The Muslim Brotherhood

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND DOMINANT IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN EGYPT: A CASE STUDY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN WEST ASIAN STUDIES (POLITICAL SCIENCE)

BY AFSAHN

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. MOHAMMAD GULREZ PROFESSOR

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES & NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (U.P.)-202002 (INDIA)

2016 DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES & NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH-202002(U.P) India

Date: Certificate

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis entitled “Islamic Movement and Dominant Ideological Trends in Egypt: A Case Study of Muslim Brotherhood” submitted by Ms. Afshan under my supervision is his own original contribution and suitable for submission for the award of the degree of

Ph.D.

It is further certified that Ms. Afshan has been engaged in fulltime research and that he has put in required attendance as prescribed by the

University.

(Dr. Mohammad Gulrez) (Dr. Mohammad Gulrez) Maulana SupervisorAzad Library, Aligarh MuslimChairman University i

PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The purpose of this study on “Islamic Movement and Dominant Ideological Trends in Egypt: A Case Study of Muslim Brotherhood” is not to give a modern history and contemporary trends of all kinds of thought expressed by the Egyptian scholars since the second half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis however is on the ideological trends about politics and society within a certain context. This thought process was influenced by the growth of European and the Islamic resurgence movements calling for radical social reforms and for changes in the system of government. These movements are characterized by a strong religious component. Their call for reforms were couched in the Muslim idiom - i.e., in demands for social justice (adala) and the satisfaction of man’s basic necessities and were accompanied by demands for a return to an Islamic form of government, one that is ruled by the Sharia. This nomenclature covers a multitude of organizations with different principles and slogans, but all have one common denominator - their reformist appeal derives from religious belief and were asserted to be found in Muslim principles.

This study, in this context intends to elaborate discussion of the political ideas as developed in the context of the institution building in Egypt by the respective contemporary political leaders of the state; Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Under Nasser, this ideology was seen as revolutionary nationalism, but thereafter, the ideology of the 1952 revolution was gradually replaced by a new conservative consensus that reflected the interests of an establishment with no interest in further radical change. Sadat pioneered this ideological transformation in the October Working Paper, which outlined his view of Egypt’s new course after the October 1973 War, through a ‘de-Nasserisation’ propaganda campaign; and by subsequent efforts to revive the legitimacy of capitalism and to justify his Western alignment. Sadat also sought to root legitimacy in constitutionalism and democracy. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Under Mubarak, however, democratization became the main legitimacy formula. Nevertheless, it was limited. The masses were held not to be prepared for full- blown democracy, lacking sufficient responsibility and consciousness, they were susceptible to ‘alien’ (leftist) or ‘Islamist’ ideas. Strong presidential tutelage, the careful

channeling of political discourse through regime-managed institutions, and limits on overt attempts to incite the masses was needed for the sake of social peace. By the Mubarak era, this new conservative consensus seemed to bind the elite, affecting ideological divisions.

Hence, in the current research the focus is placed on Islamic movements, in particular on the ideological, organizational and operational character of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other dominant ideological trends generally bowed and controlled by the Egyptian elite with a view to examine the genesis of the contemporary state system in the context of changing dimension of state-society relations.

In doing so, the current research aims to provide an analysis of the evolution and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood, completed from a perspective that was inspired by five distinct areas, leading to significant conclusion about the overall phenomenon of the Islamic movement and dominant ideological trends in Egypt. The areas chosen have been put in a logical order so as to the central thesis of the study.

The First Chapter: ‘Intellectual influence & Islamic ideologue in Egypt,’ is an attempt to find out and analyse the intellectual influence of the Islamic ideologues in Egypt in the context of growing Western influence & culture. In the light of existing theoretical debates, an attempt has also been made to find out the difference between the political ideas imbibed in liberal western political thought and the Islamic political ethos. In the context of Egypt, two theoretically important arguments emerged. The first believed in revival the Islamic ideology that guides society as a whole and that (teaches) the law must be in conformity with the Islamic Sharia. These ideologues seek cultural differentiation from the West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe. The second are those moderate and reformist Islamic ideologues who accept and work within the democratic process and Western culture and have been making an attempts Maulanato reconcile Azad Western Library,and Islamic political Aligarh ideas. Eventually, Muslim both terms yieldedUniversity to Islam, the name of the faith and a world free to either pejorative or comparative association. The overall aim of applying this combination of theories is to reveal the growing influence of Islamic ideologues, their theories and other related issues, as a guiding principle for the governance and state building.

iii

The Second Chapter: ‘The Muslim Brotherhood: An Introduction,’ examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from the 1930s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluating possible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of political Islam and (2) the concept of political structure in the social movement theory. The successful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the way in which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, and strategies connected in the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas are integrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows. It will help in expanding our understanding as to how the organization can stay in a highly repressive environment.

The Third Chapter: ‘Political Development in Egypt: Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood,’ systematically elaborates on the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood vis- a-vis characteristics of the nation state system in Egypt in the context of the existing socio-economic, socio-political and social-cultural conditions. These conditions are manifested in the inter-related and multifaceted crisis of political development, inequality and identity over the century and produced oppression and dependency in their wake. It is thus concluded that this ruin of religious activism lies in the failure of the political system to address & to focus on these intractable issues - indeed, minimally, to safeguard the Egyptian community from exploitation in various forms.

The Fourth Chapter: ‘Islamic Brotherhood & contemporary Islamic Movements under Sadat,’ focuses on the cultural, social and political system in Egypt in particular time and space. Egypt’s national economic policy of the Nasser (1952-70) was systematically abandoned by Sadat’s Infitah as soon as he consolidated his political power. It is in this context that this chapter examines how Sadat, encouraged the Islamists in order to counter-balance secular opposition from Nasserist, Marxist, and the nationalist circles. By doing so, Sadat strengthened political Islam in Egypt, releasing Maulanahundreds Azad of members Library, of the organization Aligarh and other politicalMuslim prisoners. University It was mainly during his presidency of Anwar al-Sadat that many contemporary Islamic movement along with the Muslim Brotherhood re-emerged, paying way to proficiently organize their programmes within the civic spheres.

The Fifth Chapter: ‘Governance and Political Order in Egypt under Hosni

Mubarak,’ aspires to understand that the area of concern under study is about the nature of governance in Egypt. Islamist movements seek to shift Egypt’s political culture toward an Islamic solution. Other segments within the population seek a greater voice in the affairs of state through democratization for Egypt’s political future. The ruling elites of Egypt’s multiparty autocracy seek to retain their own power and wealth in spite of the interests of these groups. It is in this framework, the study attempt to reveal that Egypt is still in the midst of a comprehensive crisis and which has led to a confusion about its very identity, future choices and destiny. Its poor achievement in the economic and social field forces Egypt to reflect on the causes of protracted failure and accordingly on the nature of the society that it aspires to create.

The Last & Concluding Chapter: ‘Egypt at the Cross Roads,’ focuses the relationship between the state and society in Egypt. This has been done by examining the events and developments in the country. It is generally assumed (in the context of Egypt) that the state and society pursue different agenda and have different priorities. It is due to this reason that there is cleavage between the outlooks and the attitude of the state and society. After a brief description of the factors and reasons that stood behind the rise of contemporary Islamists, the present research study attempts to explore the adaptive nature of the Muslim Brotherhood under the successive regimes. The pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood was further discussed during Al-Tahrir Square revolution and later on in the context of the approval and consent to participate in the national election under the military rule.

However, in an important sense this study remains preliminary. It is an attempt to evolve an overall understanding of Egypt’s modern ideological and political trends that will provide the way for a more definitive study on the subject. Nevertheless, in presenting a more general interpretation of the Egyptian political scene, the researcher has tried to ask important questions - questions that will yield more lasting answers, i.e. Maulanacompatibility Azad of Islam Library, with Democra cyAligarh both in the context Muslim of Egypt and University the West Asian region.

My sincere thanks and gratitude is due to my supervisor and Chairperson Prof. Mohammad Gulrez for his invaluable help, guidance in every stage in the preparation of the manuscript.

During the preparation of this study Prof. Nazim Ali and Prof. Fazal Mehmood gave beneficial counsel. From them I learned that political phenomena can only be understood in terms of culture and historical matrix in which it is evolved. Others who inspires me - whether through brief exchanges, correspondence, or hours of conversation were Dr. Ghulam Mursaleen and Dr. Jawaid Iqbal.

In addition, I wish to thank the staff of Maulana Azad Library of Aligarh Muslim University and Central Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi for their indispensable help in terms of library & internet facilities towards my research work.

I also appreciate the indispensable resources, and pleasant environment of the Center of West Asian Studies at the Aligarh Muslim University, where I am enrolled as a researcher for under taking this study.

Finally, I am very grateful to my beloved parents and my elder sister Darakhshan Irshad and younger brother Zubair Ansari(SE), who supported me morally from Bareilly while I was conducting my research in Aligarh.

June 2016 Afshan

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND DOMINANT IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN EGYPT: A CASE STUDY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

ABSTRACT SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN WEST ASIAN STUDIES (POLITICAL SCIENCE)

BY AFSAHN

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. MOHAMMAD GULREZ PROFESSOR

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES & NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (U.P.)-202002 (INDIA)

2016 1

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study on “Islamic Movement and Dominant Ideological Trends in Egypt: A Case Study of Muslim Brotherhood” is not to give a modern history and contemporary trends of all kinds of thought expressed by the Egyptian scholars since the second half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis however is on the ideological trends about politics and society within a certain context. This thought process was influenced by the growth of European and the Islamic resurgence movements calling for radical social reforms and for changes in the system of government. These movements are characterized by some strong religious components. Their call for reforms were couched in the Muslim idiom - i.e., in demands for social justice (adala) and the satisfaction of man’s basic necessities and were accompanied by demands for a return to an Islamic form of government, one that is ruled by the Sharia. This nomenclature covers a multitude of organizations with different principles and slogans, but all have one common denominator - their reformist appeal derives from religious belief and were asserted to be found in Muslim principles.

Given the complexity of the situation in Egypt, the study intends to provide an overview of the state of Egypt’s national scene in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular outlining the scenario as to how the Muslim Brotherhood in the past and still central, although vastly diminished, plays a major role within Egypt’s boarder national scene and provides a comprehensive picture that may guide the thinking, scholars, policy makers and the stake holders to stay abreast of the highly dynamic political situation in Egypt. In the light of this historical change, the study has analyzed the political and ideological transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1928 to 2012.

The political experience of the Muslim Brotherhood allowed the movement to Maulanapractice undeAzadr different Library, circumstances Aligarhwhich can be divided Muslim into three differentUniversity periods. First, the movement was established under the period of Egyptian Kingdom between 1928 and 1952 where the Brotherhood developed as a socio-religious movement. In this phase the Brotherhood prioritized the grass roots organization and aimed to Islamize society from bottom up. Secondly, the Free Officers Revolution in 1952 opened a new 2

page in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood by classifying the movement as an illegal until the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. After the ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak, the group’s political arm won parliamentary elections, and its candidate Mohammad Morsi was elected president. Many analysts saw the Brotherhood’s political ascendance as a test of whether it remained ideologically committed to its founders’ Islamist tenets or this had been moderated by the exigencies of governing. However, Morsi’s tenure was marked by widespread frustration with economic mismanagement and poor governance, and his administration was ousted by military in July 2013. A violent crackdown followed in which Morsi, much of the Brotherhood’s leadership, and thousands of its supporters were arrested, and more than one thousand supporters were killed, according to right groups. The military-backed government banned the Brotherhood once again at the end of 2013, excluding it from mainstream political channels.

From the very foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Movement urged for a change in the society and politics in Egypt, what it believed to be the only solution to economic, political and social problems, Islam. This was further followed by the movement as slogan during the parliamentary elections. However, as concepts “democracy”, “freedom” and “social justice” gained a new momentum in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood transformed its ideology towards such ideas by not breaking ties with its socio-religious roots.

It is in this scenario the study meticulously analysed and examined the genesis and the growth of Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological transformation within the context of the political situation in Egypt. During the era of British control of Egypt, Hasan al- Banna was preaching for national, international Islamic unity which would lead to the reinstatement of Caliphate. Although, there were cases of violence carried out by Secret Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement was avoiding an open Maulanaconfrontation Azad with the Library, state. Under the Aligarh leadership of Gamal Muslim Abd el-Nasser University, on the other hand, the group produced ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, who rejected the religious nature of the society and called for an overthrow of the government. Qutb took one step further than Hasan al-Baana by defining how people can found an ideal Islamic community that will create the Islamic state, but he less dealt with the question of how Islamic state should govern. While doing this, he did not strictly follow the ideas of 3

Banna, but he filled the intellectual infrastructure. His aim was to portary Islam as a “Third Way” to other political ideologies and people should trace these solutions at the fundamental principles rather than other “manmade political systems.” The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, at the time, under Hasan al-Hudaybi and his successors was loyal to the legacy of Hasan al-Banna and stressed the importance of social change, distance from violence and politics.

The call of reforms by the Brotherhood ultimately culminated in an assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954. In response, thousands of suspected Brothers, including Sayyid Qutb, Banna’s successor, were imprisoned. Though Nasser barred the group from government, the Brotherhood nevertheless became ubiquitous in society, building allegiance as a populist alternative to the Egyptian state, which provide neither prosperity nor welfare and suffered repeated military defeats by Israel. The concepts of “democracy,” “freedom of speech,” “equal citizenship” and “civil state with an Islamic reference” began to appear in the movement’s publications and public speeches starting from the 1970s under the presidency of Anwar Sadat and later Hosni Mubarak. This evolution coincided with retreatment of the movement from producing a universalistic goal for the Muslim society (Ummah) to a local movement that address the current issues in Egypt. This change required the Muslim Brotherhood to clear its stance on certain subject, especially the rights of women and minorities. Despite the challenges and contrary to its moderate argumentation of democracy and pluralism the movement chose a more conservative religious view for women and minorities. During the course of their political struggle, the Muslim Brotherhood became the largest opposition group that challenged the legitimacy of the government with its presence in both social and political levels. Although, it witnessed waves of mass arrests, the Muslim Brotherhood remained loyal to its earlier understanding of gradual change, instead of a revoltionary approach against the state.

MaulanaThe Azad Brotherhood Library, emerged as Aligarh a dominant political Muslim force in EgyptUniversity following Mubarak’s removal from office amid mass protests in February 2011 in part because its organizational capacity was unmatched, but the group’s electoral victories were tarnished by power struggles with the judiciary and the military. Battle over the drafting of a new constitution were a particular flash point. This was a real question mark on the administrative acumen of the organization administrative capacities. 4

All in all, state institutions worked to foil the Brotherhood’s rise to power and ultimately succeeded. Their hostility to the Islamist group, whose ascendancy put their interests and authority in jeopardy, evolved into vindictiveness, as they unrelentingly repressed the group’s members and supporters.

The First Chapter: ‘Intellectual Influence & Islamic Ideologue in Egypt’, is an attempt to find out and analyse the intellectual influence of the Islamic ideologues in Egypt in the context of growing Western influence & culture. In the light of existing theoretical debates, an attempt has also been made to find out the difference between the political ideas imbibed in liberal western political thought and the Islamic political ethos. In the context of Egypt, two theoretically important arguments emerged. The first believed in revival the Islamic ideology that guides society as a whole and that (teaches) Maulanathe law mustAzad be in conformityLibrary, with the Aligarh Islamic Sharia. Muslim These ideologues University seek cultural differentiation from the West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe. The second are those moderate and reformist Islamic ideologues who accept and work within the democratic process and Western culture and have been making an attempts to reconcile Western and Islamic political ideas. Eventually, both terms yielded to Islam, the name of the faith and a world free to either pejorative or comparative association. 5

The overall aim of applying this combination of theories is to reveal the growing influence of Islamic ideologues, their theories and other related issues, as a guiding principle for the governance and state building.

The Third Chapter: ‘Political Development in Egypt: Nasser and The Muslim Brotherhood,’ systematically elaborates on the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood vis- a-vis characteristics of the nation state system in Egypt in the context of the existing socio-economic, socio-political and social-cultural conditions. These conditions are manifested in the inter-related and multifaceted crisis of political development, inequality and identity over the century and produced oppression and dependency in their wake. It is thus concluded that this ruin of religious activism lies in the failure of the political system to address & to focus on these intractable issues - indeed, minimally, to safeguard the Egyptian community from exploitation in various forms.

The Fourth Chapter: ‘Islamic Brotherhood & Contemporary Islamic Movements under Sadat,’ focuses on the cultural, social and political system in Egypt in particular time and space. Egypt’s national economic policy of the Nasser (1952-70) was Maulanasystematically Azad abandoned Library, by Sadat’ s Aligarh Infitah as soon Muslim as he consolidated University his political power. It is in this context that this chapter examines how Sadat, encouraged the Islamists in order to counter-balance secular opposition from Nasserist, Marxist, and the nationalist circles. By doing so, Sadat strengthened political Islam in Egypt, releasing hundreds of members of the organization and other political prisoners. It was mainly 6

during his presidency of Anwar al-Sadat that many contemporary Islamic movement along with the Muslim Brotherhood re-emerged, paying way to proficiently organize their programmes within the civic spheres.

The Fifth Chapter: ‘Governance and Political Order in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak,’ aspires to understand that the area of concern under study is about the nature of governance in Egypt. Islamist movements seek to shift Egypt’s political culture toward an Islamic solution. Other segments within the population seek a greater voice in the affairs of state through democratization for Egypt’s political future. The ruling elites of Egypt’s multiparty autocracy seek to retain their own power and wealth in spite of the interests of these groups. It is in this framework, the study attempts to reveal that Egypt is still in the midst of a comprehensive crisis and which has led to a confusion about its very identity, future choices and destiny. Its poor achievements in the economic and social field forces Egypt to reflect on the causes of protracted failure and accordingly on the nature of the society that it aspires to create.

The Last & Concluding Chapter: ‘Egypt At The Cross Roads,’ focuses the relationship between the state and society in Egypt. This has been done by examining the events and developments in the country. It is generally assumed (in the context of Egypt) that the state and society pursue different agenda and have different priorities. It is due to this reason that there is cleavage between the outlooks and the attitude of the state and society. After a brief description of the factors and reasons that stood behind the rise of contemporary Islamists, the present research study attempts to explore the adaptive nature of the Muslim Brotherhood under the successive regimes. The pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood was further discussed during Al-Tahrir Square revolution and later on in the context of the approval and consent to participate in the national election under the military rule.

MaulanaOjective Azad of the study: Library, Aligarh Muslim University There are the main objectives of the study: 1. To examine the philosophy of modern and contemporary Egyptian Islamic Ideologues, their various theories and related issues, as a guiding principle for the governance and state building. 7

2. To analyse the dynamic role of charismatic leaders such as Hasan al-Banna and the subsequent emergence of their movements as effective force for social change. 3. To apply the general vision in studying the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy to mobilize Islamic values to effect modernization both at individual and societal levels with particular reference to Egypt. 4. To examining how religious values in the context of modern religious resurgence in the context of Arab Spring led to socio-economic churing in Egypt. 5. Finally, to explore the compatibility between the Islamic movements and political and dominant ideological trends in Egypt.

Hypotheses: In this study an attempt has been made to examine and explore the compatibility between the Islamic movements and the dominant ideological trends generally bowed and controlled by an Egyptian elite with a view to examine the genesis of the contemporary state system in the context of changing dimension of state-society relations. While attempting to these pertinent question the study in based on the following hypotheses: 1. Islam can be compatible with democracy in terms of institution building. 2. Egypt’s revolutionary rulers as yet have been unable to generate the institutions, systems and civic relations which they themselves see as essential to the social reconstruction of their country.

Research Methodology: This research methodology followed in this study in inductive, analytical and descriptive. To get reliable and objective information, the study relied both on primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include documents published by governments and other international organizations. The secondary sources include newspapers, electronic media, books, periodicals, journals, research reports related to the area of study with emphasis on the West Asian region. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University However, in an important sense this study remains preliminary. It is an attempt to evolve an overall understanding of Egypt’s modern ideological and political trends that will provide the way for a more definitive study on the subject. Nevertheless, in presenting a more general interpretation of the Egyptian political scene, the researcher 8

has tried to ask important questions - questions that will yield more lasting answers, i.e. compatibility of Islam with Democracy both in the context of Egypt and the West Asian region.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University CONTENTS

Page Nos. Preface & Acknowledgement i-v Map of Arab Republic of Egypt vi Abbreviations vii Chronology viii-xiii Glossary xiv-xviii Figure: General Table of Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood 56

CHAPTER - I 1-44 Intellectual Influence and Islamic Ideologue in Egypt 1. Mohammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) 9-20 2. Mohammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) 20-28 3. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (1888-1935) 28-35 4. Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) 36-44

CHAPTER - II 45-108 The Muslim Brotherhood: An Introduction 1. Growth and Origins of Muslim Brotherhood Movement 45-52 2. The Muslim Brotherhood; Structure of Organization and its Function 52-60 3. Growth of the Muslim Brotherhood: A Result of Socio-Political 60-87 Circumstances 4. Basic Program of the Movement 87-108

CHAPTER - III 109-148 Political Development in Egypt: Nasser and The Muslim Brotherhood 1. Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood 134-148

CHAPTER - IV 149-198 Islamic Brotherhood & Contemporary Islamic Movement under Sadat Maulana Azad The Muslim Library, Brotherhood Aligarh and Sadat Muslim University 169-173  The Islamic Movements during Sadat 173-180

1. Jama' at al-Muslimin (The Society of Muslim) 181-186 2. Al-Jihad (The Holy War) 186-191 3. Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami (The Islamic Liberation Organization) 192-198 CHAPTER - V 199-250

Governance and Political Order in Egypt under Hosni- Mubarak

1. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak Regime, 1981-2011 241-250

CHAPTER - VI 251-260

Conclusion: Egypt at the Cross Roads

Appendix: 261-296 1. The Arab Socialist Union: Egypt's sole Legal Political Organization, 1962-1977 261-262 2. The Sinai Agreement 1974 between the Governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel 263-266 3. Sayyid Qutb: Milestones 267-270 4. The Ideological and Political Discourse of Hasan al-Banna 271-294 5. Speech Delivered by President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser at Port-Said on the Occasion of Victory Day on 23 December 1961 295-296

Bibliography 297-335

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University vi

MAP OF ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC Arab Co-operation Council AI Amnesty International ASU The Arab Socialist Union FIS The Islamic Salvation Front FJP Freedom and Justice Party GDP Gross Domestic Product GODE The Gulf Organization for Development in Egypt HLF Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ICO Islamic Co-operation Organization IFIs International Financial Institutions ILO Islamic Liberation Organization IMF International Monetary Fund ISIs The International Statistical Institutions MPs Member of Parliament MB The Muslim Brotherhood NDP The National Democratic Party NGO Non-Government Organization NPUO The National Progressive Unionist Organization OAU The Organization of African Unity OIC The Organization of Islamic Conference PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PNA Palestinian National Authority QIZs Qualified Industrial Zones RCC Revolutionary Command Council SAP Structural Adjustment Programme SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Force SCC Supreme Constitutional Court SIC Supreme Islamic Council SLO Socialist Liberation Organization SSC Supreme Sufi Council UAR United Arab Republic UNO United Nations Organization USA United States of America USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic Maulana AzadWEF Library, World EconomicAligarh Forum Muslim University YMMA Young Men’s Muslim Association

viii

CHRONOLOGY

1517 A.D. - 1798 A.D. Occupation of Ottoman Turks over Egypt.

1798 A.D. - 1801 A.D. Napoleon Bonaparte to invade Egypt.

1805 A.D. - 1849 A.D. Mohammad Ali ruled over Egypt (under the supervision of Ottomans).

1879 A.D. - 1882 A.D. Urabi movement (1879-1882) occurred when an Egyptian army Colonel, Ahmed Urabi led a movement to subject Egypt’s hereditary Ottoman governor.

1882 A.D. British invasion or ruled in Egypt.

1884 A.D. Journal al-Urwah al-Wuthqa published and edited by Afghani and Abduh.

1892 A.D. - 1914 A.D. Khedive Abbas II Hilmi Pasha become rules under the supervision of the British.

1906 A.D. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was born in October 1906 in a small town of Mahmudiyya.

1913 A.D. British gave permission Egyptian people, the establishment of an Egyptian legislative council.

1917 A.D. Sultan Fuad I become ruler under the supervision of the British. 1919 A.D. Lord Cromer become protectorate of Egypt.

1919 A.D. Sa’ad Zaghlul’ revolution followed in 1922 by Egypt’s Independence. 1922 A.D. British granted conditional independence to Egypt.

1923 A.D. British granted permission the drafting of constitution. Maulana1924 A.D. Azad Abolition Library, of the Caliphate Aligarh by Mustafa KamalMuslim Ataturk. University 1925 A.D. Raziq’s controversial book ‘Secularization of power in Muslim state’ published.

1928 A.D. Al-Banna established the organization of Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan nul-Muslimun) in Isma’iliyya.

1929 A.D. A centre called Dar-al-Ikhwan and a mosque was built in Isma’iliyya.

1933 A.D. First General Conference of the Muslim Brotherhood held in May 1933, after it the General Guidance Council was formed.

1934 A.D. The Muslim Brotherhood centre transferred from Isma’iliyya to Cairo.

1936 A.D. April 28, King Faruq become King of Egypt.

1936 A.D. British occupation ended in Egypt.

1945 A.D. The welfare and social services section of the Brotherhood established.

1947 A.D. UN Partition Resolution for Palestine. British military withdraw in Egypt to the Canal Zone; Egypt brings the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations before the UN.

1948 A.D. Involvement of Muslim Brethren volunteers, including army officers, in Arab guerrilla operations against the Jews in Palestine; proclamation of the State of Israel and the outbreak of the Palestine War. Assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi by a Muslim Brothers.

1949 A.D. Assassination of Hasan al-Banna, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brethren.

1950 A.D. The Wafd return to power. Free Officer leaflets distributed. Executive Committee of Free Officers formed.

1951 A.D. Hasan al-Hudaibi nominated the second supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood organization.

1952 A.D. Military coup by Free-officers and deposed King Farouk.

1953 A.D. January 16, R. C .C dissolved all political parties except Muslim Brotherhood.

1953 A.D. January 23, Liberation Rally formed with Nasser as its secretary-general. Committee to draft a new constitution appointed. Extensive purge of army officers; political parties ordered to purge and reorganize themselves, later dissolved. Revolutionary tribunals set up. Abolition of monarchy and proclamation of Egypt as a republic with General Naguib as first President. Voice of the Arabs begins broadcasting. The Permanent Council for National Production formed, and a provisional constitution proclaimed. Anglo-Egyptian agreement over the Sudan signed. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 1954 A.D. Struggle for power between Nasser and Naguib leading to widespread political unrest in the country and near-mutiny in the officer corps. Initialling and signing of evacuation agreement with Britain, followed by the attempted assassination of Nasser by a Muslim Brother during an Alexandria rally; Muslim Brethren proscribed, and Naguib ousted from office. Nasser becomes Prime Minister of a mixed civilian-military government. x

1956 A.D. Last British troops leave Egypt; RCC abolished by Nasser. Nasser nationalize Suez Canal; proclaims new Egyptian constitution. Sinai War and Anglo-French landing in Port Said --- the Suez War; Nasser confiscates and nationalizes British and French assets in Egypt.

1958 A.D. Union of Egypt and Syria, formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR); 1956 Egyptian constitution abolished and replaced by a provisional constitution for the new UAR. Preliminary negotiations with Soviet Union for the financing of the Aswan High Dam.

1961 A.D. Break-up of Egyptian-Syrian union; first “socialist decrees” in Egypt promulgated.

1962 A.D. The National Charter proclaimed.

1967 A.D. Middle East crisis leading to the Six Day War; Israeli forces conquer all of Sinai, West Bank of Jordan and Golen Heights; Nasser resigns for one day and returns to office by public “furore”.

1967 A.D. November 22, Security Council Resolution 242 is adopted.

1970 A.D. September 28, Nasser dies and Sadat steps in as Acting-President.

1970 A.D. October, Sadat elected by A.S.U. as sole candidate for presidency is confirmed by the Assembly and returned by 90 percent of the popular vote. Sworn in as President on 17 October.

1971 A.D. April 24, Ali Sabry is challenges Sadat in the A.S.U. Secretariat.

1971 A.D. May 4, Ali Sabry is dismissed. Thereafter other members of the “foci of power” are either dismissed or resign.

1971 A.D. May 15, demonstration in support of Sadat. Onset of “Corrective Revolution”. Liberation of the regime, freeing of political detainees.

1971 A.D. May 16, Ali Sabry and his groups arrested.

1971 A.D. June 22, Sadat declared 1971 “The Year of Decision”.

1971 A.D. September 11, a new constitution was presented by Sadat approved by the electorate. This constitution provides that the National Assembly is to replace by the People Assembly. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 1972 A.D. January 15, student disturbances in Cairo against Sadat’s vain Promise.

1973 A.D. March, Sadat makes himself Prime-Minister, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Military Governor of Egypt.

1973 A.D. October 6, surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel.

1973 A.D. October 13, Sadat rejects a cease-fire proposed by the British.

1973 A.D. October 21, Security Council Sponsors Resolution 338 for cease-Fire.

1973 A.D. November 11, six-point agreement is signed with Israel under Kissinger’s mediation.

1973 A.D. December 21, Geneva Peace Conference opens.

1974 A.D. January 18, First disengagement agreement with Israel signed.

1974 A.D. February 28, Sadat resumes diplomatic relations with U.S.

1974 A.D. March 21, disengagement with Israel completed.

1974 A.D. Military Technical College attack by military group with plans to kill President Sadat and over throw the existing regime.

1974 A.D. April 18, Sadat promulgates his ‘October Paper’ and announces, he has adopted a policy of ‘diversifying sources of arms supplies’. The Infitah (economic open-door) is launched.

1975 A.D. Omer al-Tilmissani, become III Supreme Guide of Muslim Brotherhood organization.

1975 A.D. March Kissinger’s shuttle-diplomacy for a second disengagement ends in failure.

1975 A.D. June 5, Sadat reopens the Suez Canal.

1975 A.D. September 1, second disengagement with Israel is signed. Sadat breaks with Syria and the P.L.O.

1975 A.D. September 4, Sinai Agreement signed between Israel & Egypt.

1976 A.D. March, Sadat abrogates the Treaty of Friendship with the U.S.S.R.

1976 A.D. July Muslim Brotherhood allowed to publish their Al-Da’wa or Manabir (Political platforms’) are permitted to operate.

1976 A.D. October, Sadat re-elected to a six-year, second term of office.

1976 A.D. November, Sadat announced that the Manabir will be allowed to become Maulana Azad political Library, parties. Left-wing Aligarh students demonstrate Muslim against University Sadat’s reforms.

1977 A.D. January food riots in Egypt, Sadat is shaken by the violence.

1976 A.D. November 19-21, Sadat visits Jerusalem.

1978 A.D. 5-17 September Camp-David accords are singed.

xii

1978 A.D. October Sadat announces the establishment of his National Democratic Party.

1978 A.D. December Sadat is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

1981 A.D. 6 October Sadat is assassinated by Khalid Islambouli.

1981 A.D. 13 October Mubarak came to power at a referendum.

1981 A.D. State of Emergency started.

1983 A.D. New electoral system was established.

1984 A.D. The Muslim Brotherhood take part in election (parliamentary) with Wafd Party won 37 seats out of 450.

1984 A.D. January Egypt required its dominant role in Islamic Co-operation organization when it voted her back into its rank.

1987 A.D. The Muslim Brotherhood made a new Islamic alliance with labour party or liberal party in 187 parliamentary elections. Mubarak dissolved the parliament.

1991 A.D. Invasion of Iraq on Kuwait (Gulf war). The Madrid Peace Process, initiated by U.S.

1992 A.D. Attack on tourists by militant group.

1994 A.D. Mubarak invited a national dialogue.

1991 A.D. Structural adjustment program initiated through agreement.

1993 A.D. A new unified law for professional syndicates was passed.

1997 A.D. The Supreme Constitutional Court had invalidated 121 Laws and 1990 parliament on the grounds that a clause in the law that governed its election was unconstitutional.

2001 A.D. In January, Egypt and Iraq had signed a free trade agreement.

2002 A.D. The National Council for Human Rights, a government appointed body was established.

Maulana2003 A.D. Azad Invasion Library, on Iraq led by Aligarh US. Muslim University

2004 A.D. In August, Kefaya movement started. Opposition and civil society, group joined forces to call for genuine democratic reform.

2005 A.D. In September, the first competitive presidential election was held in Egypt.

2007 A.D. Mubarak imposed economic blockade on Gaza Strip with Israel. xiii

2011 A.D. Nation-wide protests that erupted on January 25, forced Hosni Mubarak to leave his powers to Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The Muslim Brotherhood was operating as a legal entity with its political party called Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).

2012 A.D. Muhammad Morsi became the first democratically elected president of Egypt on June 24 and he took official oath for Presidency in June 30.

2012 A.D. November 22, was the date that confrontation between President and judiciary as well as opposition towards Muslim Brotherhood and President reached its peak. President Morsi announced seven-article Constitutional decree that provided him with substantial powers or as some later claimed beyond the powers that were enjoyed by former President Hosni Mubarak.

2013 A.D. The rise of anti-Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood protests.

2013 A.D. Morsi was unseated on 3 July by a military coup council consisting of Defence Minister Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

2014 A.D. Sisi was sworn into office as President of Egypt on 8 June.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University xiv

GLOSSARY

Abid Servant

Alim (Plural ‘Ulama) also used to refer to scientists, scholars and experts in any sphere of knowledge. Alim derived from same root of ‘ilm literally means those who know’.

Allah God, the Creator

Amir Ruler, prince, governor of province

Aquida Ideology

Asabiyah Social Solidarity with an emphasis on unity

Awqaf Religious endowments

Badr The place at which the first military confrontation between the Muslim and the Jahiliyya (the Meccan) took place in (January 624) the second year of the Hijra.

Bida Innovation

Ba’it Oath of allegiance to Khalife

Dar al-Ifta Fatwa council

Da’wa “Call”, “invitation”. In its original religious sense, Da’wa is the invitation addressed to people by God and the Prophet to believe in Islam, the true religion. The word is now used in the context of the missionary work carried out by Muslims among both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Dawla State

Din Religious, faith

Dua Prayer

Fadayan Devotees

MaulanaFellan Azad Library,Farmer Aligarh Muslim University

Fellahin Peasant (sing- fallah)

Fatwa A formal legal opinion given by a canon lawyer of standing, in answer to question submitted to him either by a private individual xv

or a government functionary. It applies to all civil, religious and Political matters.

Fiqh Literally “to understand”. As a term it is used for jurisprudence and covers all aspects of religious, political and social life (jurisprudence of the shari’a).

Hadith (pl. a hadith) saying or compilations of the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad.

Hajj Pilgrimage to Makah “Arafat and Mina”.

Hakimiyyah Literally the reign of Allah’s sovereignty on earth. It also used the highest governmental and legal authority.

Hizbiya Political bickering

Ijma Consensus of Islamic scholars on a point of Islamic law.

Ijtihad Ijtihad is the concept of making a personal judgement on a particular issue not specifically covered by the Qur’an and Sunnah after careful study of the texts. Both reformists and jihadist scholars are engaged in this practice.

Ilm knowledge

Imam (pl. a’ imma) Leader of the congregational prayer (slat). Also used in an honorific sense to eminent scholar of religious sciences. The Sunnis apply the term to the Caliph as the leader of the community.

Iman Belief

Infitah (open door policy) Sadat’s policy of economic liberalization opening to the West.

Jama’at Literally group’s community collectively uphold by it and is opposed to those who deviate.

Jahiliyya Literally a state of ignorance, especially lack of forbearance and moral integrity. It refers to the state of affairs in pre-Islamic Maulana Azad Library,Arabia and its socialAligarh and cultural Muslim value, which Islam University denounced. Jihad Struggle, holy war.

Kaaba A square structures built by Abraham. Makah toward which Muslim turn to pray in. xvi

Khalafah The institution of government legitimized by succession of the Ruler from the Prophet (Caliph).

Khalife Successor of the Prophet; temporal leader of the Umma in the Sunni doctrine.

Khedive Name given to the ruler of Egypt from 1867 to 1914. He governed as semi-independent viceroy of the Sultan of Turkey.

Khutba Sermon delivered in a mosque at the Friday Congregation Prayer.

Kufr Non-belief

Madrasah The traditional theological college or seminary of the Islam science (religious school).

Mahzalah Comedy or farce

Majlis al-shura Consultative Council

Maktab An elementary religious school

Maqasid Aims

Masjid Place of prostrations, centre for Muslim worship

Mufassiroun Commentator of Qur’an

Mufti Person qualified to hand down a fatwa

Muhaddithoun Traditionalists

Mujahidin Guerrilla fighters in Islamic countries, esp. those who are Islamic fundamentalists.

Mu’min Muslim believer

Murshid Guide

Murtaddin Approving of apostates

Nabi Prophet

Namaz Religious prayer MaulanaQur’an Azad Library,Record of the revelationAligarh Muslims Muslim believe were Universitysent to mankind through the messenger of God.

Ramadan The holy month of Islam.

Salaf The pious ancestors who lived at time of Muhammad and the Rashidun Caliphs are called the Salaf. xvii

Salafiyyah In the twentieth century, reformers in the tradition Muhammad ‘Abduh have been called salafiyyah because they called for a return to the principles followed by Salaf. It is a movement of Islamic revival led by Muhammad ‘Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida.

Salat Principal from of prayer in Islam. Its performance five times a day is obligatory (Farida) on every male and female able Muslim adult.

Shahada Muslim declaration faith in God and the Prophet Muhammad.

Shahid Martyr

Shari’a Literally “clear path to be followed”. It is the “totality of God’s commandments relating to the activities of man” and compromises all regulations of judicial and political nature. It stands for Islamic canon law in its wider sense.

Shaykh Head of a family or a tribal patriarch. A widely used term for high dignitaries and for anyone who holds public authority spiritual or political. Shaykh al-Azhar is a special title in Egypt.

Shura A council

Sufi(sm) this dimension of Islam stresses the immanence of God. It manifests itself as the Islam form of mysticism.

Sultan A secular ruler of the Islamic community

Sunnah Behaviour of the prophet Muhammad; his sayings and deeds

Tabi’at Nature

Takfir To change someone with unbelief, ex-communication, denouncement (God’s fairs)

Taqwa “God-consciousness” or higher consciousness

Tawhid Sovereignty of God – the belief in the unity of Allah in opposition to shirk – the belief in as cribbing “partners” to the Maulana Azad Library,godhead. Aligarh Muslim University Tazkiyah Carnal self or desires

Ukhuwwa Brotherhood

Ummah The Muslim community

Ulama (Singular ‘Alim) scholar, expect in Islamic law and theology xviii

Uluhiyya Divinity, sovereignty, divine power

Usul al-Iman Literally the roots of religious faith, denotes scholastic theology – Pillars of faiths.

Wahdat al-Islamia “unity” of Islamic groups

Wahhabism the puritanical movement led by Abdul-al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century in the Arabi.

Waqf plural: Awqaf Religious endowment’s

Watan Country

Zabiba Mark on forehead from pressing it on the prayer met

Zakat Compulsory almsgiving

Zawiya The corner of a building, applied to a small mosque or a room reserved for prayer. In North Africa, it was used for any building complex of a religious nature, which formed part of Sufi practices.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CHAPTER ONE

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCE AND ISLAMIC

IDEOLOGUE IN EGYPT

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 1

CHAPTER ONE

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCE AND ISLAMIC IDEOLOGUE IN

EGYPT

The Egyptian mind exercises itself in many ways throughout its history before assuming present Islamic-Arabic character. The country faced from time to time the onslaught of various foreign invaders---the Hyksos, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans. These invasions, however, did not bring about any fundamental change in the Egyptian ethos. The event which truly was epoch-making in the Egyptian history was the Arab-Islamic conquest of the country in the seventh century, followed by the non- Arab Islamic conquests from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. The latter included the dominance of Kurdish, Turkish and Ottoman powers and still later of the European encroachments which began with the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1798. The legacies which all the Arabs and non-Arab influences have left in Egypt and the consequent social and cultural changes and adjustments which have taken place constitute the essential and crucial elements of the Egyptian polity (Haq, 1988:1).

Although the reaction among educated Egyptians to the British occupation was not altogether one of enmity. Yet a revulsion towards an army-led revolt in 1881-2 (which led to British occupation) provoked many Muslim reformers to question the strength of Islamic institutions and to seek to reform them in such a way as to render them viable in the modern world. They realized that Khedivial authority had been restored in Egypt by force of British arms, and that for some time to come an Egyptian administration under the Khedive1 would govern under the supervision and control of British Agent and Consul-

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

1 Ismail Khedive came to power in 1863, his aspiration was no less than the transformation of Egypt into part of Europe. He shared Muhammad Ali’s desire for power and attempted in his turn to build an Egyptian empire by expanding southward into the Sudan, equatorial Africa, and Abyssinia; but while his great predecessor had built only arsenals and factories, Ismail but operas, palaces, and promenades as well, adopted French as the language of his administration, and introduced modern legal codes.

General. While for all practical purposes autonomous until 1882, they realized their country was not a sovereign state. The Egyptians were Ottoman subjects, as taxes were levied and money was circulated in the name of the Sultan. The Egyptian as subjugated land were not allowed to make political treaties with other states, or theoretically send representatives to foreign courts, although in actual practice Khedive Ismail did so. Moreover, the autonomy, the Egypt used to enjoy in administrative and financial matters was diluted when it came under European control and, after 1882, under direct British control. There was no uniform judicial system. Religious and ‘national’ civil courts had jurisdiction over native Egyptians, whereas Mixed Tribunals and Consular Courts dealt with foreigners protected by the Capitulations (Vatikiotis, 1981:188).

To this extent the Islamic reform movement which gathered momentum between 1882 and 1906 at least was not really concerned with the creation of an Egyptian national-state entity. Whereas much of its momentum was due to the resentment of European occupation, its original impetus came from the wider reaction of the Muslim world to an expanding European imperialism in Africa and Asia. France in North Africa, Britain in India and Africa, Russia in Central Asia, and Holland in Southeast Asia. A waning Ottoman Empire, bludgeoned by the encroachments of Christian Europe - both East and West - and partly dismembered by the successful separatism of its Christian subjects in the Balkans, further sharpened the realization among Muslims of a weak and exposed Islamic community. Reform movements in India led by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan,2 and Young Ottoman and Young Turk ideas of constitutionalism in Turkey, also stirred Muslim leaders in Egypt (Haq, 1988:40).

Until 1914, with a few significant exceptions, most Egyptian religious leaders firmly believed that the interests of Egypt lay in supporting the Ottoman Sultan who constituted the best guarantee against European imperialism (Najjar, 2004:197). The idea was strongly expressed in the writing of that period, as for example by Abduh, the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

2 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was a teacher and politician. He was also a social reformer. He believed that Indian Muslims were in a bad position because of their views. He, therefore introduced the Western style of scientific working; and organized Muslim intellectuals.

theological reformist, and his most devoted disciple Rashid Rida. Besides, he was certainly the only Muslim thinker at his time who formulated his views on the Islamic state. He called on Muslims to unite as part of his observations on the dissolution of the Caliphate clearly and courageously, but unlike ‘Abd al-Raziq - with whom he shared some of his conclusions - not in a way which would aggravate the traditionalist resistance to change. His thesis provides an instructive starting-point to gauge the degree to which the modern concept of the Islamic state has changed from its earlier spiritual character to its present, totally of political nature.

The story of Islamic modernism in Egypt is the upshot of the ‘encounter’ between the Egyptian way of life and the Western civilization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This encounter brought about changes in the social, economic, political and cultural life of the Egyptian people, which in turn generated tensions in the minds of the Muslim intelligentsia (Haq, 1988:6). On the religious plane, this resulted in the division of ‘Ulama’ into two groups: the one favoring change in response to the Western challenges and the other adopting a totally antagonistic attitude towards everything which the west presented, both revolving around a constant struggle over identity and order. The competition between secular politics and political Islam after the collapse of Ottoman authority and the ensuing process of colonization and de-colonization have contributed in part to regional instability, and during this period that elements of Islamism which fused on the notions of jihad and Salafism3 began to emerge. Thus political sentiments in this period were of the kind that hardly distinguished religious belief from national consciousness.

Mention may be made of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) as one of the representative thinker and activist, who left a deep impact on the Islamic discourse and Islamic modernization. His place of birth which is a source of controversy, is not known, but he received his early education in various religious schools near Kabul and Tehran. To some he was the principal figure in awakening Islamic political sentiments Maulanaand social Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

3 Salafism is an ideology that posits that Islam has strayed from its origins. The word ‘salaf’ is Arabic for “ancient one” and refers to the companions of the Prophet Mohammad. Arguing that faith has become decadent over the centuries, Salafists call for the restoration of authentic Islam as expressed by an adherence to its original teachings and texts.

reforms in India, Afghanistan, Persian, Egypt and Ottoman empire (Vatikiotis, 1976:189). He was expelled from Istanbul in 1870. During his stay in Egypt in 1871, he was allowed to teach in the Azhar, and between 1871-9 he managed to create a following for himself among Azharites and other Egyptians. His preaching about the rational-scientific reform of Islam earned Afghani the charge of agnosticism (Vatikiotis, 1976:189). Yet, publicly at least, he insisted upon remaining faithful to general principles of the Islamic message and teaching. Politically more significant was his call to limit the absolute powers of rulers, and his idea of liberation of not only Egypt, but all the Islamic countries from European control under the leadership of the strong Muslim state of the time, the Ottoman Empire. To this extent Afghani’s activity reflected official Ottoman policy.

Afghani’s brand of political agitation was timely for Islamic sentiment was apt to increase when the European attack upon the Ottoman Empire was sustained over the years. Many members of the Egyptian ruling class were themselves of Turkish blood; and the religious reformers, leaders, Ulama and others, saw in the presence of a foreign power and its influence upon the new generation a further threat to their own position in society. Even the more enlightened Egyptian leaders such as Shaykh Muhammad Abduh and Mustafa Kamil,4 who resented the tyranny of the Sultan and the Khedive and later came to believe in the independence of Egypt, felt that continued loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph presented a safeguard against European imperialism. The mass were instinctively pro-Ottoman because they knew no other bond than that of religion (Vatikiotis, 1976: 189).

This essentially Islamic reaction of the Egyptians to the events of 1882 in particular and to the world around them in general did not, however develop along the militant lines

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

4 Mustafa Kamil was a military officer during World War l. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War l, he led the Turkish National Movement in the Turkish War of Independence.

preached by Afghani. A period of fiscal, administrative and judicial reform under British guidance and control5 had intervened which by the turn of the century had produced new and different political conditions. But, Islam remained a basic organizing unit of social life in the Egyptian society. Its capacity of mass mobilization was used by all shades of politicians-religious, semi-secular and secular, during the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.

This encounter with Europe, overwhelmed Egypt. An influential, though small, section avidly absorbed whatever was western, regardless of whether it suited their own indigenous values. A direct confrontation of this section with religious orthodoxy, which was increasingly being marginalized, was one aspect of this scenario. Another was a common desire for social and religious reform, which found open expression in almost all sensitive sections of society. Many traditionally educated Egyptian Muslims were trying to come to terms with the changed social milieu, and efforts to reform al- Azhar, Egypt’s powerful religious, educational institution, were gaining momentum (Ibrahim, 1963:135-136).

Although Egypt’s legal system is considerably streamlined, the continued existence of some western legal codes which Muslims consider as opposed to Islamic teachings still draws heated debate in the country. The debate has now changed into a purely religious issue, mainly on account of the rise of an Islamic movement with political overtones. Muslims consider the Shari’a as their supreme law, and there has been very little efforts at its modernization or incorporation of its elements into the new legal system. A considerably strong section of the reformist group, which favored restricting accommodation of western elements, insisted that pristine Islam, as it was understood by early Muslims and recognized as such by later reformists, should provide the basis for such accommodations. This group was particularly influenced by the strong undercurrent of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 5 Lord Cromer Britain’s Chief Representative in Egypt was carryout wide-scale financial and administrative reforms in a country that was bankrupt and had just gone through a popular revolution and a foreign occupation, and eventually to effect the evacuation of the British forces stationed there. Quickly he concluded that reforms and evacuation were incompatible, that reforms were of more lasting value to the mass of the Egyptians, and that evacuation should come only in the distant future when the Egyptians had been taught self-rule.

puritanical Islamic revival which existed in Egypt ever since the eighteenth century. Both the Azharite personalities and Sufi orders, such as Khalwatiya and Sanusiya6 one may presume who played dominant roles in this revival (Bari, 1995:12).

The revivalists of the late nineteenth century were neither an exclusive nor homogeneous group, except for their reformist outlook and upper middle class orientation. They worked particularly to eradicate some degrading popular practices and to lead society towards progress and enlightened perceptions. Soon, they were considered to have represented a new social force in Egypt, with Shaykh Muhammad Abduh, an Azharite who was influenced by reformist Sufi trends in his early years, emerging as their chief proponent and guiding spirit.

A theologian primarily, Abduh in his program for religious reform covered social aspects as well. Though his writings indicated a keen desire to infuse Muslims with a passion for free inquiry and independent reasoning, he was keen not to detach his program for reform from the traditional past of Islam, which in his view was ideal. He focused on revitalizing Egypt’s social fabric rather than reformulating Islamic theology.

His efforts in this direction were meant to encourage the individual believer to strive for a better life on earth as a measure of serving God. Abduh was not to be satisfied with less than an ethical system in which reason and the pragmatic accommodation between Islam and modernity would supersede the traditional practice and belief. He was in effect demanding that ijtihad, the right of the Muslim to interpret and reinterpret the rules of the Sacred Law in the light of changed conditions, be permitted (Vatikiotis, 1980:195). If scientific and other modern knowledge were required to achieve this, then Abduh saw no conflict, or incompatibility, between science and Islam.

6 The Khalwati order (also known as Khalwatiyya, Khalwatiya, or Halveti, as it is known in Turkey) is an Islamic Sufi brotherhood. Along with the Naqshbandi, Qadiri and Shadhili orders. It is among Maulanathe most Azad famous Sufi Library, orders. The order Aligarh takes its name from Muslim the Arabic word University Khalwa meaning “method of withdrawal or isolation from the World for mystical purposes”. The order was founded by Umar al-Khalwati in the city of Herat in medieval Khorasan (now locates in Western Afghanistan).

Sanusiya, Sufi order is also known as Senussi or Sanussi are a Muslim political-religious Sufi orders and tribe in Libya and Sudan region founded in Mecca in 1837 by the Grand Senussi Sayyid Mohammad ibn Ali as Senussi. Senussi was concerned with both the decline of Islamic thought and spirituality and the weakening of Muslim political integrity.

However, in contrast to the secular positivists in Egypt, who sought to replace theological, religious doctrine with a rational, scientific interpretation of universal phenomena, he insisted upon retaining the essentially Islamic character of Egyptian society while at the same time permitting it to accept the benefits of a secular ethic to guide its social and political conduct. Although politically significant in the long term, it did not become a political issue until religious reform took on the character of a political conflict between conservatives on the one hand, and modernist reformers on the other. When modernists after independence in 1922 sought to replace Islamic solidarity with a secular nationalist principle, the defense of, and apology for, Islam became urgent. Yet an earlier defense of Islam appeared in Egypt simultaneously with the reformist movement of Shaykh Abduh. This was closely connected with the direct reaction of the Egyptians to the British occupation. It differed from his venture in that it was directly involved in the practical political question of opposing British tutelage and influence, and in so far as it sought to rid Egypt of Britain. It preceded the more secular nationalist movement of such leaders as Mustafa Kamil and his National Party, and the other party organizations in the first decade of the twentieth century.

In these early decades of the twentieth century, Egyptian Muslims, including some of Abduh’s followers, began to articulate the concept of secular nationalism on western lines by discounting the concept of Islamic Umma under entirely changed circumstances. In the troubled conditions after the First World War, there was sharp debate in Egypt on the political system best suited for the country. The crux of the debate was whether the classical pervasive character of Islam was to be accepted to allow its supremacy in all spheres of social life, or to moderate its influence. In this debate between Islamism and secularism, pristine Islam provided the principal source of inspiration to the former, and the nineteenth century secular ideology of the West to the latter, which however did not renounce Islam as a religion. The foremost proponent of the Islamist thinking was Rashid Rida, a Syrian follower of Abduh Maulanasettled inAzad Egypt. Rida Library,’s journal titled Aligarh al-Manar, and Muslim his group of University followers, also bearing the same name, became the main source of Abduh’s ideology and propagation of Salafism.

Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who is described as a product of “reformist Islam” (Bari, 1995:15), appeared on the Egyptian scene at a time

When, owing to the presence of a large number of foreigners in almost all walks of life and the overwhelming influence of western liberal ideas on upper-class Egyptians, urban Egypt was becoming a melting-pot cultured7. Sensitive minds in Egypt had also been greatly disturbed by Turkey’s humiliating defeat in the First World War and the consequent abolition of the Caliphate and subjugation of most Arab areas by western colonial powers. Al-Banna, therefore, unlike most of his reformist predecessors who admired the West and sought to accommodate some of its elements, challenged its ascendancy in all its forms. His endeavor to reconcile the various, sometimes conflicting, reformist Islamic trends led him to describe Salafism and Sufism, together with Prophet’s model, as forming the religious basis of his organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (Enayat, 1988:69-83).

In explaining post - World War 1 Islamic revivalism, its non-clerical or lay character is often emphasized, as analogous to Christianity (Bari, 1995:15). Such usage ignores the fact that Islam does not have a rigidly institutionalized division of clergy and lay persons. To a limited extent, however, such distinction is useful as representing a break from the tradition of al-Azhar of the nineteenth century, which was the first phase of Islamic revival.

This phase of Islamic revival in Egypt was closely connected with the induction of modern education on formal European pattern, and introduction of European thought into the country, which induced a group of sensitive youth not only to try to reformulate the social fabric of the country, but also to reconsider some of their religious beliefs and practices.

By the 1930s Islamic revivalism was consolidating its position as a powerful political and social force that affected the political thinking of every element of Egyptian

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 7 The Egyptian society that had the highest foreign influence under British rule. While living in such an atmosphere, al-Banna grew increasingly disillusioned with the British cultural colonization he witnessed. He was especially concerned that hasty attempts to modernize Egypt often resulted in the negative effect of sacrificing or forgetting Islamic principles. Al-Banna was also among many Egyptian nationalists who were dissatisfied with Wafd leadership, namely because of its moderate stances and its insistence on secularism and complaining about the injustice suffered by Arabs and Muslims at the hand of foreign control.

society. Pan Arabism8 in the 1950s and 1960s with its socialist ideals and objectives of a unified Arab world kept Islamic dissidents distant from the political arena. It is to be noted, however, that such perceptions were ascribed to Abduh by authors who wrote during the late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, following the successful emergence of secular currents in Egypt in the wake of the 1952 revolution.9 The Islamic belief system was disrupted and was no longer congruent with experienced social life.

In their religious thought and political action, nationalist Egyptians attempted hard to deal with the shattering impact of the British presence. Egyptian intellectuals were concerned, even during the period of direct British occupation to provide their communities with a new basis for legitimacy and indigenous political authority (Aree, 2001:6). Two orientations competed for the loyalties of the intellectuals: reformist Islam and liberal nationalism. The first as is believed to be revivalist in nature, advocated a return to the path set by early Muslim rulers and the second, whereby, drew its inspiration from Europe, attempted to reconcile European and Islamic political philosophy. Both were moderate; that is, both compromised by British power. These ideological thoughts thus can be summarized emphasizing the relevance of their ideas to the society and state’s aspiration for a better place in the world order.

Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905)

The Egyptian reformer and Muslim apologist Muhammad ‘Abduh was a pupil and friend of al-Afghani. Although deeply influenced by him, ‘Abduh was less inclined to political activism and concentrated on religious, legal and educational reforms. The son of a farmer in the Delta, his early education was entirely religious. From there he entered the Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 8 Pan-Arabism is an ideology espousing the unification of the countries of North Africa and West Asia from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea, referred to as the Arab world. It is closely connected to Arab nationalism, which asserts that the Arabs constitute a single nation.

9 The Egyptian Revolution of 1952, also known as the July Revolution, began on July 23, 1952 by a group of young army officers who named themselves the “Free Officers Movement”. The revolution was initially aimed at overthrowing King Farouk l. However, the movement had more political ambitions and soon moved to abolish the constitutional monarchy and establish a republic.

Azhar in 1866 to study and to become an alim. In 1872, he met Afghani and came under his influence. When in 1879 Afghani was expelled from Egypt for his political activities, Abduh was dismissed from his teaching post at Dar al-Ulum10 for his association with Afghani, and his political views. He was forced to return to his village and was asked to refrain from all political activity. Yet Khedive Tawfiq in 1881, probably on the recommendation of Sharif Pasha,11 recalled Abduh to Cairo and appointed him editor of the Official Gazette. In this capacity, Abduh resumed the pursuit of his reformist activities in education, language and religion (Vatikiotis, 1969:193-194). During the Urabi Revolt12 he supported the cause of the rebels, assisting the movement with his word and pen and advising its leaders. After the debacle, he was sentenced to three years and three months of exile. He joined al- Afghani in Paris, where, in 1884, they both published the reformist, Pan-Islamic, revolutionary review al-’Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Most Firm Bond) (Safran, 1961:62). The review was shut down after eighteen issues, and ‘Abduh went to Beirut, where he gave up his political activity and led a quiet, scholarly life. At the end of his term of exile, he returned to Egypt, reconciled with the British, and was appointed judge in the National Courts, and then the counselor in the Court of Appeal. In 1894, he was appointed member of a newly formed Committee of Administration of al-Azhar, which aimed at reforming that institution (Kedourie, 1966:7-19).

By this time Abduh was ready to embarked upon a theological exercise to clear Islamic doctrine of traditional interpretations which, in his view, were inconsistent with the

10 Dar al-Ulum is an educational institution designed to produce students with both an Islamic and modern secondary education. It was founded in 1871 and is now a faculty of Cairo University; it may be called Faculty of Dar al-Ulum. It began as a means to introduce those in mosque colleges to new knowledge emanating from the West. Its graduates include activists like Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood organization and Sayyid Qutb, the author of Social Justice in Islam and Milestones.

11 Sharif Pasha was an Egyptian statesman of Turkish origin. He served as Prime Minister of Egypt three times during the military insurrection of September 1881 under Urabi Pasha. Sharif was Maulanasumm Azadoned by the KhadiveLibrary, Tawfiq (Kha Aligarhdive of Egypt and Muslimthe Sudan between University1879 and 1892) to form a new ministry. The impossibility of reconciling the financial requirements of the national party with the demands of the British and French controllers of the public debt, compelled him to resign.

12 Urabi revolt was mainly the handiwork of a few frightened agitators. Urabi and his associates were able to arouse all sectors of the population only because these had been for some time past restless under a political order that only oppressed them. It was basically a negative one with no understanding of what the real ailments of Egyptian society where or how to cure them.

original ethical and religious message of Islam. His efforts in this direction were meant to encourage the individual believer to strive for a better life on earth as a measure of serving God. Abduh was not to be satisfied with less than an ethical system in which reason and pragmatic accommodation between Islam and Modernity would supersede the traditional practice and belief. He was in effect demanding that ijtihad, the right of the Muslim to interpret and reinterpret the rules of the Sacred Law in the light of changing conditions, be permitted (Vatikiotis, 1976:194). If scientific and other modern knowledge were required to achieve this, then Abduh saw no conflict, or incompatibility, between science and Islam. He argued, moreover, that Muslim jurists and Ulama should be educated accordingly in order to lead an evolving modern society of believers (Kedourie, 1966:37-39).

Early in his career, when still a student of al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh had been as obsessed as his master with the immediate problem of power rather than with the broader implications of the ideological crisis. Measures that he advocated concentrating mainly on defensive necessities, and the opinions that he expressed about other subjects were based more on broad generalization than on concrete thought and evidence. For instance, in an article published in al-Ahram in 1876, he said:

The ‘Ulama’, who are the spirit of the nation, have failed so far to see the benefit of the modern sciences. They continue to busy themselves with what might have been suitable for a time that is long gone by, not realizing the fact that we are living in a new world. . .. We must study the affairs of other religions and states in order to learn the secret of their advancement. . .. We see no reason for their position of wealth and power except their progress in education and the sciences. Our first duty, then, is to endeavor with all our might and main to spread these sciences in our country (Safran, 1961:63).

After his experience with the ‘Urabi movement and his earlier activities during Maulanahis exile ,Azad he became Library, convinced of theAligarh utility of impulsive Muslim and violent University methods. He began to see the problems faced by Egypt and the Muslim countries not so much in terms of a threat of the materialistic power of the West as in terms of a challenge of the intellectual, social, and ethical dynamism underlying that power to Islamic superstructure the present age.

Once when he was allowed to return to Egypt, ‘Abduh set out to revise systematically some of the orthodox conceptions which he felt prevented Islam from serving as a valid and effective foundation for a modern community. He consistently kept this practical purpose in mind and tried, whenever possible, to avoid provoking abstract theological discussions which were likely to lead to sectarianism and strife and to defeat his intentions. For the same reason he attempted throughout his work to couch his formulations, which often had revolutionary implications, in conservative terms, and followed the logic of his argument only to the point necessary to achieve the practical aim behind it. But this excessively pragmatic and cautions approach, wise and perhaps inescapable as it might have been in the short run, relied too much on a restraint which was essentially subjective. It did not draw boundaries based on principle, and therefore made it possible for others, invoking his authority, to expand or restrict his principles beyond anything he himself had anticipated.

‘Abduh’s most revolutionary enterprise was, of course, his re-interpretive initiative. He rejected vehemently the orthodox view that the doctrine and law of Islam had been formulated once and for all by the medieval doctors, and insisted on the right of every generation to go back to the sources and understand them according to its owns light:

Islam turned the hearts of men away from exclusive attachment to the customs and practices of the fathers . . . It qualified those who accepted blindly the words of their predecessors with folly and levity, and it called attention to the fact that precedence in time is not a sign of knowledge nor a mark of superior intellect and wisdom. . .. Indeed, later generations have a knowledge of past circumstances and the possibility of reflecting upon them and profiting from their lessons which their ancestors did not have (Safran, 1961:64).

With this conception, ‘Abduh reversed the easy and tempting conception of Islam as the immutable doctrine and law of God in favor of a more difficult and more Maulanadangerous Azad one. To be Library, sure, he believed Aligarh in the absolute Muslimtruth of the Qur ’Universityan.

‘Abduh not only defended the rights of later generations to go back to the sources of Islam and understand them according to their own lights, but he also diverged radically from the orthodox view of what these sources were. The Qur’an, he naturally accepted as the primary source; but regarding the Sunnah ---- Tradition of the

Prophet --- he considered only a minute number of hadiths (particular traditions), mostly concerning the life of the Prophet, as genuine, (Hourani, 1983:189) discarding implicitly as later inventions most of what orthodoxy had accepted. The value of the whole Sunnah was anyway greatly discounted by ‘Abduh’s conception of prophecy, which tended to restrict the infallibility of the Prophet to his activity as transmitter of the divine message (Vatikiotis, 1976:195). Outside of this function, which is his proper one, the Prophet is subject to human failures and errors. Although ‘Abduh’s was inclined to view Muhammad in his ‘‘extra-prophetic’’ activity as a great social reformer, this did not give his activity any authoritative character. As for the traditional third source of doctrine, the consensus of the community, there could, of course, be no question of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s accepting it, since it would ipso facto rule out all his activity. The unanimity, he would accept was that of universal reason, which, after the Qur’an, was to him the main source of doctrine.

The most consequential of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s teaching, aside from his assertion of the right to reopen Islamic doctrine to new inquiry, was his definition of the relation between reason and religion. Basically, ‘Abduh viewed this relation as a symbiosis, which is best calculated to serve man’s nature as a thinking and feeling being. Reason approves the credentials and weighs particular beliefs and rulings of religion, even as reason allows religion to respond to man’s innate craving for contact with the metaphysical universe. Religion, on the other hand, endows the conclusions of reason with the effective power that gives them vitality and puts a brake on the attempts of reason to speculate on the nature of divine “things in themselves”. ‘Abduh’s conception of the relation between reason and religion also implied a general shift of emphasis from the traditional legalism and preoccupation with the divine, to the humane and ethical-social aspects of religion. He was in agreement with Ibn- Khaldun13 with regards to religion as indispensable for the achievement of individual

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

13 Ibn Khaldun, the well-known historian and thinker from Muslim 14th century in North Africa. He is considered a forerunner of original theories in social sciences and philosophy of history, as well as the author of original views on economic.

and social happiness, and by al-Ghazzali14 in viewing it as an affair of the heart, in relation to which the outward forms are only secondary. But, he went beyond both men in advocating restraint of the religious passion by means of reason, having learned from the history of the Sufis the abuses to which this passion may otherwise lead:

Religion is a general sense, the province of which is to discover the means of happiness that are not clearly discernible to reason. But it is reason which has the final authority in recognition of this sense, in directing its exercise in its appropriate sphere, and in accepting beliefs and rules of conduct which that sense discovers for it. How can the right of reason to do this, be denied when it is the reason which examines the proofs of these beliefs and rules in order to arrive at a secure knowledge of them and to be assured that they emanate of certainty from God? (Safran, 1961:65).

Elsewhere, ‘Abduh applied this rule more specifically to the Tradition of the Prophet:

There is general agreement among Muslims that in case of conflict between reason and what has been given as Tradition, the conclusions of reason are to be given performance. Two possibilities remain with regard to the Traditions: either to acknowledge its genuineness while confessing inability to understand it and resigning the matter to God’s knowledge, or to interpret it so that it would, in a sense, agree with what reason has been established, without, however, doing violence to the rules of the language (Blunt, 1907:624-628).

In his major theological work, ‘Abduh applied the same rule, though in a somewhat modified form, even to direct revelation. He argued that it is the duty of reason, once it has accepted a prophet as true, to believe all that he reveals, even though not all of the true meaning of the revelations can be understood. This does not mean that something impossible must be accepted --- such a thing cannot be contained

Maulana14 Al-Ghazzali Azad (1056 -1111)Library, was one of the Aligarh most prominent and Muslim influential philosophers, University theologians, jurists and mystics of Sunni Islam. He was active at a time when Sunni theology had just passed through its consolidation and entered a period of intense challenges from Shi’ite Ismailite theology and the Arabic tradition of Aristotelian philosophy (falsafa). Al-Ghazzali understood the importance of falsafa and developed a complex response that rejected and condemned some of its teachings, while it also allowed him to accept and apply others. Al-Ghazzali critique of twenty position of falsafa in his Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifa) is a significant landmark in the history of philosophy as it advances the nominalist critique of Aristotelian science developed later in the 14th century Europe.

in the message of the prophets. If the apparent sense of a passage contains what seems, nevertheless, to be a contradiction, then,

reason must believe that the apparent sense was not intended. It is then free to choose between interpretations of the passage consistently with the rest of the words of the Prophet. . . and between resigning the matter to Allah and His knowledge (Safran, 1961:66).

‘Abduh’s faith that reason cannot ultimately be in contradiction to revelation, despite appearances to the contrary, was a crucial aspect of his teachings. Though he cautiously limited reason so as to exclude excessive metaphysical speculation about “things in themselves,” his position permitted and encouraged Muslims to indulge in rational study and inquiry without fearing that they might thereby deny their faith or be considered as renegades by their Fellow-Muslims. And both the pursuit of rational inquiry and the assurance of remaining within the fold were necessary if a humanistic, dynamic belief-system appropriate to the conditions of a modern society were to be worked out and at the same time have a chance of gradual acceptance by the existing still-traditional society.

The impulse ‘Abduh gave to the development of Egyptian thought was particularly effective because he did not confine himself to these general concepts, crucial as they were, but took the initiative in suggesting some concrete revised theories. Abduh saw the need to reconcile and re-unite the two stands in Muslim and Egyptian thinking. The traditional stand, which offered stagnation, slavish imitation of Muslim traditions and resistance to change, and the modernist / secularist stand, which offered uncritical acceptance of western ideas and culture almost to the exclusion of the indigenous cultural and intellectual environment. It could only be done by accepting the need for change, and by linking that change to the principles of Islam, and by showing that the changes which were taking place were not only permitted by Islam, but were indeed its necessary implications, if it was rightly understood and that MaulanaIslam could Azad serve both Library, as a principle ofAligarh change and could Muslim have a salutary University control over it. Unlike the secular positivists in Europe, who sought to replace theological, religious doctrines with a rational, scientific interpretation of universal phenomena, he insisted upon retaining the essentially Islamic character of Egyptian society while at the same

time permitting it to accept the benefits of a secular ethic to guide its social and political conduct.

In asserting that Islam could be the moral basis of a modern and progressive society, Abduh did not, of course intend to imply Islam would approve of everything that was done in the name of progress. He felt that a basic purpose of his life was to liberate thought, and how it can be, was one of Abduh’s major purposes. The key to his defense of Islam, indeed, to all his thought, was a certain conception of true religion: a distinction between what was essential and unchanging in it and what was inessential and could be changed without damage. The real Islam, he maintained, had a simple doctrinal structure. It consisted of certain beliefs about the great questions of human life and certain general principles of human conduct.

However, ‘Abduh was modernist in his own right thought from the shackles of taqlid and understand religion as it was understood by the elders of the community before dissension appeared.

To show that Islam can be reconciled with modern, who wanted to formulate a response within Islam to the challenges and changes triggered by increasing western hegemony in the Middle East. They were not just responsible for prompting a call to all Muslims to return to their faith, to the ‘straight path’ advocated by God in the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad through example, but also for recognizing the eternal and inextricable links between the regeneration of faith and the particular brand of politics that had emerged from the practice of the religion.

Abduh sought to reacquaint Islam with the immense political, social and economic changes that were taking place around him as a direct result of the colonial experience. As the fabric of society strained under secularizing influences, al-Afghani, ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida formulated a response that embraced modernization --- of Islam --- and advocated the primacy of Muslim belief, asserting that an irrelevant and Maulanaoutdated Azad interpretation Library, of Islam, promoted Aligarh by backward Muslim and old- fashionedUniversity clergy (Ulama), was actually playing a large part, alongside colonialism, in undermining the unity of the Muslim community.

To establish the reconciliation between science and Islam, it was necessary to modify the traditional emphasis on the arbitrary will of God in favor of a concept that

would underline regularity in the functioning of nature. This ‘Abduh did by reinterpreting the traditional notion of the Sunnah (custom) of God, which, in the traditional doctrine, held primarily the function of distinguishing normal occurrences from miracles, (Dunne, 1950:94-95) to give it a meaning that permitted scientific causality. Thus, God is the constant creator of the universe, but in this activity, He follows a regular, unchanging custom which may be studied and formulated into scientific “laws”:

The Qur’an makes such references to the origin of the universe . . . of creation, and so on, in order to arouse the intellect to follow its natural course in discovering the original state of things and the laws which govern them. . .. The Qur’an does not restrict the mind in these things in any respect, but it summons in many verses. . . which amount to as much as half the Qur’an . . . to the contemplation of God’s signs in nature (Dunne, 1950:95).

