account can be found in Daniel Gordis, Menachem Begin: The Battle for Israel’s Soul (New York: Nextbook, 2014). For critical studies, see Yechiam Weitz, “From Peace in the South to War in the North: Menachem Begin as Prime Minister, 1977-1983,” Israel Studies, Vol. 19:1 (Spring 2014): 145-165; Ofira Seliktar, “Israel’s Menachem Begin,” in Kellerman and Rubin, eds., Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, 30-69; and Avi Shilon, Menachem Begin. See also the special issues of Ha’aretz Magazine, “Rethinking Begin,” 21 December 2007, and “The Man Who Transformed Israel,” 24 February 2012; as well as the review essay by Avi Shilon, “Missing Menachem,” The Jewish Review of Books, 24 March 2014. A psychoanalytic read of Begin and his leadership is offered by Ofer Grosbard, “Personality Study of Menachem Begin” (Ph.D. diss., George Mason University, 2004); and later as Menachem Begin: A Portrait of a Leader—A Biography [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2006).

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justification for his actions in Lebanon. In one scathing letter to the Israeli liberal daily newspaper Ha’aretz, the Holocaust scholar Ze’ev Mankowitz excoriated the Prime Minister for his misuse of Jewish history.

Begin has lost touch with reality and is punishing phantoms born in the greatest tragedy that ever befell our people. Whatever its final outcome, the epitaph to be place upon the war in Lebanon will read: Here lies the international stature and moral integrity of a wonderful people. Died of a false analogy.123

Begin resigned from office less than a year later, in August 1983. Beset with grief over the recent death of his wife Aliza and the terrible outcome of the Israeli invasion, the Israeli leader was rarely seen in public again.124

Reagan, in a most gracious cable to his dear friend “Menachem,” wrote the departing leader that “few men have so rightly worn the mantle of peacemaker as you…a half a century at the center of history is an extraordinary achievement.”125 The new Israeli leadership was even less inclined to compromise with the Arab neighbors. Yitzhak Shamir, a former leader of the

Stern Gang who had a “reputation for extremism and violence” succeeded Begin as Prime

Minister, and Moshe Arens was appointed Defense Minister.126

123 Quoted in Howard Morley Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 2007), 913.

124 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 419. In a 2007 radio interview, Uri Porat, Begin’s media advisor, recalled the Prime Minister entering his office shortly after the resignation: “I looked up, and there was Begin in the corner of [my] office. He asked, 'Uri, my friend, what's happened. Why are you so downcast? ' [I] replied: "Mr Prime Minister, something happened today, this isn't an easy day for us.” Begin sighed. He said: 'Uri, my son, all good things have an end." He turned around and left the office. I watched him walk away. I didn't have time to take in what he said. A few seconds later, he returned. 'Also bad things," he said. 'Also bad things.’” Recounted to Yossi Verter in Ha’aretz, 1 June 2012, and discussed during my interview with Yechiel Kaddishai, Tel Aviv, 13 June 2010.

125 Cable, Ronald Reagan to Menachem Begin, 12 Sept. 1983, folder 3 “Prime Minster Begin Cables,” Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, RRL.

126 Quandt, Peace Process, 259.

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Alongside these military and political implications, the cultural consequences of Lebanon left an indelible mark on Israeli society.127 For committed liberal Zionists, the impact of the 1982 war was devastating. , a beloved Israeli writer and leading intellectual, reflected some years later how the experience of 1982 shaped the nation’s psyche.

After Lebanon, we can no longer ignore the monster, even when it is dormant, or half asleep, or when it peers out from behind the lunatic fringe. After Lebanon, we must not pretend that the monster dwells only in the offices of Meir Kahane; or only on General Sharon’s ranch, or only in Raful’s carpentry shop, or only in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. It dwells, drowsing, virtually everywhere, even in the folk-singing guts of our common myths. Even in our soul-melodies. We did not leave it behind in Lebanon, with the Hezbollah. It is here, among us, a part of us, like a shadow, in Hebron, in Gaza, in the slums and in the suburbs, in the kibbutzim and in my Lake Kinneret.128

For Oz, like many others who witnessed and wrote about the events of 1982 and its aftermath, the war represented a moment of rupture. Yet the persistence of rhetoric and tactics articulated during the war—often under the guise of humanitarian imperatives—continued to animate the logic of military action and state policy towards Palestinians living under Israeli control well after it ended. Lebanon, as the events in Gaza over the summer of 2014 underscored, remains a formative proving ground in the wider history of Israel’s relations with the Palestinians and the

Arab world.129

127 For an incisive account of the breakdown of Israel’s cultural consensus in the wake of 1982, see Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, “From Auschwitz to the : Binding and Unbinding the Israeli Narrative,” in Jakob Lothe, Susan Rubin Suleiman, and James Phelan, eds., After Testimony: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Holocaust Narrative for the Future (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2012), 291-313. Another useful collection of essays examining cultural transformations in late twentieth century Israel is Rachel S. Harris and Ranen Omer-Sheman, eds., Narratives of Dissent: War in Contemporary Israeli Arts and Culture (New Jersey: Wayne State University Press, 2012). As David Hartman told the New York Times, “In Lebanon the grandeur that started in 1967 was exploded...The early naiveté of the pioneers, all that is gone now. We have to find a way to reinstitute into Israeli society a sense of joy and vision now that we have gained some anchorage in reality. Israelis need music…there is no music in the air now. There is just this invasion of reality.'' See Thomas Friedman, “Israel’s Dilemma: Living with a Dirty War,” New York Times, 20 January 1985.

128 Amos Oz, The Slopes of Lebanon (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), 23.

129 On the link between events in Beirut and Israeli military actions in the West Bank, see Irit Gal and Ilana Hammerman, eds., From Beirut to [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2002).

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An Ephemeral Peace

Even after the violence of September, American and Israeli officials continued efforts to claim victory in Lebanon. Sabra and Shatila compelled the American government to redeploy

U.S. Marines to Beirut, leaving them exposed without a clear mission in the midst of a civil war.

Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger’s critics had blamed him for enabling the violence by withdrawing the Marines, and Ambassador Habib would later admit that the U.S. failed to keep its word in not protecting Palestinians left behind.130 The situation was fast turning into the quagmire Reagan’s advisors had initially feared. Yet an acute sense of moral obligation shifted

Reagan’s view of military involvement, and he was newly willing to intervene with more substantive force.131

Notwithstanding the deteriorating events on the ground, the Israeli security establishment maintained its belief that a peace agreement with the Maronites was possible. Before his resignation, Sharon spoke of normalization with the Lebanese, and of free Israeli civilian entry into Beirut.132 David Kimche, an Israeli diplomat and Mossad recruitment officer, traveled to the

Gemayel family compound in the Bikfaya hills in January 1983 to meet with Sheikh Pierre

Gemayel. Pierre was the father of both the slain Bashir and his brother Amin, the new Lebanese

130 See John Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat Versus the Israeli General, Beirut 1982 (Belmont, CA: Applegate Press, 2002), 266-73. I also drew on Boykin’s papers at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

131 Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble, 282-84. Tyler recounts a revealing exchange between Reagan and his NSC staffer, Philip Dur, about the success of President Dwight Eisenhower’s earlier intervention in Lebanon in 1958, which consisted of 19,000 troops compared to Regan’s 1800.

132 Habib protested Sharon’s outlandish suggestion given the circumstances on the ground, telling the Minister of Defense, “I know you want to go to the Hotel Commodore and have a cup of coffee. It’s a lousy hotel, but you want to go there and have a cup of coffee, and I say wait a little while, please. This is not a time for tourism.” See “Meeting of Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and Ambassador Philip Habib, 23 September 1982, 6:30 PM, A- 4317/3, ISA.

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President. Pierre had founded the Phalangist party after his participation in the 1936 Summer

Olympics in Berlin, where he was heavily influenced by German , serving as a strange counterpart to his Mossad visitors. But the elder Gemayel was optimistic that a new Lebanon could still be built with their help. He told Kimche to

Tell Mr. Begin and Mr. Sharon that the relations between you and us are like marriage bonds. This is a deep bond for a lifetime, like a Maronite wedding...You have physical power and we have political power. We can open doors on your behalf in the Middle East...Once we thought we would not be able to build Lebanon like we dreamed of. But today that looks possible. The Muslims are beginning to understand us and we are a bit optimistic. We have the possibility to now build a new Lebanon and begin to live together like we want and hope. Give us time.133

Like Begin’s rhetoric defending the Maronites, Gemayel’s rhetoric fueled unrealistic expectations about the possibilities opened up by the war, with disastrous results for the country and its inhabitants.

During an interview decades after his own involvement as the Israeli government’s coordinator in occupied Lebanon, a contrite admitted to this overreach. Lebanon is like a “piano,” Lubrani remarked, and “one must play all the keys.” “Some of the Mossad were captivated by the Maronites, who played on their egos with nice food and hospitality.” But they knew how to manipulate their Israeli interlocutors, who failed to account for competing forces.

The legacy of the invasion, Lubrani concluded, is that “Israel had no business trying to manage the internal affairs of the Lebanese.”134 It was a lesson learned too late.

133 Top secret meeting between Pierre Gemayel and David Kimche [Hebrew] January 10, 1983, MFA-6848/8, ISA. In a meeting with Sharon and the Mossad in August, Pierre told the Israelis “God has sent you. During the last seven to eight years everybody has let us down. The Americans and the Europeans were afraid of burning their hands here. It was necessary for you to act the way you did. You’ve come and saved us.” “Minutes of a Meeting Between the Defense Minister and Pierre and Bashir Gemayel in Bashir’s Office,” 21 August 1982, KCD, 2-3.

134 Author phone interview with Uri Lubrani, 25 June 2012.

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In early 1983, the United States backed the secret Israeli negotiations for a peace treaty with the Lebanese government.135 The talks were held while Lebanon was subject to both Israeli and Syrian occupation, and U.S. diplomats solicited Israeli negotiating positions before seeking approval from Beirut.136 Forced upon a reluctant and shaky Lebanese government, the treaty ultimately collapsed.137 In a recently declassified CIA intelligence analysis prepared for the

Agency’s Director, William Casey, on 9 February 1983, the CIA’s Near East and South Asian experts provided the rationale for these negotiations.

Beirut believes—probably correctly—that Tel Aviv is deliberately dragging them out to scuttle the Reagan initiative….Israeli political leaders, including Prime Minister Begin, probably have more reason than ever to secure major concessions on security and normalization now that the Sabra-Shatila massacre report is in. They need to prove the Lebanese invasion was a profitable political gamble for Israel.138

The desire to prove that the invasion was “profitable” drove the Israeli government to continue occupying a large swath of south Lebanon until 2000, a decision that would turn Lebanon into the never-ending quagmire that it became in the mind of the Israeli public.

Israeli forces partially withdrew twenty-five miles north of the border, using General

Saad Haddad’s (SLA) as a proxy to control the area alongside its own forces. This marked the onset of a “prolonged defacto partition of Lebanon” between Israeli and

135 The U.S. mediated discussions had already begun in November 1982. See “Meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir and Ambassador Philip Habib, 24 November 1982, 4:35PM, A-4317/11, ISA; letter exchanges, Shultz and Begin, 27 and 29 November 1982, A-4317/11, ISA; and “Top Secret Meeting between Prime Minister Begin and Ambassador Philip Habib at the Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, 16 December 1982, 6PM. A-4317/11, ISA.

136 See, for example, the meeting between Begin and Habib, 9 February 1983, 5PM, A-4317/12, ISA.

137 For the treaty negotiations, see “Secret Agreement between Israel and Lebanon,” 18 January 1983, A-4317/11, ISA; and Milchemet Shalom HaGalil, Masa u’Matan Mamshelet Yisrael Mamshelet Levanon [Operation Peace for Galilee, Negotiations between the Government of Israel and the Government of Lebanon], 4-10 January 1983, A- 4317/9, ISA. See also the continuation in A-4317/10, 12, ISA.

138 Secret talking points for DCI on Lebanon-Israel, 9 February 1983, CREST (CIA RDP85M00363R001202740017-2), NARA.

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Syrian spheres of influence. The regional implications of this partition, as CIA analysts predicted in a remarkably prescient report, affected the Palestinians as well. Ultimately, as the CIA argued,

“a prolonged stalemate in Lebanon will tend to detract attention from other Levantine issues, particularly the Palestinian problem.”139 For Israel, despite the setbacks of the invasion, Lebanon could remain subject to indefinite occupation and the Palestinian question could remain isolated from developments in the territories themselves.

Searching for a Middle East Policy

Lebanon’s government, led by the brother of the slain Bashir Gemayel, President Amin

Gemayel, signed a peace agreement with Israel on 17 May 1983.140 Full withdrawal, however, remained dependent on the Syrians, who were unwilling to give up any of the newfound regional influence they had gained during the war. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad opposed the Israeli imposed peace agreement from the start. Habib, who had been a trusted Middle East advisor for

Reagan from the beginning of his first term, lost the confidence of the Syrians after the May 17

Accord was signed, and promptly departed from his job.

Habib’s replacement, the onetime Henry Kissinger aide Robert “Bud” McFarlane, had little experience in the Middle East. Knowledgeable advisors like the new CIA station chief,

William F. Buckley, feared that a potential power vacuum from any rapid Israeli withdrawal would ignite Syrian-backed militias against the Lebanese army and Christian Phalangist

139 Ibid

140 For the full text of the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 287-289.

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militias. This debate extended to Washington, as Shultz and Weinberger disagreed over the further exercise of American military power.141

By the fall of 1983, the debilitating lack of movement in Lebanon, fraying relations with

Jordan, and stalled negotiations over the fate of the Palestinian raised serious concerns within the

Reagan administration. George Shultz outlined his worries to the President, acknowledging “We need to take a hard look at emerging signs of serious danger for us and for our friends in the area.”142 Shultz was especially concerned about policies “toward Jordan, toward settlements on the West Bank, and toward the human condition of Palestinians both in the occupied territories and in Lebanon.”143 Shultz’s warnings coincided with a series of important NSC meetings and critical administration directives that attempted to provide a new coherent policy on the Middle

East.144 Recent declassification of these documents provides strong evidence that Reagan and his advisors understood the serious challenges facing the U.S., even while their actual policies continued to flounder.

The National Security Study Directive that would provide an overarching plan for new administration action in the Middle East and South , NSSD-4, took almost two years to complete. When the main findings of the fifty-page document finally emerged as an official

National Security Decision Directive in July of 1983, NSDD 99 emphasized the prevention of

Soviet hegemony and the protection of adequate U.S. access to Gulf oil reserves as the primary

141 For more on Shultz’s view of the military as a tool of diplomacy, see Ronald Steel, “Shultz’s Revenge” The New York Review of Books, 23 September 1993.

142 Memo, George Shultz to Ronald Reagan, 5 Oct. 1983, folder “NSPG 72,” box 91306, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG, RRL.

