THE COLD WAR'S LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW AND WHY THE USSR INSTIGATED THE 1967 WAR By Isabella Ginor*
The Soviet warning to Egypt about supposed Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border in May 1967 has long been considered a blunder that precipitated a war which the USSR neither desired nor expected. New evidence from Soviet and other Warsaw Pact documents, as well as memoirs of contemporary actors, contradicts this accepted theory. The author demonstrates that this warning was deliberate disinformation, part of a plan approved at the highest level of Soviet leadership to elicit Egyptian action that would provoke an Israeli strike. Soviet military intervention against the "aggressor" was intended to follow and was prepared well in advance.
"The truth of anything at all supposed Israeli reinforcements after doesn't lie in someone's account inspecting the Syrian front.(3) of it. It lies in all the small facts of In order to reconcile this Soviet the time." provocation with the accepted view that --Josephine Tey, The Daughter of Moscow had no intention to precipitate a Time(1) war, various theories have been proposed.(4) An especially noteworthy It is well-accepted in Middle Eastern version was offered recently by Karen historiography that the 1967 war's Brutents, a former CPSU Central immediate trigger was disinformation fed Committee counsellor,(5) who claimed by the Soviet Union to Egypt in May that Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir 1967 about massive reinforcements Israel Semyonov "couldn't control himself" and was supposedly concentrating on its prematurely revealed yet-unconfirmed border with Syria. However, new and intelligence to visiting Egyptian compelling evidence, including a hitherto Parliament Speaker Anwar Sadat.(6) secret speech delivered by Leonid According to previous accounts, the Brezhnev shortly after the war, information was supposedly transmitted challenges the equally accepted notion to Sadat at a much higher level by that the USSR simply blundered into a Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolai V. war which Moscow neither desired nor Podgorny.(7) expected. This evidence also casts doubt Brutents's assertion of Semyonov's on the conclusion reached in the recent "slip" is but the latest example of and definitive study of the conflict: "why, continuing efforts even in post-Soviet exactly, the Soviets acted as they did Moscow to obscure the facts of, and proved less important than the way the responsibility for, the USSR's fateful Egyptians reacted."(2) move. There is no mention at all of the Even the traditional version of these matter in the first Soviet official account events could never explain why the of the 1967 crisis.(8) In other instances, it USSR blundered or miscalculated. Both is claimed that Soviet intelligence Middle East and Cold War historiography actually did possess exact knowledge of have been unable to explain the Soviet Israeli intentions to wage war on Arab "hallucinations," as the Egyptian chief of states(9) and even the supposed dates for staff termed the Soviet intelligence on the this attack.(10) At the other extreme, one 34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War recent version quotes the head of the was in fact alive enough to be KGB's First Main Directorate (foreign interviewed subsequently by at least two intelligence), Lieutenant-General journalists, including the present writer-- Aleksandr Sakharovski, as suggesting although he contributed little to clarifying that Soviet intelligence doubted the this affair.(14) accuracy of the information but decided it Brutents's attempt to blame the was their duty to share it with the relaying of disinformation to Egypt on a Egyptians.(11) slip of the tongue by a single official is The USSR and its satellites, however, blatantly inconsistent with the standard were in fact much less conscientious procedures of Soviet officialdom. If about sharing accurate intelligence with Semyonov had indeed been "notorious their closest allies in the Arab world, for scanning intelligence reports before including both Egypt and Syria. Some of such meetings [as with Sadat] and then their actual activity is revealed by a retailing them as the latest gossip,"(15) document discovered in the East German and in this momentous case acted on his intelligence (Stasi) archives by the own initiative rather than on instructions German historian Stefan Meining. This from above, he would hardly have been protocol of a KGB-Stasi meeting at the included in the crucial talks with Soviet Council of Ministers between Egyptian Minister of War Shams Badran April 10 and 15, 1967 (with Sakharovski two weeks later.(16) He certainly would leading the Soviet delegation) delineates never have been trusted in 1968 with the a complex program of "active measures" most sensitive mission as head of the for 1967. It mandates the continuation of Soviet team to the SALT talks in "Operation Marabu" aimed at Helsinki, which has been described by a "aggravation of tensions between West Foreign Ministry veteran in the following Germany and the Arab countries, in terms: "never did such a high and particular by [drawing attention to] the representative Soviet delegation go politico-military and economic abroad."(17) cooperation of West Germany and Israel" These various attempts to belittle the by means of "manufactured documents" warning given to Sadat also disregard the and rumors.(12) Some of these, as will be established fact that simultaneously with detailed below, may have had a direct its transmission to him, the warning was connection to the May crisis. But overall, hammered home to the Egyptians through Marabu demonstrates conclusively that two additional channels: by the Soviet the Soviets systematically disinformed intelligence "resident" in Cairo to their Arab clients--which provides a Egyptian intelligence(18) and by the plausible motivation for their persistent Soviet ambassador himself. In the early attempts to cover up the case that evening of May 12, a coded message exposed this practice most dramatically. from the Soviet Embassy to the Ministry In another extreme example of these of Foreign Affairs in Moscow was cover-up efforts, American diplomat- intercepted "somewhere in Western historian Richard B. Parker was told Europe," stating that "today we passed on during a visit to Moscow in September to the Egyptian authorities information 1990 that the Soviet ambassador in Israel concerning the massing of Israeli troops in 1967, Dmitri Chuvakhin, whom he on the northern frontier for a surprise wished to interview on his role in the attack on Syria. We have advised the crisis, had died.(13) Chuvakhin, however, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 35
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UAR government to take the necessary Committee."(22) The meeting was steps."(19) ultimately convened, however, only on As an Egyptian official who took June 20. notes during this meeting pointed out at a Brezhnev's speech was never conference 25 years later, "it was not published, but a typescript translation of customary for the Soviet ambassador to its text was also discovered by Meining at deliver such reports… it never happened the Stasi archives in Berlin. While this before, so why did the Soviets choose to speech must be viewed cautiously as an act this way? Was it to confirm the apology for Brezhnev's own role and that seriousness of the situation and to leave of his colleagues, it does give away no doubt that an Egyptian action is several crucial factual disclosures. One of required?" This official, Salah Bassiouny, these startling statements relates to the went on to relate how after meeting warning to Egypt: Ambassador Dmitri Pozhidayev, the Egyptian undersecretary of foreign affairs In mid-May--and to this I want to sent "an alarming report… based on the draw your attention--reports Soviet ambassador's repeating… that it reached us that Israel was should be seriously considered in the intending to land a military blow light of Syrian fears and the reported on Syria and other Arab states. Israeli massing of ten to twenty brigades The Politburo resolved to bring on the Syrian border." But, in line with this information to the attention of the Soviet/Russian cover-up attempts the governments of the UAR and described above, a Russian participant at Syria.(23) the same conference reported that no evidence of such instructions to This attribution to a Politburo Pozhidayev had been found in the resolution appears finally to negate the Foreign Ministry's archive. He added, claim that the USSR simply stumbled correctly, that "without the decision of into what was termed recently a the Politburo, none of the ambassadors "catalytic role" in precipitating the would have been allowed to pass it."(20) war.(24) The accepted practice in It is therefore of the utmost preparing "Politburo top-secret significance that a document has now documents… never disclose[d] the emerged showing the Politburo did adopt authors of the proposals or how the precisely such a resolution. In his decision was made."(25) The almost memoirs, Brutents relates being offhand mention of a Politburo resolution summoned on June 5 to Communist Party by Brezhnev seems aimed primarily to headquarters. He was instructed to deflect responsibility for the resulting prepare a speech on the Middle Eastern fiasco from himself personally and spread crisis and newly erupted war for delivery it over the collective body. But with most by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to members of the Politburo present as he the CPSU Central Committee.(21) spoke, Brezhnev could hardly have Brutents added to the present writer: "I invented a resolution that was never and one of my colleagues prepared the adopted.(26) Moreover, Brutents states urgent plenum. We were called in the that the draft he prepared for the speech evening to Brezhnev and were told that in was based on party documents supplied the morning we had to submit Brezhnev's for the purpose.(27) speech to the plenum of the Central 36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