Thus, it is clear from the above interpretation that Muhammad ‘Abduh was very anxious to bring the Qur’an into alignment with modern scientific theories by putting forward novel and unexpected interpretations. Apart from the pseudo-scientific approach, a phenomenon common among the modernist reformers, he sometimes resorted to the metaphor sing of supernatural notions. Thus, commenting on the Surah al-Quri’ah: (“Then, as for him whose scales (Mizan) are heavy he will live a pleasant life; but as for him whose scales are light, the Bereft and Hungry one will be his mother”) ‘Abduh says: It was wrong to think, as some commentators believe, that the word Mizan in the verse is used in a material sense. Similarly, he says, the description of heaven and hell should not be taken in their literal sense; they are metaphorical expressions meant to describe the greatest intensity of pleasure and sorrow. It has been generally accepted by Muslims that the word al-Kawthar in the Qur’an is meant to be the name of river in paradise which God has bestowed upon Prophet Muhammad. But Muhammad ‘Abduh suggests that the word al-Kawthar meant the benefits which God Maulanabestowed Azad upon mankind Library, by providing Aligarh the latter with Muslim the guidance ofUniversity Prophet hood. Similarly, other eschatological matters, such as al-Nafkh fi’al-Suwar, al-Lawh al- Mahfuz etc., cease to be sensual and corporal for ‘Abduh, who, as usual, resorted to metaphor sing such references wherever possible.

To reinterpret the doctrinal and dogmatic bases of a revealed religious message entailed the danger of rejecting some of them, and changing others out of all recognition. Thus, his later religious disciple, led by Shaykh Rashid Rida, ended up with a movement whose basic teachings reverted to a strict orthodoxy. Until the 1930s, this movement (the Salafiyyah), (Vatikiotis, 1976:196) though not as puritanical as that of the Wahhabis15 of Arabia, basically preached a return to the early principles of Islam as laid down by the Prophet and as practiced by his immediate successors to the spiritual-political leadership of the Islamic Community, the four Orthodox Caliphs (AD 632-61).

Like the Salafiyyah, ‘Abduh wished simultaneously to defend Islam to reconcile it with modern science. He longed to retain its original purity and simplicity of belief (Vatikiotis, 1976:196) --- Tawhid, or the oneness of God --- and to create a symbiosis between its scripture and modern rationalism, in order to produce a synthetic but a viable social philosophy which would permit the conscious formation of a modern social and political reform program. But, to reform Islam as Abduh tried, since he considered it entered, meant either to reject it as a bad social principle and replace it, or to transform it beyond all recognition. Thus the difficulty of ‘Abduh ultimately was not simply theological, but also intellectual (Bari, 1995:19).

‘Abduh’s efforts were more successful in legal and educational reform, two areas of public life which were under governmental control. The office of Mufti was a state function. Thus, in this capacity as Mufti Abduh applied his reformist ideas to the interpretation of the Sacred Law and specific Islamic practices: viz, the wearing of hats and European clothes, food rites and so on. In this capacity, also, Abduh was a member of the Supreme Council governing the Azhar, where he pressed for the reform of Azharite institutions and their educational curricula. Both these positions involved political power, the support or opposition of the government. So long as the latter favored institutional reform of this kind, the social and religious ideas of ‘Abduh had a Maulanachance of Azad advancement. Library, Yet this was notAligarh the kind of theological Muslim reformulation University of

15 This branch of Islam is often referred to as “Wahhabi”. Members of this form of Islam call themselves, Muwahhidun (“Unitarians”, or “unifiers of Islamic practices”). They use the Salafi Da’wa or Ahl ul-Sunnah Wa al-Jamaah. The teachings of the reformer Abd al-Wahhab are more often referred to by adherents as Salafi, that is, “following the forefathers of Islam”.

Islam that Abduh had envisaged. Nonetheless, Abduh’s reformist activities had a lasting effect upon later generations of Egyptian leaders, even though the question of the reformation of Islamic doctrine remains unresolved and perhaps is such that it can never be resolved. It was, however, largely as a result of his efforts that the government created in 1895 an Administrative Council for the Azhar in which Abduh served. The Council was responsible for both the academic and administrative supervision of the Azhar. The promulgation of a curriculum, the choice of texts, the establishment of a central library and the setting of examinations were to be supervised by this Council. So were the organization of its finances, staff appointments, contracts, students and disciples (Vatikiotis, 1976:197).

Abduh was equally active in the reform of religious courts and the education and training of qadis, or judges. As Mufti of Egypt, he prepared reports for the better training of judges, the reforms of legal rules to meet the needs and interests of a changing society; in short, he was anxious to ensure that the courts should seek to render justice in litigation rather than merely to apply the letter of the law. Recognizing the inadequacy of government schools to meet the increase in student population, Abduh together with others - among them Sa’ad Zaghlul16 - founded the Muslim Benevolent Society in 1892. Its main purpose was to find schools for poor children, which would serve as an experiment in private national education; they were meant to give people a modern education while emphasizing on Muslim upbringing.

Muhammad ‘Abduh’s views on political institutions and forms of government, however are less clear, partly because he found politics distasteful. His concept of an ideal government was similar to the classical jurists’ concepts: there should be a just ruler who rules in accordance with the law and in consultation with the people. However, he not only accepted temporal plurality, but was also deeply influenced by his sense of being an Egyptian. Both these matters had to be reconciled with the universal Ummah (The Islamic community). Accordingly, he defined the unity of the MaulanaUmmah Azadas a moral Library, unity within which Aligarh political plurality Muslim was accepted University; but there should also be a restored Khilafah, though he was ambivalent about its proper

16 Sa’ad Zaghlul Pasha ibn Ibrahim, an Egyptian statesman and patriot leader of the Wafd party and of the nationalist movement of 1918-19, which led Britain to give Egypt nominal independence in 1922. He was briefly prime-minister in 1924.

functions. On the one hand, he argued that it should have spiritual functions and spiritual authority only, even suggesting that there should be ‘a chief of our Egyptian nations, acting under the religious sovereignty of the Caliphate’ (Hourani, 1983:156). On the other hand, he argued that ‘the traditional constitution theory of the Caliphate in Islam, in its positive manifestations as distinct from its religious, is as much a system of civil law as the Western secular type’ and that ‘the Caliph was simply the political head of the community, he was not its Pope. He did not have the power or the position of the chief priest nor did he have the exclusive right of interpreting the will of God’ (Kerr, 1966:48).

Muhammad Rashid Rida, who remained the most devoted disciple of Abduh and his biographer, tried to systematize the teachings of the master into genuine theological dogma. The journal Al-Manar, which Rida founded in 1897 and edited until his death in 1935, served as an organ of the Salafiyyah movement which he also headed. It began as a vehicle for the propagation of the Islamic views of Abduh. But it was also associated with the less reformist and more fanatically Islamic daily Al- Mu’ayyad, published and edited by Shaykh Ali Yusuf. Although al-Manar disseminated the views of a progressive, but orthodox Islam, it was distinctly influenced by the rationalism of the Abduh theology, especially as developed in his Essay on ‘Oneness of God’ (Vatikiotis, 1969:198). It calls both for the reform and improvement of the Islamic community everywhere as well as for the political rally of Muslim around their heritage. Although it insisted upon the accommodation between reason and established religious texts, the Salafiyyah for the sake of solidarity of an Islamic bloc of nations. It rejected the revolutions of Afghani, perhaps because Abduh suspected the political and irreligious motives of the latter, retained the idea to reform society expounded by Afghani, but strengthened the conservative requirement of facing the West and its culture with the irrational solidarity of an Islamic community.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Muhammad Rashid Rida (1895-1935) Muhammad Rashid Rida was Muhammad ‘Abduh’s leading disciple until his death and afterwards. He was also his biographer, the editor of his works, and the man

who more than anyone else carried on his tradition and interpreted his doctrines. His contribution to the Renaissance of political Islam and linkage or engagement with the debate about nationalism was to develop a Salafist approach to the modernization of Islam and its political regeneration. Throughout his life Rashid Rida led the modernist movement in Cairo and continued to win supporters for his ideas throughout the region. Through the publication of a journal-cum-newspaper entitled al-Manar (The Lighthouse) and his involvement in a religious school close to the traditionalist religious university, al-Azhar, Rida played his part in maintaining the momentum for reform initiated by his mentors al-Afghani and Abduh. Rida, however, was a conservative rather than a liberal reformer, rejecting the argument for liberalization of Islam through westernization of the religion. There would be no Islamic reformation where the forces of religion and state were unleashed to depart on separate paths; for Rida, the answer to modernization lay in strengthening and further forcing the ties within Islam that marry the spiritual and the political values together. By the late 1920’s and early 1930’s Rida had become an influential figure throughout the Muslim world. His journal and associated publications were read by young men who were thus encouraged to explore and put into practice his ideas. Rida advocated a modernized Islamic state to respond to western ideas of liberalism. In this way, Rida planted the seeds that encouraged a debate on the regeneration and defense of Islam from within.

Further, Rida endeavored to restore confidence in Islam by pointing out its glories and advantages, and tried in a practical way to secure his suggested reforms by presenting a political blueprint which had at its center the revivification of the Caliphate. The chief pitfall in ‘Abduh’s thought was that, having rejected ijma’ and restricting the authoritative sources to the Qur’an and a very few traditions, he left wide scope for the unhampered operation of reason, which could be, and often was, exploited by the western forces to justify their espousal of foreign ideas. This latitude was particularly dangerous in the sphere of ethics where ‘Abduh had severed any Maulananecessary Azad relation between Library, revelation Aligarhand morality. To Muslim meet this danger University, Rida tried, in general, to restrict the scope of reason by greatly increasing the authoritative sources of reference to include a vast number of traditions besides the Qur’an and by restoring the principle of ijma’, which he restricted, however, to the period of the first four caliphs, the “rightly guided ones” (Safran, 1969; 108). These sources taken together,

Rida claimed, contained the whole body of dogma, all the principles of the faith, a code of ethics, and the practices of the cult (Safran, 1969; 108).

In his attempt to give specific application to this general concept, Rida retreated in the sphere of dogma from the position of moderate rationalism taken by ‘Abduh to one of cautious liberalism that exceeded in its restrictiveness even the faint rationalism of the orthodox. To those who worried about its effects on the initiative of the concept of arbitrary divine omnipotence that was likely to follow from a literal interpretation of the Qur’anic dogma, Rida pointed out that the Muslims, under the rightly guided caliphs, had been able to achieve mighty deeds without being hampered by this belief, which they accepted without casuistry (Hourani, 1983:228-232).

In the sphere of ethics, ‘Abduh tried to overcome the rigidity of traditional conception by asserting the autonomous rational-utilitarian foundation of a Sufi brand on Islamic principles. The Qur’an and the Tradition, as understood by the Companions of the Prophet, he asserted, contained a complete code of ethics which is best for mankind because it is the product of divine wisdom (Heyworth & Dunne, 1950:105- 107).

Unlike Muhammad ‘Abduh, who remained silent on the subject, Rida considered the Caliphate an indispensable part of his reform program. The Calipha, Rida argued, ‘is the greatest interest for the Ummah as a whole, and does not exist without the sword and power’. Its establishment is a religious obligation on all Muslims, and not merely a rational and utilitarian expedient, as the Mu’tazilites17 and other had earlier argued, (Taji, Farouki & Basher, 2004:74-75) Rida concedes the Kemalist point that the genuine Khilafa had existed only for a very brief period (the thirty years of the Righteous Caliphate), leaving the field for the ‘khilafa of necessity’, or of ‘coercion’. But this did not justify the scrapping of the institution altogether, as the system has its

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

17 Mu’tazilites is a school of Islamic theology based on reason and rational thought that flourished in the cities of Basra and Baghdad. The adherents of the Mu’tazili school are best known for their denying the status of the Qur’an as uncreated and co-eternal with God.

own inbuilt corrective mechanism, mainly the proactive role of Ahl al-hall WA ‘I- ’aqd18 (community leaders, those who ‘loose and bind’), whose central role must be revived as the electors of the caliph, guarantors of people’s freedoms and rights and guardians of the implementation of sharia. To Rida, since the establishment of the Khilafa was an inescapable religious duty, the Muslim community does not exist as a community unless and until the Caliphate is restored (Hourani, 1983:242).

At this stage in the debate, a major shift also began to occur: the idea of the restoration of the khilafa was beginning to be replaced by a new concept, that of the ‘Islamic state’ (as opposed to the secular one established by the Turks) (Hourani, 1983:242). While for Rida this state (or states) still involved at least the re- establishment of a symbolic khilafa, the stage was set for the post-caliphate order. But this shift had now raised new problems, chief among which was the problem of religious authority, thought in the past to reside in the khilafa or imam (for the Shi’a). In the ensuing contests, many rival centers arouse to compete to fill this authority vacuum.

In his writing Rida deliberated on the subject of the Islamic state after dealing with the problems of the Caliphate. He did this in three stages: (1) first he traced the foundations of the Caliphate in the Islamic political theory; (2) then he demonstrated the cleavage between that theory and the political practice of Sunni Muslims; (3) finally he advanced his own idea of what an Islamic state should be. Rida’s advances towards the idea of an Islamic state was to examine a number of practical difficulties hindering the rehabilitation of the Caliphate --- especially finding the right person to become the Caliph of all Muslims, as well as the right city for its capital. Surveying the political scene, he ruled out the most ambitious candidate for the Caliphate at the time, Sharif Hussain of Mecca, for his despotism, lack of canonical knowledge, pro- British sympathies, and opposition to the reforms. Turks were also naturally excluded, since they were at the time opposed to the concentration of all spiritual and political Maulanapowers inAzad the hands ofLibrary, one man anyway. Aligarh He was silent Muslim on the Egyptian University candidates.

18 Ahl al-Hall wa’l-Aqd - Those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community. In medieval political theory, the term refers to legal scholars whose task it was to offer the caliphate to the most qualified person. Because, in practice, most ruler designated their successors, the task was generally a mere formality. Some modern thinkers have tried to accommodate their task to that of a parliament.

Only Imam Yahya of the Yemen enjoyed his approval because of his mastery of the religious law, moral probity, efficiency, political semi-independence, and Qurayshi descent. He admitted that the Imam could become the Caliph of all Muslims only if, first, the people of Hijaz, Tihamah and Najd agree to take the oath of allegiance to him, and, second, if the Imam himself undertook to observe the rules of ijtihad by allowing all groups of Muslims to follow their particular rites. In point, laying such conditions was another way of stating the impracticality of the whole scheme, for the simple reason that the Imam belonged to the Zaydi sect19 of Shi’ism. Although, as Rida rightly points out, compared with other Shi’is, the Zaydis are the closest to Sunni, especially Hanafi Muslims20 in canonical matters. But then, it is hard to imagine how the majority of Sunni Muslims could have brought themselves to obeying a Shi’i caliph, of whatever denomination (Enayat, 2005:74).

He was therefore arrived at the new conclusion that as was there really was no candidate to meet the ideal requirements of the Caliphate. For the same kind of reasons, he concludes that both Hijaz and Istanbul were unsuitable for the seat of a restored Caliphate. Ideally, he was of the opinion, that the Caliphate need to be revived through the co-operation between the Turks and the Arabs of the Peninsula, who between themselves possess the essential qualities required for the regeneration of Islam. The westernized outlook of those who seek to dispense with the religious and historical constituents of the Islamic community; the determination, tenacity and courage of Turkey’s new leaders, and their skill in military techniques, ensured their success in reforming Islam by establishing a Caliphate equipped with both the material strength and moral virtues necessary to protect the Muslims from Bolshevism and anarchy. The Arabs of the Peninsula, on the other hand, were the ‘substance’ and ‘root’ of Islam; there was no trace of heresy and westernization in their midst, their only defect was being ‘ignorant of the ways of administering and developing the land’ (Enayat, 2005:75). He also praised the Arabs because of the pivotal place of their language in MaulanaIslam; this Azad had nothing Library, to do with national Aligarh or radical prejudices Muslim, but wa Universitys cleverly 19 Zaydi sect is an early sect which emerged in the eighth century out of Shi’a Islam, named after Zayd ibn Ali, the grandson of Husayn ibn Ali. Followers of the Zaydi Islamic jurisprudence are called Zaydi Shi’a.

20 The Hanafi school is one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence (fiqh). It is named after the school Abu Hanifa an-Nu’man ibn Thabi (767), a tabi whose legal views were preserved primarily by his two most important disciples, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani. The other major schools of Shari’a in Sunni Islam are Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali.

incorporated into his reformist doctrines: Islamic revivalism depended on ijtihad in religious law, and ijtihad was impossible without proper understanding of the sources of the law, for which knowledge of Arabic was an indispensable tool. Again the realist in him took over; he confessed to his lack of confidence in both the Arabs and the Turks, because neither of them had reached the requisite degree of progress, and neither was showing any readiness to co-operate in such an enterprise (Taji, Farouki and Nafi, 2004:178-179).

He then made a suggestion which, although sounding as utopian as the previous one, gave him the opportunity to set forth his principal ideas on the nature and future of the Caliphate. According to him this Caliphate can be an ‘intermediary zone’ between the Arabian Peninsula and Anatolia, where Arabs, Turks, and Kurds live side by side. He hoped that once the area is declared neutral, as the seat of the Caliphate, the parties would stop quarreling over it, and Mosul would be truly ‘worthy of its name (in Arabic, mausil, literally, the place of re-union) . . . would be serving as the spiritual link (rabitah wasl ma’nawi) at a geographic borderline (Enayat, 2005:75).

The metaphor ‘spiritual link was in fact the key to Rida’s vision to regenerate Caliphate --- and an Islamic state. He elaborated this vision in his proposal for the organization of the Caliphate.

In addition to the concept of Caliphate, another cardinal principle in Rida’s thought was the related concept of the Ummah. Even before the Ottoman Empire broke up into half-a-dozen Muslim states, one of his major endeavors had been the restoration of complete unity of the Ummah.

Naturally, Rida and the Manarists21 looked with marked disfavor at the modern nationalist movements among the Muslims, and they did so on more than one score. Rida was one of the few Muslim thinkers in Egypt, who saw early and clearly the threat posed by the concept of nationalism to the Islamic doctrine. To be sure, the Maulanaundeniable Azad appeal ofLibrary, the negative sideAligarh of nationalism Muslim --- liberation University from foreign occupation --- prevented him from condemning it absolutely, except once in 1900

21 Manarists were those who wrote in al-Manar newspaper edited by Rashid Rida. Al-Manar to be associated with the Salafi movement so the Manarist also called Salafist. They called for the separation of religion and politics.

(Safran, 1969:107). But even though he accommodated himself to this aspect of it on the ground that the liberation and reunification of the Ummah must, under the circumstances, proceed by degrees, (Safran, 1961:107) he never ceased to condemn the positive, ideological aspects of the nationalism that prevailed in Egypt and other Arab countries after the turn of the century. Nothing is more dangerous, Rida argued, than the desire of the nationalist westerns to replace the sentiment of Islamic solidarity with national and racist sentiment. This was, to him, not only a new source of dissension among Muslims, but something close to apostasy.

Western civilization, Rida maintained, is the product of certain intellectual attitudes and social habits which Muslims had lost and in which westerners came to excel. Yet he insisted that these traits were the very essence of Islam. On the question of how could Muslims revive these qualities, he responded that an understanding of the true meaning of Islam is the Islam as taught by Prophet Muhammad. Knowledge of true Islam may be found in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s traditions as related and understood by the companions of the Prophet and the elders (Salaf) of the first generation of Islam. Their opinions constituted the consensus (ijma) which gave a full expression to the principle laid down in the Qur’an and traditions. That consensus was the only valid and binding one upon Muslims in succeeding generations. Being thoroughly learned in the science of Traditions and in the opinions of elders, Rida set for himself the task of interpreting Islam in a manner that would fit modern conditions of life, as indicated by his copious commentaries on the Qur’an and the juristic and Theological studies. But it was precisely in this method that Rida departed from ‘Abduh’s broader outlook since Rida’s great attachment to traditions prompted him to formulate even more precisely the very same principles that rendered these traditions no longer adequate for the ever growing demand of succeeding generations.

Rida, however, did not insist on Orthodoxy in all its facets, for he allowed certain measures of flexibility in his system of ideas, especially in the realm of law and Maulanapolitical Azad theory. He Library, made a distinction Aligarh between the Muslim sacred law, regulatingUniversity man’s personal behavior, and the law regulating man’s actions towards others. The former, he maintained, are prescribed for all times and cannot be changed; the latter is necessarily subjected to revision in accordance with changing circumstances. The criteria of revision he held, must be for the common good (maslah) of the community.

These criteria are provided by the law, for Islam forbids injury (la darar WA la dirar) and permits relaxation of prescribed rules if there is pressing necessity (al-darurat tubih al-madhurat). These guiding principles, he maintained, were constantly followed by the elders, but they had been applied by other methods of legal reasoning such as an analogy (Qiyas) and consensus (ijma). He stressed, in particular, consensus as a legal procedure, which he reserved to the Ulama (scholars) who acted on behalf of the public. The Ulama, meeting in an assembly (parliament) as representatives of the people, make decisions and laws on the basis of the general interest and welfare of the people. Thus, Rida combined the concepts of consultation (al-Shura) with consensus in order to demonstrate that representative government is feasible under the Islamic system.

In general, the views of Islam held by Rashid Rida and his friends were that as expounded by Al-Afghani and Abduh. It starts from the question as to why the Muslim countries are backward in every aspect of civilization and is answered in terms of the essential connection, in Islam, although not necessarily in other religions, between religious truth and worldly prosperity. The teachings and moral precepts of Islam are such that, if they are properly understood and fully obeyed, they will lead to success in this world as well as the next-and to success in all the forms in which the world understands it i.e. strength, respect, civilization happiness. If they do not understand and obeyed. Hence, weakness, decay and barbarism are the results. This is true not only for individuals, but for communities as well. According to him:

“The reason for the backwardness of Muslim countries is that Muslims have lost the truth of their religion, and this has been encouraged by bad political rulers. For, the true Islam involves two things, acceptance of the unity of God and consultation in matters of State, and despotic rulers have tried to make Muslims forget the second by encouraging them to abandon the first. He warned that what happened in the past can happen again: Islamic civilization was created out of nothing but by the Qur’an and the moral precepts enshrined Maulana Azadin it, and Library, can be re-created Aligarh if a Muslim Muslimreturn to the Qur University’an. It is irrelevant to say that modern civilization rests on technical advance, and that Islamic civilization cannot be revived so long as the Muslims are technically backward; technical skill is potentially universal, and its acquisition depends on certain moral habits and intellectual principles. If Muslims had these, they would easily obtain technical skill;

and such habits and principles are in fact contained in Islam” (Quoted in Hourani, 1983:228).

The real problem, he believed, lay in ignorance and neglect on the part of rulers and religious leaders, as a result of which corrupt practices and accretions had become the norm. To him, the solution is simple. All that is needed, is to return to the practice ‘of the early days of the first four Caliphs.

The extent to which this revival of Islam took place is hard to measure. Although not broadly populist in appeal, al-Afghani, Abduh and Rida managed to inspire a new generation of educated Muslims, many of whom, it should be noted, were not from the Ulama class, to rethink the role which Islam could play in their lives and the unifying nationalist role it could maintain.

‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq was born in Lower Egypt to one of the most distinguished among the big landowner families. His father was the first president of the Ummah Party. ‘Ali entered al-Azhar at the age of ten after a preparatory religious education and remained for thirteen years. In his last two years at the college he also attended lectures by Nallino and Santillana at the Egyptian University. In 1912 he went to England, where he spent a year learning the language and a year at Oxford studying economics and political science before returning to Egypt during the outbreak of World War l. He became judge in a Shar’i court and lectured at the Islamic Institute of Alexandria while he undertook a study of the Muslim judiciary system. The first result of his study was his book on the caliphate, published in 1925. It was the time when, ‘Ali also became an editor of the journal of al-Rabitah al-Sharqiyyah (The Oriental League) and a senator. (Safran, 1961:139). Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University His ideas on Caliphate can be understood in the backdrop of this abolition of Caliphate in Turkey in 1924. During this time, there was a lively discussion throughout the Muslim world about whether the Turkish action was legitimate and whether the caliphate could or should be revived. In 1922, when the sultanate was abolished, the Turkish Grand National Assembly issued a semi-official statement

justifying their act: drawn up by a group of religious lawyers, it was published in Arabic as well as Turkish, under the title of al-Khilafa Wa sultat al-Umma (The Caliphate and the Sovereignty of the Nation). There is such a thing, the statement declares, as a legitimate caliphate, but it can only exist in certain conditions: the caliph must possess certain qualifications, and he must be chosen and invested by the people, for the Islamic people as a whole possesses sovereignty. These conditions were only fulfilled for the first four caliphs, and all others have therefore been fictitious. That does not mean however that there is no legitimate authority in the Islamic community: when there is no caliph, the community itself can choose some other form of government, and make whatever arrangements it wishes to ensure that it be ruled justly and legally. The form of government it chooses depends on the needs of the age, and in the modern age a National Assembly has a sacred duty to ensure the welfare of the country which is better than a sultan whose only care is to preserve his throne (Hourani, 1983:184). The logic of this statement points not to the compromise of 1922 but to the decisive step of 1924; and after the caliphate had been finally abolished, it was Mustafa Kamil who with typical frankness explained why it was done. The caliphate had ruined the Turkish people: they had spent themselves in vain for an ideal which was not in their national interest, and was impossible in itself. For the caliphate was essentially political: the very attempt to make it purely spiritual had proved this, since the caliph had become the rallying point of discontented elements. Either the caliph was a head of state or he was nothing; and he could not be a head of State, for there could not be a united Muslim State today (Hourani, 1983:184).

Orthodox Muslims received such views with honor, but when they themselves thought the matter out they reached to a conclusion that was not very different. In May 1926 a ‘Congress of the Caliphate’ was called together in Cairo by a group of Egyptian ‘Ulama’ presided over by the Rector of the Azhar, ‘in view of the privileged position which this country enjoys among the Muslim peoples’ (Taji, Farouki and Nafi, Maulana2004:175) Azad. The congress Library, reaffirmed Aligarh the traditional Muslim view of the caliphate:University it was legitimate, indeed it was necessary, since many legal obligations depended on it. But to be real it must have both spiritual and temporal power. When such power did not exist the caliphate could not really exist, and this was the situation at the present time. All that could be done was to hold successive meetings to discuss the matter, until the time should become propitious: to this one delegate added the hope that, when this

time should come, a caliph might be elected by a ‘Muslim representative body’ (Hourani, 1983:184).

‘Abd al-Raziq’s book was a contribution to this debate. His central argument in his book was that the Caliphate had no basis either in the Qur’an, or the Tradition, or the consensus. To prove each part of this argument, he dealt in some detail with the major pieces of evidence which were normally drawn from these three sources in establishing the ‘obligatoriness’ of the Caliphate. He rightly said that the Qur’an nowhere makes any mention of the Caliphate in the specific sense of the political institution.

To dispose of consensus as the last, conceivable sanction, ‘Abd al-Raziq argued that, judging from concrete historical instances, consensus, whether in the sense of agreement of the Prophet’s Companions and their followers, or that of ‘Ulama’ or the entire Muslim community, has never played any role in installing the Caliphs --- except in the case of the first four. The Caliphate has always been established by force, and maintained by oppression: it is for this reason that political science has always been a barren discipline, and political writings have been so scant among the Muslims. If there has been any consensus serving as the legitimacy of the Caliphate in history, it has been of the kind that the Muslim jurists refer to as ‘the consensus of silence’ (ijma sukuti). Being himself an expert on Islamic jurisprudence, (Vatikiotis, 1976:304) Abd al-Raziq felt confident enough to declare that consensus in this sense can never be used to deduce ‘religious proof and canonical rule’. To underline the perils of ‘consensus of silence’ he mentioned the example of the enthronement of Faysal, the son of Sharif Husayn, as the King of Iraq, after the First World War, which was justified by the British claim that ‘the people who loose and bind’ (Ahl al-hall wa’l- Aqd), namely the religious and political leaders, had consented to it. From a strictly legal point of view, he said, the British were right: there had indeed been an election of sorts, in the form of consultation with the tribal chiefs and the ‘Ulama - but this was as Maulanavalid a form Azad of consensus Library, as the one arrangedAligarh by the Umayyad Muslim ruler, MuUniversity ‘awiyah,22 to

22 The Umayyad Caliphate was the second of the four major Islamic caliphate established after the death of Muhammad. This caliphate was centered on the Umayyad dynasty, hailing from Mecca. The Umayyad family had first come to power under the third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan (644-656), but the Umayyad regime was founded by Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, long-time governor of Syria, after the end of the first Muslim civil war in 661 CE/41AH.

receive the oath of allegiance to his son Yazid: in the year 55/674 he summoned all the representatives of Muslims to an assembly in which he obtained their agreement to Yazid’s succession at the point of the sword (Taji, Farouki & Nafi, 2004:197).

Thus far, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reasoning’s could be excused by many a traditionalist as a legitimate expression of an unconventional opinion on the Caliphate - especially at a time when that institution was completely discredited. But he then doomed his book to orthodox damnation by introducing an issue which, although being related to the question of the Caliphate, was tangential to his immediate concern. This was the question whether Islam, as a system of religious doctrines, necessitated the creation of government at all. Abd al-Raziq accordingly admitted that contrary to the Caliphate, the creation of government has in fact been envisaged in the Qur’an as an essential instrument to administer the affairs of Muslims, and protect their interests: when God says that he has elevated certain individuals above others (43:32), or when He orders the Prophet to adjudicate among people according to the Book, and not to follow individual vagaries (5:48), He is indeed proclaiming the necessity of government. But this again does not mean that government is a fundamental principle of religion. True the Prophet, during his period of messenger ship, also performed some political acts, such as conducting wars, appointing officials, collecting alms-tax and distributing spoils of war, but none of these acts were directly related to his Prophetic mission. Even jihad cannot be considered as a function of prophecy, because according to ‘Abd al-Raziq’s reading of the Qur’an, God has instructed the Muslims to propagate their religion only through peaceful persuasion and preaching. Whenever the Prophet resorted to acts of war, it was not for the sake of disseminating the religious call, but ‘for the sake of state (or a kingdom, Mulk), and towards consolidating the Islamic polity. And there is no state which is not based on the sword, and sustained by virtue of violence and subjugation’ (Enayat, 2005:64). This should mean that all the other verses in the Qur’an enjoining, for instance, the Muslims to strike the infidels Maulanawherever Azad they find themLibrary,, should be interpretedAligarh in the Muslim same vein - although University ‘Abd al- Raziq does not explicitly say no. What is significant is that he thus draws a distinct line between the Prophet’s position as a responsible statesman, and his position as a religious or spiritual teacher.

Following these abstract rational reflections, ‘Abd al-Raziq considered the career of Muhammad and came to the conclusion that he had never envisaged the establishment of any specific political organization. Hence, all the Prophet’s political acts should be explained in terms of the requirements of maintaining an emerging state, but any attempt at relating them to the essence of his divine mission is totally unjustified. Ironically, a crucial reason mentioned by the author in support of this argument is the principle of individual responsibility in Islam --- that is, one of the main points used by modern, radical writers to encourage the Muslims to take a more active part in the political life of their societies: had God wanted the Prophet to undertake the political as well as religious leadership of the Muslims, He would not have warned the Prophet repeatedly against acting as the ‘agent’ (Wakil), ‘guardian’ (Hafiz), or ‘holder of absolute authority (musaytir) over the Muslims, while reminding him that his sole function is to communicate (al-balagh) the divine message through wise words, sermon and dialectics (Safran, 1961:142).

The whole debate was the most subtle part of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s arguments --- and one which has been most misunderstood by many of his critics and expositors alike, with damaging results for the overall impression that his work made on religious thinking. This conclusion can be stated in two propositions: first, political authority and governments, however indispensable for implementing Islamic ideals, do not belong to the essence of Islam and specifically do not constitute any of its cardinal principles (Taji, Farouki & Nafi, and 2004:176). Second, Islam, if properly understood, leaves the Muslims free to choose whatever form of government they find suitable to ensure their welfare. The opposite belief that in Islam, religion and politics form a unified whole, is wrong so far as it associates politics primarily with the Caliphate, and then with the despotic regimes that have ruled the Muslims throughout history. ‘Abd al-Raziq considers the currency of this belief to be the result of both the observations of well-meaning, ‘realistic’ historians like Ibn Khaldun, who have erected an existing Maulanastate of Azad affairs into Library, a dogmatic axiom Aligarh, and the cynical Muslim insinuation University of the despots themselves who wanted to give an appearance of sanctity to their rule (Taji, Farouki & Nafi, 2004:177). The final remark of the book summed up by the authors urges to see the conclusions turned to the service of political activism among Muslims today: ‘There is nothing in the religion which prevents Muslims from competing with other nations in the field of social and political sciences, and from demolishing that

antiquated order which has subjugated and humiliated them, and to build up rules of their state and the organization of their government on the basis of the most modern achievements of human reason, and on the most solid experiences of nations as to the best principles of government’ (Enayat, 2005:65).

It is possible that if the essential ideas of the book had not been dressed in such a provocative language, they would have been received differently by the orthodox establishment --- at a time when it was reeling under the blows of the Turkish secularists. It is an indication of the tendentious spirit in which the book was treated by the orthodox ‘Ulama that, in their most authoritative statement denouncing its contents, they singled out a neutral reference to Bolshevism by the author as evidence of his Communistic beliefs. ‘Abd al-Raziq’s actual remark had been that if the Muslim jurists, in establishing the necessity of the Caliphate, merely wanted to demonstrate the necessity of government in general, then what they said was true: ‘Promoting the religious symbols’, he said, ‘and ensuring the people’s welfare do indeed depend on the Caliphate, in the sense of government --- in whatever form and kind the government may be, absolutist or conditional, personal or republican, despotic constitutional or consultative, democratic, socialist or bolshevist (Enayat, 2005: 65-66). Apparently seizing on this sentence, the Special Court of al-Azhar, set up to pass judgement on the author, declared: ‘In addition to negating the religious foundation of the Islamic (state), and revolting against the repeated cases of the Muslims’ consensus with regard to their form of government, he takes the position of licensing the Muslims to instal a Bolshevik state (Enayat, 2005: 66).

However, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book raised an uproar among the traditionalists and the orthodox, who were able to capitalize on a political conjuncture to punish the author by depriving him of his diploma of ‘alim and causing him to be dismissed from his position as Shar’i judge (Safran, 1961:143). The intellectual leaders, however, defended the author publicly on the ground of freedom of opinion, and sponsored his Maulanaviews on Azad appropriate Library, occasions without Aligarh necessarily usingMuslim his arguments. University Thus, in a different context, Heikal hailed the separation of church and state in modern Turkey as one of the “necessary foundations of any true democracy, a healthy social life, and for the upsurge of civilization” (Safran, 1961:143). Taha Husayn argued that “the Muslims realized a long time ago, that religion is one thing, and state and culture

another thing,” and that they knew that the true foundations of the state are practical interests. Ahmad Amin repeated in different words ‘Abd al-Raziq’s arguments in the course of his study of the social and cultural history of Islam23 (Safran, 1961:143).

All this was understandable in the emotionally-charged atmosphere prevailing in the Sunni world in 1925. But the regrettable fact was that when passions subsided, instead of such anathemisations giving way to a more sober judgment, the work itself fell into oblivion, except in the studies of a few Western scholars - until recent times. The orthodox ‘Ulama were not, of course, short of arguments against the work, so far as they ignored ‘Abd al-Raziq’s distinction between the Caliphate and government, and presumed that if they could prove the legitimacy of both on the basis of Muslim historical practices, that should be enough to prove the ‘obligatoriness’ of both too. The special Court of al-Azhar peremptorily dismissed the work in these terms: ‘it is evident that the bases of government, and the sources of legislation with the Muslims are the Book of God, the Prophetic Tradition, and the consensus of the Muslims. For Muslims, there can be nothing better than this. ‘Abd al-Raziq wanted Muslims to demolish what is based on these foundations.

It is not difficult to understand why his book met with such opposition. It propounded a new historical theory about matters of which the accepted historical view had something of the nature of religious doctrine; and this theory was drawn more from non-Muslim writers on Islam, who might be accused of trying to weaken its hold on its adherents than from the fundamental Islamic sources, the sciences of Quranic interpretation and hadith. One critic of the book, Rashid Rida, declared it was the latest attempt of the enemies of Islam to weaken and divide it from within, another, Muhammad Bakhit, maintained that what non-Muslims said of Islam should never be accepted, and above all what they said about the caliphate, ‘the fearful ghost which, if the bravest man in Europe saw it even in his sleep, would cause him to rise in fear and panic (Hourani, 1983:189). ‘Abd al-Raziq, he asserted, had accepted the historical Maulanathesis by AzadSir Thomas Library, Arnold in preference Aligarh to the whole Muslim consensus of Islamic University thought;

23 In fact, persons like Taha Hussein (1889-1973), Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888-1956) and Ahmad Amin (1886-1954) was greatly influenced by ‘Abduh’s polemics of Islamic modernism and by no means were secularist, but rather they were looking for a more liberalized version of Islamic modernism. It is equally notable that the political behavior of the Wafd, a liberal, secular, nationalist party by Western account, were not guided by the secular considerations as shown by their speeches, debates, and discussion in the Egyptian parliament over the issue of Shari’a and the abolition of caliphate by Kemal Ataturk.

and he set himself, in great detail and at enormous length, to refute the author’s interpretation of Muslim history and cast doubt on his knowledge and understanding of the sources. He produced much evidences to refute the idea that there was no organized government in the Prophet’s time, and that the Prophet never taught his people about political organization, (Hourani, 1983:189-190) and to prove that there was as nearly a complete ijma’ on the necessity of some sort of inmate as there was on any question of doctrine (Hourani, 1983:189).

There was a still graver charge against the book, made by the ‘Ulama’ in their judgment and elaborated by Shaykh Bakhit. By implication, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book attacked the whole system of Islamic doctrine in one of its two bases: the theory of prophecy. Muslim theologians had always taught that, while some prophets were sent into the world to reveal a Book only, that is to say, to reveal a truth about God and the world, others were sent also to reveal a law, a system of morality derived from the Book, and to execute it; and that, while Jesus was a prophet of the first type, Muhammad was one of the second (Enayat, 2005:65-67). To execute the law was an essential part of his mission; but this implies that he had political power, and that from the start the Islamic community was a political community. Moreover, since the Book and the law were given not for one generation only for all time, there must always be someone who exercises political power in the Ummah:

The Islamic religion is based on the pursuit of domination and power and strength and might, and the refusal of any law which is contrary to its Shari’a and its divine law, and the rejection of any authority the Weider of which is not charged with the execution of its edicts (Hourani, 1983:190).

Although, ‘Abd al-Raziq’s theory made an important contribution to the justification of the principles of the Liberal National state as embodied in the Constitution. It was still necessary to provide a positive ideological rationale for a specific Egyptian nationalism and for the specific institutions of popular sovereign rule Maulanaadopted inAzad Egypt. To Library, this end the Intellectual Aligarh leaders Muslimattempted in two University ways to justify and enhance a separate Egyptian nationalism. They endeavored, first, to reinterpret history so as to dissociate Egypt’s past from that of the larger Muslim community, and then to endow a separate Egypt with a distinct cultural personality of its own.

Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) Perhaps the most sophisticated approach to the ideology of Pan-Islam in the new situation of Nationalism was developed by Hasan al-Banna, the founder and the first general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama’ at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (www.ikhwanweb.com/article.Php?=17065). Hasan al-Banna was born in October 1906 in a small town of Mahmudiyya when Egypt was under the British occupation. Banna grew up in a religious family and was much influenced by the religious teacher of his father, Sheikh Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, who by profession was a watch repairer and studied at Al-Azhar University (the most influential school of Sunni Islam) at the time of Muhammad Abduh, one of the pioneers of Islamic revival. Banna became familiar with the teachings of Muhammad Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida’s commentary of Qur’an, Al-Manar. In their understanding, Muslims had fallen behind other nations because they distanced themselves from the main sources of Islam, Qur’an and teachings of the Prophet (Hadith). Muslims had to return to these sources if they wanted to regain their power. This is the reason why, for Banna, “Islam is understood as a religion, a civilization, a way of life, an ideology, and a state” (Rabi, 1995:65). From the very beginning, Banna was socially active and used to participate and directed organizations such as the Society of Moral Behavior and Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden in his primary school. In addition to these activities, Banna also joined a Sufi group, the Order of the Hasafiyyah Brothers. His education coincided with the rise of nationalist tendencies in Egypt against the British occupation where Banna participated as an activist.

The most important change in Banna’s life was when he left his hometown to study in Dar’ul Ulum in Cairo, a school that teaches both Islamic and modern sciences. His difference from previous contemporary Muslim leaders was that Banna took a secular formal Egyptian education. Despite having strong affiliation with the Cairo Maulanabranch of Azad the Order ofLibrary, the Hasafiyya BothersAligarh24 where Muslimhe became a full University member in

24 Hasafiyya is a Sufi mystic circle. The founder of Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna became involved in the order of the Hasafiyya, at the age of thirteen was appointed secretary of new group affiliated with the Hasafiyya order that aimed to fight for the preservation of Islamic morality and to resist the work of Christian missionaries in the town.

1922, Banna joined the Islamic Society for Noble of Character and often visited Salafiyyah bookstore, which led him to engage more on the subject of Islamic cause (Mitchell, 1969:5).

By this time Banna’s intellectual and emotional apparatus was taking shape. The two continuous influences on his training so far had been classical Islamic learning and the emotional disciple of Sufism. The extra-academic influence of his father and his teachers had been more important than his formal education. He prided himself on going beyond the dictates of his ‘academic program’. Besides his religious studies, he read widely: the literature of Sufism, biographies of the Prophet, and historic tales of heroism --- defense of ‘the homeland’, ‘zealotry in defense of religion’, and struggle in the path of God’. It is not clear whether this last type of reading preceded or followed his awareness of Egypt’s occupied status, but he clearly indicated its relationship to this awareness (Mitchell, 1969:4).

All these influences in his life were given a ‘practical’ orientation by his teachers, and ‘practical’ application in the numerous societies with which he became involved. A revealing instance of his religious ardor and convictions is the legendary tale, perhaps apocryphal but undoubtedly symbolic, of his single-handed and successful effort when al-Banna as a student of Darul-ulum, he observed there what he described as “a strong, violent and frightening wave of disbelief and permissiveness” sweeping the metropolis following the First World War. These “disintegrating” elements were promoted in society in the name of intellectual freedom and personal liberty, which he ascribed mainly to the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey.

He strove to check this trend, meeting prominent religious personalities and cautioning them of the consequences of not acting to check this western onslaught. Among those he met with this mission were Shaykh Yusuf al-Dajawi, an Azharite with Sufi25 inclinations, and Muhibbuddin al-Khatib, a Salafite. They all shared his

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 25 Sufi: almost certainly from the Arabic “suf” meaning “wool”, hence a “woolly” or “wool-clad” individual, because of the early adoption by Muslim ascetics and pietisms of the white garments of Christian monks. A member of one of the Sufi Orders, the devotees of a mystical “path” or discipline which consists of carefully graded esoteric teachings leading through a series of initiations to the status of adept. The goal of the “path” (tariqa) is to achieve direct communion with God through personal devotion and a mastery of the techniques taught by the Shaykh (Wendell,1978:169).

concern, but this did not go beyond verbal consolation (Mitchell, 1969:3-5). While the “educated youth, who were appreciative” of the new phenomenon of disbelief and permissiveness contributed to its growth consciously, the uneducated masses remain unaffected.

Al-Banna was more of an activist, unlike Abduh, who was a reformer. He nevertheless echoed Abduh’s calls earlier to the Muslims not to lose sight of their rights in the state while doing their duty towards it, and asserted that they should be educated first to understand their rights and the means to achieve them (Bari, 1995:18). But this education called for patience and long struggle. In his view, Abduh and Mustafa Kamil, the longtime adversaries who were opposed to each other on many political and social issues, besides Jamal Uddin Afghani and others, were leaders who established the Egyptian awakening on sound foundations. Had there been no deviation from the line of these leaders, Egypt would have marched forward. Reflecting on his own programs, he tried to reconcile the contribution of these conflicting personalities by suggesting that “Mustafa Kamil and his men wanted to prepare the Ummah for a long struggle (leading to) the freedom of its soul and values” ... while “Afghani, Abduh and Kawakebi26 led the people to a fruitful sphere religiously and morally, which related to the rectification of beliefs (besides) reorganization of thoughts in the field of their Islamic associations. Now a harmonious division of these branches of the awakening had become necessary” (Harris, 1964:195-237). His endeavor to reconcile the various, sometimes conflicting, reformist Islamic trends led him to describe Salafism and Sufism, together with the Prophet’s model, as forming the religious basis of his organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (Hussain, 1983:113).

After graduating from the Dar al-Ulum in 1927, Banna embarked on a teaching career in the state school system while simultaneously fostering ideas for a collective action in the service of Islam. Banna vowed to become “a counselor and a teacher” Maulanagiving himself Azad to both Library, children and adults Aligarh in order to teachMuslim the “objectives University of religion

26 Kawakebi is a well-known Syrian scholar. In 1898, he left Syria and went to live in the freer atmosphere of Egypt. He wrote his famous book was entitled Umm al-Qura (a name occurring in the Qur’an as one of designation of Mecca). It is a symposium on the destiny of Islam.

and the sources of their well-being and happiness in life” (Mitchell, 1969:6). In reaction to the secular movement of Westernization, Banna aspired to provide an alternative path to modernization and material development. To him;

Liberalism and Western-style democracy has not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity. Today these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can already hear the sounds of shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the liberal democratic systems ... Whether we like it or not, the world is gravitating towards faith in the Almighty and justice and the will of God will prevail over all things (Lilla, 2007:50).

Adhering to the prospect of God’s omnipotence, Hasan al-Banna together with six friends founded Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the year 1928. The Brotherhood took the oath to be “troops (Jund) for the message of Islam... brothers in the service of Islam; hence, we are the Muslim Brothers” (Mitchell, 1969:8). The group emulated modern, political components, incorporating these ideals slowly into the rise of Islam. This task was made easier through the use of the various outlets the movement controlled, including its own youth groups, schools, and media, all of which focused upon improving the aspects of society that Banna demanded change from (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2004:60). Banna assumed the title of the Murshid- e-Aam, or Supreme Guide, the highest position within the organization. The membership of the Muslim Brotherhood was arranged in hierarchal order where roles and responsibilities were skillfully allocated in order to implement the Islamic order in Egyptian life (Hussain, 1983:4).

In the year 1932 the Muslim Brotherhood’s headquarters was moved to Cairo in order to include a larger cross section of Egyptian society intending to incorporate civil servants, urban leaders, students, and peasants. Hasan al-Banna’s philosophy revolved around establishing credibility within the diverse masses. He emphasized the idea that God, Allah, demands that his followers should step away from the developing Maulanatrend which Azad calls for Library, believers to surrender Aligarh to humanity Muslim or accept a submissive University role out of despair; “For when we work for mankind in God’s way, we work harder for ourselves, we are for You and no one else, Beloved, nor shall we ever be against You, even for a day” (Hussain, 1983:6). Banna stressed the concept that when mankind accepts defeat and mistreatment, Allah is the one who is truly being mistreated. This

assertion targets the group of individuals that yearn for God’s blessings and salvations; Muslims. Banna aimed to steer Muslim society away from the aspects of society that added stress to the relationship between Muslims and God, which he defined as:

... the civilization of the west, which was brilliant by virtue of its scientific perfection for a long time, and which subjugated the whole world with the products of this science to its states and nation, is now bankrupt and in decline. Its foundations are crumbling, and its institutions are guiding principles are falling apart. Its political foundations are being destroyed by dictatorship: and its economic foundations are being swept by crises (Hussain, 1983:4).

Hasan al-Banna aspired to mend these failures grounded in Western ideology through the straight path of Islam.

Realizing the impossibilities of merging the consensus of all Muslims in the major points of contention within both religious and the societal life, through the use of the Muslim Brotherhood, Banna strove to discover the sociological aspects that are imperative to uphold the existence of the faith. Believing on the concept of jihad, the internal and external effort to secure the future of the faith, is a religious duty that every Muslim has a responsibility in performing, Banna painted an image of a society in which all members live moral and righteous lives under the banner of Islam:

We believe that Islam is an all embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating on everyone its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order it does not stand helpless before life’s problems, nor the steps one must take to improve mankind... There he will understand what the Qur’an is about and, we will see right there the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hussain, 1983:6).

The Muslim Brotherhood promised to provide the Egyptian society with the Maulanameans necessaryAzad to Library, stand independently Aligarh, without the Muslim influence of the University West, through the use of Islam and the path that God provides.

Hasan al-Banna, however, was not only critical of the West and the debilitating ideals it deposited upon the Arab and Muslim world, but also of the state of the third World, of which he was a product was no better, for nations were like individuals who had their strengths and weakness, youth and old age, and who could be afflicted with

ailments as well. Al-Banna’s diagnosis of the nations was very perceptive for in his words:

The disease afflicts these Eastern nations assumes a variety of aspects and has many symptoms. It has done harm to every expression of their lives, for they have been assailed on the political side by imperialist aggression on the part of their enemies, and by factionalism, rivalry, division and disunity on the part of their sons. They have been assailed on the economic side by the propagation of usurious practices throughout all their social classes, and the exploitation of their resources and natural treasures by foreign companies... while through imitation of the West, the viper’s venom creeps insidiously into their affairs, poisoning their blood and sullying the purity of their well-being ... But God and the believers will not tolerate this. Brother this is the diagnosis, which the Brotherhood make of the ailments of this Ummah, and this is what they are going in order to cure it of them and to restore it is lost health and strength (Wendell, 1978:61-62).

Al-Banna could have easily turned a blind eye to the disease, he perceived in the Ummah had he not had any alternative. But Islam was his source of strength and that made him part ways with the decadent generation which he observed in his country. A beginning had to be made for

the creation of nations, the education of people, the realization of hopes, and the defense of principles demand of their nation which tries to achieve them --- or, at any rate, of the group which is proselytizing for them --- a mighty spiritual strength which may be manifested in numerous ways: a strong will which no weakness can penetrate; a steady loyalty unassailable by fickleness or treachery, a noble spirit of self-sacrifice, unaffected by greed or avarice, a knowledge of the principle, a faith in it, and a proper assessment of its value which is immune to error in its regard. . . Every person that has lost these four qualities or . . . whose leaders and proselytizers for reform have lost them, is a wretched, frivolous people, which neither comes to any good nor realizes Maulana Azadany hope Library, (Hussain, 1983:6). Aligarh Muslim University

Such a group which would lead the Islamic movement would try to convince all types of Muslims and mobilize them. Some of them may be believers who have faith in the mission of the group, but others, such as the waverer (anyone to whom truth remains unclear), the opportunist (who does not wish to lend his aid except after

finding out how much he will get back as profit) and the prejudiced (who had misgivings about the group) - all have to be made aware of the cause of Islam. The group, which leads the Islamic movement must therefore establish its credibility with the masses. In this matter al-Banna wrote that

“The people should know that we love them more than ourselves, and that it is pleasing to us to be offered up as a sacrifice for their greatness, if we must make such a sacrifice, and to pay the price for their glory, their nobility, their religion, and their hopes, if we possess the requisite wealth. One thing alone has persuaded us to take this position in their regard --- the fellow feelings which seize our hearts, master our emotions, keeps us from sleep, and brings us to tears. It is difficult, it is indeed very difficult, to see how our people are presently beleaguered, and then to resign ourselves to humility, or accept a submissive role, or abandon ourselves to despair. For when we work for mankind in God’s way, we work harder for ourselves, we are for you and no one else, beloved, nor shall we ever be against you, even for a day (Agha, 1970:207-217)”.

Al-Banna did not consider himself superior, but with his total commitment to the Ummah the difference was in the understanding of Islam for ‘though we are all in accord with our faith. . . among them it is anesthetized faith, dormant within their souls, one to which they do not wish to submit and according to whose dictates they do not wish to act, whereas it is a burning, blazing, intense faith fully awakened in the souls of the Muslim Brotherhood’ (Ajami, 1967:119). What was this understanding of the Islam which in the masses was considered an anesthetized faith? Al-Banna elucidated this by pointing out that:

Our aims include anything that the word Islam stands for. The term Islam has a very wide meaning and is not adequately defined by that narrow interpretation which is given to it by many people. We believe that Islam comprises and regulates all human affairs and does not shrink from new problems and necessary reforms. It is not restricted to Maulana Azadreligious Library,and spiritual matters Aligarh . . .. We Muslimunderstand, however University, the word Islam in a different sense. We understand it in a very wide sense, as regulating all the affairs of this life and the next. This interpretation of Islam is not of our making. This is derived from the study of the Qur’an and the manner of life (Sirah) led by the first Muslims. If the reader desires to understand how it is possible for the Ikhwan to claim that they promote an idea which, it would seem, has a wider

meaning than that implied in the term Islam, let him take his Qur’an and strip his soul from desire (hawa) and purposefulness (ghayah). Then he will understand the actual meaning of the Qur’an, and he will recognize its identity with the propaganda aims of the Ikhwan (Rabi, 1996:82).

With such an understanding of Islam the mission of every Islamic movement becomes political. However, the flexibility that al-Banna gave himself and the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in interpreting Islam was justified by direct reference to the Qur’an, as the foundation of Islam. He declared that the objective of the Muslim Brotherhood was to create a new generation capable of understanding the essence of Islam and of acting accordingly. He believed that Islam was the solution to the problem of Egypt. He started to call for the replacement of secular institutions by Islamic-oriented ones and asked for major reforms.

However, al-Banna did not advocate violent political action as the means toward achieving political goals; in fact, he and several members of his organization ran for parliamentary elections more than once and lost. Al-Banna accepted the legitimacy of the Egyptian regime and tried to work from within the system. His condemnation of Egyptian parties was not based on a rejection of the idea of multiparty systems built on the rejection of corruption and manipulation. This is why the Egyptian Brethren today have been able to embrace as legitimate theories pluralism, human rights, and democracy (respectively, ikhtilaf, al-huquq al-shar’iyya, and shura).

By the end of World War ll al-Banna was an acknowledged political figure, and the Muslim Brethren had emerged as a strong force presenting itself as a political alternative. As was the case with other parties, the society established a military wing, which assassinated a number of its adversaries. The Brethren reached its apogee during the Arab-Israel War of 1948, in which the Muslim Brothers participated through their paramilitary organizations. However, the expansion of the society, its growing influence, and its development of a strong military force brought it into a Maulanaclash with Azad the government. Library, In February Aligarh 1949 al-Banna Muslim was assassinated University by the police agents (Hussain, 1983:8). The death of al-Banna was tragic for the Muslim Brotherhood movement, for he was the central figure in the movement, and a respected Egyptian leader who was able through his charisma and leadership skills to elicit the sympathy and support of many influential people. Today, his ideology still

informs most of the moderate Islamic movements across all of the Islamic world, and his movement is still the leading ideological power behind the expansion of Islamism.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CHAPTER TWO

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: AN INTRODUCTION

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 45

CHAPTER TWO

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: AN INTRODUCTION

Growth & Origins of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Isma’ilia in the Suez Canal Zone in April, 1929, by a young teacher, Hasan al-Banna’. In the late 1920’s and the early 1930’s several such Muslim youth organizations were launched throughout the region, but only the Muslim Brotherhood lasted.

The basic idea of the Brotherhood, that both private and public life should be remodeled according to the teachings of Islam, fell on fertile ground in the Egypt of the 1930’s (Laqueur, 1961:237). There was growing dissatisfaction with both the traditional parties and the Wafd;27 for the peasants (among whom no Egyptian party had ever got, or had ever tried to get, a firm foothold) the idea of reforms had, of course, a strong attraction. At the same time, the pronounced xenophobic trend, far surpassing anything known up to that date in Egypt, was a major asset of the movement and very much in line with the prevailing state of mind and the emotional exigencies of the urban masses. Hasan al-Banna established close relations with ‘Ali Mahir, Prime Minister in 1939, and with the Palace; he received financial assistance which was used to launch various economic enterprises, such as factories, big shops, etc.

In its formative years the Brotherhood was considered as a rival mass movement organization. But when this party came to power in 1942 al-Banna’ and Mustafa Nahhas, Wafd leader and Prime Minister, reached a working agreement Maulanawhich lasted Azad almost Library,up to the end of theAligarh war. Early in Muslim 1942 Hasan al -BannaUniversity promised Mustafa Nahhas to discontinue

27 The Wafd party was a nationalist liberal political party in Egypt. It was said to be Egypt’s most popular and influential political party for a period from the end of World War l through the 1930s. During this time, it was instrumental in the development of the 1923 constitution, and supported moving Egypt from dynastic rule to a constitutional monarchy, where power would be wielded by a nationally elected president. 46

his pro-Axis propaganda and was subsequently released from prison. (He got arrested in May, 1941). It would appear that on the whole this undertaking was kept by the leadership of the Brotherhood. Some of the leading personalities of the Brotherhood entered government service, notably the Ministry of Social Affairs, and were given virtually a free hand to organize branches in the villages throughout the countries, thus exploiting their official status. In 1946-47 Hasan al-Banna’ switched his political support several times; first he backed the anti-Wafdist government of Isma’il Sadqi, but after the Bevin-Sadqi pact28 (which never came into force) he joined the opposition headed by the Wafd (Laqueur, 1961:238). Soon, however, new disputes arose between these two main forces in Egyptian politics. The Wafd left wing, which had been greatly strengthened immediately after World War ll, regarded the Brotherhood as a reactionary movement to be combatted, while some of the Wafdist right-wingers, such as Fuad Sarag ad-Din, saw it, on the contrary, as a useful counterweight to both Socialist and Communist ideas (Brynjar, 1998:45). However, owing to the authoritarian structure of the movement, only the “Supreme Guide” and executive knew the full truth about these political maneuvers, the rank and file was hardly ever informed and remained unspoiled by the intricacies of political horse- trading and power politics.

In 1946-47 the Brotherhood reached the summit of its influence; according to one of its leaders, the number of members was then 2.5 million (Hussain, 1983:7). The fighting units of the movement were given military training for the impending struggle in Palestine, and police and government officials received instructions not to hinder the Brotherhood in collecting arms. This followed an agreement between Hasan al- Banna’ and Haj Amin al-Husaini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem; collaboration between these two leaders had begun in the late 1930’s when the Mufti had assisted al-Banna’ to get the support of influential circles which had originally hesitated in backing such a “plebeian” organization. Military camps were established at El Arish in the Sinai and Maulanain the Western Azad desert Library, by the Aligarh Muslim University 28 The fall quarter of 1946 was a time when the first step toward a post-war order for the middle East were being put to the text. Negotiations for a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which had opened with much promise in the spring of the year, had still failed to evolve a compromise acceptable to all parties. As the Egyptian Parliament prepared to debate the proposed provisions for a treaty, rioting in Cairo and Alexandria emphasized the rift between uncompromising nationalists and those willing to trim their sails to a moderate course. 47

Brotherhood units, which later participated in the Palestine campaign without, however, greatly influencing its outcome (Hussain, 1983:7-8).

When the units of the Brotherhood returned to Egypt, they did what armed units in similar situations had done time and again --- they revolted against the powers that be29. The fate of Hasan al-Banna was similar to that of Codreanu, the leader of the Rumanian “Iron Guard”,30 (Laqueur, 1961:238) a movement whose ideology and history offered some striking parallels; King Farouk, too, was exiled at the end, just as his Rumanian cousin had been. The Sa’adist-Liberal government in power in 1948 had originally supported the Brotherhood, but after the defeat in Palestine, in the general atmosphere of dissatisfaction, it came to regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a formidable danger; the leaders of the movement had apparently decided to turn their arms against the government. It has never been proved whether Hasan al-Banna really intended, as was argued at a later occasion, (Hussain, 1983:8) to take over state power at a predetermined date, killing most of the leaders of the day, proclaiming a republic, and having himself elected as Caliph. But there can hardly be any doubt that even if zero hour had not been fixed, the whole political atmosphere made such a development at least a possibility. In November and early December, a number of serious terroristic outrages were committed by the fighting units of the Brotherhood; several foreign-language newspaper offices were blown up, the commander of Cairo police killed. In this situation the Prime Minister, Mahmud Nuqrashi, banned the Brotherhood on December 8. Hundreds of party leaders and militants were arrested and were held in the concentration camps of Tur and Huckstep, together with Jews and Communists (Laqueur, 1961:239. However, the Brotherhood’s campaign of terror

29 The Muslim Brotherhood sent its soldiers to fight with the Palestine following the declaration of an Israeli State, another popular cause in Egypt, its growing involvement in political issues soon brought it into conflict with the Egyptian government. The Muslim Brotherhood blamed the defeat Maulanain the Azad war on the EgyptianLibrary, government Aligarh, particularly King Muslim Faruq who personally University had made the decision that the country should go to war despite the poor preparedness of the Egyptian army. However, Al-Banna supported the idea of jihad against Egypt’s British-backed government.

30 The iron guard was the name most commonly given to a far-right movement and political party in Romania in the period from 1927 into the early part of World War ll. The iron guard was ultra- nationalist and promoted the Orthodox Christian faith. It was also considered an anti-semitic organization. Its members were called “Green shirts” because of the predominantly green uniforms they wore. 48

continued unabated, and several days later the Prime Minister himself was killed. His successor, Ibrahim ‘Abdul Hadi, now took severe measures to suppress the Brotherhood, and the murder of Hasan al-Banna in February, 1949, would not appear to be entirely unconnected with these steps. This counter-terror was temporarily successful, and the Brotherhood terrorist campaign ceased.

In October, 1950, after the Wafdist government once again resumed power that, the demand for ending the ban on the Brotherhood was renewed. So much do that the government coalition partners and the opposition both competed in requesting for the release of the last arrested of the movement and the return of the property of the Brotherhood that had been seized in 1950. In May, 1951, the ban was lifted on condition that the Brotherhood political activities would be subjected to certain limitations and that the semi-military activities would have to be discontinued altogether. But the Brotherhood spokesmen proclaimed at once that they would not heed these warnings. In October, 1951, the new Supreme Guide of the movement was elected. The lack of a leader had very much impaired the activities after the murder of al-Banna. But the new Supreme Guide, Hasan al- Hudaibi, a former judge of the Court of Appeal, was quite unlike al-Banna; an eminently respectable and conservative citizen, who was even received the King Farouk in the audience after his election, and he utterly lacked the mass appeal and the enthusiasm of al-Banna, especially the latter’s zest for social reform. His election was a blow to Salih ‘Ashmawi, who had been the deputy leader of the movement since the death of Hasan al-Banna, and who was far more radical in both his national and social demands. Around Ashmawi and his magazine Ad-Da’wa31 (The Appeal) an opposition group crystallized, and the struggle between Ashmawi and the official leadership seriously weakened the activities of the Brotherhood up to the time of its dissolution in 1954.

The political line taken by al-Hudaybi was one of “safety first”, and he was criticized not only by his Brotherhood opposition but also by the extremists circles Maulanaoutside Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

31 Al-Da’wa under its editor Umar al-Tilmisani, was allowed to renew publication in June 1976 after 22 years of suppression. It became an unofficial propagator of the Brethren’s views and challenged many of the regime’s internal and external policies. It would therefore seem to be justified to rely primarily on al-Da’wa in attempting to assess the political and ideological orientations of the Muslim Brethren as they emerged throughout the 1970s. 49

it. Owing apparently to al-Hudaybi’s reticence, the movement was not officially engaged in the events which led to “Black Saturday”32 in January, 1952. But the Brotherhood had been instrumental in establishing fighting units for the struggle against the British in the Canal Zone, and the Cairo members of the movement had joined the Bulak Nizam (the auxiliary police) in their demonstrations. After “Black Saturday,” Hudaybi collaborated with ‘Ali Mahir, who was appointed Prime Minister, but he was much more reserved in his attitude towards Hilali, who replaced ‘Ali Mahir in March, 1952. Under the pressure of the radical wing of the Brotherhood, al Hudaybi, in a memorandum, demanded that a time-limit should be set for talks with the British.

The group of officers who carried out the coup d’ estate in July, 1952, and deposed Farouk included a number of Brotherhood members (notably Colonel Rashad Muhanna)33 and sympathizers; one of the member of the Brotherhood executive branch became a minister in the new government (Shaikh Hasan al-Baquri). But it cannot be said that the Brotherhood and its leaders knew about the army initiated or participated in the coup (Mitchell, 1969:7-9). However, several weeks after the revolt the Brotherhood executive gave up its attitude of studied reserve and declared that in the interests of Egypt it would “guard and protect” the military movement. In October, 1952, it was reported that al Hudaybi had resigned, or been forced to resign, and that leadership had passed into the hands of Salih Ashmawi and ‘Abdur-Rahman al-Banna, the son of the first Supreme Guide. Al Hudaybi was said to have emphasized the Pan- Islamic34 character of the Brotherhood and its ties with other countries, whereas Ashmawi and his friends wanted to make the

32 The Black Saturday also known as Cairo Fire, was a series of riots that took place on 26 January 1952, marked by the burning and looting of some 750 buildings, nightclubs and the country’s Opera House - in Downtown Cairo. The direct trigger of the riots was the killing by British occupation troops of 50 Egyptian auxiliary policemen in the city of Ismailia in a one-sided battle a day earlier. The spontaneous anti-British protests that followed these deaths were quickly seized upon by organized element in the crowd. Maulana33 Rashad Azad Muhanna wasLibrary, one among the strongAligarh supporter of theMuslim Muslim Brothers University in the idea of the establishment of Islamic state. He was the leader of the unsuccessful revolt of 1947, who refused to join the Free Officers at the critical stage of the July Revolution. He was dismissed from the Regency, because he had a close relation with the Muslim Brothers and had attacked the RCC’s agrarian reforms. As a result, he was arrested, released, and again arrested after waging a campaign for the abolition of the 1923 and for an Islamic constitution. This time he was sentenced to life imprisonment (Aree, 2001:81-82). 34 Pan-Islamism was a political movement advocating the unity of Muslim under one Islamic state --- often a Caliphate. 50

movement an Egyptian political party --- and a radical one at that (Bari, 1995:20-26). But by this time the initial reformist zest of the junta had already cooled considerably after having encountered unforeseen obstacles, and in the end al Hudaybi was restored to the Supreme Guide ship.

Relations between the Brotherhood and the new regime remained excellent, at least on the surface; members of the junta came to visit the Muslim Brotherhood clubs, and appeared, together with Brotherhood members, in public meetings and demonstrations. When the political parties were dissolved in January, 1953, this move did not affect the Brotherhood, which was recognized by the authorities as a “non- political organization.” (It was resolved, however, at the same time to discontinue the activities of the political department of the Brotherhood). But in fact, there was much dissension between the officers and the head of the Brotherhood, who demanded an Islamic constitution, not “Western reforms” (Laqueur, 1961:240). In foreign policy the Brotherhood opposed talks with the British on evacuation, repeatedly stating that a “people’s war” should be preferred to negotiations. At the same time there were serious differences of opinion within the leadership of the movement; the Ashmawi group continued to attack al Hudaybi and the other conservative leaders for not actively participating in the reform work of the “Liberation Movement”. The elections for the 1953 conference of the Brotherhood brought a strengthening of the radical opposition; Shaikh Farghalli, the head of the organization in the Canal Zone, and Hasan al-Banna’s son were both elected to the executive of the Brotherhood (Marius, 1979:346). Several leading members of the Brotherhood, including the Mufti of the Muslim Brotherhood, were outside during a new internal crisis of November and December, 1953; in January, 1954, after further quarrels and attacks upon the government, the junta dissolved the Brotherhood and arrested 400 of its leaders. Three months later, however, the Brotherhood was again permitted to resume its activities; Colonel Nasser did not yet feel himself strong enough for a decisive contest, but his Maulanahand was Azad soon to be Library,forced. Aligarh Muslim University On October 26, 1954, while he was speaking in Alexandria, an attempt on the life of Colonel Abdel Nasser was made by Mahmud Abdul Latif, a member of the Brotherhood; Nasser escaped unhurt. Mass arrests of the Brotherhood followed; the junta announced that a general massacre of its members and their military supporters 51

had been planned. From prison, some of the Brotherhood leaders suggested terms on which peace should be restored between the government and the Brotherhood (the demand was made that further arrests must cease in exchange for a promise that the Brotherhood would dissolve its secret military organization). But the junta, apparently believing that the clash was inevitable, resolved to continue the purge, which also affected Brotherhood sympathizers’ in the army, navy, and air force --- and General Naguib. On December 5 the Brotherhood was officially declared dissolved, and on the same day seven of its main leaders were condemned to be hanged. (The death sentence imposed on the Supreme Guide was later commuted to life imprisonment). Some militants escaped to Syria, where they attempted to launch a protest movement against the policy of the Cairo junta. Meanwhile, however, their organization was broken up, and although some underground cells were undoubtedly not uncovered, the Brotherhood as such ceased to exist.

During the last phase of its existence, a collaboration between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian Communists had been fairly close. An agreement had been reached in July, 1954, between the two movements to co-operate in distributing leaflets. (The Brotherhood newspaper ceased to appear in July, 1954, and Sayyid Qutb published instead a series of leaflets). Agreement to this effect was reached at a meeting between a Communist representative, Muhammad ‘Abdul Mun’im Tamam, who was in charge of the Agitprop department of the Egyptian Communist Party, and the Brotherhood leaders. At a subsequent meeting, also in July, 1954, another Communist leader, “Nasser,” discussed with his Brotherhood contacts the feasibility of armed demonstrations against the junta (Laqueur, 1961:241). The Brotherhood representatives proposed a two-point common platform: (a) the cessation of the negotiations with Britain and the renewal of the armed fight, and (b) the abolition of military law and “all the laws opposed to freedom.” This was accepted by the Communists, who demanded, however, a more concrete and specific program of Maulanaaction. AtAzad a third meeting Library,, when Tamam Aligarh again represented Muslim the Communists University, it was resolved to go slow on opposition activities in the army, because these would become known to the junta at once. There were apparently differences of opinion among the Brotherhood chieftains with regard to the desirability of an armed demonstration, but after further talks in Alexandria between Yusuf Tala’at, the head of the Brotherhood secret branch, and the Supreme Guide, it was resolved to publish leaflets in favor of 52

the demonstration and in collaboration with the Communists. The Brotherhood and the Communists also used an illegal broadcasting station in common, (Hussain, 1983:8-12) and there were further revelations of co-operation following the arrest in December, 1954, of an Egyptian journalist who had allegedly served as liaison officer between the Brotherhood and the Communists.

The change in attitude of the Brotherhood towards Communists, and vice versa, from extreme hostility in 1945-46 to close co-operation in 1953-54, should be seen against the background of the common opposition to “Western influences” and of the attempt by the junta to Westernize (or rather modernize) the country. No ideological affinity was needed to cement that common front; in documents published at the time of the Cairo trials of the leaders of the Brotherhood it was occasionally argued with them that the Communists were no serious rivals, and that they could be easily eliminated once the Brotherhood were victorious in their fight.

In fact, the very opposite proved true, and not a few members of the Brotherhood went over to the Communists because the latter had a clearer political program, and emerged, generally speaking, as the strongest political factor in view of their much larger experience in underground work and organization. The leaders of the Brotherhood who refused to take the Communists seriously as a factor of equal political importance under conditions of illegality, and who thought it would be easy to get rid of them in due time, proved to be no match for the Communists.

