THE COLD WAR's LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW and WHY the USSR INSTIGATED the 1967 WAR by Isabella Ginor*

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THE COLD WAR's LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW and WHY the USSR INSTIGATED the 1967 WAR by Isabella Ginor* THE COLD WAR'S LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW AND WHY THE USSR INSTIGATED THE 1967 WAR By Isabella Ginor* The Soviet warning to Egypt about supposed Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border in May 1967 has long been considered a blunder that precipitated a war which the USSR neither desired nor expected. New evidence from Soviet and other Warsaw Pact documents, as well as memoirs of contemporary actors, contradicts this accepted theory. The author demonstrates that this warning was deliberate disinformation, part of a plan approved at the highest level of Soviet leadership to elicit Egyptian action that would provoke an Israeli strike. Soviet military intervention against the "aggressor" was intended to follow and was prepared well in advance. "The truth of anything at all supposed Israeli reinforcements after doesn't lie in someone's account inspecting the Syrian front.(3) of it. It lies in all the small facts of In order to reconcile this Soviet the time." provocation with the accepted view that --Josephine Tey, The Daughter of Moscow had no intention to precipitate a Time(1) war, various theories have been proposed.(4) An especially noteworthy It is well-accepted in Middle Eastern version was offered recently by Karen historiography that the 1967 war's Brutents, a former CPSU Central immediate trigger was disinformation fed Committee counsellor,(5) who claimed by the Soviet Union to Egypt in May that Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir 1967 about massive reinforcements Israel Semyonov "couldn't control himself" and was supposedly concentrating on its prematurely revealed yet-unconfirmed border with Syria. However, new and intelligence to visiting Egyptian compelling evidence, including a hitherto Parliament Speaker Anwar Sadat.(6) secret speech delivered by Leonid According to previous accounts, the Brezhnev shortly after the war, information was supposedly transmitted challenges the equally accepted notion to Sadat at a much higher level by that the USSR simply blundered into a Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolai V. war which Moscow neither desired nor Podgorny.(7) expected. This evidence also casts doubt Brutents's assertion of Semyonov's on the conclusion reached in the recent "slip" is but the latest example of and definitive study of the conflict: "why, continuing efforts even in post-Soviet exactly, the Soviets acted as they did Moscow to obscure the facts of, and proved less important than the way the responsibility for, the USSR's fateful Egyptians reacted."(2) move. There is no mention at all of the Even the traditional version of these matter in the first Soviet official account events could never explain why the of the 1967 crisis.(8) In other instances, it USSR blundered or miscalculated. Both is claimed that Soviet intelligence Middle East and Cold War historiography actually did possess exact knowledge of have been unable to explain the Soviet Israeli intentions to wage war on Arab "hallucinations," as the Egyptian chief of states(9) and even the supposed dates for staff termed the Soviet intelligence on the this attack.(10) At the other extreme, one 34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War recent version quotes the head of the was in fact alive enough to be KGB's First Main Directorate (foreign interviewed subsequently by at least two intelligence), Lieutenant-General journalists, including the present writer-- Aleksandr Sakharovski, as suggesting although he contributed little to clarifying that Soviet intelligence doubted the this affair.(14) accuracy of the information but decided it Brutents's attempt to blame the was their duty to share it with the relaying of disinformation to Egypt on a Egyptians.(11) slip of the tongue by a single official is The USSR and its satellites, however, blatantly inconsistent with the standard were in fact much less conscientious procedures of Soviet officialdom. If about sharing accurate intelligence with Semyonov had indeed been "notorious their closest allies in the Arab world, for scanning intelligence reports before including both Egypt and Syria. Some of such meetings [as with Sadat] and then their actual activity is revealed by a retailing them as the latest gossip,"(15) document discovered in the East German and in this momentous case acted on his intelligence (Stasi) archives by the own initiative rather than on instructions German historian Stefan Meining. This from above, he would hardly have been protocol of a KGB-Stasi meeting at the included in the crucial talks with Soviet Council of Ministers between Egyptian Minister of War Shams Badran April 10 and 15, 1967 (with Sakharovski two weeks later.