143 Ibid.

144 For general background and details of each National Security Planning Group meeting (NSPG) and National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), see Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

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objectives of American policy in the Middle East.145 The next major concern was ensuring the security of Israel and obtaining a resolution of the Palestinian problem, and Reagan believed that the U.S. was well suited for both tasks. But the President’s accompanying statement on cooperation with Israel once again threw into relief the inevitable dilemma that would result from his approach.

I acknowledge that our ability to defend vital interests in the near East and South Asia would be enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in recognition of Israel’s strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative planning with Israel expanding on the work begun earlier.146

In choosing to renew strategic cooperation with Israel, Reagan understood that he could further undermine America’s credibility with Arab states, as Lebanon had so clearly demonstrated.

On the eve of the National Security Council meeting that considered the implementation of Reagan’s new policy for the region, the President’s National Security Advisor, William Clark, stressed the importance of fully restarting strategic cooperation with Israel and saving face with the Arab world.

Among the best reasons for close cooperation with the Israelis is our need to manifest, in concrete terms, our commitment to the security of Israel and our determination to collaborate with Israel in defeating Soviet aggression which threatens our common interests. Such an expression of our determination to cooperate where interests coincide is also critical to improving our own freedom of action and latitude on issues where U.S. and Israeli interests do not coincide. Simply put, a clear expression of U.S. resolve to defend the core security interests of Israel will make it much more difficult for Israel to question our reliability as we undertake to cooperate and equip moderate Arab states with similar stakes in a strategic relationship with the U.S.147

145 See the entire folder “NSDD 99: Security Strategy for Near East and South Asia,” box 91290, Executive Secretariat, NSC, RRL.

146 Ibid.

147 Memo, William P. Clark to Ronald Reagan, 11 July 1983, file 2, “NSDD 99: Security Strategy for Near East and South Asia,” box 91290, Executive Secretariat, NSC, RRL, emphasis in original.

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Clark’s convoluted logic demonstrated the paramount importance of the Soviet threat, which remained the dominant prism through which Reagan viewed the Middle East. Such an approach to Lebanon highlighted the flawed belief that a strengthened U.S.-Israel alliance could coexist with support for the Arab states, belying the fierce opposition that the ongoing Israeli occupation of the country had engendered in the region. As an ally and a regional power, Israel’s limits had become increasingly clear.

With Reagan’s 1984 reelection bid looming, the U.S. government continued searching for an overall strategy in Lebanon and the wider Middle East.148 As predicted, Israeli forces began to leave the Shouf Mountains above Beirut in the fall of 1983, triggering a power vacuum. U.S. troops remained in place, exposed to attacks near the airport and drawn into the fighting alongside Lebanon’s Christian militias. Local opposition among the country’s disaffected Shia population led to targeted strikes against these installations, the work of an emergent Hezbollah.

In April, a suicide bomber killed sixty-three people in a targeted attack on the U.S. Embassy in

Beirut, including several key CIA operatives, soldiers and marines.149

On 23 October 1983, in the single deadliest attack against the U.S. Marine Corps since

World War II, another enormous explosion ripped through the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing two hundred and forty one American servicemen.150 Minutes later, a second suicide bomber hit the French military barracks in the ‘Drakkar’ building, killing fifty eight

148 Tyler, A World of Trouble, 289-91.

149 For a harrowing description of the bombing, and the death of CIA operative Robert Ames, see Bird, The Good Spy.

150 Quandt, Peace Process, 258. For an insider’s perspective on the end of American involvement in Lebanon, see Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 220-234. For an account of the Marine mission in Lebanon and the barracks bombing, see Eric M. Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984 (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985). On the intervention, see Thomas Anderson Bowditch, “Force and Diplomacy: The American Failure in Lebanon, 1982-1984” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1999).

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in France’s single worst military loss since the . These attacks led to open warfare with Syrian-backed forces and, soon after, the rapid withdrawal of the Marines and Multinational

Forces to their ships, accelerating the end of U.S. and European involvement in Lebanon.

Despite Reagan’s pledge to retaliate against the perpetrators, and not withdraw until the mission was complete, American troops departed within months.151 In the words of U.S. Ambassador

Sam Lewis, America left the country “with our tail between our legs.”152

The possibility of Lebanese unity quickly crumbled as the Syrian army filled the void left by the departing multinational forces, which evacuated by March 1984. Soon after, Amin

Gemayel abrogated the May 17 Agreement that had been signed with Israel. Syria maintained direct influence over Lebanon for more than twenty years, finally forced out by the ‘Cedar

Revolution’ in the aftermath of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination in 2005.

Hezbollah, which grew into a highly organized paramilitary organization and political force, resisted the Israeli occupation of the south and forced a full Israeli military withdrawal by May

2000.153

Despite the lofty rhetoric of Israeli leaders and the Cold War aspirations of the Reagan

White House, Lebanon facilitated Syria’s regional ascendency and adversely impacted

America’s strategic position in the Middle East. In talking points for a meeting on the prospects

151 On Reagan’s pledge to retaliate and remain, see “Transcript of President Reagan's News Conference on the Attack in Beirut,” New York Times, 25 October 1983. On Reagan’s about face, see Micah Zenko, “Reagan’s Cut and Run,” Foreign Policy, 7 February 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/07/when-reagan-cut-and-run (accessed 8 March 2015); and Crist, The Twilight War.

152 Phone interview with Ambassador Samuel Lewis, 6 September 2012.

153 See Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. For more on the withdrawal, and the role of domestic Israeli critics, see Avraham Sela, “Civil Society, the Military and National Security: The Case of Israel’s Security Zone in South Lebanon,” Israel Studies, 12:1 (Spring 2007): 53-78.

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in Lebanon, CIA analyst Graham Fuller explained how the war was engendering a close Syrian-

Soviet alliance.

Syria can derive considerable satisfaction from the flow of events in Lebanon which strengthen Assad’s conviction that things are going his way…Syria will take efforts to avoid sparking Israeli attacks against itself, especially while the pace of events is moving strongly against national reconciliation and in favor of confessionalism and partition. Syria can live happily with partition, confident that it remains the dominant power in Lebanese politics. The USSR’s interests are closely linked to Syria’s. The Soviets support Syrian opposition to any U.S.-sponsored peace plan in the area.154

Given the political dynamics that have inhered since the Syrian army’s formal departure from

Lebanon in 2005—and Russian influence in sustaining the that began in 2011— it is important to revisit this particular legacy of the intervention.155 The war also led to other unexpected regional transformations in light of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its spillover into

Lebanon. “Israel’s myopic obsession with destroying the Palestinian resistance spawned a far more dangerous enemy,” one historian of the period has noted. “American Cold War naiveté opened the door for Iran in Lebanon.”156

Conclusion

While the signing of a strategic agreement between Begin’s Likud government and the

Reagan White House in 1981 may have marked the formal onset of an alliance, the 1982

Lebanon War and the legacy of the Israeli and U.S. intervention complicates the dominant

154 Graham Fuller, Secret talking points for SSG meeting, Situation Room, “Syrian and Soviet options in Lebanon,” NIO/NESA, 29 August 1983. CREST (CIA-RDP85M00363R00020034001-6), NARA, emphasis in original.

155 One observer who recalls this history is retired U.S. diplomat , witness to the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks bombing, as well as the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila massacre. See “Containing the Fire in Syria,” Yale Global, 23 July 2013, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/containing-fire-syria (accessed 10 March 2015).

156 Crist, The Twilight War, 153.

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narrative of abiding friendship between stalwart allies.157 Israel’s leaders were motivated by overly ambitious regional aims and the internal realities of a fractured Lebanese state, compromising relations with the United States. Alongside the previous chapter’s examination of the neoconservative alliance with the Likud, this chapter’s focus on Lebanon underscores how the codification of a strategic relationship between the U.S. and Israel and the unchecked hostility towards Palestinian nationalism in Jerusalem fueled the 1982 invasion and implicated the United States in the tragedy of the war. To a large extent, it was the assurance of bilateral peace with Egypt at Camp David that paved the way for more ambitious Israeli intervention in the region. In a revealing interview some years after the PLO expulsion, Yasser Arafat told

Zahid Mahmood in Tunis “We knew that the invasion of Lebanon would not have taken place if there had been no Camp David agreement and without the Iran-Iraq war. Because of Camp

David, Egypt was absent; Iraq was completely preoccupied; and the Syrians accepted the cease- fire after about four days.”158

Lebanon, and the , endured as a touchstone of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. During a historic interview in Beirut with veteran journalist and peace activist —his first with an Israeli— Arafat appealed to world opinion for a greater understanding of the Palestinian reality.159 “I am not worried. I am not worried at all about the

157 One helpful corrective of this tendency to gloss over Reagan’s critical relationship with Israel is Chemi Shalev, “If Obama Treated Israel like Reagan Did, He’d be Impeached,” Ha’aretz, 9 December 2011.

158 Interview with Yasser Arafat by Zahid Mahmood, 11 March and 2 June 1986, International Documents on Palestine, IPS. In another interview on Meet the Press, Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij was asked about a comment that he made in the New York Times, “The American signature on the Camp David Accords is not worth the ashes on your cigarette.” The interviewer asked Freij “Are you partly blaming the United States for what was done to the PLO in Lebanon?” Freij replied, “I am blaming the United States for what has befell the Arab women and children and civilian people in Lebanon, the Palestinians and the Lebanese, and the destruction of West Beirut, the obliteration of the Palestinian refugees’ camps in Tyre, Sidon, , and other places.” See Transcript, NBC’s Meet the Press, 29 August 1982, CREST (CIA-RDP88-01070R000100330005-4), NARA.

159 See “Press Interview Statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat,” 2 July 1982, International Documents on Palestine, IPS. The interview with Avnery was conducted for the weekly Ha’olam Haze, which he 320

future despite this extensive invasion of Lebanon,” Arafat told Avnery. “I turn to every human being in the world to come here and see this great power, the Israeli Army, what it did against the Palestinians, to our refugees, to our women and children…History is not made of battles.”160

The PLO leader was adamant that his fight was against the Israeli army, not the Jewish people.

“We want to live with all the Jews. We are not against the Jews!...The Jews are a religious people, people sticking to religion. The Israeli military regime damages the whole course of life, and damages, in a very disgraceful way, the Jewish spirit.”161

Throughout the summer siege, Palestinian leaders continued to assert the PLO’s willingness to accept binding UN resolutions and the possibility of a negotiated settlement. In the aftermath of the PLO’s evacuation from Beirut, ABC News hosted an episode of “This Week with David Brinkley” on the situation in the Middle East, inviting Bassam Abu Sharif of the

edited. Avnery told Arafat “I have been waiting for this interview for years…the one point that should be made completely clear in a way that every Israeli in the street can understand: that you want a solution of peace based on mutual understanding, mutual respect and recognition.”

160 Ibid. Before Avnery left, Arafat asked if he was going back to Palestine the same day, which he was. “You think you have the right to go back there, and I don’t have the same right?” Arafat asked Avnery. “Simply, I am a human being! To where? Apart from my native country? I want to return to my homeland.”

161 Ibid. There is a fascinating account of Arafat’s own outreach to Lebanese Jews who remained in Beirut during the fighting, hiding out at the Magen Avraham Synagogue in the Wadi Abu Jamil neighborhood downtown, right on the Green Line between the city’s Eastern and Western districts. This was the site of what had been a vibrant Jewish community, but also the epicenter of violence between Christian Phalangists and PLO fighters in the civil war. Several Jews who remained behind during the war—mostly elderly and infirm—took shelter in the synagogue sanctuary, and the rabbi called Prime Minister , a Sunni Muslim, to ask for help, which he promised to send. But before government troops arrived, Arafat made a humanitarian gesture and sent his fighters through with food for the Jews who were trapped inside to make sure they were not harmed. Later, the Israeli army suspected that PLO weapons were being stockpiled in the vicinity of the synagogue, and an jet shelled the roof of the synagogue on 12 August 1982 during the height of the summer siege of the seaside capital. The synagogue was restored in 2014 with donations from expatriate Jewish Lebanese and the blessing of the government, including officials from Hezbollah. Hussain Rahal, a spokesman for the group, explained the support. “We respect the Jewish religion just like we do Christianity. The Jews have always lived among us. We have an issue with Israel’s occupation of land.” This complicated interplay between the impact of political Zionism and the legacy of Jewish religious life in the Middle East requires greater attention for the post-1948 period. See “Behind the Headlines: The Jews of Lebanon,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 25 August 1982; Kirsten Schulze, The Jews of Lebanon: Between Coexistence and Conflict, 2nd ed. (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009); Steve Lipman, “Rebuilding Lebanese Jewry,” The Jewish Week, 26 August 2009; and Avi Mograbi’s film, Pa’am Nichnasti La’Gan [Once I Entered the Garden] (2014) for reflections on the Jews of Lebanon.

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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to discuss the political repercussions of the departure. Brinkley asked the Palestinian spokesman whether he would be satisfied with a

Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and Abu Sharif remarked that it was “satisfactory” to have a state on “any part of Palestine.” In a follow up, he was asked “does that mean that the

Palestinians, in your view, the PLO, in your view, can accept the simultaneous existence of Israel as a Jewish state?” Abu Sharif replied “This is the PLO program. It was very clear…it is to establish a Palestine independent state on any part of Palestine.” Brinkley asked if such an outcome were to materialize, “would that be the end of your hostility to Israel?” Abu Sharif replied that “this would be probably a start for simultaneous cooperation between Palestinians and Jews.”162

Although many argue convincingly that the failures of the PLO leadership were more evident after the summer of 1982, power shifted to internal political activism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The unintended consequences of the invasion strengthened calls for a national solution to the Palestinian question. A special National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the

CIA in the aftermath of the war described this altered climate. “Israel has been surprised to discover that its military victory has not produced the expected political dividends and seems to have strengthened its antagonists’ political hand.”163 This analysis cohered with the view of one

Israeli Knesset member, who remarked “In Beirut, we created a Palestinian state.”164 As the

162 “Full Text: Middle East,” This Week with David Brinkley, 29 August 1982, 11:30AM, CREST (CIA-RDP88- 01070R000100330006-3), NARA.

163 Special National Security Intelligence Estimate, “PLO: Impact of the Lebanese Incursion,” 8 November 1982. CREST (CIA-RDP85T00176R001100290014-5). The Israeli defeat of the PLO was not decisive, as the Soviet Union aided the Palestinian and Syrian recovery after the war. The White House could no longer advocate for autonomy as a corridor to sovereignty, deferring substantive conversations of the Palestinian question until after the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987.

164 This was Shevach Weiss during a discussion of Sharon’s role in Sabra and Shatila. See transcript of Knesset meeting, 22 September 1982, Abraham D. Sofaer Collection, Box 8, Hoover Institution Archives. 322

following chapter explains, Palestinian nationalism’s revival in the occupied territories fomented the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, forcing Israel’s reluctant reckoning with the Palestinian question on rather different grounds than the prior decade.