The Muslim Brotherhood: Structure of Organization and its

Function

In theory any Islamic organization could be potentially political, for Islam can Maulanabe viewed Azad as an Library, all-encompassing Aligarh ideology affecting Muslim political institutionsUniversity and activities within a particular Islamic society. The society of Muslim Brothers (established in 1928) was, in its early years, not distinct from any other Islamic organized group, seeking the safeguarding of the central values of Islam. The early activities of the society were only concerned with the building of mosques, the 53

establishment of educational institutions, and the propagation of the Da’wah (message) as an essentially religious and moral one. The first two General Conferences held in 1933 (Marius, 1979:379) were concerned with the general affairs of the society. The latter most probably was not yet interested directly with political issues and problems in Egypt. As far as owe could determine if was not until 1934, that the society broached subjects which had very clear political implications.

In an early Risala, written in 1934, al-Banna did not deny the accusation that the society was political in its objectives, for the asserted that the return to Islam, which the society was calling for, was necessarily both mundane and otherworldly, which lay at the core of Islam itself (Issawi, 1954:150-151). The Third Conference of 1935 witnessed an address given by one of the prominent members of the society on its stand with respect to public currents or trends (al-Taiyarat al-Amma). In August 1936 Risalat Nahwa al-Nur35 was sent to King Faruq, Prime Minister al-Nahhas and other Arab rulers which was undoubtedly a general political and social reform program and expressed succinctly the ideas held by the society. It urged the abolition of “party politics” (al-hizbiya) and “the guidance of the political forces of the nation into direction and in one block.” (Marius, 1979:379)

The objective of the Society of Muslim Brothers with respect to Egypt was the regeneration or the “renaissance” (Nahda) of the nation. Egypt, it claimed, suffered from maladies which bedeviled all aspects of its life. Politically, it suffered from imperialism and party politics, dissensions and divisions, among its members; economically “usury was widespread among all its classes” and it suffered from having its wealth dominated by foreign companies. Socially, educationally, and morally the Egyptian nation and other Eastern countries were also in a state of decadence. For the regeneration of the nation reform would be needed in all the sectors of the society. To work for the achievement of the nation’s political aspiration, al- Banna argued that, it was not sufficient to concentrate on political struggle only. But, Maulanaon the contrary Azad, the onlyLibrary, way to secure Aligarh Egypt’s political Muslim rights was to remedyUniversity its social, economic, intellectual, and educational plight (Issawi, 1954:222-223). Writing in 1934

35 Banna’s Risalat Nahwa al-Nur (Towards the light), was an appeal to the King, the Prime Minister and various Muslim leaders which appeared in 1936 for political and social reform program. 54

in the aftermath of the world economic depression, al-Banna regarded Egypt’s economic situation as the basic malady. The problem of mortgage debt was affecting all individuals and was transferring the wealth of Egyptians into the hands of foreigners. “Foreign companies, foreign goods, foreign luxuries … and foreign commission merchants were factors which undermined the national wealth and obstructed the economic renaissance and was an important cause for the great number of unemployed …” (Marius, 1979:380)

Al-Banna’s criticism of the Egyptian nationalist movement and the main political parties was that they lacked both a clear program and a genuine leadership. “Our renaissance” which al-Banna wrote in the mid-thirties, “is still ambiguous, it has no means, no aims and no programs” (Mitchell, 1969:328). Not a single political leader had a clear program for the re-awakening of the nation. Moreover, the leaders at that time were a product of circumstances and not “educated” to be leaders. On the other hand, genuine leadership and clear programs were “the basis upon which Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid and before them, Jamal al-Din and Shaikh ‘Abduh, had built Egypt’s renaissance and if Egypt had continued to follow the same course and did not deviate, it would have reached its goal or at least it would have advanced …” Leaders who were products of circumstances, wanted to reach results before having clear means (wasa’il) for achieving them (Mitchell, 1969:328).

Al-Banna advocated the return to the real and genuine renaissance of the pre- World War l period. All the successful renaissance movements, he claimed, followed a universal and social law, namely, a course with clear stages which would inevitably lead to the results sought by a particular nation. The cause of Egypt’s failure to follow this universal law, was due, inter alia, to the emotional and rash traits in the Egyptian character, which “made our renaissance (tantamount to) emotional outbursts.” Moreover, even if one accepted, al-Banna argued, that their objective was clear, “our means are unknown, undefined and even unbeknown to us” (Marius, 1979:381). MaulanaFinally, thereAzad was no Library, continuity in the Aligarh Egyptian political Muslim movements asUniversity they tended to last as long as the life span of their leader.

The basic unit of the society, according to the Third Conference, was the district (al-Da’ira) a term which was used interchangeably with that of the branch (far’or shu’ba) was almost invariably used in describing the basic unit of the society 55

(Marius, 1979:381). In 1935 the country was divided into “districts” (manatiq) which, to a certain extent (especially in Lower Egypt and the Governorates) corresponded to the administrative divisions in Egypt. When the system was adopted there were twelve districts, six in Lower Egypt, three in Middle and Upper Egypt and one each for the Canal Zone, Cairo, and Alexandria (Mitchell, 1969:22-26). Regular meetings of the heads of the branches in each district were held in one of the branches at the rate of four meetings a year. Although the system of districts and the conferences held regularly in each district created a system of horizontal links between the basic units, it also helped in the centralization of the society, and a closer supervision by the highest body in the society namely the General Guidance Council (Mitchell, 1969:13).

Each branch had, during the early 1930’s, an administrative board (majlis- idara), a chairman called al-na’ib (literally substitute), and a secretary. However, in the late 1930’s, the head of the branch was called president (ra’is) instead of the former na’ib (Marius, 1979:382). The latter term was a little confusing as it referred not only to the president of the branch, but was also an honorary title bestowed by the General Guidance Council upon some members of the society who already belonged to either of the two categories of active (‘Amil) and struggler (Mujahid) members. Another confusion was in the use of the term, in the Third Conference, of the Central Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura al-Markazi) referring most probably to the administrative board, though it seems that this innovation in terms introduced by the Third Conference, in 1935, fell very soon into disuse.

In accordance with the decision of the Third Conference, the General Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura al-’Amm) was composed of the “presidents” (nuwwab) of the districts and in fact of the branches, as the “district” division had not yet, most probably, developed into an intermediary organizational body linking the headquarters in Cairo and the branches (Issawi, 1953:154). The General Consultative Assembly was higher in the hierarchy of the society than that of the district and the Maulanabranch organizations. Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Figure 1. General Table of Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood

Base on Deeb Marius (1979:383) The Society of Muslim Brothers, London: Oxford, Ithaca Press 57

The General Guidance Council (Maktab al-Irshad al-‘Amm) headed by the General Guide (al-Murshid al-‘Amm), was the body invested with authority and power in the society (al-Sulta al-’Ulya lil-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (Mitchell, 1969:166). In 1935 the work of the General Guidance Council was divided into four sections (aqsam). First, there was the general supervision section (al-Muraqaba al-‘Amm) headed by the supervisor (muraqib). The second section was the treasury, or as it was called the propagation chest (Sunduq al-Da’wa), which was established independently of the treasury of the General Guidance Council, as its only objective was the financing of the propagation of the Da’wa by appointing preachers, employees, and publishing the necessary literature for this purpose. The third section dealt with the financial supervision (al-Muraqaba al-Maliya) headed by the treasurer of the council. The fourth section was called the general Secretariat and was headed by the Secretary-General who was also in-charge of the society’s newspaper. It seems that the General Guidance Council appointed liaison officers, delegated by the council to link the leadership of the districts to that of the four sections of the Guidance Council (Mitchell, 1969:165- 166).

The General Guidance Council, which was formed in 1933 (after the first Conference on May 1933) was throughout the 1930’s the administrative arm of the General Guidance himself. The latter did not have a secretariat of his own, independent of the Guidance Council itself (Zelter, 1962:210). There is no doubt that the General Guide himself constituted the apex of the society’s hierarchy. He was the founder, the main ideologue and the main organizer of the society. His strong personality and mastery of organization made him virtually a leader with dictatorial powers.

The origins of the para-military organizations in the society, go back to the early years when it had headquarters in Isma’iliyya (Marius, 1979:385). They were called the Rovers (al-Jawala) which followed the organization of the Egyptian scout Maulanamovement. Azad Every shu Library,’ba was supposed Aligarh to have a group Muslim (firqat) of Rovers University, and in 1935, a statute of these groups was drafted and approved by the Third Conference of the society (Mitchell, 1969:13). It seems that these groups were established, trained and their director, regularly visited the various branches. Their number increased tremendously and so, by the Fourth Conference of July 1937, they had probably one or 58

two thousand members (Mitchell, 1969:14). In the autumn of 1937, a new kind of paramilitary group was established, namely the Battalions (al-Kata’ib). The first Battalions were formed in Cairo and were based on social groups: the students, the workers, the merchants, and the government employees, who each had a Battalion (Zelter, 1962:218). The relationships between the Rovers and the Battalions were not clear, but it seems that the latter were exclusive, and probably constituted the basis for the secret apparatus (al-Jihaz al-Sirri) of the society. Nevertheless, it was not until the battalion system was “supplemented” during World War II by the “family” system (Nizam al-Usar) (Marius, 1979:385) that the latter’s secrecy and efficiency, if not prepared the ground for, at least helped in the development of the secret apparatus as it came to be known in post-World War II. There is no doubt that the germs of the secret apparatus were already in existence from 1935 onwards, but the organization of the society lacked the secrecy and the high degree of centralization which characterized it in the 1940’s.

During this time on the one hand branches were urged by the General Guidance Council, (1938-1939), to organize the Rovers and the Battalions, in accordance with the important resolution of the Fifth General Conference of January 1939 (Wendell, 1978:2). In other words, the organization of these para-military bodies depended to a large extent, upon local initiative. Thus the Rovers and the Battalions were not unlike the wafd’s Blue Shirts,36 in their formation and organization. On the other hand, the weekly program which the Rovers and the battalions were supposed to follow were drafted and communicated, by the General Guidance Council, as a circular published in the society newspaper al-Nadhir to all its branches (Zelter, 1962:219).

Membership of the Rovers and the Battalions was not open to all members of the society. The Third conference distinguished, for instance, three degrees of membership. The first degree was that of assistant (musa’id) member which included Maulanaany Muslim Azad who was Library, to join the society Aligarh (by filling and Muslim signing the membership University form)

36 The Blue Shirts of Egypt were a para-military organization of Egyptian youth subsidiary to the Egyptian Wafd, the leading political party of Egypt in that nation’s interlude as a parliamentary monarchy. The Blue Shirts were a major phenomenon of Egyptian public life, furnishing a manifest symbol of the power of the Wafd during the Wafdist ministry of 1936-37, undertaking considerable public violence against the opponents of the Wafd. 59

and was ready to pay the dues (which were in fact not obligatory but depended probably on the applicant’s financial means). The associate (muntasib) was the second degree of membership which was open to Muslims who learnt the principles of the society, promised to obey its leaders and attended the branches’ meetings. Active (‘amil) membership involved the thorough study of the doctrines of the society, regular attendance of Qur’anic study-groups, and the financial participation in the Pilgrimage Treasury, and the Zakat Committee (depending on the member’s means), the joining of the Rovers (depending on the age of the member) and lastly the acceptance of sanctions imposed by the society, for the breaking of moral principles (Mitchell, 1969:166-167).

These three degrees of membership were, in practice, decided and given by the administrative board of the branch. Particulars about the members of all branches were to be sent to the General Guidance Council, which had the right alone of bestowing the highest degree of membership, that of Mujahid, upon some active members. Other than the strict following of Islamic obligations and principles, the Mujahid had to pay a subscription to the General Guidance Council, to the Propagation Treasury and even leave a part of his property as a legacy to the society. Lastly the Mujahid was supposed “to obey the general Guidance Council’s call at any time or place.”

An examination of the leadership of the society of Muslim Brothers, during the 1930’s, shows a predominance of effendiya. The first General Guidance Council formed according to the decisions of the first meeting of the General Consultative Assembly, in May 1933, had four Azharite Shaikh’s and seven members who could be classified as belonging to the effendiya. Four of the rest were Government officials, one was a teacher in a government school, another a merchant, and the seventh an effendi member of a rural notable family. Moreover, seven of the eleven members of the General Guidance Council were living and working in Cairo, one in Suez, one in Mahmudiyya (Buhaira), one in Shubrakhit (Buhaira), and one in Jamaliya (Daqahliya). MaulanaThe General Azad Guidance Library, Council of the Aligarh Third Conference Muslim of the General University Consultative Assembly of 1935 had ten members belonging to the effendiya and two Azharite Shaikh’s. The members of the society who participated in the Third Conference, or who were invited but could not attend, were 139 in number, of whom only 43 were Shaikh’s (both rural and urban) (Heyworth & Dunne, 1950:17). Not counting the 60

members of the General Guidance Council, the proportion of representative of Cairo at the conference, was more than 35% of the total, and with the Canal Zone reached approximately 60% (71 out of 127 representatives). Thus, by the mid-1930’s there was little doubt about the effendi character of the leadership of the Muslim Brothers.

The membership of the society, by the mid-thirties, was perhaps not very different from that the leadership. Although the society was established among workers in Isma’iliyya, (Safran, 1961:199) and later expanded westwards mainly in some rural areas of Daqahliya, Qalyubia and to a lesser extent, to Sharqiya, the membership of this early period of the movement 1928-1935, cannot be said to be representative of the society’s membership over the years that followed. As the movement did not encompass the whole of Egypt, but was confined geographically to the Canal zone, Cairo, and three provinces of Lower Egypt, it was mainly due to its place of origin and its gradual growth and spread that its membership in this early period was generally “rural and working class” (Marius, 1979:388). The Fourth and Fifth General Conferences of the society held in July 1937 and January 1939 respectively, were perhaps more representative of the society as the movement had by then spread all over the country. Al-Banna claimed that in the Fifth Conference there were representatives of all the murderous “of villages, towns and from all classes…” (Mitchell,1969:14).

Growth of the Muslim Brotherhood: A result of socio-political circumstances

By the end of the World War l, many Egyptians hoped that Great Britain would grant Egypt its independence. A group of prominent secular nationalists led by Sa’ad Zaghlul formed a ‘delegation (Wafd) to present the case for Egyptian independence at Maulanathe Paris Azad Peace Conference Library,37. In 1919 Aligarh, the British security Muslim forces arrested University Zaghlul and two other leading nationalists and exiled them to Malta in the hope that this would put an end to the widespread demonstrations in support of their delegation. But the exile of

37 The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 was a conference organized by the victor of World War l to negotiate the peace treaties between the Allied and Associated Powers and the defeated Central Powers, that concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles (www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Paris_Peace_Conference_1919). 61

Zaghlul, who was coming to embody Egyptian nationalism much as Nasser would in the fifties and sixties, triggered a series of demonstration, strikes, and riots, in which virtually all segments of Egyptian society participated, Christian Copts as well as Muslims. This national upheaval finally induced Great Britain to grant Egypt nominal independence in 1922, but real power remained in British hands.

It was in an atmosphere of political and intellectual ferment about the freedom of Egypt from the British control that the Muslim Brotherhood Organization was established with the allegiance of Hasan Al-Banna with six intellectual members of his colleagues. (Mitchell, 1969:5). As a pupil in primary school, al-Banna had taken part in the nationalist struggle. But the struggle for him was not simply a fight for independence; it was a fight to defend Islam itself against the threat of the godless British. He founded the Brotherhood as a movement to protect Islam by positive religious and ethical action designed to counter the spread of secularism and moral and religious laxity under the impact of modernization and imitation of the foreigners. At first, he directed his appeal exclusively to the lower classes who, he believed, were still uncorrupted at heart. As his movement grew, he moved its headquarters to Cairo in quest of a larger field of operation and began to appeal the other classes as well. The organization accomplished the move by absorbing a Cairo-based Islamic society headed by al-Banna’s brother. After a year in Cairo, the organization began publishing its first weekly newsletter and held its first general conference of members. Meanwhile, the organization’s membership began to grow dramatically. It had five branch offices by 1930, fifteen by 1932, and three hundred by 1938. While exact membership figures are unknown, the three hundred branches probably represented between 50,000 and 150,000 members (Mitchell, 1969:28).

Principally, the Muslim Brotherhood Movement should be assumed as a result of political and social conditions in the contemporary history in Egypt following the prevalence of paradigm of separation of religion from politics (secularism) among Maulanaintellectuals Azad and rhythm Library, of nationalistic Aligarh feelings for reformationMuslim in the University country during political suffocation after Egyptian Revolution 191938 against the Britain. The

38 The Egyptian Revolution of 1919 was a countrywide revolution against the British occupation of Egypt and Sudan. It was carried out by Egyptians and Sudanese from different walks of life in the wake of the British-ordered exile of revolutionary leader Sa’ad Zaghlul, and other members of the Wafd party in 1919. 62

members of this movement focused on all potentials on the one hand, on creating development in Islamic beliefs of Muslims and in particular Egyptians from static and motionless status of dynamic state and governance of Shariat teachings over social and political life in Egypt and on the other hand to the unification of Muslims against western colonialists, who had violated to Islamic states.

The Brotherhood first came to public notice in 1937 when it tried to organize assistance to the Arabs of Palestine who were then in open revolt. By then it had already expanded its program far beyond the initial religious and ethical issues. To ensure life according to the precepts of Islam, it now insisted that the whole political order must be transformed into an Islamic system whose constitution would be the Qur’an. As the depression brought to the fore the problems of social misery, the Brotherhood incorporated in its platform a social program based, it said, on the conception of the solidarity of the Ummah and the responsibility of the collectivity for the welfare of its members. And when the Wafd surrendered its leadership of the national cause by signing the Treaty of 1936,39 the Brotherhood picked up the fight for absolute independence and the evacuation and unity of Egypt and the Sudan, as steps in the liberation of the abode of Islam from the domination of the infidel. Thus, Islam remained, at least formally, the chief point of reference for the movement even when it in fact adopted the principles which had been first promoted by movements of secular inspiration, or when it launched slogans which were dictated by the logic of the situation.

This emphasis on the religious aspect proved of great service to the Brotherhood since it enabled it to continue to operate under martial law when other organizations that were avowedly political had to suspend their activity. It also intimidated hostile governments and made them hesitant before taking action against it for fear they might be accused of persecuting religion. Maulana Events Azad and circumsLibrary,tances connected Aligarh with World Muslim War ll and its University aftermath gave the Brotherhood unique opportunities to grow and develop which it knew how to use.

39 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, (Aug, 26 1936), signed at Montreux, Switzerland in May 1937 that officially brought to an end 54 years of British occupation in Egypt. After the treaty had been signed, the Egyptian government assumed full administrative control over its armed forces. The treaty was unpopular in Egypt, and it was unilaterally abrogated by the Wafd government in 1951. 63

In the economic and social sphere, the war and its consequences confronted the successive Egyptian governments with problems that would have baffled far more honest, able, and unselfish rulers. Handled recklessly, heartlessly, and shortsightedly, these problems drove millions to despair, and hundreds of thousands to the ranks of one organization that promised to eliminate the whole system.

The war eliminated temporarily the problem of unemployment only to make things much worse in the long run. The demand for manpower to staff the large number of military workshops established by the Allies and a large local industry, which rose to substitute for the shrinkage of imports accelerated the usual movement of the rural population to the cities. This led to a further crowding of the slums, especially since the little new construction was undertaken. Immediately after the war, as the military workshops were dismantled and as many of the new industries were shut down, most of the immigrants were reluctant to go back to their villages and the unemployment problem became worse than it had been before. For now, in addition to the deprivation resulting from unemployment and the usual downward pressure that the unemployed exert on the wages of the employed, there was an increasingly hard pressure on the standard of living of wage earners and salaried employees caused by inflation. This pressure led to the eruption of waves of endemic strikes that encompassed workers, government employees, and even the police force. Many of these strikes were violently suppressed, leaving behind them a residue of tension and of bitterness against the government.

The effect on public morality of the shortages induced by the war was dissolution and corruption in the system of distribution of goods. Their effect on the health, lives, and livelihood of millions of poor people was even more devastating. The extent of this devastation may be easily imagined if it is recalled that a malaria epidemic in Upper Egypt in 1943-1944 that took a toll of two hundred thousand lives. The Egyptian government failed to provide an adequate health care system for the Maulanapeople. AsAzad a result , Library,people die that couldAligarh have been Muslimcured given proper University care. To fill this gap, the Brotherhood opened numerous health clinics, supplied with larger equipment’s and staffed with dozens of volunteer physicians & provided better quality yet lower cost health care than the state. However, this move both damaged the government’s reputation and increased the Brotherhood’s popularity. And the 64

political-social consequences of this massive misery were made worse by the efforts of the factions of the ruling class to capitalize on it by mutual accusations about the responsibility for it. Thus, in 1944, when Faruq was finally able to dismiss the Wafdist government of al Nahhas Pasha, (Bari, 1995:25-28) (He stressed in his formal message to the government that he was dismissing it for its failure to provide the people with food and clothing. At the same time, the smaller parties were called by the king to form a new government. A little while later, as the new government struggled hopelessly with the same issue for which the Wafd had presumably been dismissed, the latter had ample opportunity to take its revenge against it and its royal sponsor. Despite the restrictions imposed by martial law, it managed to stir up discontent with the social policy of the government and to promote a campaign of systematic destruction of the king’s moral reputation40. Whatever the degree of truth in all the charges and countercharges --- as it varied considerably --- their net effect was to destroy every shred of credit that remained in the system as a whole.

Amidst all the misery and discontent, cynicism and despair, corruption and resentment, the Muslim Brotherhood appeared as the one movement offering grounds for hope for the future and opportunity for expressing immediate dissatisfaction with the regime. Not all who joined or supported it, needless to say, agreed with its ideology and accepted its full program. There were those who were impressed by its moral and religious preaching’s at a time when society seemed to have reverted ethically to the rules of the jungle. This included the religiously devout and many disillusioned Liberals. Others, especially the masses of lonely and uprooted slum dwellers and immigrants to the cities, found in its branch meetings and collective prayers a psychological haven that fulfilled the function previously accomplished by the Sufi brotherhoods and the corporations. Educated nationalist youth from the middle classes saw the Brotherhood as the main heir to nationalist leadership at a time when the Wafd was abjectly collaborating with the forces of the Occupation that had Maulanamade a Azad mockery of Library, the country’s independence.Aligarh Political Muslim opportunists University of all sorts supported it or joined it in the hope of using it to further their own designs. Others

40 King Faruq dismissed Mustafa el-Nahhas’ s government, because the Wafd government failed to halt the country’s downward spiral. Corruption remained ubiquitous despite attempts by prime- minister to put their political houses in order, that challenge the supremacy of the Wafd. On the political front, the conflict sparked a fresh outburst between the Wafd and the King, which destroyed King’s moral reputation. 65

were attracted by one aspect or another of the movement’s activities and enterprises, which expanded ceaselessly as its membership grew. By the end of World War II, these activities included the founding and maintaining of sport clubs, Boy Scout groups, para-military squads, a secret apparatus for sabotage and terror, a daily newspaper and several magazines, clinics, welfare centers, schools, cooperative enterprises, and trade unions. The membership had reached at least half-a-million, an unprecedented size of a voluntary organization, and was organized in general branches and in overt and covert functional cells within the Army, workers’ organizations, government service, and the schools. Though the bulk of the membership continued to be composed of working people, the directive layer came to comprise larger numbers from the professional class --- particularly teachers --- and from the intelligentsia. A few years after the war, for example, students affiliated with the Brotherhood were able to gain control through open elections of the student councils of all the faculties of the Egyptian University.

Having marshalled the elements of social, economic, political, and religious discontent into a powerful movement, the leaders of the Brotherhood chose to concentrate their first major effort on agitation to set forth national aspirations. This choice was a logical one, since the full realization of the movement’s program depended on the overthrow of the current regime and the establishment of an Islamic state, and this was a risky, if not an impossible, task for an attempt as long as the British were present with force on Egyptian territory. It was even more sensible from a tactical point of view since it offered the movement the opportunity to mobilize a larger number of supporters behind a universally shared aim. The circumstances placed the ruling parties in an embarrassing squeeze between the British and an aroused public, so open up revolutionary possibilities. As soon as the war in Europe was over, the agitation for the British evacuation of Egypt and the unity of the Nile Valley was resumed with great vigor, spearheaded by a “national front” composed of Maulanathe Brotherhood Azad and Library, other “popular” organizations.Aligarh The Muslim government of University the day, led by Nuqrashi Pasha, approached the British for negotiations to revise the Treaty of 1936, (Laqueur, 1961:243) but the pressure of popular opinion was such that it could only take an intransigent position which led to the failure of the negotiations and the government’s resignation. Another government, headed by Sidqi Pasha, reopened the discussions and actually reached a compromise draft of a new treaty which was 66

initiated by the two parties, but the agreement was repudiated by public opinion in Egypt, and Sidqi resigned. A third government within two years, again headed by Nuqrashi Pasha, took the Egyptian case to the Security Council of the United Nations, but failed to achieve any concrete results. When Nuqrashi returned from Lake Success, he was expected either to resign or to initiate an active struggle against the British. The latter option seemed hopeless as well as dangerous one given the existing state of extreme social tension due to the difficulties. Resignation was opposed by the king because it would have led to elections and the likelihood of the return of the Wafd. In these circumstances, the Palestine issue, which was coming to a head at that time, provided a welcome expedient to divert popular agitation, and the king and the government seized upon it.

Further, before the United Nations adopted the partition resolution of Palestine, of November 29, 1947, the Egyptian government, together with the other members of the Arab League, had committed itself to resist its application even by force. When the resolution was passed and civil war broke out in Palestine, the Egyptian government believed that the Palestinian Arabs could win by themselves, with indirect assistance from the Arab countries. Together with other member-governments of the League, it took the lead in arousing its people, contributed money and arms, and encouraged the organization and dispatched volunteers. By the spring of 1948, however, events in Palestine took an unexpected turn against the Arabs and it became obvious that the cause would be lost unless the regular armies of the Arab states intervened. The Egyptian government was reluctant to send its army to war; but the tremendous popular agitation which it had helped to incite, the necessity to confront the national issue if the Palestine problem were dropped, pressure from the king who feared the Wafd’s return to power, and expectation of quick success in the war promoted it to overcome its hesitation. Once again the government took the lead in stirring up the enthusiasm of the public by the premature announcement of success and reiterated Maulanacommitments Azad to fight Library, until complete victoryAligarh was won Muslim. But once again University its calculations proved wrong. Not only was it impossible to win the war, but it became evident after the first forty days of fighting that every delay in ending hostilities exposed the Arab armies, the Palestinians, and what remained of Palestine to disaster. However, even as the disaster began to materialize, the government lacked the courage to admit failure 67

and end the war. By that time, it was almost completely the prisoners of that jinn --- mass opinion --- which it had so recklessly unabated.

During the whole agitation, the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the relaxation of the usual public security controls to collect arms and train its men. When it became evident that the war could not be won, and while the best units of the army were still occupied at the front, the Brotherhood began to plot the complete overthrow of the regime. Having begun with a campaign of terror against Jews and Jewish establishments which the government was too timid to repress, the Brotherhood extended its attacks against foreigners, and finally against Egyptians. It succeeded in undermining the morale and effectiveness of the police force after killing its chief and battling with it several times. By the autumn of 1948, it became the almost unchallenged master of the street and was about to deal its coup de grace when the government, in a spirit of determination, outlawed it and ordered its dissolution on the ground of conspiring against the existing order. Indicative of the power that the movement had attained and of the decline of public authority was the fact that the government did not dare arrest the leaders of the Brotherhood or bring them to trial. Not even when the movement retaliated by assassinating the Prime Minister did his successors dare to take such measures. Instead, they resorted to extra-legal means and had the leader and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated.

The liquidation of the Palestine war brought to the force once more the Egyptian national issue which had been pushed aside in the preceding year-and-a-half. This, together with the disaster of the war, the crying of social crisis, the continued underground activity of the Brotherhood, and the revelation of scandals in the handling of military supplies to the armed forces during the war, created an explosive atmosphere in the country and made the position of the government untenable. Partly for this reason and partly to embarrass the Wafd, the king called for new elections. In the absence of alternatives, he expected the Wafd to win, but he hoped at the same Maulanatime to seeAzad it trapped Library, between the British Aligarh trenches inMuslim the Suez Zone University and the highly agitated public. His expectations were justified. The Wafd returned to power, and, in the hope of expiating its spotty past and recapturing the leadership of the national struggle, it risked the danger of nationalist agitation in times of social crisis, which all parties had tried to avoid before, denounced unilaterally the Treaty of 1936, whipped 68

nationalist feeling into hysteria and launched an ill-prepared guerilla war against the British forces. In the meantime, as part of a political bargain, it resorted the legal status of the Muslim Brotherhood. But this time the forces that it unleashed were beyond its control. After an irresponsible order by the Minister of the Interior had led to a clash in the Canal Zone, which cost the lives of scores of policemen, the wrath of the masses was turned inward and erupted in the burning of Cairo. The king had at last found the excuse he needed to dismiss the Wafd, but the enduring crisis led directly to the July revolution and the complete overthrow of the whole regime.

The assassination of both al-Nuqrashi and Hasan al-Banna damaged the public image of Brotherhood. However, by 1949 the movement was claiming to have 2000 branches throughout Egypt and between 300,000 and 600,000 active members, the largest organization in the country of the time (Munson, 2001:488-489). During the next two years between 1949 and 1951 Brothers operated in secrecy until they were acquitted from the assassination of al-Nuqrashi and the Jeep incident41. The court came to the conclusion that; “a criminal conspiracy to overthrow the form of government, on the basis of the evidence and investigation, to be without foundation” which secured the Brotherhoods’ freedom (Mitchell, 1969:78).

By the time these cases were taking place, the Brotherhood had to choose a new Murshid which was the most significant position in the organization, since the leader takes crucial decisions and has to keep the society together. Their clash with the political authority and decrease in their popularity forced the society to decide on a leader, which was respected by both palace and government. Muslim Brotherhood leaders approached to a well-known judge, Hasan al-Hudaybi who was not an official member of the movement. His election in 1951 was contrary to the constitution of Muslim Brotherhood because the constitution indicated that the new leader has to be Maulana“a member Azad of the Consultative Library, Assembly Aligarh for at least Muslim five years and University that he must be elected from among the members of the Assembly” (Zollner, 2009:20). However, because of the chaotic situation, they accepted him being the second Murshid of

41 Jeep case in 1948 was a turning point for Muslim Brotherhood, when documents were found indicating a secret plan to over throw the government. Although, Prime Minister Nuqrashi announced the dissolution of Muslim Brotherhood in December 8 1948, and Shafiq Ibrahim Anas, a member of the secret apparatus of Muslim Brotherhood was arrested. 69

Muslim Brotherhood. The position has been critical to fill since Hasan al-Banna had a significant charisma to uphold the organization. Hudaybi had a different character and nature than his predecessors. This became more obvious after Hudaybi declared his distance towards the Special Unit, which created big discontent inside the organization, especially those who are leading figures of Special Unit, Salih al-Ashmawi and ‘Abd al-Rehman al-Sanadi (Zollner, 2009:23). Oppositions inside the Brotherhood continued to increase after the coup against King Farouq by lower ranking military personnel in the army, calling themselves Haraka al-Dubbaat al-Ahrar (Free Offices Movement) in 23 July 195242.

A few days after the coup Murshid of Muslim Brotherhood, Hudaybi announced their support of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) (Cook, 2012:11). There is a widely debated issue on the involvement of Brotherhood during the Free Officers Coup. It was a fact that there were some members and sympathizers, Nasser and Sadat among them inside the Free Officers’ movement. Despite the fact that the coup was not the plan of the Muslim Brotherhood, the group had nevertheless connections with the Free Officers leadership. As Vatikiotis argued; “Free Officers movement occurred within the Brethren-led operations in the Palestine Conflict (1947- 49) and those against the British in the Suez Canal Zone” (1946-53) (Vatikiotis, 1978:85). Although they didn’t become official members of the Muslim Brotherhood, both Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abd al-Nasser met with Hasan al-Banna.

Muhammad Naguib became the first president of the newly declared Republic of Egypt on June 18, 1953. Despite the fact that their understanding of implementation a “just state system” differed completely, in the first period of the presidency of Naguib the relations with Brothers were in the line of cooperation. They rather forced to see each other beneficial partner and didn’t want to take radical steps, in order not to lose large support from the Brothers. First confrontation emerged after the Muslim Brotherhood refused the offer by the Free Officers to participate to the Revolutionary MaulanaCommand Azad Council (ZollnerLibrary,, 2009:27 Aligarh-29). However, theMuslim Brotherhood University didn’t cut their connections with the new regime and continued to support the Officers as long as they

42 In 23 July 1952, a group of disaffected army officers (“the Free Officers”) led by General Muhammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser over threw King Farouk, whom the military blamed for Egypt’s poor performance in the 1948 war with Israel. The revolutionaries then formed the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council, which constituted the real power in Egypt, with Naguib as chairman and Nasser as vice-chairman. 70

fit to Brothers goals. For example, the organization supported the announcement of the dissolution of all political parties and established Liberation Rally43 to represent people directly. The ban on political parties excluded the Muslim Brotherhood parties since it was not classified as a political party. However, the conflict between Free Officers and the Brotherhood emerged after they rejected joining to the national front. On October 19, 1954 Abd al-Nasser signed the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, concerning the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. This increased concern for the part of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hudaybi opposed to the signing of the treaty. Husaini argues that Brotherhood’s position was to take armed struggle against the British occupation in the Suez Canal (Husaini, 1956:136). Total suppression was inevitable after Mahmud Abd al-Latif, a member of Secret Unit of Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Abd al-Nasser while he was giving a speech in Manshiyya Square44 of Alexandria on October 26, 1954. Following the incident Abd al-Latif and five other members of the Muslim Brotherhood was executed. The assassination attempt opened a new page in both political position and the ideological understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The attempt of assassination to Nasser brought him into a higher position in the eyes of public. This was both a chance to suppress the most visible political rival in the country, Muslim Brotherhood and then dismiss the president of Egypt, Muhammad Naguib. For the part of the Muslim Brotherhood around 4,000 members were jailed and movement leaders were arrested and imprisoned for life, Hudaybi being one of them (Dekmejian, 1972:33-34). This is the reason why during the years under Nasser, although, Egypt had become a major political power in the Third World, it was a total suppression and inactive years for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The crackdown on the movement continued through 1955, most members were executed, arrested or exiled in different Arab countries. Both, imprisoned members of the Muslim

Maulana43 Nasser Azad’s regime created Library, a series of national Aligarh rallies or unions Muslim to mobilize popular University support --- the Liberation rally, the National Union and finally the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). All were conceived as mass organizations with a monopoly of legitimate political activity. The choice of name was also significant; in each case the word ‘party’ was deliberately avoided, for this had powerful connotations of division and lack of national purpose (Owen, 1992:266).

44 Manshiyya incident was called after the site in Alexandria --- in which one Mahmud ‘Abd al-Latif, a Brother and member of the ‘secret organization’ attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was addressing some 10,000 workers in Alexandria. 71

Brotherhood and exiled Brothers tried to keep in contact with each other. This period opened a way for the Muslim Brotherhood to spread and establish its own branches in other Arab and African countries like Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria. Following their release from prison in the late 1960s’ and early 1970s, during the leadership of Anwar Sadat, there had been a rise in the number of militant Islamic groups that at the end assassinated Sadat in 1981. In order to understand this, change of method in Islamic movements in Egypt one has to focus on the debates that were carried out by Muslim Brotherhood members. Their brutal treatment and excessive were carried out by Muslim Brotherhood members. Their brutal treatment and excessive torture has been effective on new ideological search. One of the most significant leaders of this transformation was Sayyid Qutb. However, even during the darkest days of Nasserist persecution, it is estimated the organization had up to 600,000 members.

While members of all political parties alongside the Muslim Brotherhood spent there in prison time, Egypt became increasingly a significant country, in economic, cultural and international terms. As much as Nasser became the only leader of Egyptian politics with little or no opposition to himself, Gamal Abd al-Nasser emerged as the most popular leader of “Third World” with the initiative of the Nonalignment Movement in the international arena. Nationalization of Suez Canal, which led to the 1956 Suez War with Israel and Pan-Arabism policy can be counted as the main reasons behind the emerging popularity of Nasser in the World. Domestically Nasser gained the support of the lower class since he tightened the condition of private property and he increased his popularity, especially after the Suez War by forcing British military presence to leave the country. As Dekmejian argues; “For over a decade, Nasser was able to offer the Arabs much of what the Brotherhood had promised --- dignity, unity, and popular participation, defiance of the West and a semblance of socioeconomic justice” (Dekmejian, 1985:83).

Maulana Six Azad Day War Library, in 1967 was a Aligarh turning point for Muslim the popularity University of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular and Islamic movements in general around the Arab society after the defeat of Nasser against Israel. The internal debate increased after the war within the Muslim Brotherhood among those who advocated the ideas of Qutb and supporters of al-Hudaybi. The debate was on the issue of their support for Nasser 72

during his war with Israel. For the supporters of Qutb, Nasser is a jahili leader and such a leader cannot be supported even if he wages war against “the enemy of Muslims”. Hudaybi reacted to this argument and suggested that the support should be given to Nasser since it would create strife amongst the society (Zollner, 2009:46). Although, the Muslim Brotherhood was an alternative to the idea of Pan-Arabism in the post 1967 period in Egypt, they were continuing to operate as an illegal organization. Despite the fact that the ideological rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and other militant Islamic movements was achieved under the leadership of Nasser, they gained their social support after a new era was opened with the presidency of Anwar Sadat.

Nasser died in September 28, 1970 and succeeded by his vice-president Anwar Sadat. There was a significant shift in the attitude towards the Islamic movements during his presidency from 1970 to 1981 compared to his predecessor. Some argued that the transformation was in fact within the state of full-authoritarianism with Nasser to semi-authoritarianism under Sadat (Ottaway, 2003:31). The situation was tough for Anwar Sadat to replace a charismatic leader as Nasser, as a result, he had chosen the way of economic and political liberalization and tried to erase the “mistakes” of Nasser. In 1971 to increase his popularity and legitimacy Sadat announced Islam as the religion of the Egyptian state and the Shari’a is a source of legislation (Dekmejian, 1985:86). Since the morale of the Egyptian society was devastated after the defeat in the 1967 War, Sadat aimed to restore the power of his country by challenging to United States and Israel. In October 6, 1973, which was also the holy day of Yom Kippur in Israel, Egypt launched an attack against Israel, in order not to retake all parts occupied by Israel in 1967 but only Sinai. Sadat named as “the hero of the Crossing” after the war in Egypt and signaled to the United States and Israel that he wants peace in the region. On the other hand, opposition also rose through his presidency from different groups; Islamic movements, leftists and Nasserist’s against three main Maulanasubjects ; AzadInfitah policy Library,45 which aimed Aligarh to open Egyptian Muslim economy to the University investment of

45 Sadat’s program of Infitah, officially outlined in the October Paper in April 1974, represented a marked departure from the socialist framework of his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The open- door economic program was meant to encourage capitalist investment by domestic and foreign investors, thereby invigorating Egypt’s sizable and inefficient public sector. Incentives such as reduced taxes and import tariffs were offered to investors, and foreign banks were encouraged to return to Egypt. 73

the Western countries led to the increase in the price of basic subsidies, increasing relations with the United States and his visit and peace treaty with Israel.

Starting from the early-1970s members of Islamic movements were released until the declaration of amnesty in 1975 to all political prisoners arrested during the leadership of Nasser. The rise of Islamic ideology became apparent in different parts of the society.

The Muslim Brotherhood found a chance to reorganize after the release of Hasan al-Hudaybi in 1971 and increase its popularity. During the next two years after his release from prison al-Hudaybi worked to spread the organization until he died on November 11, 1973 at the age of 82 and succeeded by Umar al-Tilmisani (Zollner, 2009:49).

Despite the fact that the Brotherhood was the only major Islamic movement before the Nasser’s crackdown in 1954, after most of the members released from prison there were 29 different Islamic movements in Egypt (Dekmejian, 1985:88). During the same period as the Brotherhood was trying to reorganize itself, there were other splinter Islamic movements such as Jama’at al-Muslimin (The Society of Muslims) also known as al-Takfir WA-l-Hijra (Excommunication and the Hegira) and the Islamic Liberation Organization that was created by those who extensively read the works of Sayyid Qutb and challenged to Hasan al-Hudaybi. Similar to those organizations, al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya became popular among students on university campuses and until the end of Sadat’s presidency, they were controlling nearly all Student Unions around Egypt (Wickham, 2002:116). These groups were most likely to recruit, younger generation intellectuals of Egyptian society, who are in search of a new explanation of the problems that they face, such as unemployment. Prominent members of al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya in 1970s such as; Dr. Esam al-’Aryan, Dr. ‘Abd al- Mun’im Abu al-Futuh, Dr. Hilmi al-Gazzar and Eng. Abu al-’Ala Madi, later became Maulanathe leading Azad figures of Library, the Muslim Brotherhood Aligarh (Mubarak Muslim, 1996:40-46). University This is the reason why it was not just the Muslim Brotherhood that increased its popularity, but all other Islamic movements during the presidency of Sadat, increased their ability to operate. This came not only because people were attracted by the Islamic movements, but rather Sadat used Islamic movements as a tool against his 74

opponents, especially those who supported the policies of Nasser. In addition, Sadat created close connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and supported its activities as long as they operate as an alternative to militant Islamic movements that pose a threat to the regime. The organization had never been officially reorganized until 2011 but rather operated as a social movement with the goal of spreading Islamic knowledge. Umar al-Tilmisani as the third Murshid of Muslim Brotherhood after Banna and Hudaybi made a transformation in the movement which led Gilles Kepel, to describe the post-prison period of the Muslim Brotherhood as “neo-Muslim Brethren” (Kepel, 2005:109). Between July 1976 and September 1981 Brotherhood published a monthly magazine called al-Da’wa, for the first time since 1954 that dealt with various up-to- date issues from an Islamic point of view. This magazine was a media organ of the Muslim Brotherhood to declare his opinions not only on what was happening in Egypt but other Muslim majority countries as well. By 1979, the magazine reached to 80,000 circulations (Rutherford, 2008:83).

The Muslim Brotherhood with the publications in Al-Da’wa started to increase its criticism against Sadat after the growing economic crisis as a result of Infitah policy, relations with United States, visit to and speech at Israeli Knesset and Camp David accords in 197946. It was also the period when Brotherhood developed its connections with political forces other than Islamic movements, leftists and liberals by “allowing the latter to write in their periodicals on issues of common agreement (such as opposed to the peace treaty with Israel, alliance with the United States, and in defense of democracy and civil rights)” (Ibrahim, 2002:47). In 1977, when Bread Riots erupted after masses gather to denounce the rise in the basic food prices, Muslim Brotherhood launched its first open critic against the state. They supported the riots and opposed Sadat’s comments on riots being “a plot engineered by the communists” (Ibrahim, 2002:40).

After protests started to question the legitimacy of President Sadat, he diverted Maulanahis attention Azad from economicLibrary, problems Aligarh in diplomatic Muslimrelations with Israel.University He openly declared on November 9, 1977 that he is ready to go and speak in Israeli Parliament.

46 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt signed on September 17, 1978, that led in the following year to a peace treaty between those two countries, the first such treaty between Israel and any of its Arab neighbors. 75

This declaration was an intention of peace with Israel and for Egyptian and other Arab states a betrayal of Egypt to the Palestinian cause. This led Arab League, which was established by initiatives in Egypt in 1945 decided to move its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis (Ibrahim, 2002:140). During this era the articles in al-Da’wa magazine increased their tone of criticism against Sadat and dangers that can be brought by peace with Israel to Egypt.

Anti-Israel and anti-Palestinian rhetoric was the main subject that Muslim Brotherhood used from its very early years with Hasan al- Banna and Sadat’s peace with Israel brought the critique of Sadat regime into its peak. Criticism was not specific to Brotherhood or other Islamic groups, but a wide range of intellectuals in Egypt showed their discontent on the peace treaty. The question of Sadat’s presidency continued, although Sadat tried to restore his image by religion and introduced a series of bills on Islamic penalties for usury, apostasy, theft, and adultery and drinking, most of which were withdrawn after protests by both Copts and liberal Muslims. In March 1980 the Shari’a was made the source of legislation through a plebiscite (Dekmejian, 1985:86). However, these announcements were not enough to calm the society against Sadat and as a final resort he ordered the arrests of significant opposition figures, Muslim Brotherhood and its Murshid Umar al-Tilmisani alongside with other Islamic movement’s members, including members of the Coptic Church, and Pope Shenouda lll, secularists, liberals and closed down the opposition including publications including al-Da’wa (Beattie, 2000:273).

Compared to the crackdown of Nasser to the opposition in 1954, Sadat’s mass imprisonment was unable to prevent the rise of militant Islamic movement, called al- Jihad (Sacred Struggle) inside the military. In October 6, 1981, on the eighth anniversary of the 1973 war, 26-year-old lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli47 with four other gunmen opened fire and Killed Sadat. Maulana In Azad the aftermath Library, of assassination Aligarh security forces Muslim launched a crackdown University to the militant Islamic movement al-jihad. It was a significant indicator of popularity of this

47 Khalid Ahmad Showky Al-Islambouli was an Egyptian army officer who planned and participated in the assassination of Egypt’s third President Anwar Sadat, during the annual 6th October victory parade on 6 October 1981. Islambouli stated that his primary motivation for the assassination was Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with the state of Israel. He was tried by a military tribunal, found guilty, and sentenced to death. 76

group when, Egyptian security arrested 303 members from different “cross-section of Egyptian society”; most of them being college and university students and graduates, workers, engineers, landowners, professors, teachers and journalists (Dekmejian, 1985:106).

Two weeks following the assassination of Sadat, October 14, 1981, his vice- president Hosni Mubarak, who was sitting in the right side of Sadat in the event of an assassination, became the fourth president of Egypt. For the part of the Muslim Brothers, who were in jail during the assassination of Sadat, new presidency meant new opportunities in both social and political arenas that made the Brotherhood, the main opposition force in the country for the next 30 years during Mubarak’s presidency.

The term of Mubarak’s presidency was the “golden age of Muslim Brotherhood” in Egypt since it became the largest and most organized opposition force against the regime during these years. However, compared to three years with Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood had also rivals from different social and political groups. The organization gained maturity during this period by participating in 1984, 1987, 2000 and 2005 elections and made alliances with ideologically different political forces, for example with, the New Wafd Party in 1984, with the Socialist Labor Party in 1987 and with the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya)48 in 2005. The rise of the Brotherhood was also rapid in the leadership of professional syndicates and by taking part in these organizations the Muslim Brotherhood extended its reach to the different classes of the society. Compared to the influence and charisma that previous General Guides Hasan al-Banna and Hasan al-Hudaybi held among the Brotherhood members, during the years of Mubarak, the organization lacked a charismatic leader. This is the way during this period, the Brotherhood became popular with its political activities rather than its General Guides. In the following thirty years, the organization changed six Murshid in this period starting with Umar al-Tilmisani (1972-1986), MaulanaMohammad Azad Hamid AbuLibrary, al-Nasr (1986 Aligarh-1996), Mustafa Muslim Mashhur (1996 University-2002),

48 Kifaya is the unofficial moniker of the Egyptian Movement for change, a grassroots coalition which prior to the 2011 revolution drew its support from across Egypt’s political spectrum. It was a platform for protest against Hosni Mubarak’s presidency and the possibility he might seek to transfer power directly to his son Gamal; political corruption and stagnation, the blurring of the lines between power and wealth; and the regime’s cruelty, coercion and disregard for human rights. 77

Ma’mun al-Hudaybi (2002-2004), Mohammad Mahdi Akef (2004-2010) and Mohammad Badi (2010- ).

Hosni Mubarak, in order to show his difference from his predecessor, released political prisoners that were jailed during the presidency of Sadat. However, contrary to the era of Sadat, the Emergency Law was announced after the assassination of Sadat that permitted security forces to arrest those suspected criminal activities against the state and try them in military courts rather than civilian.

Mubarak announced the importance of democracy and promised that the parliamentary elections will be held regularly starting from the 1984, as part of his semi liberalization. Although, the Brotherhood was still regarded as an illegal organization and prevented from founding its own political party, the movement nominated its own candidates as independents Brotherhood announced its alliance with the secular New Wafd Party, a recreation of Wafd Party which was the largest and most popular nationalist party from 1919 until it dissolved in regime change in 1952. In spite of their ideological differences two movements participated and gained 13% of the votes with 58 seats that the Wafd took 50 whereas Brotherhood put 8 members of the parliament. However, this was a pragmatic move that didn’t change both group’s understanding of politics. As Dina Shehata argues “In fact, Brotherhood and Wafd leaders refused to call theirs an alliance and preferred to refer to their relationship as electoral coordination or cooperation. Moreover, the two groups campaigned separately for the election, raised distinct slogans and banners, and drafted separate election programs” (Shehata, 2010:87). This was proved in 1987 both Muslim Brotherhood and Wafd participated in the elections separately. Although Wafd participated without a coalition, Muslim Brotherhood and Liberal Party decided to join with Socialist Labor Party candidates list. The alliance was named “Islamic Alliance” and their most widely used slogan was “Islam is the solution”. Since religion was one of the most effective elements in Egyptian society, the slogan gained support of many MaulanaEgyptians Azad (Mustafa ,Library, 1995:171). The Aligarh alliance won 17%Muslim of the votes University and Muslim Brotherhood occupied 36 seats (Thabet, 2006:11-24). This was seen as a challenge for Hosni Mubarak and his party National Democratic Party (NDP).

Politics was not the only place where the Muslim Brotherhood spread its influence, but the movement also started to become popular with its participation in 78

student unions, and professional syndicates. The strategy rather used the legal ways instead of clashing with the state which is the reason why a new generation of Muslim Brotherhood members started to take part in associations councils. Starting from 1984, the Brotherhood members started to enter to the Doctors’, Engineers’, Dentists’, Scientists’, Agronomists’, Pharmacists’, Journalists’, Commercial Employees’, and Lawyers ‘Association elections (Wickham, 2002:184). This was an indicator of support to the Muslim Brotherhood by middle-class Egyptians, which increased the ability of Brotherhood to reach out to the Egyptian public. “At Cairo University”, as Carrie Wickham stated, “in 1990/91, the Islamists won 47 of 48 seats on the student union’s board in the science faculty, all 72 seats in the medical faculty, and all 60 seats in the engineering faculty” (Wickham, 2002:117).

Although, the first decade of Mubarak’s presidency was relatively liberal towards the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, starting with the early 1990s regime which was against the Islamic movements. Firstly, the state aimed to distance Muslim Brotherhood from participating in 1990 parliamentary elections by changing the election law that “allowed only individuals rather than parties to participate” (Kotob, 1995:339). The Muslim Brotherhood alongside the largest political parties at the time, Al-Wafd Party, Socialist Labor Party, and Socialist Liberal Party decided to boycott the elections. This was a political move by the organization rather than rejecting the legitimate struggle for recognition by the system. Even though they were left out of parliament, Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, the fifth Murshid of Muslim Brotherhood, didn’t hesitate to declare their willingness to establish a “Muslim Brotherhood Party” (Kotob, 1995:329). However, due to both, the rise in the militant group’s attacks to civilian and political figures inside Egypt and the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front49 (FIS) in Algerian elections in 1991, Mubarak became suspicious about the Islamic takeover of the country. This perception reached its peak after a failed assassination attempt against Mubarak during his visit to the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa; the regime Maulanalaunched Azad another large Library, scale crackdown Aligarh on religious extremism.Muslim However University, despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood had denounced these attacks, the organization couldn’t survive

49 In December 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front, an Algerian political party had won national democratic elections, proving to be immensely popular. However, before the paramilitary seats could be taken after January 1992, the Algerian military violently overturned democracy. 79

from the prosecution. For example, in an interview given to Le Monde in 1995 Hosni Mubarak stated; “They (The MB) assassinated two prime ministers and a finance minister before the (1952) revolution. Then they pretended to back the late President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, but attempted to assassinate him in Alexandria. President Sadat did not act against them early in his tenure, having been preoccupied with the resorting the occupied territories, and so they killed him. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Jihad, the Islamic Groups, and the rest of them, are all the same” (Rutherford, 2008:86-87). One of the main reasons behind the wave of crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood was because the movement became an alternative to the regime by providing services to the people that the state couldn’t. This became especially apparent after the Cairo earthquake in October 12, 1992 that caused injuries and serious damage in many buildings. The Muslim Brotherhood’s humanitarian response was much more, in which they quickly mobilized to help the victims. Within hours after the incident, Brotherhood provided first-aid, food, clothing, blankets, shelter and money (Rutherford, 2008:86-87). This was seen as a direct challenge by the state and increased people’s support for the organization. In the same year, the security forces announced that they discovered a conspiracy by the Muslim Brotherhood to overthrow the government. This was the case of “Salsabil”; a computer company that was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak government saw this as an excuse to justify for a wave of mass imprisonment first time since the 1960s. From 1992 to 2000 Muslim Brotherhood was unable to operate actively as in the 1980s, both in parliament and other social services like universities and professional association. In 1993 the brotherhood members were tried in military courts and imprisoned without any concrete evidence between three to five years. In addition to unfair trials, during these arrests also, as Human Right Watch reported, there were brutalities of security forces against the detainees, such as torture and even death in custody. The government, in addition to arrests to members, enforced laws to prevent Muslim Brotherhood members to join syndicates and university council elections, as in the case of Law 100 Maulanain 1993 Azad, to recognize Library, the voting Aligarh turnout inMuslim the association University’s elections (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8452/egyptian-doctors-strike-and-the-quest- for-bread-fr). Parliamentary Election in 1995 was regarded as one of the most corrupt elections in the history of Egypt. Although the Brotherhood was planning to participate in the next elections, with 170 candidates, the government launched another 80

wave of arrest that led the Muslim Brotherhood unable to enter to the parliament (Soage and Franganillo, 2010:48). During this era, the Muslim Brotherhood faced a dispute between the “old guard” represented with the General Guide and “new generation” of moderates, Abu Ayla Madi is most prominent of them. The difference between these two groups emerged as a result of younger Brothers’, willingness to establish a political party with the name of Hizb al-Wasat50 (the “Middle-Way” Party) in 1996. Mustafa Mash’hur then - General Guide and other members of the Guidance Bureau didn’t approve such an establishment, after taking into account the immense pressure that the government imposing to the Muslim Brotherhood. Later, some members belonging to the new generation decided to apply for a party on their own, but rejected by the state and later jailed with the charges of belonging to an illegal organization (Wickham, 2002:218).

Although most members spend their days in prison the 1990s, early 2000s were the peak for both success of the Muslim Brotherhood especially in 2000 and 2005 elections and its prosecution. The Brotherhood proved that the state was unable to dissolve the organization, but kept its members together. In 2000 Mubarak approved the Supreme Constitutional Court decision to the supervision of the elections by judges, which increased the chance the Brotherhood members to be elected. Even though the supervision of judges in the elections regarded as relative liberalization in an autocratic state, the regime continued to suppress and tried to limit the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood in the elections as in the case of previous 1995 elections. In October 2000, around 1,600 members were jailed prior to elections and detained for several months (Howeydi, 2000:508). Even though there was pressure from the state, Muslim Brotherhood was able occupy 17 seats in the parliament (Thebet, 2006:17).

The Muslim Brotherhood reached to a position of main political opposition to the regime in Egypt, after it has gone through mass prosecution since the presidency of Nasser. The era between 2000 and 2005 in Egypt was the period where social Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 50 The founders of Hizb al-Wasat party in 1996 were a group of former Brotherhood members, including the founder, Abul-lla Mady. This group of activists included members from the student movements in the 1970s, who later became active in labor syndicates, which then came under Brotherhood control in the 1990s. This younger group of activists objected to the centralized nature of Brotherhood decision-making, and started to question how far these structures were different from those of the government. They also distanced themselves from the religious dimension of the Muslim Brotherhood, and focused instead on party politics and creating a more inclusive party with liberal ideological background. 81

movements increased opposition towards the Mubarak regime and their popularity in the country. It started with mass protests in solidarity with the Second Palestinian Intifada, activists gathered from various ideologies, Nasserist, Islamist and Liberal, under “The Egyptian Popular Committee for the Support of the Palestinian Intifada”51 and later organization continued against the Iraq war in 2003. During the coming year, “The Egyptian Movement for Change”, also known as Kifaya, founded as an opposition force which directly targeted the domestic politics. There were numerous reasons behind this opposition; (1) the rumors of Mubarak’s son, Gamal, would succeed his father, (Oweidat, 2008:65) (2) upcoming presidential referendum that Hosni Mubarak, 77, will contest for a fifth term in power and (3) an increase in Western pressure on the Mubarak regime to democratize the country (Shehata, 2012:100). This became obvious, especially after the then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice made a speech in her Cairo visit in 2005 stating; “President Mubarak has unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must put its faith in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of Egypt’s reforms when peaceful supporters of democracy --- men and women --- are not free from violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees - and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice” (http://2001- 2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm). The year 2005 was a significant year in Egypt since it was going to face both presidential as well as parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its new General Guide Mahdi Akef, made a significant decision to join the Kifaya movement in its anti-government demonstrations by organizing protests with more than 3,000 members for the first time since 1952 to protest the political process in the country (Latif, 2005:32). As a sign of answering to the call for democratization, Mubarak agreed to hold multi candidate presidential elections in 2005 by amending the Article 76 of the constitution by a referendum in May 25. In the day of the presidential elections, September 7, as witnessed with the previous elections, there were signs of anti-democratic practices. However, for the first Maulanatime in theAzad history of Library, Egypt, President Aligarh Hosni Mubarak Muslimwas challenged Universityby two civilian

51 The Intifada was a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991, through some date its conclusion to 1993, with the signing of the Oslo Accords. The uprising began on 9 December, in the Jabalia refugee camp after a traffic incident when an Israeli Defence forces truck collided with a civilian car, killing four Palestinians. In the wake of the incident, a protest movement arouse, involving a two-fold strategy of unarmed resistance and civil disobedience. 82

opposition figures, Ayman Nour, leader of al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party and Noman Gomaa from the Wafd party. Although there were documented attempts to limit opposition during voting by security forces as well as supporters of the regime, officially Ayman Nour became the second by obtaining 7% of the total votes compared to 88.6% for Mubarak and 3% Gomaa (Sharp, 2006:32). However, the relative freedom in Presidential elections, did not last long for Nour until he was arrested in December 24 with charges of “having forged more than a thousand signatures in an application seeking his party’s legal registration” (Amnesty International, December 16,1995,1).

The Muslim Brotherhood on the other hand used all of its efforts to use the liberalization in elections while putting its own 150 independent candidates to run for parliament positions. Although they joined forces with the Kifaya in protests, the Brotherhood and al-Ghad didn’t join the ranks of the alliance in the coming elections of 2005 under the banner of “National Front for Change”. The Wafd Party conditional agreed to join the National Front if al-Ghad Party was excluded and the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to give up its campaign slogan “Islam is the solution”, a request that was rejected by the Brotherhood. In a move to disable their power of the Muslim Brotherhood before the elections, security forces arrested 800 members. The violence towards the Muslim Brotherhood members also continued during the day of election as Independent Committee on Election Monitoring reported; “NDP supporters beat the Al-Wafd newspaper reporter in the El-Baugur district in Manufeja and assaulted a group of journalists in El-Saaf district. In the Hadeik El-Kobba district, the NDP candidate beats a Muslim Brotherhood poll-watcher” in November 9, 2005 (http://www.ndl.org/files/1943e.g.icemfirst110905.pdf). Despite all these irregularities in parliamentary elections, the result was a significant achievement for the Muslim Brotherhood, when it won 88 seats in the parliament, whereas 11 seats gained by the National Front (Antar, 2006:6). The Muslim Brotherhood for the first time in its Maulanahistory sinceAzad its foundation Library, in 1928 byAligarh Hasan al-Banna Muslim reached to the University position of the second largest political group in the main opposition bloc in the parliament. Even though they were successful in obtaining the position of second largest group in the parliament, it was hard for the Muslim Brotherhood to operate independently and affect the decision that will be taken since National Democratic Party dominance continued. 83

The arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members continued with the charges of being a member of “an illegal organization” and some members detained for days without any charge since the Emergency Law allowed the security forces for such arrests. One year after the elections, 2006, was the year of another wave of crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood leaders. In the first wave arrests was happened after, protests that organized in reaction to the irregularities in parliamentary elections, around 800 hundred members were arrested, including the Brotherhood leader such as Esam al- ’Aryan, Head of Political Committee and Mohammad Morsi, Head of Parliamentary Committee. In December 10, 2006 the demonstration by al-Azhar University students with their black hoods similar to the scenes from the release of Hamas52 in Palestine and Hezbollah53 in Lebanon increased reactions and criticism against the organization. The Muslim Brotherhood General Guidance Office denounced the demonstrations and announced that they do not have connections with the students. This event occupied a great space in the Egyptian media that warned the society from the dangers that the Muslim Brotherhood poses to the country. The state saw this event as the reason for second wave of crackdown on the Brotherhood (http://www.merip.org/mero080807# [12]). These arrests included, according to Human Rights Watch, at least 140 students and 1000 Brotherhood members with the leaders, including, Khairat El-Shater, the deputy supreme guide and the chief strategist of the organization (http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/17/egypt-police-intensify-crackdown-muslim- brotherhood). They were tried in military tribunals and charged with three to ten years in prison (Soage and Franganillo, 2010:52).

The Muslim Brotherhood paid a severe price for gaining a large number of seats in the parliament in 2005 with the constant arrests of its members. In 2008

52 Based on the principles of Islamism gaining momentum throughout the Arab world in the 1980s, Hamas was founded sometime in 1988 soon after the first intifada broke out, as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which in its Gaza branch had been non-confrontational towards Israel, refrained from resistance, and was hostile to the PLO, co-founder Sheikh Ahmed Yasin stated in 1987, and the Hamas Charter affirmed in 1988, that Hamas was founded to liberate MaulanaPalestine Azad, including Library,modern-day Israel, theAligarh West Bank and the Muslim Gaza Strip. University 53 Hezbollah is a Shi’a Islamist militant group and political party based in Lebanon. It was conceived by Muslim clerics and funded by Iran following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and was primarily formed to offer resistance to the Israeli occupation. Its leaders were followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, and its forces were trained and organized by a contingent of 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards that arrived from Iran with permission from the Syrian government. After the 1982 invasion, Israel occupied a strip of South Lebanon, which was controlled by a militia supported by Israel, the South Lebanon Army. Hezbollah waged a guerilla campaign against them; with the collapse of SLA, then Israel withdrew on May 24, 2000. 84

municipal elections, which planned to take place in April 8, the majority of the Muslim Brotherhood members was rejected by the government to become candidates and another 800 members of the Brotherhood was arrested before the elections which forced the organization to boycott the elections under these harsh circumstances. All these arrests were due to the flexibility that states gained through Emergency Law, which was extended for two years in April 2006 and in 2008 the government decided to extend it for two more years until 2010. As Mona Farag argued, “. . . from 2005 to 2010 the Muslim Brotherhood had to endure some of its worst years in terms of political oppression, as the regime systematically made life difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood’s members, closing their businesses, revoking their licenses, and continuously and freely arresting many members thanks to the emergency law that allowed such action without recourse to the courts” (Farag, 2012:214-229).

In an environment of intense pressure towards different political opposition forces, the Muslim Brotherhood alongside with Leftists, Seculars, Liberals and common Egyptians was called to vote in parliamentary elections in two round elections, November 28 and December 5, 2010. In total, more than 2000 Brotherhood members were jailed with the charges of “belonging to an illegal organization” and prevent from taking part in the elections (Human Rights Watch, December 2010:8). The regime decided to leave the opposition forces out of parliament in 2010, which raised the anger of many Egyptians against the state. Especially during his speech before parliament in December 19, Mubarak signaled his intentions towards running for a sixth term in presidential elections planned to take place in 2011 and “to reform in the coming phase” (Farag, 2012:214-229).

All opposition parties, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, expressed their criticism against the process of elections and disappointments about the hopes for democratization in Egypt. However, only one month later after the 2010 elections, Tunisian uprising54 became an inspiration to all around Arab countries including MaulanaEgypt. The Azad protests inLibrary, Tunisia continued Aligarh three weeks andMuslim eventually forced University 24-year-

54 The Tunisian uprising also known as the Jasmine Revolution, was an intensive campaign of civil resistance, including a series of street demonstrations taking place in Tunisia, led to the ousting of longtime president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. It eventually led to a thorough democratization of the country and to free and democratic elections. They saw the victory of a coalition of the Islamist Ennahda Movement with the centre-left Congress for the Republic and the left-leaning Ettakatol as junior partners. 85

old Ben Ali regime to fall. The Egyptian activists inspiring from their Tunisian example decided to organize gatherings against the Mubarak regime.

The nationwide protests that erupted on January 25, 2011 forced Hosni Mubarak to leave his powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This unexpected political change compelled the Muslim Brotherhood to re-visit its political ideology and seize the opportunity in the post-Mubarak era by mobilizing its supporters for presidential and Parliamentary elections. This was explained by Pargeter stated;

Despite the fact that the popular uprisings that gripped parts of the Arab world in 2011 were largely non-ideological in nature, driven largely by youth who came together with no political agenda other than to oust the authoritarian regimes that had gripped the region more or less since independence, it was the Brotherhood that was to reap the advantages of the revolutions.

For the first time in its history, the Muslim Brotherhood was operating as a legal entity with its political party called; Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). As the movement increased its popularity within the political competition, soon it decided to nominate one of its members as a candidate for the Presidency; Mohammad Morsi. In the new political environment that Egypt was trying to transform itself from an authoritarian regime into a democracy, Muslim Brotherhood, with its party and president, became the major player. In a very limited period FJP occupied the largest number of seats in the Parliament, in the committee that was responsible for drafting the new constitution and the post of Presidency. However, due to both political turmoil’s in Egypt and the inexperience of the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP and Mohammad Morsi in governance, soon the opposition arouses in the public, due to their inability, joined with inexperience, to address the main problems that Egyptians are facing. From the early days after assuming power, Morsi was challenged by Maulanamilitary , Azadjudiciary and Library, finally secular andAligarh liberal groups. Muslim In a similar line University, Morsi didn’t enjoy the power of the President and FJP lacked the tools of mass communication, newspapers and TV channels to appeal general public. Further, FJP and Mohammad Morsi adopted a policy of challenging the country’s oldest bureaucratic forces, armed forces and judiciary, rather than addressing the most urgent issues of the country such as economy or unemployment. Most of the opposition forces accused the president and 86

the movement for trying to Islamize society and politics by occupying the majority of the seats in the People’s Assembly, Shura Council and finally Constituent Assembly. However, in response to these accusations FJP and Mohammad Morsi promoted the idea that this is their democratic right since they legitimately elected by popular vote. In order to “protect the revolution” from former regime members, radical measures can be taken such as the case of Morsi’s November 22 constitutional declarations.

Nonetheless, the sum of these factors led to wide dissatisfaction of the people and the structure of ex-regime within the framework of army generals and supreme judges in Egypt deemed the given climate as appropriate for overthrowing the Islamist government and ousting it from the power. The reaction to a military coup by army on July 2013 that was accompanied with wide classes of seculars and nationalist and leftist streams, which were called as a contravention from them, led to ousting of the cabinet of Mohammad Morsi and returning of militaries to power by the leadership of Field Marshal El-Sisi, Minister of Defense.

Moreover, by virtue of some awards issued by Cairo Court, the properties and assets of this movement were confiscated and its title was omitted from Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the main leaders of this movement were detained. Similarly, Court of Alexandria barred presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the presidency and Parliamentary elections in Egypt by issuance a legal award.

Although, this movement was dissolved by various governments during the period of its activity for several times and it could return to the political scene in Egypt, it seems that at this time the Muslim Brotherhood movement should pass through a much longer and more difficult path to return the political scene of Egypt for several reasons, particularly the main leaders of this movement have been arrested since date of ousting Mohammad Morsi.

Morsi had no opportunity to test himself in ruling before his victory in Maulanapresidential Azad elections Library, and also people Aligarhhad no experience Muslim in this regard inUniversity order to see if this movement could practically fulfill its objectives and promises. Likewise, not only the claims for uprising 2011 were forgotten in some elements like civil freedom and enjoying equal social rights and improvement of public life, but also playing up the dominant political aspect and exclusion and monopoly of governing Islamist faction 87

caused public despair toward new leaders following to ignoring cultural diversity of Egyptian people.

It necessitates Muslim Brotherhood movement to perceive this point that they could not return to power only with reliance on street rallies and demonstrations and this movement should prove once more its potentials and capabilities to the Egyptian people with its organization and exertion of changes in their executive paradigms.

Basic Program of the Movement

The Muslim state, the Muslim order, as conceived by the Brothers was, however, far from realization. But if the country could not be ‘Islamized’ overnight, much could be done to pave the way towards the final goal. This meant a total reform program of the political, economic, and social life of the country by the government from the top, and by the people from below. The government was to be ‘guided’ by a series of reform programs advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood organization; and these were to be given substantial support from the ever-increasing circle of Muslims converted anew to the truths of the faith. Thus, besides advocating reform programs, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to create a milieu conducive to the ‘truly Islamic life’, by undertaking on its own initiative, numerous projects designed to demonstrate the viability of Islam as a coherent program of social organization.

As a means of spreading basic programs of the movement al-Banna used pamphlets, letters, newspapers, speeches, public lectures, personal visits and epistles. His possession of a strong insight aided him in the selection of supporters and members. From these he formed the nucleus of a society which took over an unpretentious house as a meeting place. The house of the Brotherhood in Ismailia became the headquarters of the movement and the respective branches were tied to it Maulanaby a bond Azad of fraternity Library, without any branch Aligarh working through Muslim another or Universitythe work of one attracting the attention of another. The establishment of the headquarters was followed by the creation of some projects, including, among these were; (1) the building of neighborhood mosques; (2) creating small educational institutions, which offered courses in the region and literacy; (3) small hospitals and dispensaries for the public; 88

(4) small industrial and commercial enterprises, designed to provide employment as well as income for the organization; and (5) social clubs and organizations --- a brilliant stroke, since Banna apparently recognized that people join organizations with public goals for reasons other than the achievement of these goals, i.e., to satisfy private needs as well. Perhaps no less importance, the Brotherhood undertook a large scale publishing Program-books, magazines, pamphlets, etc. and finally, after World War ll, a mass-circulation newspaper (Aly and Wenner, 1982:338).

