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WMHSMUN XXXIV After the Accords: Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet Background Guide “Unprecedented committees. Unparalleled debate. Unmatched fun.” Letters From the Directors Dear Delegates, Welcome to WMHSMUN XXXIV! My name is Hank Hermens and I am excited to be the in-room Director for Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet. I’m a junior at the College double majoring in International Relations and History. I have done model UN since my sophomore year of high school, and since then I have become increasingly involved. I compete as part of W&M’s travel team, staff our conferences, and have served as the Director of Media for our college level conference, &MUN. Right now, I’m a member of our Conference Team, planning travel and training delegates. Outside of MUN, I play trumpet in the Wind Ensemble, do research with AidData and for a professor, looking at the influence of Islamic institutions on electoral outcomes in Tunisia. In my admittedly limited free time, I enjoy reading, running, and hanging out with my friends around campus. As members of Anwar Sadat’s cabinet, you’ll have to deal with the fallout of Egypt’s recent peace with Israel, in Egypt, the greater Middle East and North Africa, and the world. You’ll also meet economic challenges, rising national political tensions, and more. Some of the problems you come up against will be easily solved, with only short-term solutions necessary. Others will require complex, long term solutions, or risk the possibility of further crises arising. No matter what, we will favor creative, outside-the-box ideas as well as collaboration and diplomacy. I look forward to meeting you all and am excited to watch our committee unfold, from innovative crisis arcs to creative speeches and intense debate. Please feel free to reach out and email either Sam or me about the committee, positions, or really any questions that you might have. We’ll see you all on Zoom! Hank Hermens [email protected] Background Guide – Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet Dear Delegates, Hello and welcome to WMHSMUN XXXIV! My name is Samantha LeBlanc and I am your Crisis Director for Anwar Sadat’s cabinet. I am originally from eastern Massachusetts and a junior at the College of William and Mary majoring in Public Policy and minoring in Data Science. Over the past two years I have traveled, directed, and served on a Secretariat for IR Club, and right now I run our social media (you can follow us on Instagram @ircubwm). This will be my second time crisis directing for WMHSMUN, and my second time directing with Hank. Outside of Model UN, I enjoy spending (socially distanced) time with my friends on the front porch of the Global Research Institute house just off of campus. For the past year and a half, I’ve worked for AidData, a research lab under the Global Research Institute. Over the course of the weekend you will be met with challenges with internal and foreign issues facing Egypt. We understand that many members of the committee are not from Egypt and have their own goals they wish to pursue, so it is essential that you all work together to create a lasting peace. WMHSMUN may look different than in years past, but we hope you approach this committee with enthusiasm and creativity when Feel free to email me if you have any questions concerning committee, and I look forward to seeing all of your creative ideas conference weekend! Samantha LeBlanc [email protected] 2 Background Guide – Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet Introduction Anwar Sadat, Egypt, and Israel Anwar Sadat became the third president of Egypt in 1970, upon the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Part of the Free Officers coup that overthrew the king of Egypt in the1952 Egyptian Revolution, he was instrumental in navigating the Camp David Accords peace process with Israel and the US in 1978. As a result, he shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize with Israel’s Prime Minister, Menachem Begin. He attended an Egyptian military academy, through which he first met Nasser. In and out of prison for a variety of revolutionary causes throughout the 1940s, he joined Nasser’s Free Officers group in 1948.1 In 1949, following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Nasser, at that time a lieutenant Colonel, founded the group. Focused on liberating Egypt from British rule and the British-allied monarchy, and promoting Egyptian nationalism, the Free Officers overthrew and exiled Egypt’s king, Farouk, in 1952.2 Nasser became prime minister, and then president, soon after the coup. Ruling fairly autocratically, he governed until 1970. Under Nasser’s rule, Egypt turned moderately socialist, while purposely distancing itself from both the United States and Soviet Union.3 Nasser’s Egypt also allowed for Sudanese separation; Egypt’s southern neighbor became an independent republic in 1956.4 Egypt also continued to engage in conflicts with Israel, such as in the 1967 Six-Day War, which led to an overwhelming Israeli victory. Such conflicts