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Chapter Six: Alternatives to the PLO?: 1985-1988

We insist that we are entitled to a home. We are entitled, as human beings, to our self- determination. We insist that we are entitled to have an identity and a state of our own. And this may take some time, as long as Israel can suppress us. But ultimately we will get that role. -Rashid al-Shawa1

Attempts to reach a settlement that do not include the Palestinians as a major partner to the negotiations or whose outcome is not the establishment of an independent Palestinian state are doomed to failure. -Moshe Amirav2

Introduction

In the wake of Lebanon, the Israeli government remained determined to avoid the prospect of Palestinian self-determination. U.S. officials did not force the issue, having shifted gears away from the Reagan Plan towards the “Jordanian Option” to conduct secret peace talks with King Hussein after the 1984 election. This diversion, along with other so called “quality-of- life” initiatives in the West Bank and Gaza, was intended to circumvent the PLO and build a moderate Palestinian infrastructure under the aegis of an Israeli-Jordanian arrangement.3 Some of the efforts echoed the limited autonomy measures Begin had suggested in 1977. But the shock of

1 This was on NBC’s Meet the Press, 29 August 1982. Shawa was the former mayor of , removed from office by the Israeli military government. See CREST (CIA-RDP88-01070R000100330005-4). The NBC broadcast with al-Shawa and Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem, was supposed to be aired earlier but Israeli authorities refused permission for the two Palestinian leaders to travel to the U.S.. See “West Bank, Gaza Village Leagues Termed As Israeli ‘collaborators,’” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 30 August 1982, http://www.jta.org/1982/08/30/archive/west- bank-gaza-village-leagues-termed-as-israeli-collaborators (accessed 6 March 2015). On Freij, al-Shawa and the political milieu of West Bank leadership, see Yehuda Litani, “Leadership in the West Bank and Gaza,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, Number 14: Winter 1980.

2 This was in a report prepared for Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. See “Report by Herut Party Member Amirav of Israel entitled ‘Outline for Advancement of Negotiations between the Likud and the PLO,” Jerusalem, September 1987, International Documents on Palestine, IPS.

3 Quandt, Peace Process, 271. 324

the first Intifada, which broke out in December 1987, shattered any illusion that the Palestinian national movement could be sidestepped.

Inhabitants of the occupied territories, seething with anger after twenty years of Israeli military control, erupted in demonstrations and widespread civil disobedience that lasted for several years. In response, Secretary of State Shultz formulated a new initiative for dealing with the Palestinian issue, the first serious peace proposal since Reagan’s September 1982 peace plan.

But King Hussein, whose support was crucial for the success of Shultz’s initiative, relinquished

Jordan’s legal and administrative ties to the West Bank in July of 1988 partially in reaction to the

Intifada. This forced the United States and Israel to deal solely with the PLO, a prospect that had been unthinkable in the late 1970s. While this development proved critical for the start of the

Madrid and Oslo negotiations in the early 1990s, a lack of substantive progress on other fronts, particularly the absence of an Israeli freeze on settlement building, eroded the basis of what would later emerge as the highly touted two-state solution.

The persistence of Palestinian nationalism after the creation of Israel in 1948, against the backdrop of dispersion, cold and wars, inter-Arab rivalry and internal divisions, has been the subject of close scholarly attention.4 Yet while historians have periodized the critical stages of the national movement, the 1980s remain understudied in several important ways. Arriving in

Tunis, the Palestinian leadership found itself far away from historic Palestine and the

4 For the best periodizing schemes of Palestinian history, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle; Helga Baumgarten, "The Three Faces/Phases;" Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston: Beacon, 2006); Ibrahim Dakaak, “Back to Square One: A Study in the Re-Emergence of Palestinian Identity in the West Bank, 1967-1980," in Michael Dumper, ed., Arab-Israeli Conflict: Volume II, 1967-1991 (London: Routledge, 2009): 34-68; and Alain Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within : Towards an Independent Palestinian State, Rev. and updated ed. (London: Zed Books, 1988).

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infrastructure it had developed in Arab states like Jordan and Lebanon.5 The PLO adopted an interim strategy to access the West Bank through Jordan, in order to shift the center of gravity back to the territories. At the same time, there were serious internal cleavages within the PLO over accepting this reality.6 Dissidents of the PFLP and other radical groups formed a “Rejection

Front,” which strongly opposed a negotiated settlement and committed egregious acts of terror against Israeli as well as Jewish targets in the 1980s.

By the end of the decade, the PLO had managed to reposition itself at the forefront of the national struggle, reconciling warring factions internally and garnering official recognition from the U.S. government after decades of exclusion. That such a shift took place in the last months of a Republican administration ideologically opposed to Palestinian nationalism, viewing the PLO as a Soviet proxy, was a surprising turn of events. But the decision to embrace limited self-rule as an entry point back into the territories did not come without risks. In the rush to secure greater global legitimacy, the PLO leadership sacrificed basic principles of national self-determination for limited self-rule, acquiescing in part to the earlier notions of autonomy put forward during the

Egyptian-Israeli-American negotiations. The consequence for the onset of the Madrid and Oslo negotiations was the emergence of a local authority largely subject to Israeli control. Such an arrangement deferred sovereign statehood, fostering the performance of independence without substantive political content. As I argue in this chapter, the latter half of the 1980s witnessed

5 See Rashid Khalidi, “Palestinian Politics after the Exodus from Beirut,” in Robert O. Freedman, The Middle East after the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 233-53; and Emile F. Sahliyeh, The PLO after the Lebanon War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).

6 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, 170. The PLO’s ‘Dissident Rebellion’ is explained by both Said Musa and Khalid al- Hasan in Walter Laqueur and Barry M. Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 290-93. On the internal dynamics of Palestinian political life in the West Bank and Gaza during the 1980s, see Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, “The West Bank and Gaza: Political and Ideological Responses to Occupation,” in Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, eds., Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

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various failed attempts to work around the PLO, ending with the recognition that the organization had to be engaged with directly.

Reagan’s Second Term

After winning the election handily in 1984, Reagan’s second term was overshadowed by the Iran-Contra scandal.7 To rehabilitate U.S. foreign policy in the wake of these events, Reagan brought in new staff including Frank Carlucci, a former Deputy Director of both the CIA and the

Department of Defense, who replaced John Poindexter as the National Security Advisor. General

Colin Powell took over the position in 1987 when Carlucci took Caspar Weinberger’s spot as

Secretary of Defense. Dennis Ross, who had worked under Paul Wolfowitz at the State

Department’s Policy Planning staff, was put in charge of Near East and South Asian affairs at the

NSC in June 1986.8 Along with Secretary Shultz, whose influence in the White House had grown steadily since his 1982 appointment, a new cadre of policymakers sought a different approach to the Middle East in the second term.

Reagan’s victory in 1984 coincided with a political realignment in Israel, where a standoff between the Labor and Likud parties resulted in a unity coalition with a rotation in the premiership. Shimon Peres, the Labor leader, would serve as Prime Minister until 1986, and then the Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir would complete the term. The political environment, at least initially, seemed ripe for reengaging with the Arab-Israeli peace process. At the same time,

Palestinians debated the value of reconciling with the Hashemite regime in order to further ties

7 For more on the scandal and its impact on Middle East policy, see Quandt, Peace Process, 266-268; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 439-442; and Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (University of Kansas Press, 2014). For more on the realignment of the national security apparatus after Iran- Contra, see Rothkopf, Running the World, chapter 8.

8 Ross, The Missing Peace, 50.

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with West Bank inhabitants.9 In a February 1985 communiqué, the PLO formulated a joint position in support of a confederation with Jordan.10 The new accord was centered on the idea of an international conference where the PLO would play a limited role as part of a Jordanian-

Palestinian delegation. Although the Jordanians had made it clear that the PLO might accept UN

Security Resolution 242 in return for American recognition of Palestinian self-determination,

Secretary of State Shultz and his fellow policymakers remained unconvinced, as did the

Israelis.11

The Palestine Liberation Front’s hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and cold-blooded killing of the Jewish wheelchair bound tourist in October 1985 only strengthened these anti-engagement views. Along with a string of plane hijackings and deadly shootings at the and Vienna airports, outrage over Palestinian terrorism mounted.

The American government was confronting a rash of worldwide terrorist attacks throughout the

1980s, and had little tolerance for the PLO’s internal power struggles writ large on the international scene.12

In Israel, Prime Minister Peres had grown in popularity for withdrawing troops from

Lebanon and successfully managing the struggling economy, while “quiet diplomacy with

Jordan seemed to be laying the groundwork for a kind of condominium over the West Bank and

9 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, 148.

10 For the full text see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 298-299. Quandt, Peace Process, 260-265 covers related events during these years in some detail, and Bernard Avishai provides a perspective from Amman in “Looking over Jordan,” The New York Review of Books, 28 April 1983; and “Jordan: Looking for an Opening,” The New York Review of Books, 27 September 1984.

11 Quandt, Peace Process, 261-262.

12 For a description of Reagan’s anti-terrorism policy, with detailed reference to the Middle East, see David C. Wills, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); and Nicholas Laham, Crossing the Rubicon: Ronald Reagan and US Policy in the Middle East (Aldershot: Aldgate, 2004). See also Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 643-688.

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Gaza at the expense of the PLO.”13 American officials wanted to strengthen Peres’ position against the Likud, so they expended effort to minimize any strains in the U.S.-Israel alliance, reiterating their refusal to deal with the PLO and their continued opposition to any form of

Palestinian self-determination. President Reagan, who had been pushed by Shultz in the summer of 1985 to allow his new assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, Richard Murphy, to meet with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, backed away at the final moment.

But the troubling regional climate undermined chances for reengagement on the

Palestinian question. By the fall, relations between King Hussein and Arafat had deteriorated beyond repair, with the PLO’s failure to rein in terrorism and Hussein’s political vulnerabilities taking an enormous toll on the alliance.14 In a scathing address on 19 February 1986, King

Hussein announced the end of the joint initiative with the PLO.15 He blamed the Palestinian leadership for continued intransigence in not accepting UN resolution 242, and his remarks signaled “the end of an era in which Jordan was the leading actor in the search for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict.”16 Reflecting on this emblematic return “to where we had started,” Shultz describes his “deep frustration” with this climate of failure. In his words, “I knew that without a peace process, a dangerous vacuum existed that would likely be filled by violence…We would need a new model. We would not give up.”17 Yet American policymakers expended little effort to improve the prospects for peace during Reagan’s second term.

13 Quandt, Peace Process, 262. 14 Ibid., 260-265.

15 For sections of Hussein’s three and a half hour address, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 299-313.

16 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 433.

17 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 462.

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At a Presidential news conference in the spring of 1985, the President was asked pointedly about this growing lack of interest in restarting the peace process.

Q: Mr. President, in your first term you proposed your own Middle East peace plan. You dispatched special envoys to the region to seek solutions, you even sent in marines to try to stabilize Lebanon. These days we hardly ever even hear you mention the Middle East...I wonder if you could tell us tonight, sir, what you expect to gain from the new policy of disengagement, and what do you expect to be achieved over there?

The President: Well, it isn't disengagement...our proposal, in the very beginning, was that we did not want to participate in the negotiations. It wouldn't be any of our business to do so but that we'd do whatever we could to help bring the warring parties together and, in effect, you might say, continue the Camp David process...18

As an alternative to reviving a peace initiative, U.S. diplomats focused on more limited programs to alleviate hardship in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including strategies like the “Village

Leagues” and “Quality of Life Initiatives.”

The Village Leagues

In the early 1980s, the Israelis began to encourage the development of “Village Leagues” to build alternative sources of leadership to the PLO in the West Bank.19 The concept of local control over municipal governance via pliable non-PLO Palestinian leaders first emerged under

Moshe Dayan’s tenure in the occupied territories. Begin and Sharon expanded this effort, looking for rural leadership to counter nationalist politics. When asked why he did not participate in these talks, Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij told NBC’s Martin Fletcher “There are no talks

18 President’s News Conference, 21 March 1985, PPRR, RRL.

19 On the Village Leagues, see the newly released files at the Israel State Archives, MFA-8415/18; as well as Flora Lewis, “How to Grow Horns,” New York Times, 29 April 1982; Menachem Milson, “How to Make Peace with the Palestinians,” Commentary 7, no. 5 (1981): 25-35; Yehuda Litani, “‘Village Leagues’: What Kind of Carrot?,” Journal of Palestine Studies 11, no. 3 (1982): 174–78; , “In League with Zion: Israel’s Search for a Native Pillar,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12:4 (1983): 41-56 and Hillel Cohen, "Village Leagues: Failed Framework, Conceptual Victory and the Lost Peace" [Hebrew], The New East (2014): 251-277. Another non-PLO strategy was targeting local mayors in the occupied territories. See Moshe Ma’oz, Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Mayors under Jordan and Israel (London: Frank Cass, 1984).

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going with anybody. The Israelis have created these creatures. They’re protecting them just as symbols. And these symbols or collaborators will simply sign a blank check for Israel.” 20

Freij compared the efforts on the part of the Israelis to pursue these Village Leagues as akin to the failed autonomy talks. Those talks, Freij explained, were devoid of content. “Israel is not giving us anything whatsoever. Israel wants the land. It is talking of an autonomy where Mr.

Begin says will never lead to self-determination, will never lead to statehood.” Harkening back to the language of Camp David, the Bethlehem Mayor insisted that the real meaning of the agreement was “full autonomy” for Palestinians, akin to the Egyptian formula suggested during the autonomy negotiations, not the model being proffered by Israel. “We have not fought for 60 years to accept a very limited, powerless administrative council without doing anything,” Freij declared.21

Turning towards Jordan

As efforts like the Village Leagues shifted the focus away from Palestinian nationalists, direct bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan intensified. In a coda to the cessation of

Jordanian-PLO relations, King Hussein closed down the PLO office in Amman in July of 1986.

In August, the King also tried to strengthen his support among Palestinians in the territories by launching a West Bank Development Plan to improve their economic conditions. Israel expressed its support for this initiative in the hope of further undermining the PLO and possibly asserting its own claim to the West Bank.22

20 Transcript, NBC’s Meet the Press, 29 August 1982, CREST (CIA-RDP88-01070R000100330005-4), NARA.

21 Ibid.

22 This argument is suggested by Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 433-435. For more on Israeli and Jordanian influence over the West Bank, see Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians (New York: Greenwood, 1989). 331

Hussein visited the White House in the summer of 1986. In a memo ahead of the monarch’s arrival, Shultz outlined the American commitment to a continuation of the strong alliance between the two countries, which Hussein was beginning to doubt after a failed

Jordanian arms sale. The Secretary of State saw a meeting with Hussein as an opportunity for reassurance, while also encouraging a “more active Jordanian role” in the West Bank.23 In a closed-door discussion, the President told Hussein that he supported “an alternative Palestinian leadership” and wanted to move forward on quality of life issues in the occupied territories.24

Later that afternoon, NSA Advisor John Poindexter also met privately with Hussein, and reiterated his shared “frustration with Arafat,” agreeing that the PLO leader was unlikely to join the peace process.25

In the weeks following the visit, American official Dennis Ross prepared a follow up cable for his boss at the NSC to send to the Secretary of State. In it, Poindexter encouraged

Shultz to help King Hussein in his initiative to “close all doors” to Arafat and provide money to build a “moderate Jordanian position on the West Bank.” Poindexter sensed there could be problems with this approach.