Islamic Program

The Muslim Brothers, while having a well-planned Islamic program - contenting themselves with vague generalities about Muslim government and a Muslim polity --- had an effective social and economic issues, one which won them numerous adherents in the late 1940s. The Bothers with their Islamic antecedent and ideas filled the need in a society which was going through a depression as well as a period of transition. That explains their membership, which grew rapidly, as did the group who sympathized with their Islamic program. It is more important to understand this group and its Islamic programs. A natural starting point in this effort is to examine the writings of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna’s Islamic world view may be summarized in four main propositions:

Islam is a perfect and complete way of life: Al-Banna stresses that “Islam is a perfect system of social organization, which encompasses all the affairs of life”. Speaking on the behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts, “We believe that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life”. Because Islam is all-encompassing, it is impossible for Muslims to separate politics and religion. Al- Banna advises his fellow Muslim Brothers: “If someone should ask you: To what end is your appeal made? Say: we are calling you to Islam...: government is part of it.... If someone should say to you: This is politics!, say: This is Islam, and we do not recognize such divisions” (Hussain, 1983:11-15). Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Islam must be the basis of all legislation:

Because Islam is a complete way of life, encompassing law and politics, all constitutional and positive law must be based on it: 89

Every nation has a body of law to which its sons have recourse in their legal affairs. This body of law must be derived from the prescriptions of the Islamic Sacred Law, drawn from the Holy Qur’an, and in accordance with the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence. For the Islamic Sacred Law and the decisions of the Islamic jurists are all-sufficient, supply every need, and cover every contingency, and they produce the most excellent results and the most blessed fruits. If the punishments prescribed by God (note omitted) were carried out, they would be a deterrent dismaying even the hardened criminal... (Quoted in Aly and Wenner, 1982:340)

It is striking that al-Banna mentions “the punishments prescribed by God” as an example of positive laws that must be derived from Islamic law. These are the so- called hadd punishments (plural hadud), specific punishments like stoning, crucifixion, amputations or lashes for specific crimes like illicit intercourse, drinking of alcohol theft, or highway robbery. Under Islamic law, these punishments have a special status because they are directly prescribed by God, either in the Qur’an or in the teachings of Muhammad.

As the above quotations make clear, al-Banna is very scrupulous in adhering to the traditional prescriptions of classical Islamic law. In 1936, al-Banna wrote a letter to King Faruq of Egypt, as well as to the other rules of Islamic countries, in which he laid out in some detail his program for Islamic government. In this letter al-Banna called for

1. “A reform of the law, so that it will conform to Islamic legislation in every branch;”

2. “The diffusion of the Islamic spirit throughout all departments of government, so that all its employees will feel responsible for adhering to Islamic teachings;”

3. “The surveillance of the personal conduct of all (government) employees, and Maulanaan Azad end to the Library,dichotomy between Aligarh the private and Muslim professional spheres University;”

4. Action by Islamic countries to pave the way for the restoration of the Caliphate;

5. “The imposition of severe penalties for moral offenses” and the prohibition of prostitution, gambling, drinking alcohol, dancing; and the criminalization of 90

“fornication, whatever the circumstances, as a detestable crime whose perpetrator must be flogged;”

6. “Treatment of the problem of women...in accordance with Islamic teaching” and segregation of male and female students; “private meetings between men and women, “except for family members, are: to be counted as a crime...”

7. “The surveillance of theatres and cinemas, and a rigorous selection of plays and films;”

8. “The regulation of business hours for cafes; surveillance of the activities of their regular clients; instructing these as to what is in their best interests...;”

9. “The expurgation of songs, and a rigorous selection and censorship of them;”

10. “The confiscation of provocative stories and books that implants the seeds of skepticism in an insidious manner and newspapers which strive to disseminate immorality...;”

11. “Punishment of all who are proved to have infringed any Islamic doctrine or attacked it, such as breaking the fast of Ramadan, willful neglect of prayers, insulting the faith, or any such act.”

12. “The annexation of the elementary village schools to the mosques...;”

13. “Active instigation to memorize the Qur’an in all the free elementary schools;”

14. “The prohibition of usury, and the organization of banks with this end in view.”

Al-Banna’s program is perhaps more readily understood in the context of a central provision of classical Islamic law, the duty to command the right and forbid the wrong. Firmly rooted in the Qur’an (e.g.3: 104), classical Shari’a prescribes this as a Maulanacommunal Azad obligation Library, of the Islamic Aligarh Ummah, and Muslim indeed as “the University most important fundamental of the religion,” such that “if it were folded up and put away, religion itself would vanish, dissolution appear, and whole lands come to ruin.” Gudrun Kramer writes that this Qur’anic injunction to command the right and the wrong “was to play a central role in al-Banna’s career as an Islamic activist” (Husaini, 1956:42-43). 91

The duty to command the right and forbid the wrong amounts to a communal duty of the whole Muslim Umma to police the behavior of all its members, intervening verbally and even physically when seeing violation of Islamic law such as drinking wine, eating during Ramadan, playing illicit music, and so forth.

Al-Banna was acutely aware that his program for Islamic government is radically at odds with Western values, like personal liberty and secular government. In his writing one finds a scathing critique of Western culture in general. He lists what he takes to be the defining traits of Western society, all of which are negative. European life and culture “rest upon the principle of the elimination of religion from all aspects of social life, especially as regards the state, the law-court, and the school.” European society is inherently materialistic, retaining its Christianity “only as a historical heirloom.” It is marked by “Apostasy, doubt in God, denial of the soul, obliviousness to reward or punishment in the world to come, and fixation within the limits of the material, tangible existence...” (Issawi, 1954:267)

Other defining marks of European civilization are “licentiousness, unseemly dedication to pleasure, versatility in self-indulgence, unconditioned freedom for the lower instincts, the gratification of the lusts of the belly and the genitals, the equipment of women with every technique of seduction and incitement...” European culture is marked by “individual selfishness and materialism” (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:62).

Al-Banna summed up: “These purely materialistic traits have produced within the European society’s corruption of the spirit, the weakening of morality,” “importance to guarantee the security of human society” and “failure to grant men happiness” (Wendell, 1978:61-62).

What is worse, the entire Muslim world is being corrupted by Western decadence: Muslim countries are being flooded with Western capital, banks, and companies; Western has invaded Muslim lands with “their half-naked women, their liquors, their theatres, their dance halls, their amusements, Maulana Azadtheir stories Library,, their newspapers Aligarh, their novels. Muslim” Westerners University have even “founded schools and scientific and cultural institutes in the very heart of the Islamic domain, which cast doubt and heresy into the souls of its sons.” This cultural infection of the Islamic world by Western decadence is even more dangerous than the political and military imperialism of the West. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood has two fundamental 92

goals: “(1) That the Islamic fatherland be freed from all foreign domination, and (2) That is the free Islamic state may arise in this free fatherland, acting according to the precepts of Islam...”

He further outlined his views that since the divinely revealed law is superior to manmade law; and since Islam is a complete and perfect way of life, encompassing the political sphere; and since materialistic European civilization cannot but cause unhappiness, it follows that Islam must rule the world:

The holy Qur’an appoints the Muslims as guardians over humanity in its minority, and grants them the right of suzerainty and dominion over the world in order to carry out this sublime commission. Hence it is our concern not that of the West, and it pertains to Islamic civilization, not to materialistic civilization (Maluleem, 1979:335).

It is our duty to establish sovereignty over the world and to guide all of humanity to the sound precepts of Islam and to its teachings, without which mankind cannot attain happiness.

The founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 is often explained as a reaction against Western imperialism. This is certainly true. However, one searches in vain in al-Banna’s writings for any principled critique of imperialism per se. What al- Banna criticizes is non-Muslim, especially Western imperialism. For Islamic imperialism al-Banna has only the most effusive praise. Imperialism to impose Islamic rule on non-Muslims is altogether to the good. Al-Banna is fully aware that Islam was born not only as a religion, but also as an imperialistic ideology mandating the conquest of non-Muslims. The first Islamic conquerors, he writes, “produced the maximal justice and mercy, reported historically in any of the nations” (Zeltzer, 1962:218).

Al-Banna was also fully aware that classical Islamic law imposes offensive war Maulanato expand Azad the borders Library, of the Islamic state Aligarh as a communal Muslim obligation (fard University al-Kifaya) on the entire Muslim community. Indeed, al-Banna wrote an entire essay “On Jihad” in which he gives a survey of the Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions (hadith) on jihad as well as the teachings of all four of the classical schools of Sunni jurisprudence on this topic. He reaffirms the classical teaching that “Jihad is not against polytheists alone, but against all who do not embrace Islam.” It is obligatory on us to begin 93

fighting with them after transmitting the invitation (to embrace Islam), even if they do not fight against us. Jew and Christians as “People of the Book” are not to be forcibly converted to Islam (unlike polytheists), but are to be forced to pay the jizya or tribute tax, as mandated by the Qur’an (9:29), as a sign of their humble acceptance of Islamic domination. Imperialism, therefore, is an obligation under Islamic law, and is wrong only when carried out by non-Muslims (Hussain, 1983:43).

When Islamic lands are actually invaded, or occupied by non-Muslims, Muslims have not just a communal but an individual duty to join the jihad (a fard al- ’Ayn). This means every single able-bodied Muslim must join the fight or at least help the fighters. Al-Banna sums up the classical Shari’a on jihad as follows, applying the lesson to his own time:

Now you can see from all this how the men of learning... agree unanimously that jihad is a communal obligation imposed upon the Islamic Ummah in order to broadcast the summons (to embrace Islam), and that it is an individual obligation to repulse the attacks of unbelievers upon it. Today the Muslims, as you know, are compelled to humble themselves before non-Muslims, and are ruled by believers. ...Hence it has become an individual obligation, which there is no evading, on every Muslim to prepare his equipment, to make up his mind to engage in jihad, and to get ready for it until the time is ripe... (Quoted in Husayni, 1956:63)

A final point al-Banna makes regarding jihad has to do with an alleged saying of Muhammad, to the effect that fighting is the “lesser jihad” while spiritual struggle is “the greater jihad.” Al-Banna points out (correctly) that this alleged saying is not a sound tradition, that is, there is one or more weak links in the chain of people who allegedly passed it down from Muhammad. Indeed, this tradition never made its way into any of the six canonical collections of prophetic traditions. And in any case, the rewards of martyrdom are conferred only on those who slay or are slain in the way of God, al-Banna asserts; they are not bestowed on those who merely struggle spiritually. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The classical Islamic law of warfare is closely linked to another central teaching of Muhammad and the Qur’an that clearly informs all of al-Banna’s writing, namely, that “Islam is superior and nothing must be made superior and nothing must be made superior to it.” As a scholar of Islamic law Yohanan Friedmann remarks, 94

military victories and the humiliation of the subjugated infidel are “the most conspicuous way in which the superiority of Islam is demonstrated.”

Economic Program

The Brotherhood generally avoided an in-depth discussion on economic issues, and always overshadowed these with its cultural and social outlook. Implementation of the Shari’a and other religious and cultural issues, and not the economy, were at the core of its ideology. The organization did not have any clear framework to solve the economic problems of the country, and whatever rudimentary ideas it threw up from time to time over economic issues lacked coherence. It, nevertheless, made it clear that it was opposed to both socialism and capitalism, and instead favored a rudimentary economy, which was directed to the benefit of the poor and what it described as “clear earning”, which it described as Islamic. The Brotherhood benefited from the worsening economic situation in the country because it showed care for the poorer sections of society in its programs.

The Brotherhood blamed Egypt’s economic problems squarely on the past colonial powers, “who left our societies moving in a vicious circle which begins with the lack of production because of the paucity of investment and ends with the lack of income and profit because of the weak purchasing power of the people”. In its opinion, Nasser’s economic policies were derived from the Marxist ideology, which not only led to the ruin of the country’s economy, but to its human resources as well, because it “looked only for the material benefit”. Sadat on the other hand, lived in the shadow of capitalism, which flooded Egypt with “debts, assistance and projects in order to overpower him and to bring him to make peace with Israel”. This opened the door “for black-marketers and thieves to plunder” the country’s wealth (Mitchell, 1969:272).

Even though the Brotherhood was more emphatic in denouncing the Nasser’s Maulanapolicies thanAzad those ofLibrary, Sadat, in its primary Aligarh concerns itsMuslim approach was Universitycloser to that of Nasser. Its opposition to “socialist subsidy”, which continued during Sadat’s period, was nevertheless on the practical grounds. Even during Nasser’s time, a section of the people had enriched themselves by transferring subsidized consumer goods. Also, subsidized items were so impractically cheap that a section of the farmers found bread cheap enough to feed their livestock. 95

The Brotherhood called for differentiation between the rich and the poor in providing the subsidy. There was a need to provide subsidized goods to the poor sections that would be harmed if it was stopped. As regards misappropriation and disorientation of the subsidy system, such problems could be cured by creating consciousness among the people about moral values. Also, public sector enterprises which were aimed at laying the foundation of the economy needed to be strengthened; “but its continued protection after it was fully established required reconsideration”.

The Brotherhood also emphasized the need for the guarantee of a level of subsistence. The social security system prevalent in capitalist economic had many defects while zakat provided a superior form of collective security, under which each section of society was guaranteed a minimum share in the economy as of right. Collection of zakat from the rich and its distribution among the poor was the responsibility of the State. A suggestion was also made that zakat money could be used in building industries and its shares could be distributed among the poor free of cost.

Some unfounded claims of economic gains by the Sadat regime came in for trenchant criticism by the Brotherhood. One such claim related to the launching of an agriculture project, which the government claimed would irrigate three and a half million feddan (1 Feddan = 4,555 sq. meters) of the desert in southern Egypt (Hinnebusch, 1985:55-57). After the office of the Prime Minister spelled it out, the Egyptian mass media projected as if it would bloom the dearest and solve Egypt’s food problem completely. Al-Da’wa, however, sought to set the record straight by publishing opinions of experts to point out that the project was simply not feasible. It titled the survey: “Those who sell the illusion”, and said that it was possible that such a project did not exist at all.

The Brotherhood took the Government to task on other economic and social Maulanaissues as Azad well, particularly Library, after its relationsAligarh with the Muslim government wereUniversity strained. In March 1981, under the title “Worries of an Egyptian citizen”, Muhammad Abdel Qudous, a prominent member of the Brotherhood and a regular columnist of al-Da’wa, complained of youth planning to marry could not afford a suitable accommodation; housing has so far beyond the reach of common lived in ramshackle houses; conditions of service and health sectors had worsened; education was mismanaged, 96

and graduates were under-employed; the media were “debased” by the State; women took up jobs in preference to concentrating on bringing up their children, which was their real profession. After this litany of complaints, the author commented that lack of moral values and distance from religion were the reasons for common man’s problems. A return to religion and its moral values was ‘the only remedy for all these problems. Had a truly Islamic order been accomplished, “many of the difficulties would have been different automatically”. The main features of this Islamic order were: “Servitude to the God, work, social solidarity, struggle for lawful profit and avoidance of corruption and sabotaging” (Bari, 1995:37).

The state’s role is to encourage economic productivity and, despite privatization as a general rule, to own and manage some enterprises that should necessarily remain in the public domain. Citing the program of the 1987 tripartite electoral alliance (Muslim Brotherhood, Labor, and the Liberal parties). Ann Lesch identifies the following as the Islamists’ requirements for economic development:

1. Shrinking the government bureaucracy and public sector;

2. Official adherence to standards of high productivity;

3. The private sector as the backbone of the economy;

4. A non-interest bearing banking system;

5. Zakat; and

6. Independence from foreign economic intervention.

In this latter concern, the Brotherhood hopes to promote integration of the Egyptian economy with other Muslim economies as an alternative to the present reliance on, and interference with, “foreigners from the West.”

Maulana Although Azad much Library, of the Brotherhood Aligarh’s economic Muslim framework has University been identified as compared to the economic thought of socialism, the Brotherhood’s respect for private property and insistence on downsizing the public sector make their platform notably different. Significantly, the Brotherhood did not oppose Anwar Sadat’s plans to privatize the Egyptian economy through the policy of Infitah, having become 97

wealthy through foreign connections and the establishment of lucrative economic enterprises in Egypt.

The economic principles advocated by the Brotherhood are, as Lesch notes, at ends in themselves. “They ideally would lead to the creation of a harmonious Islamic society in which the upper class would not exploit the poor, the manager would not oppress the worker, and the profit would be tempered by piety and good works” (Quoted in Kotob, 1995:327). The goal of social justice is thus part of the overall objective of establishing an Islamic society, governed in its totality by Islamic precepts.

Much of the reform program advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood was beyond its institutional capacity to do more than talk about. However, efforts were made in the fields of ‘industrial’ enterprise and labor activity to demonstrate the possibility of an Islamic approach to economic affairs. In its ‘industrial’ and commercial operations, the organization sought not only to demonstrate the viability of ‘Islamic economic theory’, but also to provide itself and the memberships with profitable earnings. In its labor activity, the organization sought not only to demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of harmonious labor-management relations within an Islamic framework, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to establish itself as the spokesman for the needs and expectations of the vast and inarticulate body an Egyptian labor, a fact of great significance in its claims to authority on the Egyptian scene.

The original purpose of the Muslim Brotherhood organization’s business enterprises was the development of the national economy. Banna was not the originator of the policy; when it was first put into effect he was, in fact, making distinctions, interesting in the light of later ideological developments, between economic activity and the Muslim Brothers’ program. ‘The message’, he observed, ‘was one thing and finance and economics another.’ He did, however, go along with Maulanathe idea asAzad a means notLibrary, only to contribute Aligarh to the national Muslim wealth, but also University to destroy the control of foreigners over the economy.

Foreigners, in the first instance and in a non-economic sense, meant missionaries; the original inspiration for the organization’s enterprises was in reply to missionary activity. One case of conversion in which it interested it appeared to have 98

come about from economic motives. The organization thereupon organized a ‘workhouse-school’ (mashghal) for women in an effort to provide some means of livelihood for the destitute of the area involved. Similar attempts were made on a local basis as the organization grew, but all remained local and ineffective ventures. The larger enterprises followed the rise to fame on the Cairo scene (Mitchell, 1969:254).

In 1938 the organization embarked on its first major venture, the founding of the Company for Islamic Transactions (sharikat al-mu’amalat al-islamiyya). The original announcement declared the company to be an attempt to provide the means to gain within the framework of Islamic principles. Initial capitalization was to be £4,000 divided into 1,000 shares of £4 each; the stock could be purchased in one payment or over a period of time not to exceed forty months at a minimum of PT 10 monthly. Management was to be in the hands of a board of directors composed of a chairman, treasurer, and seven other members; members of the board had to have at least five shares in the company, and the chairman and treasurer at least ten. The organization was to take 2.5 per cent of the capital and profit of the company annually for purposes of zakat. The company was to embark on ‘investment activity’ when the funds became available for sale of stock, buying at ‘wholesale prices’ in accordance with the ‘requirements of the Brothers’ and selling at ‘appropriate prices’. The profit would be distributed annually on the following schedule: 10 percent for directors’ fees; 20 percent of the reserve fund; and 50 per cent of the shareholders, paid for their initial purchase of stock.

The first sale of stock was rapidly completed and the company expanded from its initial capital value of £E 4,000 to £E 20,000 in 1945; in 1946, a new issue of stock was advertised which was to increase the capital to £E 30,000. In 1947 the company was combined with other enterprise called the Arabic Company for Mines and Quarries (al-sharikat al-’arabiyya li’l-manajim wa’l-mahajir) which had a capital value of £E 60,000 (Mitchell, 1969:220). The various activities of the two groups included Maulanamoving andAzad trucking Library,, automotive repairs Aligarh, and the production Muslim of cement University, tiles, and gas- cooking equipment. In 1947 the quarrying end of the merger decided to modernize traditional techniques and placed orders in Europe for equipment for cutting and polishing marble. The deteriorated during the crisis of 1948 which brought an end to 99

the economic activity of the organization; after its return to legality in 1950, the organization sued the government for its losses.

A larger enterprise, earlier in inspiration, but later in fruition, was the organization’s printing press. It will be recalled that the second general conference of the Brothers authorized a small company for the establishment of a press. During the pre-war period the venture failed to achieve either continuity or permanence, largely, it would seem, because of inefficient distribution. The growth of the organization in the war years, however, changed the situation and in the post-war years the enterprise flourished. In 1945 publishing operations were separated from press operations and two separate limited companies founded: The Brothers’ Printing Company (sharikat al-Ikhwan li’l-tiba’a) and the Brothers’ Journalistic Company (sharikat al-Ikhwan li’l- sihafa), initially capitalized at £E 70,000 and £E 50,000 respectively (Mitchell, 1969:221-225). The Journalistic Company was irresponsible for producing the organization’s daily founded in 1946, which provided it with a firm economic basis; the Publishing Company, on the other hand, was hampered by lack of equipment, which was ordered from abroad, but which did not arrive in quantity before the 1948 dissolution of the organization and the curtailment of its multiple economic activities.

The success of the Journalistic Company was apparently related to the establishment of the Arabic Advertising Company (sharikat al-i-’lanat al-’arabiyya) in 1947. Heyworth-Dunne reports its capital to be a reputed £ E 100,000 and sees the company as a ‘rival to the Societe Orientale de Publicite’, a fact which he relates to violence inflicted on the latter in 1948 (Heyworth-Dunne, 1968:65). The Brothers’ company included in its operations newspaper and cinema advertising, covers for books and magazines, and sign-painting for business establishments. There seems to have been little doubt among the Brothers’ that this was the largest and most successful of their undertakings. Maulana In Azad an effort Library, to come to terms Aligarh with the seriousMuslim post-war University unemployment problems, the organization embarked on a program of small industry. This included the Muslim Brothers’ company for Spinning and Weaving (sharikat al-Ikhwan al- Muslimin li’l-ghazl wa’l-tansikh), which was founded in 1947 with a capital of £ E 8,000, of which £ E 6,500 had been subscribed when it began operations. All the workers in the company were shareholders. The company claimed to have spent in its 100

first ten months of operations £ E 2,700 in salaries to sixty workers (or almost half its initial capital) and concluded the period with a profit of £ E 1,400. The organization took much pride in this company, advertising it as an effort to ‘revive Islamic socialism’, ‘liberate the national economy’, and ‘rise the level of the Egyptian workers’. Its factory was in the Shubra al-Khayma industrial quarter of Cairo, the scene of the great labor depression and unrest of the early post-war years. Most of its stocks were sold through the Shubra branch of the Muslim Brothers as well as through the labor section at the general headquarters.

In Alexandria the organization founded the Company for Commercial and Engineering Works (sharikat al-tijara wa’l-ashghal al-handasa) which concerned itself with the construction of buildings, the production of construction materials, and the training of workers in such trades as plumbing, electricity, and carpentry. The company was capitalized at £ E 14,000 divided into 3,500 shares. Another company founded in Suez as the Company of Commercial Agencies (sharikat al-tawkilat al- tijara) expanded largely into the fields of advertising and transport.

These enterprises never recovered from the blow dealt the organization in 1948, although their confiscation was repudiated by the Council of State in the case brought by the organization in 1950 and 1951. A committee was appointed in 1952 to make an effort to revalue the stocks of the various companies in the light of the losses and depreciation of equipment since 1948, but nothing was concluded before the new dissolutions of the organization in 1954. Only one new venture had been established between 1952 and 1954; it seemed to be prospering. In 1952 the Commercial Company (sharikat al-tijara) was founded at al-Mahalla al-Kubra; by the end of the year it had sold £ E 8,000 of the Capital stock and by February 1953 was advertising to increase its capital to £ E 25,000. The company produced textiles, household goods, clothing --- ready-made men’s clothing and accessories, including ties and scarves --- notions, office and school supplies, and electrical equipment. It was confiscated with Maulanaall other Azadassets of the Library, organization in 1954.Aligarh Muslim University

Social Program

With respect to social program, the Brotherhood is often criticized for having formulated a detailed program of reforms. The group does, however, advance broad 101

goals for the rectification of Egypt’s social decline and low standards of living of the population. Uppermost in the current writings of the Brethren is the importance of social justice as a foundation of the Islamic political system. In their references to this ideal the Brotherhood emphasizes that a society based on Islamic precepts would necessarily promote social security for all citizens, narrow the social gap between classes, undertake welfare spending to assist those to need, encourage social solidarity among citizens, respect private property, and enforce the requisite that each able- bodied person must be economically productive. Their social program makes both the individual and the state active participants in the pursuit of social justice. It is incumbent upon every able individual to earn and contribute to the economic system. It is also the responsibility of such individuals to alleviate the suffering of others by practicing the Islamic principle of zakat (alms-giving). Muslims are thus mutually responsible for one another.

In his early reform program Banna made public health an important part of social reform concentrating especially on the dissemination of information and the increase of facilities and personnel to tackle the vast national health problem. The organization’s program of action adopted the same approach.

The first organizational groups used to disseminate hygiene knowledge and bring medical care to the countryside where the rovers. Local rover units undertook the actual work of cleaning up the streets and alleys of the villages, encouraged villagers to use in hospitals and clinics and provided simple first aid. These activities were part of a general ‘social program’ established for the rovers in 1943 in revulsion against the fifth and the sanitation and health problems of the mass of Egyptians, rural and urban. Although this kind of activity gradually passed to the medical section of the organization, the rovers continued to be a useful medium for dealing with the medical problems of the villages. It will also be recalled that Banna offered the services of the rover groups to the ministry of health during the epidemics of 1945 and 1947 to serve Maulanain the stricken Azad areas whereLibrary, needed. Aligarh Muslim University

This largely educational program of the organization was augmented in November 1944 by the establishment of a ‘medical section’ by the doctors in the organization. Its objectives were defined as the establishment of dispensaries, clinics, and hospitals, the intensity of the program for ‘spreading the message of hygiene’ and 102

the ‘raising of the health level of all classes’ by all means available. The first dispensary was opened at that time in the offices of the leading doctor member (Muhammad Ahmad Sulayman), and within a month it was transferred to the Organization’s headquarters. In 1946 the clinic moved to its own building near the headquarters and added to itself a pharmacy headed by a registered pharmacist. This clinic, which soon professed to be a small hospital, claimed to have treated 21,677 patients in 1945, 29,039 in 1946, and 51,300 in 1947. From the time of its opening smaller clinics were started wherever possible, and in 1948 the medical section had an annual budget of £ E 23,000.

While most of the equipment and material of the clinics and dispensaries was confiscated in 1948, activity was resumed in 1950. In 1953 it was claimed that each province of Egypt had at least one dispensary and that sixteen clinics in Cairo had treated over 100,000 patients. In January 1954 the government of the revolution formally took over all the clinics then operating; what has happened to them since is not clear.

In its social-reform program, the organization’s greatest activity was in the field of education. Greater emphasis on recruitment of teachers and students was quite naturally linked to the view that in their hands by ‘the future of culture in Egypt’. This was more than an assessment of a natural future; it also envisaged the nation’s historic and cultural identity and destiny. Qutb puts it thus:

No renaissance of Islamic life can be effected purely by the law or statute, or by the establishment of a social system on the basis of the Islamic philosophy. Such a step is only one of the two pillars on which Islam must always stand in its construction of life. The other is a production of a state of mind imbued with the Islamic theory, to give permanence to external forces leading to this form of life and to give coherence to all the social, religious, and civil legislation. . ..

MaulanaAnd the naturalAzad method Library, of establishing Aligarh that philosophy Muslim is by education. University What caused the organization must concern was the secularization and fragmentation of the school system of Egypt, the low educational standard, and the lack of educational opportunity. It tackled these problems by (1) propaganda and agitation for reform of the existing school system, and (2) the founding of 103

supplementary or alternative education facilities. Perhaps in no other field except politics was the organization more persist in the pursuit of its aims.

In 1938 the minister of education, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, proposed to the rector of the Azhar a program for uniting religious and secular education. The Brothers joined in the ensuing public debate; a letter to the minister of education stated, the views of the organization, which in essence summarized the kind of argument thenceforth made on this issue. The introduction of Western secular education, contended Banna, alongside the traditional Azhar-type education had created formidable conflicts between the two groups, a situation dangerous for a nation seeking ‘rebirth’, since the greatest need was a ‘unity of culture’; the path taken by Iran and Turkey which was advocated by the secularists was not for Egypt because of the indestructible bond between Islam and Egypt. ‘Religious people’ are misguided in thinking that they will be done with the evils of secularism by ignoring it; secularism will be conquered only by the mastery of the fields of ‘science and learning’.

Banna therefore suggested that education should be neither purely Islamic nor purely secular (i.e. Western), but should harmoniously blend religious character and moral training with scientific training. The syllabus should be consistent and balanced in its parts. Kindergarten education should be related to the ‘child’s perception’ and his ‘emotional needs’. In the primary schools no foreign languages should be taught, but only the ‘language of the nation’, an emphasis to be supplemented by character training. The secondary schools would teach two foreign languages (one Western and one Eastern), Islamic history, ‘patriotism’, and related subjects; they would also lay the foundation for future ‘technical, specialized, or teacher-training schools’. Higher training would be in the Azhar or Egyptian universities with similar general courses in subjects related to Islam and history so far as these could be fitted in with the student’s other non-religious academic needs. The Azhar would be expanded and developed in the areas of ‘research, criticism, writing, composition . . ., and Islamic sciences’. MaulanaStudying Azad the Qur’an Library, would depend onAligarh the student’s Muslim specialization; aUniversity student in arts and Islamic studies in higher learning would be required to know the whole of it. Non- Muslims would deal with selected parts of their own religious literature.

These suggestions were important, not as a ‘program’ for Egyptian schools --- but rather as another reflection of the organization never thought out the issues in such 104

specific detail --- but rather as another reflection of the deeply felt national disunity, not only or even primarily on a political level but on a cultural one.

Political program

The first and most important of the political reform measures was the reform of the constitution. Banna’s conception of constitutional reform was embodied in the slogan his followers shouted: ‘The Qur’an is our constitution’; this indicated his undifferentiated approach to law and politics, for when listing political reform program, he called for the ‘reform of the law’ in general so as to harmonize it with the Shari’a. After him, reform programs announced by the organization tackled the issue of legal reform less directly, apparently assuming that conformity with the Shari’a would emerge automatically from effecting specific reform measures in all areas of Muslim Brothers. Political reform, as such, was seen as a specific issue and in slightly more secular terms. Thus the Egyptian constitution was intolerable because it was the product of ‘the age of English imperialism’ and of ‘political tyranny’; the ‘gaps’ left in it because of this made it appear to be ‘a grant from the king and not derived from the will of the nation (Umma)’. The time had come (August 1952) to call a convention to draft a new constitution, which would be ‘an expression of the faith of the nation, its will and its desires, and a shield for the protection of its interests’; its ‘principles should derive from the principles of Islam . . . in all matters of life without exception’. Such a constitution would enunciate the fundamental principle that the ruler and ruled alike were equally responsible before the law for all behavior.

Political reform would lead to the reform of parliamentary life. From the beginning of Egypt’s parliamentary life, Egyptians have known neither ‘fit nor genuine representation’; corrupted parliaments have been impotent expressions not of the popular will but of party intrigue and monarchial will. Genuine parliamentary reform will come with the abolition of political parties; the parliament, during the Maulanaperiod ofAzad ‘partyism ’Library, (hizbiyya) has beenAligarh little more Muslim than ‘a device whichUniversity has given legality to the appetites of the rulers and the tyrannies of authority’. Parties are not necessary for a representative form of government; democracy requires only that there be guarantees of freedom of opinion and the participation of the nation in government. Without ‘partyism’, parliamentary life is perfectly compatible with the teaching of 105

Islam; further, because parties create ‘disunity’ in the nation, they are incompatible with Islam. Banna expressed what was later only implied: the abolition of political parties should be followed by the creation of a single party with an ‘Islamic reform program’.

Suggestions for the political reform included:

1. “The people are the source of authority for all branches of government in the country. No person or party, group or organization has the right to claim exclusive authority unless it derives from the people by their free will.” Note that this section openly challenges Sayyid Qutb and his school of thought, which deemed Allah to be the sole source of authority (in the sense of hakimiya or divine sovereignty) and held that this role could not be delegated to other sources. This is done purposely to block any freedom --- oriented issue to defame or insult religious and holy texts.

2. “A commitment to respect the principle of replacing the party in power by means of free and honest election.”

3. “A guaranteed of freedom of conscience.”

4. “A guarantee of freedom of religion for all recognized religions” (meaning the monotheistic faiths: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism).

5. A guarantee of freedom of expression: “Freedom of expression must be guaranteed as part of the general order and norms and according to the basic principles of society --- guaranteeing freedom of the press and property as the way to achieve freedom of expression.” The freedom of expression that the Muslim Brotherhood proposed was limited: this freedom must take account of society’s basic principles --- but the Brotherhood did not define these Maulanaprinciples. Azad However Library,, it is clear Aligarh that it refers to Muslim the Egyptian society University’s religious principles, thereby restricting freedom of expression and setting basic principles and general norms of society, whether traditional or religious, beyond the pale. 106

6. A guarantee of freedom of political organization, including the establishment of parties, and denial to any authority or agency the power to interfere in a way that would obstruct or limit this right: “The independent judicial system is the only agency of government entitled to determine which organizations are opposed to the general order and norms and to the basic principles of society.” This point is significant for the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime’s refusal to recognize the Brotherhood as a political party, starting in the Nasser era, was one of the main factors that stymied the movement’s political development and kept it from becoming a viable political alternative to the ruling party.

7. A guarantee of freedom of assembly and of individuals’ rights to participate in community activities, as long as they keep the peace and national harmony and security.

8. A guarantee of freedom of nonviolent demonstration and protest.

9. A guarantee of the right of popular representation through a freely elected parliament, with a fixed term, and its replacement through free elections. Election laws must assure free and honest elections while ensuring the state’s neutrality. The most efficient type of regime in the state and society is a parliamentary regime, which gives the party that received the most or majority votes’ responsibility for forming the government and running the country. Note that the Muslim Brotherhood focused on parliament and the cabinet and did not mention the presidency; in other words, they preferred not to clash with this institution. This can be interpreted in one of two ways: first that the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to stay as far away as possible from any conflict with President Mubarak, at least for the time being, and hence declared that its maximum political aspiration was to form a government, which would deal primarily with domestic issues. The movement was not interested in running a Maulanacandidate Azad forLibrary, president. According Aligarh to theMuslim second interpretati Universityon, the Brotherhood was interested in a genuine parliamentary regime in which the president has only limited powers. The presidency is mentioned later in the platform, albeit in very general terms. 107

10. Limitation of the power held by the president of the republic, which would turn him into a symbol for all of the Egyptians: the president would not be the head of a political party and would not have any executive responsibilities. He would be limited to two terms in office. This section is very general and insufficiently detailed to reveal the Brotherhood’s true view of where the presidency should fit in the Egyptian regime. The movement, though, did state its preference for a president who would not be associated with any political party. This notion was compatible with that of part of the Egyptian elite, who wanted to run a famous Egyptian who were associated with political parties as presidential candidates. Through this proposal, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to neutralize the president’s links with ruling party and turn the presidency into a symbolic --- rather than executive --- institution.

11. Removing the military from politics to enable it to focus on defending the country and to keep the government from exploiting the military, directly or indirectly, in order to tighten its control of society. The Minister of Defense would be a civilian politician like every other government minister. This is vital in the Muslim Brotherhood political thoughts to avoid a military coup in the future and to avoid any military role in politics.

12. The police and security forces would be obligated to play civilian roles, as prescribed by law, and to limit their role in defending the security of society and state --- not to take advantage of it in order to maintain the regime’s dominance or to suppress the opposition forces. They would not be allowed to intervene in public activities or elections. They would stand on equal footing and equal distance from all political forces.

13. Repeal of undemocratic laws, such as the Political Parties Law, the state-of- emergency regulations, the Trade Union Law, and the Press Law. The Maulanamovement Azad sufferedLibrary, primarily Aligarh from the first Muslim three laws, which University limited its activities in all of its foci of power, especially the Trade Unions Law and the law that prevented it from becoming a legal political party.

14. Release of political prisoners and an end to the use of torture by the police and the security forces. 108

Later, the Brotherhood began to take up other causes; among these in the 1930s was that of the Palestinians, which resulted in a spread of its influence into Syria, Transjordan, and to a lesser degree, Lebanon. While the Brotherhood continued its educational, social, economic and religious activities, it became increasingly concerned with, and an influential factor in the political life of Egypt.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT: NASSER AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 109

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT: NASSER AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

After World War II, socialism gained widespread popularity in the Third World. Nationalists of all persuasions were quick to adopt current socialist slogans and formulate grandiose programs. Although most socialist ideologues were not based primarily on Marxism or any other intellectual system. Rather, they were more a reaction against the Western private enterprise system and commercial domination. Socialist programs called for an end to the gross income disparities in society. The misery of the masses was apparent enough, and the cause of their misery was attributed to the selfishness of the local elites, who were allies of the imperialists. As young intellectuals and technical specialists absorbed these ideas, nationalist movements began to gather momentum. Broad-based nationalist parties, then attempted to draw in the masses, especially those in cities, who were more sophisticated than those in rural areas.

The situation in Egypt after World War II reflected these trends. When the British resisted the Egyptian government’s demands for a troop withdrawal and a renegotiation of the 1936 treaty, popular sentiment erupted into major riots in Cairo. The situation was complicated by the desperate economic conditions and the failure of the Egyptian army to prevent the formation of the state of Israel, which many Egyptians regarded as another outpost of Western imperialism. On January 26, 1952, a month after forty-three Egyptian policemen had been killed in a pitched battle with British troops in Ismailia, rampaging masses burned many Western-owned buildings in Cairo. Six months later, on July 23, 1952, a group of young army officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, and Muhammad Neguib, staged an almost Maulanabloodless Azad coup and forcedLibrary, King Farouk Aligarh to abdicate andMuslim leave Egypt Universitythree days later. The monarchy was abolished the following June.

Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged in 1954 as the leader of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the name adopted by the Free Officers after taking power. Three years after the revolution, he wrote of his disillusionment that a new social order 110

based on equality and justice would evolve naturally. It became clear to him that the various groups competing to influence the reordering of Egypt generally were concerned with enhancing their own well-being without much regard for truly national concerns: he perceived them as attempting to change the actors in the political and economic hierarchy without changing the structure. He believed, therefore, that Egypt needed a transition phase between the old order and the new; he called this transition the “Guided Democracy,” and the RCC was to be its guide.

The defense of the soldiers’ revolution --- and soon Nasser’s personal rule --- was linked to a change of regime. But the new political organizations like the Liberation Rally were not intended to broaden the movement’s popularity base. Nasser was more interested in creating a vehicle through which he could forestall political agitation by rival groups such as the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, on 23 February 1953 he warned those who thought the army coup aimed merely at overthrowing the monarchy:

This aim is a major objective compared to the wider aims of our revolution. The latter seeks to change the political system for the benefit of the people. It is therefore necessary to defend the revolution against those who try to deter it from its course and prevent it from attaining its ultimate goals (Vatikiotis, 1978:174).

Once they had dissolved all the old political parties, the military regime could use their new political organizations as pens to marshal the populace. That the purpose of the Liberation Rally, for example, was one of regimentation was asserted by Major Salah Salem --- the bluntest member of the RCC --- when on 11 April 1953 he told an audience at Mit Ghamr, “We did not come to you for votes, because we do not aspire to rule or to become members of parliament. We came to seek your co-operation and unity (Najjar, 1968:183-99). This policy enabled the military regime to clear trade unions, student organizations and professional associations of antagonistic elements. MaulanaThe pattern Azad became clearLibrary, when Nasser Aligarh formed his first Muslim Cabinet in April University 1954. The key Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, for instance, went to a member of the Free Officer inner circle, Kamal el-Din Hussein. He systematically purged all trade unions and labor organizations of opposition elements. He performed the same task among student organizations after he became Minister of Education in June 1956. 111

The tediously elaborate structures of the National Union after 1956 (Vatikiotis, 1978:175) and the ASU55 after 1962 attest to the complex arrangements for Nasser’s control. These organizations may be considered to have been schemes that facilitated hid guidance of a public autocratically governed by him. At the same time, they checked those who might otherwise have conspired against his regime. Integration --- the elimination of factionalism --- was the purpose of the exercise. Needless to say, factionalism was inevitable, but only within the confines of Nasser’s power cliques.

The Communists, for example, had been neutralized by 1964. Their bedraggled remnants who emerged from concentration camps and prisons were absorbed in the bureaucracy, the media and the press. The combination of state repression and Soviet support for the Nasser regime left the Communists no alternative but to survive as best they could on Nasser’s terms. A proliferation of magazines and journals during those years and an expanded Ahram establishment headed by Nasser’s confidant, Heikal, dispersed them in their editorial and administrative posts (Kerr, 1962:127-44). Nasser’s regime could now speak with several voices, ranging from the right to the left. Coexistence between the Communists and Nasser did not however preclude the occasional reminder type of arrest of both rightists and leftists, as in fact occurred in 1966.

The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, though at bay, exploded again in the summer of 1965. They constituted enough of a serious danger for Nasser to arrest several thousands of them, and to try to execute their leading ideologue, Sayyid Qutb.56 Nevertheless, they remained a dangerous source of sedition in the armed forces.

A certain amount of superficial debate, confrontation and opposition were allowed periodically in the National Assembly, the ASU and the media. But this confined its targets mainly to the sins of a top-heavy bureaucracy. It hardly questioned MaulanaNasser’s Azad own conduct Library, in office, or soughtAligarh to limit hisMuslim power and render University it publicly accountable. Nor did it contemplate putting up alternatives to his regime.

55 For the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), See Appendix pp. 261-262

56 For Sayyid Qutb's thought and writing. See Appendix pp. 267-270 112

The Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood were periodically fought by the coercion of a repressive security and intelligence service. The prospect of the only credible opposition to Nasser regime lay in the armed forces. Paradoxically --- perhaps naturally --- this was not forthcoming, so long as the army remained the regime’s only genuine constituency and main source of support precisely because of the privileges it --- and particularly the military ruling caste controlling it --- came to enjoy under the regime.

There was no doubt in admitting that Nasser reshaped Egypt’s political structure. That he overthrew an earlier governing elite and political class which controlled the state was also not in doubt. Though agrarian reforms, nationalization and industrialization he affected a choice for the transformation of Egyptian society and its economy, and permitted the emergence of a substitute governing elite and ruling class.

On the other hand, there was no evidence of Nasser favoring a wider public participation in the formulation of policy, the making of decisions, or the questioning of either; that is, calling the regime to account. He did of course shift the balance of power in favor of those groups in society that worked for him, for the retention of his power and personal rule --- the so-called “new classes”. These, however, came mainly from his relatively reliable constituency, the army. But he failed to create cadres for a new political order that could also exercise initiative in public policy, in spite of repeated attempts to do so and to mobilize independent support from the masses. Instead, he occasionally had to inoculate their inertia and total dependence with a dose of his charismatic and imperious leadership. In short, he chose, in the end, to take over an existing state structure, abolish its as yet inexperienced institutional underpinnings for limitation and accountability, and fashion it to his own purposes.

Consequently, all efforts to organize political institutions for the regime were partly frustrated by his privileged lieutenants with whom he had to rely for his Maulanapersonal Azad rule. The Library,“scientific socialism Aligarh” of the 1962 Muslim Charter57 did University not mean in practice the further secularization of society and public endeavors. The Islamic dimension of Egypt’s choices in the public domain persisted (Hamza, 1961:57). Arab

57 The National Charter was made public on May 1962. This document embodied a nationalist socialist doctrine and outlines the broad courses of action for the revolution. It provides the Egyptian with a long-sought, ego-enhancing identity. 113

socialism stubbornly rejected class notions regarding Egyptian or Arab society in the name of national unity and in order to retain control over any change. The conditions for the army’s supremacy in politics remained for national unity, a sort of integrative ideology, and an avoidance of pluralistic voluntarism.

If Egypt’s political revolution at mid-century consisted essentially of her emancipation from foreign rule, national unity was the minimum ideological requirement. Later, though, the social and economic revolution under the autocracy of a charismatic leader required the exclusion of Egyptians --- except for the new privileged military class --- from all meaningful political activity, group interests and other differences could not be allowed to express themselves. The revolution had been decreed from the top, above this rigid, regimented heap of national unity. Hence it could not easily succeed.

The most serious threat to Nasser’s position came from his friend and closest colleague, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer on 11 June 1967, the day after Nasser had gone back on his resignation from the presidency. Amer, it is reported, resented Nasser’s attempt to lay the blame for the defeat of Egyptian arms in the June War on him, and sought to make a show of force if only to restore his position and prestige, not in order to oust Nasser. Typically, other officers and state officials implicated in the affair were close to Amer, or had worked in his office: Salah Nasr, Abbas Radwan, and Shams Badran, the commanders of the “Saiqa” Parachute Commando Regiment (Galal al-Hureidi) and of the Inshass Air Base (Tahsin Zaki). Badran, for his part, tried to gather military academy graduates of his 1948 class to aid the conspiracy (Vatikiotis, 1978:177).

Within six months of weathering this most dangerous challenge to his position, Nasser had reorganized the High Command of the armed forces by making himself MaulanaCommander Azad-in-Chief Library,, appointing General Aligarh Muhammad Muslim Fawzi Minister University of War and creating a National Security Council over which he presided. He assumed control over all military promotions to the rank of colonel or higher. He announced a new Cabinet on 20 March 1968 in which only Hussein Shafei of the old RCC members remained as Vice-President and Minister of Waqfs. Ali Sabri was made Secretary of the ASU. 114

Members of a new cabal organized within the ASU were also prominent among the new Ministers. Zakariyya Mohieddin resigned as Vice-President.

For the next ten days, Heikal in his Ahram leaders prepared the way for Nasser’s famous Manifesto of 30 March, “Mandate for Change”. He wrote of the need for a new generation to take over from the old bureaucrats in the center of power and their civilian followers. He complained that the most powerful army clique was in the Mukhabarat. Its villainy had deadened society; its members had been overtaken by events and could no longer seriously lead the revolution. It was time for a change. Proposals for strengthening civil liberties flowed from Heikal’s pen. Thanks to the immense popular support expressed to the President in the demonstrations of 9-10 June 1967, Heikal mused, “we were able to liquidate the centers of power that had grown up in the regime” (Quoted in Vatikiotis, 1976:123).

Nasser now introduced elections for membership to the ASU Higher Executive Committee, relinquishing his prerogative of appointing members. In early October eight members had been elected, three of whom were well-known Free Officers: Ali Sabri, Anwar Sadat and Hussein Shafei. The Central Committee, however, was formed of 148 members in addition to Nasser, after a referendum on the 30 March Manifesto in May. A concerted propaganda campaign led by Nasser assisted by Heikal in the Ahram throughout this period referred to the four revolutions, 1945-52, 1952-6, 1961- 2, and the new one in 9-10 June 1967. The demonstrations in Nasser’s favor were now considered to constitute a popular revolution, to which Nasser responded with a reorganization of the regime, based on the wider involvement of the new generation and greater civil liberty.

Further developments in this direction, however, were so complex and cumbersome that it was hardly fair to expect public enthusiasm for the intricate, multi- Maulanastage process Azad of elections. Library, A temporary Aligarh committee Muslim to supervise the University elections was announced on 22 May, over whose deliberations Nasser presided from an elevated dais. The four stages of elections for some 7,500 committees and units of the ASU at various levels were set for 25 June and 4, 6 and 8 July. 115

All this furious activity was accompanied by the usual slogans, posing and empty gesturing. Thus, on 4 June 1968 the armed forces declared 5 June a day of mourning. A new National Defense Force militia was launched, yet again. More meaningful, presumably, was the organization of a National Defense Council in November 1968.

Meanwhile a worse eruption of student troubles occurred in Alexandria and Mansura in early November. There were severe clashes between demonstrating students and security forces resulting in several deaths and scores of injuries. Leaflets prepared by students setting out their grievances were distributed. Later in the month there were more dangerous developments. Teachers’ colleges and religious institutes demonstrated against the regulations of the Ministry of Education, and the troubles spread to secondary and vocational training schools. The three days 23-25 November saw the worst period of the disturbances centered in the Engineering Faculty of Alexandria University. Soon the trouble spread to Cairo University. Charges against agents provocateurs, including a certain Muhammad Mahmud el-Haddad, who was branded an Israeli spy, were announced by the government. There were wide arrests in October and November, and the meeting of an extraordinary National Congress on 27 November to deal with the grave situation.

Heikal in the meantime, continued to criticize the old ASU leadership in his newspaper, whereas Nasser prepared for the selection of nominees to stand in the National Assembly elections on 9 January 1969. Talk of an “open society” and fortification of the home front against the Israeli menace continued while Nasser proceeded to strengthen his parallel secret organization to the National Assembly. A special secret organization in the ASU was formed in various parts of Cairo at least, as for example the one for Kasr el Nil headed by Minister of Information Muhammad Faiq. The problem of restless, troublesome students continued to plague the regime on and off for a few more months. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Nasser’s rule and political style are best illustrated in the occasions when he has had to make certain perfunctory political concessions to the public. A quick recapitulation of his attempts to construct a national political base suggests that their motivation arose from a reaction to other difficulties, some economic, other political. Although the implementation of the provisions of the 1956 constitution was delayed 116

by the Suez crisis.58 In May 1957, he appointed an executive committee consisting of trusted colleagues --- Abdel Hakim Amer, Zakariyya Mohieddin (Minister of Interior) and Abdel Latif Boghdadi (Minister of Economic Planning) --- to screen some 2,500 candidates for election to the 350-seat proposed National Assembly the following July under the National Union. Half of the candidates were rejected as unsuitable or unacceptable.

Even though the features of the new political arrangement included compulsory voting and suffrage for women, candidates still needed to find a £E 50 deposit and had to be literate. In any case, nominations in the final analysis was a gift in the hands of the supreme autocrat. The National Assembly, which held its opening session on 22 July 1957, was therefore hand-picked and tightly controlled by Nasser. Except for minor criticisms of routine bureaucratic problems, it might mainly to approve government (that is, Nasser’s) decisions. It’s one attempt to force an investigation of the Liberation Province, or the suspect activities of its director (Magdi Hasanein, a Free Officers) was resented by Nasser, and he sought to influence the proceedings of the Assembly (Kerr, 1962:144). All the same, the National Union’s secretary-general, Anwar Sadat, declared in November 1957 that its aim was the “creation of a socialist, democratic, co-operative society free of all political, social and economic exploitation”.

The life of the Assembly elected under the National Union scheme was, however, short. In March 1958, it was dissolved when Syria united with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). The details of the new arrangements for the National Union though should not detain us here. Suffice it to note that they were such as to facilitate the extension of Cairo’s, or Nasser’s, control over Syria too (Seale, 1965:67). This development in itself was one of the main reasons for the dissension in 1959 between the leaders of the Syrian Ba’th party that had originally pressed for

58 The Suez Crisis was provoked by an American and British decision not to finance Egypt's Maulanaconstruction Azad of the Library,Aswan High Dam, asAligarh they had promised, Muslim in response to Egypt'sUniversity growing ties with communist Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Nasser reacted to the American and British decisions by declaring martial law in the canal Zane and seizing control of the Suez Canal Company, predicting that the tolls collected from ships passing through the canal would pay for the dam's construction within five years. An invasion of Egypt in late 1956 by Israel, followed by Britain and France. The aims were to regain Western control of the Suez Canal and to remove Egyptian President Nasser from power. After the fighting had started, the US, the Soviet Union and the UN forced the three invaders to withdraw. The episode humiliated Great Britain and France and strengthened Nasser. 117

union with Egypt and Nasser. It led to the resignation of Salah el Din-Bitar from the UAR government, and accelerated the collapse of the Ba’th’s civilian leadership and the Syrian military’s control of the party.

However, the 1962 National Charter and the ASU, the political organization, it provided for, were in a way a direct consequence of the Syrian secession in September 1961. With the loss of the other partner, Syria, in the union, a major shake-up of administration and political arrangements was inevitable. In fact, the Syrian affair caused the first serious rift between Nasser and some of his closest associates, members of the original Free Officers conspiracy, particularly Field Marshal Amer, who had served as Egyptian pro-consul and special envoy of the President in Damascus. Possibly his gauleiter role in Syria partly accounted for Syrian disillusionment, resentment and ultimate succession. Moreover, elements that surfaced as prominent forces in the Damascus secession coup were considered by Nasser as representing the old notables, financial and commercial interests in Syria. These of course --- as much as those in Egypt --- had reacted sharply to Nasser’s socialist decrees of July 1961 which, among other things, further reduced the limit of land ownership from 200 to 100 feddans. The more unacceptable was the fact that Nasser prepared and announced them without prior consultation with or discussion in the National Assembly.

It was logical, therefore for Nasser, in reacting to the Syrian secession --- in fact, the rejection of his rule --- to further tighten his control over an economy with yet another series of socialist decrees later that autumn (October). These paved the way and supplied the momentum for his National Charter the following May which, on paper at least, expressed his decision to travel down the road of socialism. But this too was an overspill of his resentment, feelings of insecurity and suspicion in the face of events in Damascus. He realized Egyptian questioned the hasty --- nay, instant --- union with Syria some four years earlier and could not afford a loss of prestige. A Maulanadrastic reorganizationAzad Library, of political arrangements Aligarh was Muslim necessary with University security as the foremost consideration.

The six weeks of debates over the National Charter in the National Congress of Popular Forces were perhaps the only ones of their kind throughout the life of the Nasser regime. They indicated the persistence of pockets of criticism and laid bare 118

widespread feelings of frustration and discontent. Nasser, however, never intended the openness of these debates to set the tone and style of any future political deliberative bodies. He cleverly allowed everyone to let off steam after the Syrian adventure. In doing so he had a clearer idea of public opinion trends, the mood of the country and, more significantly who or what groups were more likely to prove troublesome. The Congress all the same approved the Charter, unanimously by acclamation. In the end, it too was an occasion of “applause democracy” at its best.

The statutes for the ASU were announced in October, providing for some 7,500 units on all national and local levels, with over four million members. As in the case of the 1956 constitution, the implementation of the Charter had to be delayed because of the eventually abortive Tripartite Talks for Arab Unity with Syria and Iraq in the spring of 1963 (Riad, 1963:45). Elections for a new Assembly to meet on 23 July 1963 had to be postponed to November. Candidates for the 360 seats (350 elected, 10 appointed by the President), had to be over 30 years old and literate. Now, however, 50 per cent of them had to be workers and peasant farmers, a change from the earlier arrangements. Although the definition of a peasant and a worker was made clearer, it was difficult to see how the majority of these, who were illiterate, could qualify.

Typical of Nasser’s balancing act was the lifting of martial law when a provisional constitution was announced on 22 July 1963, the day before the new Assembly met. But on the following day he introduced emergency powers that allowed him the retention of overall control whatever happened under the new political arrangements. He also reorganized the government, abolishing the old Presidential Council of 1961 and replacing it with the appointment of seven Vice- Presidents, of which Amer was made the first. Ali Sabri was appointed Prime Minister and the newly elected Assembly duly proceeded to nominate Nasser to another six- year term for the presidency. The plebiscite held in March 1965 gave Nasser 99.99 per cent of the vote. Some might assume that the near unanimous election of Nasser was Maulanaan indication Azad of public Library, approval for Aligarh the new changes Muslim he had introduced University into the country’s political arrangements. More accurately, however, is the inference that very little had changed to shake his total control. Nasser rather weathered the lingering post-secession crisis and came out of it more or less unscathed. None of the specific grievances had really been dealt with. 119

On the economic front, Nasser regime exerted great effort to develop Egypt. His government’s interference in the economy generally increased, prompted mainly by welfare considerations. Regulation of trade and commerce expanded a pace. The state contribution to capital formation, especially in improving infrastructure, increased. The launching of an Industrial Bank indicated that the Egyptian authorities already recognized the need for economic growth in the industry if they were to create alternative opportunities for production and employment outside agriculture. Thus, public investment continued to be directed mainly into infrastructure in order to promote further private enterprise and attract foreign capital.

However, the exception was agrarian reform (Gadallah, 1962:35). The speed with which the Free Officers decreed and implemented land reform was due firstly to their commitment since the 1930s to redistribute land to landless peasants and work towards a more equitable distribution of income (Saab, 1966:81). But it was due even more to their immediate political need to destroy the economic power of the land- based elite, consisting of big landowner who were the members as well as the mainstay of the old ruling class. Irrespective of its technical and other economic merits or drawbacks the Agrarian Reform Law of September 1952 was possibly the singular achievement of the Nasser-led officer regime, whose social effects are yet to become completely clear. It was, needless to say, mainly a negative political act directed more against the destruction of the old ruling class and less at the resolution of Egypt’s agricultural problems. Its tangible effects on rural society have not been too great, although one could make a case for the panoply of new institutions --- co-operatives, credit facilities, and expert’s services --- that arouse from the reform.

Large estates which accounted for over one million feddans owned by 2,000 people disappeared, thus reducing slightly the degree of inequality in land ownership. Conversely, the average size of small holdings increased slightly. The total area of medium-sized holdings (3-5 feddans) also increased. The measure did not redistribute Maulanaland to allAzad the nearly Library, three million rural Aligarh families in theMuslim country --- there University was not that much land to redistribute --- but it did benefit some half a million families.

The Agrarian Reform Authority set up by the Nasser government to implement the reform measures concentrated on the requisition and distribution of land, and the further organization of co-operatives. Having redistributed over 800,000 feddans by 120

1970 and requisitioned nearly 185,000 feddans for the public domain, the Authority grew into a vast bureaucratic institution. Its supervision of co-operatives were impressive, albeit bureaucratically cumbersome. Beneficiaries of these reforms were compelled to join a cooperative in which the Authority’s representative organized production and the marketing of the corps. The co-operatives, in turn, became the suppliers of credit, fertilizers and seeds.

Generally, these reforms allowed the government to assume the functions of the old landlord, and to implement the distribution of land and improve productivity. But it also gave the state the monopoly of the wherewithal for agricultural production via the co-operatives. It also allowed it to use co-operatives as agencies of taxation, since these controlled all inputs --- technology, credit, seed, fertilizer, etc. --- and the marketing of produce, especially cotton.

These reforms, however, accelerated the application of technology to agricultural production. It also helped the shift from a cash to a production nexus, especially when loans were advanced against the security of crops instead of land, as was the case before 1952. Robert Mahro, who argued in his book, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972, the agrarian reform “sought limited improvements in the distribution of wealth, and benefited the upper section of the lower-income group”, and that it should be seen as “a set of complementary measures and its impact assessed over a long period of years,” nevertheless concluded that “the land reform laws reflect an awareness of the main aspects of the agricultural problem --- distribution of land ownership, disparity of incomes and unsatisfactory tenancy agreements. . .” (Vatikiotis, 1978:208) on the part of the Nasser regime. Institutions, he believes, replaced landlords, and that he adjudged a good thing. Galal Amin, on the other hand, emphasized the persistent neglect of agriculture and the growing inequality, or gap, between rural and urban incomes in Egypt (Vatikiotis, 1978:208). Maulana However Azad, one Library, assesses the economic Aligarh significance Muslim and impact ofUniversity these reforms, its political importance for Nasser and his regime is not in doubt. When its economic results proved meager, given the rapid population growth on a limited area of land, it became imperative to create opportunities for production and employment outside the agricultural sector. Massive industrial development as the only means of rapid economic growth became the policy of the regime. A singular attempt to buttress both 121

further agricultural production and industrialization was the construction of the Aswan High Dam. It represented a remarkable achievement in irrigation, control of water supply for land reclamation and intensified land utilization. It also represented an attempt to adjust traditional patterns of land use and water allocation. Its other main benefit was seen to be the supply of cheap power for industry. There were to be also corollary benefits in flood control, navigation and fishing.

In almost every walk of life Nasser instigated a revolution: in industrialization, and in the countryside expansion of social services. He had inaugurated the nationalization process in 1961; by 1964 almost all big companies of any kind had been nationalized. Thus, large sections of the rural population profited to some extent from the expansion of social services in the countryside. Nasser’s energies were also visible in his policies on education. As new schools were built at the rate of one a day, the number of children attending primary school increased from 1,300,000 in 1952 to 3,400,000 (1,300,000 of them girls) in 1966 (Stephens, 1971:375-377). The successful and rapid expansion of education must be cited as one of Nasser’s most positive achievements.

Practically every student of the Egyptian economy under the Nasser regime agreed that there had been continuity as well as a break in the country’s economic history after 1952. The continuity was most marked in the first four years, 1952-56; the break occurred gradually first after 1956, and more abruptly after 1961, when the so-called socialist solution to centrally directed comprehensive planning was adopted. The constraints on Nasser’s policy of rapid economic growth and the transformation of Egyptian society remained great indeed. Besides the availability of capital, skills and other requisites of rapid economic growth, Nasser was also faced with the dilemma of rapid growth versus consumption, a greatly inflated bureaucracy to cope with a vastly Maulanaexpanded Azad public sector Library,, and the crippling Aligarh expense of Musliman aggressive ArabUniversity and foreign policy, entailing two wars with Israel within a decade and a civil war in the Yemen in between.

Nasser made the break with the past to the extent that he moved the Egyptian economy from a free private enterprise to a massively state-controlled and centrally 122

planned one in less than fifteen years. One could argue he reverted to the Muhammad Ali59 model of the early nineteenth century. The element of continuity in this process lay in the fact that some government intervention, as indicated earlier, was always exercised by the state before 1952. Moreover, both Egyptianization and diversification had been major economic aspirations of the Egyptian national movement since the 1920s. However, Nasser really accomplished was the nationalization and comprehensive planning of the economy with greater vigor, determination and, some would argue, ruthless abandon.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 constituted the turning-point. Its corollary of the expropriation or nationalization of British, French and other foreign commercial enterprises and assets in the country laid the foundation of a new public sector of the Egyptian economy. The establishment of a Permanent Council for the Development of National Production and its successor, the Economic Organization in 1956-57, marked Nasser’s intention to embark upon a radical, aggressive national economic policy.

Nasser used political pretexts for the further expansion of the public sector. After the 1956-57 seizure of foreign assets and nationalization of foreign concerns, including the Suez Canal and the banks, he used the Congo crisis60 of 1960-61 to nationalize Belgian concern in Egypt and sequestrate the assets of Belgian nationals. Similarly, he utilized domestic and inter-Arab crises in 1960-63 to take over Egyptian enterprises headed by the Bank Misr and Abboud groups. The socialist decrees of those years reflected the momentum of the state’s involvement in the economy.

Before 1952, public, state, ownership of the means of production was confined to irrigation and part of the transport infrastructure, particularly railroads, petroleum

59 Mohammad Ali was an Ottoman Albanian commander in the Ottoman army, who became Wali and self-declared Khadive of Egypt and Sudan with the Ottomans temporary approval. He is regarded as the founder of modern Egypt because of the dramatic reforms in the military, economic Maulanaand cultural Azad spheres Library,that he instituted. Aligarh Muslim University 60 The Congo Crisis was a period of political upheaval and conflict in the Republic of the Congo (today the Democratic Republic of the Congo) between 1960 and 1965. It began almost immediately after the Congo became independent from Belgium and ended --- unofficially, with the entire country under the rule of Joseph -Desire Mobutu. Constituting a series of civil wars, the Congo Crisis was also a proxy conflict in the Cold War in which the Soviet Union and United States supported opposing factions. Around 100,000 people are believed to have been killed during the crisis. 123

refining and public domain agriculture. Ten years later it was extended to all financial institutions, public utilities, transport (excluding taxicabs), industrial concerns, insurance, department stores, large hotels, the media and the press, export-import trade and the marketing of the major agricultural crops. Within a decade the regime eliminated both foreign economic activity and the major native independent centers of economic enterprise in the country. Sequestrations of the property and other assets of individual Egyptians followed after the Syrian secession in October-November 1961. A series of decrees in 1964 completed the state’s takeover of the economy.

Both agrarian reform and massive nationalization, whatever their economic consequences, were safe political measures, since they affected only a small group of Egyptians, namely, the rich landowners, financiers and monopolists in commerce and industry. These people were associated with the old regime; by 1962-64, they were branded as opportunistic reactionaries who wished to undermine the Nasser-led revolution and its new socialist state. They were accused of disloyalty and of having links with imperialist powers and their agents.

The central question concerning Nasser’s expansion of the public sectors is whether he genuinely aimed at the establishment of a socialist system or at simple statist hegemony. Ali Sabri, a key figure in those years of the drive for a centrally planned economy, characterized the first Five Year Plan (1960-65) as the “years of socialist transformation” (Vatikiotis, 1961:359). He argued that before 1960 the regime operated on the bare original Six Principles of the Revolution. The basis of the public sector was laid as of 1956, beginning with the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the seizure of foreign holdings, corporate and banking institutions. “The state was able”, in this way, to “own an economic base” for comprehensive planning, for growth and development and the doubling of the national income. The nationalization of the essential means of production, effected further by the 1961-64 socialist decrees, together with the Aswan High Dam project, because the expression of the Maulanadetermination Azad to introduce Library, comprehensive Aligarh change. Muslim University

According to Ali Sabri, the first stage of the “socialist revolution” was accomplished when the soldiers overthrew the old political order. The second stage consisted of setting up a “socialist society” by transferring the means of production to state ownership. However, because Nasser did this autocratically through a vast new 124

military-bureaucratic establishment, these means of production never came under public control, or scrutiny. So that with comprehensive planning and rapid industrialization came the immense inflation of government expenditure on services rather than on capital goods production. For a long time, moreover, control over the economy was exercised mainly by the apparatus of the military establishment. Sabri himself conceded when he was Prime Minister in 1966 that the first Five Year Plan was more than fully implemented in public services, which effectively required a vastly expanded bureaucracy, whereas in production it fell far short of the mark. As a result, public indebtedness rose rapidly. Thus, by 1967 there were over 1.5 million public officials, a 2,000-million-dollar public debt and a 25 per cent share for the military of the annual state budget.

Before the first Five Year Plan Egypt’s population was over 25.5 million. At the end of it had grown to over 29.5 million. National income stood at under £E 1,300 million at 1959/60. By 1965 it had risen to over £E 1,750 million, so that per capita income rose by only £E 10, from £E 50 to £E 60. But consumption, especially by the lower classes, rose sharply. Industrial output registered a 50 per cent increase, but over a third of this was in services, a very high proportion of the total.

Problems with balance of payments deficits, imbalances in the execution of various projects in the Plan, bureaucratic centralism and over-manning presented added difficulties for the projected transformation. The infrastructure for a rapid growth of the public sector was generally poor. Roads were inadequate, imported raw materials often difficult to secure or afford, factories opened before power to work them was available. Lack of managerial skills was papered over by the recruitment of personnel from other government departments and army officers. All these problems aside, many critics of the Plan have argued that it was no more than a blueprint for state investment. Even then capital goods were neglected. In the process, the nationalization’s required to create the public sector resulted in higher public Maulanaconsumption Azad, an inflated Library, and cumbersome Aligarh bureaucracy Muslim and reduced savings. University

Nasser’s economic policy gave the state the leading role in the industry, and in this way, he effected some changes in its structure. Whereas before 1952 it was mainly concerned with consumer goods, after 1952 Nasser enabled it to move into the production of intermediate goods and consumer durables, as well as some heavy 125

industrial production such as iron and steel, and electricity. Moreover, he achieved new forms of government intervention in the whole economy. However, although by the early sixties the growth of industrial output reached 12 per cent, after that it declined to less than half of that rate. Despite its growth, the industry managed to absorb only a small proportion of the increased labor force. At the same time, it acquired a vast administrative superstructure with new problems.

It is more likely that Nasser’s economic policy in both agriculture and industry, as expressed in the socialist decrees of 1961-64 and his National Charter of 1962 were aimed at improving the prospects of rural and urban lower classes, especially the so- called petite bourgeoisie. That a small group of these attained a slightly higher standard of living and a measure of social mobility cannot be denied. But he did this by expropriating and nationalizing the sources of upper-class wealth, bringing them into state ownership. The restructuring of agricultural ownership and production, and of the public sector were both aimed at the redistribution of national income. Similarly, fiscal measures in the form of new direct taxation on incomes, ceilings on salaries, regulation of dividend payments, new work legislation and insurance were all aimed at this particular constituency.

Political reasons, precisely after 1956 prompted Nasser to move away from an earlier economic policy. By 1960 capital formation became primarily a state function or responsibly. The state assumed nearly exclusive responsibility for investment along with its commitment to comprehensive planning. The new slogan of a “socialist democratic co-operative society” was to be given further strength and more substance in the 1962 National Charter. The ambiguity regarding the private sector, or even a mixed economy, was abandoned in favor of a state capitalist scheme. However, by the end of 1964 almost all large companies throughout every field of economic activity had been nationalized, and the public sector consisted then of enterprises both controlled and owned by the state (O’Brien, 1966:291-351). Private enterprise now Maulanacame to playAzad a minor Library, role. Aligarh Muslim University

Although experts estimated twenty years for the execution of the Plan, which aimed at doubling national income, Nasser insisted on ten. The difficulty was that its financing depended on savings, foreign loans and grants. The government could hardly expect to finance the Plan from private or national savings or from direct taxation in a 126

poor country like Egypt. Thus Nasser’s economic policy, in the final analysis, was the result of political considerations, that is, his political priorities. It partly failed because despite the state’s control of the economy, much of its comprehensive planning and execution depended on too many external factors, such as foreign loans and other aid. Meanwhile the rate of investment by the state far exceeded that of savings, requiring the government to borrow heavily from abroad and eventually facing serious balance of payments difficulties and therefore forcing it to slow down its investment program.

Equally unrealistic was the Charter’s promise both to raise living standards and attain social justice. A spate of social legislation to regulate wages, working hours and conditions, health and social insurance measures hardly affected the majority of workers in agriculture and non-corporate sections of trade and industry. In fact, the last category in the private sector still employed two and a half times as many workers as the public sector. Consequently, a privileged group in the public sector became the beneficiaries of these measures. Their impact on the overall redistribution of income, for example, was negligible. In fact, the nationalization and sequestration of private property in 1960-64 affected a very tiny class of people who owned a disproportionate share of national wealth (Murad, 1975:215). This was particularly true of land ownership and ownership of corporate enterprises stock. Furthermore, the charges of exploitation remained even in relative terms somewhat meaningless when the output of the average Egyptian worker remained very low and his wages in contrast to those of workers in other countries equally abysmally low.

The immediate concern of Nasser therefore was the control, not necessarily the ownership and distribution, of wealth. He extended government control over the whole economy first gradually and after 1961 rather abruptly, so that the demise of private enterprise was the culmination of this process. Nasser mistrusted the old bourgeoisie Maulanaand, given Azad the economic Library, needs of Aligarh the country, was Muslim anxious to University channel private investment into state-approved directions. To some extent the areas he pushed forward --- agrarian reform, the Aswan High Dam, nationalization --- reflected his earlier political preferences, deriving in the first instance from Young Egypt’s hazy notions of a social revolution. To this extent he had to make the state the prime mover of a new industrial revolution or transformation. Other political developments from Suez to the 127

Syrian secession and the Yemen war61 helped to harden his anti-capitalist or private enterprise attitude in favor of a command state economy. This, however, was not even remotely socialist, but a directed, centrally controlled, or etatist, economic policy.

The matter of control was perfected under Nasser, but the economy’s performance could not be ordered so easily. Economically, perhaps, the policy might have worked. But it failed politically. It was not efficient because the quality of men in government and the public sector was generally low; education and training remained poor, and several foreign policy episodes, including war, marred it. Much of its potential efficiency, say, in production, was equally impeded by excessive government regulation and pricing policies.