Brezhnev's assertion that it was the anything…. And they have closely Politburo which resolved to inform Egypt guarded secrets which they do not and Syria of Israel's aggressive intent (he disclose to anyone, even…to their made no explicit reference to the governments."(31) The sheer numbers of supposed "troop concentrations") does Israeli troops supposedly concentrated on not in itself rule out the possibility that the Syrian border--11 to 13 brigades, the Soviet political leadership-- as above the strength of Israel's entire distinct from the intelligence apparatus-- standing army--do seem designed more to believed the allegation. This version is impress party leaders, who held Soviet still proposed by some Western analysts, concepts of military scale, than to resting on Prime Minister Alexei conform with Middle Eastern Kosygin's confirmation of the "troop realities.(32) concentrations" to Minister Badran However, it seems improbable that during the latter's visit to Moscow on either the KGB or its bitter rival the GRU May 25-28 and Kosygin's repeating this (military intelligence) could have allegation on June 19 at the UN General submitted such false information Assembly.(28) separately to the Soviet leadership, as However, even before Brezhnev's each would only have been glad to speech, there were indications from disprove the other. In view of the diplomatic spokesmen of the USSR and disastrous results, collusion of both its allies that they knew the troop agencies in this venture without the concentration story was untrue. As early blessing of a ranking patron would as June 13, 1967, Bulgarian UN delegate certainly have been punished. In reality, Milko Tarabanov, "the loyal echo of both KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov and [Soviet Ambassador Nikolai] Defence Minister Andrei Grechko were Fedorenko," asserted at the UN Security promoted to Politburo candidate- Council: "The question of concentration membership status near the end of June of forces being true or not does not matter 1967-- that is, not only following this at all, as it is known that Israel is able to incident but also after its outcome had mobilize within 24 hours."(29) This become apparent. It might be argued that extraordinary equation of potentiality both of them were fresh appointees to with fact in order to justify a lie was still their positions (Grechko in mid-April and maintained recently by a former Soviet Andropov on May 19), and so could not official: "Israel...is well organised… so be blamed for the misdeeds of their for them to mobilise the reserve is a predecessors. Indeed, Grechko tried to matter of 24 hours, not more...their army lay the blame for overevaluation of the had always been... prepared both for Egyptian army's preparedness on the defense and for attack."(30) previous Defence Minister, Rodion But did the Soviet leadership believe Malinovski, who had died on March the veracity of its warning when it was 31.(33) given to the Egyptians in mid-May? But Grechko (whose official title was Brutents hinted to the present writer that then First Deputy Minister of Defense Soviet intelligence may have foisted and Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw fabrications on the political leadership: Pact Forces) is recorded to have assumed, "Neither you nor I can guarantee that informally but effectively, the duties of intelligence does not do some things. In the ailing Malinovsky by November my opinion they are capable of 1966.(34) Andropov, as a Secretary of the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 37
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Central Committee, functioned as …the KGB will undertake "curator" of the KGB for at least a year measures in Arab countries before Brezhnev exploited the defection (UAR, Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, to the West of Stalin's daughter to remove Syria), around documents the mistrusted Vladimir Semichastny manufactured by the [Stasi] and from formal leadership of the agency.(35) verbal information, exposing the Both new nominees--Grechko and policy of West Germany and the Andropov--as well as Foreign Minister USA against these countries and Andrei Gromyko, were or became the common actions of West personal friends of Brezhnev and all three Germany and Israel against Arab were elevated later to full membership of interests, aimed at launching a the Politburo. Given this background, it government crisis appears highly unlikely that Brezhnev [Regierungskriese] of Arab was misled by his own proteges, and it is countries.(38) much more probable that he was a participant rather than a victim of this In any event, the purported causal scheme. connection between this alleged Israeli In the search for some substantive verbal threat and the Soviet warning has base for the Soviet warning, some have been definitively contradicted by the depicted it as an extrapolation from a posthumously published memoirs of supposedly aggressive statement toward Yevgeni Pyrlin, who at the time was a Syria--the threat of a "lightning strike" to senior member of the Egyptian desk in "occupy Damascus [and] overthrow the the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Pyrlin regime there"--attributed to Israeli Chief confirms, for the first time in print, that of Staff Yitzhak Rabin. Nasser, speaking the information on Israeli troop on May 22 to the troops he had moved concentration on the border with Syria into Sinai, referred to "a very was passed to Sadat by Semyonov impertinent" threat made in Israel on May already on May 12--not May 13 as 12, after which "one simply cannot conventionally accepted.(39) The newly remain silent."(36) No published text disclosed Politburo decision--for which exists for any such Israeli statement, Brezhnev gave no exact date--must have which would have been made around preceded this, and therefore could not Independence Day when every word have resulted from Israel's purported spoken by a politician is carefully threat. Moreover, there is an account of covered, and Rabin vehemently denied preparations already being made on May ever making it. Its dissemination has been 11 by the Soviet Embassy in Cairo attributed to a misquote by United Press (undoubtedly on directions from International from an Israeli Defense Moscow) for an "unavoidable" war Force press briefing on May 11.(37) between Egypt and Israel.(40) However, a different provenance for The very fact that the decision to alert Rabin's "threat" is now suggested by one Egypt was brought before the Politburo of the "active measures" agreed upon by for final approval means that it was the KGB and Stasi, and confirmed a considered a matter of major strategic month before the May crisis as one of the planning. "By the Politburo's mandate elements comprising Operation Marabu: and its established practice," according to an insider's description, "it made decisions only on important, large scale 38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War military actions."(41) But was this that Egypt followed up with the "relative" Politburo resolution taken with full or "necessary" steps that the Soviet understanding that it would cause a war, leadership "advised" and expected. indeed with the intent to achieve such a Egyptian diplomat Bassiouny appeared to result? Considering the nature and extent be glossing over this when he stated, of the military preparations undertaken "The fact is that the report was presented by the USSR well before it triggered the to us, whether with instructions or crisis, and that are now coming to light not."(46) As Brezhnev's speech confirms: from a wide variety of contemporary "They [the governments of UAR and witnesses, there can be little question that Syria] informed us immediately that they this was indeed the case.(42) were taking the necessary steps in the In his memoir, Pyrlin still tried to military sphere, and their forces were downplay the significance of this Soviet being put on full combat alert."(47) The move: "The military tension in the recent official Russian history states Middle East was growing every day in unequivocally that "the Soviet leadership geometric progression and our also knew about the war being information, which was passed among prepared."(48) other confidential messages to the Pyrlin states that three weeks before Egyptian President, was an ordinary the war "…several people of the message, one of many dozens of [Foreign] Ministry… were addressed… communications that were passed not with a request but with the order, then."(43) But this description is instruction to prepare…a document contradicted by Pyrlin's own statement to which would evaluate the war [between BBC researchers who in 1997 were Israel and Egypt] as if it had happened, as preparing a documentary on the Arab- if the war were over." Such a report could Israeli conflict: "In the presence of the be ordered only by the party leadership. translator, he [Semyonov] told it not for Its "unanimous" opinion, which the personal information of Sadat, it was according to Pyrlin was shared by the rather to be transformed [transmitted] to KGB and the military headquarters, was Nasser. Relative steps were supposed to "that the war would end up without be taken by the Egyptian side."(44) anybody winning"(49)--indicating that In Sadat's judgment, Semyonov's even a limited Soviet intervention could information about "ten Israeli brigades… tip the balance in favor of the Arab side. concentrating on the Syrian border" was Brezhnev did not elaborate in his urgent enough for him to rush, upon speech what measures the Soviet return to Cairo shortly after midnight on leadership "advised" or expected from May 13, straight from the airport to Egypt and Syria. As it happened, Egypt Nasser‘s residence in order to report. But took three steps: on May 14, its forces he found the president already closeted started to pour into Sinai; on May 16, the with Abd al-Hakim Amer, vice-president UN force was asked to leave its positions and deputy supreme commander of the along the border; and on May 22, Nasser armed forces. Sadat then "realized that declared a blockade on Israeli shipping the Soviet Union had informed Nasser of through the Straits of Tiran. this" through other channels as well.(45) In his speech, Brezhnev ignored the The Soviet warning was thus first move; in relation to the latter two, he calculated to produce a specific result, took care to disclaim any Soviet and every precaution was taken to ensure collusion: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 39