(16) He certainly would leading the Soviet delegation) delineates never have been trusted in 1968 with the a complex program of "active measures" most sensitive mission as head of the for 1967. It mandates the continuation of Soviet team to the SALT talks in "Operation Marabu" aimed at Helsinki, which has been described by a "aggravation of tensions between West Foreign Ministry veteran in the following Germany and the Arab countries, in terms: "never did such a high and particular by [drawing attention to] the representative Soviet delegation go politico-military and economic abroad."(17) cooperation of West Germany and Israel" These various attempts to belittle the by means of "manufactured documents" warning given to Sadat also disregard the and rumors.(12) Some of these, as will be established fact that simultaneously with detailed below, may have had a direct its transmission to him, the warning was connection to the May crisis. But overall, hammered home to the Egyptians through Marabu demonstrates conclusively that two additional channels: by the Soviet the Soviets systematically disinformed intelligence "resident" in Cairo to their Arab clients--which provides a Egyptian intelligence(18) and by the plausible motivation for their persistent Soviet ambassador himself. In the early attempts to cover up the case that evening of May 12, a coded message exposed this practice most dramatically. from the Soviet Embassy to the Ministry In another extreme example of these of Foreign Affairs in Moscow was cover-up efforts, American diplomat- intercepted "somewhere in Western historian Richard B. Parker was told Europe," stating that "today we passed on during a visit to Moscow in September to the Egyptian authorities information 1990 that the Soviet ambassador in Israel concerning the massing of Israeli troops in 1967, Dmitri Chuvakhin, whom he on the northern frontier for a surprise wished to interview on his role in the attack on Syria. We have advised the crisis, had died.(13) Chuvakhin, however, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 35 Isabella Ginor UAR government to take the necessary Committee."(22) The meeting was steps."(19) ultimately convened, however, only on As an Egyptian official who took June 20. notes during this meeting pointed out at a Brezhnev's speech was never conference 25 years later, "it was not published, but a typescript translation of customary for the Soviet ambassador to its text was also discovered by Meining at deliver such reports… it never happened the Stasi archives in Berlin. While this before, so why did the Soviets choose to speech must be viewed cautiously as an act this way? Was it to confirm the apology for Brezhnev's own role and that seriousness of the situation and to leave of his colleagues, it does give away no doubt that an Egyptian action is several crucial factual disclosures. One of required?" This official, Salah Bassiouny, these startling statements relates to the went on to relate how after meeting warning to Egypt: Ambassador Dmitri Pozhidayev, the Egyptian undersecretary of foreign affairs In mid-May--and to this I want to sent "an alarming report… based on the draw your attention--reports Soviet ambassador's repeating… that it reached us that Israel was should be seriously considered in the intending to land a military blow light of Syrian fears and the reported on Syria and other Arab states. Israeli massing of ten to twenty brigades The Politburo resolved to bring on the Syrian border." But, in line with this information to the attention of the Soviet/Russian cover-up attempts the governments of the UAR and described above, a Russian participant at Syria.(23) the same conference reported that no evidence of such instructions to This attribution to a Politburo Pozhidayev had been found in the resolution appears finally to negate the Foreign Ministry's archive. He added, claim that the USSR simply stumbled correctly, that "without the decision of into what was termed recently a the Politburo, none of the ambassadors "catalytic role" in precipitating the would have been allowed to pass it."(20) war.(24) The accepted practice in It is therefore of the utmost preparing "Politburo top-secret significance that a document has now documents… never disclose[d] the emerged showing the Politburo did adopt authors of the proposals or how the precisely such a resolution. In his decision was made."(25) The almost memoirs, Brutents relates being offhand mention of a Politburo resolution summoned on June 5 to Communist Party by Brezhnev seems aimed primarily to headquarters. He was instructed to deflect responsibility for the resulting prepare a speech on the Middle Eastern fiasco from himself personally and spread crisis and newly erupted war for delivery it over the collective body. But with most by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to members of the Politburo present as he the CPSU Central Committee.(21) spoke, Brezhnev could hardly have Brutents added to the present writer: "I invented a resolution that was never and one of my colleagues prepared the adopted.(26) Moreover, Brutents states urgent plenum.
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