guided much of Egyptian policy up until the Camp David Accords. However, even after the Accords, Egypt was heavily split domestically over peace with Israel. After Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency. Despite the closeness of the two men during their earlier lives, Sadat worked to distance himself from the nationalist, left-wing policies of his predecessor. He engineered the infitah economic policy, opening Egypt to foreign investment and trade. He also opened the country politically, allowing for greater personal and political freedom. Sadat approached Israel on the subject of peace talks numerous times. However, despite these initial attempts to broker peace, Sadat was turned down by Israel due to demands for the return of the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt had lost during the Six-Day War. As a result of these rejections and a domestically challenging position, Sadat organized an Egypt- and Syria-led offensive against Israel, designed to take back the Peninsula and reclaim Syria’s Golan Heights.5 The war, called the Yom Kippur War due to the Arab Forces’ attack during Yom Kippur, resulted in a United Nations-brokered cease-fire and Israeli victory. It was complicated, and turned more dangerous, due to Soviet and US support of the Arab forces and Israel, respectively. 3 Background Guide – Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet Despite the loss, Sadat’s prestige grew throughout the Middle East and North Africa. He used this newfound distinction to advocate further for peace with Israel. Sadat even expelled Soviet diplomats and opened diplomatic communications with the United States, knowing of the importance of the US in mediating peace.6 The Accords The Yom Kippur War was ended through the Sinai Disengagement Agreements of 1974 and 1975, prompting further, future peace discussions. In 1977, Anwar Sadat visited Israel and addressed the Knesset, Israel’s parliamentary body, advocating for a renewed effort for peace. These actions were revolutionary for a sitting Arab leader.7 The next year, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister, to travel to Camp David to work towards terms for peace. Mediated by US President Jimmy Carter, their discussions centered around a “land-for-peace formula,” through which Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and Egypt would recognize Israel, and both states would establish diplomatic relations.8 Throughout the process, Egyptian-US relations improved substantially, and Egypt began to take in immense amounts of foreign aid. Eventually leading to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the meetings and subsequent Accords were based on three main objectives: Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it had captured, “the acknowledgement of Israel’s existence and sovereignty–and its right to exist in peace–by all the nations in the world,” and “an undivided Jerusalem. ”9 The process was arduous and long, filled with disagreements from both Egypt and Israel. The countries differed over much, but the most significant disagreement encompassed the consequence and the maintenance of Israeli settlements in the Sinai Peninsula.10 However, by the end of the US-mediated conference, the two states settled on an extensive pact that resulted in peace between both countries, improved relations for both with the US, the return of the Peninsula to Egypt, and the ability for Israel to use and traverse the Suez Canal. The two states also recommended that the provisions listed in the Accords apply to potential treaties between Israel and its other neighboring countries–Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.11 Topic 1: Domestic Happenings and Tensions Despite his success in dealing with Israel and the United States, Anwar Sadat’s Egypt still faced numerous internal problems. Among them were exploding economic inequality and political turmoil 4 Background Guide – Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet centered in Sadat’s liberalization programs. Additionally, in the early 1970s, he had expelled a large number of Russians and moved away from Nasser’s nationalization programs, ending Egypt’s stint with socialism. As mentioned earlier, through the Infitah, or “openness,” program, Sadat worked to liberalize and open Egypt’s economy. He denationalized “factories, real estate, and farms ‘sequestered’ by Nasser to make way for a socialist society.”12 Through the program, designed to foster domestic and international investment in Egyptian enterprises, Sadat hoped to invigorate Egypt’s relatively lethargic economy. The program incented the return of foreign banks and high investment. Unfortunately, the reforms were only modestly successful. Much investment centered in important, but unreliable sectors, such as the tourism industry, while sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture remained stagnant. Further, Egypt’s complex bureaucracy decreased the likelihood of investments from abroad, as foreigners struggled to navigate the array of red tape involved.
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