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American ambassador in Moscow I have to say that the government reported asking a "well-informed" Soviet of UAR took a series of steps source "point blank whether Soviets which were not thought out till knew in advance of Egyptian action in the end. As a complete surprise closing [the] Gulf of Aqaba. He was for us, UAR government obviously embarrassed…and after a long demanded on May 19 the pause said he thought Nasser had acted withdrawal of UN forces from the on his own."(53) armistice line. The UAR An anonymous Soviet diplomat, government did not consult with speaking with Le Nouvel Observateur in us on this momentous step, which "early July" [1967], admitted some in the developing situation could collusion: "President Nasser stationed the have been understood as a step Egyptian Army on the Sinai-Israeli toward its escalation….[On May frontier in agreement with the Soviet 23] President Nasser explained to Union, in order to prevent an Israeli us through the Soviet ambassador attack on Syria. The other two serious that the situation in the Middle decisions however--to demand the East had improved as a result of evacuation of the UN Forces and to close the determined steps that were the Sraits--Nasser took on his own and taken by the UAR leadership. At only told us about them afterwards."(54) this time he also informed the Russian sources remain extremely ambassador, as a fait accompli, reticent on the question to this day. "The that the UAR government has Soviet leadership did not react in any way closed the Aqaba Gulf to Israeli to Egypt's steps to close Aqaba and Tiran, ships and to ships of other apparently, not wishing to ‘annoy countries carrying strategic Nasser,'" wrote Pyrlin in his memoir. materiel to Israel. Again, no prior Interestingly, he cited legalistic information was given to the arguments--including Israeli trade Soviet government for this statistics--which the Soviets apparently important action, which caused had at the ready immediately upon serious results.(50) Nasser's announcement, in order to prove that closure of the Straits could not But were Egypt's initial responses to constitute a legitimate casus belli for the Soviet warning [moving forces into Israel. Nonetheless, Pyrlin contends the Sinai, removing the UN force and closing USSR might have dissuaded Nasser had the Straits] actually planned by or it been consulted.(55) coordinated with Moscow? The leading Earlier, former Deputy Foreign contemporary Western analyses found Minister Georgi Korniyenko, who at the "the evidence is conflicting."(51) The time was a senior member of the U.S. Soviet reaction to those steps caused a desk, gave rather conflicting U.S. diplomat to remark on May 26: "It explanations. On the one hand, he almost seemed as though the Soviet claimed, "no consultations took place Union had been aware in advance of the between Cairo and Moscow about the coming Near Eastern crisis, since withdrawal of UN forces, about the Strait Brezhnev had first called for the of Tiran, and so on" and attributed the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet [from the lack of Soviet objection to the UN force's Mediterranean] on April 24."(52) The removal to "the situation…developing 40 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War too fast for our [Soviet] bureaucratic in Gaza."(60) However, at the height of machine to react properly." On the other the crisis, the third-ranking official of the hand, he cited "ideological, political Egyptian Embassy in Moscow confided considerations" of "solidarity… in to an American counterpart that "the general and not on this particular purpose [of] Gromyko's visit to Cairo" question."(56) Soviet collusion with was to give Nasser a "larger commitment Egypt's initial steps is indicated, however, than anyone…had realized…[the] by the fact that Nasser did deem it absence of Soviet public endorsement of nessessary to obtain Soviet approval UAR position on Aqaba [is] not (through Minister Badran's mission to the important because Soviets [are] Kremlin on May 25-28) only for the supporting UAR ‘in other ways.'"(61) further escalation of a pre-emptive strike According to one of his subordinates against Israel. at the time, "Gromyko did not resolve a A plan including two of the initial single tiny question: he would not fulfill a Egyptian measures (removal of UNEF decision or make up his mind without and closure of the Straits) was wired to getting the approval of the Politburo Nasser by Marshal Amer from a visit in first."(62) Gromyko indeed told the Pakistan in early December 1966.(57) Egyptians "that he came, not in his The three leaders of this delegation to capacity as minister of foreign affairs, but Pakistan--Amer, Badran and intelligence as candidate member of the chief Salah Nasr--arrived there one week Politburo.…Soviet relations with Egypt after talks in Moscow with the Soviet were regarded as so important that they military command headed by Grechko. remained the concern of the Indeed as far back as 1975, the Israeli Politburo."(63) regional expert Avraham Ben-Tzur, in a The next ranking CPSU official to brilliant analysis of Arab and Soviet visit Egypt (April 11-26) was Moscow documents and press reports, concluded city party boss Nikolai G. Yegorychev, that even if this plan was not directly who came as the guest of the Arab suggested by Grechko to his Egyptian Socialist Union (ASU), Nasser's political guests, he "provided the inspiration" for party. The formal host was Yegorychev's its inception.(58) By April 18, according counterpart as head of the ASU in Cairo, to a CIA report, Nasser himself was who was also Nasser's chief of staff. In a telling a senior Egyptian diplomat of his recent interview with the present writer, own desire to get UNEF out of Sinai and Yegorychev declined to discuss the close the Straits.(59) content of a confidential document which While Ben-Tzur makes a persuasive he subsequently presented to the Central case for Grechko's original authorship of Committee. He denied later reports that the "Amer Plan," its promotion appears to he endorsed direct military support for have been adopted as Politburo policy Egypt or Syria during the war.(64) But it well before the mid-May decision to is noteworthy that Nasser pointed out on trigger its implementation. When the May 26: "I was authorized by the Arab Soviet foreign minister paid an Socialist Union's Higher Executive to unexpected visit to Cairo during the last implement this plan [moving forces into week of March, "The only concrete Sinai, removing UNEF and closing the detail leaked out in the Cairo press was Straits] at the right time. The right time that Gromyko would also discuss the came when Syria was threatened with problems of the UN peace-keeping force aggression."(65) Yegorychev was sacked Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 41
Isabella Ginor following the June session of the Central Badran addressed "the Soviet leadership Committee, where he "infringed on the with their [Nasser's] request to approve of General Secretary's personal bailiwick" pre-emptive measures… early strikes to by asking whether the defeat of the prevent Israel from being the first [to USSR's Arab allies did not cast doubt on attack]." The exchange continued for its capability to defend its own another two days of "sharp" conversation territory.(66) until "apparently he [Nasser] accepted the Brezhnev's speech confirms that argument of the Soviet leadership."(70) following the Egyptian moves, "in the Brezhnev stated in his speech that on United Nations we did everything that May 26 the Soviet government sent depended on us, comrades, to lessen the Nasser a message "which spoke of the pressure of the Western superpowers on necessity ‘to do everything possible in the UAR in connection with the question order to prevent military conflict.'"(71) of the free passage in the Aqaba Gulf This must refer to the talks with Badran, and in order to frustrate the plans for which were subsequently portrayed by military provocation against UAR."(67) Soviet spokesmen as an attempt to dissuade the Egyptians from any military Indeed, at the UN Fedorenko so action. Brutents, for example, told the diligently stalled proposals to lift the present writer: "Kosygin was saying blockade (even to convene the Security ‘Nyet' to him…these talks ended with a Council) that his Canadian and Danish ‘sour reaction' of Badran. He received an colleagues told him they had "A nasty instruction from Nasser…:If our Soviet feeling [that the] USSR [was] playing [a] friends do not support us, if they oppose, game of allowing crisis to build to force we do not have a choice."(72) Israel to act."(68) But Brezhnev did note that upon This appears, however, to have been receiving the message Nasser expressed the limit of prior coordination with full aggreement with the Soviet Egypt, and it was almost disrupted on considerations it outlined, and "stated to May 25 when Badran arrived in Moscow our ambassador… that the UAR never to seek consent for an Egyptian first will start first the armed conflict."(73) strike against Israel. In his Central This position was confirmed by Nasser Committee speech a month later, on May 31 or June 1 to President Brezhnev described Badran's mission as Johnson's special envoy to Cairo, Robert limited to a "request of military B. Anderson, former secretary of the assistance that was sent by the UAR treasury, by stating that "he would wait leadership to the Central Committee;" until the Israelis had moved."(74) this request to bring forward military Describing the talks with Badran, supplies scheduled for 1968-69 was Akopov adds: "the first thing he accepted, with delivery dates set to begin [Kosygin] marked and sounded from the in June.(69) But a participant at the actual very beginning without any diplomatic talks, Pavel Akopov, an Egyptian desk mannerism, that we, the Soviet Union, officer at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, cannot give you our consent for your pre- denied this: "As far as the Egyptians emptive strikes against Israel. This would requests to increase the armament contradict our policy and our position. supplies for the Egyptian army, at the Should you be first to attack, you will be talks where I was present this matter was aggressors, and once you are not raised." According to his account, aggressors…we cannot support you."(75) 42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