Nasser, however, had no choice but to go for rapid economic growth. Given the rapid growth of population and the limited area of land available for further agricultural expansion, it was imperative to create new opportunities for production and employment outside agriculture. Industrialization was the obvious answer. It did not prove successful because after 1957 the bias was for capital-intensive development which ignored the vast cheap labor available in the country. As a result, employment opportunities in the countryside were not exploited, and there was no spread of rural industries. Instead of maximally utilizing the country’s abundant and cheapest resource, labor, and the regime opted for an indiscriminate use of expensive modern technology. At the same time much of the revenue from nationalized assets was used to finance increased military and other state expenditure. A part of it was transferred to higher incomes for state bureaucrats and managers, as well as to finance the perks for Nasser’s crucial military constituency. Throughout this exercise, there was no control by any popular elected public body.

The beneficiaries of Nasser’s economic policy in the long run were the small group of skilled and semi-skilled labor in large-scale industry and commerce, the Maulanaurban salaried Azad class Library, and middle peasants Aligarh in the countryside Muslim, as well University as the growing numbers of “communicators” in the media, press, information and propaganda services. In implementing his economic policy, however, Nasser was denied the

61 President Nasser's armed intervention in Yemen was the most ambitious and dangerous foreign adventure of his career. It has brought him to the brink of war with Saudi Arabia and Jordan and provides American diplomacy in the Middle East with possibly its greatest challenge since Suez Crisis. 128

supreme fiscal measure of direct taxation in raising revenue with which to finance social and other services. In short, in 1962 he promised a welfare state more or less without a prayer of being able to finance it because, in a formally decreed socialist Egypt, social welfare could not be financed by direct taxation. In a scheme where taxation began at £E 1,000 per annum net income, it was difficult to find many Egyptians who made that much money in a year. Consequently, social welfare measures remained confined to civil servants, employees of public corporations and the largest private enterprises. Thus, of a seven million total labor force in 1966, only 1.5 million were covered by some kind of social security.

To be sure, investment in industry increased greatly and economic growth of about 3-7 per cent per annum did occur over a period of a decade (1956-66). There were accomplishments of the Nasser regime. In his speech to the Congress of Popular Forces on 24 September 1962, Nasser asserted “the necessity of the socialist solution” for Egypt’s economic problems. Two years later he tried to justify his new economic policies to the National Assembly by reminding them that until 1952 power in the country was in the hands of sixteen rich families, a condition corrected by his July 1961 decrees. One hundred Egyptian and foreign families, Nasser asserted, held the equivalent of £E 1,000 million of the country’s wealth. In order to attain sufficiency and justice, his regime had introduced agrarian reform, embarked upon the construction of the Aswan High Dam and vast reforms in education and other public services. The war was one against imperialism and backwardness, he declared. Listing major problems facing the country in agriculture, industry, health, housing and prices, he conceded the existence of serious difficulties with the bureaucracy, inflation and domestic production. But he also justified the concentration of powers in his hands “in order to take decisive action”. A year later, in his Labor Day Speech62 on 1 May 1965, he admitted of difficulties faced in the administration of the public sector, emphasizing the importance of resolving economic problems, and in particular the achievement of a Maulanahigher rate Azad of saving. Library, Aligarh Muslim University It would appear then that by the mid-sixties Nasser’s economic policy of rapid economic growth via industrialization had run into serious difficulties. His

62 For the details of Nasser's Labor Day Speech. See Appendix pp. 295-296 129

determination, as formulated in the National Charter, to raise both consumption and investment at the same time could not be carried through. Much of the investment and resultant growth depended heavily on foreign borrowing and aid, creating difficulties with the balance of payments. In the meantime, while investment in industry rose, expenditure on services rocketed. Most of the manufacturing still consisted of consumer goods and only a small proportion of labor was engaged in it. With hardly any private or government savings to fall back on, by 1966 the government was forced to cut down the rate of investment to adopt a deflationary policy.

Political considerations and factors prompted the regime to allocate a greater proportion of investment services, including housing, price stabilization, wages and salaries, and less to agriculture or industry. Similarly, political factors guided the development and expansion of the educational system. Between 1952 and 1970 the number of pupils in primary and preparatory schools tripled, in secondary schools it almost doubled, in secondary technical schools it increased eightfold, and in universities it rose by nearly five times. Unfortunately, this rapid expansion, especially at the secondary and university levels, created new problems of overcrowding and unemployment. Enrollment in primary schools never exceeded 60-65 percent of all eligible children. Teacher training lagged behind. Classrooms became intolerable and counter-productively overcrowded. Physical disabilities, such as the lack of classroom space and the absence of post-schooling and adult educational programs in the countryside, helped keep the rate of illiteracy at 75 per cent. After 1962, the policy of entitling every university graduate to a job in either the government administration, or the public sector of the economy led to the inflation of the bureaucracy and an additional burden on the national exchequer. The government tried after 1965 to limit the number of university places as well as channel entrants more into science and applied technology courses. Basically, though, the hope of absorbing many more school-leavers in manufacturing were never realized. In the meantime, the quality and Maulanastandard Azadof middle andLibrary, higher education Aligarh dropped sharply Muslim (Issawi, 1965:76). University In health and housing, too, Nasser tried to deal with the problems. He introduced a program of health services reform, coupled to one of birth control and family planning. Expenditure in these fields rose, but the uneven distribution of doctors and hospital beds in the country, together with the widespread incidence of 130

parasitic diseases and high infant mortality rates rendered these efforts inadequate. In the countryside, especially the lack of adequate social security and old pension schemes forced the fellah to depend for his future security on a large family. The continued unequal distribution of wealth in the country further prevented him from responding to family planning schemes. In the absence of alternative social security arrangements, the fellah remained unimpressed by these schemes.

The erection of subsidized, cheap popular housing estates did benefit many of the industrial and lowest-paid government employees in urban areas. It also helped clear one or two of the Cairo area slums. An equal investment was made by the regime in housing for the public sector employees and other government officials, such as managers and army officers. The problem of rural housing, however, remained unattended to. With Nasser’s deflationary policy after 1964-65, investment in such public projects naturally dropped.

Expansion in all these directions suffered from an inability to sustain it. But it was also undermined by its poor quality, deriving in part from Nasser’s rigid control. Thus political control over education at all levels was paralleled by similar dictation over all cultural organizations and activities, including the nationalized media and the press. Arts boards, the press and broadcasting, national educational commissions and research organizations were all brought under strict central control and directed by carefully selected, loyal Nasser appointees. All came under strict government control when Nasser appointed trusted though not necessarily competent ex-officers. Such control grew when educational and cultural programs were reorganized between 1956 and 1964, a period of so-called ideological reconstruction.

Similar rigid political control over labor legislation and the organization of trade unions prevailed. Thus, in April 1959 trade unions were reorganized under Anwar Salama, a Nasserist leader of the Petroleum Workers’ Unions. Strikes remained illegal, Maulanabut the minimumAzad daily Library, wage was raised Aligarh to £E 0.250, Muslima measure that wasUniversity not enforced before 1961. New insurance schemes for industrial workers were introduced and other social security arrangements. Over 1961 profit-sharing schemes for workers and employees came into force. At most of these measures applied to or were implemented in the public sector, workers in it acquired a relatively privileged status vis-a-vis the masses of workers outside it. Concentrations of industrial workers grew up around the 131

new industrial centers in Aswan, Zagazig and Fayyum in addition to older ones in Shubra el-Kheima, Helwan and Mehalla-el-Kubra.

Yet instead of the expected growth of industrial production, Nasser’s economic policy led to excessive growth in services. Employment policy was aimed mainly at absorbing the formally educated into the tertiary sector of the economy, the service sector. In fact, there was an alarming growth of services independently of the rest of the economy. A mark of continuing massive poverty was the fact that in 1968 direct taxes still yielded only a third of the revenue accruing from indirect taxation. Continuing high pressure of population and lingering unemployment gave a parasitical aura to the whole economy.

Nasser, however, was an integrationist and hegemonies, and not only in economic matters. Thus he integrated all the judiciaries in Egypt, abolishing the religious (Shari’a) courts in 1955/56. He completed the integration of the educational system by reorganizing the Azhar in June 1961 as a modern university teaching both religious and secular subjects (Safran, 1958:20-28).

Apart from the massive infusion of foreign capital that the further growth and development of the Egyptian economy will require, a politically less monolithic social and educational policy is just as necessary. Although Nasser expanded education on all levels and “organized” national cultural activity, his priority for political conformity and control undermined their quality, and in the long run eroded their productive potential. Neither education nor the trade unions nor any of the other professional and cultural syndicates and associations could claim an independent status under Nasser. Their bureaucratization impeded their otherwise important role. Their total political control from the center stifled them completely.

However, some of the wider social consequences of Nasser’s economic policy were appalling. It was not only the new employment opportunities of developing Maulanaindustry Azadthat attracted Library, growing numbers Aligarh of people to Muslimthe city. It was Universityalso the neglect and deterioration of conditions in the countryside. Soon rapid urbanization was dissociated from the growth of manufacturing, having further detrimental effects on economic development. The latter cannot be divorced from the determination of upper-income groups and the state for rapid capital accumulation via savings. The new 132

governing elite under Nasser did not exhibit any such propensities. On the contrary, both they and the state were more inclined to consume, the former for selfish reasons, the latter for political ones. Corruption in the conduct of economic affairs and venality in public life are universal human failings. In the rigidly controlled command state economy of Nasser’s Egypt these reached alarming proportions. A public sector runs largely by a cumbersome bureaucracy and hampered by a miasma of regulations, licensing requirements and other politically determined controls inevitably led to the attempt by many to bypass or escape them. “Middlemen and contract” millionaires quickly appeared to milk the public sector and bypass state regulations.

Comprehensive planning of the economy was, probably, on strict economic grounds, premature for Egypt. But Nasser adopted it basically for political reasons, chief among them his wish to further safeguard his control over the state. Consequently, it led to serious imbalances, such as greater consumption with all its attendant ills, rather than capital goods production and industrial development.

The twin aims of national independence and modernization entailing economic and social transformation were to be attained by a formidable state apparatus and a new economic technocracy. The first, not uncharacteristically for Egypt, was recruited from the lower and middle strata of society --- the secondary school and university graduates and army officers --- that is, the aspiring young. The second was recruited from those educated further abroad in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet both of these groups in the state machine were dominated by the military, the new ruling class, and eventually, the new “state capitalist” class. Moreover, the new technocracy was placed astride an old bureaucratic pyramid, contributing to the further over-centralization of state functions and activities. Consequently, policy decisions were taken at the very top of the power pyramid and implemented by these subservient groups of the state machine. There was barely any initiative at levels below the top. Maulana Muhammad Azad Library, Ali the Great at Aligarh the beginning ofMuslim the nineteenth University century never claimed he wished to create a modern society, only a modern and powerful state. Etatisme --- state capitalism --- was his preferred economic approach and instrument, a common enough phenomenon in Egyptian history since private ownership was a relatively recent --- later nineteenth-century --- development. Moreover, under the Mamluks as much as under the Pharaohs, military men played an active and long role 133

in the country’s economy. Muhammad Ali used his new modern army and emerging native administration, both trained and fashioned by foreigners in his employ, to carry out his ambitious agricultural and monopolistic industrial schemes. In the process, he nurtured a new privileged class of both native Egyptians and resident foreigners. The latter in particular ran the commercial and financial aspects of that economy.

Nasser, on the other hand, was not satisfied with his control of the machinery of state and government; he took total political power and, in the mid - twentieth century, pre-empted all ideological alternatives. He also aspired to transform Egyptian society. To that end he adopted socialism in the sixties, but would not countenance the presence of socialists in the country, or the creation of the institutions needed for its development and functioning. In fact, he sought to establish order and discipline so as to impose “social peace” and national solidarity”. To that end he adopted something like a corporatist order (Schmitter, 1974:85-132). But this policy also led to new forms of exploitation by an oppressive military-bureaucratic elite whose members soon carved out new fiefdoms of interest, privilege and profit. Very soon there was hardly any ideological or political cohesion between them, only a fierce rivalry and competition in a haphazard pursuit of advantage and survival. Ultimately, even Nasser’s apparent corporatist political experiment degenerated into an agglomeration of avaricious cliques within his new political elite. This permanent ambivalence on his part together with his charismatic autocracy inevitably gave rise to a new economically privileged class in the country.

It is therefore difficult to assert that Nasser made a clean break with the past. Muhammad Ali’s experiment collapsed after his death precisely because he monopolized it and otherwise stunted the growth of modern political institutions in the country. He left no political groups loyal to his experiment who would defend and maintain it; only a strange grandson, Abbas Pasha, on the throne, who proceeded to dismantle most of his grandfather’s work. Nasser’s monopolistic approach too has Maulanacaused hisAzad experiment Library, to suffer partially Aligarh the same fateMuslim, even though University the objective constraints on its further development in the 1970s were not wholly of his own making. Surely, though, his style and obsessive preoccupation with the security of his paramount position contributed to at least a less efficient, less competent and more venal handling of economic and social affairs than might otherwise have been the case. 134

Nasser’s socialism in fact was characterized by a pervasive bureaucracy that was needed to implement a massive system of controls. In the end it succeeded in restricting initiative and impeding growth. In the context of a political despotism the privileged cadre of this bureaucracy and state security apparatus acquired all the trappings of profligate capitalism, namely, luxury, waste and cynicism.

Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood

Though Gamal Abdel Nasser curbed the Muslim Brothers with an iron hand after assuming power, its sources unanimously claim that he was an associate of theirs in the pre-revolution days and a member of their secret apparatus. A former member of this apparatus, who became a supporter of Nasser in the early stages after the revolution, and was therefore expelled from the Brotherhood, revealed that, “in any case, Nasser was attached to the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood and was sworn in on the Qur’an to respect its principles and follow its line. This happened years before the evolution of his own formation” (of Free Officers like Abdel Moneim, Abdel Rauf and Rashad Mehanna) (Vatikiotis, 1978:85). However, Nasser committed himself to the ideology of the Muslim Brothers; but he backed out after the success of the revolution.

According to Adil Kamal, even before the Revolution, Nasser showed deviating tendencies. He slighted the Muslim Brotherhood’s method of religious training, and once pointed out that there was no use inviting army officers in groups to teach them religious subjects. He also questioned the Muslim Brotherhood’s method for bringing about change. Hasan al-Hudaybi, the General Guide, appeared uncomfortable in his encounters with Nasser, and was unable to appreciate his approach (Adil, 1987:300-301). Though Nasser had links with the Muslim MaulanaBrotherhood Azad, his movementLibrary, of Free Aligarh Officers was Muslim started independently University of it. Indicative of the independence of the Free Officers’ movement was the fact that even the officers of the Muslim Brotherhood could participate in the revolution of 23rd July 1952 not as Brothers but only as army officers (Adil, 1987:304). The Muslim Brotherhood welcomed the fall of the old regime, although not certain about its own actual connection with the revolution (Adil, 1987:305). The Revolutionary 135

Government on its part dissolved all political parties after taking over charge, but did not dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood.

The relationship between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brothers, however was on the basis of their shared approach to the socioeconomic problems in particular and to the other national issues in general. The Muslim Brother’s neglect of these issues under the new leadership not only estranged some Free Officers who were earlier connected with it, but also eroded its social base. In the ensuing conflict between the two contenders for power --- the army officers and the Brothers --- the latter stood by a weaker because of this enervation.

One major issue over which serious differences might have emerged between the Brotherhood and the army officers was the choice of Hasan al-Banna’s successor. The opinion of the army officers associated with the organization is not known. Perhaps they did not make their views known, Nasser and his like-minded group being apathetic to issues concerning the organization and not being favorably disposed towards a polity based on religion. Nasser and his associate officers were also put out by the clout of the upper class and aristocratic elements in the Brotherhood, which ultimately resulted in the selection of Hasan al-Hudaybi as the new General Guide (Hudaybi was a judge of twenty-seven years’ standing, closely connected with the palace) --- his brother-in-law was the chief of the royal household --- and had pro- establishment inclinations (Bari, 1995:40). Nasser was particularly sensitive in those years to upper class proclivity. Sayyid Mar’i, a civilian official who worked both under Nasser and Sadat, narrates a telling anecdote about this instinctive dislike of Nasser’s. Mar’i, who had a university degree in agriculture and had shown keen interest in agricultural reform, was invited by some revolutionary leaders to a meeting of the Committee of Agricultural Reform. Nasser was also present. Unfortunately for Mar’i, he had gone there in habiliments generally worn by Egyptian aristocrats. Nasser took an instant dislike to this outfit (Mar’i, 1978:232). Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University As an essentially religious organization, the Muslim Brotherhood lacked clarity in its socioeconomic programs. This diffuse vision attracted to it a cross-section of people with diverse social orientations, who as a whole even failed to appreciate the measures taken by the Revolutionary Government for equity and social justice. 136

The elitist tendencies of the Brotherhood had become noticeable even during and after the second World War, when the entry into it of a wealthy landowner like Munir al-Dilla in 1947, who generously contributed to the cause of the organization, heralded the introduction into the movement of “Cadillac’s and aristocracy” (Mitchel, 1961:85). Abdel Halim, the historian of the Muslim Brotherhood, differentiated between two categories of persons of aristocratic background in the Brotherhood, the first being those like Dilla and Hasan al-Ashmawi, who freely mixed with persons of modest background and were acceptable to the rank and file; in the second category were those who kept themselves aloof from the rest and whose attitude led to dissension (Bar, 1995:40). In any event, this group of upper class Egyptians reoriented the organization in an elitist outlook and promptly ascended to power following al- Banna’s demise. Al-Dilla’s opinion was given weighted in the selection of al-Banna’s successor because of his singular contribution to the cause of the movement, both personal and financial. It was in his home and at his inspiration that Hasan Isma’il al- Hudaybi’s name was first mentioned as a candidate for the post of General Guide (Mitchel, 1961:85).

Al-Hudaybi’s appointment provoked sharp division in the movement, his eligibility for the post itself being questioned. He had first met al-Banna as late as in 1942 just incidentally. He was not even a member of any apex body of the organization. In electing him, the regulation which required that the leader must be a member of the Consultative Assembly and win three-quarters of its vote was also bypassed (Mitchel, 1961:87). In order to accommodate the new leader, the other contenders were overlooked, particularly Salih Ashmawi, a hardliner and one of the most powerful personalities in the organizational set-up.

But the opinion leaders in the organization justified this election on practical grounds. The Muslim Brotherhood had by now attained notoriety as a terrorist group, particularly after Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha’s assassination, and it was keen to get Maulanarid of this Azad image in theLibrary, public mind. InAligarh this endeavor , Muslimthe new leader fittedUniversity the bill. He was “noted for respect for the law” and was opposed to the agitational approach. Also, he was considered to be a stop-gap leader, being close to sixty years and constantly ailing. His proximity to the Palace was especially important in getting the official ban on the organization lifted (Bari, 1995:41). To quote Husaini: 137

“Watching all this with keen interest was King Farouq, perhaps out of a sense of guilt for what he had done to al- Banna and partly out of fear of vengeance sworn by the Brethren. Weighing all these, he found it in his interest to get al-Hudaybi, a man of distinction and legal training, into this delicate position. On the other hand, the Brethren found al- Hudaybi an acceptable solution to their outstanding problems” (Bari, 1995:41).

The government’s active interest in al-Hudaybi’s appointment was transparent. Before lifting the ban on the organization, it allowed the Brotherhood to hold the meeting of its Consultative Assembly, where al-Hudaybi was elected the Guide. The announcement of his election was withheld for some time, giving him time to resign as a judge. Then followed the announcement of the lifting of a ban on the organization. Only then was al-Hudaybi’s election as General Guide announced, in October 1951 (Harris, 1964:25).

The Islamic movement of the Brotherhood, however had to pay the price of this soft-pedalling in the erosion of its social base. To begin with, all the wrangling over the new appointment could not have remained hidden from the rank and file of the organization, which “provoked doubts about the real intention of the leadership towards the organization and its program” (Harris, 1964:195-237). Within a month of his appointment, al-Hudaybi with some other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood visited the palace in a “royal carriage”, and the meeting lasted forty-five minutes (Husaini, 19:122). On 16 January 1952, at a time when popular resentment against the British and clashes over the Suez Canal were at their height, al-Hudaybi visited the King to congratulate him on the birth of his crown-prince. During his next visit to the King on 25 May 1952 to renew his allegiance to the King (Husaini, 19:122), at a time when the Egyptian public was raising slogans against the King, al-Hudaybi described Maulanahis meeting Azad with the Library, royal head as a Aligarh“noble visit to a Muslimnoble king” (Bishri University, 1983:371). Not everyone in the Muslim Brotherhood could stomach these demonstrations of felicity between Farouq, the man behind al-Banna’s assassination, and al-Hudaybi. In the emerging differences, some hardliners headed by Salih Ashmawi were expelled from the organization. Others, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali, protested against al- 138

Hudaybi’s arbitrary attitude and demanded that the principle of Shura (consultation) should be applied in the decision-making (Bishri, 1983:372).

By the time of the July 1952 Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a movement, had almost detached itself from all national issues on which sensitive Egyptian opinion was intensely agitated. Chief among these were: The King’s high- handed approach, the armed struggle against the British and the disturbing social situation, including conflict between various social classes. At the time when the Muslim Brotherhood was reinstated, the situation in Egypt had become explosive, because of Britain’s arbitrary annulment of its treaty of 1936 with Egypt. Demands were raised for an armed struggle against Britain, and hopes were high that the Brotherhood, with its cadre trained and experienced in the use of arms, would take the initiative. But the Muslim Brotherhood failed the people, with its leadership disallowing its enthusiastic rank and file to participate in the national struggle (Bishri, 1983:373).

In the process, the Brotherhood failed the King as well. Complacent in the support of the leadership of the Brotherhood to himself, the King deluded himself that he had the support of the entire popular base of the organization. In the end, the leadership of the Muslim Brothers failed to save his throne. Indeed, a substantial section of the Brotherhood was only waiting for the right opportunity to get rid of the King, and provided the popular support for the revolution (Husaini, 19:123). While the revolution threw the rank and file of the Brotherhood into confusion, al-Hudaybi became incommunicado for another four days after the event, in his summer resort at Alexandria. When he finally emerged on 28 July, it was to return to Cairo to meet Nasser in the house of Salih Abu Raziq, (Bari, 1995:43) a leading member of the Brotherhood.

Even though many in the Brotherhood considered the Revolution as their own, Maulana(Vatikiotis Azad, 1961:76) Library, the leadership Aligarh of the Free Officers Muslim left no doubt University about their independence from the Brotherhood. Kamaleddin Husain, an officer most sympathetic to the Brotherhood, noted that following the creation of a formal organization of the Free Officers movement after the 1948-49 Palestinian war, Nasser suggested that their organization should not subject itself either to the Muslim Brotherhood or to any other political party. Abdel Mun’im Abdel Rauf, a member of the Free Officers leadership 139

committee and a devoted Brother, objected. He pointed out that the Brotherhood, being a bigger organization, was in a position to take care of the family of any officer who came under a cloud. But Abdel Mun’im was alone in this stance, the others unanimously agreeing against affiliation with any other organization or political party. Individually, however, the officers had the liberty to be affiliated with political parties of their choice. When his proposal was rejected, Abdel Mun’im withdrew from the leadership Committee of the Free Officers. His colleagues, however told him that he was welcome back any time and he rejoined the committee on the night of 26 July 1952, and “remained with us till the clash of 1954 with the Brotherhood (Bari, 1995:43).

While Nasser’s relationship with many leading personalities of the Muslim Brothers remained cordial, there seemed to be an antipathy between him and al- Hudaybi. It is possible that Nasser was prejudiced by his view of al-Hudaybi’s social milieu. Al-Hudaybi, on his part, showed indifference, and even dislike to Nasser. The man who was fond of accepting invitations to visit the palace, cold-shouldered Nasser’s initiatives for a meeting with him. The revolutionary government was favorably disposed towards the Muslim Brotherhood, with Nasser keen to ensure the Muslim Brothers’ support to the Revolution, and even willing to share power with it but al-Hudaybi apparently lacked the pragmatism required for a reconciliation.

Nevertheless, the number of leading personalities in the Muslim Brotherhood who appreciated Nasser’s approach was significant. Those who responded favorably to Nasser’s postures included Salih Ashmawi and Hasan al-Baqouri, al-Hudaybi rivals for the highest position in the organization, and such other heavy weights as Abdel Qader Awdeh,63 Sayid Sabiq and Muhammad al-Ghazali. Abdel Qader was particularly vociferous in his plea for forging a working relationship with the Free Officers and engaged in heated debate with al-Hudaybi during the extraordinary sessions of the Consultative Committee of the organization, which was being Maulanafrequently Azad called to Library, consider the post Aligarh-Revolution situation Muslim (Bishri, 1983:44).University There was considerable sympathy for the Revolution in the secret apparatus of the

63 Abdel Qader Awdeh, a deputy of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the Egypt's honorable judges. Nasser executed Awdeh and some of his colleagues from the Brotherhood in the wake of the Manshiyya incident; thousands were sentenced to long prison terms. 140

Brotherhood as well, to which Nasser and other officers are said to have belonged some time before the revolution. The secret cell group, under the leadership of Abdel Rehman al-Sanadi, had its own grievance against the new Guide who was keen to disband the apparatus. Al-Hudaybi had al-Sanadi and three others of the apparatus expelled from the organization for indiscipline.

Eager to prove his religious credentials, Nasser at first offered three ministerial positions to the Muslim Brothers. When the Brotherhood refused the bait, he invited it to form a ministry of its own, provided the final power remained with the Revolution Command Council. But the Brotherhood was averse to this condition, (Bishri, 1983:177-78) its leadership determined not to give in to the socio-economic and political program of the Free Officers and to insist on their own terms pertaining to the application of religion in matters related to the State (Jawhar, 1977:42-43). Nasser’s next ploy was to exploit the internal division in the Muslim Brothers and he persuaded Hasan al-Baqouri, an Azharite, to accept a ministerial position under the army as early as September 1952. Al-Hudaybi in retaliation asked for Baqouri’s resignation from the primary membership of the Brotherhood and got it (Jawhar, 1977:43). Even after he announced the dissolution of the Brotherhood and arrested a large number of its leaders, including al-Hudaybi, Nasser visited Hasan al-Banna’s grave on 12 February 1954, his death anniversary, to find there his supporters among the top personalities in the organization ready to welcome him (Berger, 19:43-44). This was part of his strategy to finally eliminate the Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brothers were now clearly divided between those who wanted al- Hudaybi to step down as General Guide, and those who were reconciled to his continuation. The former consisted of leaders of the secret apparatus and other top personalities like Muhammad al-Ghazali, Salih Ashmawi, Bahi al-Khawli, Sayid Sabiq and Abd al-Rehman al-Banna (Hasan al-Banna’s brother). Most of them supported Nasser and were consequently expelled from the organization for Maulanaindiscipline. Azad As such Library,, they played Aligarh no role in the Muslim ensuing conflict University between the Brotherhood and the revolutionary regime. In the second group, though many were critical of al-Hudaybi, they preferred to sink their differences and to recognize al- Hudaybi as the General Guide in order to avoid disorder and to save the organization from falling apart. Among these, even those who had earlier been openly critical of al- 141

Hudaybi’s approach to withdrew their support from Nasser, having realized that he was not only exploiting their internal differences but also would not allow the organization to function as an independent body.

Both Hudaybi and Nasser appeared to be under no illusion about that the differences between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood was real and reflecting their respective world views. The conflict arouses from the assertion by the Free Officers of their supreme political authority in Egypt and the totalitarian system they wanted to establish. The army officers, having taken over power on their own steam without active help from the Brotherhood, wanted to streamline the Brotherhood to serve their own purposes. This disillusioned many prominent members of the organization, who had earlier been eager to cooperate with the revolutionary regime.

Abdel Qader Awdeh provides one such example. Not only did he maintain close personal relationships with Nasser, but also appeared quite convinced of the prospects of fruitful cooperation between the Muslim Brothers and the Free Officers. His disillusionment started after Nasser implicated a large number of the Brothers, including Hasan al-Ashmawi, another close friend, in fabricating cases. Awdeh and his like-minded group in the Brotherhood, then made common cause with those political forces in the country which were demanding democracy and free elections. Awdeh’s view of Nasser had so greatly changed in the course of a few months that when a group of leading personalities in the Muslim Brothers, in order to lessen the government’s heat on them, decided to stop all such Brotherhood’s publications which were critical of government policies, Awdeh and his group disrupted the meeting between the Brotherhood leaders and Free Officers, called in September 1954 to give this agreement a formal shape (Jawhar, 1977:56). Awdeh had been spared in the first series of arrests in January 1954, and was even allowed to freely visit the prisons in which the Brothers were lodged. But he was on top of the list of those arrested in the second series in October-November and was among the first six Muslim Brothers to be Maulanaexecuted Azad by the revolutionary Library, government Aligarh after summary Muslim trials (Bari, 1995:47).University

Most of the blame for the souring of relations between the Brotherhood and Free Officers goes to Hudaybi as General Guide. Some prominent members of the Brotherhood, when they met him in one of their last reconciliatory efforts, Nasser described Hudaybi’s attitude towards the Free Officers as contemptuous and 142

complained about his behavior bitterly. He had been eager from the very beginning “to consult the General Guide over important affairs of the state”, Nasser said, but was rebuffed. Even the few meetings with the General Guide that materialized were customarily held at the latter’s house. In these meetings, the General Guide did not conceal his lack of respect to the Free Officers, including Nasser. When in one such meetings the General Guide showed contempt and indifference towards him that went beyond endurance, Nasser decided to sever his relations with the General Guide. In this meeting Nasser demanded the disbanding of the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in the army (Vatikiotis, 1978:46). He also wanted a halt to the Muslim Brother’s criticism of the revolutionary regime. The General Guide’s failure to commit himself on these counts led to the arrest of a large number of the Muslim Brothers including the Guide in January 1954.

These arrests, however, were Nasser’s undoing, for a short while. There was country wide criticism of the revolutionary government, including from al-Masri, the pro-Wafd independent newspaper. Faced with pressures from most political quarters against these arrests, Nasser imposed curbs on the freedom of expression in general. When President Muhammad Nagib himself criticized the government measures, he was sacked. Large-scale spontaneous demonstrations took place thereafter to demand Najib’s reinstatement and the release of political prisoners.

In a tactical retreat, Nasser quickly accepted these demands, and showed himself willing to compromise with the existing political forces in the country. By 25th March 1954, all prisoners were released. The same day the Revolution Command Council, after about a five-hour deliberation, announced its decision to restore democratic rights, to allow the establishment of political parties and hold free elections, and to dissolve itself on 24th July and transfer power to the people’s representatives. The General Guide was unable to realize the intrigue behind the Nasser’s move. After his release from prison, he could not even move out of the house for three days rejoicing in the Maulanaflood of Azadvisitors pouring Library, into to felicitate Aligarh him (Berger Muslim, 19:43-44). Among University the visitors was Nasser, who apologized for his imprisonment and asked him not to threaten him by organizing demonstrations.

As later events showed, however, Nasser had already drawn the line of final showdown with the Brotherhood and other forces demanding democratic rights. 143

Within four days of the announcement by the RCC, on 29th March, stage-managed demonstrations took place on a wide scale, calling for “No to political parties. No to politicking”. The demonstrations freely entered government offices and invited workers to join them while the police watched. (Bishri, 1983:337).

According to Salah Shadi, a prominent leader of the Brotherhood, when a few Brothers demanded, holding of counter-demonstrations, the General Guide refused in view of his promise to Nasser (Bari, 1995:47). Another explanation of Shadi’s is at variance with the overall strategy of the Muslim Brothers, and its treatment of the revolution. To him, the leadership of the organization preferred to avoid armed confrontation by the government because that would have led to civil war and opened the door for foreign intervention (Bari, 1995:47). But if this was the reason for the Brotherhood’s inaction at this stage, why at all did it adopt a confrontationist approach towards the revolutionary regime from the outset? In reality, the Muslim Brotherhood also made efforts to capture political power, or at least to control it. Its failure was essentially the failure of its leader, who definitely lacked political skill. The army officers, many of whom were sympathetic towards the Brotherhood, supported the action against the organization when it came to a final showdown apparently due to the latter’s loss of credibility in its confrontation with the military regime, which was able to build up its image as the savior of Egypt.

Nasser thereafter kept up the pressure. He had Najib stripped of all his responsibilities, made a figurehead, and finally ousted and imprisoned. The General Guide went underground, fearing a government-engineered plot on his life. A responsible Brother doubted the information regarding the government plot, and suggested that the Muslim Brothers during those days were “under the pressure of psychological outburst and nervous tension.” He also pointed out that the presence of the General Guide amongst the Muslim Brothers would have helped in easing this tension. What appears to have inflamed the situation further, however, was yet another Maulanafutile exercise Azad to continue Library, the publication Aligarh of leaflets Muslim bearing the GeneralUniversity Guide’s imprint (Ramadan, 1975:35-48). A final reconciliatory meeting was held in September 1954 between the Free Officers under Nasser and some available leaders of the Brotherhood, but the effort failed. Large-scale arrests of the leaders and members of the organization followed thereafter in October-November. The final straw in this war 144

between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood was the shooting at Nasser by a Brother during a public meeting in Alexandria --- claimed by the Brotherhood to have been stage-managed.

A combination of factors thereafter brought successive victories to the Free Officers in their war against the Muslim Brotherhood. These included quick implementation of some policies related to social justice and land reform, drawing public applause, confrontationist approach towards the British and superior manouverings and adroitness in maligning the Brotherhood in the public eyes. Typical of the Brotherhood’s political miscalculation was its insistence that the land ceiling should be kept at 500 feddans, when the Free Officers suggested limit of 200 feddans, (Vatikiotis, 1978:76) and the popular feeling was in favor of an even lower ceiling (Vatikiotis, 1978:76). So decidedly had the social bases of the Brotherhood slipped towards the side of the Free Officers in the course of two years, that when Nasser finally struck at the Brotherhood, no demonstration of public support in their favor took place --- in a marked departure from the experience through most of the 1940s and early 1950s. And when a number of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members, on the run from the government’s persecution, took shelter in Saudi Arabia and Jordan --- which had their own reasons to support internal unrest in Egypt --- the rulers of Egypt capitalized on the propaganda value of this development, identifying the Brotherhood with the two conservative monarchies. The two kingdoms were competing with Egypt in inter-Arab rivalry, and particularly Saudi Arabia not only gave them asylum readily, but also provided them with plush jobs. Because of this circumstance the common Egyptians saw them as collaborators with kingdoms which assisted imperialist powers in their designs in the area, and were considered to be people’s enemies. After the tripartite attack on Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, while Nasser and other Free Officers emerged as heroes and saviors, the social base of the Muslim Brotherhood was further eroded.

MaulanaOn Azad external relations Library,, Nasser’ sAligarh foreign policy Muslim focused on three University issues: The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Cold War and the macro-political dynamics of the West Asia. Israel was regarded throughout the Arab World as a creation of Western imperialism that was detrimental to the interests of the Arab people (Heikal, 1996:29- 49). By repeatedly denouncing Israel as a foe, one which all Arabs could easily reject, 145

Nasser could extend Egyptian identity by conferring on it a regional legitimation: Nasserism. This became a new brand of Arab nationalism, the epithet of Arab unity. The rallying point was the Palestine problem, which spawned a sense of “Arabness” and solidified anti-Western sentiment. Yet, the solution to the Palestine problem, from Nasser’s perspective until the defeat of 1967, was based on the UN Partition Resolution of 194764 (Ismael & Jacqueline, 2011:355). Palestine, therefore, was a legitimating contrivance of Nasserism and of little real concern to Egyptian foreign policy.

The emergence of the international dimension of Nasser’s foreign policy is usually pinpointed to the Suez Crisis of 1956. In fact, it had been shaped the year before, with Israel’s raid on Gaza, which revealed Egypt’s military vulnerability. It was also heavily influenced by the American refusal to sell arms to Egypt, a state of affairs that forced Nasser to distance himself from the United States and seek military assistance from Czechoslovakia. These circumstances coincided with the halcyon days of the non-aligned movement, as expressed by the Bandung Congress on April 1955, and they were also influential in the creation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement (Heikal, 1996:106-109).

Relations with the superpower, Cairo’s clashes with pro-Western monarchies and ties with Moscow persistently undermined relations with Washington, and Israel’s supporters in the United States lobbied against amicable ties with Egypt. But Washington realized that Nasser was anti-Communist, and some people saw his reformist policies in a positive light. Relations with the United States improved during the last two years of the Eisenhower administration, particularly, as Nasser backed anti-Communist groups in Iraq and clashed with Qasim,65 who for a while depended on the Communists to counter Pan-Arabists. This inspired anti-Communist polemics in

64 The UN Partition Plan for Palestine was a proposal developed by the UN, which recommend a Maulanapartition Azad with Economic Library, Union of Mandatory Aligarh Palestine to Muslim follow the termination University of the British Mandate. The resolution recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the city of Jerusalem.

65 Abd al-Karim Qasim (21 November 1914- 9 February 1963), was a nationalist Iraqi Army brigadier who seized power in 1958 coup d'etat, wherein the Iraqi monarchy was eliminated. He ruled the country as Prime Minister until his downfall and death during the 1963 Ramadan Revolution. 146

the Egyptian press and even some angry exchanges between Nasser and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Especially after the Kennedy administration came to office in 1961, the idea that Nasser represented the kind of anti-Communist progressive stance that would promote long-term stability had its day. Egypt became a major recipient of American economic assistance, with American agricultural products paid for in the local currency of little international value emerging as a mainstay of the Egyptian food supply. And Washington gave diplomatic recognition to the Egyptian- backed revolutionary government in Yemen.

But as the Yemen War threatened to spill over into Saudi Arabia, it helped to undermine United States-Egyptian ties. And after Lyndon Johnson became president, the downturn in relations accelerated. Johnson was ardently pro-Israel, and he seemed to detest radical third world leaders in general, who to him were said to represent the Mexicans against whom his Texan forebears had fought. And one of Nasser’s close associates later told how he found some of the new American president’s personal behavior crude and boorish. By 1966, attacks on Nasser in American political circles had brought an end to food aid.

Relations with Soviet Union strengthened from the mid-1950s on except during the short-lived clash over Iraq. In 1958, the Soviets took on the task of building the High Dam, and by 1970 this monumental attempt to harness the Nile was complete. Soviet help enabled Egypt to develop such important industrial projects as the steel- producing complex at Helwan. Total economic aid from the Communist world in general amounted to over $1.4 billion during 1954-1965. The Egyptian armed forces came to depend almost entirely on Soviet military aid that totaled $1.5 billion in the decade starting in 1955.

At the regional level, the incorporation of the Arab states into the world capitalist Maulanasystem hasAzad made the Library, region vulnerable Aligarh to exploitation Muslim by Western powers.University The rift between the UAR and Saudi Arabia widened. In February 1966 Nasser expressed opposition to an Islamic grouping that King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa’ud was promoting, and in subsequent months’ propaganda warfare between the two countries was intensified. In October Tunisia severed relations with the UAR in response to 147

continued differences over Arab League66 policies. Although by this time Egyptian control over the republican armed forces and administration was increased, and when in September 1966, after President Abd Allah Sallal had returned to Yemen from a year’s absence in Cairo, the republican Prime Minister, Hasan al-Amri, and seven senior members of his Cabinet visited Egypt to make a plea for greater independence, they were arrested and detained there. In the following month about 100 senior Yemeni officials were dismissed, and arrests and executions were carried out.

However, Nasserism, as a discourse and a theory, did not die with the Egyptian military defeat in June 1967 and the Israeli occupation of Sinai. In fact, the defeat brought the Arab world together in a rallying call for Arabism. Furthermore, the main goals of Nasserism, especially Arab unity, proved to be unachievable because of international, regional and Egyptian political realities. Externally, the international system is founded on asymmetrical power relations that allow the power to impose, to various degrees, their strategic interests on the weak. Such a feature, given the asymmetry of power, may be viewed as legitimate within the international context. The sustained confrontation between the dominant Western power and the (West Asia) Middle East has been unmatched in the history of colonialism in terms of power relations.

Meanwhile, President Nasser faced daunting economic difficulties and an unstable political situation in Egypt. An austerity budget had been framed in July 1967. The cost of re-equipping the armed forces required reductions in investment, despite Soviet aid and assistance from other Arab governments. Socialist policies were still pursuing, as demonstrated by the decision, announced in October, to nationalize the wholesale trade. The continuing shortage of foreign exchange made it desirable to improve the UAR’s relations with the West, and in December diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were resumed. A bridging loan from the British, West German and Italian banks, obtained in February 1968, enabled the UAR to make the Maulanarepayments Azad to the IMF Library, that had been Aligarhoutstanding since Muslim the end of 1966 University, and in March the Fund approved further drawings.

66 The League of Arab States is a regional organization of Arab countries. It main goal is to draw closer the relations between member states and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. 148

Demonstrations by students and workers took place in Cairo and Helwan towards the end of February 1968. Initially organized to protest against the leniency of court sentences passed against senior air force officers for their failure to prevent the destruction of the UAR air force on 5 June 1967, they revealed widespread discontent. Several people were killed in clashes with police, and the universities were closed; nevertheless, President Nasser realized the need for immediate conciliatory action. Re- trials were ordered and comprehensive changes to the Cabinet were announced, including the introduction of a number of civilian experts. President Nasser retained the premiership.

Deprived of foreign exchange by the continued closure of the Canal and the reduction in the tourist trade, the UAR remained dependent on the regular aid payments from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya and on Soviet assistance. There were signs that the civilian economy ministers favored some relaxation of over-rigid state control in the industry and more encouragement of private enterprise and foreign investment. Meanwhile, military expenditure in 1968 and 1969 remained high; Soviet arms deliveries continued, as did the presence in Egypt of some 3,000 Soviet military advisers and instructors.

A pattern of sporadic action, involving artillery duels across the Suez Canal, commando raids and air combat developed throughout 1969 and into 1970, with growing Soviet involvement in Egypt’s defense. In the summer of 1970 the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, presented a set of proposals for solving the continuing Middle East crisis. An uneasy ceasefire, but no permanent solution, resulted. All of this, however, would be left for others, notably the reputedly rightist Sadat, whom he had installed as vice president the previous December (although perhaps not with the idea that Sadat would succeed him except as a temporary stopgap), as Nasir’s arduous attempt in September 1970 to mediate the growing conflict between the PLO and Jordanian monarchy ended with a fatal heart attack. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CHAPTER FOUR

ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD AND CONTEMPORARY

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT UNDER SADAT

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 149

CHAPTER FOUR

ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD AND CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT UNDER SADAT

At Nasser’s death, the political elite which inherited power was deeply divided. Nasser had failed to groom an obvious successor (Shazli, 1980:91) and the succession process was weakly institutionalized. Thus, a power struggle broke out between two major factions in the power elite which was to determine the direction of Egypt’s post- Nasser course. On one side was a small but well-placed faction composed of left-wing Free Officers and their civilian allies who held high positions and influence in the sixties. Ali Sabri, a Free Officer, senior party (ASU) chieftain and newly appointed Vice President, was the informal leader of this group. It also included a formidable number of the very top political elite, most of whom were also Free Officers: Interior Minister and party boss, Sha’rawi Guma; Information Minster, Muhammad Fa’iq; party apparatchik, Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur; Minister of Presidential Affairs, Sami Sharif; chief of the political police, Ahmad Kamel; War Minister, General Muhammad Fawzi; several other ministers and the Speaker of Parliament (Perry, 2004:112). The leftist faction enjoyed a majority of the executive committee of the state party, the ASU, a collective leadership organ which had assumed increasing authority in the sixties. A larger, but more diffuse conservative faction was led by the new President, Anwar Sadat, who assumed that office by virtue of his position as Vice-President on Nasser’s death and was confirmed in it by the ASU and subsequently by a popular plebiscite. Sadat’s main asset was the superior legal legitimacy of his office. He had not been close to the center of power in the late Nasser years and did not possess an organized power base; in fact, his rivals consented to his assumption of the Presidency partly because they Maulanathought heAzad represented Library, no threat to them Aligarh and could readily Muslim be controlled. University But Sadat did enjoy political seniority as one of the two remaining senior Free Officers and he had extensive contacts and diffused support in the political elite (Mc Dermott, 1988: 43-46). Prominent conservative personalities aligned with him from the outset were Hussein Shafa’i, the second surviving senior Free Officers, Sayyid Marei, a veteran minister ---

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politician and Mahmud Fawzi, a senior statesman --- diplomat. Once he assumed office, Sadat became the natural leader of all those opposed to the Sabri group. Civilian centrists such as Muhammad Hassanein Haykal and Aziz Sadqi joined him chiefly to prevent the Sabri faction from dominating the post-Nasir state. Some other important figures such as the prominent Free Officers, Mahmud Riad and Abd al-Qadir Hatim, simply accepted Sadat’s legal authority.

At issue between the two factions was the distribution of power, particularly Presidential power. Sabri’s group wanted a collective leadership in which the President would be held closely accountable to the rest of the power elite, specifically to the Supreme Executive Committee of the ASU (where it held a majority). Seeing themselves as Nasser’s true heirs, they could not permit Sadat, who had failed to keep up with the revolution’s leftward evolution in the sixties, to assume the tremendous powers, Nasser had acquired for the Presidency. Sadat, however, who considered himself to have been unfairly pushed from the center of power by upstarts like Sabri, had other ideas. He promised to consult the party bodies over the main lines of policy. But within these lines he fully intended to exercise the broad discretion Nasser enjoyed and would accept no tutelage over the power to decide for Egypt which the people had ‘deposited’ with him. Nor would he allow himself to become a front for rule by the Sabri clique or tolerate factional struggles against his authority (Hinnebusch, 1985:41). Sadat and his rivals clashed from the outset over what the latter considered unilateral actions taken by the President without consulting or against the wishes of the executive committee. But for Sadat and his allies who were long-time members of the elite and, in their view, under-represented in the executive committee because of Sabri’s electoral manipulations, its incumbents enjoyed no special authority, and by the weight of Nasirite tradition, the committee was subordinate to the President. Thus, the institutionalization of authority remained uncertain, and each faction asserted the superior legitimacy of the constitutional body it controlled. At base, the struggle was Maulanaover who Azad shall rule. Library, Aligarh Muslim University But the issues were far from separated from this power struggle and from the outset it was apparent that Sadat and Sabri stood for different conceptions of the course Egypt should follow. Sabri’s group was identified with the turn Nasserism had taken in the sixties: internally, heavy industrialization, state socialism, efforts to make the party

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superior to other power centers such as military and the cabinet, strong governmental controls over society, and, to many, the police repression which marred Nasser’s rule. In foreign policy, they stood for militancy toward Israel and a close alliance with the USSR. Sadat was known, by contrast, to have had strong reservations about all these policies. Prominent Sadat supporters like Fawzi and Haykel argued for a diplomatic opening to the West on the grounds that Egypt’s isolation from the West reduced her foreign policy options. The Sabri group retorted that expectations of American diplomatic help were an illusion unless Egypt was prepared to return to capitalism. In fact, many of those around Sadat were identified with conservative socio-economic policies; for example, had clashed with leftists in the sixties over his solicitude for the rights of landlords. One of Sadat’s first acts as President, the return of certain property seized from wealthy families, showed his sympathies lay in the same direction.

There were several watersheds in the conflict. Sadat’s appointment of Mahmud Fawzi as Prime Minister in defiance of the left’s desire to put one of their own in this post, was the opening shot; immediately the cabinet split into pro-and anti-Fawzi factions. Sadat rejected the Sabri group’s demand to reopen the War of Attrition and extended the ceasefire with Israel. He also proposed to reopen the Suez Canal in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the Canal bank and sought US mediation in dealing with Israel. In Sabri’s view, these were moves toward a separate peace in violation of Egypt’s policy of refusal to concede Arab rights. The showdown came over Sadat’s commitment to join with Syria and Libya in forming the so-called ‘Federation of Arab Republics,’67 (Perry, 2004:112) that was to include Egypt, Libya, and Syria (Sudan originally was expected to join, but dropped out because of the civil war in the South) which Sabri opposed because Sadat took this decision without consulting the ASU executive committee. At a meeting of the committee, the Sabri majority voted in the opposition, but Sadat took his case to the central committee and, after a bitter personal altercation with Sabri failed to resolve the issue there, to parliament where his

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

67 The Federation of Arab Republics was attempt by Libya’s Muammer Gaddafi to merge Libya, Egypt and Syria in order to create a United Arab state. Although approved by a referendum in each country on 1 September 1971, the three countries disagreed on the specific terms of the merger. The federation lasted from 1 January 1972 to 19 November 1977.

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opponents finally conceded. In May Day Speech68 the President openly and threateningly spoke of individuals and groups:

Concealing themselves behind slogans and maneuvers in order to establish a center of power so as to impose their control over the people after the people acting with Gamal Abdel Nasser and overthrown all the centers of power in order that the people themselves might remain the sole masters of their destiny (Quoted in Baker, 1978:125).

After ending his May Day Speech in 1971 with a dramatic attack on “centers of power,” Sadat suddenly withdrew all of Sabri’s responsibilities. Gum’a was fired after an Interior Ministry official brought Sadat a collection of taped conversations that allegedly revealed the existence of a coup plot. A large group in the anti-Sadat camp attempted to make the president’s position untenable by resigning en masse, but he responded by arresting more than 90 top leaders, several of whom soon received long prison or death sentences that in fact later were commuted. Culminating what he called his May 15 Correction, Sadat revealed that his opponents had bugged his office and broken into the late president’s safe to read his personal notes. Symbolizing an apparent break with oppressive practices, Sadat publicly conducted a bonfire of telephone conversation transcripts and secret files from the Interior Ministry. Before the end of the year, the country had a permanent constitution, approved by 99.8 percent of the voters (a not-so-subtle indication that democracy still had not arrived).

As Sadat was prevailing over his rivals in the government, the “no war, no peace” with Israel continued to hang over him. Following renewals of the original 90- day cease-fire, he declared that 1971 would be “the year of decision” (McDermott, 1988:44). When the year ended without any movement either toward peace or toward renewing hostilities. Sadat repeatedly called for a peaceful settlement, starting with a statement made to an American emissary at Nasser’s funeral. In February 1971 he Maulanaproposed Azad the possibility Library, of an interim Aligarh settlement in which Muslim the Israelis University would withdraw from the east bank of the Suez Canal and Egypt would reopen the waterway. In the

68 In his May day speech in 1971 with a dramatic attack on “centers of power”, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat openly and threateningly spoke of individuals and groups. Responding to the scarcely veiled warning in the speech, Sabri and the others resigned en masse, most likely intending thereby to embarrass Sadat.

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same month, Sadat eagerly agreed to a proposal by the United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring for an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement based on Security Council Resolution 24269 (Perry, 2004:113) but Israel’s strident rejection of the suggestion brought an end to Jarring’s effort. Washington still failed to take either Sadat’s staying power or his sincerity seriously.

Then, to the amazement of the world, the great “Crossing” of the Canal took place on October 6, 1973. Sadat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad --- whose forces simultaneously attacked the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in the June 1967 War (Vatikiotis, 1976:412). The Egyptian forces were successful in pushing back the Israeli, and in destroying many tanks and planes. After sixteen days, the United States provided Israel with sophisticated new weapons for use against Egyptian missile launchers. However, the October War was a major watershed in the development of the Egyptian political system under Sadat. Sadat’s ability to take credit for the war, and portray himself as the ‘Hero of the Crossing,’ (Hinnebusch, 1985:54) greatly enhanced his personal legitimacy and made him a leader in his own right. For a decisive two to three years, he was virtually free from challenges; the beleaguered, insecure Sadat of the pre- war period was transformed into a President radiating confidence and determined to get his way. The whole political establishment was strengthened by the war; there was a ‘rekindling of political will’ which, for a while, recharged the political elite with new hopes and energies (Baker, 1978:132). Sadat used the political capital won in the war and the opportunities created by it to transform Egypt’s foreign policy and economic strategy. In the October Paper70, the document setting forth his intended post-war course, he stressed continuity as much as change. In practice, his subsequent reversal of Nasser’s priorities was of the magnitude of a ‘counter-revolution’ from above. Global forces played the most immediate role in the shaping of Sadat’s course after October. His attempt to manipulate them produced a foreign policy opening to the West and a

Maulana69 UN SecurityAzad Council Library, Resolution 242 wasAligarh adopted unanimously Muslim by the UN University security council on November 22, 1967 in the aftermath of the six-day war. It was adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The resolution was sponsored by British Ambassador Lord Caradon and was one of five drafts under consideration. It led to peace treaties between Israel and Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), as well as the 1993 and 1995 agreements with the Palestinians.

70 In April, 1974, concomitant to the open-door policy, Sadat issued his “October Paper”, in which he outlined a strategy for the development of Egypt until the year 2000. Parallel to economic liberation, the paper also promised political liberation. For further detail see Aree pp:107-108.

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corresponding economic Infitah which altered the balance of power in state and society, permitting a virtual ‘restoration’ of the bourgeoisie.

Sadat insisted that his new course was a mere adaptation of Nasser’s nationalist foreign policy to new conditions. There would be an opening to the West, but Egypt would remain non-aligned. The struggle to regain lost Arab land would continue. Arabism remained a policy cornerstone, though in place of revolutionary Pan-Arabism, he envisioned a network of economic and diplomatic cooperation linking Egypt to the wealthy Arab oil states. In fact, by the end of 1976, a major foreign policy transformation was well on its way to consummation. Egypt’s relations with the Soviet Union, hitherto its main political and military backer, were close to the breaking point; instead Sadat unabashedly pursued the patronage of the United States, (Perry, 2004:115) the country he had shortly before recognized as the main backer of Egypt’s Israeli tormentor. Equally remarkable, in two major post-war troop disengagement agreements, Sinai l (1974) and Sinai II (1975)71, Sadat accepted partial and separate accords with Israel, which came close to withdrawing Egypt from the military conflict, and decisively weakened the Arabs’ ability to force a total Israeli withdrawal from the Arab lands. Not just Egypt’s traditional leadership of Arab nationalism was destroyed by this go-it alone policy, but access to the new Arab wealth she needed was jeopardized.

The predisposition for this course had been established by elite disillusionment with the costs and failures of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism and by the post-1967 friction with the USSR. Only the failure of the US to respond to Sadat’s overtures prevented a policy transformation prior to the October War. Paradoxically, Egypt’s relative success in the war actually strengthened this tendency, for the vindication of her humiliated pride was a psychological watershed permitting Egyptians to consider a withdrawal from Nasser’s Pan-Arab visions and ambitions without damage to their self-image. The military --- political power balance at the close of the October War was, however, the most immediate determinant of Egypt’s course. Sadat’s strategy of seizing a foothold on the MaulanaEast Bank Azad of the Canal Library, succeeded so wellAligarh that he decided Muslim to push further University into the Sinai, but this campaign too late and poorly conceived, ended in a retreat. The Israelis regained the initiative and carved out a ‘salient’ on the West Bank of the Canal, which

71 For the Sinai Agreement, See Appendix pp. 263-266

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put Sadat’s armies to the east in jeopardy. Forced to accept a ceasefire under these conditions, Sadat found that his bargaining hand, insofar as it depended on the military balance, was weak (Shazli, 1980:270). His political leverage, by contrast, was much stronger. American policy was now conscious, in the wake of the oil embargo, of the need to placate the Arabs if US West Asia interests were to survive. Israel was put on the defensive; its military superiority had been challenged with some success and its American patron now expected it to cooperate in efforts to defuse the West Asian crisis. The US perceived that Egypt was ready for a peace settlement and that a successful American mediation effort might both protect its interests and ‘roll back’ Soviet influence in the area.

When Kissinger arrived to mediate a disengagement of forces, Sadat responded with alacrity. In part, he feared a resumption of the fighting might go against him. The Soviets’ failure, in the face of American intimidation, to enforce the ceasefire against Israeli violations convinced him he could not depend on their help. His whole position as ‘Hero of the Crossing’ was at risk if he lost his Sinai foothold. In any case, American mediation was what he had wanted all along. Anxious to demonstrate to the Americans his statesmanship and readiness for peace, Sadat underplayed his hand in the negotiations (Perry, 2004:113-114). The resulting agreement removed the Israeli salient and entrenched and legitimized an Egyptian presence in the Sinai, thus rescuing Sadat from his military predicament. It committed the US to continuing the mediator role he wanted. But, by defusing the war crisis and ending the oil boycott, the disengagement destroyed the conditions which might have forced rapid super-power imposition of a comprehensive settlement; and by accepting a withdrawal of his missiles on the West Bank of the Canal and a mere token force in the east, Sadat seriously weakened the war option needed to play a credible hand in subsequent negotiations. Sinai l was perhaps the major watershed in the transformation of Egypt’s foreign policy (Brown, 1980:37- 50).

Maulana The Azad next stepLibrary, was Sinai llAligarh, a second disengagementMuslim agreementUniversity which significantly deepened Egypt’s disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict and her realignment with the US but at the expense of a more comprehensive settlement. Sinai l set the stage for it by reducing Sadat’s military options, staking his prestige on American mediation, and making him grateful to and trustful of Kissinger. The

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worsening of Soviet-Egyptian relations, further narrowing Sadat’s options, also helped push him into Sinai ll. In spite of the bad blood between Sadat and the Kremlin, the Russians had provided the weaponry which made the Canal crossing possible and they thought they were entitled to some gratitude. To Sadat, however, they had again demonstrated, in the ceasefire affair, their unreliability. When he opted to put his eggs in the American basket, the Soviets either decided to punish him or to cut their losses in Egypt. They refused to replace much of the weaponry Egypt had lost in the war or help him out of his economic difficulties (Fahmi, 1983:170-175). Cut off from Soviet support, Egypt’s military capability deteriorated; its bargaining leverage with Israel declined and its dependency on American diplomacy increased. Sinai ll had risked and costs, but if Sadat wished to keep the American patronage, he could hardly refuse an American sponsored agreement. Post-war economic constraints and opportunities pulled in the same direction. Egypt’s options were sharply constrained by her economic problems; on the other hand, the war had opened up new sources of economic help, surplus Arab petrodollars and Western aid and investment. Both the West and the conservative oil rich Arab states began to provide Egypt with enough aid to stay afloat, consolidating a growing economic dependency which had direct bearing on foreign policy: continuing aid and investment could only be expected in the context of a diplomatic and economic opening to the capitalist world. Ultimately, this depended on ending the conflict with Israel. By the middle of 1975, the obstacles to a comprehensive settlement seemed to have convinced Sadat that Sinai ll was the only viable road to this end. Negotiations for a comprehensive settlement seemed bogged down. The Arabs withdrew from Jordan and gave the PLO72 (Palestine Liberation Organization), with whom the Israelis refused to deal, the right to bargain for the Jordan’s West Bank. Israel seemed determined to avoid an overall settlement in exchange for conquered territory and the Americans appeared unwilling to force her into one. Thus, Sadat was faced with the choice of holding out in an effort to increase pressure on the US and Israel to move toward a general settlement, or taking the easier path toward a separate one. In the Sinai Maulanall agreement Azad he took Library,a decisive step along Aligarh the latter road. Muslim University

72 The Palestinian Liberation Organization is an Umbrella political organization claiming to represent the World’s Palestinians --- those Arabs, and their descendant, who lived in mandated Palestine before the creation to centralize the leadership of various Palestinians groups that previously had operated as clandestine resistance movements. It came into prominence only after the Six-day guerrilla war against Israel during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s before entering into peace negotiations with that country in the 1990s.

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In essence, the accord exchanged a limited Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai for a mere token of Egyptian military presence there and American ‘observers’ between the two armies. Thus, it nearly put an end to the Egyptian war option and came close to taking Egypt, out of the Arab-Israeli power balance. From Israel won, as the price of her withdrawn, a massive delivery of advanced weaponry from the US, it came out of the agreement with enhanced military superiority over the Arabs and a much-reduced incentive to make further concessions for the sake of peace. Israel also won an American promise to refrain from pressing it into dealings with the PLO or concessions to Syria. Indeed, the Americans, satisfied that the Arab-Israeli conflict had been defused for the immediate future, lost the sense of urgency which had driven their post-war diplomacy. By relying exclusively on the Americans and agreeing to a separate second disengagement Sadat decisively undermined the prospects of a general Arab-Israeli settlement. The agreement was also a first step in Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab world: it caused a decrease in Arab financial support to which Egypt was entitled as a front line state and it was a big step in alienating her from the Arab nationalist opinion which had long-sustained Egyptian leadership in the Arab world. As against these long- range costs, Sadat finally had concrete benefits to show for his war and diplomacy: The Suez Canal and Sinai oil fields won back, a significant withdrawal of the Israeli army, ending its threat to the Egyptian heartland, the promise of a massive infusion of Western aid into the economy. Before long, however, Sadat would again be faced with the choice of sticking with the Arab world in pursuit of a comprehensive settlement made much less likely by his own actions, or taking the ultimate steps towards a separate peace. Just as his war strategy ended in Sinai l, and later led to Sinai II, so the last would push Sadat along the road to Jerusalem (Baker, 1978:136-148).

Simultaneously, Egypt’s economic policy was undergoing an equally radical transformation. A creeping liberalization had since 1968 been gnawing at Nasser’s socialist edifice, setting the stage for his (Cooper, 1979:43). But the announcement of Maulanathe Infitah Azad, marked anLibrary, entirely new direction Aligarh in economic Muslim policy. Sadat University insisted that the new policy intended no retreat from ‘socialism’, but an adaptation to new conditions. Egypt’s economy, he argued, sapped by military spending and bureaucratic inertia could not alone mobilize sufficient resources for an economic recovery. Post-1973 conditions, were, however, right for attracting a major influx of Arab and foreign capital; hence an economic open door was required. Moreover, recovery required that

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the private sector be revitalized and allowed to play a role in the economy (Ministry of Information, 1974:60-65). In practice, however, Infitah spelled a major reversal of Nasserist economic: through an unrestricted opening of the economy to foreign imports and investment, a recession of statist and populist intervention in it and a downgrading of the public sector, Egypt was gradually reintegrated into the world capitalist system.

A multitude of forces converged to produce this policy transformation. Egypt’s economic crisis in the early seventies was certainly one powerful factor behind it. The economy was stagnant, growth, having fallen to perhaps 1% by 1974 while, in good part because of defense burdens, average private consumption was actually around 7% lower than a decade earlier. The country labored under a staggering debt load, estimated at from $ 4 billion to $ 10 billion, and 1974 debt service absorbed 40% of export earnings (Hinnebusch, 1985:58). Rapid population growth continued. The prospects of extracting much of a surplus from an already impoverished society appeared dim: to squeeze either the masses, taught under Nasser that they were entitled to a minimum of economic rights or the bourgeoisie, which expected a rising standard of living in return for the support the regime needed, carried grave political risks. Much of the elite had lost faith in a public sector burdened by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and populism as a viable engine of development. This was especially so in the absence of the Soviet technical and financial support on which it depended, and, in any case, much of the elite believed more and better such support was available in the West. Last, but not least, as population growth surged ahead of a stagnant agriculture, Egypt steadily lost the ability to feed herself and the West alone possessed the food surplus needed to make up the gap; to buy it required hard currency obtainable only in the West and to get it as aid required a Westward reorientation. On many counts, therefore, a convincing case could be made that Nasserism had failed and that Egypt could not survive without an economic bailout, which only the rich Arabs and the West could provide (Waterbury, 1976:201-215).

Maulana Fortuitously Azad , Library,Egypt’s grave need Aligarh was matched Muslim by new opportunities. University The post- war Western concern to safeguard its West Asian interests, combined with Egypt’s Westward diplomatic opening, made Egypt eligible as never before for Western capital and technology. The post-war boom in oil prices produced a massive transfer of global wealth to the Arab oil producers which Egypt had a chance --- and having helped

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produce it, perhaps a right --- to share. To continue a policy of socialist austerity amidst such capitalist riches must have seemed foolish if not impossible; rather, Egyptian elites perceived a unique opportunity to spark a new economic takeoff combining Western technology, Arab capital and Egyptian manpower. The opening of the international capitalist market was tailored to make this possible. To attract capital and to compete in this market, in turn, required the internal introduction of capitalist economic norms. Once Egypt began to get a share of the new wealth, she rapidly became ever more dependent on it; an enormous increase in imports after the war quadrupled her balance of payments deficit in 1975-76 and thereafter a huge deficit covered by Western or Arab aid became a permanent fixture of the economy. This dependency made the new course increasingly irreversible. The country also became more vulnerable to constraints on her policy options, issuing from external donors and investors who were undivided in urging, as a condition of continued assistance, a more thorough and rapid dismantling of Nasserite policies in favor of the capitalist markets. Once these forces had joined to local interests, they acquired a foothold in the political process which further increased their clout.

While ‘objective’ economic factors set the context of Egypt’s economic policy changes, the actual decisions resulted from a political process in which the balance of power was rapidly shifting toward indigenous social forces with an interest in these changes. The private bourgeoisie was recovering its economic power and political influence. Small and medium capitalists encouraged by the modest liberalization after 1967 were joined by the return to Egypt of those who had made fortunes in the Arabian Gulf. Segments of the state bourgeoisie recruited from private sector families or enriched in the office were friendly to private enterprise and less enthused about ‘socialism’. Both these elements wanted the security and opportunities to increase their wealth, and the access to Western goods which the Nasserite system failed to provide. They were aware that a free market system which rewarded those with scarce capital Maulanaand skills Azad was far more Library, favorable to them Aligarh than one which Muslim tried to mini mizeUniversity these effects by administrative means. They knew that economic liberalization would open up enormous new opportunities as traders, agents and partners with foreign firms for those with Western connections, education and business experience. Those in official position were aware of the opportunities for commissions, or higher paying jobs in foreign firms. They were therefore easily convinced that Nasserism had failed, through their own

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opposition explained, in part, its failure. The bourgeoisie pressed vigorously for many of the changes which became a part of Infitah, and once Infitah was adopted bourgeoisie pressure groups scrambled to take advantage of and extend it (Waterbury, 1976:305-313).

Finally, Sadat’s own preferences and political needs played a critical role in the new policy. He shared the view of the bourgeoisie that Nasser’s ‘socialism’73 had outlived its usefulness. A new course was needed to consolidate his support among the bourgeoisie, and indeed, his commitment to Infitah soon brought much of this class to regard him as virtually indispensable. Most decisively, Sadat viewed Infitah as inseparable from his foreign policy: he believed that the kind of American commitment needed to recover the Sinai from Israel was contingent on Egypt’s reintegration into the world capitalist system, and that the greater the economic opportunities opened to American investors, the more sympathetic the American government was likely to be (Baker, 1978:137). Thus, Sadat had multiple reasons to initiate Infitah and though he did so under pressure of domestic demands and foreign constraints, he did not do so reluctantly.

The intimate linkage between foreign policy alliances and economic strategies in weak, vulnerable states such as Egypt was clearly evident in the dynamics of policy change in Egypt. Just as Nasser’s conflicts with the West and friendly Soviet overtures were associated with moves away from capitalism and conflicts with the local bourgeoisie, so the collapse of Egypt ‘s Soviet alliance and the growing responsiveness of the US to Sadat’s needs, were associated with the opposite. It was not that external forces determined internal events; rather, the two were related in a process of mutually reinforcing positive feedback. Thus, Sadat’s purge of the Sabri group diluted Soviet support; this paved the way for post-war American responsiveness which in turn reinforced Sadat’s liberalization of internal policy and his alliance with the bourgeoisie. Maulana In Azad an attempt Library, to continue strengthening Aligarh the Muslim legitimacy of hisUniversity regime, Sadat introduced and enacted several political reforms that had a particular effect with in

73 Nasser adopted the programme of socialism, announced in the Charter of May 1962. The document explained that socialism ‘is the way to social freedom; social freedom means equal opportunity to every citizen to obtain a fair share of the national wealth’. Socialism could be instrumental in eradicating feudalism, in destroying the dictatorship of capital, and in establishing social justice, entirely by peaceful means (Sharabi,1966:129-130).

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regard to the common man’s role in government. The Arab Socialist Union, the sole political party developed under the Nasser regime, controlled Egypt’s political landscape, but was often charged with being the party of the elite and privileged. In an attempt to assuage popular pressure, in 1974 Sadat call for the reform of the union and the Egyptian political system. These reforms were geared to address various social forces in society as well as expanding the forum to new political parties (www.mideastinfo.com/paper4.htm). In 1975 Sadat permitted the establishment of the three groupings in the Arab Socialist Union to express the opinions of the left, the right, and the center of the regime. By 1976 the three platforms were permitted, within established guideline, to act as separate political entities, but each group needed to elect a minimum of twelve deputies to the people’s Assembly to be recognized. The leftist group was originally known as the National Progressive Unionist Organization (NPUO) led by Khalid Muhi ad Din, a Free Officer and a Marxist. The right wing group was the Socialist Liberal Organization (SLO --- later the Liberal or Ahrar Party) led by Mustafa Kamil Mural. The center group was known as the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization. The country’s main political forces, the Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nasserites, and the communists, however, were not allowed to represent (www.memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+eg0052).

In the October 1976 election, not unexpectedly, the pro-government center platform of the Arab Socialist Union won with an overwhelming majority, 280 seats; the SLP won 12 and NPUO only 2. Independent candidates, however could secure 48 seats in all. When he opened the new assembly Sadat announced that the plate forms would become political parties. Thus Sadat announced that he would establish his own party, the National Democratic Party74 (NDP), signaling the end of the Arab Socialist Union, which was merged with the NDP.

With his immediate priority of countering the Nasserist’s and leftists, who together were posing considerable threat to his regime, President Sadat released the MaulanaBrothers Azadfrom the prison Library, shortly after Aligarhtaking over as the Muslim President, and Universitysoft-pedalled the

74 The National Democratic Party (NDP) was an authoritarian party in a multi-party system in Egypt. It emerged from the Arab Socialist Union, serving as its successor after the end of the ASU sole ruling of Egypt in 1962. The party was dissolved on 16 April 2011 by court order, and its assets were transferred to the state.

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Islamicists. In the longer run, with his keenness to chart out a path that was different from Nasserism, he made a re-socialization, and to an extent re-Islamization, permanent features of his domestic policy. Sadat dotingly called the state of his vision “the state of science and faith” (dawlat al-’ilm wa’l-iman) --- although in the end it satisfied neither science nor faith.

Sadat launched his new program with what he described as the “15th May Corrective Operation”. In a televised address to the nation, he stressed the need to draft “the permanent constitution of the Republic”, and invited public debate on the matter. Making his own suggestions, which he claimed he was doing as an ordinary citizen, he wanted the constitution to stipulate what he described as “the dependable bond between collective freedom and political freedom”. Apparently with a view to satisfy his still existing socialist support base, particularly in the establishment, he emphasized that the new constitution should make “the socialist legitimacy the basis of all relationships in society”, and called for the protection of the public and cooperative sectors. The foundation of the constitution, however, had to be the Egyptian ethos and tradition. He said: “We should turn to the village which is our root”, ... “We have our tradition built up over thousands of years, and we have first and foremost our mission of faith” (Bari, 1995:80-81).

