UCHICAGO Institutional Change and Veto Players: Displacing Militaries Paper Presented to the CPW - UChicago Dina Rashed 1/15/2016 Draft: Please do not cite or circulate without author permission. All feedback is welcome, please send to
[email protected] Dear Colleagues and readers, I am interested in publishing a more polished version of this working paper; the purpose is to get my theory out to a bigger audience. So I would appreciate all feedback that makes it a stronger and more publishable piece. I also would like to get your feedback: 1- Whether there are too many details in the Egyptian case. I tend to think that the detailed accounts carry a big weight in showing evidence and proving the theory. But maybe I am putting too much. [On a personal level: I love history and stories, and I grew up in the Middle East where we love details and gossip .] 2- Whether I should discuss, albeit briefly, some of the cases that are listed in the table on p. 11. With appreciation, Dina DRashed 1 Introduction: In October 1973, the Egyptian military initiated a military offensive against Israeli occupying forces of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. The war resulted in the liberation of parts of Egyptian land and put into gears a peace process that ultimately facilitated the return of Egyptian territory. In many ways, the war was a political victory for the military, restoring its image as a capable force, and opening venues for international professional and financial support. Yet the Egyptian president was able to gradually disengage his generals from their once-held strong domain: domestic control, by enhancing police powers.