The recent official Russian military Kosygin's message--reiterating also the history confirms that the Arab attack was, original Soviet allegation: "I urged at Soviet behest, not cancelled but only Eshkol to stop the escalation, stop the restored to its original design as a concentration [of forces] on the Syrian counterstrike: border and start negotiations with Arab states."(80) In reply, Eshkol offered to The Arabs planned to open the meet the Soviet leadership, but this-- offensive first but because of according to Pyrlin--"was left unnoticed." some difference of opinion within Pyrlin explains that the Soviet leadership their leadership (and perhaps the needed approval from Nasser for meeting Soviet warning had its effect), the the Israeli prime minister,(81) which in date for the beginning of the itself suggests very close coordination ‘decisive actions' was between Soviet and Egyptian leaders, postponed…. Soviet experts were who "during past year… maintained of opinion that in the impending direct dialogue… and handled some war…an important role will be business directly."(82) But more played also by who will appear as significantly, Pyrlin says that Foreign direct initiator of the Ministry officialdom did not dare "to offensive.(76) push the leadership towards some constructive solution or response. We Akopov notes: "Kosygin probably has could have received a reproach for that reported it to the Politburo…because it but…the absence of a reply is a reply was a question of war and peace and our itself."(83) involvement, naturally it was discussed at The Soviet bureaucracy was thus under the Politburo."(77) While the talks with the impression that the leadership desired Badran were in progress, Kosygin sent to precipitate a crisis, not to prevent it. messages to the leaders of the United This was also the reading of the U.S. States and Britain, which must have been ambassador in Moscow, who cabled on approved at Politburo level, assuring the final day of Badran's mission, based them that the measures taken by Arab on a warning from the Egyptian states were "of a defensive nature" but Embassy's political counselor: "[The] warning that "if Israel commits Soviet objective is to transform Arab- aggression and military action begins Israeli struggle into [a] showdown then we would render assistance to…the between Communists and anti- victims."(78) In his speech, Brezhnev Communists for control of Middle East, mentioned only "the Soviet message from and [the] Soviets are succeeding. If May 26 to [Israeli] Prime Minister Levi Nasser wins this one, monarchies and Eshkol that included a warning to the Western oil interests will go."(84) Israeli government not to increase the Years later, Pyrlin confirmed that this tension and not to escalate the situation to was exactly the USSR's strategic the point of letting the arms speak"--an aspiration: "it was possible to hope and to expression apparently used in the count on the fact that the distribution of Politburo discussion as it is virtually political forces on the Middle East would identical with that used in Kosygin's be considerably changed due to this war, letters to the Western leaders.(79) and that events will take place similar to At 2:10am on May 27, Chuvakhin post-1956 events when the whole chain woke up Eshkol and handed him of revolutions took place in the Arab Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 43
Isabella Ginor world, and a number of regimes which for its conclusion shortly after the coup were pro-Western were replaced by on February 23 which put Damascus nationalistic regimes…."(85) firmly in the Soviet camp and provided a The determining test of the Soviet test case for the activist foreign policy leadership's intentions must remain in the formulated at the Soviet Communist facts of its preparation for military action. Party's congress a few weeks later. This Pending the unlikely declassification of official CPSU doctrine asserted "unity of the directly relevant Soviet documents, the three revolutionary trends in modern the full scope and content of the Soviet times--global Socialism, national- operational plan can only be liberation struggle of enslaved peoples approximated by piecing together a and the international workers' growing number of partial but revealing movement."(87) and complementary accounts from Syrian leaders, including the new participants. These outline deliberate and prime minister and defense minister, were complex military moves which predated flown to Moscow in a Soviet military and parallelled the political-diplomatic plane on April 18. On May 2, a treaty efforts designed to manipulate Egypt into was signed between Syria and the provoking Israel to launch a first strike, USSR.(88) Then, as documented by following which the USSR would Walter Laqueur, "During his May [10-18] intervene to support the Arab side against 1966 visit to Cairo Kosygin persuaded the "aggressor." the Rais [Nasser] that a mutual defense Michael Oren cites numerous sources pact between Cairo and Damascus (to be to establish that already in 1966, with guaranteed by Moscow) would be in the Egypt ostensibly barred from deploying best interests of all those concerned."(89) substantial forces in Sinai, the Soviets Kosygin's mission and his speech to the devised a master plan for such Egyptian National Assembly on May 17, deployment codenamed "Conqueror." stressing "the important role of your More revealing, perhaps, is the country also in the Arab peoples' struggle description of this plan's strategy as for the solution of the Palestinian "shield and sword"--the motto and question"(90) must have been cleared by emblem of the KGB. One of this plan's the Politburo with a clear view of what basic features (a lightly defended front was to follow. By that time the Soviet line) was specifically designed "to serve plan, at least in its political aspect, might as bait for luring the Israelis into a frontal have begun to take shape. It conformed assault."(86) with the overall change toward an activist Perhaps even more significant is that strategy against the United States. "Conqueror" was originated at the same As recalled by Aleksandr Bovin, a time that Egypt signed its defense treaty member of Andropov's think-tank from with Syria, which was invoked by the the latter's pre-KGB days (and later warning of May 1967. Syria's role in the Brezhnev's speechwriter), "[By] about the Soviet instigation of the 1967 crisis has middle of 1966 there began to ripen not been adequately explored, partly within the Soviet leadership an intent to because Russian sources--not to mention stamp its foot, to scare the Americans, to Syrian ones--are absolutely silent on it. put them in their proper place."(91) The The Egyptian-Syrian pact was signed in Soviet ambassador in Washington at the November 1966, just before Amer's visit time, Anatoli Dobrynin, writes that such to Moscow; but the USSR began pressing a trend "was reflected during the 23rd 44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
Party congress…which devoted much Ambassador Katriel Katz. "The Soviets attention to Soviet-American relations appear to have had an obsession about and to criticism of the USA's policy in such troop concentrations," writes Parker; Vietnam."(92) Ben-Tzur points to the Israel counted at least eight such meetings held by the Soviet military with warnings before the last one actually Arab and other delegations to the 23rd touched off the war.(98) An apter congress, in all of whose countries description is probably that given by violence erupted in short order.(93) Solomon M. Schwartz, one of the first Syria's role in the CPSU's new global researchers on the subject: "The legend concept can be extrapolated from about energetic preparation by Israel for contemporary Soviet propaganda, attacking Syria became from the summer according to its standard methods: "In of 1966 an integral part of the Soviet Soviet diplomatic practice, every propaganda in the Middle East."(99) In important foreign policy step…was the summer of 1966, this was indeed a accompanied by a number of propaganda legend. Despite recurring firefights on the actions--including publication of articles, frontier, Israel's entire defense line from statements by ‘independent' organizations Lake Tiberias northward was held by one and public figures supporting the Soviet company of paratroops with minimal position, invitation…to participate in a auxiliary units.(100) Soviet V.I.P.'s visit, praising the latter The recurrence of these Soviet and his position, and so on.… these warnings is customarily invoked to expensive operations were called support the thesis that the May 1967 ‘propaganda insurance' or ‘propaganda disinformation was merely a routine backing.'"(94) exercise that happened to get out of hand. Such a campaign was begun already But this is purely speculative, and on May 8, 1966 in Izvestia, which for the certainly no better founded than an first time claimed that Syria "became a alternative interpretation: that the central object of military blackmail and repetition of these charges, together with provocation by Israel."(95) On the same increasingly acrimonious Soviet day, a TASS cable from Damascus made statements and the encouragement of the first mention of "a suspicious Syria to undertake actions (which indeed concentration and movement of Israeli provoked a forceful Israeli response troops sighted lately on the border with climaxing on April 7), were part of a Syria."(96) This report, predating deliberate escalation designed to prepare Kosygin's trip to Cairo, appeared only in the ground for harnessing Egypt to the the provincial Sovietskaya Kirgizia. By military confrontation being prepared and May 21, upon his return, the national to draw an Israeli strike against Egypt as Sovietskaya Rossiya was charging that well. "about a third of the Israeli army, after On April 22, 1967, in Berlin on his marching to music through the streets of way to a gathering of Communist bloc Haifa, was immediately following the leaders at Karlovy Vary, Brezhnev parade transferred to the Syrian signalled that this regional build-up was border."(97) approaching its global objective: a strike On this background the first official at the United States via its Israeli client. Soviet protest about these troop He notified his counterparts, East concentrations was delivered on May 25, Germany's Walter Ulbricht and Poland's 1966 by the same Semyonov to Israeli Wladislaw Gomulka, of a "decisive Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 45
Isabella Ginor