The ensuing public debate over the proposed constitution eventually turned into a debate on the place of religion in Egyptian polity. Al-Ahram became the medium of the debate for over a month and a half, in which various prominent personalities of law and religion expressed themselves. Among the first to plead that the new constitution should proclaim Islam the official state religion and make it the source of law was Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad al-Fakham. Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, the ideologue of the Brotherhood and then Director General of Islamic preaching (Da’wa) in the Ministry of Awqaf, favored complete Islamization of the constitution. Some others favored a modern secular constitution and suggested the application of modern method Maulanaof research Azad and criticism Library, to the sources Aligarh of Islamic jurisprudenceMuslim (Fiqh). University In the final outcome, the new constitution made Islam, like its previous version religion of state. Nasser’s constitution had stopped at that. But the present version added that “the principles of Islamic Shari’a are a major source of legislation”. The Islamicists had wanted the shari’a to be made the sole source of legislation (Kane, 1972:137-148).

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In the final outcome, however, the new constitution, adopted Islam as the religion of the state. Part 1, Article 2 of the new constitution reads: ... Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic is its official language. This was not the end of the controversy. Firstly, because the principles of Shari’a rather than the Shari’a itself were stated to be a source of legislation and not the major source. Lastly, by stating in Article 3 that the people were the sole source of authority, the constitution in fact left ample scope for secular legislation. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the battle for the application of the Shari’a (tatbiq al-Shari’a) continued throughout the 1970s with the Islamists in the lead.

Despite the considerable tension between the Islamic establishment and the regime over the issue of implementation of the Shari’a, Sadat continued to use religious symbolism. Since al-Azhar was the most important connected with the religious life of Muslims in Egypt, Sadat appeared to have given considerable thought to using this institution, together with the Sufi orders of the country, as an instrument to promote his religious policy, about which he always appeared to have held. The government encouraged, and sometimes actively assisted, the establishment of a variety of religious institutions outside the sphere of al-Azhar as well. In November 1975, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the only legal, political party of the country, announced a plan to establish, in cooperation with a private religious society, what was called the “first Islamic complex” at a cost of 250,000 Egyptian pounds (1£E = > US $ 2 in the 1970s) in ‘Imraniya area that would include a mosque, a religious institution and sections for preparing children for junior and secondary certificates. Hafiz Salama, head of the Islamic Guidance Society (Jam’iyat al-Hidayat al-Islamiyya) in the Suez city (Bari, 1995:84) and a leader of the popular resistance against Israeli attacks on the city during Egypt-Israel war of attrition, launched an “Islamic project” worth three million Egyptian pounds, with active government encouragement, to construct a mosque in the ‘Abbasiya area, which was to function as the center of various Islamic activities. The Maulanagovernorate Azad of Cairo Library, donated the land.Aligarh Contributions Muslim were collected University not only by individuals, but by various private and public sector companies as well. Even the armed forces personnel participated in fund collection. Many Gulf States also responded favorably to Shaykh Salama’s request for donation for the purpose (Al-Ahram, 28 July 1976:12).

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A similar program, which was described as guiding experience for the establishment of a real Islamic society, was “the club of small Muslims”. Marzouq Hilal, the founder of the club, was otherwise known for his television programs for children on Islamic subjects. The club started with thirty members of both sexes in the age group of fourteen and sixteen years, but shortly swelled into a large membership. The aim of the club was to prepare a new generation of youth who had memorized the Qur’an and was knowledgeable about the principles of the faith, to acquire an understanding of Islam which suited the young minds (Bari, 1995:84).

Keeping this enhanced weight of the right to his regime, President Anwar Sadat was attacked by the Islamicists on two counts: (1) His “open door policy” had produced a new class of elites whose lifestyle was resented by the poor and these grievances was articulated by the Islamic groups. Thus corruption became a major weapon to discredit President Anwar Sadat’s regime in the hands of the Islamic groups. (2) He was also attacked by these Islamic groups for his visit to Israel (Jerusalem) and his subsequent conclusion of the Camp David Agreements with Israel in 1978-79 (Pasha, 2005:231).

On November 9, 1977, without consulting anyone in advance, the Egyptian president provided the world with another example of his “electric shock” technique. He announced in the People’s Assembly that he was so intent on peace that he would be willing to go to the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) to present his case, a proposal that was so extraordinary that it took a while for anyone to realize that Sadat was serious.

After receiving an invitation, Sadat flew to Israel November 20 and gave a flowery speech to the Knesset (Perry, 2004:118). He eloquently stated the Arab case, but pleaded for peace and overdid himself with exaggerated affection toward Israeli leaders. From this point on, he came to be idolized in the West, and at least for a while the vast majority of Egyptians seemed to hope that he had embarked on a road to peace and prosperity. But even after the trip to Jerusalem peace was hard to come by, as ensuing MaulanaEgyptian Azad-Israeli negotiations Library, demonstrated. Aligarh Israel was Muslim ready to withdraw University from Sinai as part of a peace settlement, but Sadat could not blatantly desert the broader Arab cause to get this. When Begin met Sadat in Ismailia in December, he offered mere autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip --- not for these territories as such --- under the continuing Israeli rule.

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With the momentum for peace in danger, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to a meeting at his retreat in Camp David, Maryland (Perry, 2004:118). The tripartite summit of September 5-17, 1977, resulted in an agreement --- which would earn them the Nobel Peace Prize later that year --- on the framework for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that would fully end the occupation of Sinai but with strict limits on Egyptian military forces located there. Begin and Sadat also accepted a framework for a broader settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict involving projected negotiations to establish Palestinian autonomy for five years (bypassing the PLO), with the final status of these territories to be the subject of further talks. Hurdles remained, as Begin made clear that Israel intended to keep the occupied Palestinian territories and as Sadat, who was coming under heavy criticism in the Arab world for moving toward a separate peace --- called for a link between any Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the resolution of the Palestine issue. But following a trip by Carter to Jerusalem and Cairo in March 1979, Begin and Sadat finally signed a peace treaty that went into effect the following month. It provided that Israel would fully withdraw from Egyptian territory by April 1982. In accordance with the treaty, the two countries established normal relations in January 1980, at a time when Israel still occupied a third of the Sinai.

The treaty did not provide the link that Sadat had called for. In the Arab world this appeared as a separate peace that would so diminish the coalition confronting Israel that any inducement to settle the Palestine question except on its own terms would be gone. With neither the Palestinians nor the Jordanian regime willing to work within the new framework, Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy proceeded for a while, but Cairo broke the discussions off in 1980 after the Knesset passed a resolution reaffirming the eternal nature of an undivided Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.

The Egyptian alliance with the United States blossomed. From now on, Egypt would receive about $ 2 billion a year in American aid, making it second only to Israel. The United States would get base facilities in Egypt, and joint United States --- MaulanaEgyptian Azad air force Library, maneuvers would Aligarh occur. With Muslim the Iranian revolution University of 1979 overthrowing the Shah’s regime, Sadat’s Egypt seemed to inherit his mantle as a top US client state. Sadat gave refuge to the dying shah and became an enemy of Iran’s revolutionary regime, as well as a supporter of the Islamic guerrilla resistance in Afghanistan after the USSR occupied that country in 1979. The relationship with the

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Soviet Union deteriorated, with Sadat abrogates the Friendship Treaty in 197675. He suspended payment on Egypt’s debt to the USSR the following year and expelled the Soviet ambassador in September 1981.

The rest of the Arab world was horrified by Sadat’s separate peace. A meeting in Tripoli, Libya, in December 1977 established a Steadfastness Front of Syria, the PLO, Algeria, and South Yemen aimed at freezing relations with Egypt (McDermott, 1988:56). The Iraqi delegate walked out of the meeting to protest its failure to take an even stronger stand. Sadat severed diplomatic relations with all of them. Following the Camp David agreements, popular anger in the Arab world was so intense that even conservative regimes dared not express displeasure. An Arab League meeting in Baghdad on November 1978 called for severing diplomatic relations with Egypt, suspending it from the Arab League, and moving the organization’s headquarters to another country if Sadat went ahead with the separate peace with Israel. When the treaty was concluded, a meeting of Arab foreign ministers called for cutting off all economic relations with Egypt as well. Almost all the Arab states implemented these sanctions. With Egypt’s membership in the Arab League --- and other organizations too, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)76 --- suspended, the Arab League moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. Egypt’s isolation from the Arab world seemed nearly complete, as Sadat lashed out with epithets such as “dwarfs” and “madmen” toward other leaders. Insofar as his peace with Israel would remain popular at home, it seemed that Egyptians were rejecting their Arab identity altogether. As a result, Egypt became increasingly dependent on financial and military aid from the USA.

In the aftermath of the treaty, Sadat, seeking to present an image of internal unity behind it, launched an offensive against the opposition. Parliament, from which the opposition had agitated against his foreign policy and in which even government Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 75 On May 27, 1971 a friendship treaty was signed between the two countries but the relationship were nevertheless declining. In July 1972 the Egypt government expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt and in March 1976 abrogated the friendship treaty.

76 Organization of Islamic Conference is an international organization founded in 1969 consisting of 57 member states. The Organization states that it is “the collective voices of the Muslim world” and works to “safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting peace and harmony”.

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deputies sometimes seemed on the verge of revolt against it, was dismissed; in the subsequent elections the government made sure no deputy which had opposed the treaty was returned. Sadat also attacked the press, proposing to abolish the journalists’ syndicate which he considered a bulwark of those engaged in ‘irresponsible criticism’. He proposed a political ‘code of ethics’ to ensure that criticism remained ‘responsible’ and outlawed transgressions against traditional family values such as disrespect for the head of the big Egyptian family, that is, the President (Cantori, 1980:75).

Yet far from declining, opposition widened significantly in the post-treaty period. Much of it grew out of discontent with the treaty. Virtually no progress was achieved in the ‘autonomy’ talks, yet normalization was allowed to proceed. Israel’s aggression against Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, made possible, according to the opposition, by Egypt’s separate peace, embarrassed the government; it could only lamely assert that it would not allow Israel’s ‘foolish’ actions to undermine peace. Opposition was inflamed by rumors of plans to divert Nile water to help irrigate the Israeli Nagav, the rewriting of school textbooks to change the negative image of Israelis and efforts to push Egyptian professionals into relations with Israeli counterparts. The silencing of critics of ‘normalization’ appeared to be repression for the sake of Israel. As time passed, the negative psychological effect of isolation from the Arab world and disillusionment that peace would bring prosperity, increased. Sadat’s overt abandonment of non-alignment for American patronage grated on the sensibilities of the opposition. Accumulated grievances over unabated economic distress and official corruption, soured many on Infitah. Sadat himself publicly acknowledged that Infitah would have to be altered to help those --- workers, peasants, government employees --- who had not benefited from it. The ‘lack of democracy’ and Sadat’s personalistic rule were also part of the brew of discontent. Sadat had faced opposition all along, of course; what made the post-treaty period different was that previously acquiescent part of the political spectrum --- the mainstream Islamic and even the secular center --- were now joining it, and disparate Maulanaopposition Azad forces were Library, coalescing against Aligarh the regime. Muslim Dissidence was University taking on wider and deeper dimensions than at any time since 1973.

A startling rise in the breadth and intensity of the Islamic movement had been apparent since 1977 when Islamic forces swept the student union elections, then spilled over into the mosques, Baladi quarters and small towns. But it was only after the Iranian

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revolution and the peace treaty that the mainstream of the movement took a clear anti- government direction. Sadat’s asylum to the Shah,77 his support for a liberalized law of personal status and, above all, his separate peace treaty turned Islamic militants against him. Islamic opposition was manifested in student demonstrations, criticism of the treaty in the Muslim Brotherhood press, and a growth in violent attacks on security forces. In the end, Sadat, breaking with his former allies, denounced the Islamic movement as a state within a state that he would no longer tolerate.

The secular opposition also significantly widened as the left and liberal-right (pro- Wafd) were increasingly joined by centrist elements. The initially ‘tame’ SLP turned into an authentic opposition, bitterly critical of the regime. It took issue with normalization of relations with Israel in the absence of any Israeli concessions to Palestinian rights and followed a populist line in criticism of the government’s socioeconomic policies. Like its predecessors, this government-created opposition party was taking it seriously; as Sadat shut off one channel of dissidence, it only seemed to find new ones through which to express itself. Growing centrist opposition was also expressed in petitions signed by nearly 80 prominent Egyptians grouped in a ‘National Coalition’ (Hinnebusch, 1985:76). They called for a freeze in relations with Israel, a return of Egypt to its role in defense of the Arab cause, and an end to American bases and dependency; they also criticized the personality character of Sadat’s rule, his failure to share power within the elite or observe democratic rights and the independence of the press and the judiciary. The petitioners were mostly moderate liberals and Nasserites, including ex-Free Officers, former Vice Presidents and many ex-establishment figures who had served and being shunted aside by Sadat. Sadat’s personal support within his own constituency was fraying, as his foreign policy started to go beyond even the establishment consensus of what was acceptable.

Sadat initially tried to appease the dissidents. In 1980 he personally assumed the Premiership and brought in a new economic management team, promising to stamp out Maulanacorruption Azad and favoritism Library, and reform AligarhInfitah. A reversion Muslim to populist measuresUniversity, such as slashes in prices of popular goods, and increased price controls, were meant to assuage

77 Iranian Revolution also called Islamic Revolution, popular uprising in Iran in 1978-79 that resulted in the toppling of the monarchy on April, 1979 and led to the establishment of an Islamic Republic. Facing likely execution should Shah return to Iran, he died in exile in Egypt, whose President Anwar Sadat had granted him asylum.

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the mass discontent. To divert dissidence over his Western and Israeli relations, he tried to portray communism as the chief enemy of Islam and made much of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, alarmed at the breadth and growing boldness of the opposition, Sadat resorted to repression. In 1981 a wave of arrests swept up at least 1500 opposition leaders from across the political spectrum, including Islamicists and even leaders of the SLP. Scores of mosques were seized from militant preachers and government controls over thousands of others tightened; the recalcitrant Pope of the Coptic Church was fired; and seven publications, including the SLP organ, closed down (Hinnebusch, 1985:77).

In October 1981 the Sadat era came to an abrupt end after the President was gunned down by Islamic militants in apparent retaliation for the crackdown. The lack of public grief in any way comparable to that which greeted Nasser’s death suggested that there was little sorrow among the mass public at Sadat’s passing. Paradoxically, however, Sadat’s work may last for longer than Nasser’s did, for, in contrast to his predecessor, he had institutionalized his course in a political establishment whose interests were compatible, indeed served, by the main lines of his policies.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat:

After Nasser’s death, Sadat’s rise as President of Egypt, the Brotherhood began to enjoy the benefits of once again operating out in the open, something they had been prevented from doing under Nasser. Sadat felt that Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood could counterbalance the unwanted influence of the Nasserite and Leftist elements that had enjoyed support when Nasser had been alive. During this period, the Brotherhood was able to once again expand their efforts outside hidden back rooms and hushed conversation. Under the Sadat’s rule, the Brotherhood was able to expand their Maulanamembership Azad in the Library, established middle Aligarh class, which Muslim had been all butUniversity decimated by Nasser.

Perhaps most important of the changes of the Sadat era was his abolishment of the one- party system of government instituted by Nasser. The Arab Socialist Union adopted by Nasser had served as the sole party in Parliament. This one party represented the whole

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of Egypt and prevented groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood the opportunity to mobilize politically. This signaled a new period in the history of the Brotherhood, as the possibility of real political power became a reality, and the Brotherhood was afforded the chance to begin making plans for the future. Sadat ratified a constitution in 1971, replacing the one-party system with a multi-party system, (McDermott, 1988:52) as well as securing Islam as the religion of the state. Sadat was turning into a savior for the Brotherhood, as his image as the “believer president” provided the Brotherhood the legitimacy to operate more openly (McDermott, 1988:192). It is at this point that the Muslim Brotherhood had to decide what were its political aspirations.

Sadat instituted sweeping changes at the beginning of his rule. Perhaps the most significant for the Brotherhood were Sadat’s aspirations of reconciliation with Israel. It is important to note how the Brotherhood’s position affected their relationship with Sadat, as his lax policies toward Israel conflicted with the Brotherhood’s view. Sadat was bidding for support from the West, who was eager to see the hostilities between Israel and the Arab world cease. The Brotherhood would be immovable in their opinion, though later in their history their position eased. The Brotherhood understood itself to be maintaining the general opinion of the Egyptian people, still raw from defeat in the 1967 war. Though Sadat was making bold political strides to reconcile with Israel and in turn with the West, to do so would distance his regime from the people, who were still deeply embarrassed by Egypt’s defeat. The entire government machinery in Egypt was traumatized by it and began to take a more lenient view of the Muslim Brothers in the prisons. They re-grouped themselves again in 1969, and began their activities in gatherings arranged for the “recitation of the Qur’an and remembrance of God” in mosques and elsewhere. Medical and engineering colleges in Cairo were among the first to witness such activities (Bari, 1995:82-83). Sadat had seen rising religiosity in the country after Egypt’s humiliating defeat in the 1967 war. Wishing overall to capture the religious imagination of the Egyptian public, Sadat favored an open religious policy. MaulanaThis went Azad further in Library, facilitating the organizationsAligarh re -Muslimemergence as a Universitypolitical force in the second half of 1970s.

Sadat’s regime heralded in not only changes in policy, intended to separate itself from those of Nasser, but perhaps more importantly a close aligning with the “Western” world. The criticism of Sayyid Qutb on American i.e. Western culture was aimed not

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only at the West, but also the Nasser regime and his nationalistic policies. Inheriting Nasser’s tendency to lean away from the Brotherhood’s Islamic message would serve to sour the Brotherhood’s impression of him. Though the Sadat regime did indeed take a more lenient stance toward the Brotherhood, his vetting of support from the Western world placed him in a compromising position.

In return for these political favors, the Brotherhood initially cooperated with the government. Not only did the Brotherhood oppose the anti-regime violence of the militant Islamic groups, but also provided Islamic justification for the regime’s denunciation of Pan-Arabism and socialism. The Brotherhood claimed that history textbooks taught in Egyptian, Syrian and other Arab schools were in fact a war against Islam.

Though under Sadat, the Brotherhood had enjoyed a much more politically open relationship with the government, the Brotherhood had to consider its constituency. But the Brotherhood could not budge on its position on Israel, nor could it fully, embrace such an open Western approach to civil and foreign policy no matter how much freedom Sadat had afforded them. The Peace Treaty with Israel ended the Brotherhood’s voluntary cooperation with the government. Disenchanted with the government’s non-implementation of Shari’a, but more specifically, the government’s refusal to allow them to form a political party, the Brotherhood came into increasingly open confrontation with the Sadat regime in the Post-Camp David period. Omar al- Tilmissani, the Supreme Guide and editor of al-Da’wa denounced the agreement as it did not explicitly compel Israel to withdraw from Jerusalem as according to Islamic law, ‘it is a sin to leave any Muslim land in the hands of usurpers’ (Aree, 2001:119).

On the economic front, the Muslim Brotherhood also opposed his open door policy. The Brotherhood described the Sadat’s policy of Infitah as the policy of consumerism and opposed it specifically on moral and religious grounds. It pointed out Maulanathat in orderAzad to popularize Library, their produce Aligarh, foreign companiesMuslim were University trying to change public thinking and their culture, which sometimes contrasted with the teachings of their religion. It further said that efforts to open an American television station in Egypt and to establish a joint film company were also aimed at achieving the same objective (Hinnebusch, 1985:285). However, the Brotherhood utilized the flexibility allotted to them to launch criticisms of Sadat through their publication and demonstrations.

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Sadat would not have been overtaken by the Brotherhood’s criticism of his policies, but he was slow to review his approach to the Brotherhood, apparently hoping to win it over to his side. So the Sadat’s government proposed the constitution of a Higher Islamic Council, and in August 1979 the President invited Islamic leaders, which included ‘Umar al-Tilmisani, the General Guide of the Brotherhood, for consultation. The Brotherhood, however, was not sure of the government’s intentions. It expressed the fear that the council might only be meant to “restrict the Islamic da’wa”. It wanted guarantees of independent functioning of the council so that it would not be turned into an instrument to control the Islamic work. The Brotherhood argued that Islamic preaching was obligatory, and every Muslim, male and female, should be allowed to preach without restrictions or preconditions. It also demanded that the council should represent Islamic associations and groups (al-jami’yat wa’l-Jama’at al- Islamiya) without exception, and these associations and groups should be given freedom to select their representatives in the council. Its other demands included full freedom in Islamic work without pressure or restraints, holding an election for filling up important religious positions, and closure of the “centers of amusement and immorality in al-Ahram Street and other places” (Bari, 1995:98). To alleviate those concerns, Sadat offered the Brotherhood an opportunity to participate in parliament through the political parties that arose from the abolishment of the single party system under Nasser (Waterbury, 1983:88). The Brotherhood, under General Guide Umar al-Tilmisani, declined due to the belief that participation in a secular government would negatively impact the Brotherhood’s image as an Islamist organization (Raphael, 1985:268).

However, Sadat’s unabated pursuit of controversial policies, which ignored the interests and views of the Brotherhood, and persisting historical animosities, combined to polarize relations between the regime and the Brotherhood. His Jerusalem visit thus became a watershed in the history of the Muslim Brothers. While previously the activities of the organization remained subdued because it perceived its open existence Maulanaas fully dependentAzad onLibrary, the good-will ofAligarh the government Muslim --- for which Universityit openly showed its gratitude --- in the post-1977 phase it was defiant and could hardly find a common ground with the regime in Cairo.

When the Brotherhood attempted to mobilize public support in a challenge to his policies, Sadat responded with varying levels of repression; the former had their

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political activity curbed or ended, the latter suffered imprisonment. Anwar Sadat would be assassinated on October 6, 1981 by what some believe to be ex-members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat’s death would herald in a new era of political participation for the Brotherhood, as well as political oppression under Hosni Mubarak.

The Islamic movements during Sadat

The emergence of an Islamic movement in Egypt increasingly at odds with the regime was perhaps the most important ingredient in the pluralization of the political arena: it added a depth of the opposition of which neither the left nor liberal right was capable. Its emergence was partly rooted in an accumulation of rapid, unbalanced, social change. Massive urbanization was uprooting a growing number of persons from the land and village community who could not be absorbed by the modern sector of the economy. Set adrift from the security of family and village, searching for a wider identity and solidarity, yet barely removed from traditional life and values, their heightened aspirations frustrated with a system dominated by a Westernized bourgeoisie, urban migrants were especially susceptible to recruitment by a nativist social protest movement. The unbalanced development of education, producing graduates far in excess of the absorptive capacity of the economy, reached crisis proportions in the seventies, making the campuses a special breeding ground for oppositional movements. The Islamic movement on campus was also fed by another kind of social dislocation: the massive movement of women out of the protected home environment in higher education and public spaces, helped produce the movement toward Islamic dress and deportment partly as protection against the male molestation (Hinnebusch, 1985:199). But, that the main opposition movement should have taken an Islamic, rather than a secular nationalist or left wing from, and that it emerged when it did, cannot be explained without reference to political factors. The Muslim Brotherhood, Maulanapowerful Azad before 1952 Library, had, after Aligarh all, being contained Muslim under Nasser University through a combination of efficient repression and the popular legitimacy of the leader. It is clear that the decisive political event which revived the fortunes of the Islamic movement, was the 1967 defeat; the peoples’ faith in Nasser as a symbol of Arab dignity and strength and in the secular nationalist and socialist mix which made up his ideology,

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was shattered, leaving a leadership and ideological vacuum. It was not unnatural that Egyptians, suffering from a loss of self-esteem and security, and apparently failed by importing secular ideologies, should turn back to the indigenous and familiar: religion provided a comprehensive world-view which satisfied people’s need for inner security in the face of uncontrollable disaster. The disaster could be made bearable by resignation if it was seen as God’s will; religion offered hope too, for if Egyptians returned to the Islamic path, God would favor them and give them the moral strength to redress the defeat. The 1973 ‘Ramadan War,’ seen as an Islamic victory, and the sudden rise in the wealth and prestige of apparently ‘Islamic’ regimes like Saudi Arabia and Libya reinforced this view. The growing contact of Egyptians with these more conservative societies as well as the funds made available by them to religious groups in Egypt helped stimulate religious revival (Dessouki, 1982:22-23). Finally, Sadat’s policies played a decisive role in the broadening of an Islamic opposition. His relaxation of police controls and the encouragement he initially gave to Islamic revival as a way of winning mass legitimacy and defeating the threat from the left, gave Islamic groups the opportunity to proselytize and organized without government molestation. But it was Sadat’s economic and foreign policies which mobilized the movement against the regime. The Westernization and inequality spurred by Infitah were perceived as a threat to Islamic values and Islamic social justice, the alliance with the United States and peace with Israel as capitulation to infidel powers. Thus, the very factors which accounted for Nasser’s ability to contain Islamic opposition --- efficient repression and nativist --- populist legitimacy --- were decisively weakened under a less repressive, more cosmopolitan regime.

Sadat enjoyed good relations with much of the Islamic movement for at least the first half decade of his rule. His more traditional outlook as compared to Nasser, his portrayal of himself as the ‘believing President,’ his expulsion of the Soviet advisors, his alignment with the more Islamic Arab states and his support for the Islamization of Maulanalegislation Azad pleased IslamicLibrary, leaders. Sadat Aligarh released many Muslim the Brotherhood University leaders from prison, and allowed them to preach and organize so long as they eschewed opposition politics, violence and secret cells. In 1976 al-Dawa was allowed to start publishing and in 1977 the regime abstained from obstructing the movement’s capture of the student unions. For a while, there were even pro-Sadat factions in the movement. For Sadat, the political benefits of this policy were substantial. It enhanced his legitimacy as an

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Islamic ruler. The spread of political Islam weakened the nationalist-left in which, until the end of the seventies, he saw his main opposition. The movement swept the campuses where otherwise dissidence would have probably taken a left wing from while the mass religious revival it encouraged undercut the threat of a mass reaction to de-Nasserisation.

The first signs of divergence between the regime and political Islam were the 1974 attack on the military academy, the attacks of fundamentalists on nightclubs during the 1977 riots and the Takfir wa’l-Hijra incidents. Thus aroused to the oppositional potential in an independent Islamic force, the regime rejected the Brotherhood requests to form an Islamic political party, and insisted on the separation of politics and religion. As Western penetration, the American alliance and Sadat’s accommodation with Israel became more overt, regime, relations with the movement soured; the peace treaty and the break with Saudi Arabia, patron of the center-right of the movement, marked a watershed in this development (Altman, 1979:88-93). Sadat at first tried to contain rising Islamic opposition through overt Islamic symbolism and the sponsorship of Islamic legislation. But, encouraged by the Iranian revolution, it spread and intensified: criticism in al-Dawa invited its frequent confiscation; demonstrations against the treaty, and the asylum offered the Shah, spread. Minya and Asyut were turned into centers of nearly constant anti-government and anti-Copt agitation. Sadat finally began to re-impose coercive controls on Islamic political activity: the leadership of the Islamic-led student unions were purged, and a Supreme Islamic Council (SIC) proposed which would bring all Islamic associations under the establishment tutelage (Hinnebusch, 1985:206). But the scale of disturbances and violence escalated. In 1981, sectarian rioting spread in Cairo. In the summer of 1981, Sadat cracked down, arresting large numbers of Islamic leaders, including the moderate Tilmisani, and ordering the takeover of mosques controlled by fundamentalist preachers. The Islamic movement, he declared, had become a state within a state and would no longer be tolerated; the break Maulanabetween AzadSadat and hisLibrary, former allies seemed Aligarh complete. Muslim It required only Universitythe assassination of the President by Islamic dissidents in the army and massive Islamic attacks on police stations in Upper Egypt in which more than 100 policemen were killed or injured, to complete the story (Hinnebusch, 1985:207).

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The development of relations between the regime and political Islam exposed something of the changing role of religion in Egyptian politics. Under Nasser, the political system seemed to tame and subordinate religion to its own purposes. The smashing of the Brotherhood, the confiscations of extensive Wafq lands, and the secularization of the schools and courts radically curbed the political influence of religion; the takeover of Al-Azhar, and the supervision subsidization and appointment of the personnel of the main mosques narrowed the autonomy of Islamic institutional life (Berger, 1970:63). Although religious elites were brought to lend public approval to regime policies, its legitimacy rested mainly on nationalist grounds. Under Sadat there was a re-Islamization of politics. Unwittingly, he contributed to it by relaxing state control over mosques and religious societies. He insisted that they eschew political activity and that religion and politics remain separate. But he himself constantly tried to use religious legitimacy and Islamic forces, established or not, against his opponents. As Sadat’s policies went beyond what they could accept from an Islamic ruler, Islamic activists rejected the separation of politics and religion, and sought to recreate the city of God on earth. The very dearth of legitimate means of political expression at odds with official policy turned many to the mosque and Islamic associations as outlets for their dissidence. This re-Islamization threatened to shift the balance of power in Egypt. Because Islam was the idiom most comprehensible to the masses, the movement had the powerful potential to mobilize mass opposition and to do so on an intensely moral- ideological basis. In short, it promised to broaden the scope and deepen the intensity of conflict between a Westernized elite and a nativist mass. Its diffuseness and natural mass roots made it very hard to decisively repress. The effect of this seemed to be to put vague, but real limits on what the elite believed it could safely do, a lesson reinforced by the assassination of Sadat. By the eighties, there were signs that this was beginning to check, even upset, the game of interest group politics, which throughout the Sadat era had been played chiefly at the expense of the have-nots. It may also have begun to destroy the mass tolerance for the normalization of relations with Israel and the MaulanaAmericanization Azad of Library, Egypt and thus Aligarh to put in place Muslim domestic constraints University on foreign policy-making which seemed largely absent for much of the Sadat era. But the potential of the Islamic movement seemed largely limited to such negative power. Barring regime acceptance of an Islamic party, it had no legitimate means to translate support into the shaping of policy. It lacked the organization and unified leadership to make a

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forcible bid for power on its own; the limited appeal of its program to the secular educated and to Copts, exacerbated by its own sectarian agitation, was an obstacle to the formation of the broad opposition front needed to really threaten the regime and, indeed, allowed the regime to play the politics of divide and rule.

Ideology of the Islamic movements:

It is appropriate to speak of an Islamic movement in Egypt, which shares a common orientation. All Egypt’s Islamic groups seek the creation of an Islamic state headed by a pious Muslim and enforcing Islamic law and social justice. All believe that in the true implementation of the social blueprint supposedly contained in the Qur’an and Shari’a lies the solution to Egypt’s problems. They share a rejection of foreign ideologies --- whether liberal capitalism or Marxism --- and attribute Egypt’s disasters to attempt to imitate these foreign models. In varying degrees, they all combine puritanism in matters of personal morals with public activism in search of a truly Islamic social order. The movement, however, possesses no united leadership, overarching organization or common program, and is, indeed, divided into a multitude of autonomous groups. These groups can usefully be classified along a spectrum ranging from those more conservative and tolerant of the status quo to the more radical activist groups which reject the established order and seek its violent revolutionary transformation (Dessouki, 1982:12).

On the conservative side of the spectrum were traditional, but politically active Ulama and neighborhood leaders who spoke the language of Islam and projected an image of Islamic piety. Their main concern was the enforcement of the Shari’a in matters of personal morality. Although they sometimes used populist rhetoric, most were little concerned with the social equality which agitated other Islamic militants; Maulanaindeed, manyAzad profited Library, from Infitah, and Aligarh were not only Muslim violently anti-Nasserite University and anti- Marxist, but were alarmed at radical Islam as well (some denounced Khomeini’s regime as a communist front). A good example of this type of figure was Sayyid Gallal, a wealthy merchant and pious Hajj powerful in Cairo’s Baladi quarters. This group was generally satisfied to work through the regime (e.g. through parliament) and was, in fact,

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long allied with Sadat. In time, however, as Sadat’s commitment to Islamization failed to take concrete forms, particularly when he threw his weight behind a liberalized law of personal status, many of this group were disillusioned with him; nor did his separate peace with Israel to go down well them (Hinnebusch, 1985:200).

Toward the center of the spectrum were the various factionalized remnants of the once powerful Muslim Brotherhood. Imprisoned, broke, or exiled under Nasser, and amnestied under Sadat, most of the former Brethren avoided open confrontation with the regime in favor of the peaceful evocation of Islamic goals and the rebuilding of their movement. Least activist was the ‘Murshid Jadid’ faction led by Rahman al-Misiri, which argued that the Muslim Brotherhood was in a ‘period of weakness’ during which God did not demand jihad; eschewing, thus, any confrontation with the state, it concentrated on building a new generation of preachers. A second faction led by Zeinab al-Ghazali, was chiefly distinguished by its opposition to this ‘passive’ policy. The dominant remnant of the Muslim Brotherhood, clustered around the paper al-Dawa and its editor Omar Tilmisani, initially cooperated with the regime. Some of its members sat in parliament where they advocated Islamic legislation. It opposed the anti-regime violence of the radical wing of the movement (and was accused by these radicals of informing to the police) and long avoided any overt criticism of the regime. After the peace treaty, however, its relations with Sadat deteriorated and in 1981 Tilmissani was among those arrested in opposition (Altman, 1979:95).

The idea advocated in al-Dawa give a representative view of the program of the mainstream Islamic movement. The Muslim Brotherhood was much concerned with personal Islamic morality, advocating a value system which was, by Western standards, conservative, if not reactionary. It opposed birth control, arguing that God was capable of providing food for all Egyptians. Holding to an authoritarian - patriarchal view of the family, it opposed liberalization of marriage and divorce laws, defended polygamy and the unrestricted right of husbands to divorce their wives, and held that the place of Maulanawomen wasAzad in the Library, home, not with menAligarh in offices. Muslim It called for the University replacement of Western law codes by Islamic law, and wanted the state to enforce the daily acts of Islamic worship and the observance of Ramadan. It called for banning of the indecent books, films, nightclubs and alcohol consumption, which it took as symptoms of imported Western immorality (Dessouki, 1982:20).

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The Dawa group did not accept the principle of separation of religion and politics preached by Sadat. It advocated, albeit cautiously, its own conception of an Islamic state in which the ruler would enforce and be bound by the Shari’a and rule through a single ‘Islamic’ party. Although it denounced Nasser’s socialism as repressive and a failure, it advocated a welfare state capable of closing existing class gaps without resorting to class struggle; the prohibition of usury, enforcement of zakat (charitable contributions) and a full-employment policy were the primary envisioned instruments of equalization and social justice, but neither land reform nor nationalizations were ruled out in principle. Dawa also deplored the corruption of the state which it attributed to Western influence. Infitah, at least as it was being implemented under Sadat, did not meet its approval. In social policy the Dawa group was thus vaguely populist (Altman, 1979:93-94). In the field of foreign policy the group, supported by and sympathetic to Saudi Arabia, applauded Sadat’s alliance with the conservative Arab states and the break with the USSR. But, it rejected the separate peace with Israel. A peace treaty with a state which still usurped the land of Muslims, including sacred Jerusalem, was, it declared, unacceptable. Sadat’s treaty had returned, but one-tenth of the usurped land and Israel showed, in its attacks on Lebanon and its West Bank settlement policy, that far from wanting peace, it was still intent on expansion; thus, Sadat’s argued that the peace was justified by Muhammad’s injunction to make peace with those who wanted it, was invalid. Nor could the Jews, loyal only to their own kind, be trusted to keep a treaty. The Arab-Israeli conflict was inherently irreconcilable. It had its origins as far back as Muhammad’s conflict with the Jews; today, Israel was an instrument of both the capitalist West (which provided it with weapons and funds) and the Soviet Union (which provided it with migrants) to dominate the Arab-Islamic world. The treaty, opening the door to Jewish cultural, economic penetration, and destroying the Arab front against Israel, put the Arab world in danger of being swallowed up. As against Westernized groups which advocated Egypt’s withdrawal from Arab affairs, al-Dawa vigorously reaffirmed her Arab-Islamic Maulanacharacter. Azad Finally, althoughLibrary, al-Dawa Aligarhdenied the appropriateness Muslim of aUniversity Khomeini type revolution in Egypt, it supported Khomeini and criticized the refuge given by Sadat to the Shah (Altman, 1979:95).

A second grouping in the center of the spectrum were the individual Islamic preachers whose sermons in mosques or circulated by cassette tape, attracted a wide

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popular following in the traditional urban quarters. These preachers, combining a charismatic appeal with a populist message, denounced official corruption, immorality and the growing gap between rich and poor. Among them may be counted the blind Shaikh Iman, Shaikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, Shaikh Salah Abu Ismail and Shaikh Ashur Nasr. All had run-ins with the regime which feared their agitation (Dessouki, 1982:12).

Also in the center, but larger and more activist than the aging Muslim Brotherhood leaders, were the youth groups which sprang up in the mid-seventies under the label of Jama’at al-Islamiyya. Espousing an alternative Islam disdainful of the religious establishment, they concentrated on creating an Islamic order on campus. This meant adopting the Islamic dress, and sometimes the veiling and segregation of women, a goal pursued in conflict with secular-minded university authorities. In Upper Egypt, campus Islamic groups were involved in clashes with Copts. Gradually, however, the Jama’at began to mobilize the campus against Sadat’s policies. They attacked the corruption and inequality supposedly caused by the Infitah; a famous leaflet, distributed by the group, decried the lack of public buses and food for the poor while others feasted on campaign and drove limousines. They also adamantly opposed the peace treaty and hailed the Khomeini’s revolution. Insofar as the Jama’at had a socio-political program, it did not seem to differ much from that of the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, but they were less circumspect in their dissent from the status quo (Altman, 1979:96-97).

Finally, at the radical end of the spectrum were the smaller activist factions which believed the regime totally illegitimate and were prepared to challenge it openly and with force. Messianic and paramilitary, they deplored the mainstream the Muslim Brotherhood as weak, opportunistic and burnt out. There were at least a half dozen such groups, but significant evidence are available in only three of them. Jama’at al- Muslimin (The Group of Muslims), Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami (The Islamic Liberation Organization) and al-Jihad (Holy Struggle). However, these groups did represent a significant force within the country. It may be useful at this point to consider Maulanain some Azaddetail of certain Library, features of theseAligarh secretive underground Muslim Islamic University groups. Most of them have had philosophical or organizational roots that at some point or other grew away from the older Islamic societies in their criticism of the regime, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.

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Jama’at al-Muslimin (The Society of Muslim)

The phenomenal growth of religious extremism in Egypt in the 1970s --- a phenomenon which still endures --- has been differently explained by scholars working in the area and by ideologically oriented Egyptians. Marxists and Nasserites blamed Sadat for propping up the Islamic oriented youth, particularly in the universities, as a counterfoil to the Left (Bari, 1995:130). Both moderate Islamicists and westernized liberals are of the view that the roots of extremism and political violence of Sadat’s period lay in the repressive policies of Nasser’s regime and lack of political participation in his time (Ansari, 1984:123). This may be true of the extremism of the Takfir and Military Academy groups, which emerged in the early years of Sadat’s regime. According to the Islamicists, the emergence of the ideology of excommunication between young prisoners of the Brotherhood was a direct product of torture and brutalization that was meted out to them in the prison during the 1950s and 1960s. The youth were horrified that a fellow Muslim could inflict such torture and humiliation on them for the kind of ideology they believed in. This climate generated the dogma of ex-communication (Ansari, 1984:124).

It was in these circumstances that the group, named by government agencies as al-Takfir wa’l-Hijra (Excommunication and Holy Flight), but which called itself Jama’at al-Muslimin (the Group of Muslims), came into existence. The charismatic self-styled Mahdi, Shukri Mustafa, its founder leader and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had a B.Sc. in agricultural sciences and had been arrested for distributing Brotherhood’s anti-government pamphlets at the University of Asyut in 1965. He remained in prison for six years, before being released in 1971 following the takeover by Sadat. He had witnessed in prison some of the most brutal torture perpetrated on members of the Muslim Brotherhood. He had also steeped himself in the literature of Sayyid Qutb and Maudoudi and got involved in debates in the prison with Maulanathe elders Azad over ideological Library, issues emanating Aligarh from the writingMuslim of Qutb (AreeUniversity, 2001;124). Returning to the Asyut governorate in Upper Egypt, to which he belonged, directly from the prison, he spared no time in recruiting new converts to his group. Away from the national capital, and to a degree from the eyes of the intelligence, he used acquaintances and relations to expand his following. Some families joined his

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group wholesale, and his follow reached, according to an estimate, five thousand members, and included young and old, male and female from middle and lower middle- class (often rural) backgrounds (Hinnebusch, 1985:203).

It would appear that the structure of the Jama’at al-Muslimin as same as the Muslim Brotherhood: organized in hierarchical order each cell headed by an Amir al- Mu’minin (Commander of the faithful, the traditional title of the head of the Islamic community). They were responsible for overlooking the work of its branches (Aly and Wenner, 1982:333). In comparison with other Islamic groups the Jama’at al-Muslimin has had to formulate a manifesto for seeking the support. Its programs have sought to cover, within an Islamic framework, all aspects of human lives that could ultimately evolve into an Islamic society. In the economic field, it wanted to eradicate the capitalist system by breaking up the concentration of wealth in a few hands forbidding all forms of interests, speculation, gambling, hoarding adultery and consumption of alcohol. The Jama’at therefore sought to remedy these ills through the unification of Muslims and focused on the individual committed to Islam leading the ultimate creation of the Islamic state. Its legal system would be based on Shari’a.

Shukri Mustafa expressed his ideas in his book ‘Kitab al-Khalifa’ (The Book of the Caliphate) based on the work of Sayyid Qutb, especially Ma’alim with some extremist additions. This philosophy had two main axes: ideology and action. The principle of his ideology is as follows:

1. To enforce the law of the Shari’a justice. According to him the implementation of Shari’a would provide the necessary instrument for getting rid of many social ills that Egypt was facing such as mortal decadence and corruption, which was reflected in the working of the administration and general social behavior. Maulana2. The Azad approach Library, of Islam --- Islam Aligarh has become Muslim alienated. Existing University societies will fall. Islam will undergo a Renaissance brought about by an elite which believes in leaping from the hills of Yemen brandishing the sword, based on the Hadith, ‘Stories from the End of Days’.

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3. The state which was ruled by the Caliphs, was truly representative of Islam as a faith and a system.

4. To combat oppression of the right of ordinary individuals and to eradicate corruption.

5. To prevent the intervention of foreigners is the affairs of the Muslims.

6. To fight heresies and errors that are legislated by the false parliament, a number of conditions and rules outlined in the Qur’an and Sunnah for the government in order to implement.

7. The Hijra --- the need to abandon existing society in order to begin forming the nucleus of the hope --- for Islamic society through Hijra to the mountains and the caves.

The principles of the actions are:

1. Creating the organizational structure of the group, the election of Shukri Mustafa as Amir (head of the faithful). Therefore, amirs were chosen for each region under Mustafa, the chief amir.

2. Rental of the flats to be used as the local underground headquarters in Cairo, Alexandria, and other districts.

3. Migration of the group to the caves and clefts of the mountainous region in order to implement the ideology.

4. Recruitment of as many military men as possible for use in operations and for training members of the organization to use weapons. These military men were to seize the weapons in their military units (Aree, 2001:126-127). Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

The group condemned the existing political system and believed that its religious duty to bring about a truly Muslim social order through political change. The group considered the implementation of the Shari’a, its primary religious duty. The Arab

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defeat in the Arab-Israel war, the domination of the Arab region by the enemies of Islam --- the Christian West, Jewish Zionism78 and Communism --- and the socioeconomic problems of Egypt they attributed to the corrupt political system and deviation from the path of true Islam. The group talked only in terms of the interests of the Umma and hardly mentioned the interests of individuals. The group’s manifesto, al- khalafah, categorized the group’s mission into three stages, beginning with communications (balagh); followed by an organization, emergence (tabaw), and migration; and culminating in the holy war and its strategy (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:117).

Believing the totality of Egyptian society to be an infidel, it denied any legitimacy not only to the regime, but to the whole social order, including the religious establishment and even the Fiqh, the corpus of religious jurisprudence. The group claimed that both the Sadat’s regime and all of society were pagan, therefore the true Muslim must separate from them. They also included in this condemnation all four traditional schools of Islam (Madzhabs) and all traditional commentators. It labeled these schools as puppets of rulers who used them to monopolize Qur’anic interpretation to their own advantage. So alienated was this group that it attempted to totally withdraw from society and create new communities in the desert in which all modern innovations were rejected in favor of a return to natural simplicity. The group did not intend, however, to remain an isolated sect and prepared itself for a conquering ‘return’ for which it engaged in paramilitary training and the collection of arms (Altman, 1979:110).

At best, however, the knowledge and understanding that this group had of Islam was half baked. Even though they used the terminology of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi79 to explain parts of their ideology, their intellectual limitations and poor understanding

78 Zionism is a colonial movement based on racist, supremacist and distant religious notions perceived and launched as a political project within the imperialist framework of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe. Both the antagonistic Western attitude towards the Arabs and the Zionist colonial ideology are now clearly anachronistic and actually threaten the interest and well-being of the West, the Jews and humanity. That these Western attitudes and Zionist ideas are presently at variance with the spirit of our times, is borne out by the liquidation of colonialism and racist entities Maulanain Africa Azad and elsewhere Library, and by the United Aligarh Nations Resolution Muslim 3379 of 10 November University 1975 which determined that Zionism is a form of racism and radical discrimination (Kayyali, 1979:5).

79 Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) was an Indian-Pakistani scholar, jurist and imam. He was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamic organization in Asia. He strove not only to revive Islam as a renewer of the religion, but to propagate “true Islam”, a remedy for the weakness from which Islam had suffered over the centuries. He believed that politics was essential for Islam and that It was necessary to institute shari’a and preserve Islamic culture. Mawdudi was the first recipient of the Saudi Arabia King Faisal International Award for his service to Islam in 1979.

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of Islam led them to interpret whatever they knew about their religion haphazardly, and often inconsistently. Making the Meccan period of the Prophet’s life and the injunctions the nascent Islamic society was given on how to live in a hostile surroundings and preserve their fundamental approach to life and society, the group formulated its own approach to the existing Egyptian Society.

Shukri claimed that each word in the Qur’an had a secret meaning, to which he alone had the knowledge. One such means which Muslims did not know --- and therefore fell into unbelief --- was related to his interpretation of the Qur’anic verse to the effect that the Prophet was sent to illiterate people. On the face of it, this verse means that the Prophet was sent among the Meccans, where illiteracy was common. But on the basis of the secret meaning of this verse, which he alone claimed to know, Shukri opposed education in schools and universities, because, he said, illiteracy was a characteristic of the Islamic Umma (Bari, 1995:72-73).

However, Shukri’s group had neither showed the intention nor planning to overthrow the existing regime, when the government cracked down on them in July 1977. They had barely begun implementing the very first component of their strategy, namely building the model community of believers somewhere in the unpopulated hinterland on the edge of the Nile valley. But the security forces had arrested several of their members and detained them without trial, which was against the law of the land. When the government ignored their pleas either to try the arrested members according to law or set them free, they kidnapped the former Minister of Awqaf in July 1977 to force the government’s hands (Ibrahim, 1980:436).

Nine members of the group knocked on the door of Muhammad Husayn al- Dhahabi, the former minister, in the pre-dawn hours of 3rd July. Posing themselves as the security officials, they took him away. By midday they contacted the local newspaper offices to claim responsibility for the kidnapping and setting the conditions Maulanafor his releaseAzad, which Library, included the Aligarh release of their Muslim arrested companions University and 200 Egyptian pounds as compensation, and threatened to kill their captives if these conditions were not met (Al-Ahram, 4 July 1977:12). When he was a minister, Dhahabi in the preface of a booklet published by the Ministry of Awqaf in 1975 to refute the group’s ideology, had severely criticized it. In the bargaining for Dhahabi’s release, during which the group extended the deadline for his execution, apparently the

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government did not consider the matter urgent or serious. President Sadat himself was out of the country attending an OAU80 summit congress, when Dhahabi was killed mainly due to the government’s failure to meet the conditions of the kidnappers.

The government acted swiftly after Dhahabi’s killing and made a large number of arrests of the members of the group. Shukri Mustafa himself was arrested on 8th July along with 15 members of the Leadership Council of the group, three of them female university students. A total of 189 members, including 22 female members was tried. Shukri accepted the responsibility of planning and killing the ex-minister, and was sentenced to death with four others; twelve were sentenced to life imprisonment. The rest were set free, because no offense could be established against them and this movement appears to have disintegrated since (Ibrahim, 1982:23).

Al-Jihad (The Holy War)

The emergence of al-Jihad group and its spectacular showmanship in October 1981 by assassinating Sadat could be seen in this perspective. An organization calling itself al-Jihad, according to a report, was formed at the end of 1974 or beginning of 1975, but was not discovered before 1979, when Egyptian authority arrested over a hundred of its members for anti-Coptic activities. Al-Da’wa published the news of their release by the State Security Court with fanfare (Ansari, 1984:123).

This group as such was not behind the President Sadat’s assassination. There seem to have been as many as five al-Jihad groups, which believed in political violence (Bari, 1995:133). Sadat’s assassination was carried out by an offshoot of the early al- Jihad, carrying the same name. Mohammad Abdel Salam Faraj, an engineer by profession, was a member of this early al-Jihad group, who later formed his own group of the same name. The group quickly attracted membership, members of the banned Maulanaextremist Azad organizations Library, of Sirya and ShukriAligarh joining it , Muslimand also many newUniversity recruits to the ideology of extremism and violence. Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, who assassinated

80 The Organization African Union was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa. It’s aims to promote the unity and solidarity of African States.

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Sadat on the prompting of Faraj, was earlier associated with the group of Shaykh Taha al-Saawi, another extremist outfit (Bari, 1995:133).

Faraj appears to have been mainly instrumental in organizing the group initially in early 1980. One of the first acts of the group was to establish a consultative committee (Majlis al-Shura) in order to coordinate its activities as well as to consolidate itself ideologically. It also appointed Shaykh ‘Umar Abdel Rehman, the blind professor of a branch of al-Azhar in Asyut, and a most respected personality among the militants of various denominations, (Ansari, 1984:126) as its guide in religious affairs and its ideology.

Al-Jihad, had two main branches, with the Cairo branch (apparently controlling the activities in other parts of the Delta as well) under the leadership of Abdel Salam Faraj, and the branch in upper Egypt, particularly covering Minya and Asyut, under the leadership of Karam Zuhdi (Kepel, 19:194). Its members are working in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, provided most of its financial resources. According to a confession of one of its members, the total sum received by the group was £E 20,000. The group also robbed a leading jewelry shop in north Cairo (Ansari, 1984:126).

The leadership of the Jihad group, however, was a “curious mixture of people with different backgrounds and social origins”. Many came from families of good social standing and prestige than the leadership of the earlier militant groups. Faraj, like many others in the group, belonged to the lower middle class; his father was an employee of the Health Ministry. Abbud al-Zamor, another top leader of the group, came from a family of relatively high standing. His father was the ‘Umda (chief) of the family village, Nahya in Giza district. Himself a colonel in the army intelligence, he had an uncle in the army of the rank of general; another uncle was a member of Majlis al-Shura, the upper house of the Egyptian parliament; three close relatives were majors in the army. His family was also linked through intermarriages with at least two more Maulanainfluential Azad families, Library,namely Ghurab andAligarh Mikawi, both Muslim of whom had University a long record in Egypt’s parliamentary history before and after the July 1952 revolution, Khalid al- Islambouli’s social profile was similar (Ansari, 1984:134-135).

Faraj published the first ideological formulation of al-Jihad in December 1981 for private circulation within the organization. Titled al-Farida al-Gha’iba (the

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Neglected Duty), it was by all standards a rigorous theological exercise, though written by a non-theologian. Unlike Shukri Mustafa, who cared little for the traditional Islamic authority, Faraj’s Neglected Duty was full of quotations, from the Qur’an, the Sunna, and from other authoritative sources of the past. Karam Zuhdi, head of the upper Egyptian branch of the group, pointed out that the booklet contained nothing really new and was no more than a collection of quotations from various Ulama, (Kepel, 19:194) in effect emphasizing that their ideology was based on standard Islamic sources.

The theme of the booklet was to justify the excommunication of the rulers of the country and to invoke what it asserted was every Muslim’s duty to revolt against such rulers and to go in for an armed struggle against them. It focused on the failure of the rulers to respect the Islamic law and to implement it, which had taken them out of the Islamic fold. This had made the revolt against them obligatory on all Muslims.

The establishment of the Caliphate --- an Islamic State --- was obligatory on the Muslims, Faraj said. He quoted approvingly Abu Hanifa81, the originator of one of the four schools of Islamic law, who had said that the House of Islam (meaning the area where Muslims live and rule themselves) would change into a House of Unbelief if Muslims were ruled by laws other than those of Islam. Faraj next cited Ibn Taymiya82, the 14th century Islamic theologian and reformer. Ibn Taymiya had been bitterly opposed to Mongol rule over the lands of the Caliphate. When he was asked whether the city of Mardin in upper Mesopotamia, which was being ruled by a Muslim prince on behalf of the Mongols, was a House of Peace, Ibn Taymiya made it clear that he did not consider it as either the House of Peace or the House of War. It was not House of Peace because it was not ruled by the laws of Islam: The Mongols, though they had accepted Islam, introduced their own system of law called Yasiq, overlooking the Shari’a. Nor was it the House of War, because it was inhabited by Muslims, whereas the House of War should be inhabited by infidels. Ibn Taymiya therefore invented a third, vague category. He merely said that in the city of Mardin Muslims should be treated to what Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 81 Abu Hanifa was the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). He is also considered a renowned Islamic scholar and personality by Zaydi Shia Muslims. He was often called “the Great Imam”.

82 Ibn Taymiyya was one of Islam’s most forceful theologians, who as a member of the Pietist school founded by Ibn Hanbal, sought the return of the Islamic religion to its sources; the Qur’an and the Sunnah, revealed writing and the prophetic tradition. He is also the source of the Wahhabiyyah, a mid-18th century traditionalist movement of Islam.

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was due to them; and “anyone who rebelled against the law of Islam should be treated according to what was due to him”. Ibn Taymiya also made it clear that “anyone who facilitated the spread of any religion other than Islam or any law other than the law of Muhammad, was an infidel”. In Islam, belief in one part of it and unbelief in another part was unacceptable and amounted to total unbelief.

From these theological formulations, Faraj extrapolated to contemporary Egypt. Although the majority of Egyptians were Muslims, the State was being ruled by the laws of unbelief, enacted by infidels (the western legal system). God’s commandment was that “whosoever does not rule by what God sent down is an unbeliever” (Qur’an, 5:44). The present-day rulers were “in apostasy from Islam”. They were “raised at the table of imperialism, be it Crusadism or Communism or Zionism”. Though they claimed to be Muslims and performed Islamic rites, they carried “nothing of Islam except their names” (Jansen, 1986:165-169).

Reacting to Faraj’s citation of Ibn Taymiya, Muhammad ‘Imara, (Bari, 1995:139) a moderate Islamic writer, commented that Faraj erroneously did so. But here ‘Imara himself may be wrong, because there was indeed a great deal of similarity between the conditions obtaining at an Ibn Taymiya’s time and that of the Jihad ideologues. Both sides issued fatwa in distressing social conditions, when specifically, the domains of what they considered as Islamic law and Islamic social norms were encroached by alien legal and social systems. The cultural and social distress, for which Egyptians generally held Sadat responsible, was so intense that not only did the President’s assassination pass unwept but, as one observer put it, in the eyes of the Egyptian public Khalid al-Islambouli appeared “as a sort of right arm of the popular will, and not merely as a militant exponent of an Islamic group” (Jansen, 1986:170-176).

The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and that of Jihad groups leaves little doubt that the difference in their views was more strategic than ideological. The only Maulanaexception Azad related to Library,the assertion of theAligarh Jihad group Muslimthat the kind of University violations of the law of Islam and its values, in which the rulers of Egypt were indulging, amounted to the negation of the faith itself. President Sadat in their opinion, stood ex-communicated, and it was imperative that Muslims revolt against him.

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This was a stand that had particular appeal among the intelligentsia, particularly the youth. The leadership of the Brotherhood was therefore alarmed, because the youth, among whom the Jihad ideology became popular, formed the largest chunk of its own following. The Brotherhood could not challenge al-Jihad on any serious ideological ground as they had done with the Takfir and similar other organizations. The Brotherhood itself had an attractive legacy of militancy which had been sustained during the height of its popularity. It participated in actual fighting in the Palestine war of 1948-49. Its secret wing, the “Special System” (or al-Nizam al-Khass) was involved in various kinds of political extremism for almost a decade before the revolution of, 1952, before the Brotherhood was banned and then re-emerged almost twenty years later, as an organized group whose thinking was greatly mellowed down by the post- revolution events.

Extremists of Sadat’s era therefore taunted the organization with “having become tired after the ordeal, lay down arms and abandoned Jihad” (Jansen, 1979:45). Mustafa Mashhour, an important functionary of the Brotherhood who later became its General Guide and was instrumental in its efforts for reconciliation with the Jihad group, advised them to be prepared rather than to be rash. “The Muslim Brotherhood will not be driven by the enthusiasm of some youth to indulge in thoughtless acts, which cannot change the corrupt reality, but may harm Islamic work”, he stressed (Bari, 1995:143). He referred to the Brotherhood’s involvement in fighting in Palestine and its other militant activities. As long as its slogans were: “Allah is our aim, the Prophet is our leader, the Qur’an is our constitution, jihad is our way and death in the path of Allah is our highest objective” jihad would remain the guiding spirit of all the activities of the Brotherhood (Hinnebusch, 1984:99-121). Two objectives for which jihad could be launched were: (1) for “the removal of aggression and damage to which Muslims were subjected by the enemies of God”, and, (2) “for the establishment of the Islamic State and consolidation of this religion” (Adil, 1987:32). This jihad was not far away, he said, Maulanabut it was Azad a complex Library, matter: “Do not Aligarhbe among those Muslimwho are simple mindedUniversity, and have no grasp over affairs”, he cautioned (Adil, 1987:33)

The serious socioeconomic problems, and the government’s quite reckless approach to some hypersensitive national issues such as peace overtures to Israel, had more to do with the wider appeal of the extremist articulation --- which placed Islam at

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the Centre --- and consequent violent outbursts among a section of society, than with the actual neglect of Islamic norms, even though considerable popular anger did exist over this aspect as well. President Sadat had indeed shown more concern with the religious sensibility of the Egyptian public. The author of Neglected Duty (al-Farida al- Gha’iba) ignored it totally, showing a lack of concern for the process of reserialization and re-Islamization undertaken in the 1970s by various private Islamic agencies, particularly the Jama’at Islamiyya. Mosques were being constructed everywhere, and veiled women and bearded young men became common features of the Egyptian landscape (Bari, 1995:145). The Islamicists could not have achieved all this without Sadat’s liberal social and religious policies. He had shown interest in the codification of the Shari’a, and was inclined to meet, though halfway, the demand of the Islamicists, for its implementation. For the extremists of the Jihad group, however, these were not enough to spare the President from a violent end.

However, two days after Sadat’s assassination on October 6, 1981, members and sympathizers of al-Jihad seized control of the upper Egyptian town of Asyut. But Egyptian paratroopers crushed the revolt within days. The rebels had hoped that the assassination of “the Pharaoh” would spark an Islamic revolution. It did not. The zealous of al-Jihad, had far less popular support than they believed. Like the Islamic Liberation Organization after its seizure of the Technical Military Academy in 1974 and like the Society of Muslims after the kidnapping of al-Dhahabi in 1977, al-Jihad appears to have been destroyed, or at least permanently crippled, by the execution of its leaders and the arrests of hundreds of its members (Adil, 1987:37).

The militants never had mass support. Even many students sympathetic to the protean notion of “a truly Islamic society” condemned the fanaticism and violence of groups such as al-Jihad. And all such groups were condemned by the Muslim Brotherhood as well as by Egypt’s prominent Ulama, who were in turn excoriated by the militants as lackeys of the “heathen” (jahili) government. However, one blind Maulanaprofessor Azad of Islamic Library,studies at a college Aligarh in Asyut, Shaykh Muslim ‘Umar ‘Abd University al-Rehman, did serve as a legal counselor to al-Jihad. And some other Ulama who opposed the methods of the militants echoed many of their demands, for example, the demand for a strictly Islamic legal code (Jansen, 1986:165-169).

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Munazzamat al-Tahir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Organization)

A similar clandestine group, calling itself Munazzamat al-Tahir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Organization), but described by the Egyptian mass media as Jama’at al-Fanniya al-Askariya (Technical Military Academy Group) (Bari, 1995:70) also became active with aims and objectives strikingly similar to those of the Jama’at al- Muslimin group, but ideologically quite different from it. This group was spurred into opposition to the regime by Sadat’s move toward accommodation with Israel and the West which it considered to be ungodly treason.

The Islamic Liberation Organization founded in 1971 by Dr. Salih Siriyya, a Palestinian with a Ph.D. in the science of education. Siriyya, who was in his mid-thirties when he started the group, had been a member of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood known as the Islamic Liberation Party. After joining various other Palestinian organizations following the Arab defeat of 1967 by Israel, had settled in Egypt and took a job in one of the specialized agencies of the Arab League in Cairo, before forming his own secret organization (Ibrahim, 1980:436). Many young Egyptians, who had been profoundly affected by the stories they had heard about the torture of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1966, joined the group (Hamouda, 1987:32).

Most of the members of this group were young people from the middle or lower middle classes in their twenties or early thirties, to whom militancy had greater appeal. Most of them also had rural or small-town background, having recently arrived in big cities, (Ibrahim, 1980:439) where they felt alienated because of the breakdown of communal ties and the traditional solidarity of urban life under western impact (Ayubi, 1980:481- 499). Women were not recruited. Membership of the Islamic Liberation Organization, however, was predominantly from Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta, since Siriyya operated from Cairo and had links with Alexandria University as well as students in the MaulanaAyn Shams Azad University Library, and other universities Aligarh (Aree, 2001:130). Muslim University

Decision-making within the Islamic Liberation Organization was largely consensual, based on a twelve --- member committee chaired by Dr. Siriyya. He was revered by Islamic Liberation Organization members and his advice was usually accepted during policy deliberations. The notable exception to this was the group’s

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decision in 1974 to attack the Technical Military Academy and carry out a coup against President Sadat; although Dr. Siriyya gave the scheme only a 30 percent chance of success, it was adopted and attempted on 18 April 1974. Their first objective was to capture the Technical Military Academy to make it a base for challenging the government. In this they succeeded. Their next planned step was to march to the office of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), where Egypt’s top ruling elite were scheduled to listen to a speech by President Sadat. The plot, which one, commentator described as “spectacular in volume, planning and timing” (Ibrahim, 1980:425), was foiled while in process.

The main attack of the prosecution was on Siriyya’s dubious connections, such as his visit to Libya at the invitation of the Libyan government and he’s holding an Iraqi passport (Hinnebusch, 1985:203). But the fact that this event took place at a time when President Sadat was at the height of his popularity following the performance of the Egyptian army in the 1973 war against Israel, showed the strong anti-establishment sentiments that still existed in Egypt, particularly on religious and social grounds. The Siriyya’s group acted against the regime not because it was sure of its success --- their action could be a demonstration of “outrage for the sake of God” (Ghadab Lil-Allah) (Ibrahim, 1980:437). However, the group, despite extensive planning and practice, failed to achieve its objectives and was subsequently Egyptian police suppressed an attempted coup by Siriyya and his followers, and the Islamic Liberation Organization effectively ceased to exist after this (Ibrahim, 1980:425). Siriyya and the commander of the action at the Military College were both condemned to death and executed.

The ideology of the Islamic Liberation Organization was highly influenced by the writings of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shari’ati83 and Mawdudi, have following aspects:

1. The central objective of the contemporary Islamic Liberation Organization Maulanacontinues Azad to Library, be the establishment Aligarh of an Islamic Muslim state that is University governed not by human, man-made laws, but by the Shari’a (Islamic law). Whereas the former

83 Ali Shariati was an Iranian revolutionary and sociologist, who focused on the sociology of religion. He held as one of the most influential Iranian intellectuals of the 20th century and has been called the ‘ideologue of the Iranian Revolution’.

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system of legislation implies the sovereignty of man over man, this being interpreted as man’s servitude to man, the latter testifies to the sovereignty of God alone. Divine sovereignty is equated with man’s liberation and therefore must be enforced if the state is to be other than nominally Islamic. It is critical to most Muslims that sovereignty cannot be assumed by man. The group believed that the method to achieve these goals is to spread the call of Jihad. As one of the fundamental duties of the true Muslim, Jihad has two aspects: power and argument.

2. The objective of applying Shari’a raises the question of rule (hukm) in an Islamic state. They consider an Islamic state necessary to spread the teaching of Islam and implement its law. It is based on homage to the ruler (bay’a), and consultation of the Umma (Shura), and the ruler cannot do as he pleases but is constrained by Shari’a.

3. The fanaticism of the group was returning to the Qur’an and the elimination of all relaxations of religious discipline which have appeared in the course of time. It meant that the study of the Qur’an, prayer, and the observation of fasts were again to become the center of human activity, and that puritanism in daily life was to be restored and all luxuries.

4. The establishment Ulama are condemned as propagandists, who prop up an immoral socio-political order, corrupting Islam in the process.

5. The Islamic Liberation Organization, like similar groups, sees themselves engaged in takfir (an accusation of godlessness) against the extant political and social structure and in a jihad (holy struggle) for the re-Islamification of society. Dedication to this cause is reinforced by the acceptance of the concept of martyrdom, with paradise awaiting those who fall in the struggle against godlessness (Ismael & Ismael, 1985:114-115). Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Thus, the group’s aim is to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the Islamic Da’wah to the world. The ultimate goal of this radical Islamic group is to unite the entire Ummah, or Islamic world community, into a single caliphate. The aim is to bring the Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in ‘Dar al-Islam’ [the land where the rules of Islam are being implemented, as opposed to the non-Islamic world]

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and in an Islamic society such that all life’s affairs in society are administered according to the Shari’a rules.

Part of the thrust of the Islamic Liberation Organizations’ argument was that a true Muslim life could only be conducted within the Ummah, the universal congregation of all Muslims; hence the demand for a return to the caliphate. Thus, the society are administered according to the Shari’a rules, and the viewpoint in it is the halal and the haram under the shades of the Islamic State, which is the Khilafah State. That state is the one in which Muslims appoint a Khalifah and give him the bay’ah to listen and obey on condition that he rules according to the Book of Allah (swt) and the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (saw) and on condition that he conveys Islam as a message to the world through Da’wah and jihad.

The work of the Islamic Liberation Organization is to carry the Islamic Da’wah in order to change the situation of the corrupt society so that it is transformed into an Islamic society. It aims to do this by firstly changing the society’s existing thoughts to Islamic thoughts so that such thoughts become the public opinion among the people, who are then driven to implement and act upon them. The political struggle is manifested in the struggle against the disbelieving imperialists, to deliver the Ummah from their domination and to liberate her from their influence by uprooting their intellectual, cultural, political, economic and military roots from all of the Muslim countries. The political struggle also appears in challenging the rulers, revealing their treasons and conspiracies against the Ummah, and by taking them to task and changing them if they denied the rights of the Ummah, or refrained from performing their duties towards her, or ignored any matter of her affairs, or violated the laws of Islam.

The group - also known as Shabab Muhammad (Muhammad’s Youth) - believes it can achieve its utopian Islamic state in three steps. The first involves educating Muslims about its philosophies and goals. In the second step, the Muslims would then Maulanaspread these Azad views amongLibrary, others in thei Aligarhr countries, especially Muslim members University of government, the military and other power centers. In the third and final step, the Islamic Liberation Organization believes its faithful will cause secular governments to crumble because loyalties will then lie solely with Islam - not nationalities, politics or ethnic identifications. At that point the group says a supreme Islamic leader, a Caliph like

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those of past centuries would rule all Muslims with both political and religious authorities.

Unlike similar Islamic groups, the Islamic Liberation Organization did not blame society as a whole, even though it described society as decaying and riddled with problems. Unlike the Jama’at al-Muslimin, which believed that both the political system and society were beyond redemption, and frequently used the term jahiliyya to describe the state of affairs in the country, the Islamic Liberation Organization viewed society as a victim of “unscrupulous leaders who had no fear of God” at the top of the political system. It saw this “victimized society” as eager but unable to get rid of it victimizers (Ibrahim, 1980:429-435). Siriyya’s difference in approach appears to have been on account of his not having experienced the hardships that members of the Brotherhood faced in Egypt. While Shukri’s stance was extremely dogmatic and spoke of his absolute charisma, Siriyya’s group not only practiced democracy in its internal functioning but was also more tolerant of Muslims who did not belong to it.

Amidst this threat of growing clandestine Islamic extremism in the 1970s, both the State machinery and the Brotherhood found a commonality of interests in curbing the trend. The militant groups were posing a challenge to the credibility of the Brotherhood, advocating ideologies in the name of political revival of Islam, which the Brotherhood had espoused from the beginning. These doctrines, which were serious deviations from certain formulations that Islam upheld traditionally, were being seriously questioned in mainstream Islam. The mainstream Brotherhood was being criticized by both the pro-establishment forces, who tried to expose its past record of violence, and the hardline Islamicists who were unhappy over its soft pedaling the government stand. Some pro-establishment elements remained the Brotherhood of its involvement in violent activities in the past, particularly the shooting at Nasser by an activist of the Brotherhood in Alexandria in 1954. Maulana In Azad its approach Library, to the militants Aligarh, the Brotherhood Muslim took a persuasive University tone. Hasan al-Hudaybi, the General Guide of the organization himself wrote a monograph under the suggestive title “Du’at la Qudat” (Preachers, not Judges), to point out that Islam did not allow excommunication, whether of an individual or a society, as long as they pronounced the Kalima, by which they recognized Allah as the only God and Muhammad as His Prophet (Bari, 1995:76). Many others wrote monographs

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denouncing the ideology of militants, particularly Shukri group, (Bahi, 1978:45) while the Brotherhood launched a systematic campaign to win over the individual members of the militant organizations.

In its writings, the Muslim Brotherhood did not hide its displeasure over the government’s treatment of the problem. Writing in its organ al-Da’wa, Muhammad Abdel Quddous, one of its prominent members, asked bluntly, why there was a difference between the treatment of the communists and that of Shukri Mustafa and his group (Hamouda, 1987:193-195). In so writing, he was apparently exploiting the government’s fears about the rise of the left, and its overtures towards the Brotherhood. While condemning Dnahabi’s killing “doubtlessly an ugly crime”, Quddous also castigated the press coverage on the episode as an equally “ugly crime, unworthy of the right kind of journalistic practice” and berated its subservience to the State machinery at the cost of objectivity. He suggested that the “youth of the group were not criminal by nature, and they could not be cured by harsh treatment; they could rather be cured through objective debate and calm and scientific discussions”. Yousuf al-Qardawi, the Muslim Brothers’ ideological guide said, “This youth was clean and honest, but had lost the way”. The first mistake of not only the press, but also the State was pushing the youth to the road of destruction instead of trying to attempt to reform them, he said.

More as a result of the criticism and persuasion by the Brotherhood on ideological ground than the government curbs, Shukri’s group was greatly reduced in size though it could not be eliminated completely. But many more Islamic groups came to the surface in the 1970s (Bari, 1995:77). In 1981 there emerged a much bigger group Al-Jihad, which assassinated the President. This show, on the one hand, a constant rise of militant Islamic groups during the decade, and on the other, their deep roots in society.