I realize supporting the King’s efforts to undermine Arafat and nurture an alternative leadership may be controversial. Some may feel that the King will fail or that there can be no alternative to Arafat. I am concerned that if we look lukewarm in our support we will guarantee his failure, and I am convinced that Arafat is incapable of ever negotiating peace with Israel.26

23 Memo, George Shultz to Ronald Reagan, 5 June 1986, “Chronological File, June 1986,” box 5, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

24 Talking points for the President’s meeting with Jordan’s King Hussein, 9 June 1986, ibid.

25 Talking points for Poindexter’s meeting with King Hussein, 9 June 1986, ibid.

26 Draft cable, John Poindexter to George Shultz, 23 June 1986, ibid.

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Even though other policymakers and external critics had repeatedly stressed the importance of dealing with the PLO leadership directly, the NSC chief had other ideas. Advancing the notion that the PLO could be shut out of the peace process by going along with Jordan’s scheme, the administration ignored many of its own critical assessments over the previous years.

Quality of Life Initiatives

U.S. financial support for King Hussein’s plan was less forthcoming than the Jordanian monarch had hoped, with senior policymakers reluctant to dole out funding.27 But the NSC had begun pushing the idea of alternative leadership to the PLO. In talking points prepared by Ross for a discussion with Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, Poindexter criticized the Saudi government for continuing to give money to Arafat, who “has failed every test that’s ever been put to him to show he is committed to making peace.” Poindexter stressed that “the King [Hussein] has given up on Arafat and we think for good reason. He is now trying to build an alternative Palestinian leadership. A leadership that is committed to negotiating peace, and we support that effort.”

Poindexter, who was on the verge of being convicted for his role in Iran-Contra, told Bandar that

“In our judgment, your continued financial support for Arafat undermines the King‘s efforts to build a credible alternative Palestinian leadership and is counterproductive to the peace process.”

The NSC advisor proceeded to ask Bandar to “at least reduce” Saudi support for Arafat if he couldn’t end it, by making payroll deductions for all Palestinian workers in Saudi Arabia

“optional.”28

27 See misc. memos in box 7, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

28 Talking points for Prince Bandar, Dennis Ross for John Poindexter, ibid.

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Poindexter also outlined a more activist approach for the Saudis, encouraging them to support moderates in the West Bank and contribute to “developmental projects” in the territories.

He sought “Small investments-- $25 to 30 million in institutional and infrastructure projects” as a counter to the growth of radical forces. This was all done “under the rubric of improving the quality of life for the Palestinians in the West Bank—and giving them some hope in the process.”29 Dennis Ross continued pushing this idea through October. Reviewing an invitation list to an administration Middle East meeting, Ross suggested to the President’s assistant that Dr.

Martin Indyk, a founder of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, be invited. “I include

Martin because he represents a think tank that can do much to build the intellectual underpinnings of support in important Jewish and political circles for increased investments in

Jordan and the West Bank.”30 Having recently flexed their political muscle against the arms sale to Jordan, domestic supporters of Israel remained opposed to any form of aid for the Jordanians.

Indyk and his organization could potentially circumvent these concerns, a sign of growing influence by outside lobbyists in the 1980s.

In December, Ross prepared a brief study of King Hussein’s proposal for the NSC.

Describing the bleak situation in the West Bank, he outlined several compelling reasons for

America’s involvement in the initiative. With sixty percent of the Palestinian population under the age of fifteen, the younger generation had no memory of association with Jordan and didn’t identify with King Hussein. In Ross’s view, “They have been socialized by more radical

29 Ibid. This approach has persisted beyond the 1980s, in both U.S. efforts to support economic integration and alliances without a political settlement to the Palestinian question, and growing calls to abandon efforts for peacemaking and focus on improving daily life for Palestinians as a permanent solution to their political plight. See Danny Dayan, “Peaceful Nonreconciliation Now,” New York Times, 8 June 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/opinion/peaceful-nonreconciliation-now.html?hp&rref=opinion&_r=1 (accessed 9 March 2015).

30 Handwritten note, 3 October 1986, Dennis Ross for John Poindexter, RRL. The Washington Institute was closely affiliated with AIPAC’s leadership.

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ideologies,” including “the imagery of radical Shiite success” when it came to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. This ideological shift “convinced many that the answer to Israeli occupation is fundamentalism and armed struggle.”31 King Hussein, fearing the long-term survival of the Hashemite monarchy, was seeking to stem the tide of this radicalism by delivering on economic relief.

If extremism took root in the West Bank, Ross argued, it would prompt Israel to act,

“making it more likely that Sharon, Eitan and others will gain more clout and pursue their objective of de-populating the West Bank of Arabs.” Sensing the threat this would pose to

Jordan’s stability, Ross wrote, “Hashemite rule in Jordan is probably not sustainable in a circumstance where the Palestinians on the West Bank move to the East Bank and fundamentally alter the demographic balance in the country.” By reestablishing Jordanian influence in the area,

“that will ensure that Palestinians in the West Bank stay put, and it may in time also create a more moderate constituency prepared to join with the King in negotiations with Israel.” Ross acknowledged that this might be a long shot, but felt that the “Quality of Life” initiative was still well worth the investment of American funds and “could have a profound effect.”32

Ross concluded his assessment with a premonitory note. “The monies involved may not be great, but their effects could be. And these effects should be measured not only in terms of what they positively produce, but also in terms of the negative developments that they prevent…If Hussein fails we will surely face an explosion in the West Bank—with long term consequences for the prospects of Arab-Israeli peace.33 The memo predated the outbreak of the

31 “Funding Development on West Bank,” 15 December 1986, “Chronological File, December 1986,” box 5, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

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Intifada by a year, underscoring the administration’s recognition that the status quo was enormously damaging to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Reagan and his advisors would soon confront the inevitability of engaging with the Palestinian leadership, once popular discontent in the territories had fully erupted in the form of the Intifada.

The broader inaction of the mid-1980s was a concern to many officials in Washington, but they also recognized the risks in active U.S. involvement in a process that had not yielded many tangible results. “We’re interested in negotiations that produce outcomes,” wrote Frank

Carlucci in early 1987, “the U.S. does not need more unrealized expectations or perceived failures in the Middle East.34 On 13 February of that year, senior members of the administration gathered for a National Security Planning Group meeting with President Reagan in the Situation

Room.35 Carlucci, using talking points prepared by Dennis Ross, presented the “Building Blocks of Strategy” for a new U.S. approach to peacemaking in the region. In Carlucci’s view, the

“hallmark of our approach right now should be incrementalism. We need to develop a systematic, tempered approach to rebuilding credibility…We should move in a low-key way on the peace- seeking process.” The Middle East needed U.S. involvement that was measured but substantive in nature. Frustrated with a pattern of inaction, he called for more “momentum” in order “to counter an image of drift” on the Palestinian issue.36

To assess the state of U.S. policy at the time, the President issued a National Security

Study Directive, which was sent off to the State Department, the Department of Defense and the

CIA in March. Among the series of questions posed to Middle East staffers, one in particular

34 Talking points, Frank Carlucci for National Security Planning Group Meeting, 13 Feb. 1987, box 7, “Chron File, Feb. 1987,” Dennis Ross Files, 1986-1988 Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate, NSC, RRL.

35 Agenda, National Security Planning Group Meeting, 13 February 1987, ibid.

36 Ibid.

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concerning Jordan revealed the shift in Reagan’s thinking. “How can we strengthen Jordan’s role in the peace process and its efforts to assert leadership on the Palestinian question? What further steps could we take, e.g., in the Quality of Life area or in the bilateral relations, to strengthen the

King’s hand?”37 Reagan, at the behest of his advisors, was approaching Jordan as the primary interlocutor for arbitrating the Palestinian issue.

Israeli Alternatives

In February of 1987, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir arrived at the White House for his first official meeting since taking over the premiership from Peres in October 1986.

Shamir, invested far less than Peres or the Americans in pursuing negotiations with Jordan, was a staunch territorial maximalist in the mold of Menachem Begin. Years later, after stonewalling at the Madrid Peace Conference, one Israeli political observer wrote, “Shamir is not a bargainer.

Shamir is a two dimensional man. One dimension is the length of the land of Israel, the second, its width. Since Shamir’s historical vision is measured in inches, he won’t give an inch.”38 In preparation for a briefing between Shamir and Shultz before the President’s private meeting, advisors suggested the following points for consideration.

How do we move ahead and make progress in the coming year? How do we show that moderates can deliver? Quality of Life is the one concrete thing we have going in the peace- seeking process. Settlements will undo it and again we want Shamir to leave with that clear impression…We also want Shamir to leave knowing that partnership requires sensitivities to each other’s needs, something that means Israel should be mindful of our need to support Arab moderates resisting radicals and fundamentalists.39

37 National Security Study Directive Number 4-87, 22 January 1987, ibid.

38 Avishai Margalit, “The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir,” The New York Review of Books, 14 May 1992.

39 Memo, Robert Oakley to Frank Carlucci, 17 February 1987, “Chronological File, Feb. 1987,” box 7, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

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U.S. officials were clearly aware that both settlements and continued Israeli opposition to the arming of moderate allies would ultimately undermine American policy in the region.

The President’s note cards for his one-on-one meeting with Shamir indicate an emphasis on strengthened cooperation between America and Israel. Reagan made it clear that the U.S.

“will provide limited arms sales to Arab friends. Don’t expect you agree; but do expect no campaign against us.”40 Reagan stressed positive developments with King Hussein, and then concluded the brief meeting with a most astonishing compliment to Shamir. “Impressed you have been able to hold line on new settlement activity against political pressure. Tell me your secret. New settlements would only undercut promising developments on West Bank and with

Hussein and cause problems between us.”41 There was no big secret; the reality on the ground flew in the face of Reagan’s misinformed praise. Between 1985 and 1990, fourteen new settlements were built in the West Bank, and the number of total settlers doubled from 46,000 to

81,600. The only decline in growth was a result of economic recession that adversely affected

Israel’s construction industry, not opposition by the Shamir government. As two leading experts on the settlements argue, “the economic crisis of the 1980s succeeded where international criticism and domestic opposition had failed.”42 Shamir, after his electoral defeat in 1992, confirmed his maximalist position in an interview with the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv.

It pains me greatly that in the coming four years I will not be able to expand the settlements in Judea and Samaria and to complete the demographic revolution in the land of Israel. I know that others will now try to work against this. Without this demographic revolution, there is no value to the talk about autonomy, because there is a danger that it will be turned into a Palestinian state. What is this talk about ‘political settlements?’ I

40 Talking points, meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, 18 February 1987, ibid, emphasis in original.

41 Ibid.

42 Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land, 102-103.

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would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years, and meanwhile we would have reached half a million people in Judea and Samaria.43

Despite Reagan’s claims to the contrary, Shamir was among the most active agents of settlement expansion in Israeli history. In light of the dire warnings about the consequences of this expansion, going back to the Carter White House, the Reagan administration’s neglect of this issue was startling.

Among the strongest voices against Israeli settlement expansion was Vice President

George Herbert Walker Bush. As early as August 1983, in a meeting with Israeli Ambassador

Meir Rosenne, Bush criticized Rosenne’s claim that Jews should be permitted to live in “Judea and Samaria.” “You will have a hard time selling your position here,” Bush told Rosenne, “The

U.S. is the most moderate in the world in its position on settlements, the President is a friend of yours, but he thinks settlements are not conducive to peace.” In this same meeting, Israel’s

Deputy Chief of Mission and future Prime Minister, a young Benjamin Netanyahu, argued with

Bush that settlements were not the real issue. “There’s a disparity between Arab rhetoric on settlements and the real interests of the Arab neighboring states. The real difficult decision that they have to make is to accept that Israel is a ‘fait accompli.’” Bush was skeptical of

Netanyahu’s hyperbolic warnings. “Even the nuttiest Arabs like Kaddafi [sic] recognize that

Israel is here to stay. The P.L.O. are dumb not to change their charter to strike out their call for the ‘elimination of the Zionist entity.’ If they did so, we would talk to them. They are like those in Taiwan who still talk of liberating the mainland.” Netanyahu disagreed. “Israel’s survival,” he told Bush, “would be in grave doubt if we relinquished control of Judea and Samaria. The settlements there are a sign of Israel’s presence.”44

43 Quoted in Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 500.

44 “Meeting at White House of Ambassador Rosenne with Vice President Bush,” 2 August 1983, A-4343/13, ISA. 339

Bush was not impressed, pushing the Israelis to admit how many more settlements they would be establishing. Rosenne avoided the question and spoke of Arab mistreatment of the

Palestinians. “The Arabs, indeed, have been brutal in their treatment of the Palestinians,” Bush shot back. “The U.S. gives more aid to the Arab refugees than the Arab states do. Nevertheless, the settlements are not conducive to peace. Is there any country in the world which supports your settlements policy?...We support the peace treaty, but we do oppose settlements. Don’t be under any misapprehension about it…You are up against a stone wall in trying to change the views of the President on this issue. The main question remains, what can be done for the Palestinians, for they at present have no place to go. What is the Israeli solution to the problem of the

Palestinians?” Rosenne argued that if they would have “sat down and negotiated on Camp

David,” Israel would have established an autonomy council, “but they have refused to do so.”45

Given Shamir’s unvarnished admission of his own views concerning autonomy, it is difficult to believe that Rosenne’s position reflected any genuine desire to resolve the Palestinian question.

Although Shamir continued voicing opposition to Israel’s direct talks with Jordan, the

“Jordanian Option” remained in play. King Hussein met secretly with Israeli Foreign Minister

Peres, and they finally reached an agreement in London on 11 April 1987. The “London

Document” outlined the basis of an international conference to coordinate bilateral negotiations between Israel and Jordan based on UN resolutions 242 and 338, shutting out the PLO in the process.46 Shamir, excluded from the talks by Peres and ill-disposed towards a settlement that would reintroduce the Soviets into the region, rejected the document out of hand.47 Shultz was

45 Ibid.

46 For the full text of the document, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 313-314. For background, see also Naseer Aruri, “The PLO and the Jordan Option,” Middle East Report, 131 (March-April 1985): 3-9.