blow" that was about to be dealt to yes, the order was given but there was no American interests in the Middle East-- order to bomb or to attack Israel-- even at the cost of sacrificing Grechko would not be able to issue such Nasser.(101) After the mid-May warning an order without a Politburo was transmitted to Egypt, Soviet decision."(106) "propaganda insurance" concentrated on "pushing the United States into the Preparations for the prospective forefront of the Middle East crisis by landing were one feature of the making Washington responsible for unprecedented reinforcement of naval Israel's actions"(102) in its forthcoming units in the Mediterranean which had assault on Syria--precisely according to been in full swing from January 1967, the guidelines now revealed for when Navy commander Gorshkov visited Operation Marabu. Egypt.(107) According to accepted Preliminary details of the Soviet naval Soviet procedure, military moves on this landing on Israeli shores with air support, kind of scale required Politburo approval: which was aborted after being put in motion on June 10, were first published …such as mobilizations general by the present writer in MERIA Journal or partial; substantial movements three years ago, based largely on of troops, particularly from one reminiscences of participants.(103) In military district to another; large response to the recent publication of these maneuvers, especially unplanned findings in Russian, Academician ones; deployment and use of any Aleksandr K. Kislov has added the type of weapons of mass hitherto unconfirmed fact that the landing destruction; putting on alert all force included (in addition to improvised Soviet armed forces, or forces in platoons from warship crews) "desant one or several military districts; [landing] ships with well-prepared and some other matters.(108) marines."(104) Since the original publication, other substantial The Politburo thus had to approve the corroborating evidence has emerged, "first large-scale movement of Soviet which, among other aspects, indicates naval units into the Mediterranean at the that planning of this operation began well end of February" which began shortly before mid-May 1967. after Amer submitted his plan to Nasser This was already described in 1996- and Gorshkov's visit to Egypt.(109) The 1997, in mostly unused portions of ships were drawn from the Black Sea several interviews conducted by a BBC and Northern Fleets. Two of the team for a documentary series. In participants in the projected landing denying any Soviet intent to intervene in operation give their respective dates for the 1973 Yom Kippur War, former KGB starting the voyage to the Mediterranean "resident" in Cairo Vadim Kirpichenko as May 3, from the Baltic and May 20, said: "this was not…1967…when we from an Arctic base.(110) At least one were insisting and we were prepared for Soviet nuclear submarine (K-131) was some decisive actions."(105) And in a sent from the Barents Sea into the portion of his interview that was not Mediterranean "on the eve of crisis…by included in the broadcast series, Foreign decision of the leadership."(111) Another Ministry officer Pyrlin stated specifically: Soviet nuclear submarine, based in "As far as the invasion readiness goes, Alexandria, received orders to fire 46 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War nuclear missiles at Israel if the latter attempts to present this operation as should use nuclear arms against the purely deterrent. The same applies to the Arabs.(112) combat alert ordered, according to Pyrlin, Soviet warships carrying nuclear for Soviet land and air forces "in the weapons were also dispatched to the Red Transcaucasus,…in the Transcaspian, all Sea before the hostilities started, the districts oriented at the Middle East. It ostensibly because "...there existed in was publicly known that these military Moscow a concern that in a turn of events districts are responsible for the situation... unfavorable for it, Israel could use certain in the Middle East region." Pyrlin claims kinds of WMD [weapons of mass "the fact that they were raised to alarm--it destruction], the existence of which never was well known, and from that various was denied by official Tel Aviv." On conclusions could be drawn: either we are June 8, this squadron was at close enough about to initiate some military steps or range to arrive "partially for deterrence, whether it was going to be the to the Red Sea shores of Egypt"--a move demonstration of force.…It was meant as triggered, according to the official a demonstration of power."(120) There is, Russian history, by the Israeli attack on however, no evidence that U.S. or any the U.S.S. Liberty.(113) other Western intelligence was aware of After another 10 ships passed from the this. Black Sea into the Mediterranean on May On Sunday [June 4], in Ukraine, oral 31,(114) the Soviet eskadra in the orders were also given to deploy a Mediterranean consisting of 40 battle "regiment" of strategic bombers to units, including 10 submarines, was put vantage points on the USSR's southern on battle alert on June 1.(115) On June 4, fringe, "from where they could reach it was given 12 hours to reach full battle Sinai." With the possible exception of the alert.(116) The head of Israeli SIGINT first order, all the instructions were (signal intelligence) in 1967 told the delivered from Moscow over the phone to present writer that his unit tracked radio save time over the decoding, according to messages from 43 Soviet vessels in the the Air Force Corps commander, Col. eastern Mediterranean but was unable to General (ret.) Vasili Reshetnikov. A day crack their code.(117) In any event, these before, the pilots were assigned pre- signals would not have given away the determined targets in Israel: "The Soviet desant operation, as orders to raise objects…were named to us--that strikes a landing party on each ship were given had to be delivered against: they were orally to the captains on board the marked by the geographical terms on the flagship.(118) The Soviet military map; and we were particularly interested interpreters into Arabic, who were about the anti-aircraft defense systems, confined to the Soviet Embassy in Cairo the Hawk complexes."(121) since May 11, were transferred at some This reference to Israel's U.S.-supplied point to Alexandria. There they were anti-aircraft missiles appears to connect supposed to be embedded with the the Soviet operational plans to one of the landing forces "for liason with Israeli USSR's central concerns regarding Israel- Arabs."(119) -its nuclear capability. The first Hawk As these preparations could not have batteries were deployed in 1965 around been detected by U.S. or Israeli the nuclear plant at Dimona.(122) The intelligence unless revealed in signals, KGB "resident" in pre-1967 war Israel this belies subsequent Soviet and Russian mentions being ordered to check "the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 47
Isabella Ginor reliability of existing information about intent to strike a sudden blow the progress of works conducted in Israel upon important objects on Israeli for producing nuclear weapons."(123) territory in general without any Dimona is known to have been, at least concretization. This is why we on two occasions (May 17 and 26, 1967), sent a note to Nasser, in which we the target of Egyptian high-altitude aerial very insistently advised not to photography sorties which the Hawks start this war….I think that if we either did not attempt or failed to had clearly envisaged then that intercept. A Soviet military historian who the main goal of this strike [was] has specialized in the Middle East, Col. to destroy the nuclear potential of Valeri Yaremenko, wrote that: "this lack Israel, we would not have chosen of action [response] pushed Nasser and to convince Nasser to avoid Commander-in-Chief Marshal Amer to it.(127) reach, in absolute secrecy, a decision to destroy the Israeli reactor before it would However, Akopov relates that Badran, be able to produce nuclear weaponry. when questioned by Kosygin, did Intensive training flights were started, disclose the details of Amer's proposed with live bombing of a ‘full-scale targets.(128) Given that in following Dimona model' in the Egyptian years all such deep-penetration desert….In the beginning of June [1967] reconnaissance of Israel was performed Amer decided to bomb Dimona in the on behalf of Egypt by Soviet aircraft and period of June 7-10."(124) In defense of personnel,(129) it seems unlikely that the Nasser's conduct, Egyptian diplomat Soviets were totally unaware of the Tahsin Basheer said he "miscalculated Dimona missions. In this context it is badly, but he defended the area against noteworthy to mention that in April 1967, atomization."(125) 15 Soviet SU-7 bombers were delivered Yaremenko states that "Moscow to Egypt, but "the Egyptian pilots did not remained a passive observer" of this have time to master them."(130) activity, but adds, "according to the Gromyko's statement may actually opinion of the then foreign minister, indicate there was an active Soviet nuclear war in the Middle East could interest in taking out Dimona--as have been beneficial for the USSR."(126) Reshetnikov's account appears to suggest. Gromyko himself is recorded as telling While Moscow itself treated the his subordinates 14 years later that forthcoming war in the Cold War context, "Amer--a decisive and even aggressive it took pains to present it as a local person--gave an order to bomb Dimona conflict, and to camouflage its and other important objects on Israeli participation. "There was serious warning territory. But at our behest Nasser against any losses and casualties, because cancelled this order." According to the every loss of any plane could unfold the source of this account, former Soviet essence and the meaning of our race diplomat Oleg Grinevski, Gromyko [raids], our Soviet aviation." To prevent claimed that: formal identification of the Soviet air intervention, "all the documents were the Soviet leadership did not taken from the pilots and the crew in case know then about the Egyptians' some plane is burning in the desert."(131) plan to liquidate Israel's nuclear The idea was to "let others guess who fell potential. We knew only about the down and why they were there, what 48 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War happened."(132) Reshetnikov notes that subsequent onslaught on Syria. But it "we had to work under the colors of the merits mention that Brezhnev's speech Egyptian flag."(133) There was a logistic confirms, for the first time in an official problem with repainting the planes in Soviet document, that the latter action Egyptian markings, because "no one was undertaken--and hence that it had knew what these signs should look like;" been prepared: "On June 10…all Soviet being Sunday, it was very difficult to warships in the Mediterranean, including obtain from closed factories the needed missle launchers, were given an order to paint, and "…we needed time to let it turn and under escort of submarines dry,…but in fact we were putting the [steam] to the Syrian coast."