Although radical in their activism and rejection of the established order, the Maulanasocio-political Azad views Library, of these two groups Aligarh differed little Muslim from the mainstream University the Muslim Brotherhood. They adhered to the standard positions on the status and segregation of women; accepted the traditional view of the ideal political system as a pious ruler implementing the Shari’a, and wanted a non-aligned self-sufficient Egypt. They denounced usury, extravagance, excessive wealth and poverty, called for state collection of the zakat and regulation of the economy in the interest of justice and

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welfare. But no less than established Islam, they accepted private property, inheritance, profit and social distinctions, provided they resulted solely from the expenditure of labor (Ibrahim, 1982:119-125).

Thus, in spite of its opposition to Sadat’s socioeconomic policies, and the radicalism of at least parts of the Islamic movement, almost the whole spectrum of political Islam combined an acceptance of the principles of a capitalist economic system with a moral code which denounced it’s in egalitarian and materialistic consequences. Only on the very fringes of the Egyptian Islamic movement was there any sign of an evolution beyond this traditional stance. A small offshoot of the Brotherhood, the Muslim al-Muasir group, (Hinnebusch, 1985:204) developed a doctrine combining Islamic and Marxist ideas, arguing that without socialism an Islamic social order could not be realized. It was attempting the synthesis which inspired the radical guerilla movements in Iran. It was, however, only a tiny fragment of the Islamic movement and had yet to enter the stage of political activism; this was a good indicator of the considerably lesser extent of radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic movement as compared to that in Iran.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CHAPTER FIVE

GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ORDER IN EGYPT

UNDER HOSNI MUBARAK

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 199

CHAPTER FIVE

GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ORDER IN EGYPT UNDER

HOSNI MUBARAK

Mohammad Hosni Mubarak came to power on 14 October 1981 through receiving 99.99% of the vote in a referendum after the People’s Assembly nominated him following Sadat’s assassination. He simultaneously became the supreme commander of the armed forces & chairman of the NDP. During a speech he delivered on 6 October 1981 to announce Sadat’s death, Mubarak stressed the need to stick to all treaties & charters ratified by the state. He added that he would not stop “pushing the wheel of peace forward”, a reference to the newly-enacted peace treaty with Israel (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/the-rise-and-fall-of-mubarak).

One of his earliest moves was to dispense with the acute economic problems facing the country that had ensued from the open-door policy. Mubarak stressed that the policy should concentrate on productive tasks to get meaningful results. In domestic politics, Mubarak initially set out on a path of political liberalization, immediately releasing political prisoners and rehabilitating opposition forces. He also declared a new policy of open discussion, with deference to the opposite. The Wafd Party returned, and the Islamic-oriented Ummah Party was established in 1983. On a regional level, Mubarak took active initiative for bringing back Egypt to the Arab fold.

In all fairness, although Mubarak’s regime was definitely an authoritarian one, this was provoked by real disorder (even if arguably provoking more of such), and its repressive nature neither constituted an innovation for Egypt nor proved as egregious as that in some other countries. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University A central reality of the Mubarak years was the Emergency Law put in force at the beginning of his rule and renewed by the People’s Assembly every three years with only a few opposition members opposing it. It was a crime for more than five people to meet without a permit. Publications deemed a danger to national security could be banned. The law could deprive people of essentially any civil rights. In

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accordance with legal authorization to detain people without charges for a month (renewable indefinitely), the police regularly held thousands in custody, sometimes just for stating their opinions, for demonstrating against Israel’s actions in the occupied territories or against the American war on Iraq in 2003, or even for writing a book critical of U.S. policies.

Special military courts had authority to detain people without charge. In what seemed to constitute nothing more than a cosmetic reforms, the High State Security Court was abolished in 2003 and its previous decisions made subject to appeal, but another tribunal, the Emergency State Security Court still could try important cases, with no appeals allowed (except to the president requesting a pardon). Also, in 2003, the regular courts got new authority to detain people without charge for six months. Human rights advocates suggested that the emergency measures now were so ingrained in the civil code that the government would not even need to renew the emergency law again. The conclusion stated in the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights’ 2001 report that “The law ultimately suspends democratic rights that are inconvenient for the government” remained true.

Human rights organizations regularly documented gross violations, including a “systematic pattern of torture.” The thousands of people detained without charges --- including members of the Muslim Brotherhood not involved in violence --- suffered torture severe enough that dozens died as a result. Demonstrators sometimes were violently assaulted by the police. The Egyptians have no protection against the use of torture by the state security forces; and this has developed an international dimension in the post-9/11 era, as Egypt has served as a destination for “war on terror” “extraordinary rendition.” Moreover, under the rubric of the state of emergency laws, the Egyptian government has suspended constitutional protections since 1981, thereby severely restricting basic freedoms: Egyptians are prevented from forming political parties, organizing independent trade unions and assembling peacefully. There are Maulanaother restrictions Azad relating Library, to media and Aligarh communications. Muslim University

In 1983, a new electoral system was made by amending the electoral law of 1972. The new system established three major principles. Foremost, it decreased the number of electoral constituencies from 175 to 48 large constituencies. Second, elections were to be held under proportional representation. This meant that they were

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to be taken along the basis of party lists, as distinct from the 1979 elections, when all nominees, irrespective of party affiliation, had to be given as “independents.” Third, political parties had to get at least 8 percent of the balloting to be eligible to get seats in the parliament. In 1984, Mubarak’s first parliamentary elections were contested by five political parties, with the Muslim Brotherhood allowed to participate under the auspices of the Wafd Party. At that place were numerous allegations of violence and forgery, and the results were disputed. Yet, the NDP gained 73 percent of the votes, while the new ward/Brotherhood alliance received 15 percent, establishing it the main opposition.

On February 1987, Mubarak dissolved parliament and held elections in April along the groundwork of the Supreme Constitutional Court’s (SCC)84 decision to hold the state’s electoral law prohibiting independents from running for election illegal. The SCC decision resulted in a second amendment to the electoral law. This amendment stipulated that independent candidates could play, while also preserving the principle of party list-based elections. Each electoral constituency was to include one independent candidate and one for a party. This implied that the election would have 48 independent candidates for the 48 constituencies (Kienle, 2001:26). The elections resulted in better representation of the opposition parties, although the NDP held a big majority. Meanwhile, a trilateral alliance between the Labor Party, the Liberal Party and the Muslim Brotherhood enabled it to win 60 seats (22 for Labor, 34 for the Brotherhood, and 4 for the Liberals) and therefore become the main enemy force. The Wafd won only 12 seats.

These opposition parties accused the government of breaking the constitution by not supporting fully the SCC’s ruling. They also proceeded to question the legality of the electoral law, which from their point of view, still gave limited opportunity to independent candidates. Consequently, the matter was brought up again in the SCC, which in 1990 brought out a ruling that declared all election laws that restricted the Maulanaright of EgyptianAzad citizens Library, to play in elections Aligarh as independent Muslim unconstitutional. University This

84 The Supreme Constitutional Courts was established in 1979. It is alone responsible for censoring the constitutionality of the laws and regulations and it assumes interpreting legislative texts. The SCC has the right to cancel the laws that are contrary to the provisions and articles of the Egyptian Constitution. The SCC verdicts are finals and cannot be challenged in any way.

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ruling resulted in a rejoinder to the organization based on a two-round majority vote with individual candidates contesting in two-member constituencies. The land was split up into 222 constituencies with each electing two deputies.

Nevertheless, this was a hollow victory for the enemy. The state of emergency remained in force, and then the major opposition parties decided to boycott the 1990 elections and sought to build a unified movement against the regimen. Of course, the elections resulted in an overwhelming majority of the NDP, which reached 85.94 percent of the seats. Independent candidates won 12.50 percent and the NPUP won 1.34 percent.

By 1993, the nomination of Mubarak to a third six-yr. term as President was being vigorously disputed by the terrorist actions of the Jihadi groups. In that year, a secularist writer, Farag Fouda85, who repeated the government’s stance on Islamic activism on a weekly television show, was assassinated. Assassination attempts were also made against the Information Minister, the Interior Minister and the Prime Minister. Although whole of these failed, they resulted in the deaths of several innocent people. In the 1994, Mubarak initiated a national dialogue regarding the government and opposition parties in an effort to forge agreement on basic issues facing the nation and, particularly, to mobilize widespread political support to face the Islamic militants. The talks proved fruitless because the regime refused to talk over such matters as constitutional and political reform, which were major bones of contention for the resistance groups.

Other steps were called for by the regime to consolidate its power and eliminate threats from the Islamic activists as well as the legal opposition, no matter how moderate. In 1992, Law 40/1977 was again amended to place onerous restriction, on political party activity. The amendment stipulated that founding members of new parties were not permitted to work on behalf of their party if that party was not Maulanasanctioned Azad by the Parties Library, Aligarh Muslim University

85 Farag Fouda was a prominent Egyptian professor, writers, communist and human rights activist. He was assassinated in June 1992 by members of Islamic group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya after being accused of blasphemy by a committee of Clerics (Ulama) at Al-Azhar university. Fouda was one of 202 people killed by politically motivated assaults in Egypt between March 1992 and September 1993.

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Committee. Violations would be punished with greater severity than previously. For example, prison sentences of one to five years replaced the old LE500 fine (Kienle, 2001:68). In the same year, the Penal Code (Law 97/1992) was amended to allow for harsher penalties for any acts of “terrorism” carried out by individuals or groups. Terrorist acts would be named to the Supreme State Security Court (a court of the Egyptian security establishment that is not “civilian” in nature and adheres to a freestanding set of judicial rules) as comfortably as to military courts (whose ruling are not subject to appeal, only to modification or dismissal by the president) (URL:http://www.fidh.org/THE-EMERGENCY-LAW-IN-EGYPT). Then, in 1993, a new unified law for professional syndicates was passed, authorizing the judiciary to supervise syndicate elections. The regime applied this law to contain the increasing Islamic influence in professional syndicates. Finally, in 1994, the government banned the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing it of illegally supporting terrorist Islamic groups, thus alienating even the moderate elements within the Islamist cause. (Formally, the Brotherhood had been banned since 1948, but its existence had been suffered in practice.)

The legal restrictions were matched by rigorous security criteria. In late 1993 the government started to follow a more belligerent policy against Islamist opposition groups, guiding to a precipitous fall in terrorist attempts, but with significant sacrifice of certain human rights. Prominent journalist and writer Mohammad Heikal claimed that in 1994 an average of fifty Egyptians were detained daily while five were shot down every week either by the government or by the Islamic groups --- and three Egyptians were hanged by the government every month. Heikal commented that while Islam cannot be preached by murder, just laws could not be carried out by throwing the police announcing the killing of suspected Islamic fanatics. Even the pro- government Arab Strategic Report, in a rare admission, warned that the problem of “thousands of detainees” could undermine Egypt, even though detentions might seem Maulananecessary Azad to counter Library, terrorism (Ismail Aligarh, 2011:364). While Muslim the government University strengthened its political dominance. It attempted to show an image of fostering democracy and mass participation by claiming to advance the formation of non-governmental organization (NGOs).

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According to political scientist Ahmad Abdallah, although Egypt has 15,000 NGOs that are active in many fields, severe regulations prohibit them from forming the groundwork of a sound civil society. Foremost, a single department in the Ministry of Social Affairs supervises NGOs, all of which are open to the same close scrutiny despite differences in purposes and natural processes. Second, they are governed by a complex set of principles and regulations originating from 1964 onward that preclude the issue of an autonomous civil society. As per Law 84/2002, no civil society, association can be formed without the express approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Moreover, the very scope of potential NGOs is regulated by Article 25 --- which nominally governs the activities allowable by political parties, but delivers the potential to influence NGO activity, too, as it precludes them from collaborating with established political parties to investigate issues of common fear. The laws regulating NGOs not only decide which of them may exist, simply continue to modulate their activity after formation. Clause 34 gives the Ministry of Social Affairs the power to “disqualify at will candidates for the membership of governing bodies” within NGOs where Article 23 allows the ministry to force an NGO to rescind any decision or decree issued by the association where it is held to break the law. Finally, (as per Article 42), the Ministry of Social Affairs may dissolve an NGO at any movement, should it: disperse funds in a way violating the initial charter granted to the NGO; receive funds from foreign bodies or collect donations without prior approval; establish institutional ties with organizations/NGOs outside Egypt; or commit any “grave” violation of the law or public morals (“grave,” of course, is left highly ambiguous) (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, December 3,2009). In the end, these systems are constituted and administered by an elite that is more or less alienated from the ordinary citizen. All of these genes work to undermine effective participation in the political arrangement.

The next parliamentary election was declared in 1995. Recognizing the failure Maulanaof the boycottAzad to triggerLibrary, the popular Aligarh support they Muslim had expected University, this time the opposition parties decided to take part. Foe to the government centered on the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, which contended the election despite its illegal status. Mubarak reacted by setting up a massive detention of its members and their trial by military tribunals. One Brotherhood candidate was held back twice at his own rallies, despite a court order permitting him to run freely. Pre-election violence between

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opposition supporters and security forces at rallies claimed twelve lives and over a thousand people were caught. Fifty-four Brotherhood leaders were found guilty of sedition and sentenced to hard labor in the week before the election. The answers of the poll were predictable: of 444 parliamentary seats, Mubarak’s supporters claimed over 400.

The regime’s lack of commitment to true democracy is coupled with its flagrant disregard for the constitution. By 1997, the Supreme Constitutional Court had invalidated 121 laws. Six of these had been proclaimed before the 1952 revolution, 27 in Nasser’s regime, 38 in Sadat’s, and 50 under Mubarak’s government. Thirty-two of them had been enacted in 1996-1997. As overwhelming as these figures may be, not all alleged unconstitutional laws are challenged in court.

In July 2000, the Supreme Constitutional Court invalidated the 1990 parliament on the grounds that a clause in the law that governed its election was unconstitutional. The ruling, although specifically aimed at the 1990 parliament, meant that the parliament currently in session was also illegitimate. Mubarak stepped in and issued two edicts. The initiative, introduced amendments to the law on practicing political rights, and the second summoned parliament from its summer break. The changes, contained in Decree 167/2000, were unanimously backed by parliament during an extraordinary session on July 16, and the constitutional crisis was turned away. These amendments satisfied a key opposition demand, validated by the court’s decision, that election at all the main and branch polling stations should be supervised by judges rather than public sector officials. They further obliged the government to stagger elections over three weeks instead of having them all on one day (Thabet, 2006:14).

Observers have claimed that the actual danger of Mubarak’s crackdown in that it will accelerate the radicalization of the Islamic opposition by denying it any role in Maulanathe legitimate Azad political Library, life of the nation. Aligarh The Brotherhood Muslim and its splinter University groups are very well connected, especially in academic and professional circles as well as among businessmen in small and medium-sized enterprises. It also enjoys enormous support with thousands of Egyptians who are established overseas, many of whom provide financial backing. Like most Islamist groups, the Brotherhood is more than a political organization. It has managed schools, medical facilities and media issues, and it has

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had substantial links with groups monitoring human rights abuses. Many of its operations were crippled by the government crackdown in the run-up to the 1995 elections. Amnesty International (AI) claims that Brotherhood supporters or activists are regularly rounded up and detained, either without charge or with fake complaints. While detained, they are often beaten, tortured and threatened with the rape or abuse of their female relatives. On numerous occasions, Amnesty has expressed worry over the repeated arrest, detainment and prosecution on terrorism-related charges of contributing members of the Muslim Brotherhood, apparently because of their peaceful exercise of their right to freedom of association and meeting place. AI also considers that military tribunals should not possess jurisdiction to try civilians, whatever, charges they may face, so the organization has criticized the military trial of forty members of the Brotherhood. It progressed to three efforts to send international observers to these trials, but on each occasion the observer was denied admission to the military court. AI has also criticized the amendment of Article 179, which allows the president to interfere in the judicial system and bypass the ordinary criminal courts, including bringing up people suspected of terrorism-related offenses in the military courts (URL:http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/028/2007/en/30d4ef42- d36d-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/mde120282007en.html).

Although Mubarak and his supporters won the 1995 elections with over 94 percent of the popular vote, voting irregularities led to about one-third of those elected having their seats challenged. As of June 1998, the appeal of the court had nullified the elections of some 170 members of the people’s Assembly (Al-Ahram, 2000:295-298). Nevertheless, the Assembly was still decidedly in the NDP’s clutches when it nominated Mubarak for a fourth six-yr. term as president. According to the Arab Strategic Report of 1998, his government faced a huge credibility problem at the beginning of the parliamentary session in 1998, despite Mubarak’s landslide electoral victory (Globe and Mail, September 28, 1999: A15). Because of the loss of a large Maulananumber ofAzad seats due Library, to electoral irregularities Aligarh and a highMuslim level of absenteeism University in the People’s Assembly, new elections were needed to reestablish legitimacy. The Assembly had seemingly abdicated its legislative role to the executive, limiting itself to a rubber stamp for government plans. This was apparent in the sporadic activity conducted during the Assembly’s third session in 1997. A paltry eleven laws were passed with practically no discussion, while the Assembly enacted twenty-nine pieces

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of legislation giving the government emergency powers, despite a decline in religious terrorism.

The general election in 2000 saw a substantial shift in Egyptian politics. Throughout the 1990s, the judiciary had increasingly served as “the opposition” by performing a number of political tasks, such as the promotion of democracy and political liberalization. In fact, a numeral of the political parties who won seats in the People’s Assembly in 2000 acquired them but through court orders. With judges now overseeing the ballot, the elections were evidently directed to the gratification of many in the opposition as well as international observers.

There were gains for a number of opposition parties and a dramatic ousting of incumbent NDP deputies. Of the 444 contested seats, only 132 incumbents secured victory. The allocation of seats again favored the NDP, with 388 deputies, down from 410 in the previous election. Approximately 218 of these were actually elected as independents (out of a sum of 256 independents). Opposition members rose to 35, an increase of 21 seats from the previous Assembly, with the major parties represented as follows: Muslim Brotherhood (17), Wafd (7), Tagammu (the newfangled name for the NPUP --- 6), Nasserites (2), Liberal Party (1), with two opposition deputies remaining independent.

The government’s clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood was seen as one of the principle causes for the latter’s success. The constant harassment of Brotherhood members and supporters created sympathy for their political program. As its older members were delayed, it was forced to move a list of young and relatively unknown candidates, which implied it was less susceptible to government scrutiny. Fifty-seven Christian candidates ran for office, with seven winning elections (six Copts and one Roman Catholic). A record 120 women candidates ran for office, with five winning elections, and a further six were appointed by Mubarak among the ten members he is Maulanaconstitutionally Azad required Library, to take. Aligarh This provided Muslim the highest stage University of female representation since 1979.

Mubarak’s authoritarian tendencies throughout the 1990s have been increasingly resisted from within and outside the state since the tour of the country. The regime has been subject to robust domestic and outside pressures to permit for

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greater political participation, with the latter acting as the most significant part. The prototypical US policy toward regimes in the region is to do whatever is necessary to ensure stability, so that the various regimes will protect its interest. The US therefore allocated the larger part of its democracy-oriented aid- just about $250 million during the 1990s --- to projects that were not likely to undermine local government agency. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, America’s attitude changed, with US officials holding authoritarian regimes in various Arab countries responsible for nurturing extremism among their peoples. It was considered that political reform --- democracy --- could rectify the position.

The Mubarak regime fully grasped the change in US policy and thus took on a number of measures designed to reconcile the West. However, in reality, these produced merely a facade of democracy. In 2002, the National Council for Human Rights, a regime-appointed body, was founded. The organization of state security courts was canceled, and a dialogue with opposition forces was initiated. These criteria were largely the consequence of the rising influence of Mubarak’s son, Gamal, within the ranks of the NDP. And the reforms were likely intended to propel him to the forefront of the Egyptian politics by depicting him as a catalyst for reform or a representative of youthful aspirations for change. Such speculations proliferated when the younger Mubarak was thrust into the political limelight at the General Congress of the NDP in September 2003. During the Congress, he was named Secretary of the NDP Policies Committee, making him responsible for shaping the party’s general policies at home and overseas.

In 2004 opposition and civil society groups joined forces to call for genuine democratic reform, having realized that the government’s plan was just decorative. In March of that year, the Muslim Brotherhood formulated a comprehensive initiative for political, economic, religious and social reform in Egypt. Announced by “Supreme Guide” Mahdy Akef, this manifesto demanded a parliamentary, constitutional, Maulanarepublican Azad system; Library,called for the respect Aligarh of public Muslim freedoms and University the precepts of democracy; urged that steps be taken to secure the independence of the judicial system; and required that laws be made more compatible with Islamic Shari’a. In the economic sphere, it called for the promotion of the private sector through a well-thought-out program and closer cooperation with the rest of the world. In the religious sphere, it

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called for the formation of a committee of senior religious scholars; for the grand imam of al-Azhar to be elected; and for Muslim endowments to be separated from the state budget. It also voiced commitment to freedom of belief and worship and urged national unity. This initiative received mixed responses from the various political powers. Both the regime and Tagammu Party denounced it, albeit for different causes. Whereas the regime received it on the basis that the inquiry of reform should be talked about by legal parties, not illegal organizations, Tagammu rejected it due to its longstanding ideological conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Wafd, Nasserite and Labor parties all gave the initiative a cautious welcome.

In line with the Brotherhood’s initiative, in August 2004 the Egyptian Movement for Change --- Kefaya (Enough) --- came together. It includes nearly 300 Egyptian intellectuals and political activists of all political stripes --- pan-Arabists and Nasserites as well as Islamists, Marxists and liberals. Kefaya has emerged as the most vocal opposition movement, denouncing the NDP’s political monopoly and calling upon Mubarak to step down. It also rejected Gamal Mubarak as a candidate for high office. In October, it took its first group discussion, where its founding document was awarded by a highly respected former judge, Tariq al-Bishri,86 who cried upon the Egyptians to take away their “long-abused consent to be governed” and to engage in civil disobedience (URL:http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020205.html). It also urged immediate political and constitutional reform, the independence of the judiciary, and the abrogation of emergency and extraordinary laws.

In December, Kefaya organized its first demonstrations in Cairo, calling for an end of Mubarak’s rule. These protests represented a remarkable break with custom. O’er the past two decades, popular demonstrations in Egypt had been aimed at foreign affairs, such as the war in Iraq and the Palestinian question, while domestic issues had been limited to debates in the press, seminars and party headquarters. However, Kefaya managed to organize public rallies on domestic issues without prior Maulanaconsultation Azad with the Library, agencies. In addition Aligarh, the three principal Muslim legal opposition University parties,

86 Tariq al-Bishri is an Egyptian thinker and judge, considered one of Egypt’s top legal minds. On February 15, 2011 al-Bishri was appointed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces to head the committee set up to propose constitutional change in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution of 2011.

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Wafd, Tagammu and the Arab Nasserist Party, have joined in an “Alliance of National Forces for Reform” with the Islamist Labor Party, which has not been allowed to operate or publish its newspaper since 2000. The alliance presented its agenda in September 2004 to coincide with the annual congress of the NDP and called for six main reforms : an end to the state of emergency; a constitutional amendment to allow for the direct election of the president from among competing candidates and a limit of two five-year presidential terms; free elections under judicial supervision; greater freedom to establish political parties ; a loosening of the government’s controls over unions, syndicates and civil society groups ; and an end to the ruling party’s dominance in the state media.

In 2005, opposition forces amplified their demands for political reform, and in February Mubarak called for a change to Article 76 of the constitution to allow for competition in presidential elections. Although this initiative likely came in reaction to external pressure, it triggered an unprecedented degree of agitation and civil activism within Egypt. In the months following the proclamation, a disparate collection of resistance movements across different sectors of society converged with one message: opposition to the position quo. Thousands regularly took to the streets, demanding more political freedom and domestic reform. In March, for the first time in decades, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood protesters demonstrated outside the People’s Assembly and called for constitutional reforms and the lifting of the emergency laws. In April, the Brotherhood organized demonstrations at universities, mobilizing thousands of Islamist students to call for the cancellation of emergency laws. In the same month, fifteen of its parliamentary deputies presented a memo on Article 76 to the speaker of the People’s Assembly, listing the following demands: that the president should be elected through direct, multi-candidate elections under full judicial supervision; that candidate must secure the signatures of 20,000 voters to be nominated: that a commission, headed by the chairman of the Supreme Constitutional MaulanaCourt andAzad including Library, four counselors Aligarh from the CourtMuslim of Cassation University, should be established to supervise the electoral process ; and that the successful presidential candidate should give up any party affiliation (Browers,2007:69-88). Meanwhile, Kefaya and other political forces organized vociferous protests in many Egyptian cities, demanding an end to Mubarak’s rule and the implementation of reform.

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However, optimism for genuine political reform faded quickly as the drafting of the constitutional amendment continued to conform to the overall interests of the regime. The NDP set terms that were intended to maintain its monopoly over political life. The amended article reads as follows:

1. For nomination for the presidential elections, independent candidates need the approval of at least 250 elected members of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council, and local councils, all together. Out of this figure, the approval of at least (1) 65 members from the People’s Assembly, (2) 25 members of the Shura Council, and (3) 10 local councilors in 14 of the 26 provinces, must be secured.

2. Political parties, which were founded at least 5 years before the date of nomination to the presidential elections, and which have at least 5 percent of the number of seats in the People’s Assembly and Shura Council, 5 percent for each --- have the right to nominate one of their senior members to the presidential elections.

3. Candidates of political parties for the presidential elections are exempted from the 5 year and 5 percent conditions for the September 2005 elections.

4. An oversight commission --- the Committee of Presidential Elections --- is to be established with the task of supervising all stages of the electoral process. The committee is chaired by the chief of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and consists of five senior judges, including (1) the chief of the Supreme Constitutional Court, (2) the chief of Cairo’s Court of Cassation, (3) the oldest member among the deputy-chiefs of the Supreme Constitutional Court; (4) the oldest member among the deputy-chiefs of the Court of Cassation, and (5) the oldest member among the deputy-chiefs of State Council; plus five public figures, three of which to be chosen by the People’s Assembly, and two by the MaulanaShura Azad Council. Library, Aligarh Muslim University

5. The President of the Republic is elected by 50 plus 1 majority. If none of the candidates receive this required majority, the election is repeated after at least seven days between the two candidates who received the largest number of votes (URL:http://www.carnegieedowment.org/publications/index.cfm? fa=view&id=19075).

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These terms effectively excluded independent candidates from competing with Mubarak or with any future NDP presidential candidate. Furthermore, independent candidates would have virtually no chance of even running in the elections, given that approval had to be secured from 250 members of the lower and upper houses of parliament and nationwide local councils. After all, the NDP is dominant in all these institutions. Similarly, opposition political parties would have little chance of nominating candidates for future elections, given that the 5 percent representation, condition has never been attained by any opposition party. None the less, the NDP- sponsored amendment was approved in June by both the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council.

In September, the first “competitive” presidential election was held in Egypt. There were ten candidates: Hosni Mubarak of the NDP, Noman Gomma of Wafd, Ayman Nour of al-Ghad, Usama Shaltut of al-Takaful, Ahmad al-Sabbahi of al- Ummah, Wahid al-Oqsury of Egypt’s Arab Socialist Party, Rif’at al-’Agroudy of the National Conciliation Party, Ibrahim Turk of the Democratic Unionist Party, Mamdouh Qinawi of the Constitutional Party and Fawzy Ghazal of Egypt 2000. Mubarak obtained about 88 percent of the vote, followed by Ayman Nour (8 percent) and Noman Gomma (3 percent).

One month later, the parliamentary election was held in three stages. During the first stage, there was an unprecedented level of violence that left ten people dead and dozens injured. The violence escalated during the second and third phases after the Muslim Brotherhood had managed to secure 34 parliamentary seats in the first phase. Scores of polling stations were sealed off by large contingents of police to prevent opposition supporters from voting. Hundreds of machete - and club-wielding gangs were directed by security agents to attack supporters of opposition candidates. The regime also arrested about 700 Brotherhood members and supporters. Despite these draconian measures, the election’s result came as a surprise to most observers and Maulanapolitical Azadanalysts. The Library, NDP won 311 Aligarhseats after receiving Muslim 71.9 percent University of the vote --- its lowest majority since 1976. Al-Wafd won 6 seats, al-Tagammu two, and al-Ghad and al-Karama one each. Independents won 112 seats, but many of these were actually Muslim Brotherhood candidates, who had been forced to run as independents. Therefore, once the Assembly formed, it contained eighty-eight Brotherhood deputies

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(20 percent of the total), making them by far the largest opposition force inside parliament.

Since 2005, repression and persecution of political dissidents have become commonplace, with the Brotherhood and judges the main targets. In early March 2006, the regime arrested twenty members of the Brotherhood, including Mohammad Rashad El-Bayoumi, Professor of Geology at Cairo University and a member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, on charges of possessing anti-government publications. Additionally, dozens of Islamist students and professors from al-Azhar University were arrested for protesting the disqualification of Brotherhood-affiliated students from running in student union elections. “Deputy Supreme Guide” Mohammad Khayrat al-Shater was also detained. Similarly, the relationship between the regime and the judiciary soured when, on March 6, 2006, Fathi Khalifa, the government-appointed president of the court of Cassation, referred two senior judges in Alexandria for interrogation allegedly for accusing the Supreme Judicial Council of falsifying the 2005 election results in favor of the ruling party. In April, the government-judiciary confrontation escalated when two more senior judges accused the government of rigging the election and some members of the Court of Cassation87 of committing fraud or ignoring serious irregularities while supervising the election. The Supreme Judicial Council denounced these accusations and referred the two judges to a disciplinary panel on charges of insulting the judiciary. This triggered a strong reaction by the Judges’ Club, which on April 27 held an extraordinary meeting in support of the two accused judges. The meeting concluded with a final statement demanding genuine reform through free elections and the abolition of all exceptional laws.

In May, thousands of Egyptians of various political persuasions took to the streets to protest the disciplinary action against the two judges and demand real political reform. Their demonstrations were met with overwhelming force. Large sections of Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

87 The court of cassation, the only one in its category, was established in 1931 and based in Cairo. The court of cassation, the exclusive and uniform interpretation and application of law. The jurisdiction of court of cassation basically includes consideration of challenges brought to it by either adversary or by the public prosecution. It also includes examining lawsuits related to judge’s actions.

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central Cairo were sealed off to traffic while state security forces assailed the protesters. Hundreds were arrested, while others were severely beaten, including one judge. Legislation was drafted ostensibly to ensure independence of the judiciary, but the deputy-chairman of the Court of Cassation, Ahmad Mar’i, described this as a “conspiracy” against the judiciary. In addition, the Ministry of Justice suspended all financial subsidies to the Judges’ Club to force its members to back down on their demands for reform.

The government’s onslaught did not stop there. In March 2007, justified by the need to modernize the constitution, thirty-four articles were amended. For example, Articles 4, 12, 24, 30, 33 and 56 were amended, all supposedly to reflect the changed economic and social situation in Egypt since the 1970s. References to socialism, the alliance of working forces and the leading role of the public sector in the development were eliminated (URL:http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/837/eg13.htm). Some of the amendments aimed at expanding the powers of the prime minister (ibid). For instance, there was a stipulation that the prime minister must approve or be consulted with regard to the president’s exercise of their vast executive and quasi-legislative authorities. Other amendments strengthened the Shura Council and gave additional powers to parliament (URL:http://en.euromedrights.org/index.php/news/emhrn_release/emhrm_statements_ 2000/3329.html). The People’s Assembly was granted the right to vote article-by- article on the general budget and withdraw confidence from the cabinet, which would force the president to accept the government’s resignation (URL:http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/837/eg13.htm). These amendments, however, did not fundamentally alter the distribution of power because the president continues to enjoy sole authority over the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister and, more importantly, still has the authority to dissolve parliament without a referendum. Consequently, the amendments were clearly designed to shore up executive power. A Maulanathird clause Azad was added Library, to Article 5, which Aligarh stipulates thatMuslim the Egyptian Universitypolitical system is based on party pluralism. The new clause stipulates that “any political activity or political parties shall not be based on religious authority or foundation, or on any discrimination on the basis of race or gender (Ibid). Effectively, this gives the regime the constitutional right to accuse any institution or civil organization of involvement in religiously inspired political activities. It was clearly introduced to curb the growing

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influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, Article 62 was amended to allow for a change in the Egyptian electoral system for an individual candidate system to a mixed one that “combines the individual district and party list systems in any ratio that it specifies.” This amendment has led to the narrowing of the margin available for electoral candidates to run in the general elections as independents and further restricts electoral opportunities for the Muslim Brotherhood, which has benefited from the individual candidacy system. Article 88 was amended to minimize judicial scrutiny of general elections by establishing a supreme supervisory commission whose membership includes, but is not limited to, current and former members of judicial bodies. However, the amendment did not identify the boarder monitoring functions of this commission and did not provide guidelines for hundreds of auxiliary polling stations. This means that, in practice, the auxiliary stations will be supervised by state employees. The amendment also stipulates that the election should take place on a single day, thus making it practically impossible to rely primarily on members of the commission to supervise the voting process. Finally, Article 179 was amended to give the executive --- specifically the president and the security forces --- unprecedented powers. The state was given the right to suspend proscription for arbitrary arrests and requirements for judicial warrants for home searches and technological surveillance of citizens. In addition, the president was given the right to refer crimes of terrorism to exceptional courts, such as military or state security courts (in violation of Article 68 of the constitution, which stipulates that all citizens have the right to a “natural judge”) (Ibid). All this led Amnesty International to describe the amendments as “the greatest erosion of human rights in 26 years” (URL:http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/008/2007/en/c74b5428- d3a5/11dd-a3292f46302a8cc6/mde120082007en.pdf). Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, the deputy director of Amnesty’s International Middle East and North Africa Program, asserted that such amendments

Would simply entrench the long-standing system of abuse Maulana Azadunder Egypt’s Library, state of emergency Aligarh powers Muslim and give the misuseUniversity of those powers bogus legitimacy . . . Instead of putting an end to the secret detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and unfair trials before emergency and military courts, Egyptian MPs are now being asked to sign away even the constitutional protections against such human rights violations (Cited in Ibid).

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In the midst of all of this, the NDP took further steps to promote Gamal Mubarak within the ranks of the party. This process had begun in earnest in early 2006, when he was appointed assistant secretary-general, in addition to his post as chairman of the Policies Committee. In March, he was portrayed by the state media as a senior official when he opened a social rehabilitation center in Cairo. Then, in August, one of his close associates, Husam al-Badrawi, admitted for the first time that Gamal Mubarak was one of the candidates to succeed President Mubarak. In an interview with the al- Wafd opposition newspaper, al-Badrawi said, “The ruling party seeks to maintain power and present candidates for the presidency, whether it is President Mubarak or other figures who will succeed him in the future . . . [And] Gamal Mubarak is one of those figures, as long as this takes place within a legal framework and according to three presidential elections” (URL:http://www.alwafd.org/front/detail.php? id=3704&cat=invest&PHPSESSID=26da628160397994cec97a79681d77b5). In September, the young Mubarak received a significant endorsement from President George W. Bush, who praised him in the Wall Street Journal as the leader of “a new group of reformers who are now in government,” The same month, the NDP held its Annual Congress, in which Gamal overshadowed other senior party members, including the secretary-general himself, by playing the lead role in all discussions on domestic and foreign issues.

Despite the growing civil opposition to Gamal Mubarak’s succession, it is unlikely that opposition forces will be able to prevent it on their own. However, the military might yet come to their aid. Should the younger Mubarak succeed his father, this would mark a departure from the usual method of succession in republican Egypt, which has always taken place with military approval. Despite the apparent demilitarization of Egyptian society over the last two decades, the armed forces remain the most influential institution in the country. Accordingly, high-ranking military personnel must be unified in their support for Gamal Mubarak, otherwise his Maulanasuccession Azad could fail. Library, Aligarh Muslim University In the early year of his administration, Mubarak’s regime tried to accommodate the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing it to resume its political activities as well as the publication of its periodicals. Mubarak also released the supreme guide of the Brotherhood, Omar al-Tilmissani and other members who were imprisoned during

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Sadat’s so called “Autumn of Fury” (Vatikiotis, 1961:39) in September 1981. However, the regime’s relationships with the Brotherhood during the early 1980’s reflected a delicate balance. The regime sought to use the moderate and non-violent Brotherhood as a political counterweight against organizations that were viewed as a threat to the regime, such as radical Islamic groups and other groups, both Islamic and secular, which were politically active. The regime did this in order to enhance its stability.

The regime’s policy had offered the Brotherhood a wider space to function as technically illegal, but informally recognized political entity, allowing it an indirect participation, and the growth of its operation in the field of social services, throughout the country. Taking advantage of this increased freedom, the Brotherhood started spreading its influence and hold among different sections of the society. It sought to give a boost to its ideology by carrying out social service work. Its volunteers were the first to reach the spot when a powerful earthquake shook Egypt on 22 November 1995. In order to secure a place for itself among diverse fora for expressing its ideas and to educate the Egyptians, the Brotherhood focused its attention on establishing a presence within professional associations, students’ unions, university faculty and clubs. This was mainly because despite their professional basis, most Egyptian syndicates until early 1980s were under the control of either government or liberal forces in the society. Within a short time, the Brotherhood captured, in elections, major professional associations, (Fahmy, 1998:551-52) such as engineering, pharmacist and medical, on the basis of its effective and efficient mobilization. Its gaining hold of prestigious and formally secular dominated Bar Association --- the greatest bastion of liberal thought in Egypt --- was a climax. The existence of an apathetic majority, and highly skilled and organized Muslim Brotherhood minority within the syndicates had facilitated the latter’s successful takeover of many of the syndicates’ top leadership positions.

The Brotherhood’s control over various associations was particularly significant Maulanain terms Azadof the Group Library,’s increasing prominence Aligarh in civil Muslim society. The Brotherhood University used the fora of professional associations to broaden its social activities which were previously restricted and carried out its work via charitable societies and other private organizations.

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The Brotherhood’s gradual control of these institutions, at the minimum, indicated symbolically that the group had for the first time gained control over the legitimate channels to further its own political aim, highlighting its viability as a formidable political force, particularly because of the weakness of the existing opposition political parties that enjoyed legal status.

Here, it may not be out of place to mention the nature of the Egyptian civil society as it was reflected in the functioning of these professional syndicates and other organizations. It is really ironic that while syndicates and other organizations. It is really ironic that while syndicates, political parties, and other organizations criticize the government for being intolerant and repressive of an opposition movement, the syndicates they are intolerant of internal criticism and reluctant to abide by the syndicates’ rules. The credibility and prestige of professional syndicates have been further eroded by charges of corruption, waste of funds and embezzlement that have been made against syndicates members and then leaders. Falsification of election results had been other charges levelled against the syndicates. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to have outwitted the government in these matters. The top leadership of all major syndicates remained unchanged. Yet, they wanted the government to amend the constitution and limit the tenure of the head of the state (Fahmy, 1998:557-58). All these factors had increased the vulnerability of these syndicates vis-a-vis the government and had given the state the opportunity to tighten even further its grips on the institutions of civil society, thus, affirming the age-old saying: people get the government they deserve.

In the early years, Mubarak did not view the Brotherhood as a threat to his regime and hence continued to overlook its growing presence until 1984. However, when the group scored an impressive gain (eight seats) in parliamentary elections through its alliance with the secular Wafd Party, it came as a surprise both to the government and the Brotherhood. This promoted a subtle change in the regime’s attitude towards the Maulanagroup. The Azad Brotherhood Library, on its part made Aligarh clear its intention Muslim by stepping University up its criticism of government policies through its members in Parliament who enjoyed parliamentary immunity.

However, things had still not gone beyond the Regime’s control. For example, the Brotherhood’s demand for the implementation of Sharia Law, which was quite

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embarrassing to the Government, was successfully thwarted in the parliament. Also, the impact of Islamic radicals at the time was limited to the University campus, with only sporadic minor acts of violence. The regime also enjoyed relative stability. Therefore, for most of the period between 1984 and 1989, the State pursued a consistent policy of non-confrontation, save for occasional arrest and investigation of Brotherhood members by security forces, and sporadic, but innocuous, the criticism made by semi-official media and government officials.

In 1990, the Brotherhood, along with Wafd Party, boycotted the elections saying that the elections would be fundamentally compromised. The Brotherhood’s increasing influence over the masses at the social level, and its increasingly visible participation in civil and political life, attracted the State’s attention and the Regime now viewed the group as a formidable threat (Compagna, 1996:280). Then came the October 1991 Madrid peace talks between the parties to the Arab-Israel conflict. While Mubarak consolidated the gains from Sadat’s Israel-Palestine policy, he wanted to disassociate himself from the popular aspect of that policy. But Mubarak could not do this tight-rope walking for long. He had to

take a position. Egypt’s endorsement and active mediation at Madrid peace talk88 exposed him and he now came under attack from the Muslim Brotherhood, (Fahmy, 1998:557) which was highly critical of these talks. They now came out openly with a statement terminating it as a sell-out of Palestine --- the issue that was top on their priority (Compagna, 1996:287). Islam, they roared, does not sanction peace with the usurper of our land.

After 1991, an important political change took place which strained State- Brotherhood relations even further. By 1992, Mubarak’s government found itself embroiled in bloody conflict with radical Islamists who had taken up arms against the State and carried out bold attacks against security forces in Upper Egypt and also

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

88 The Madrid Conference of 1991 was a peace conference, held from 30 October to 1 November 1991 in Madrid, hosted by Spain and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an attempt by the international community to revive the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process through negotiations, involving Israel and the Palestinians as well as Arab countries, including Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

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against government officials in Cairo (Compagna, 1996:287). In May 1992, 13 Christians were killed by Islamic militants in order to expose the regime’s weakness to provide security where militants were unable to attack security forces. In October 1992, the first of the series of armed attack against tourists also took place.

The Brotherhood’s failure to unequivocally condemn such attacks angered the beleaguered regime and it began to press the Brotherhood to take position publicly against violent activities. As a result, Brotherhood painstakingly made efforts to disassociate itself from violent Islamist groups and condemned attacks against tourists. Christians and government officials; the language of these condemnations was less than unequivocal (Fahmy, 1998:278-304). Though the Brotherhood had no clear-cut economic ideology and a framework to solve the economic problems of the country, they exploited the deteriorating economic situation and the government’s failure to redress the grievances of the people. However, the Muslim Brothers made up a network that in some ways seemed to outdo an enfeebled (if dangerously repressive) state that had little legitimacy as an institution serving Egyptian society. They provided inexpensive clinics and other welfare services, demonstrating a kind of dedication, honesty, and efficiency lacking elsewhere. The earthquake that devastated parts of Cairo in 1992 provided a notable case of the Muslim Brethren’s ability to extend immediate relief at a time when the government bureaucracy found itself paralyzed by rigid rules. Some physicians working for the organization were arrested for providing such emergency services and thus increasing the Islamists’ popularity.

Fringe Islamist movements violently confronted the regime. Some members eventually merged with similar revolutionary organizations in other countries to create a worldwide force that attacked the United States. Mubarak survived an attempt by Egyptian militants to assassinate him during a visit to Ethiopia in 1995 (Hala, 2009:31). Small groups such as the Survivors of the Fire [of Hell, a reference to Mubarak’s prisons and torture chambers] in the late 1980s and The Promise in 2002 Maulanaengaged Azad in assassinations Library, and became Aligarh the object of Muslim government repression. University Others were accused of belonging to the Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO), which had carried out attacks during Sadat’s rule. The biggest militant organizations remained al- Jihad and particularly the Islamic Group. The latter, which had evolved from the Islamic groups Sadat initially supported as allies against the left, carried out brutal

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attacks, killing Farag Farah, a professor known for unorthodox views. Nagib Mahfuz, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature seven years earlier, whose writings, some considered blasphemous, survived a stabbing by members of the same group (Soliman, 2011:45).

Another brutal tactic adopted by some militants during the 1990s was to murder tourists. The goal was to punish the regime and hopefully bring it down by undermining tourism, which provided a vital source of foreign exchange. This reached its climax with the killing of 62 German tourists (and four Egyptians) at the famous Temple of Queen Hatshepsut in Luxor in 1997 (Perry, 2004:136). This nearly destroyed tourism for a while, costing the country billions of dollars. It also horrified the Egyptian people in general.

The Luxor massacre accelerated repression to the extent that leaders of the Islamic Group unilaterally declared a cease-fire in 1999. In 2002, the government organized a meeting --- in prison --- of imprisoned militants with hundreds of other members of the Islamic Group to tell the latter that peace had been concluded. Now it seems that they had already agreed on a cease-fire at the time of the Luxor massacre, but were unable to get word to the unit that carried it out. Hundreds of militants who renounced violence were released from prison in subsequent years, although other Islamists continued to face arrest.

With most of the militants rejecting violent activities in the late 1990s, others fled to Afghanistan, where the Taliban89 regime was giving sanctuary to Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida90 and where hundreds of Egyptian militants had fought alongside him against the Soviets in the 1980s (Perry, 2004:137). Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri91, the physician who had come to many people’s attention earlier as he appeared in court in a

89 The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist political movement in Afghanistan. It spread throughout Afghanistan and formed a government, ruling as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from MaulanaSeptember Azad 1996 until Library, December 2001, Aligarhwith Kandahar as theMuslim capital. Mohammad University Omar was the founder and served as the spiritual leader of the Taliban from its foundation in 1994 until his death in 2013. 90 The Al-Qaida is a global militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and several others, at some point between August 1988 and late 1989, with origins traceable to the Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. 91 Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri is the current leader of al-Qaida and senior official of Islamist organizations which have orchestrated and carried out attacks in North America, Asia, Africa and Middle East.

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cage with others accused in Sadat’s assassination and who was a veteran of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, formally united his faction of Jihad with al-Qa’ida and emerged as the top lieutenant of bin Laden to pursue a direct global terrorist campaign against the United States, which the militants saw as the patron of the Egyptian, Saudi, and other Arab regimes as well as of Israel, (Perry, 2004:137) rather than continuing the fight at home. Already following the attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993, several Egyptians affiliated with militant Egyptian Islamist organizations, notably Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rehman, were imprisoned in the United States. In September 2001, it was the young Egyptian al-Qa’ida operative Muhammad Atta, who led the first kamikaze attack92 on the World Trade Center that allegedly in large part represented planning by Zawahiri.

The Mubarak regime reacted to the Islamist challenge not only by repressing the militants and, by 1994, increasingly the moderate Islamists as well, but also in many ways by joining the movement to Islamicize Egyptian society. Those Islamists who railed against the regime were matched by television preachers that tried to provide religious legitimacy for it. Some leading Islamic scholars allied with the government made statements equating secularists with apostates. The judiciary became more Islamicized, as indicated by the sensational case of one university professor, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, whose marriage a court dissolved in 1995 on the ground that his heretical views made him a disbeliever and thus unqualified to have a Muslim wife, and there were unsuccessful attempts to punish the outspoken feminist Nawal al- Sa’dawi in the same way. Dramatic arrests of homosexuals in 2002 indicated that the regime was anxious to protect its religious credentials. Even actions designed to supervise the religious activity, such as increasing attempts to bring private mosques under control and to determine the content of sermons (it was announced in 2003 that one sermon, approved by the government, now would be heard in all mosques), reflect something at odds with authentic secularism. The contest seemed more and more to be Maulanabetween Azadpopulist and Library, establishment Islam Aligarh rather than betweenMuslim Islam and University secularism.

92 Kamikaze attacks were suicide attacks by military aviators from the Empire of Japan against Allied naval vessels in the closing stages of the Pacific campaign of World War ll, design to destroy warships more effectively than was possible with conventional attacks. During World War ll, about 3,860 Kamikaze pilots died, and about 19% of Kamikaze attacks manage to hit a ship.

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The simultaneous resurgence of Coptic Christianity and Islam in Egypt endangered the relationship between the two religious communities. Sporadic clashes occurred between Copts and militant Islamists. In 2000 a dispute between two people escalated into a sectarian riot in the Upper Egyptian town of Kushah in which 20 Copts were killed. It was left to the Court of Cassation, responding to a request from the public prosecutor, to call for a retrial following light sentences and acquittals of the accused Muslims by the lower court. And in 2001 Copts in Cairo rioted after a Cairo tabloid (later closed down and condemned by the parliament and its editor sentenced to three years in prison for “insulting a heavenly religion”) published an inflammatory photo of a Coptic monk (later reported to have previously been excommunicated) engaged in lewd behavior. Although the Muslim Brothers sometimes issued reassuring statements, the Copts were apprehensive about the possibility that the Islamist opposition would come to power.

In the economic field, Egypt has not been as successful as hoped for. Sadat had introduced the Infitah (open door policy) in the 1970s, which signaled a switch from planning and nationalization of free market economy. The world oil boom of the early 1970s proved beneficial for Egypt also. However, when the oil boom started receding and the oil price dropped, it had its impact not only on Egypt’s balance of payment regime, but also on the level of home-remittances made by the Egyptians working in oil-producing countries. This had its adverse effect on the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country which dropped to 7 percent in the mid - 1980s.

Between 1984 and 1988, external debt increased progressively from $37.8 to $45.7 billion. The debt service from the US sources alone was $2.4 to $3.4 billion, while the export value of goods and services dropped from $3.4 to $2.7 billion. The obvious conclusion was that the Egyptian government was not able to pay even the necessary debt service charges (Amin, 1979:65). The liberalization of the economy, thus impoverished the majority while enriching the well-off few who had supported Maulanacloser ties Azad between Library, foreign capital and Aligarh the regime. InMuslim sum, the few University simply depleted economic resources instead of becoming a genuine national bourgeoisie that was engaged in economic development and political reform (Imam, 1986:230).

The rapidly increasing gap between rich and poor in Egypt is a major factor contributing to the rise of Islamic militancy and the de-legitimization of the regime. In

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1993-1994, Egypt ended the first stage of its structural adjustment program, initiated in 1991 through an agreement with the IMF and World Bank. Egypt agreed to embark on policies to lower inflation and reduce the balance of payments deficit. Meanwhile, it would implement policies to improve the efficiency of the public sector and to privatize public assets.

The structural adjustment program has had some success. The deficit as a percentage of GNP decreased from 17 percent in 1989 to 3.5 percent in 1993, and inflation declined from 21.2 to 11.1 percent in the same period. However, austerity measures have come at a high cost to the middle and lower classes. According to a World Bank Report, average individual income in Egypt has fallen from $670 a year in the early 1960s to $610 a year in the early 1990s (Ismael, 2001:448). Yet the government simultaneously adhered to World Bank injunctions to minimize social subsidies to the poor for subsistence and education. Prices increased by almost 300 percent, excluding new taxes. New economic policies also led to higher unemployment, estimated by the World Bank in 1994 to be 17.5 percent, and by other sources as high as 20 percent (Ibid). Furthermore, unemployment in Egypt is not cushioned, by social insurance or social welfare.

The upper classes have profited from corruption, arms sales commissions, widespread bribery and commercial services. As if to add insult to injury, their wealth tends to be invested outside of Egypt, with a double indemnity for the country: there is less domestic investment in developing infrastructure and taxes are avoided. According to a study by Mohammad Heikal, there are 50 Egyptians, whose wealth is $100-200 million; 100 to $80-$100 million; 150 to $30-$50 million; 350 to $15-$30 million; 2,800 to $10-$15 million; and 70,000 with $5-$10 million. If Heikal is correct, then over the last twenty years, almost 1,000 individuals have accumulated over $50 billion, more than the foreign debt of Egypt, and all of them have accumulated this wealth from within the country --- through estates, by setting up monopolies for Maulanaessential Azadgoods, or asLibrary, agents of international Aligarh companies Muslim (Ismael and Ismael University, 2011:374).

The sharp deterioration of economic conditions for the vast majority of Egyptians over the last two decades has recently led to the emergence of the “new social strikes” (Ismael and Ismael, 2011:374). These strikes have been largely a political and focused on one major issue: the fall in wages and salaries (Zaki, 1994:34). In the beginning,

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they were limited to factory workers, especially textile workers, but they spread to the professional classes, including public sector employees. The first strike took place in February 2007, when thousands of workers from the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in al-Mahalla al-Kubra occupied their factory and adjacent streets to demand a wage increase. They wanted payment of overtime, an increase in basic pay and basic medical and transport services, but also insisted that the company’s chairman should be suspended pending investigation into alleged misuse of funds and that union officials attached to the state-controlled General Federation of Trade Unions should be impeached. Perhaps surprisingly, the government agreed to the workers’ demands, which inspired workers in other industries across the country to strike, too. In almost every confrontation between workers and the government, the result was the same. In November 2007, university professors protested against poor salaries and the security forces’ intervention on campuses. Pharmacists, lawyers and civil servants have all followed suit, and the strikes were still common (Ismael and Ismael, 2011:374).

In political and economic terms, Egypt is ossified. In April 2008, the cost of food staples doubled and incited protesters to storm the “City Hall in Mahalla, burn [ing] tires in the streets, smashing [ing] chairs through shop windows. . . The police responded with tear gas and detained more than 500 protestors” (URL:http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2004333929_egyptriots08.ht ml). The government has continued to jail opposition figures, and is now employing a new tactic of closely scrutinizing the internet to identify dissenters (URL:http://www.ft.com/ems/s/0/090b9796/4b1f-11de-87e2/00144feabdc0.html). Fundamental restrictions were again imposed on the domestic process prior to the 2008 municipal elections, when 800 Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters were rounded up. In response, the Brotherhood boycotted the election, allowing the NDP to claim 92 percent of the vote.

Another significant strike took place in late 2009 in which 10,000 municipal tax Maulanacollectors Azad and their supportersLibrary, won “ aAligarh 325 percent wage Muslim increase and theUniversity right to form an independent labor union, the first in Egypt’s modern history”. Strikes continued until the uprising, which was initially led by the youth. The scores of thousands of workers who participated in it constituted a main component of the uprising. Furthermore, all sectors of society took an active part in it (Amin, 2011a:12).

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It is instructive to point out that the World Bank considered Egypt a model for neoliberal policies. An IMF report a few days before the uprising spoke of Egypt’s neoliberal measures in laudatory terms. In fact, Egypt’s Finance Minister Committee was named to become the IMF chair and member of the Financial Committee (Maher, 2011:36).

The Egyptian political economy and the lead up to the uprisings would show that the social movement had been developing rapidly in the past several years before January 25. The uprising came as a surprise to Western observers and governments (Amin, 2011a:12-13). The youth began the uprising and the left and the middle class answered the call. From the beginning the Muslim Brothers (MBs) decided to stay away, expecting the regime to crush the protesters. They joined four days later, after the millions of people poured into the streets of Egypt (Aoude, 2013:243). The secular character of the uprising was indisputable, even after the MBs joined in. The secular character of the uprising was also reflected in its slogans of democracy, social justice (a new economic development strategy independent of neoliberal globalization) and a foreign policy that expressed the will of the Egyptian people, not the imperial dominance of the US (Amin, 2011a:13). At first the MBs were among the parties and groupings that agreed to the regime’s call for dialogue, but the 15-million-strong protests clearly showed that the masses were in no mood for dialogue. The youth branch of the MBs pushed the organization to participate by itself joining the protests on the third day without orders from the organization (Aoude, 2013:246-247).

The NPUP did not participate either, but indicated that its members may do so as individuals (Interview with the General Secretary of the NPUP, 2011). Even when the MBs, the NPUP, the Communists and the Wafd party joined in the protests, the uprising continued to lack a clear centralized leadership (Maher, 2011:38) celebrated the movement’s “horizontal and decentralized organizational form.” However, the decentralized, often chaotic, character of the uprising was at once its strength and Maulanaweakness. Azad As later Library, events did show ,Aligarh the Muslim Brothers Muslim were the University only organized force capable of taking advantage of the chaos. They had their following (roughly 5 million) and the popular support of the other parties paled in comparison to that of the MBs (Aoude, 2013:249).

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Economic losses mounted to the tune of $310 million per day. On February 9, 2011 a general strike of workers across Egypt was instrumental in ending Mubarak’s rule. However, the political economy of Egypt leading towards the downfall of the Mubarak regime. It shows how the country moved from a public sector and import substitution industrialization economic growth strategy of the Nasser era to the market-oriented privatized economy of the Sadat and Mubarak era. This whole process was largely directed from the top without broad political participation. It shows how weak the political institutions were in directing economic activity for the benefit of the country as a whole. It also shows how external factors and pressures affected the course of economic policy. Particularly, the pressure from the IFIs played a crucial role, especially since the 1990s in the implementation of SAP93. While the SAP brought about needed macroeconomic adjustments, it also contributed to rising unemployment, poverty and inequality. The deleterious consequences are predictable given the very logic of the SAP. Many other countries which have gone through SAP faced similar consequences. This, however, was not inevitable. Along with SAP, the government could have instituted social welfare policies to counteract the impact on the poor and marginalized population. Egypt had no such policy and the IFIs did not pay attention to social welfare. The result was social and political conflict which ultimately led to the downfall of the Mubarak regime.

However, from the point of view of the analysis the foreign relations between the Mubarak government and neighboring countries are constant strain to please entrepreneurs. In the mid-1980s, Egyptian-Israel relations started to warm, as official visits were exchanged and Israel participated in the Cairo Book Fair. Since then,

Maulana93 During Azad the early years Library, of the Mubarak regimeAligarh, Egypt was sufferingMuslim from economic University inefficiencies and economic crises. Mubarak realized that the economic situation could only improve with a privatization of the economy and foreign investments. In 1990, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was willing to help Egypt to overcome the economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Plan. The help was however, tied to several laws that should private the economy. In 2000, many former state-controlled firms were privatized, yet the state often remained the largest stakeholder. Moreover, important parts of the public sector, the Suez Canal, the national oil company, social and health insurances and the General Authority for Supply were still state-controlled.

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though, Egypt has been careful not to appear too close to Israel, with Mubarak keeping relations formal. By the late 1980s, the relationship was focused on the issue of elections in the occupied territories, and a degree of genuine cooperation was achieved here. However, this has never looked like developing into anything that could be described as “friendship.”

Mubarak has also moved to enhance bilateral relations with other Arab countries and emphasized that Egypt’s return to the Arab fold was only natural. He ordered the cessation of propaganda attacks against Arab regimes, even if they had previously attacked his regime. Officially, he asserted that any restoration of relations with Arab states should be based on an Arab initiative, because they had broken off relations with Egypt. Behind the scenes, however, Egyptian diplomats and Mubarak himself worked feverishly to regain Egypt’s credibility. As a result, Egyptian troops on the Libyan border were relocated and Mubarak cultivated ties with Oman and Jordan while emphasizing Egypt’s historic links with Sudan.

Egypt finally regained its dominant role in the Arab and Islamic world when, in 1984, its membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference was restored, five years after it had been rescinded. Meanwhile, bilateral relations between Egypt and Arab/Muslim countries began to improve. Moreover, in late 1987, the League of Arab States allowed Arab countries the right to restore bilateral relations with Egypt (although this was a mere formality because they had never been completely terminated). In February 1989, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen established the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)94, and by the following year Egypt had restored formal diplomatic relations with all of its Arab neighbors.

With the liberation of Kuwait in 199195, in which Egypt participated with troops

94 Arab Co-operation Council was founded by February 1989 by North Yemen, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. It was created partly in response to the four countries being left out of the Gulf Corporation Council partly out of a desire to foster close economic co-operation and integration among its members, and partly as an Egyptian step to rejoin mainstream Arab politics after years of ostracism Maulanafollowing Azad its peace treatyLibrary, with Israel. Aligarh Muslim University

95 The liberation of Kuwait was the campaign to retake Kuwait from Iraq after the massive air campaign between 24-28 February 1991. U.S. troops and the Coalition entered to find the Iraqis surrendering en masse; however, pockets of resistance existed, particularly at Kuwait International Airport where Iraqi troops seemingly unaware that a retreat order had been issued to them, continued to fight, resulting in a fierce battle over the airport itself. The majority of the fighting took place in Iraq, rather than Kuwait.

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in the Coalition forces to evict Saddam Hussein, and the initiation of the Middle East peace process, Egypt’s political leadership pursued a more aggressive foreign policy, especially at the regional level, taking an active role in bilateral negotiations in the peace process. It also became an active partner in International peacekeeping operations both inside and outside the region. Mubarak attempted to solidify regional political blocs, detach Egypt from certain US policies and present his country as a sovereign entity, free from the suzerainty of the US.

The Madrid peace process, initiated by the United States after the 1991 Gulf War, allowed Egyptian representation only in the multilateral negotiations which discussed general regional issues, not in the bilateral peace negotiations. However, Egypt insisted on carving a vital role for itself in the bilateral talks because it was the only Arab party that had good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries involved in the process. It therefore became a hybrid of mediator and partner in the negotiations: in some instances, it tried to mediate between the Israeli and the Palestinians or between the Israelis and the Syrians; at other times, it championed the Arab position and abandoned its previous “neutrality.”

In this context, Mubarak met with Yitzhak Rabin, Hafiz al-Assad and Yasir Arafat whenever there was a deadlock in negotiations. However, Egypt decided not to interfere in the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo negotiations96. Nevertheless, Mubarak, at Arafat’s request, persuaded Rabin to add part of the West Bank to the self-rule area, so that the PLO leader could not be accused of trading the West Bank to Gaza. Consequently, Jericho included in the Palestinian domain. Later, Cairo hosted the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations for the implementations of the Declaration of Principles and was involved in last-minute negotiations to get the implementation agreement signed on May 4, 1994.

Egypt has also been consulting closely with Syria, and on December 1, 1994, MaulanaMubarak Azad visited Syria Library, to promote bilateral Aligarh relations and Muslim to discuss the peaceUniversity process 96 On September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yatzhak Rabin and PLO negotiator Mahmud Abbas signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim self-government arrangements, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Accord”, at the White House. Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that PA would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. Then, permanent status talks on the issues of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem would be held.

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with al-Assad. The Israeli reaction to this suggested that Egypt should take a stronger stand for peace between Israel and the Arabs, which highlighted Egypt’s significance in the peace process. Later that month, though, Egypt hosted a trilateral summit with Syria and Saudi Arabia that was designed to slow the normalization process with Israel until a comprehensive peace had been achieved. Al-Assad was concerned that the Arab states would end their economic boycott of Israel before the latter agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which would leave Syria in a weakened position in future peace negotiations. This would have been ironic, because Egypt had opened the door for normalization with Israel at Camp David and had paid dearly with almost ten years as a pariah in the Arab world. Egypt pursued its active involvement in the peace process to convince the Western world, especially the United States, that it, not Israel, was the key to stability in the region. By doing this, Mubarak hoped to secure the economic benefits of peace.

In the upsurge of violence that followed the assassination of Rabin in November 1995 and the Palestinian elections in January 1996, Egypt again seized the chance to act as a regional mediator. It hosted the March 1996 “Summit of the Peacemakers” in the Red Sea town of Sharm-al-Sheikh, with US President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres as well as King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat all in attendance. While the leaders presented a united front in condemning terrorism, deep divisions were evident. Egypt took the opportunity to advance itself at Israel’s expense by blaming the spate of Hamas suicide bombing on Israeli intransigence in the occupied territories and succeeded in isolating Israel in its endeavors to win united condemnation of Iran for its role in sponsoring terrorism. However, both Syria and Lebanon, key players on the Arab side of the Palestinian issue, boycotted the conference. Nevertheless, for Egypt, hosting the conference was an end in itself, and the domestic press and government trumpeted the return of the country to prominence in regional affairs.

MaulanaSubsequent Azad to Library, the May 1996 electionAligarh of Benjamin Muslim Netanyahu University and the Likud government in Israel, Mubarak seized the opportunity to make further diplomatic gains. In response to Arab concerns about the direction of the new regime in Tel Aviv, Mubarak, King Hussein and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia called for an Arab summit to be held in Cairo in late June. This summit strengthened Egypt’s position, as having its

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continued efforts to maintain communication channels with Israel, although Mubarak has never expressed support for the Likud interpretation of the peace process.

With the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000 relations between Egypt and Israel spiraled downward, with the former accusing the latter of employing excessive force against the Palestinians. The Egyptian regime turned a blind eye to the country’s press (both opposition and official) depicting Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a “Nazi” and a “butcher” who only understood the language of blood (URL:http://spme.net/cgi-bin/facultyforum.cgi? ID=1578). Relations deteriorated further when Mubarak recalled the Egyptian ambassador in Tel-Aviv in response to Israel’s escalation of military force in the occupied territories. However, the two countries began to reach an understanding of several issues in the aftermath of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003.97

During that year, the “Road Map”98 peace plan was released by the International Quartet for Middle East Peace (United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations). This plan divided the resolution of the conflict into three phases. The first phase focused on Palestinian reform, recognition of Israel and an end to the Intifada. The second related to Israel’s withdrawal from the Palestinian self-rule areas occupied after September 2000. The third focused on the establishment of an interim Palestinian state and on the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states. In June 2003, an Arab-American summit was held in Sharm-al-Sheikh with the aim of securing Arab support for the Road Map. The summit was attended by President George W. Bush, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and the new Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas.

97 The 2003 invasion of Iraq lasted from 19 March to 1 May 2003 and signaled the start of the Iraq war, which was dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States (prior to 19 March, the mission in Iraq was called Operation Enduring Freedom, a carryover from the War in Afghanistan). MaulanaThe invasionAzad consisted Library, of 21 days of troops Aligarh from the United Muslim States, the United KingdomUniversity, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq and deposed the Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein. The invasion phase consisted primarily of a conventionally fought war which concluded with the capture of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad by American forces. 98 The Road Map for Peace was based on a speech of U.S. President Gorge W. Bush administration on 24 June 2002. A first EU draft, proposed in September 2002, was put aside in favor of a U.S. draft. The draft version from the Bush administration was published as early as 14 November 2002. The EU pushed the Quartet to present the final text on December 2002, but failed, due to Israeli opposition.

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The first significant improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations come in May 2004 when Mubarak and Sharon agreed to set up political, security and economic committees to improve all aspects of the bilateral relationship. This move was augmented with the conclusion of the biggest economic deal ever signed between the two countries: a contract worth $2.5 billion for Egypt to supply Israel with natural gas. Mubarak then surprised the Arab world by asserting that Sharon was the Palestinians’ “best chance for peace” (URL:http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020205.html). The following month, Mubarak affirmed Egypt’s readiness to help keep the peace in Gaza after Israel’s planned withdrawal. Finally, in December, he sent both his intelligence chief and foreign minister on an official visit to Israel, during which the two countries signed a protocol for the deployment of 750 Egyptian troops along the Egypt --- Gaza border in advance of Israel’s planned withdrawal from the territory. The protocol, which was finalized in August 2005, would make Egypt responsible for preventing arms smuggling into the Gaza strip.

The same month, bilateral relations warmed even more. First, Egypt returned an imprisoned Israeli spy, Azzam Azzam, who had been in an Egyptian prison since 1996, in exchange for six Egyptian students who had been arrested in Israel a few months earlier on suspicion of terrorism. Then, the two countries signed the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) Agreement, according to which Egyptian goods would gain free access to the US market only if 11.7 percent of the content originated in Israel. This agreement, although largely welcomed by the Egyptian business community, triggered significant opposition from a cross-section of Egyptian society, including lawmakers, economists and activists, because it gave Israel a de-facto veto over Egyptian exports to the US. Galal Amin, a prominent economist, said the agreement “has put Egyptian industries under the mercy of Israel, which could now decide upon which types of industries would be allowed to developed and flourish and which ones would stagnate and diminish (Amin, 2009:93).

MaulanaOther Azad measures Library, enhanced the new Aligarh relationship. InMuslim February 2005 University, Egypt hosted the first Israeli-Palestinian summit in four years. Highlighting Egypt’s indispensable role in the mechanics of peacemaking in the Middle East, this was held amid hopes of reviving the peace process in the wake of Arafat’s death and the election of Abbas as chairman of the PNA. More importantly, the two countries agreed to reestablish

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formal diplomatic ties. Later, in the year, Mubarak stunned Egyptian and Arab public opinion amid the military confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah. In a joint statement with King Abdullah of Jordan, he blamed Hizbollah for the outbreak of the war in Lebanon and referred to “uncalculated adventures that do not serve the interests of the region” (URL:http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/804/re91.htm). The statement also made indirect reference to UN Security Council Resolution 1559,99 which calls for the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon and the disarmament of Hizbollah. Mubarak’s remarks fueled angry demonstrations in many Egyptian cities in support of Hizbollah. Thousands of protesters waved Hezbollah flags and held aloft picture of its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, while demanding the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Egypt and calling for the termination of all aspects of cooperation with the Jewish state. From 2007 onward, Mubarak again antagonized Egyptian and Arab public opinion when he joined with Israel to impose an economic blockade on the Gaza Strip in light of the internecine conflict between Abbas and the Hamas-led government of Ismail Haniya. The aim of the blockade was to topple the Hamas government in Gaza. All crossing to the strip, including humanitarian supply lines, were blocked. Then, in December 2008, Israel launched a massive assault on Gaza, which resulted in the deaths of more than 1,300 Palestinian civilians.

In late 2009, Egypt confirmed that it was constructing an underground barrier on its border with the Gaza Strip in order to disrupt “tunnel traffic.” The 1.5 million residents of the strip have relied on a network of tunnels to import everything from food and cars to cigarettes, as well as weapons (URL:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20091217/wl_mideast_afp/mideastconfictgazaegyp tsmuggling). In response to construction of the barrier, and the death of a Palestinian during the excavation, Palestinians protested against the Egyptian government (URL: http: //www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx? id=114655§ionid=351020202). Likewise, Hizbollah protested against the Egyptian action, with Nasrallah tells a crowd of tens of

Maulana99 UN Security Azad Council Library, Resolution 1559 adoptedAligarh on 2 September Muslim 2004, after recalling University resolution 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982) and 1553 (2004) on the situation in Lebanon, the council supported free and fair presidential elections in Lebanon and called upon remaining foreign forces to withdraw from the country. The resolution was sponsored by France and the United States. The corporation between these two nations on an issue concerning the Middle East was seen as a significant improvement in their relationship, compared to their earlier bitter disagreement over the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Because Lebanon was governed by France as a League of Nations mandate 1919-1943, France has long taken a special interest in Lebanon.

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thousands that “Egypt should be condemned if it does not stop building the wall.” This development comes in conjunction with Egypt’s prosecution of twenty-six men “suspected of links with Hizbollah and accused of planning attacks inside the country” (URL:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1137967.html).

Egypt still maintains a special relationship with the US --- it is the second-largest recipient of US aid in the region. However, the Egyptian government has demonstrated an inclination to be more independent of its American patron, mainly as a result of misperceptions between the two nations beginning in late 1994. It was bad enough, from Egypt’s perspective, that the American press criticized Mubarak for violating UN sanctions against Libya, but this was followed by an American report on human rights abuses in Egypt. In both these instances, the Egyptian press and intellectuals attacked the Americans for distorting Egypt’s image and adopting double standards. The government was upset at US interference in Egypt’s domestic politics, and denied the allegations. It was suspected that the reports were published in retaliation for Egypt’s stance on the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty100. The treaty, signed in 1970, was up for renewal in April 1995, but Egypt declared that it would not approve any extension unless Israel joined. The Egyptian position was that Israel had been justified in keeping its nuclear arsenal when it was at war with the Arab states, but now that the region was moving toward peace. Israel should not be exempt. Egypt tried to rally the Arab states and the developing world in opposition to the US proposal to have a collective vote on an indefinite extension of the treaty. However, the American proposal succeeded and the treaty was renewed indefinitely.