47 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 446. 340

reluctant to involve himself in the internal Peres-Shamir rivalry, but made one final push for a

Hussein-Shamir meeting in the context of U.S.-Soviet talks. The Jordanian leader, who was about to host the November 1987 Arab League summit in Amman, was fearful of being discredited by other Arab states and rejected Shultz’s final entreaty.48

Secret discussions among Likud politicians in 1987 suggested that there were alternative voices to the Labor-led efforts with Jordan, who were in fact advocating for direct engagement with the PLO. Moshe Amirav, a Likud member close to Prime Minister Shamir, held ten meetings with Palestinian leaders Sari Nusseibeh and Faisal Husseini in his Jerusalem home in the summer of 1987.49 They were the first Palestinians to meet with members of the Israeli right wing government, who sought out the possibility of a historic agreement with the PLO and Fatah.

Amirav asserted “the right of both people to the land” in his report to Shamir.50

The injustice done to both peoples in our terrible and bloodstained history requires redress via the following equation: security and peace for the Jewish people, self- determination on part of the land and redress of the injustice done to the refugees of the Palestine people…The sole official representative of the Palestinian people in any settlement is the PLO without whose participation there is no point in reaching any settlement. Likewise, in Israel there is no point in reaching any settlement without the Likud.51

The Likud proposal suggested the “establishment of a region of Palestinian self-administration” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a total of 5,000 square kilometers with a capital in East

48 The genesis and collapse of the London Agreement is covered in great detail by Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 440-452; and Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 442-450. For a firsthand account, see Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 936-949. See also, Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 73-91.

49 The talks were conducted through the left wing Israeli peace campaigner, David Ish-Shalom. Further details were provided during an interview with Sari Nusseibeh, 29 February 2012, Jerusalem.

50 See “Report by Herut Party Member Amirav of Israel entitled ‘Outline for Advancement of Negotiations between the Likud and the PLO,” Jerusalem, September 1987, International Documents on Palestine, IPS.

51 Ibid.

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Jerusalem. “Such an interim agreement,” Amirav wrote, would guarantee Israel’s security and enable it to maintain its settlements in Judea and Samaria at a fixed and unchanging level.”

Describing it as an “interim agreement” to advance the establishment of Palestinian self- administration “which would wield powers approaching those of a state” within one year,

Amirav also left open the possibility of “halting negotiations and leaving the situation as it stands.” His proposal for an interim solution included a Palestinian flag, anthem, stamps and currency.52

In outlining the conditions for these negotiations, which were to be held in secret and hosted by Egypt, the Likud proposal included provisions for the recognition of the right of

Palestinian people “not as refugees, but as a people,” to statehood; recognition of the PLO “as the representative of the Palestinian people,” and “cessation of any further Israeli settlement” in the territories. In turn, the PLO would have to recognize “Israel’s existence within the 1948 borders” and called for a “cessation of all hostile or terrorist actions everywhere.”53 As a coda to the decade long diplomatic effort initiated under Carter, the Amirav Plan contained some promising elements. But it also enshrined some of the more limiting principles of the autonomy negotiations, like an interim arrangement and the option of formalizing the status quo, as well as overall Israeli sovereignty in the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Amirav planned to travel to Geneva to present the working paper to Yasser Arafat, but on the eve of his trip, Israeli air force jets bombed the Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps in

Saida’s Ain el-Hilweh district, killing fifty of Arafat’s supporters. Faisal Husseini was arrested

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

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for “pro-PLO activities” and jailed without trial.54 Ish-Shalom suspected that Defense Minister

Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party, who favored the Jordanian imitative, was responsible. Amirav backed out of the trip to Geneva and Ish-Shalom went in his place, but Arafat would only accept an official overture. The story broke in the Israeli press and upset King Hussein, who believed

Israel had promised to “quash pro-P.L.O. Palestinians.” Several days later, masked men on Bir

Zeit University’s campus clubbed Nusseibeh, while Hussein was re-arrested, and hardline Likud members moved to expel Amirav from the party. In discussing the outcome of these talks,

Nusseibeh told the New York Times that political dogmas “have become like a religion, and anyone who deviates from them is a heretic.”55 The dominant Israeli attempt to sideline the PLO, manifest most concretely in the joint efforts with King Hussein, would not survive much longer.

The Intifada Ignites

On 8 December 1987, disturbances in Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp set off spontaneous protests that spread to the West Bank. Demonstrators unfurled Palestinian flags, burned tires, and threw stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli cars, and the Israeli security forces responded with force. The first Intifada had erupted. This largely non-violent and unarmed mass protest, which lasted through the early 1990s, fundamentally altered the landscape of Palestinian politics and the PLO’s relations with Israel.56

54 On the initiative and its failure, see Thomas Friedman, “Mideast Peace Bid Ends; Hope and One Arm Hurt,” New York Times, 12 October 1987.

55 Ibid.

56 On the Intifada, see Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Mary King, A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance (New York: Nation Books, 2007); Hanna Siniora, "An Anlysis of the Current Revolt," Journal of Palestine Studies 17.3 (1988): 3-13; interview with Hanna Siniora, 24 February, 2012, Jerusalem; and the memoirs of Sari Nusseibeh, Once Upon a Country; and Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace. 343

After twenty years of military occupation, Palestinians had reached a breaking point. The situation in the Gaza Strip, in particular, was intolerable. Rabin, in his role as Defense Minister, publicly sanctioned “a policy of beatings and breaking of bones,” and before long “images of savage Israeli beatings of Palestinian youngsters were a part of the American evening television news.”57 Reflecting on the symbolism of the Intifada, Hussein Agha observed

If Sabra and Shatila was the first notice to Israel that you were dealing with a national movement…then this came to remind them you are dealing with people who have national aspirations. You can break their bones, but you can’t bring them down to surrender their national feelings and you cannot break their spirit.58

People around the world watched in horror as the territories erupted in largely peaceful protest, which was met with a harsh Israeli military response. The Israeli journalist Amos Elon, a leading intellectual voice on the left, described the events this way:

Twenty years of shortsighted Israeli policies lie battered in the streets of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. The writing was on the wall for years, but most Israelis never bothered to read it…The disorienting abstractions of national and international political rhetoric and the ceaseless talk of a nonexistent ‘peace process’ even among the sensitive, produced a numbness.59

The detrimental impact of the occupation, which had for so long failed to penetrate the consciousness of most Israelis or their supporters in the United States, was now indisputably apparent.60 As Elon put it, the occupation “has held 1.5 million Palestinians as pawns, or bargaining chips, and as a source of cheap menial labor, while denying them the most basic human rights. The pawns have now risen to manifest their frustration, their bitterness and their

57 Quandt, Peace Process, 274.

58 Hussein Agha, interview by author, 17 March 2008.

59 Amos Elon, “From the Uprising,” The New York Review of Books, 14 April 1988.

60 The Israeli novelist David Grossman captured this in devastating prose for both audiences. See David Grossman, The Yellow Wind (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988).

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political will.”61 Many Israelis complained that the image of the Intifada presented in the media was biased, but even Jewish communal leaders were shocked to see the proverbial David and

Goliath image turned so blatantly on its head.62

The PLO was “more surprised than the Israelis” by the uprising, which was entirely generated from within the territories. Seeing an opportunity to capitalize on popular discontent, the PLO began to play a leadership role alongside the newly formed Unified National

Command.63 Palestinian leaders had long realized that the “only way the PLO could ever re- insert itself into Palestinian politics, into a settlement, is through the occupied territories.”64

Among the fourteen demands outlined by West Bank and Gaza Palestinian leaders on 14 January

1988 was a call to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention, a demand for the cessation of settlement activity and land confiscation, and the removal of restrictions on political contacts between inhabitants of the territories and the PLO, “in order to ensure a direct input into the decision-making processes of the Palestinian Nation by the Palestinians under occupation.”65 The central political platform that emerged from these protests was a call for self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The Israeli leadership was forced to rethink its entire approach to the conflict. Defense

Minister Rabin, deeply convinced he could end the uprising through military means, ordered the

61 Elon, “From the Uprising,” The New York Review of Books, 14 April 1988.

62 Arthur Hertzberg, “The Uprising,” The New York Review of Books, 4 February 1988. See also Hertzberg’s exchange with Eli Wiesel on 18 August 1988 as an example of how divisive the issue had become: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1988/aug/18/an-open-letter-to-elie-wiesel/ (accessed 10 March 2015).

63 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 451. For important statements and demands from the Palestinian leadership, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 314-338

64 Rashid Khalidi, interview by author, 25 March 2008. Khalidi also noted that the PLO leader Abu Jihad argued along these lines well before the 1982 War, realizing that there was no future for guerilla warfare or a para-state in Lebanon; the center of gravity had to move to the West Bank.

65 Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 319.

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IDF to crack down even more forcefully. Thousands of Palestinians were arrested, but the violence persisted. In an attempt to quell the violence, Foreign Minister Peres floated a “Gaza

First” idea to dismantle settlements and embark on a peace settlement, but Shamir rejected any territorial concessions out of hand.66

Supporters of Israel abroad, reeling from the images on nightly television, struggled to articulate a unified response to the unfolding events. Prior to Shamir’s pre-planned visit to

Washington, several prominent leaders of the American Jewish community spoke out against the

Israeli Prime Minister in an open letter to The New York Review of Books. Their language reflected a fracturing of the consensus that had been achieved after Begin’s election in 1977, as support for Israel now seemed to come into direct conflict with support for the leadership or the political platform of the Likud party.

By our own choice, and by the world’s insistence, we Jews are one family. We therefore say to you, the most highplaced of our brothers, that your ideology about the ‘undivided land of Israel’ is harmful to the Jewish people. It makes peace negotiations impossible. It casts the Jews in Israel, and those who care about them all over the world, in the impossible position that the Jewish state can live only by forever repressing the Palestinians…We are divided at this moment between the proponents of ideological intransigence and those who believe in moderation. The majority of Jews in the world belong to the moderate camp. May we respectfully remind you, Prime Minister Shamir, that you are coming to Washington these fateful days not as party ideologue but as the representative of the whole house of Israel.67

Claiming both membership in the “family” of the “Jewish people” and “belonging to the moderate camp,” Jewish leaders articulated the emotional and political fault line upon which many of their constituents were treading.

66 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 452-455.

67 Kenneth J. Arrow, et al. “An Open Letter to the Prime Minister of Israel,” The New York Review of Books, 31 March 1988.

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Shultz’s Gamble

The political crisis around the Intifada was not limited to Israelis or diaspora Jews. U.S. policymakers were increasingly concerned about the impact the uprising was having on U.S. interests in the region as well. Initially, the unrest in the territories was met with a tempered call in Washington for reengagement with diplomatic negotiations. In a one-page fact sheet for the

President on the “West Bank and Middle East Peace Process,” Dennis Ross wrote of the disturbances and the increasing Palestinian frustration with Israeli occupation. “Our approach to the peace process has been guided by the principle that we must give the Palestinians a reason for hope, not despair.” In Ross’s view, “The violence in the territories may create a new sense of urgency and give us a reason to try to energize the process.68 By February 1988, the U.S. government began moving in this direction. In a briefing for former U.S. Presidents, Ross explained how the administration was reengaging after a year of peace process discussions

“dominated by arguments about procedure,” making it clear that “it’s time to address substance and the specific issues involved in the negotiating process.”69 Secretary of State Shultz, by this time firmly in control of Reagan’s foreign policy, had recognized the damaging nature of the status quo as well. He flew to the region several times in early 1988, meeting with all the parties in a final bid to resuscitate America’s role as an evenhanded broker to the conflict.70

The resulting Shultz initiative of 4 March 1988 was, by a leading account, the “most important U.S. involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking” since the Reagan Plan.71 Drawing

68 Memo, Paul Schott Stevens to Nancy Risque, “One Page Fact Sheet for the President,” undated, “Chronological File, January 1988,” box 8, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

69 “Briefing to Ex-Presidents re: U.S. Initiative on Middle East Peace,” 8 Feb. 1988, “Chronological File, Feb. 1988,” box 8, Dennis Ross Files, RRL.

70 For Shultz’s detailed account, see George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1015-1034.

71 Quandt, Peace Process, 275. 347

upon the Camp David Accords, it called for a comprehensive peace through direct, bilateral negotiations. Shultz, wary of the time lag in Carter’s earlier attempts at a settlement, explicitly sped up the interval between a transitional period and final status implementation utilizing a negotiating tactic he called “interlock.” The talks, intended to address the Palestinian issue directly, would be preceded by an international conference at which all participants would have to accept UN resolutions 242 and 338, the basis of what would later be called a two-state solution. Shultz expended a lot of time traveling around the region to sell his initiative, but he was greeted with fierce criticism from Prime Minister Shamir, who was forcefully opposed to an international conference and unreceptive to the exchange of land for peace. The Palestinians were disappointed as well, sensing that they were being treated as appendages to the

Jordanians.72 But it was King Hussein, heavily courted by Shultz to accept the initiative, who ultimately brought about its demise.

At the end of July 1988, King Hussein announced Jordan’s disengagement from the West

Bank, refusing to negotiate in place of the PLO, and leaving Israel to deal with the territories.73

For the Israelis, Hussein’s announcement signaled the demise of the ill-conceived “Jordanian

Option” and forced an eventual reckoning with a national movement that had for decades been denied recognition.74 Disengagement also marked the failure of American quality-of-life initiatives, re-enforcing the necessity of direct engagement with the PLO leadership, whether or

72 Ibid., 276.

73 The King had been marginalized at the Arab summit in June 1988 and was forced to cancel the Jordanian Development Plan. For more background, see Ahmad Siddiqi, “From Liberation to Self-Determination: The PLO’s Move to the Two-State Solution, 1973-1988,” (M. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 2009), 93-98. For the full text of Hussein’s speech, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 338-341. For an analysis of its significance at the time, see Arthur Hertzberg, “The Turning Point?” The New York Review of Books, 13 October 1988.

74 Shlaim, The Lion of Jordan, 457-466. On the early history of the Jordanian option’s adoption by Israeli policymakers, see Reuven Pedatzur, “Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967,” Middle East Journal, 49.2 (Spring 1995): 269-291.

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not U.S. policymakers welcomed the idea. The half-hearted schemes to build an alternative moderate Palestinian leadership could not substitute for political negotiations with the PLO.

Conclusion

As the Intifada raged on in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, local leaders of the uprising worried that their moment of national unity might pass without tangible results. They pressured the PLO leadership in Tunis to formally accept the idea of a negotiated two state settlement, a position that was still being challenged by extreme factions within the organization. But Jordan’s disengagement had empowered moderates within the PLO, who recognized the shifting center of political gravity. At the November 1988 Palestine National Congress in Algiers, Arafat won a majority for the historic decision to accept relevant UN resolutions.75 The Palestinian

Declaration of Independence proclaimed an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel on the basis of UN Resolution 181, which had enshrined the idea of partition in 1947. “This was the first official Palestinian recognition of the legitimacy of the existence of a Jewish state,” explained Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi, “and the first unequivocal, explicit PLO endorsement of a two-state solution to the conflict.”76 The notion that a could exist side by side with a state of Israel, near heresy in the 1970s, had emerged as the preferred

Palestinian position at the close of the 1980s.