(137) colours on and flying straight away, flew While there is as yet no direct immediately, and new planes were ready evidence that Brezhnev and Grechko to take off as well."(134) When "the first were personally involved in the planning group was [at] the launching airfield," of a naval landing, their joint authorship Reshetnikov was instructed to await of such a scheme appears very much in further orders.(135) "In 1967 and in 1973 character. Consider the following account he [Grechko] was not able to issue the of such an operation: order without Brezhnev's decision," stated Pyrlin, equating the Politburo with Landing from the sea… would be the secretary-general.(136) an absolute surprise…a plan that The Politburo, then, had to approve is deciphered by the opponent, as the preparations and preliminary stages of is known, is half-destined to fail. the operation up to the actual Therefore, the first task was to implementation, and its mid-May ensure absolute secrecy. We resolution approving the transmission of forbade any correspondence in a warning to Egypt was but the connection with the operation continuation of a series. It certainly had being prepared. For its to approve Brezhnev's major overt move development only a severely in Mediterranean naval matters: his limited circle of people was demand, at Karlovy Vary on April 24, for drafted.…In order not to disclose removal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. As it our intentions its [intelligence happened, this was almost achieved at the gathering] was conducted across a the outset of the war, when the Sixth broad front. Work upon the Fleet was withdrawn westward in order to disinformation of the opponent disprove Arab charges that its aircraft was conducted, suggesting the were assisting Israel's air offensive. From ‘desant' would take place then until June 10, the Soviet navy [elsewhere].(138) enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the eastern Mediterranean--the best conditions This description corresponds exactly Brezhnev might have desired for the to the preparation of the Soviet projected intervention. Mediterranean operation in 1967: all The scope of this paper cannot include orders for the landing were delivered the sequence of events that prevented the orally, only ship captains were informed activation of the Soviet operation on until the actual implementation, and total behalf of Egypt in the opening days of the radio silence was observed--not to war, and then brought about its restart as mention the use of disinformation. But a declared, deterrent move to stop Israel's the quotation actually refers to a landing Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 49
Isabella Ginor at Novorossisk on the Black Sea during former Soviet officer, who in 1967 was in World War II. It is taken from the graduating class of cadets: Brezhnev's memoirs, which describe his service as the political officer of the 18th In the second half of May Army as a lifelong defining experience, 1967…the Middle Eastern and take credit for this successful situation was deteriorating, war operation together with the Army's between the Arab states and Israel commanding officer--Grechko.(139) was considered inevitable, indeed These two old comrades-in-arms imminent. The war's result was appear to have reverted in 1967 to the predetermined, as everyone in the victorious tactic of their joint heroic USSR believed…In order to memories. Brezhnev's tendency to see the prevent the West coming to two conflicts in the same context is Israel's defense, combat readiness further indicated by his use, in the June was raised…for this to be better 1967 speech, of the term "treacherous" to understood by officers and upper- describe Israel's pre-emptive attack--an class cadets, they were read a epithet usually reserved in Soviet statement by Minister of Defense parlance for the German attack on the Marshal Grechko: "The fiftieth USSR in 1941.(140) A landing operation year of the Great October would in any case not seem far-fetched to Socialist Revolution will be the Soviet brass: as late as 1969, such an last year of the existence of the assualt (in this case a paratroop drop) was State of Israel."(144) proposed in order to take Beijing following the Soviet-Chinese border While the destruction of Israel was not clashes.(141) an officially stated goal of Soviet policy, As for Grechko's input, his there are numerous other instances characterization by Yegorychev as a indicating that the idea pervaded Soviet soldafon (rough soldier) is borne out by thought and parlance, particularly among accounts that his "self-will, the military. One example of many for capriciousnes, roughness and rudeness" this indoctrination is provided in the went as far as suggesting a conquest of memoir of an officer who was dispatched Western Europe as revenge for the Cuban to Egypt shortly after the war: "The debacle of 1962. He was reportedly Arabs had decided to reestablish moderated somewhat by promotion to Palestine on the area that had already ministerial rank, but still "would not been captured by Israel. With this hesitate to demonstrate the superiority purpose, led by the UAR under the and might of the Soviet armed leadership of…Nasser, [they] deployed forces."(142) Considering another of armed forces, leaning on the assistance of Grechko's defining youthful experiences- the Soviet Union."(145) Ambassador -his service, during the Civil War and Chuvakhin, while proclaiming to Eshkol after, in the notoriously and murderously the USSR's peaceful intent if Israel did anti-Semitic army of Semyon Budyonny- not attack, was evidently more candid -it is hardly surprising that even as with the leader of Israel's Communist minister "sometimes he would wave his party (MaKI), Dr. Moshe Sneh: "The war fists, threatening to liquidate imperialism will last 24 hours only and no trace of the and Zionism."(143) According to a State of Israel will be left."(146)
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The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
Akopov, however, recalls his dacha and were improvising the diplomatic colleagues demurring at least approximate plan for celebrations."(150) from the feasibility of this aim: "If we put The KGB-Stasi meeting in Moscow in the task of an offensive…liberation of mid-April specifically stressed the earlier occupied territories--then we importance of "active measures" for estimated it differently: we [at the commemorating the jubilee.(151) At the Foreign Ministry] thought that the height of the Middle Eastern crisis, an Egyptian army is not capable of such unnamed Soviet diplomat at the UN operations.…Our military believed, appeared to betray this preoccupation in thought that the Egyptian army could an inverted form, by "saying they fulfil these tasks."(147) "Earlier occupied would…not get involved in a war on their territories" might apply to all of pre-1967 50th anniversary."(152) Israel, or at least to those parts not Ironically, when the timing, character included in the Jewish state by the 1947 and success of Israel's pre-emptive strike Partition Resolution. Official Soviet surprised the Soviets and obviated their foreign policy did not accept the 1949 planned intervention, it also put a damper armistice lines as final borders between on the festive occasion: "This interest [in Israel and its neighbors.(148) celebrations] waned with the Six-Day Restoring the Partition borders might War,"(153) which instead necessitated a well be "the unavoidable weakening of meticulous cover-up that continues to this Israel's positions" which Pyrlin mentions day. as the expected outcome of the war, while qualifying that "of course there could not *The author, a Fellow of the Harry S. be any consideration of its absolute Truman Research Institute for the liquidation, as called for by some hot Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew Arab heads." Such a result, "could have University of Jerusalem, thanks the constituted according to this [Soviet] way Institute for a research grant on the of thinking a serious blow to the prestige Soviet military involvement in the Arab- of the USA, Israel's main ally which was Israeli conflict, which facilitated the at that period getting bogged deeper and research for and writing of this paper. deeper in the Vietnam war."(149) She thanks Dr. Stefan Meining of Munich It also might have been a fitting gift for granting access to Stasi documents he for November 7, 1967. The approaching uncovered; Brook Lapping Productions anniversary of the revolution provides an for permission to quote from material element of timing and motivation for the relating to "The 50 Years War: Israel and Soviet initiative that merits further the Arabs," a six part television investigation. Several references from documentary made by Brian Lapping other sources indicate that Grechko was Associates, 1998; and the Trustees of the not alone in seeking a dramatic deed to Liddell Hart Centre for Military mark the event, such as a blow on the Archives, King's College, London for "imperialist forces" which would crown granting of access to, and permission to Soviet leaders with an historic Leninist quote, interview transcripts from this achievement. "Brezhnev," according to material (henceforth referred to as his speechwriter at the time, "began by "transcripts;" spelling and grammar May [1967] to show his interest in the reflect the text of the original English 50th anniversary...at the beginning of translation). She is also the author of June [before the war] we met at Gor'ki's "The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 51