In the final days of the Reagan administration, the U.S. agreed to begin an official dialogue with the PLO. Like Reagan’s reversal when it came to dealing with the Soviet Union,

75 Ibid., 467. For the full text of the PNC political resolution, see Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 349- 353.

76 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, 194-195. The full text of the declaration is reprinted in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel- Arab Reader, 354-358. For a description of how it was seen in Jerusalem, see Nusseibeh, Once Upon a Country, 296-297.

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this shift was a striking turn for an administration so adamantly opposed to engagement since its first months in office.77 In the spring of 1988, Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson reached out to a small group of prominent American Jews and arranged meetings with PLO leaders to formulate a statement demonstrating the Palestinian commitment to a peace deal with Israel.78

Rita Hauser, who was instrumental in these talks, recounts Andersson’s desire for American

Jews to act as a bridge between the U.S., Israel and the PLO. The Swedish Foreign Minister was in constant contact with Secretary of State Shultz, who gave the “green light” for this endeavor, unbeknownst to the participants at the time.79

These meetings proved to be crucial in paving the way for Shultz to develop an American position on beginning substantive discussions with the PLO. Shultz’s requirements included the acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338, recognition of Israel, and the renunciation of terrorism, thereby meeting the requirements of Kissinger’s non-engagement promise of the

1970s. After an initial speech when Arafat did not precisely repeat the wording of Shultz’s statement, the PLO leader finally met the American conditions in Geneva on 14 December 1988.

In handwritten notes from a meeting with President Reagan soon after the agreement on official dialogue had been reached, National Security Advisor Colin Powell scribbled, “Reaction to PLO decision: American Jewish community—resigned to it. Israelis unhappy— Shamir bitter & sad.”80 It was a sober reminder of just how much distance had been traveled since Reagan’s

B’nai B’rith campaign speech eight years earlier.

77 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal.

78 Quandt, Peace Process, 277-285, recounts the evolution of the dialogue in some detail. See also Kathleen Hendrix, “Mission to Stockholm,” Los Angeles Times, 16 December 1988.

79 Rita Hauser, interview by author, 4 April 2008, New York, NY. Further transcripts of this effort were reviewed in the 50 Years War Collection, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London.

80 Handwritten note, 16 December 1988, file 3, “OA 92477,” Colin Powell Files, RRL. 350

Achieving the international recognition that had eluded the Palestinians for decades, however, did not denote the attainment of political sovereignty. The events of the late 1980s had served to legitimate the PLO and situate their quest for national self-determination as an inevitable reckoning for Israel, the United States, and the wider Arab world. It was a culmination of years of diplomatic efforts, armed struggle, and backchannel negotiations. Since Jimmy

Carter’s election in 1976, U.S. foreign policy had been oriented towards limited engagement with the Palestinian question as a central prerequisite to ending regional discord, although the terms of this engagement were thoroughly contested. While formal recognition was finally secured, the content of a Palestinian political future was less clear. With the end of the Cold War and the onset of the Madrid Talks in 1991, that future was more sharply delineated. But as the conclusion argues, the formative influence of the late 1970s and 1980s loomed large over the start of these negotiations.

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Conclusion: A Stillborn Peace, 1989-1993

Victory is at hand. I see the homeland in your holy stones. I see the flag of our independent Palestine fluttering over the hills of our beloved homeland.

-Yasser Arafat1

We do not want to be frozen in autonomy. -Hanan Ashrawi2

George H. W. Bush took office in January 1989, an auspicious time for renewed

American engagement with negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The Cold War, which Reagan had revived as a global phenomenon, at least rhetorically, was in its final stages.3

Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, was centrally involved in efforts to restart a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East in the aftermath of the first .4 Unlike

Reagan’s personal warmth towards the Israelis, Bush and Baker were more direct and businesslike. The two men did not appreciate the obstinacy of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak

Shamir, viewing his settlement policy as “a deliberate attempt to foil U.S. peacemaking.”5 One particularly bitter debate erupted around the American refusal to grant Israel loan guarantees of

1 Quoted in Paul Lewis, “Arafat, in Geneva, Calls on Israelis to Join in Talks, New York Times, 14 December 1988.

2 Quoted in a meeting between the Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks and U.S. diplomats on 8 December 1991. See “Memo on meeting with Alan Kreczko and T. Feifer, 8 December 1991, Washington.” PPD, http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/images/Minutes%20Kreczko%2C%20Feifer%20meeting %208%20Dec_%2091.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

3 See Stephanson, “Cold War Degree Zero.”

4 Discussions with Palestinian leaders over the creation of an actual peace process and content of the negotiations had in fact begun earlier. See “Handwritten notes of a meeting between Hanan Ashrawi, Dennis Ross and Aaron David Miller, 30 October 1989;” “Handwritten notes of a meeting between John Kelly, Dan Kurtzer, John Hirsch, and Hanan Ashrawi, 30 October 1989;” and “Meeting with Dan Kurtzer and Hanan Ashrawi, 31 October 1989,” Private Collection of Rashid Khalidi, PPD.

5 Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel since 1948,” 256.

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$10 billion in light of ongoing settlement expansion. Baker publicly recited the number of the

White House switchboard at a press conference, telling the Israelis, "When you are serious about peace, call us!”6

President Bush announced his plans for an “Arab-Israeli treaty based on the territory-for- peace principle and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights” in a Congressional speech after the Gulf

War. The venue for restarting these talks would be in Madrid, Spain, at a major conference co- sponsored by the U.S. and Soviet Union between 30 October and 1 November 1991. It was the first official face-to-face gathering that included representatives from Israel, Lebanon, Syria,

Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. The Palestinians attended as part of a joint Jordanian delegation that was coordinating closely with the PLO leadership in Tunis, which had been formally prevented from attending the conference by Israel. Madrid was the first time that

Palestinians were included in substantive discussions over their political fate.7

President Bush and Soviet President Mikhael Gorbachev co-chaired these direct multilateral negotiations, which were redolent with symbolism. The head of the Palestinian delegation, Haidar Abdel Shafi spoke eloquently of a “requiem” for “trees uprooted by army bulldozers,” seeking a restoration of Palestinian land and the basis of two viable states.8 Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was more reluctant to join in the talks, and his attitude was

6 See Neil Macdonald, “The Limits of Presidential Power,” CBC, 12 March 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-limits-of-presidential-power-1.911644 (accessed 10 March 2015). On the loan guarantees, see Leon T. Hadar, “High Noon in Washington: The Shootout over the Loan Guarantees,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 21.2 (Winter 1992): 72-87.

7 See Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit, 29-65. The St. James Palace conference of 1939 could be viewed as one earlier instance prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948.

8 See Obituary, 4 October 2007, Haidar Abdel Shafi, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/9898496, accessed 11 March 2015. The Palestinian negotiators included formal members of the delegation like Su’ad al- ‘Amiry, Ghassan Khatib, and Nabil Qassis, and other advisors not allowed to participate in negotiations, including Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, Ahmad Khalidi, Rashid Khalidi, Camille Mansour, and Raja Shehadeh.

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“defiant” and “truculent” according to one observer.9 But all the parties sat around one large table, the picture of hope in a region that had just emerged from a massive war. Substantively, however, Madrid’s impact was limited.10 The conference was to be followed by bilateral negotiations between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians in Washington, as well as multilateral negotiations in Moscow.

One of the most important procedural legacies of the conference was the idea of reaching an interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, an approach that deferred final status issues like the refugee question and the fate of Jerusalem to permanent status talks. A similar mechanism had been suggested as part of the transitional phase of the autonomy negotiations, which served as a way for the Israeli government to maintain security assurances and residual sovereignty for an undefined period of time. Palestinians, as well as Egyptian interlocutors negotiating their future, had rightly contested this absence of real sovereignty. Among

Palestinian negotiators at the Madrid Conference, deep suspicion of interim measures and the autonomy model that had been suggested over a decade earlier remained palpable.11 As one of the participants at Madrid later remarked about his peers, “Many of these individuals had at the time forebodings of the grim outcome of the endeavor we were all engaged in, notwithstanding our best efforts.”12

9 This was the historian Avi Shlaim, who attended the conference and wrote about it subsequently in several accounts. See Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 484-492; and Avi Shlaim “Changing Places,” The London Review of Books, 14.1 (January 1992): 10-12.

10 As Baker told the parties invited to the subsequent Washington talks, “The first round of talks in Madrid covered little substantive ground.” See “Baker to all parties,” 22 November 1991, PPD, http://www.palestine- studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/images/Baker%20letter%2022%20Nov_%201991.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

11 See “Memo of briefing by Alan Kreczko, Madrid, 2 November 1991,” Private Collection of Rashid Khalidi, PPD. In discussions on the formation of an interim authority, Camille Mansour raised the question of settlement activity and the prejudging of final status issues in any transitional phase.

12 Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit, 122. 354

Yet in the American Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, written a few weeks before the Madrid Conference opened on 18 October 1981, U.S. positions on the “legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people” and belief in “an end to Israeli occupation” were clear. The negotiations, Secretary Baker wrote, would be conducted in phases, moving from interim self- government arrangements to permanent status talks.13 In the Madrid “Gameplan” prepared for the Palestinian delegation, a warning of a potential Israeli political gambit at the conference included their presentation of “fully fledged autonomy plans.”14 Several days after Madrid, the

Palestinian delegation made it clear in a letter to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard

Shevardnadze, that any return to Camp David was not acceptable.

We would like to emphasize that we do not view these negotiations in any way as a continuation of the Camp David talks. Nor do we perceive them as parallel to or an extension of previous Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Thus, in substance, scope, and priorities, we reserve our right to decide on our own approach and principles based on our political program and our own definitions of the nature of the transitional phase and its requirements.15

This powerful articulation of the Palestinian concern that the Madrid process and the onset of

13 See “James Baker’s Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, 18 October 1991,” http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/letter_of_assurance.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015). The interim arrangements would be completed within one year, and have a five year lifespan. In the third year the parties would negotiate permanent status agreements. On the assurances provided (and not provided) to the Israelis, see “Memo of briefing by Dennis Ross, Madrid, 2 November 1991,” Private Collection of Rashid Khalidi, PPD.

14 See “Gameplan, Not Distributed,” undated, handwriting of Ahmad Khalidi, private collection of Rashid Khalidi, PPD (emphasis in original). In a subsequent letter to the co-sponsors of the Middle East Peace Process, the Palestinian team later warned that “it appears that Israel is attempting to carry out unilateral steps to impose its own version of a de facto autonomy. Such moves are seriously prejudicial to the process itself and seek to predetermine the outcome of the negotiations. They are also a blatant exploitation of the occupation to impose solutions in violation of Palestinian rights and independent will.” See “Letter from the Palestinian Team to the co-Sponsors of the Middle East Peace Process,” Jerusalem, 15 November 1991. Private Papers of Rashid Khalidi, PPD.

15 See “Letter from the Palestinian Team to the Middle East Peace Process to U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, 25 November 1991,” Private Papers of Rashid Khalidi, PPD. The Palestinian also raised the issue of Israeli settlement intensification in this letter, conveying “serious concern and grave alarm at Israel’s escalation of its settlement activity in a calculated attempt at the de facto annexation of Palestinian land and resources.” The settlements were seen as inherently illegal “and must not be made an agenda item or the subject of negotiations.”

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formal bilateral negotiations not harken back to the Camp David process made it very clear how the shadow of those talks loomed over the fate of their self-determination.

The Washington Talks

U.S. negotiators were also aware of the pitfalls that carried over from the Camp David process. In Baker’s formal invitation to all the parties to come to Washington and begin bilateral negotiations after Madrid, the U.S. Secretary of State warned of the past missteps on the question of interim self-government.

Having experienced several years of negotiations on these issues in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is our considered view that both Israel and Palestinians should avoid as much as possible a protracted debate on such principles as the “source of authority,” “nature of the interim self-government authority,” and the like.16

Recognizing that the self-governing models Israelis and Palestinians would present were bound to diverge, Baker nonetheless saw the negotiations as an opportunity to clarify starting points in the powers and responsibilities that would be assumed by the Palestinians in the transitional period.

But as Rashid Khalidi has argued in his account of these Washington talks, the architecture inherent in their design left Palestinians in a “straitjacket.” Palestinians found themselves “only permitted to quibble over the details of the 1978 interim self-government autonomy plan that Begin had bequeathed to Shamir, and Shamir then bequeathed to Rabin.”17 In this respect, the prolonged discussion of interim measures in the wake of Madrid sustained a

16 See “Baker to all parties,” 22 November 1991, PPD

17 See Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit, 36-37. In his book, which draws on first time access to the papers from Madrid, Khalidi goes into great detail about why this happened, using the discussions between Palestinian and American negotiators, as well as Israeli diplomats, as a lens to explain the flawed nature of the architecture of the peace process. Khalidi also links my own discoveries in the Israeli archives from the late 1970s and early 1980s to the events of the 1990s, tracing Begin’s autonomy plan to the trajectory of the negotiations in later years.

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pattern of continual negotiations that avoided final status issues, deferring them for permanent negotiations that never began. The Madrid and Washington talks—like Camp David and autonomy before them—did not resolve one of the core issues facing the Palestinians: the acquisition of sovereignty over the occupied territories themselves.

There were many reasons why sovereignty remained off the table, from Israeli concerns over security, to American unease with the possibility of actual statehood. Yet as I have argued throughout this dissertation, such a deferral of the core element of the conflict did not exist in a vacuum. The territory upon which such sovereignty could be achieved was being transformed by the occupation itself. In the view of the Israeli government, which again was offering limited rights of “coexistence” to the Arab inhabitants of the land, the continued assertion of territorial control and insistence on the Jewish right to settle in “Judea and Samaria” cohered perfectly well with a resolution to the Palestinian question. But for those advocating actual statehood—or even a limited form of self-government that was less than a state—the reality on the ground made such a political future inconceivable.

Settlement expansion, which had grown exponentially since the Camp David Accords, continued in the wake of Madrid under the Shamir government. In their talks in Washington,

Palestinian negotiators raised the issue of this ongoing Israeli settlement activity directly with the

Americans, pointing to their impact on water rights, transportation and infrastructure needs. As the Palestinian delegate Ghassan Khatib told U.S. negotiator Alan Kreczko, it would be

“impossible” to deal with the future Palestinian authority “while settlements are expanding.”