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Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War" (Moscow: ROSSPEN (Rossiiskaya which appeared in the December 2000 Politicheskaya Entsiklopediya), 2002), p. issue of MERIA. 56. 6. Oren, op. cit., p. 54. NOTES 7. Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the 1. Josephine Tey, The Daughter of Time Middle East from World War Two to (London: Arrow Books, 1997), p. 111. Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge 2. Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War University Press, 1990), p. 58; Mohamed (New York: Oxford University Press, Heikal, 1967--Al-Intifijar (Arabic), Cairo, 2002), p. 55. 1990, p. 447, cited in Parker, Politics, p. 3. Nadav Safran, From War To War 6-7, p. 247 n.9. (New York: Pegasus), p. 274n, quoting 8. Maj. Gen. Vladimir A. Zolotaryov et deposed Egyptian Minister of War Shams al, Rossiya (SSSR) v lokal'nykh voynakh al-Din Badran at his trial, according to al- I vooruzhennykh konfliktakh vtoroy Ahram, February 25, 1968. Also poloviny XX veka (Russian: Russia Jerusalem Post, February 28, 1968. The (USSR) in Local Wars and Military United Nations Truce Supervision Conflicts in the Second Half of the 20th Organization also "reported to the Century) (Moscow: Institute of Military Secretary-General that there was no History, Ministry of Defense of the evidence of any Israeli build-up" [F.T. Russian Federation, 2000), p.181. This Liu, at the time Senior Advisor to first official history of the Soviet UNTSO, in Richard B. Parker, ed., The involvement in local wars does not Six-Day War: A Retrospective mention passing the information to Egypt (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, at all, starting its chronology of the 1996), p. 99.] Middle Eastern crisis on May 18, 1967, 4. For a comprehensive overview of all with the removal of UNEF by Egypt. these theories see Richard B. Parker, The 9. A vague and sparse chapter in the Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle official history of the Foreign Intelligence East (Bloomington: Indiana University Agency of the Russian Federation on its Press, 1993), Chapter 1: "The Soviet website states: "In the [1960s], foreign Warning," pp. 3-20. intelligence received information about 5. Brutents is one of several Soviet Israel's preparations for new aggression officials active in 1967 who still against Arab countries, including the date vehemently defend the USSR against for it to attack Egypt and Syria in 1967. "American and Israeli writers [who] tried This intelligence was passed on to the to prove that the Soviet Union blessed, so leaderships of Arab countries, who, to speak, the events that led to the Six- however, undervalued it and overvalued Day War" and accuse them of the military potential of their countries." "attempts… to justify the provocative
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow), March 1 the 25th anniversary of the June War 2001; Grinevski: Stsenarii dlya tret'ey convened at the Center for the Study of mirovoy voyny (Russian: The Script for Foreign Affairs at the Department of World War III) (Moscow: Olma-Press, State's Foreign Service Institute by 2002), p. 112. former Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy 10. The KGB "resident" in Israel in 1967 Korniyenko and Vitaly Naumkin of the stated as recently as five years ago: Oriental Studies Institute. It also appears "From the regularly incoming to conform with the attempts to information it transpired that a war in the downgrade the echelon involved in the Middle East was approaching and could disinformation incident and the break out at the end of the 1966 or in the motivation behind it. first half of 1967.… Our efforts and 16. Pavel Akopov, transcript, p. 4. means were concentrated in gathering 17. Oleg Grinevski, Sekrety sovetskoy reliable secret information." Ivan diplomatii (Russian: Secrets of Soviet Dedyulya: "Na Zemle Obetovannoy: Diplomacy), (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), dejatel'nost' sovetskoj rezidentury v p. 6; Korniyenko was also a member of Izraile v 60-x godax" (Russian: "In the this delegation and so must have known Promised Land: the Activity of the the position of trust that was conferred on Soviet Residentura in Israel in the ‘60s"), Semyonov. NVO (military supplement of 18. Mlechin, op.cit., pp. 246-247. Nezavisimaya Gazeta) Vol. 20, Moscow 19. Michael Bar-Zohar: Embassies in 1998. Crisis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 11. Leonid Mlechin: Mossad: sekretnaya Hall, 1970), p. 1. In a telephone interview voyna (Russian: Mossad: The Secret from his home in Tel-Aviv on November War) (Moscow: Centrpoligraf, 2000), pp. 1, 2002, Bar-Zohar confirmed this 246-247. According to this source, the quotation and gave his source as KGB resident in Cairo warned about up "probably a British intercept." to 12 brigades concentrated on the Syrian 20. Richard B. Parker, ed., The Six-Day border. War: A Retrospective (henceforth SDW), 12. MfS-S.d.M-1465, Protokoll ueber (Florida: University Press of Florida, Verhandlung zwischen Vertretern des 1996), pp. 37, 40, 42. This book presents MfS der DDR und des KfS beim the proceedings of the 25th anniversary Ministerrat der UdSSR ueber conference (see note 16). In June 1967, gemeinsame aktive Massnahmen fuer das Bassiouny was a special assistant in the Jahr 1967 (German: Protocol of office of Undersecretary Feki. The Negotiation between Representatives of Russian participant quoted is Naumkin; a the MfS of the GDR and the KGB at the similar view was presented by Council of Ministers of the USSR over Korniyenko. Common Active Measures for the Year 21. Karen N. Brutents: Tridtsat' let na 1967), pp. 8-9. Staroy ploschadi (Russian: Thirty Years 13. Parker, Politics, p. 21. on the Old Square), (Moscow: 14. Isabella Ginor, "Adayin oneh Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenija, 1996), p. bizehirut" (Hebrew: "Still Answering 230. Cautiously"), Ha'aretz, July 5, 1991. 22. Telephone interview with Brutents 15. Parker, Politics. p. 248 n12. This (Moscow), October 17, 2000. characterization of Semynov was 23. Emphasis added. Der Rede Von L.I. presented in 1992 during a conference on Breschnev auf dem Juniplenum des ZK Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 53
Isabella Ginor
der KpdSU, Uber die Politik der 26. Kosygin was away for the UN Sowjetunion im Zusammenhang mit der General Assembly's extraordinary session Agression Israels im Nahen Osten, and his meeting with President Johnson 20.06.1967 (German: The Speech of L.I. in Glassboro--where he was evidently Brezhnev at the June Plenum of the CP of constrained by collective instructions. the USSR in Connection with the Israeli Johnson was very frustrated when "each Aggression in the Middle East). time I mentioned missiles, Kosygin SAPMO=NA ZPA IV 2/1/362. The talked about Arabs and Israelis." Lyndon authenticity of Brezhnev's reference to a B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Politburo resolution is confirmed by a Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963- Polish report of the same speech (AAN 1969 (New York: Henry Holt, 1971), p. KC PZPR 2632), which was found and 483. partly published by Uri Bar-Noi, Notes 27. Brutents, Thirty Years, p. 374. from the Chaim Herzog Center for 28. Parker, Politics, p. 130. Middle East Studies and Diplomacy 29. On June 13, 1967. Solomon M. (Beersheba: Ben Gurion University), Vol. Schwarz, Sovetskii Soyuz i arabo- 6, May 2001. Bar-Noi, however, izrail'skaya voyna 1967 goda (Russian: considers that Brezhnev's speech "does The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli not shed light on the controversial War 1967) (New York: American Jewish information about concentration of Israeli Workers' Committee, 1969), p. 72, troops,"and appears to attach no quoting Security Council minutes S/PV, significance to the mention of the 1358 p. 147-150. On Tarabanov as a Politburo -- a conclusion disputed by the mouthpiece for Fedorenko, see Arthur present writer. Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 24. Uri Ra'anan, "Not Just Six Days, Not 1967 (New York: Columbia University Just a War," Bostonia (Boston Press, 1968), p. 88. University), Fall 2002. 30. Pyrlin, transcript, p. 5.
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War scope of Israeli action is wildly "The Landing That Did Not Occur"), disproportionate. Department of State Okna (Tel-Aviv), Sept.14, 2000. incoming telegram 023378, Embassy 41. Israelyan, op.cit., p. 192. Paris to Secretary of State, secret, May 42. Isabella Ginor, "The Russians Were 23, 1967. Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in 33. Arab sources quoted in MER, p. 17. the 1967 Six-Day War," Middle East 34. Al-Gumhuria and Al-Akhbar dailies Review of International Affairs (MERIA) in Arabic, both from November 26 1966, Journal, Vol. 4., No. 4 (December 2000). cited in Avraham Ben-Tzur, Gormim 43. Pyrlin, Road, p. 56. Sovietiim ve Milhemet Sheshet- 44. Pyrlin, transcript, pp. 1, 4. Ha'yamim (Hebrew: Soviet Factors and 45. Anwar el-Sadat: In Search of Identity: the Six-Day War) (Tel-Aviv: Sifriyat an Autobiography (New York: Harper & Poalim, 1975), pp. 161-162. According to Row, 1977), pp. 171-172. a former GRU Major-General, Grechko 46. Parker, SDW, p. 65. was considered "acting" Minister of 47. Brezhnev, Rede. Defense as early as November 1960 when 48. Zolotarev, p.182, citing I.I. Latynin, he hosted an Egyptian delegation headed Opyt primeneniya boevykh takticheskikh by Marshal Amer. Sergei Krakhmalov grupp v lokal'nykh voynakh na Blizhnem Zapiski voyennogo attashe (Russian: Vostoke (1967-1991) (Russian: The Notes of a Military Attache), (Moscow: Experience of Using Tactical Battle Rosskaya Razvedka, 2000), p. 76. Groups in Local Wars in the Middle East 35. Vladimir Solovyov and Elena (1967-1991), PhD dissertation, Moscow, Klepikova: Zagovorschiki v Kremle 1997, p. 49. (Russian: The Kremlin Plotters), 49. Pyrlin, transcript, pp. 5-6. (Moscow: Aktsionernoe Obschestvo 50. Brezhnev, Rede. ‘Moskovskii Tsentr Iskusstv', 1991), pp. 51. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 97. 20-21. Andropov's promotion to 52. Department of State Memorandum candidate-member of the Politburo was G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep:5-29-67, the first for a KGB chief since Stalin's confidential. Brezhnev had spoken at a appointee, Lavrenty Beria. conference of Communist parties at 36. Nasser's speech at UAR Advanced Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. Air HQ, May 25, 1967, cited in Walter 53. Department of State incoming Laqueur, The Road to War (London: telegram 029229, Embassy Moscow to Penguin Books, 1969), Appendix Three, Secretary of State, secret, May 27, 1967; pp. 371-376. This contention was the source is identified as "Voslensky," repeated by Mahmoud Riad to Parker as probably Mikhail Voslenski, a historian late as 1989: "The proof of Israel's and interpreter who later defected to the intentions, if any was needed, was a West. statement by Yitzhak Rabin...on May 12 54. Cited in Joseph Govrin, The Six-Day threatening to occupy Damascus and War in the Mirror of Soviet-Israeli overthrow the Syrian regime." Parker, Relations--April-June 1967 (Jerusalem: Politics, p. 14, p.249 n35. Hebrew University, Soviet and East 37. MER, p. 187. European Research Centre Research 38. Protokoll, loc. cit. Paper No. 61, December 1985), p. 10. 39. Pyrlin, Road, p. 56. 55. Pyrlin, Road, p. 59 40. Aleksandr Khaldeev, 56. Parker, SDW, p. 114. Georgy "Nesostoyavshiisya Desant" (Russian: Korniyenko, The Cold War: Testimony Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 55
Isabella Ginor
of a Participant (Moscow: Institute of 66. Aleksandr Bovin: XX vek kak zhizn' International Relations, 1994), pp. 129- (Russian: The XX Century as a Life) 33, cited in translation by James. F. (Moscow: Zakharov, 2003), p. 160. Leonard; Parker, SDW, p. 72. 67. Brezhnev, Rede. 57. Testimony of Shams Badran at his 68. Department of State incoming trial. Al-Ahram, February 25, 1968, cited telegram 027005, US Mission UN to in Ben-Tzur, op.cit., p. 165. Secretary of State, confidential, May 25, 58. Ben-Tzur, op.cit., p. 169. While Ben- 1967. Tzur's study was published only in 69. Brezhnev, Rede. Hebrew and drew little direct attention 70. Akopov, transcript, pp. 4-8, 10-11. outside Israel, its thesis has been 71. Brezhnev, Rede. endorsed by leading Israeli actors at the 72. Telephone interview with Brutents. time such as Maj. Gen. Meir Amit, then 73. Emphasis added. Brezhnev, Rede. Head of the Mossad, who cited it both at 74. Embtel 1517, (Lisbon), Robert the 25th anniversary conference and in an Anderson to President Johnson, June 2, interview with the present writer, August 1967, NSF, NSC History, Box 18, LBJL, 9, 2002. cited in Avner Cohen: Israel and the 59. Oren, op.cit., p. 40. Bomb (New York: Columbia University 60. Tanjug (Yugoslav Press Agency), Press, 1998), p. 26; p. 412S n27. cited in Laqueur, Road, p. 53; Moshe A. 75. Akopov, transcript, p.6; Brutents Gilboa, Shesh Shanim, Shisha Yamim mentions receiving excerpts from those (Hebrew: Six Years, Six Days) (Tel talks for use in preparation of Brezhnev's Aviv: Am Oved, 1968), p. 86. speech. Thirty Years, p.374. 61. Department of State Incoming 76. Emphasis in the original. Zolotarev, Telegram 029479, Ambassador Moscow op.cit., pp. 182-3, citing Latynin, to Secretary of State, confidential, May Experience. 28, 1967. Ambassador Llewellyn 77. Akopov, transcript, loc.cit. Thompson qualified the credibility of this 78. Kosygin message to Wilson, May 27, information, pointing out the source's 1967, reproduced in Department of State "dislike of both Nasser and the Soviets." Outgoing Telegram 204008, to American 62. Akopov, transcript, p. 16. Embassy Moscow from Secretary of 63. Mohammed Heikal, The Sphinx and State Rusk, Secret, May 28, 1967. the Commissar (New York: Harper & 79. Brezhnev, Rede. Row, 1978), p. 169. 80. Ahron Bregman and Jihan El-Tahri: 64. Telephone interview with Nikolai G. The Fifty Years War (London: Pengiun Yegorychev (Moscow), November 11, & BBC Books, 1998), p. 76. 2000; Christopher Andrew and Oleg 81. Pyrlin, transcript, pp. 6-7, 28. Gordievsky, KGB, No location, Nota 82. Department of State incoming Bene, 1992 (Russian translation of same telegram 029479, American Embassy title in English, London: Hodder and Moscow to Secretary of State, Stoughton, 1990), p. 503; Yefim Segal confidential, May 28, 1967. and Zinovi Dubrovski, "Ne dolzhny 83. Pyrlin, transcript, pp. 7, 9. Molchat'" (Russian: "Must Not Keep 84. Department of State incoming Silent"), Novosti Nedeli, Tel Aviv, telegram 029479, American Embassy March 2, 2000. Moscow to Secretary of State, 65. Laqueur, op.cit., pp. 98-99. confidential, May 28, 1967. 85. Pyrlin, transcript, p. 27. 56 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003)
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
86. Oren, op.cit., p. 65; sources listed in 103. Ginor, MERIA. p. 346 n10. 104. Professor Kislov, Head of the Center 87. Mir Pasha Zeynalov: Nezabyvaemye for Research of Peace Problems in vstrechi s predsedatelem Arafatom Moscow, was in 1967 "stationed in the (Russian: Unforgettable Meetings with Middle East." He makes this statement Chairman Arafat) (Moscow: Realii, "based on personal observation," but 2002), p. 27. disputes the present writer's contention 88. Ben-Tzur, op.cit., p.86; Gilboa, that Moscow pre-planned an operation op.cit., p. 85. against Israel, and holds that it was to be 89. Laqueur, op.cit., p. 62. implemented only "in dire necessity to 90. Pravda, May 18, 1966. stop Israeli aggression." A.K. Kislov, "Ne 91. Bovin, op.cit., p. 134. v ladakh s faktami" (Russian: "The Facts 92. Anatoli F. Dobrynin: Sugubo Don't Add Up"), USA & Canada Journal, Doveritel'no (Russian: In Strict (Moscow: Russian Academyof Sciences, Confidence) (Moscow: Avtor, 1997), p. USA & Canada Institute), Vol. 12, No. 134. Dobrynin mistakenly dates the 396, December 2002, p. 94. This is an congress in May. afterword to Isabella Ginor, 93. Ben-Tzur, op.cit., p. 72, n13. "'Shestidnevnaya voyna' 1967 g. i 94. Israelyan, op.cit., pp. 99-100. pozitsiya SSSR" (Russian: "The ‘Six Day 95. V. Kondrashov, interntional War' and the Position of the USSR"), commentary, Izvestia, May 8, 1966, cited loc.cit., pp. 76-91. in Schwartz, op. cit., p. 24. 105. Vadim Kirpichenko, transcript, p. 96. Schwartz, op.cit., p. 25. 28. 97. Schwartz, op.cit., p. 25. Sovietskaya 106. Emphasis added. Pyrlin, transcript, Rossiya, as noted by Ben-Tzur, was p. 10. considered to be Brezhnev's personal 107. MER, pp. 10, 22. A visit by the organ. op.cit., p. 73, n14. Soviet Minister of Fisheries in March 98. Parker, Politics, p. 11; Gilboa, op.cit., also included meetings with top Egyptian p. 85. commanders. 99. Schwartz, op.cit., p. 63. 108. Israelyan, op.cit., p. 192. 100. Personal communication from 109. MER, p. 10. Gideon Remez, a paratrooper then 110. Captain (ret.) Yuri Khripunkov, stationed at sector headquarters. personal communication to author, July 101. Erwin Wiet: Ostblock intern: 13 2001; Fleet Admiral (ret.) Ivan M. Jahre Dolmetscher fuer die polnische Kapitanets: Na sluzhbe okeanskomu flotu Partei- und Staatsfuehrung (German) 1946-1992: zapiski komandujuschego (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe), 1970, dvumja flotami (Russian: In the Service p. 165. Weit, Gomulka's interpreter, of the Ocean Fleet 1946-1992: the Notes understood that Brezhnev was alluding to of the Commander of Two Fleets) the war against Israel, into which (Moscow: Andreevski Flag, 2000), p. "Nasser was tempted by the Soviets." 174. 102. Theodore Draper: Israel and World 111. Valeri Mustyats: "Oshibka Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli ekipazha" (Russian: "The Crew's War (New York: Viking, 1968), pp. 54- Mistake"), Duel (Moscow) #41(132), 55, quoting several such blasts in the October 12, 1999. flagship Soviet organs Pravda and 112. Yehudit Yeheskeli, "Hikinu lifkuda Izvestiya between May 16 and 22. lishlo'ah til atomi al Yisrael" (Hebrew: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 57
Isabella Ginor
"We Awaited the Order to Launch an 125. Parker, SDW, p. 250. Atomic Missile at Israel"), Yediot 126. Yaremenko, loc.cit. Aharonot (Tel Aviv), May 8, 1992. 127. Grinevski, "A-bomb"; Script, pp. When contacted by the present writer a 112-113. decade later, the source (a former 128. Akopov, transcript, p. 5. crewman on this submarine, K-125 of the 129. Isabella Ginor: "'Under the Yellow Pacific fleet) retracted his version, Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian claiming that the reporter had Eyes': Operation Kavkaz and the War of misunderstood him (she, however, Attrition, 1969-70," Cold War History recorded the interview and stands by its (London: Frank Cass), Vol. 3, No. 1 accuracy). The source's name is withheld (October 2002). here as he also professed fear for the 130. Anonymous: "Poslevoennaya voyna safety of his family, despite their present Sukhogo" (Russian: The Sukhoy's domicile in Israel--which, if well- Postwar War), Kommersant-Daily founded, indicates the even farther- (Moscow), July 31, 1999. reaching extent of the Russian cover-up. 131. Reshetnikov, transcript, p. 4. "Race" 113. Zolotarev, op.cit., pp. 186-187. This is clearly a translation error which move was confirmed to the present writer appears in the transcript but was by Kapitanets. Telephone interview corrected to "raids" in the BBC (Moscow), January 11, 2003. documentary film, which reflects 114. List in Turkish attached to secret Reshetnikov's audible words in Russian. Israel Foreign Ministry memo, Minister 132. Ibid., p. 10. in Ankara D. Laor to Deputy Director 133. Ibid., p. 4. General Y. Tekoa, June 1, 1967. 134. Ibid., p. 6. 115. Zolotarev, op.cit., p. 185. 135. Ibid., p. 8. 116. Kapitanets, Service, p. 175. 136. Pyrlin, transcript, p. 10. 117. Interview with Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Yoel 137. Brezhnev, Rede. Ben-Porat (Ramat Hasharon), March 8, 138. L.I. Brezhnev, Vospominaniya, 2002. (Russian: Memoirs) (Moscow: 118. Kapitanets, Service, p. 176; Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury), Khripunkov, personal communication to 1982, pp. 69-70. present writer. 139. Grechko was Brezhnev's immediate 119. Khaldeev, loc.cit. superior, according to Grechko's 120. Pyrlin, transcript, pp. 10-11. biography in Nikolai Zen'kovich: Samye 121. Col. General Vasily V. Reshetnikov, zakritye ludi: Entsiklopediya biografiy Commander of the Second Corps of the (Russian: The Most Classified People: Strategic Air-Force in 1967, transcript, Biographical Encyclopedia) (Moscow: pp. 5-8; biography at
The Cold War's Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War
144. Vladimir B. Rezun, affidavit to present writer, Bristol (UK), January 13, 2001. 145. Vladinir A. Ryabukhin, "V Egypte" (Russian: "In Egypt"), in I.V. Shishchenko, ed., Smolyane- Internatsionalisty (Russian: Internationalists of Smolensk Region) (Smolensk: Smyadyn', 2000), p. 177. 146. Kol Ha'Am (Hebrew, Tel Aviv; MaKI organ), #14, p. 9, cited in Ben- Tzur, p. 237. 147. Akopov, transcript, p. 38. 148. Mikhail P. Popov: Tridtsat' sem' let na Blizhnem Vostoke (Russian: Thirty- Seven Years in the Middle East), Moscow, MGIMO, 2002, p. 20. 149. Pyrlin, Road, p. 54. 150. Bovin, op.cit., p. 160. 151. Protokoll. 152. "Roundup of gossip and attitudes in the UN," Walt Rostow to President, Top Secret, June 8, 1967, National Security File, NSC Histories "Middle East Crisis," Vol. 4, Tabs 128-130. The name and position of the Soviet source were sanitized in the declassified version of this document. 153. Bovin, op.cit., p. 160.
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 59