Kreczko’s reply, echoing the sentiment of many U.S. diplomats who had negotiated before him, was to focus on the realm of the possible. “This is a political point, not a practical point. A

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couple more settlements won’t make a difference.”18 U.S. diplomats, presented with a compelling explanation of how Israeli territorial acquisition was undercutting the Palestinian position in the negotiations for the first time from the Palestinians themselves, responded that it would be best to deal with this issue as part of an agreement, “rather than only focusing on a single lump which causes problems.”19

Kreczko affirmed to the Palestinians that the U.S. opposed the settlements, but it was

“difficult to get Israel to stop.” He suggested they not put themselves in a corner by defining a

“red line” which stops negotiations. “The Egyptians called for a settlement freeze, but went ahead with negotiations,” Kreczko suggested. Yet as Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, the head of the

Palestinian delegation to Madrid, explained to the Americans, “the Egyptians negotiated when there were few settlements, after their peace treaty with Israel. It is now too late to go back to what you are suggesting. The situation is very grave.” U.S. diplomats were sympathetic to the

Palestinian concerns, but strategically, they felt a freeze would not be obtainable. Palestinian academic and senior advisor to the Palestinian delegation, Sari Nusseibeh, spoke of the challenge raised by direct negotiations. “We are being led into [a] lion’s den to agree, in view of the asymmetry of power. We feel it is dangerous. We are willing to enter direct negotiations, and work things out with Israel, but the U.S. position has to be translated into something concrete.”

Kreczko mentioned senior U.S. officials speaking out against the settlement issue with Israel

18 “Memo on meeting with Alan Kreczko and T. Feifer, 8 December 1991, Washington.” PPD, http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/images/Minutes%20Kreczko%2C%20Feifer%20meeting %208%20Dec_%2091.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015). For an understanding of how these events are connected to earlier dynamics, see Ghassan Khatib, Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: Consensus and Competition in the Palestinian Negotiating Team (New York: Routledge, 2011).

19 Ibid. Both Yezid Sayigh and A. F. Kassim debated this point, with Sayigh telling the Americans that they must “freeze the status of the disputed property before new fait accomplis are created,” and Kassim arguing that “this is the ABC of good faith and fair dealing. We would have to negotiate about settlement while they colonize the land. At the end of 12 months there might be no water and no land.”

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directly. As another member of the U.S. delegation remarked, “THE KEY IS AN AGREEMENT.

Land is a sub-issue.” The Palestinians would do well to delineate the issues, move forward in negotiations, and then movement on the settlements would surely follow.20

The Palestinians did proceed with negotiations, offering the outline of an Interim Self-

Government Authority (PISGA), which was a very significant advancement over earlier models of autonomy suggested by Begin in conjunction with Camp David.21 Although only a temporary measure, the PISGA covered all territories occupied since 1967. “The jurisdiction of the PISGA,” the final draft version noted, “shall encompass all these territories, the land, natural resources and water, the subsoil, and their territorial sea and air-space. Its jurisdiction shall also extend to all the Palestinian inhabitants of these territories.”22 As an entity, the authority of the PISGA was derived from the fact that it was elected by the Palestinian people. No outside source invests it with its authority.” The provisions for its establishment delineated clear transfers of authority to the Palestinians themselves, the basis of meaningful sovereignty over the land and its inhabitants.

Secretary Baker, writing to the head of the Palestinian delegation to the Peace Conference, Faisal

Husseini, saw this document as a “positive development” and reconfirmed his commitment and the commitment of President Bush “to see this process through to its required objective, namely, a comprehensive settlement.”23

20 Ibid., emphasis in original.

21 See Final Delivered Draft “Outline of Model of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (PISGA), 14 January 1992. PPD, http://www.palestine- studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/images/PISGA%20Jan%2014%2C%201992%20%20p%201%2C2.pdf, (accessed 10 March 2015).

22 Ibid.

23 Letter, Baker to Husseini, 10 February 1992, transmitted via the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem. See http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Baker%20letter%2010%20Feb_%201992.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

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As the Washington talks progressed, Husseini recounted for Baker how the Israelis utilized procedural methods to disqualify certain Palestinian delegates from leaving the country, forcing some Palestinians to travel without others. Baker was sympathetic. “There is nothing we can do about a practice that we do not approve of, or about administrative detention. The only way to progress on these issues is through the peace process, and with self-governing authority for you…I can’t wave a wand and stop the settlements. I can’t wave a wand here and stop the administrative detentions.”24 Baker was adamant that the Palestinians forge ahead with substance, but that they needed to be strategic to preserve the self-governing arrangements. “If you insist on settlement first,” Baker told Husseini, “that is dumb, because you won’t get a settlement freeze.”25 It was clear that the Palestinian delegation had little room to maneuver, constrained by

Israeli actions on the ground, the demands of intensive diplomacy in Washington, and the need to maintain credibility with their own populace. But however narrow a space in which they were operating, the Washington talks underscored the necessity of direct participation by the

Palestinians themselves, as agents attempting to secure a viable political future.

A Return to Autonomy

The Israeli proposal on self-rule, delivered on 20 February, was a world away from the

Palestinian document. It was a starling return to Begin’s autonomy plan. Revealingly entitled

“Ideas for in the territories during the interim period,” the draft spoke of the

“establishment of interim self-government arrangements for the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of

24 “Meeting at the United States State Department with Secretary of State James Baker, 20 February 1992,” PPD, http://www.palestine- studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Baker%20meeting%2020%20Feb_%2092.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

25 Ibid. www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Israeli%20proposal%2020%20Feb_%201992.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015). 360

the territories.” The territory itself, like Begin’s initial plan, was not up for discussion, and the

Israelis included a clause for “keeping the established links between Judea, Samaria, Gaza district and Israel intact” as well as maintaining traditional ties between the Palestinian Arab inhabitants and Jordan.” Once again, “residual powers” and the “sole responsibility for security in all its aspects” were reserved by Israel, and just as Begin had written in his original autonomy plan, “Israelis will continue, as of right, to live and settle in the territories.”26

In his letter to the Palestinian delegation outlining the Israeli plan, Elyakim Rubinstein elaborated on the flaws of the Palestinian proposal, “which basically represents a Palestinian state in all but name, considered by Israel a mortal security threat.” As Rubinstein argued, the

Israeli interim self-government arrangements “should be fair to the Arab population but not hamper the rights of Jews,” a position that undergirded Begin’s very clear proposal more than ten years earlier. In fact, Rubinstein spelled this out. “Israel’s basic approach to the arrangements is founded in principle [sic] developments since 1978. We regret, however, that during the negotiations you have rejected the Camp David Accords.” As Rubinstein described, the arrangements would be based on a “functional-administrative approach, not to include state-like powers.”27

During a heated meeting at the State Department in which the Palestinians responded to this proposal, Palestinian negotiator Hanan Ashrawi said the Israeli proposal was a

“reorganization of the occupation…it confirms the occupation and legitimizes the annexation of

26 See “Ideas for peaceful coexistence in the territories during the interim period.” 20 February 1992, PPD. http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Israeli%20proposal%2020%20Feb_%201992.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015). See also letter, Elyakim Rubinstein to H. Abdul Shafi, 21 February 1992. PPD. http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Rubinstein%20to%20Abd%20al- Shafi%2021%20Feb_%2092.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

27 Letter, Elyakim Rubinstein to H. Abdul Shafi, 21 February 1992. PPD. 361

land.”28 When asked by U.S. Ambassador Edward Djerejian whether this really was the case,

Ashrawi shot back, “Either they’re playing games, or they’re not serious about the transfer of authority to the Palestinians. This is totally unacceptable.” Faisal Husseini added that “what the

Israelis gave us is less than Camp David and less than what we have now.” The frustration with the Israeli position emerged in full during the discussions. Ashrawi asked how long Palestinians could participate in a “charade.” “This has been an exercise in futility. Our credibility with our people is diminished. Things are worse on the ground.”29

The Americans took issue with the Palestinian portrayal of events. U.S. diplomat Daniel

Kurtzer told Ashrawi she was “posturing,” and that as long as the Palestinians were in negotiations, “see what’s there. They [Israel] won’t put a position on the table you like. Just argue against it.” Elias Samber, one of the Palestinian representatives, protested that the problem was that “land is completely absent from their presentation.” Kurtzer stated, “So make it present…Work on a way you can effectively exercise authority over the land.” The domestic constraints under which Baker was operating was a central part of the U.S. approach. “If it is perceived in Congress that the Secretary has played into a Palestinian strategy to stop settlements and to get a settlement freeze, he’s finished,” Kurtzer explained. Ashrawi interjected,

“Conversely, if we negotiate with the settlements continuing, we’re finished.”

At the end of the meeting, frustrated by the narrow Israeli position and the demands of the U.S. negotiators, Ashrawi articulated one of the core elements of her opposition to the Israeli proposal. “Their position is racist. We start with the premise that we are human beings. Israelis

28 Minutes of the Meeting at the State Department, 26 February 1992,” PPD, http://www.palestine- studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Djerejian%20Kurtzer%20meeting%2026%20Feb_%2092.pd f (accessed 10 March 2015).

29 Ibid.

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only talk about Israeli interests, and say they can stay under conditions of coexistence under their own terms.” Kurtzer urged the Palestinians to work on responding to the Israeli proposal, despite the impossibly difficult odds. He recalled Faisal Husseini remarking “there has never been a case with a people who have been able to negotiate their own way out of occupation.” Somehow,

Kurtzer urged, the Palestinians had to build a bridge, one that they might not be able to complete with the Israelis. “But you need the foundation for a bridge…I still say that you may be able to negotiate your own way out of occupation. The grist for the mill may be laid in the foundation.”30

The subsequent Washington meetings, extending into 1993, were far less heated—and increasingly productive—sites of negotiation over these very foundations, including issues like the nature of interim self-governance and land policies.31 With a change in the Israeli government from Shamir’s Likud led government to Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor party in the summer of 1992, Israeli negotiators gradually moved away from a strictly functional approach towards the territorial model developed by the Palestinians. This was a modest, but highly significant historical shift from the narrower positions first espoused at the autonomy negotiations.32 Room seemed to be opening to convince the Israelis and Americans that such a

30 Ibid.

31 See, for example, “Draft Minutes: Meeting with U.S. State Department Officials, 13 May 1993,” PPD. http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Kurtzer%2C%20Miller%20meeting%2 013%20May%2093.pdf; “Draft Minutes Land Working Group, Session 1, Round 10, 17 June 1993,” PPD. http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Land%20working%20group%2017%20 June%2093.pdf; and “Minutes Concept Working Group, 23 June 1993,” PPD. http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Concept%20working%20group%2023 %20June%2093.pdf. In these latter two meeting, Suad Amiry and Rashid Khalidi’s discussion with the Israelis about territoriality and sovereignty are crucial. See also the critical debate over security in “Draft Minutes Meeting with the Americans, 23 June 1993,” PPD. http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Kurtzer%2C%20Miller%20meeting%2 023%20June%2093.pdf (all accessed 10 March 2015). Khalidi discusses this in Brokers, 50-65.

32 See “Highly Confidential Memo on Joint Concept/Land Working Group Meeting, 24 June 1993,” PPD. 363

territorial approach cohered with “reasonable Israeli concerns on security and settlers” and were compatible with terms of reference. As the Palestinians wrote in a highly confidential memo,

“This MAY be an opportunity for us to achieve progress along the lines of our own proposals, for the first time. We should not waste this limited opportunity, nor minimize it, nor exaggerate it.”33

Oslo’s Faustian Bargain

The brief window that opened at Madrid may have eventually paved the way to a just and equitable solution to the Palestinian question, but direct secret negotiations between the PLO leadership and the Israelis in Norway’s capital led instead to the end of the Washington talks and the signing of the Oslo Accords on the south lawn of the White House on 13 September 1993.

These accords were nowhere near as picture perfect as the famous handshake between Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat suggested, although they did signify the formal Israeli recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

American diplomats were taken aback by the secret backchannel, and one Palestinian critic has written that both Israelis and Palestinians criticized U.S. mediators in Washington for being

“more royalist than the king.”34

The logic of Oslo, which maintained Israeli control over Palestinian movements in key areas of the territories while respecting the autonomy of individual enclaves, bred a condition

http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Memo%20on%20Joint%20Concept- Land%20meeting%20June%2024%201993.pdf (accessed 10 March 2015).

33 Ibid.

34 Khalidi, Brokers, 56.

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that Eyal Weizmann has incisively called “prosthetic sovereignty.”35 In the “Declaration of

Principles” (DOP), PLO negotiators “fell into traps” that the Palestinian delegation in

Washington had been working to avoid.36 Most glaringly, they allowed for an Israeli clause that would enable ongoing settlement expansion before permanent status negotiations. Oslo’s DOP reified the notion of limited self-rule and mirrored Begin’s original ideas presented in 1977: autonomy for individuals, but not for the territory they inhabited.37 Moreover, they now had the imprimatur of Yasser Arafat, the embodiment of the Palestinian national struggle.38 Many of the

Palestinian negotiators in Madrid and Washington felt betrayed by Arafat’s acceptance of the

Oslo Accords on far narrower terms than they had initially sought out.39

In September 1995, Arafat and Rabin signed the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or Oslo II, establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA) and dividing the West

Bank into three separate zones of control. There was enormous skepticism towards Arafat’s move in the Arab world, where he was seen as selling out meaningful Palestinian sovereignty for

35 Weizmann, Hollow Land, 155-157. On Oslo’s method of control, see Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 169-196. For a more recent explanation of this logic with regards to the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations, see Darryl Li, “Preening Like a State,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 3 April 2014.

36 Khalidi, Brokers, 57-58. See also Raja Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997).

37 In two separate interviews this link was conceded: first by Ruth Lapidoth, the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Legal Advisor to the Autonomy Negotiations in Jerusalem on 13 February 2012, and then by former Madrid Conference spokeswoman and now PLO executive committee member Hanan Ashrawi in Ramallah on 27 February 2012.

38 Palestinian analyst Mouin Rabbani has piercingly written of the consequences of Oslo in Israel’s wider attempt to coopt Palestinians, including arrangements like the Village Leagues as outlined in chapter six, n. 19 above. “Where Salim Tamari had in the 1980s pointed out that Israel’s search for a native pillar in the occupied territories had been one of the most unsuccessful in the history of colonialism, it now seemed that Israel had recruited no less than the leadership of the national liberation movement as sub-contractor for its rule.” See “In Honor of Titans,” Jadaliyya, 10 December 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8903/in-honor-of-titans (accessed 11 March 2015).

39 See Khalidi, Brokers, 58-59, and especially 145, note 55. Khalidi explains how Oslo helped to “formally consecrate” Begin’s autonomy idea. See also Edward Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Vintage, 2001); and critical reflections on Oslo’s twentieth anniversary by Avi Shlaim, “It’s Now Clear: The Oslo Peace Accords were Wrecked by Netanyahu’s Bad Faith,” , 12 September 2013.

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the sake of his own return to the West Bank, where he was eventually elected president of the PA.

Oslo II granted the PA limited self-government, for an interim period of time, providing the vestiges of statehood without actual content. The process around Oslo lulled its proponents into the false belief that real issues like Jerusalem, refugees’ right of return, settlements and security were being dealt with. Oslo II became the basis of the Memorandum in 1998 and

President George W. Bush’s Roadmap for Peace in 2002. They have remained unresolved ever since.

There are several reasons that have been offered as to why the PLO leadership signed onto the Oslo Accords, ranging from a desire to restore legitimacy and financial solvency after a decade languishing in the Arab diaspora, to a total disconnect from the reality of life under

Israeli occupation.40 Arafat and his coterie of senior advisors had no experience living alongside settlements and under Israeli control, and were therefore less aware of the real consequences that an unfavorable set of interim conditions would pose. The entrenchment of a debilitating status quo since Oslo, and the violence that has accompanied it across the West Bank and Gaza Strip, speak volumes about the consequences of an extended military occupation and the attendant role played by the Palestinian Authority.

For the Israeli leadership, even under Rabin, the legacy of Begin’s opposition to

Palestinian statehood and the limits of Palestinian self-rule remained part of the dominant political lexicon. Sovereign statehood, as we might envision today, was never quite considered, although Rabin’s top advisor had suggested that it was an inevitable outcome to a real self- governing authority for Palestinians.41 Critics on the right, who strongly opposed negotiations

40 Khalidi, Brokers, 60-61.

41 See Beilin’s comment in “Memo on meeting at home of Counselor of Embassy of Netherlands, Como Hubar, Herziliyya, 15 June 1992,” PPD. http://www.palestine- 366

with the PLO or the possibility of their achieving independence, grew even stronger after Prime

Minister Rabin’s tragic assassination in November 1995. The narrowing political culture since the began in September 2000 further engendered widespread Israeli opposition to the notion of a fully sovereign Palestinian state, even as Israeli leaders claimed to embrace a

“two-state solution” to ending the conflict.42 Despite the Likud leadership’s rhetorical support for a negotiated settlement, which was subsequently disavowed, they have regressed to an even harsher stance than Menachem Begin himself.43 Israel’s “decision not to decide” on the fate of the territories after 1967 in fact gave way to a de facto policy of annexation in certain areas, and public calls for formal annexation in others.44

The Legacy of the 1970s and 1980s

studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Minutes%20Beilin%20meeting%2C%20Herzillyya%2015%20June%209 2.pdf (accessed 11 March 2015).

42 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made this very clear in his press conference on 11 July 2014. “I think the Israeli people understand now what I always say: that there cannot be a situation, under any agreement, in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the River Jordan.” See David Horovitz, “Netanyahu Finally Speaks his Mind,” The Times of Israel, 13 July 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-finally-speaks-his- mind (accessed 15 July 2014).

43 See Jodi Rudoren, “Netanyahu’s Comments Cast Doubt,” New York Times, 9 March 2015.

44 See Naftali Bennett, “For Israel, Two-State is No Solution,” New York Times, 7 November 2014; and The Times of Israel interview with Bennett on 17 February 2015 which explains his argument that “Israel should annex the roughly 60 percent of the West Bank currently under its full control and offer economic cooperation to Palestinians — instead of independence. Such a move would infuriate both the Palestinians and the international community. But Bennett is unfazed. ‘What I am suggesting is a different path, it’s a tougher one but it’s the right one,’ he said. ‘Let’s make their lives better,’ he said of the Palestinians. ‘If we can do that for a few years, I think the world will see that we are actually making progress as opposed to just talking.’ http://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-no-palestinian- state-even-if-world-penalizes-israel/ (accessed 10 March 2015). See also the report of the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel (INSS), “Back to the Administered Territories,” 30 October 2014, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7950 (accessed 10 March 2015).

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Historians are not generally in the business of asking counterfactuals, focused instead on how events unfold in a contingent manner over a discrete period of time.45 One must wonder, however, if things may have turned out differently had the Madrid process reached a more comprehensive conclusion. Perhaps possibilities would have presented themselves in the last two and a half decades that are hard to imagine today.46 But given the history that is the focus of this dissertation, a more troubling question remains: Was the legacy of Camp David so deeply entrenched—both conceptually in terms of preventing Palestinian statehood, and physically in terms of the territorial transformation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—that the entire process was bound to fail from its inception? Can Palestinians, as one leading U.S. diplomat suggested, really “negotiate their own way out of occupation?”47

In pulling the frame away from a saturated focus on the peace process in the 1990s, this dissertation has attempted to explain how international political developments, the articulation of ideas and policies in the diplomatic arena, domestic politics in the United States, and transformations on the ground in the region itself during the late 1970s and 1980s produced (and constricted) the possible conditions under which the Palestinian question could be negotiated after U.S. recognition of the PLO in 1988. In the wake of an extended period of political disenfranchisement, Palestinians now had the ability to argue for self-determination, albeit in structurally challenging conditions. In tracing the journey of the Palestinian question from

Carter’s initial articulation of a “homeland” as a means of settling their political fate, through the preparations for a comprehensive peace at Geneva and the emergence of a more limited bilateral

45 On historians and counterfactuals, see Richard Evans, Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History (New York, Little Brown, 2014); and John Lewis Gaddis, “Causation, Contingency and Counterfactuals,” The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91-109.

46 See Rabbani, “In Honor of Titans.”

47 This was Daniel Kurtzer, in minutes of the Meeting at the State Department, 26 February 1992,” PPD. 368

peace with Egypt at Camp David, my first two chapters provided a sense of the new possibilities that opened up through U.S. diplomacy in the late 1970s, and the attendant limits of those efforts.

In line with recent scholarship on human rights and the meaning of self-determination in the

1970s, the Palestinian question endures as a crucial example of where that pledge to uphold those rights fell short.

By revising the triumphalist reading of Camp David, and focusing instead on the negotiations over autonomy that were launched in its wake, chapter three explained how an

Israeli vision of dealing with the “Arab inhabitants” of what Begin always referred to as “Judea and Samaria” could be achieved in a non-national framework. Using Egypt as a primary interlocutor for Palestinian political rights, the United States convened formative discussions for managing the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a manner that ensured an Israeli focus on rights for individuals rather than Palestinian sovereignty in the territories themselves. PLO leaders, adamantly opposed to Camp David and the autonomy negotiations, remained frozen out of the discussion, while working to manage their own political future in Lebanon and across the wider

Arab world. Moving away from years of armed resistance was a slow and uneven process, further complicating their place on an increasingly sympathetic international stage. In 1980s

America, however, the PLO leadership had little chance of improved standing.

As a subset of the neoconservative resurgence that I described in chapter four, the PLO was sidelined as a Soviet proxy in Ronald Reagan’s global Cold War. The visceral reaction to

Carter’s perceived weakness abroad, especially in relation to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, strengthened the hands of Democrats and Republicans who repudiated détente and sought out a more ideological struggle in the Third World. ‘The Cold War’ therefore mattered, but far less than we might expect. As a framing and periodizing device, it helps to situate developments in

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the Middle East along a global axis, but the rhythms and logic of Israeli and Palestinian concerns drew selectively and instrumentally upon strategic Cold War reasoning when it suited particular policy initiatives.

The Palestinian question, and its central role in the Lebanese arena, was a formative proving ground for the more muscular interventions of the Reagan era. But as I explained in chapter five, Lebanon was also the site where the diplomatic consequences of Camp David and

Israel’s ambitious regional agenda collided in unexpected and damaging ways. In pursuing the

PLO militarily, and working to defeat Palestinian nationalism via faulty alliances with the

Lebanese Christian minority, Israel found itself implicated in a massacre and a wider war that undercut the entire edifice upon which a carefully cultivated ethos of defensive Zionism had been resting. Even alongside the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem in 1948, military failures in 1956 and 1973, or the lost diplomatic opportunities for deciding on the fate of the territories in 1967, Lebanon endures as one of the darkest episodes in Israeli history.

The limits of power and the moral compromises made in the name of security exposed leaders like Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon to condemnation across the globe and to domestic backlash at home. Yet the lessons of Lebanon, as leading Israeli analysts explained, were never quite absorbed by the political establishment.48 Mired in the occupation of the country’s southern tip for years after the 1982 invasion, Lebanon, much like the occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, exposed the consequences of Israeli overreach. The rise of

48 See the following excerpt from Tom Friedman, “Israel’s Dilemma: Living with a Dirty War,” in the New York Times on 20 January 1985: “The wounds of Lebanon have not been healed, they have just been bandaged up,'' said Ehud Yaari, the television correspondent. ''There really has been no thorough public discussion of what happened.'' The present establishment, said Mr. Gazit, who rebuilt Israel's military intelligence after it was found seriously lacking by a commission of inquiry following the 1973 war, does not want to investigate Lebanon. Too many people and too much party politics are involved. ''It is part of the rules of the game,'' he said. ''We should not embarrass each other to the very end. We cannot afford to go into a commission on Lebanon and hope to continue working together. We can't allow ourselves to be demoralized completely. The cost is that the lessons may not be learned, but even if we have a commission the lessons may not be learned.''

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Hezbollah and of Syrian and Iranian influences were contingent factors that most Israeli analysts did not predict. The United States also suffered incomparable damage in the Lebanese imbroglio, both in terms of human lives and regional influence. Many of the legacies of intervention in the

1980s, as Mahmood Mamdani and others have articulated, continue to haunt U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.49

Notwithstanding these broader regional concerns, which are deserving of greater historical attention, the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace was always at the heart of postwar

American foreign policy concerns in the Middle East. The Reagan administration’s belated recognition that the Palestinian issue had to be dealt with on its own terms, and via the PLO, was in many ways a return to the same principles articulated by Carter years earlier, as chapter six made clear. William Quandt, one of Carter’s main advisors on this question, and the leading expert on the peace process has argued that, “On balance, Israel and its neighbors were no closer to agreement in 1988 than they had been in 1980. Perhaps the most one can say is that things had not deteriorated beyond repair.”50 But greater distance and the new sources uncovered in this dissertation suggest that the contours of a just settlement may actually have eroded significantly during these interim years, adversely impacting the prospect of any successful negotiation in the

1990s.

Looking back on the late 1970s and 1980s from the vantage point of Likud’s continued political influence in Israel, as well as an increasingly fractured Palestinian polity, we can discern the extent to which the structural failure of the peace process has inarguably exacerbated the prospect of a just settlement to Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. That failure underscores the

49 Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.

50 Quandt, Peace Process, 286.

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devastating twin impact of prolonged political disenfranchisement alongside the physical encroachment of settlements on the ground, which blur political boundaries via a mechanism of

“de facto annexation.”51 The settlements, in this respect, remain a central ‘actor’ in any wider story of this period.52

This failure is not a product of Israeli and Palestinian actions alone. To the contrary, it was produced by the external involvement of U.S. diplomats and regional actors like Egypt and

Jordan, in the context of a global transformation in the late twentieth century Middle East. More widely, the shifting regional dynamics that have carried over to this century underscore the precarious nature of the pursuit of real peace, especially given the political and social upheaval that has spread throughout the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring.53 One thing seems clear: the age of heroic American diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli arena is now over.

The history recounted here is not intended as a rebuke to the failure of those who have worked tirelessly for a resolution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Many such histories and more polemical accounts exist, some more productive than others, emanating from wells of frustration, disappointment and outright anger. Rather, my aim has been to carefully and deliberately review newly available primary sources to construct an empirically rich narrative of why the fate of the Palestinian question emerged in the particular manner that it did, providing a

51 See Ian S. Lustick, “Israel and the West Bank After Elon Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto Annexation.”

52 They remain so at the time of writing in 2015. See the New York Times report on post-Gaza land annexation, which is seen as the “biggest since the 1980s.” See Isabel Kershner, “Israel Claims Nearly 1,000 Acres of West Bank Land Near Bethlehem,” 21 August 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/middleeast/israel-claims- nearly-1000-acres-of-west-bank-land-near-bethlehem.html (accessed 10 April 2015); and Jodi Rudoren and Jeremy Ashkenas, “Netanyahu and the Settlements,” New York Times, 12 March 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/12/world/middleeast/netanyahu-west-bank-settlements-israel- election.html?emc=eta1 (accessed 10 April 2015).

53 On the Arab Spring and the consequences for regional politics, as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Fawaz A. Gerges, ed., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Mark Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 372

genealogy of a vexing problem that has bedeviled the United States, Israel, the Arab world, international actors, and the Palestinians themselves. In explaining how this happened, and restoring agency to those responsible, as well as contingency where it is often missing, this history can offer a corrective to the mythologies and emotionalism that so often frame the topic.

Political catastrophes do not just appear out of the blue; they are produced in particular moments, and periodicity is a central claim of this project. If we widen our lens to explain how earlier histories of the mandate period and state formation extend forward to the post-1967 era, the broader dynamics of the Palestinian question become more evident, as do the discrete periods in which diplomatic practices prevented its resolution in the post-1967 era.

Aside from offering a rethinking of dominant periodization schemes and widening the empirical source base for examining the 1970s and 1980s, my dissertation also suggests a conceptual framework for more clearly discerning how the absence and active prevention of sovereignty endures as a primary obstacle to Palestinian self-determination, and the mechanisms of diplomacy that sustained this.54 Showing how diplomatic practices interacted with existing governing structures and new forms of political thinking, I am also making a conceptual claim about the divergent meanings ascribed to words like autonomy, self-rule and sovereignty. This conceptual lens contributes to wider debates in fields like transformative occupation, the , decolonization, and the legacies of internationalism. The relationship between policy and practice, not high policy alone, brings together institutional history, a history of ideas, concepts, and instances of everyday violence.

Methodologically, the international approach I have taken in this dissertation—working across national boundaries, with divergent historiographies and multiple linguistic source

54 On conceptual history, see Reinhart Koselleck, “The Need for Theory in the Discipline of History,” Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1-19.

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bases—provides an effective entry point into this process of recovery, but also illustrates some important limits. The amount of newly available source material, and the asymmetries between state and non-state actors, as well as the extant literature on these events, poses a challenge for researchers. But in bringing together several different and often competing strands in this dissertation, I am suggesting that it is not only possible to write histories of seemingly intractable conflicts, but that these accounts also serve as a necessary step to collectively thinking our way out of them.

Such a move requires fresh attention to the discursive constraints that have confronted

Israel, the Palestinians, and wider U.S. and international involvement in the Middle East. As

Tony Judt argued in a critique of Cold War triumphalism, we must avoid the “perverse contemporary insistence on not understanding the context of our present dilemmas…on seeking actively to forget rather than remember.”55 There is little chance of moving forward if the failures of the recent past are cast aside. Camp David’s shadow looms large over the most intractable elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If this history helps explain how the

Palestinian question emerged as it did in the late twentieth century, it may go some distance in explaining why meaningful reconciliation remains elusive today.

55 Tony Judt, “What Have We Learned, If Anything?” The New York Review of Books, 1 May 2008. 374

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