In spite of this, the United States found itself increasingly dependent on Egypt to assist in sorting out the complex difficulties pertaining to the peace process of the mid- 1990s. As we have seen, Egypt hosted both the “Summit of the Peacemakers” in 1995

100 The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a land mark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the Maulanaspread Azad of nuclear weapons Library, and weapons Aligarhtechnology, to promote Muslim cooperation in theUniversity peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multi-lateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear weapons states. Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 190 parties have joined the treaty including the five nuclear-weapon states. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the treaty’s significance.

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and the Arab Summit the following year. It also led the Western-aligned Arab states in trying to arrive at a lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue. There is also domestic concern in the United States about the continued cost and dubious benefit of $3 billion per year in foreign aid to Israel (most of its military assistance), especially if the peace process collapse and a more militant Israel emerges. Egypt is now the US’s best contact in the Middle East and must be carefully supported if moderate Arab states are not to abandon the peace process.

In 2004, Egyptian-US relations warmed with the appointment of Ahmad Nazif’s cabinet. Nazif recruited a number of pro-Western business executives to head key government departments, such as the Ministers of industry. Foreign Trade, Investment, Agriculture, Housing and Tourism. As strong advocates of economic liberalization and integration into the global economy, the new ministers were influential in accelerating the implementation of the World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs in Egypt. They also adopted policies that complemented US interests in Egypt, especially in terms of normalizing relations with Israel. This was manifested in the decision to sign the QIZs Agreement and to export Egyptian natural gas to Israel at prices below international levels. However, these ministers have not formulated these policies on their own initiative. Rather, they have implemented policies dictated to them by forces close to the president.

The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a turning point in Egyptian-US relations, as it posed a dilemma for the Egyptian regime, which had opposed the use of military force against Iraq from the start. On the one hand, Egypt considered itself to be a close ally of the United States, a status that Cairo did not wish to jeopardize. On the other, Egypt had commitments to its Arab neighbors and could not be seen to favor the invasion of an Arab country. Even more importantly, the Egyptian regime had developed a favorable trading relationship with Iraq toward the end of the 1999s. Notwithstanding the UN Security Council’s economic embargo, the Maulanaterms of Azadtrade with Library,Iraq steadily favored Aligarh Egypt following Muslim the launch Universityof the UN Oil- for-Food Program, which allowed Iraq to export oil in return for importation of basic essentials. In January 2001, Egypt and Iraq had signed a free-trade agreement. This was signed in Cairo by Egyptian Prime Minister Dr. Ebeid and Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan, the highest-ranking Iraqi official to visit the capital since the

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1991 Gulf War. The pact called for an immediate end to all customs barriers between the two countries, and this was realized shortly thereafter. Moreover, in late 2001, the Egyptian minister of foreign trade visited Baghdad with a large delegation to lay the foundations for strong bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Their subsequent accord forged a working partnership on industrial, trade and technical issues, bolstering the free-trade agreement. Thus, Egypt had become Iraq’s most important trading partner in the Arab world (and its fifth biggest overall, after Russia, China, France and India) prior to the invasion.

In response to domestic outrage over the invasion, Egypt formally rejected the US’s action in principle and refrained from taking part military. However, once the invasion was over, Egypt gradually shifted its position from condemnation to acceptance. Consequently, it recognized the US-appointed Governing Council of Iraq and it provided training for Iraqi security forces.

However, relations between the USA and Egypt, which had become strained after the launch of the Greater Middle East initiative by the Bush Administration in 2004, remained uneasy during the early months of Mubarak’s fifth term. The key issue of contention on the part of the USA was Egypt’s retreat from democratic reform and its stance towards the crises in Iran and Iraq, which contravened that of the Bush Administration. Egypt neither supported the use of sanctions in the nuclear dispute with Iran nor the possible deployment of Egyptian troops in Iraq. Meanwhile, Egyptian policy-makers showed increasing frustration over US meddling in domestic affairs and its failure to reignite the Middle East peace process.

Following the Egyptian presidential and parliamentary polls, in December 2005 the US House of Representatives passed a strongly worded resolution condemning the two elections as fraud-ridden and demanding more far-reaching political reforms. During the visit of a congressional delegation to Cairo in January 2006 it transpired Maulanathat the USAzadA (Egypt Library,’s largest trading Aligarhpartner) was further Muslim delayed the Universitycompletion of a bilateral free trade agreement with Egypt, apparently owing to a lack of progress towards political reform. On her visit to Egypt on 20-21 February the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, confirmed the delay in negotiations, arguing, however, that it was entirely unrelated to the issue of democratic reform. In a marked difference to previous meetings, Rice focused less on domestic issues than on Egypt’s position in

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the region, urging the Egyptian Government to continue its mediating efforts in the nuclear dispute between the USA and Iran, the tensions between Syria and Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite repeated efforts to improve bilateral relations, the tension between the two countries remained evident in the early part of 2006. In a speech given at the World Economic Forum (WEF)101 in Sharm el-Sheikh on 21 May Mubarak strongly criticized US foreign policy in the Middle East, accusing the Bush Administration of double standards in the nuclear dispute with Iran, of meddling in Egyptian domestic affairs and of mishandling the crisis in Iraq (Rutherford, 2008:51). Meanwhile, in mid- May the US Congress debated a proposal to reduce US aid to Egypt (which stood at US $1,700m.) as a punitive measure for the lack of domestic reform. Although the proposal was defeated in the House of Representatives, the initiative nevertheless exposed increasing frustration among US policy-makers over the state of political reform in Egypt.

Apart from the occasional criticism of Egypt’s human rights record, the tone of bilateral relations between the USA and Egypt improved markedly since July 2006. In mid-2006 both countries agreed to resume the strategic dialogue discussions on regional, economic and domestic developments that had been introduced under the Clinton Administration in 1999. Two months later, in an interview given to The Wall Street Journal, President Bush openly praised the Mubarak regime, expressing admiration for the ‘young reformers’ in the Nazif Government, particularly for the Ministers of Economic Development and of Trade and Industry. In Egypt these comments were widely interpreted as signaling unconditional US support for the ruling party and its young cadre around

Gamal Mubarak. This sentiment was further reinforced by the lack of any mention of Egypt’s human rights record during a series of visits by Condoleezza Rice Maulanato Cairo Azad between October Library, 2006 and Aligarh March 2007. All Muslim three visits during University this period focused exclusively on regional matters, including the situation in the Palestinian territories, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the security situation in Iraq.

101 The World Economic Forum is the International Institution for public-private co-operation to shape the global, regional, national and industry agendas.

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Observers contended that the toning down of Washington’s agenda to promote democracy in the Arab World was driven in large measure by the need to bolster ‘moderate’ regimes friendly with Washington against a rising tide of radical Islamist forces in the region.

Nevertheless, the importance of US-Egyptian relations with both countries appeared to have waned by mid-January 2008, when President Bush visited Egypt only briefly at the end of an eight-day tour of the Middle East intended principally to accelerate the relaunch of the peace process and to secure Arab support in the US Administration’s ongoing efforts to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program. The US leadership had been strongly critical of Egypt for its failure to secure its border with the Gaza Strip following the takeover of the territory by Hamas militants in June 2007 and to prevent Palestinian militants from smuggling weapons into Gaza for use in attacks against Israeli targets. In December 2007 the US Congress voted to withhold US $100m. In aid to Egypt until the USA had received assurances that the authorities in Cairo had imposed sufficient measures to bring to an end the cross-border arms- smuggling and had also taken steps to improve the country’s human rights record. The decision threatened to create a significant rift between the two countries, although Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad Aboul Gheit denied such notions in an interview with the Rose al-Yousuf newspaper in January 2008, instead accusing Israel of exaggerating statistics and fabricating evidence to depict Egypt’s handling of the arms- smuggling problem in a less favorable light, as part of alleged efforts to convince the USA to reduce its aid to Egypt. In the same month a member of the US House of Representatives, Steve Israel, met with President Mubarak to discuss the dispute, and announced that the latter had agreed to undergo training from US military personnel and invest $23m. Of US aid in the purchase and use of tunnel detection equipment (Soliman, 2011:78). As a result of this US pressure, at mid-2009 the Rafah crossing- point still remained closed, except to consignments of humanitarian goods.

MaulanaThe Azad election toLibrary, the US presidency Aligarh of Barak ObamaMuslim in November University 2008 was accompanied by a discernible change in US-Egyptian relations. In contrast to the Bush Administration’s perceived sidelining of Egypt in its efforts to relaunch the Middle East peace process, the Administration of President Obama made clear that Egypt was a state to which it would offer respect and from which it would seek counsel on

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regional issues. In a keenly anticipated address to the international Muslim community in June 2009 Obama declared: ‘I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect’ (Zaki, 2011:29). The choice of Cairo as the venue for his speech was widely interpreted as an affirmation of the heightened deference afforded to Egypt by the USA under its new President. The US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, George Mitchell, visited Egypt to meet with President Mubarak during a regional tour in July aimed at reviving the stalled peace talks. In August Obama hosted a visit from Mubarak in Washington, DC --- the first time that he had attended a White House summit since 2004 --- with the US Administration stating that it wished to seek advice from the Egyptian President before embarking upon any major new initiative in the Middle East. In a joint press conference, the two heads of states expressed optimism over the possibility of moving forward with the peace process. Other issues discussed included Iranian nuclear developments, the situation in Iraq, and cooperative efforts on economy, education and health. President Mubarak also offered assurances that the Egyptian Government was committed to democratic reform and would continue to enact relevant changes to further the process. Prior to his meeting with Obama, Mubarak also met with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during which the issue of Egypt’s questionable human rights record was raised, with Mubarak vouching for the Government’s ongoing commitment to address the problem and insisting that considerable progress had already been made to that end.

Meanwhile, disquiet was raised in both the USA and Egypt, and the wider Arab world, by comments made by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in May 2009, following a meeting with President Mubarak. Posed the question of whether US military aid to Egypt would be linked to progress on democracy and human rights, as was the case during the Bush Administration, Gates replied that while the USA was always supportive of human rights, ‘by the same token, it is important to continue our Maulanawork and Azad our friendship Library, with these countries Aligarh, and the Muslimposition of the AdministrationUniversity is that, as an example, the foreign military financing that’s in the budget should be without conditions’. He added that ‘the debate over funding conditions is essentially over’. The remarks prompted concerns that, for all the promising rhetoric, the Obama Administration might not veer as comprehensively as many had hoped from the previous Administration’s implicit strategy of ignoring human rights abuses by Arab

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leaders in exchange for their cooperation on defense and security matters (Ismael and Ismael, 2011:378).

However, Egypt continued to position itself as a ‘regional peacemaker’, a role that required a delicate balancing act between Israeli and Palestinian leaders and between the different Palestinian groups. It aimed to promote reconciliation between the two main Palestinian factions --- Hamas, which was in de facto control of the Gaza Strip, and Fatah, which dominated the internationally-recognized PA102 Government in the West Bank. This proved problematic, however, as Egypt was widely seen as being much closer to Fatah, with any ‘reconciliation’ it promoted perceived as being designed to reinforce Fatah’s dominance of Palestinian politics.

Following the international reaction to the incident on 31 May 2010 during which Israeli security forces boarded a Turkish-registered ship that formed part of a flotilla of vessels attempting to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip (Soliman, 2011:45- 46) and deliver humanitarian supplies, Egypt reopened the Rafah crossing on its border with Gaza, allowing tens of thousands of Palestinians to enter Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for a few hours to purchase food and other supplies. Egypt also allowed medical and humanitarian aid through the crossing, and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, condemning an Israeli plan to close all of Israel’s land crossing with Gaza, which would leave the Egyptian border as the only access point for the movement of people, food and supplies.

President Mubarak met Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in Sharm el- Sheikh on 3 May 2010, ahead of the resumption of indirect (or ‘proximity’) talks between Israel and the PA. They were reported to have reviewed Egyptian and American efforts to prepare the ground for the proximity talks, supposedly aimed at a two-state solution. On 17 June Mubarak met President Abbas, again in Sharm el- Sheikh, where Abbas demanded that Israel open its crossings that link Gaza to the

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 102 The Palestinian Authority (also called the Palestine National Authority) is the semi-official, self- governing Palestinian body established in May 1994 in accordance with the Israel-PLO Declaration of principles on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization. On its establishment the PA government most of the Gaza Strip and the town of Jericho in the Jordan valley, representing the first step in the implementation of the interim arrangements for Israeli withdraw from territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This process was to culminate in “permanent states talks” to begin in May 1996 on all major issues in dispute between the two parties (settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the final status of the PA and its territory).

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outside world; Egypt controls one of the most important of the seven crossings, at Rafah.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak Regime

(1981-2011)

During the course of the Hosni Mubarak regime from 1981-2011, significant changes would occur in the structure and leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its relationship with the Egyptian government. Initially extending and supporting President Anwar Sadat’s ‘Infitah’ liberalization policies which permitted greater representation of Islamist activist groups in the Egyptian Parliament and in its universities, these polices soon became challenged by the Mubarak regime. From roughly 1993 to 2000, the Mubarak government would became increasingly involved in a series of conflicts with the organization and its associated Islamist groups. In these conflict terrorism in Egypt would increase, as would the frequency of assassinations, and increased casualties on the part of both Islamist and agents of the Mubarak regime, developments that would lead to an ever more severe crackdown on the Brotherhood. Despite the increasingly anarchic environment which developed in Egypt in the early 1990s, the Brotherhood would retain strong representation in the Parliament, maintain a significant role in benevolent projects throughout the country, and survived relatively intact. As Mubarak would choose in the latter years of his Presidency to shut down the organization much the same way that President Nasser did from 1954-70.

From the beginning, the Mubarak regime balanced accommodationist and repressive strategies, mixing the expected sweep of arrests in retaliation for Sadat’s 1981 assassination and surprising gestures of conciliation (Rutherford, 2008:35). Mubarak released Supreme Guide Umar Tilmisani and hundreds of other members Maulanawho had Azadbeen detained Library, during the final Aligarh years of the Sadat Muslim regime. University As events would soon demonstrate, the policy of the Mubarak regime in regard to the Muslim Brotherhood from the beginning was one of “carrot and stick.” While the regime denied, and would continue to deny, the organization legal sanction and forbid its members from gathering in public assemblies, it decided it prudent to allow

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the organization to publish books and articles in support of benign the organization objectives.

Efforts on the part of the Mubarak regime to brand the Muslim Brotherhood as being politically ineffective failed to succeed. In May, 1984, during the Egyptian Parliamentary elections, the organization entered into a strategic alliance with the secular Wafd Party a development designed to move the organization out of the shadow of quasi-legal activity. To a modest degree the change in strategy proved a success and somewhat insulted it from the activities of more violently inclined Islamist groups with which it maintained relations, and which now became more active.

In that elections, the organization, having joined forces with the Socialist Labor Party to form an alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Islam) won 56 seats in Parliament, 36 of which went to the organization’s members. Predictably, the ideological pact between the Socialist Labor Party and the organization began to wear thin. The adoption of strict Sharia law found little favor in the ranks of the Socialists, so the alliance did not long endure (Ottaway and Muasher, 2012:51).

Although the Mubarak regime was largely successful in controlling the more radical elements of the organization in Egypt, it was less successful in preventing the creation of Islamist groups whose philosophy was in conflict with it and with the Brotherhood’s officially stated aims. Dissatisfactions led to religo-political schisms within the Brotherhood and in organizations outside Egypt that neither the Mubarak regime nor the Muslim Brotherhood organization itself could prevent. However, in the early 1990s, when the Mubarak regime launched a counter-initiative against the organization. The regime’s assault on the Muslim Brotherhood represents an abrupt departure from the grudging toleration accorded non-violent Islamist groups during the first decade of his rule. Beginning around 1993, against a backdrop of mounting violence by Islamic militants, the Mubarak regime began to denounce the Muslim MaulanaBrotherhood Azad as an “Library,illegal organization Aligarh” with “ties to Muslim extremist groups. University” A glance at the charges brought against the Brotherhood leaders suggests, however, that the regime found them threating not because they were terrorists but because they were not. Indeed, it was the Brotherhood’s electoral takeover of Egypt’s professional associations --- and its growing credibility as a moderate and responsible opposition in Egyptian society at large --- that prompted the Mubarak regime to move against it.

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The regime’s campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood proceeded along several fronts. First, scores of the Brotherhood’s most dynamic leaders were imprisoned in successive waves of arrests. In 1995, the Mubarak regime detained eighty-one of the Brotherhood’s leading activists, including former members of parliament, university professors, association officials, and businessmen. The defendants were tried in military court, and fifty-four of them received sentences of up to five years with hard labor. Those who received the maximum sentence included two of the Brotherhood’s most influential “middle-generation” leaders --- ‘Islam al-’Iryan (former member of parliament and assistant secretary general of the Doctor’s Association) and ‘Abd al-Mun’im Abu-I-Futuh (secretary general of the Doctor’s Association and secretary general of the Federation of Arab Doctors). Both ‘Iryan and Abd-I-Futuh were charged with “directing as illegal organization aiming to impede the rule of law and the Constitution.” They also were charged with providing financial assistance to the families of terrorists and using their association positions to help Islamic militants abroad (Rutherford, 2008:49).

Since 1995, hundreds more the Brotherhood activists have been detained and many have received prison sentences after trials in military court (Rutherford, 2008:52). In one high-profile case, in October 1999, security officers raided the Engineers’ Association office in Maadi, a southern suburb of Cairo, where a group of the organization leaders active in the professional association had assembled to coordination future plans. The sixteen leaders arrested at the meeting (in addition to four seized at their homes) --- including prominent members of the Lawyers’, Engineers’, Doctors’, Pharmacists’, and Veterinarians’ Associations --- were charged with “belonging to a secret outlawed group.” “planning to overthrow the system of government,” and “infiltrating the professional associations to undermine security in the country” (Ottaway and Muasher, 2012:124). Following a prolonged trial, the Supreme Military Court announced its verdict on November 19, 2000: three of the Maulanaaccused wereAzad sentenced Library, to five years Aligarhin prison; twelve Muslim were sentenced University to three years; and five were declared innocent. The most prominent of those sentenced was Mukhtar Nuh, a former member of parliament and treasures of the Laywers’ Association, who received three years in prison (Zollner, 2009:127).

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The arrest and imprisonment of prominent Brotherhood activists accomplished several ends. First, it increased the risks of Islamist political activity and created a powerful deterrent to it. Second, the prolonged trials covered by the media --- with newspapers carrying photos of the accused in prison cages --- allowed the regime to rehearse its charges against the organization before the educated public. In this way, the regime hoped to transform the Brotherhood’s image from that of a moderate and responsible opposition to that of a radical organization opposed to the constitution and subverting the public order. Indeed, it is only if and when such an image conversion has occurred that the activities for which Mukhtar Nuh and his counterparts were charged --- that is, their attempts to “infiltrate” --- the professional associations, spread their ideas, and recruit new members --- acquire a sinister hue. Finally, the arrests prevented some of the Brotherhood’s most charismatic figures from running in upcoming parliamentary and professional association elections. Citizens convicted of a crime in Egypt are barred from political activity not only for the duration of their trial and prison term but also for several years thereafter. It thus appears to be no coincidence that the October 1999 arrests of Mukhtar Nuh and nineteen other association activists took place only a few days after the country’s highest court lifted the sequestration of the Lawyers’ Association, thereby paving the way for new elections within six months. As Diya’ Rashwan, an analyst at the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies observed, the aim of the crackdown was “to prevent the organization from effectively taking part in the next association elections by depriving it of activists who enjoy credibility within association circles” (Wickham, 2002:271). In addition, the Supreme Military Court delayed its verdict until November of the following year, thus preventing Nuh and his codefendants from running in the parliamentary elections scheduled for that month. According to the same logic, dozens more the Brotherhood activists were arrested in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections and again in April 2001 just before the elections for the Shura Council (Wickham, 2002:282). Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University In addition to targeting the Brotherhood leaders for arrest, the Mubarak regime re-imposed its control over those arenas of civil society that had become important sites of Islamic political experimentation in the preceding decade. During the mid- 1990s, the Mubarak regime tightened its control over association elections and placed both the Engineers’ and Lawyers’ Associations under judicial sequestration. The

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regime also blocked Islamist candidates from participating in student unions elections. For example, in 1998, opposition newspapers reported that security forces had arrested hundreds of Islamists from at least five universities in the run-up to the student elections scheduled for that November (Zollner, 2009:219). In addition, the regime began to subsidize non-Islamist societies on campus, and according to one report, administrators at one university in Upper Egypt began to hand out monthly cash allowances to needly students as a means of deterring extremism (Rutherford, 2008:153).

The Mubarak regime also tried to establish greater control over local institutions on the periphery that had served as sites of Islamist outreach. A January 1996 law mandated that all private mosques be placed under the control of the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf), and then in April of that year the People’s Assembly passed a law prohibiting any charitable association from receiving foreign funds, with the intent of cutting the flow of funds to Islamic associations from the Gulf (Rutherford, 2008:174). In 1999, the People Assembly passed the Law on Civil Associations and institutions (law 153), which strengthened the regime’s oversight of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example, requiring all NGOs to report their board members’ names and sources of funding. Although Law 153 was subsequently overturned in court on a technically, the other laws have remained in force.

Under mounting pressure from the government’s security forces and subject to a widening web of administrative and political restrictions, the organization entered a period of retrenchment. Though the end of the 1990s, the organization maintained a low profile, refraining from statements and activities that might trigger another round of repression. At the same time, the crisis in the Brotherhood’s relations with the regime led to a wave of soul-searching and introspection, prompting some of the middle generation’s “rising stars” to openly criticize the organization’s old guard. In Maulanaparticular Azad, the middle Library,-generation leaders Aligarh accused the agingMuslim leaders who University dominated the Guidance Bureau of being autocratic, at the cost of suppressing constructive debate. In addition, they castigated the old guard for remaining aloof from --- and hostile to --- other political trends, isolating the organization from potential allies and rendering it more vulnerable to repression. Finally, while the organization’s senior leaders vowed

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to stay the course, some of its middle-generation activists became even more convinced that the Brotherhood needed to shed the handicaps of illegality and gain acceptance as a legitimate political actor (Zollner, 2009:154).

The growing tensions between the Brotherhood’s old guard and middle- generation leaders came to a head in 1996. First, the death of eighty-three-year-old Supreme Guide Hamid Abu Nasr in January of that year raised the issue of succession. Ma’mun Hudaybi --- the organization’s official spokesman and allegedly the real power in the Guidance Bureau --- hastily announced at Abu Nasr’s funeral the appointment of seventy-six-year-old Mustafa Mashhur as the organization’s new supreme guide, rousing the indignation of the middle-generation leaders who felt that regular elective procedures had been flouted (Wickham, 2002:245). That same month, the organization’s senior leaders were caught off guard when a prominent group of middle-generation leaders headed by the thirty-eight-year-old Islamist engineer Abu-I- lla Madi announced their intention to form a new party, the Wasat Party. Including three Copts among its founders, the Wasat Party claimed to represent something new, in Madi’s words, “a civic platform based on the Islamic faith, which believes in pluralism and the alternative of power” (Wickham, 2002:245-46).

The Wasat Party initiative received extensive coverage in the Arab and Western media, with commentators debating whether it constituted an effort to establish a Brotherhood party by disguise or, rather, as Madi insisted, was a separate initiative expressing the views of its founders (Zollner, 2009:167).

At first, the Mubarak regime assumed that the Wasat Party was simply a front for the organization. On April 3, Madi and two other cosponsors of the party were among thirteen Brotherhood leaders arrested and charged by the Higher State Security Prosecution Office with “belonging to an illegal organization,” “preparing anti-regime publications,” “carrying out political activities without permission,” and “attempting to Maulanaform the AzadWasat Party Library, as a front for the Aligarh banned Muslim Muslim Brotherhood.” UniversityIn August, after almost five months in detention and a trial in military court, eight of the defendants received prison sentences, and five --- including the three Wasat Party founders --- were acquitted (Soage & Franganillo, 2010:121).

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However, the official reaction of the Brotherhood leadership to the Wasat Party was indeed negative. As part of the fallout from the confrontation between Madi and Hudaybi over the Wasat Party initiative, the organization middle-generation leaders have split into two camps. While broadly similar in orientations and goals, they differ in their relationship to the Brotherhood’s old guard and in their assessment of whether --- under the latter’s sway --- the organization is truly capable of reform.

Although, some middle-generation leaders have left the organization to forge their own path, other have chosen to remain in the Brotherhood fold and maintained the organization’s successful electoral campaign in the parliamentary elections of November 2000. While tolerating the Brotherhood’s participation in the elections, the Mubarak regime intervened to limit its electoral gains. Scores of Brotherhood activists were arrested in the lead-up to the election period. During the elections themselves, plainclothes security agents harassed organization supporters in several districts and in some instances, physically blocked them from entering the polling stations. Nothing the regimes’ s dependence on security thugs to prevent Islamist victories, Egyptian wryly observed at the time that the elections likewise suggest a balancing of regime objectives. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the new parliament was enhanced by the fact that the number of seats gained by opposition parties increased from thirteen to thirty-four, with seventeen seats for the Brotherhood alone. On the other hand, the NDP and its allied independents retained a comfortable 85 percent majority, with 388 of 444 seats under their control (Brynjar,2010:231).

However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s strong performance in Egypt’s parliamentary and professional associations elections hints at its enduring mobilizing power. But its conduct in these elections also reveals a new pattern of self-restraint. This leads to a final observation: repression did not propel the organization toward radicalization. On the country, its leaders have emerged from the most crisis determined to avoid another confrontation with the regime and anxious to present the MaulanaMuslim BrotherhoodAzad Library, as a moderate andAligarh responsible oppositionMuslim that poses University no threat to the public order.

Evidence of this trend can be discerned in the subtle changes that distinguish the organization’s recent electoral campaigns from those of earlier years. For example, the organization fielded 156 candidates in the parliamentary elections of 1995 but only

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76 candidates in 2000. This reduction enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to concentrate on traditional areas of its strength (for example, Cairo and Delta towns rather than Upper Egypt) but also to avoid districts where it would have to run against prominent NDP politicians. In addition, in most districts the organization did not run well-known leaders but instead chose young individuals with good local reputations and no records of detention or arrest. The organization’s reliance on candidate’s unknown outside their own districts prompted accusations that it was fielding “secret candidates” whose ties with the Brotherhood were not obvious to voters. This approach, however, can also be seen as an attempt by the Brotherhood to ally the regime’s fears and lessen the chances that its candidates would end up in prison (Thabet, 2006:109).

The Muslim Brotherhood took similar steps in the Lawyers’ Association elections of February 24, 2001. In order to avoid embarrassing the Mubarak regime (and alarming the secular opposition) with another electoral sweep the organization contested only eight of the twenty-four seats on the association’s executive board. In addition, it allied itself with secular candidates and studiously avoided any association with the handful of candidates known to have ties with Jihad and the Islamic Group (Cook, 2012:98).

Whether the moderation of the organization’s strategy and rhetoric is merely a sophisticated tactic to gain support or reflects a genuine shift in priorities is an open question. To ensure that the Brotherhood --- which retained strong ties to the mass public --- did not regain its former influence, the regime continued to harass its leaders, impede its efforts at organization and outreach, and attacked its moderate image in the official press. However, the early 2000s were significant for the Muslim Brotherhood as it matured politically and transformed its rhetoric towards the demands of the Egyptian society. They were able to gain 88 seats in 2005 parliamentary elections, despite in mid-1990s the organization suffered with imprisonments. It was able to form the largest opposition bloc and cement its role as Egypt’s dominant opposition Maulanaforce (Sharp Azad, 2006:13). Library, Aligarh Muslim University

In 2006, an increasingly desperate Mubarak announced that he intended to retain his role as President of Egypt for the rest of his life, and in yet another effort to block the organization influence, he moved to postpone local elections for two years. In July, 2007, Mubarak’s campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamists

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was given a measure of support when seven key leaders of the Islamic charity known as the “Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development” (HLF), the largest Islamic charity operating in the United States, went on trial for “terrorist activities”. Both due to waves of arrests the Brotherhood members and fraud conducted during the elections. Mubarak was able to leave the movement outside the parliament (Pandya & Laipson, 2009:74).

Meanwhile, in Egypt, the Mubarak regime found itself increasingly under fire, not least via the internet, for what critics characterized as blatant civil rights abuses but all political parties, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, expressed their criticism against process of elections and disappointments about the hopes for democratization in Egypt. However only, one month later after the 2010 elections, Tunisian uprising became an inspiration to all around Arab countries including Egypt. The protests in Tunisia continued three weeks and eventually forced 24-year-old Ben Ali regime to fall. The Egyptian activists inspiring from their Tunisian example decided to organize gathering against the Mubarak regime in January 25, 2011 forced Mubarak to leave his powers to Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This unexpected political change compelled the Muslim Brotherhood to re-visit its political ideology and seize the opportunity in the post-Mubarak era by mobilizing its supporters for Parliamentary and Presidential elections. Within the span of two years, the organization had to transform itself from an opposition movement to a political party that, in the meantime, was promising to bring change for a country that was in the period of transition. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its party and president, became the major player. In a very limited period “Freedom and Justice Party” FJP occupied the largest number of seats in the Parliament, in the committee that was responsible for drafting the new constitution and the post of Presidency. However, due to both political turmoil’s in Egypt and the inexperience of the Muslim Brotherhood, “Freedom and Justice Party” and Mohammad Morsi in governance, soon the opposition arouse in the public.

MaulanaOver Azad the next Library, nine months’ Aligarh massive protests Muslim continued against University the Morsi regime. On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian Military high command, headed by General Abd Fateh el-Sisi, which had given the Morsi regime countless warnings about its abuse of power, forcibly removed Morsi from office and placed him under arrest. On July 5, 2013, Morsi, along with the Brotherhood supporter and fundraiser Khairat al-

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Shater, was arrested. On September 1, 2013, charged with having incited deadly violence, and for espionage in regard to his collaboration with radical Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Morsi was referred to trial by prosecutors. Subsequently, on September 23, the Sisi military government declared the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization. As of last year, former President Mohammed Morsi was sentenced to twenty years in prison by a military tribunal court, and the Brotherhood has effectively gone underground just as it did in 1954 when it experienced its first major crackdown by President Nasser.

With this array of challenges on the horizon, and bearing in mind that a majority of Egyptians view the Brotherhood as being the primary vehicle for Islamist values in Egypt, and would favor it, is it reasonable to assume on the surface that it will never return to power? If nothing else, however, the resilient history of the organization suggests that any such outcome would be paradoxical in the extreme.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: EGYPT AT THE CROSS ROADS

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CHAPTER SIX

EGYPT AT THE CROSS ROADS

The removal of Mohammed Morsi from the presidency by the Egyptian army on July 3, 2013 led to a number of significant structural transformations within Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB). While the argument that MB members are joining violent extremist groups in large numbers frequently serves political purposes, radicalization among the MB’s ranks is in fact a real concern. (Ayyash, 2016:6).

Given the complexity of the situation in Egypt, the study intends to provide an overview of the state of Egypt’s national scene in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular outlining the scenario as to how the Muslim Brotherhood in the past and still central, although vastly diminished, plays a major role within Egypt’s broader national scene and provides a comprehensive picture that may guide the thinking, scholars, policy makers and the stake holders to stay abreast of the highly dynamic political situation in Egypt. In the light this historical change, the study has analyzed the political and ideological transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1928 to 2012.

The political experience of the Muslim Brotherhood allowed the movement to practice under different circumstances which can be divided into three different periods. First, the movement was established under the period of Egyptian Kingdom between 1928 and 1952 where Brotherhood developed as a socio-religious movement. In this phase the Brotherhood prioritized the grass roots organization and aimed to Islamize society from bottom up. Secondly, the Free Officers Revolution in 1952 Maulanaopened aAzad new page Library, in the history ofAligarh the Muslim BrotherhoodMuslim by University classifying the movement as an illegal until the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. After the ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak, the group’s political arm won parliamentary elections, and its candidate Mohammed Morsi was elected president. Many analysts saw the Brotherhood’s political ascendance as a test of whether it remained 252

ideologically committed to its founders’ Islamist tenets or this had been moderated by the exigencies of governing. However, Morsi’s tenure was marked by widespread frustration with economic mismanagement and poor governance, and his administration was ousted by the military in July 2013. A violent crackdown followed in which Morsi, much of the Brotherhood’s leadership, and thousands of its supporters were arrested, and more than one thousand supporters were killed, according to rights groups. The military-backed government banned the Brotherhood once again at the end of 2013, excluding it from mainstream political channels. (http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991)

From the very foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement urged for a change in the society and politics in Egypt, what it believed to be the only solution to economic, political and social problems, Islam. This was further followed by the movement as slogan during the parliamentary elections. However, as concepts “democracy”, “freedom” and “social justice” gained a new momentum in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood transformed its ideology towards such ideas by not breaking ties with its socio-religious roots.

It is in this scenario the study meticulously analyzed and examined the genesis and the growth of Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological transformation within the context of the political situation in Egypt. During the era of British control of Egypt, Hasan al- Banna was preaching for national, international Islamic unity which would lead to the reinstatement of Caliphate. Although, there were cases of violence carried out by Secret Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement was avoiding an open confrontation with the state. Under the leadership of Gamal Abd el-Nasser, on the other hand, the group produced ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, who rejected the religious nature of the society and called for an overthrow of the government. Qutb took one step further than Hasan al-Banna by defining how people can found an ideal MaulanaIslamic communityAzad thatLibrary, will create the Aligarh Islamic state, but Muslim he less dealt withUniversity the question of how Islamic state should govern. While doing this, he did not strictly follow the ideas of Banna, but he filled the intellectual infrastructure. His aim was to portray Islam as a “Third Way” to other political ideologies and people should trace these solutions at the fundamental principles rather than other “manmade political systems”. 253

The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, at the time, under Hasan al-Hudaybi and his successors was loyal to the legacy of Hasan al-Banna and stressed the importance of social change, distance from the violence and politics.

The concepts of “democracy”, “freedom of speech”, “equal citizenship” and “civil state with an Islamic reference” began to appear in the movement’s publications and public speeches starting from the 1970s under the presidency of Anwar Sadat and later Hosni Mubarak. This evolution coincided with retreatment of the movement from producing a universalistic goal for the Muslim society (Ummah) to a local movement that addresses the current issues in Egypt. This change required the Muslim Brotherhood to clear its stance on certain subject, especially the rights of women and minorities. Despite the challenges and contrary to its moderate argumentation of democracy and pluralism the movement chose a more conservative religious view for women and minorities.

During the course of their political struggle, the Muslim Brotherhood became the largest opposition group that challenged the legitimacy of the government with its presence in both social and political levels. Although, it witnessed waves of mass arrests, the Muslim Brotherhood remained loyal to its earlier understanding of gradual change, instead of a revolutionary approach against the state. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The Brotherhood emerged as a dominant political force in Egypt following Mubarak’s removal from office amid mass protests in February 2011 in part because its organizational capacity was unmatched, but the group’s electoral victories were tarnished by power struggles with the judiciary and the military. Battles over the 254

drafting of a new constitution were a particular flash point. (http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991). This was a real question mark on the administrative acumen of the organization administrative capabilities. The overthrow of Mubarak and transitional period affected the group’s ability to mass mobilization and political vision. In the post-Mubarak Egypt, the political competitiveness was more intense as new political parties were founded, including the Salafi and Sufi Islamic movements, which challenged the Muslim Brotherhood’s legitimacy as the largest Islamic group in the country.

The January 25 revolution revealed the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal diversity over decision-making. This became apparent as the younger generations decided to join with other left-wing, secular and liberal youth movements to the protests in January 25. The members of the Guidance Bureau, however, were skeptical about the developing situation in fear of new crackdowns. Further divisions occurred as the discussions on how the Muslim Brotherhood should define itself in the post- Mubarak Egypt, whether a religious movement or as a political party.

For decades, the group focused on identity politics, by stressing the need to uphold Muslim identity, defend it against seculars and the West, and only enact legislation viewed as compatible with the Shariah. The movement adopted this policy to maintain organizational unity, but spent less time on developing alternative policies to those of the regime (defamed as anti-Islamic). Its coming to power, however, created new realities for the organization. There were at least four main sets of post- revolution challenges that guided the group’s future path, namely the relation between religion and state; the shift from identity politics to policy questions; the ‘political relevance’ versus ‘religious authenticity’ dichotomy; and the balance of power between the organization and its members. So far, the Ikhwan’s (Brotherhood) organizational strategy has capitalized on the group’s successful instrumentalisation of Maulanathe Shariah Azad, and its Library, reliance on high Aligarh levels of discipli Muslimne and trust, University to achieve the intertwined objective of seeking both political power and organizational unity. While successful in the short term, in the medium and long terms this strategy could lead to the marginalization of the Brotherhood and its replacement by other more 255

sophisticated forms of religiously-motivated political and social activism. (http://fride.org/descarga/WP_117_From_Prison_to_Palace.pdf).

The Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) inconsistent political decision, both in the case of increasing contested seats in the parliament and fielding a candidate in the presidential elections increased the suspicion regarding the political program of the movement. In the early phase of the parliamentary election the Muslim Brotherhood was promising to fielding candidates for 30 to 40% of the seats. However, they re- evaluated their status after allying with other parties and witnessing support from the public and decided to run for half of the seats. Similarly, from the early days of the start of the uprising, the movement was announcing that it will not nominate a candidate. But, as the political situation changed and former regime members such as Ahmad Shafiq announced their candidacy, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to challenge them with two of its own members, Khairat al-Shater and Mohammad Morsi. For a movement that was calling for a social change in the society, such pragmatic changes were concluded as the Muslim Brotherhood’s desire for power and its prioritization of politics over social work.

The country was on the brink without a parliament or a constitution in the post- Mubarak period as the deadly street protests across the country continued to disrupt the stability. In addition, discontent was on rise towards FJP and President Mohammad Morsi, due to their inability, joined with inexperience, to address main problems that Egyptians were facing. From the early days after assuming power, Morsi was challenged by military, judiciary and finally secular and liberal groups. In a similar line, Morsi didn’t enjoy the powers of President and FJP lacked tools of mass communications, newspapers and TV Channels to appeal general public. Further, FJP and Mohammad Morsi adopted a policy of challenging the country’s oldest bureaucratic forces, armed forces and judiciary, rather than addressing the more urgent Maulanaissues of Azad the country Library, such as economy Aligarh or unemployment. Muslim Most of University the opposition forces accused the president and the movement for trying to Islamize society and politics by occupying the majority of the seats in People’s Assembly, Shura Council and finally Constituent Assembly. However, in response to these accusations Freedom and Justice Party and Mohammad Morsi promoted the idea that this is their democratic 256

right since they are legitimately elected by the popular vote. It was resolved that in order to “protect the revolution” from former regime members, radical measures were required to be taken such as in the case of Morsi’s November 22 constitutional declarations.

The political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood was reflected to the new Egyptian constitution drafted by majority of members of Islamic movements, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups. Articles concerning Islamic nature of the state and legislation, specifying minorities to Christians and Jews and finally protecting rights of women as long as they don’t contravene Sharia, raised concerns the Brotherhood’s attempts to monopolize power in the post-Mubarak Egypt. Implementation of these articles led to the conclusion that in the movement’s 85th anniversary, Hasan al-Banna’s legacy still present especially with reference to the rights of women and minorities. However, as the Brotherhood stand out for more political involvement, the movement retreat from its long standing strategy of bottom up social change to top down systemic transformation.

Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s conservative character was manifested in its non-confrontational, accommodative strategy particularly in dealing with state’s antiquated institutions. It preferred to deal and bargain with the deep state; that is, it worked through traditional channels such as the military and the Ministry of Interior, rather than accommodating and allying with the young revolutionaries and activists who sparked the uprising. The Brotherhood also alienated those with whom it marched during the uprising --- liberals, leftists, and secularists --- by allying with Salafis and former Jihadis. Although Morsi made a bold decision to dismiss the defense minister Field Marshal Muhammad Husayn Tantawi, and the Chief of Staff, Sami ‘Anan, in August 2012, this decision was linked mainly to internal arrangements and a “time-for change” mentality within the military rather than serving as a sign of his Maulana“revolutionary” Azad policy. Library, Not to mention, Aligarh some activists Muslim accused Morsi ofUniversity striking a deal with the military in order to give a “safe exit” for Tantawi and ‘Anan from being prosecuted or held accountable for their actions.

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Although on their way to power, and when in power, the Brotherhood’s approach was characterized by a mistrust of other political actors, a willingness to take risks and recourse to identity politics (Islamist vs secular, Muslim vs Copt). It defaulted to truculent, confrontational politics at times of crises. The movement failed to build coalitions with pro-democracy parties, attempted to curtail the powers of state institutions and sought to place its members in the highest positions of power. Even internally, the Brotherhood’s leadership demanded near complete acquiescence to its directives, not only from members, but also from the Freedom and Justice Party and Morsi himself. The military, however, suspended the constitution and removed the elected president on 3 July, with SCC stood firmly behind the decision along with its top judge appointed as interim president. Later, the Brotherhood members would receive harsh sentences for protesting against the coup, including mass death sentences handed down without even hearing the defendants’ cases. All in all, state institutions worked to foil the Brotherhood’s rise to power and ultimately succeeded. Their hostility to the Islamist group, whose ascendancy put their interests and authority in jeopardy, evolved into vindictiveness, as they unrelentingly repressed the groups’ s members and supporters.

The Brotherhood After the Coup The ouster of Mohammad Morsi on July 3, 2013, left the Muslim Brotherhood in an unprecedented state of anguish and dismay. The end of Morsi’s reign came as a complete surprise to the movement’s leadership. By the time they realized the tide had turned against them, events had moved far beyond their control. Even after losing power, the Brotherhood’s lack of strategy and vision contributed significantly to its inability to reorganize, an effort that has been exacerbated by devastating violence against it by the post-coup regime. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University To start with, the Brotherhood failed to detect the coup even in the weeks before it happened. The majority of the movement’s leaders seemed to have complete faith in the military, particularly its chief, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, who was the movement’s handpicked defense minister. According to Qutb al-Arabi, a mid-level member of the Brotherhood now based in Doha, Sisi manipulated Morsi and the 258

Brotherhood. In an interview with CNN Arabic, Arabi stressed that Sisi deceived the organization with his “pious appearance and behavior.” After giving the military considerable autonomy in the 2012 constitution, the Brotherhood naively thought it had neutralized the military and tamed its political ambitions (www.nyfimes.com/2013/12/05/opinion/egypts-latest-constitution.html).

Moreover, the Brotherhood dealt recklessly with the growing popular resentment and anger against Morsi’s rule. The movement’s leaders misread the realities that preceded the mass protests on June 30, 2013, and underestimated the ability of their political opponents to remove Morsi from power. In an interview two weeks before the protests began, the Brotherhood’s secretary general, Mahmud Husayn, expressed contempt toward the opposition and lamented their ineffectiveness. More surprisingly, he emphasized the ability of the Brotherhood to counter and outnumber these protests. He stated: “The majority of those calling for the protests are not grassroots. They cannot mobilize the street against us. The opposition is a minority that is amplified and trumpeted by the media.” When asked what the Brotherhood would do if its branches and offices were attacked by protesters, Husayn confidently answered, “Don’t worry, people will protect us” (Al-Anani, 2015:541). Husayn’s comments underscored the stagnation and arrogance of the Brotherhood and its disconnectedness from the ongoing crisis. Apparently, the Brotherhood’s majoritarian mindset and sense of self-assertiveness overshadowed its pragmatism and affected its political calculations during its short time in power.

Furthermore, the Brotherhood continued to mishandle the crisis after Morsi’s removal. Instead of acknowledging its blunders or rethinking its strategy, the movement invoked its long-lasting narrative of persecution (mihna) in order to maintain members’ solidarity and avoid internal fractures. In this vein, it urged its members and sympathizers to protect daily in order to defy the post-coup government. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Since taking power, the post-coup regime has adopted a heavy-handed and repressive policy towards the Brotherhood; it brutally massacred hundreds of its members in July and August 2013 and arrested thousands more. The post-coup regime also implemented a comprehensive political, economic, social, and religious policy 259

intended to eliminate the Brotherhood’s activity. In October 2013, for instance, the government confiscated and froze the financial assets of the movement’s leadership. However, the turning point came when the government designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization on December 25, 2013. Moreover, many of the Brotherhood’s members have fled the country and are now taking refuge in various countries such as Qatar, Turkey, and United Kingdom. The post-coup regime capitalized on public anger and disappointment toward the Brotherhood in order to quash it, an effort that was whole-heartedly touted and amplified by pro-military media.

More importantly, the significant and unequivocal regional support to the post- coup regime, chiefly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has played a crucial role in continuing the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and the UAE viewed the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise as an existential threat to their own ruling regimes that needed to be halted. Therefore, after the coup, both countries have rewarded Sisi, who removed the Brotherhood from power, by pouring billions of dollars into Egypt’s ailing economy. Since taking power in June 2014. Sisi has demonstrated significant reliance on financial inflows from the Gulf in order to make progress toward mitigating Egypt’s social and economic woes, an arrangement whose conditions include ending the Muslim Brotherhood once and for all.

One can therefore sum up that Egypt’s revolution has brought about major shifts in Islamist organizations’ way of thinking. The pre-revolutionary context had led to the emergence of autocratic organizations, in which leaders wielded tremendous power. Organizational success was primarily (and almost solely) determined not by intellectual capability and the sophistication and well-articulation of its political programme, but rather by organizational power and the number of supporters. Persistent political occlusion prevented political parties and groups from playing a role Maulanain government, Azad and Library, hence detailed, prioritizedAligarh and effectiveMuslim policy alternativesUniversity were unnecessary. High caliber cadres were therefore viewed as more of a burden than an asset, and organizations focused on ‘quantity’ and ‘mass-production/indoctrination’ to the detriment of quality.

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The real paradox, however, is that in order to achieve this, it is first necessary to open more windows for creative thinking and critical attitude, which in turn will negatively impact on organizational unity and electoral power. Striking a balance between ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ is therefore a serious challenge for the Brotherhood in the months to come. (http://fride.org/descarga/WP_117_From_Prison_to_Palace.pdf). In a conclusion it can be said that Egypt is going through an “open-ended revolutionary period” and the country’s oldest and most organized movement, the Muslim Brotherhood has spiraled into a state of confusion and dismay since the 2013 ouster of President Mohammad Morsi. The movement finds itself fighting two battles simultaneously: the battle merely to survive and the more desperate battle to topple the post-coup regime. Yet, it lacks both a clear vision and a coherent strategy to win on either of these fronts. Despite the heavy crackdown by the regime and the disconnect between the Brotherhood’s leadership and grassroots, the group remains operational. However, the Brotherhood’s ability to garner public support and rebuild its public image has been significantly weakened and is even counterproductive in some cases. On one hand, continued protests attempting to cripple the incumbent government may help the Brotherhood maintain solidarity and cohesion among its rank and file. On the other hand, these efforts alienate the movement from the public and entrench its isolation. In light of this, the Brotherhood needs to broaden its political and social agendas to include other segments of society in order to regain public trust. Furthermore, continued confrontation with the regime will only damage the movement’s peaceful record, in turn undermining its credibility. In this sense, admitting its political blunders and reinventing its ideology and structure seems a sine qua non in order for the Muslim Brotherhood to regain it’s as a key political actor in Egyptian politics.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

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MaulanaParliamentary Azad Elections Library, 2005 (2005, DecemberAligarh 15-21). Muslim Al-Ahram Weekly. University

Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (2006, June 15). Daily News Egypt.

Dissenting brothers (2009, November 5-11). Al-Ahram Weekly.

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A vigorous Mubarak looks set for a sixth presidential term (2010, December 19-25). Al-Ahram Weekly.

Nobel Laureate Drops Bid for Presidency of Egypt (2012, January 14). The New York Times.

Profile: Mohammad Morsi (2012, June 24). The Guardian.

Egypt reacts after Morsi moves against military chiefs (2012, August 13). The Guardian.

The Morsi Maneuver: A First Take (2012, August 12). The Arabist.

Egyptian Court decides whether to dissolve Islamist-dominated assembly (2012, October 23). The Guardian.

Egypt opposition group to boycott irresponsible vote on new constitution (2012, December 9). The Guardian.

Egypt’s judicial council to oversee referendum despite calls for boycott (2012, December 3). The Guardian.

ELECTRONIC JOURNALS: Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), Minnesota Center against Violence and Abuse, published on the internet at: www. mincava.umn.edu/papers/book/Anwar S. asp

Islamic Extremism and Modern Egypt: An Analysis, The Middle East Information Network, Inc., published on the internet at: http://www.upf.com/Spring1998/fluehr-lobban.html

Mubarak Warns of Chaos if he quits Now, February 3, 2011, published on the Maulanainternet Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim Universityat: http://www.abenews.go.com/International/egypt-abc-news-christiane-amanpour-exclus ive-interview-president/story? Id=12833673.

Parliamentary Elections 2005, Al-Ahram Weekly December 15-21, 2005. Published on the internet at: http://www.

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weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/parliamentary-elections.html

Political Developments, 1971-1978, Library of Congress/Federal Research Division/Country: Egypt, published on the internet at: www.memory.loc.gov/egi-bin/query/n? Frd.

Building on stable ground, Al-Ahram weekly on-line 23-29 September 1999, published on the internet at: www.org.eg/weekly/1994/448/comm1.html

Freedom in the World 1998-1999: Egypt, Freedom House Organization, published on the internet at: www. Freedom house.org/survey99/country/egypt.html

Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: Update, A Newsletter Reporting and Analyzing Current Events and Developments, published on the internet at: www. ajcongress.ne.org/booklets/rif/RIFmay99.html

Egypt marks 15 years of Mubarak, Middle East Times, published on the internet at: www.Metimes.com/cens/c2.html

Egypt’s Muslim Brothers Threaten with Civil Disobedience, published on the internet at: http://www.islamiconline.net/Arabic/news/2005-05/08/article12.html

Election in Egypt, Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, published on the internet at: www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mea/Egypt election bck.html

Baghdad Pact, Encarta, published on the internet at: http://encarta.com./find/conciseasp? Z=24ti=761586829.

The Political Parties in Egypt, Middle East Times, published on the internet at: http://metimes.com/2k/issue200-42/eg/rundown of egypt.html

State Building in Egypt under Sadat, The Middle East Information Network, published on the internet at: www.mideastinfo.com/paper4.html Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Terrorist Group Profiles, Dudley Knox Libraries, Naval Postgraduate School, published on the internet at: http://web.nsp.navy.mil/-library/tgp/jihad.html

The Real Loser in Egypt’s Uprising, Feb 13, 2011, published on the internet at: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0213-egypt-riedel.aspx

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Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections: An Assessment of the Results, The Estimate, published on the internet at: http://www.theestimate.com.public111700.html

Egypt votes on Controversial Constitutional Changes, Unregistered News 26 March 2007, published on the internet at: http://www.unregisterednews.com.contentview107.53.

Disarmament in Egypt, 2009, published on the internet at: http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/08/disarmament-Egypt-rejects-us-nuclear-umbrella.

Our Testimony, issued in 1994, Ikhwan web, May 30, 2006, published on the internet at: http://www.ikhwanweb.com./articl.phd? Id=4185.

Our Message by Hasan al-Banna, December 27, 2009, published on the internet at: www.slideshare.net/IslamicBooks/our-message-hasan-al-Banna.

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, Individual Report on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Egypt, December 2009, published on the internet at: http://www.anhri.net/en/? P=64.

The Emergency Law in Egypt, November 17, 2001, published on the internet at: http://www.fidh.org/THE-EMERGENCY-LAW-IN-EGYPT.

Amnesty International, Egypt: Continuing Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood, November 30, 2007, published on the internet: http://www.amnesty.org/en/liberary/asset/MDE12/028/2007/en/30d4ef42-d36d-11dd-a 329-2f46302a8cc6/mde120282007en.html.

Boxing in the Brothers, published on the internet at: http://www.merip.org/mero080807# [12].

Egypt: Police Intensify Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood, December 18, 2006, published on the internet at: Maulanahttp://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/17egypt Azad Library, Aligarh-police-intensify Muslim-crackdown University-muslim-brothe rhood.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2016: Scenarios and Recommendations, March 17, 2016, published on the internet at: http://twitter.com/3yyash/status/710464258081955840.

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Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, November 2013, published on the internet at: http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991.

From Prison to Palace: Brotherhood’s Challenges and Responsibilities in Post Revolution Egypt, no.117, February 2013, published on the internet at: http://fride.org/descarga/WP_117_From_Prison_to_Palace.

Egyptian Doctor’s Strike and the Quest for Bread, Freedom and Justice, published on the internet at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8452/egyptian-doctors-strike-and-the-quest-for- bread-fr.

Egypt’s Constitutional Amendments, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2007, published on the internet at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm? Fa=view&id=19075.

Constitutional articles, published on the internet at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/837/eg13.htm.

Court of Egypt Rules the NGO Law of 1999 Unconstitutional, September 6, 2000, published on the internet at: http://en.euromedrights.org/index.php/news/emhrn_releases/emhrn_statements_2000/3 329.html.

Remarks at the American University in Cairo, June 20, 2005, published on the internet at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm.

Independent Committee on Election Monitoring, 2nd Press Statement, November 9, 2005, published on the internet at: http://www.ndl.org/files/1943e.g.icemfirst110905.pdf.

Amnesty International Press Release, March 18, 2007, published on the internet at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/008/2007/en/c74b5428-d3a5/11dd-a3 Maulana292f46302a8cc6/mde120082007en.pdf. Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Al-Wafd (Cairo), August 28, 2006, published on the internet at: http://www.alwafd.org/front/detail.php?Id=3704&cat=invest&PHPSESSID=26da6281 60397994cec97a79681d77b5.

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High Prices, Bread Shortages Trigger Protests in Egypt, Seattle Times, May 28, 2009, published on the internet at: http://seattletimes.newsource.com/html/nationworld/2004333929-egyptianriots08.html

Editorial, Invitation to Sharon Draws Angry Reaction in Pro-Palestinian Egypt, SPME Digest, February 27, 2003, published on the internet at: http://spme.net/cgi-bin/facultyforum.cgi? ID=1578.

Egypt Looks ahead to Portentous Year, Middle East Report Online, February 2, 2005, published on the internet at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020205.html.

Cairo Draws the Line, Al-Ahram, July 20-26, 2006, published on the internet at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/804/re91.htm.

AFP, Gaza Barrier a ‘Sovereign Right’: Egyptian Daily, AFP, December 25, 2009, published on the internet at: http://news.yahoo.com./s/afp/20091217/wl_mideast_afp/mideastconflictgazaegyptsmu ggling.

Palestinians Protest Egyptian Steel Barrier, published on the internet at: http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx? Id=114655§ionid=351020202.

New York Times, Texts: Obama’s Speech in Cairo (2009, June 4), published on the internet at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html.

Egypt’s Latest Constitution (2013, December 5), published on the internet at: www.nyfimes.com/2013/12/05/opinion/egypts-latest-constitution-html.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

1. Arab Socialist Union: Egypt’s sole Legal Political organization, 1962- 1977 The Arab Socialist Union (A S U) was preceded by Liberation Rally (1953- 1956) and the National Union (1956-1962). All three organizations served Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime as instruments of mass mobilization as Egypt shifted from capitalism to socialism and from a laissez faire policy to a planned economy.

In May 1962 Nasser presented to the National Council Popular Forces his Charter for National Action, an ideological document outlining a plan for the socialist transformation. It called for the creation of the A S U, which was to symbolize “the working forces of the people”, defined as workers, peasants, intellectuals, national capitalists, and the armed forces. Because workers and peasants were to be the main beneficiaries of socialism, they were to occupy at least 50 percent of all elected posts in parliament and the A S U. Egyptians whose property had been nationalized or sequestered were declared “enemies of the people” and denied political rights. The National Council accepted the charter, with a few modifications, in July 1962.

The ASU’s basic law was issued on 7 December 1962. Its organization was based on place of residence and profession, and branches (basic units) were established in villages, city quarters, schools, universities, and factories. They were organised on district, provincial, and national levels, the latter included a general committee, a supreme executive committee, a secretary general and a president.

In theory, the ASU was supposed to serve as the supreme authority of the state. Both parliament and the cabinet were to implement its policy decisions. In practice, however, the ASU’s institutional development was confused and episodic. Its elections were not conducted on time, leaders were both elected and appointed, and for a while Maulanaelected andAzad appointed Library, committees coexisted. Aligarh In 1965 Nasser Muslim decided to Universityestablish a more radical “vanguard” organization consisting of cells whose members were appointed and whose activities were secret. In addition, the ASU created a Youth Organization as a means of recruiting and indoctrinating students and workers between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five (some of the leaders were as old as thirty-five) and set up an academic

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centre called the Higher Institute for Socialist Studies to train future Youth Organization leaders in Nasser’s doctrines and socialism.

As in many developing countries, the single party was an organization that claimed to represent the people’s will. It was not intended to be an active institution with decision making powers. Indeed, it was viewed more as a means of mobilizing political support than as a vehicle for popular participation. Lacking any real authority, the ASU served as an appendage of the executive.

Following Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israel War, student and worker demonstrations revealed popular discontent with the organization. Nasser agreed on 30 March 1968 to hold new ASU elections, but no drastic changes took place. After Nasser died in 1970, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, called for a re-examination of the ASU, which both Egypt’s leaders’ people had come to view as ineffective. In 1971 Sayyid Mar’i, who became the ASU secretary- general after the “Corrective Revolution” had purged the leftist elements from the Egyptian government, issued a “guide for political action” that hinted at some political liberalization for the organization.

After the 1973 Arab- Israel War, Sadat spearheaded a critique of the ASU by issuing a paper on the need to reform its structure and introduce diversity into Egypt’s political life. Between 1974 and 1976, politically articulate Egyptians debated the ASU’s future, leading to the regime’s creation of the three platforms (Manabir) within the organization: the right (under Mustafa Kamal Murad), the centre (headed by Mahmud Abu Wafiyya, acting for Sadat, his brother in law), and the left (led by Khalid Muhyi al-Din). Satisfied with their performance in the November 1976 parliamentary elections, Sadat announced that the platforms would become political parties. Once the Parties Law was issued in May 1977, the ASU faded away. It has never been revived.

While the ASU served the Egyptian government as a means of indoctrinating the people, it did not enable Egyptian citizens to influence their leaders. It failed to promote a rigorous analysis of Egypt’s society or to solve any of the country’s problems.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

Encyclopaedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, second edition, vol-1, edited by Philip Mattar. MacMillan Reference, USA. (2004). pp. 266-267.

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2. The Sinai Agreement

The government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that: -

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The agreement concluded by the parties on January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva peace conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973, and they are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for a Security Council Resolution 338, this agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The parties hereby undertake not to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air to refrain from any military or paramilitary actions against each other.

The parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annexure and, when concluded, the protocol shall be an integral part of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

i. The military forces of the parties shall be developed thus:

(a) All Israeli forces shall be developed west of the line designated as lines Maulana AzadJ and Library,M on the attached Aligarh map. Muslim University

(b) All Egyptians forces shall be developed west of the line designated as line E on the attached map.

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(c) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as line E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(d) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (c) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annexure.

(e) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as line E and J will be a buffer zone. On this zone the United National Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptians- Israeli agreement of 18 January 1974.

(f) In the area south from line E and west from line M, as defined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as defined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

ii. The details concerning the new lines, the re-development of the forces and its timing, the limitations of armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of roads, the U.N. functions and other arrangements, will be in the accordance with the provisions of the Annex and maps which are an integral part of this agreement and of the protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, concluded, shall become an integral part of this agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

Maulana The Azad parties herebyLibrary, established Aligarh a joint commission Muslim for the durationUniversity of this agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle East in order to consider a y problem arising from this agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the

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execution of its mandate. The joint commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

i. This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement. ii. The parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND 338

Text of Resolution No 242 of 22 November 1967

“The Security Council, expressing its continuing concern with the gave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nation have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter

i. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University Which should include the application of the following principles:

a. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict. b. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political

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independence of every State in the area and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

ii. Affirms further the necessity of: a. Guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area. b. The achieving of a just settlement for the refugee problem. c. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area through some measures, including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

iii. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contracts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and principles in this resolution.

iv. Requests the Security-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.”

Text of Resolution No. 338 of 22 October 1973

“The Security Council, 1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all military activity immediately, not later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 3. Decides that immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiation start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing Maulanaa Azadjust and durable Library, peace in the AligarhMiddle East.” Muslim University

Quandt, William B. (1977). “Decade of Decisions: American Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976”. Berkeley. University of California Press. pp. 187-190.

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3. Sayyid Qutb: Milestones

Sayyid Qutb (1906 1966) was one of the most influential Islamist thinkers. A member of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Qutb was imprisoned by Gamal ‘Abd al- Nasser in 1954. He wrote many of his most influential works in prison. In this selection, Qutb discusses jahiliyya. Although the term originally referred to the “period of ignorance” before Islam, Qutb redefined it to mean a state of ignorance in which many Muslims have lived even after Muhammad’s revelation.

If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah, and all the marvellous material comforts and high level inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed. The result of this rebellion against the authority of God is the oppression of His creatures...... Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of God alone, deriving guidance from Him alone, and bowing before Him alone……

When a person embraced Islam during the time of the Prophet--- peace be on him--- he would immediately cut himself off from Jahiliyyah. When he stepped into the circle of Islam, he would start a new life, separating himself completely from his past life under ignorance of the Divine law. He would look upon the deeds during his life of ignorance with mistrust and fear, with a feeling that these were impure and could not be tolerated in Islam! With this feeling, he would turn toward Islam for new guidance; and if at any time temptations overpowered him, or the old habits attracted him, or if he became lax in carrying out the injunctions of Islam, he would become restless with a Maulanasense of Azad guilt and wouldLibrary, feel the need Aligarh to purify himself Muslim of what had University happened, and would turn to the Qur’an to mold himself according to its guidance.

Thus, there would be a break between the Muslim’s present Islam and his past Jahiliyyah and this after a well thought out decision, as a result of which all his relationships with Jahiliyyah would be cut off and he would be joined completely to

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Islam, although there would be some give and take with the polytheists in commercial activity and daily business; yet relationships of understanding are one thing and daily business is something else.

This renunciation of the jahili environment, its customs and traditions, its ideas and concepts proceeded from the replacement of polytheism by the concepts of the Oneness of God, of the jahili view of life and the world by that of the Islamic view, and from absorption into the new Islamic community under a new leadership and dedication of all loyalties and commitments to this new society and new leadership.

This was the parting of the ways and the starting of a new journey, a journey free from the pressures of the values, concepts and traditions of the jahili society. The Muslim encountered nothing burdensome except the torture and oppression; but he had already decided in the depths of his heart that he would face it with equanimity, and hence no pressure from the jahili society would have any effect on his continuing steadfastness.

We are also surrounded by Jahiliyyah today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people’s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws---is Jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of Jahiliyyah!

This is why the true Islamic values never enter our hearts, why our minds are never illuminated by Islamic concepts, and why no group of people arises among us who are of the calibre of the first generation of Islam.

It is therefore necessary in the way of the Islamic movement---that in the early stages of our training and education we should remove ourselves from all the influences of the Jahiliyyah in which we live and from which we derive benefits. We must return to that pure source from which those people derived their guidance, the source which is free from any mixing or pollution. We must return to it to derive from it our concepts of Maulanathe nature Azad of the universe, Library, the nature ofAligarh human existence, Muslim and the relationship University of these two with the Perfect, the Real Being, and God Most High. From it we must also derive our concepts of life, our principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life.

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We must return to it with a sense of instruction for obedience and action, and not for academic discussion and enjoyment. We should return to it to find out what kind of person it asks us to be, and then be like that. During this process, we will also discover the artistic beauty in the Qur’an, the marvellous tales in the Qur’an, the scenes of the Day of Judgement in the Qur’an, the intuitive logic the Qur’an and all other such benefits which are sought in the Qur’an by academic and literary people. We will enjoy all these other aspects, but these are not the main object of our study. Our primary purpose is to know what way of life is demanded of us by the Qur’an, the total view of the universe which the Qur’an wants us to have, what is the nature of our knowledge of God taught to us by the Qur’an, the kind of morals and manners which are enjoyed by it, and the kind of legal and constitutional system it asks us to establish in the world.

We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not compromise with the practices of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics, is not worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we may later change the society.

Our foremost objective is to change the practices of this society. Our aim is to change the jahili system at its very roots---this system which is fundamentally at variance with Islam and which, with the help of force and oppression, is keeping us from living the sort of life which is demanded by our Creator.

Our first step will be to raise ourselves above the jahili society and all its values and concepts. We will not change our own values and concepts either more or less to make a bargain with this jahili society. Never! We and it are on different roads, and if we take even one step in its company, we will lose our goal entirely and lose our way as well.

We know that in this we will have difficulties and trials, and we will have to make great sacrifices. But if we are to walk in the footsteps of the first generation of MaulanaMuslims, Azad through whom Library, God established Aligarh His system and Muslim gave it victory University over Jahiliyyah, then we will not be masters of our own wills.

It is therefore desirable that we should be aware at all times of the nature of our course of action, of the nature of our position, and the nature of the road which we must

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traverse to come out of ignorance, as the distinguished and unique generation of the Companions of the Prophet---- peace be on him ----came out of it.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

James L. Gelvin. “The Modern Middle East: A History”. (2004). Oxford University Press. USA. pp. 315-317.

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4. The Ideological and Political Discourse of Hasan al-Banna

Foreword

We would like to clarify our goal and clearly set out our agenda to mankind, addressing to them our mission without any obscurity or ambiguity such that it appears ‘brighter than the sun’, ‘clearer than the morning’, and ‘more radiant than the fullness of the day’.

Vindication

At the same time, we would like our people to know, and all Muslims are our people, that the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood is pure and unblemished. It has aspired to such heights of purity that it has transcended the limits of mere personal ambition: it has held material gain in contempt, abandoned all selfish impulses and goals, and gone forward on the path laid down by al-Haqq (SWT):

‘Say you (Muhammad): ‘This is my way: I invite unto Allah with sure knowledge, I and whosoever follows me (must also invite others unto Allah). Glorified and exalted be Allah, I am not of the polytheists.’

(Surah-Yusuf (12), ayah 108)

Thus we do not ask anything from the people; we make no monetary demands, nor do we seek any reward from them. We do not desire from them any recompense or thanks. Whatever recompense we obtain is in the hands of our Creator.

Love and Care

We also wish our people to know that we love them more than we love ourselves, we love to sacrifice, and to fulfil their greatness, even if this means that we are the ones Maulanawho pay Azadthe price for Library, their glory, their Aligarhnobility, their religion, Muslim and their hopes.University One thing alone has persuaded us to take this stance; it is the feeling which seizes our hearts, controls our emotions, keeps us from sleep, and brings us to tears. It is difficult, very difficult indeed, to see how our people are presently oppressed, and then to resign ourselves to this present state of affairs, to accept a submissive role, or altogether abandon everything in despair. For when we work for mankind in the path of Allah we

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work harder than we would for our own selves: My friends, rest assured we are for you and no one else, we shall never be against you at any time.

To Allah Belongs All Virtue and Open-Handedness

We have not been bestowed with anything, nor do we think that we possess special qualities. We simply believe in what Allah (SWT) has said:

‘Nay but Allah has conferred a favour upon you, that He has guided you to faith, if you indeed are sincere.’

(Surah-al-Hujuraat (49), ayah 17)

We wish that our hearts be laid open to the eyes and ears of our people, so that our brethren may know that we only want good for them, we hold compassion towards them, and are willing to sacrifice ourselves for their welfare.

Do they find that they are overcome with grief for our current situation? Let it suffice that Allah alone knows this, that He alone is the guarantor of success, and that in His hands lie the keys to guide man’s heart; whoever Allah guides will not be misled, and whoever Allah leads astray cannot be guided. He is our Guarantor and our protector. Isn’t Allah sufficient for His servant?

Four Types

All we wish of mankind is that he makes it clear as to which of these four categories he belongs (with regard to our call):

i. Mu’min (the Believer in it)

Any person who has faith in our mission, believes in what we say, approves of Maulanaour principles, Azad and seesLibrary, therein some Aligarhgood in which hisMuslim soul may find Universitysatisfaction and his heart be content, we invite him to join us immediately, to work with us so that the number of those who strive in Allah’s way may increase and to strengthen the voice of this call by his participation. There is no meaning to faith unless it is accompanied by work, and no benefit in a doctrine which does not motivate its bearer to make it fruitful and to sacrifice himself for its sake. Such were the First Vanguards of this faith whose

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hearts were guided by Allah, such that they followed His Prophets, had faith in His revealed scriptures, and strove vehemently in His cause. On these people Allah will bestow a most generous reward. Even though they will have the rewards of those who followed them, this will not decrease anything from the reward of the followers.

ii. Mutaraddid (the Hesitant)

Anyone to whom the truth remains unclear, and does not see in our speech a glimpse of sincerity or good, is hesitant and wavering, so we leave him to his hesitancy. However, we advise him to form close links with us, read about us sooner or later, study our writings, visit our branches, and become personally acquainted with our Brethren. In this way he will gain our confidence, if Allah wills. The attitude of the waverers among those who followed the apostles in former times was the same.

iii. Naf’i (the Opportunist)

As for the person who will not help unless he knows that there is some profit and gain in it for him, we say: ‘Less haste! We have no prize on offer except Allah’s reward if you are sincere, and Paradise if He sees in you any good. As for us, we are unavailing and poor: our concern is to sacrifice whatever we have and to contribute whatever we possess. Our hope is in Allah’s grace, for He is the best of protectors and the best of helpers.’ If Allah removes the veil from his mind, and dispels the greed from his heart, he will know that Allah’s reward is far better and more lasting, he will join Allah’s battalion giving generously of all that he possesses. If it is otherwise, Allah is in no need of he who is unaware that to Allah belongs the first right over his body, his wealth, his portion in this world and the next, his life and his death. This was the same attitude that the people like him adopted; when they refused to give allegiance to the Prophet of Allah (PBUH) unless they were granted the supreme authority after him. His sole response (PBUH) was to inform them that:

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

‘The earth is Allah’s: he gives it as a heritage to whom He will of His slaves, and the (blessed) end is for the pious ones.’

(Surah-al-An’aam (7), ayah 128)

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iv. Mutahaamil (the Prejudiced)

The individual who looks upon us with suspicion, harbouring against us all sorts of doubts and misgivings, looks at us through dark glasses and talks about us only in terms of rancour and scepticism, remains entirely fixed in his arrogance, wrapped up in his doubts, and enveloped in his fantasies. On behalf of both of us, we pray that Allah opens our eyes to that which is right, allows us to follow it; to regard falsehood as falsehood, to keep us away from it; and to inspire both of us with guidance. Thus we invite him, if he accepts the invitation, summon him, if he responds to our call; and pray to Allah for him, for He, Glory unto Him, is the Sovereign of hope.

‘Verily you (Muhammad) guide not whom you love, but Allah guides whom He wills.’

(Surah-al-Qasas (28), ayah 56)

We shall, however, continue to love this individual and hope that he will come over to us and be convinced by our mission, for our only slogan is only from the guiding words of the Al-Mukhtaar (the Chosen One) (PBUH) who used to say:

‘May Allah, forgive my people, for they do not know!’

We wish that people who fall into this category were united as one with us, for the time has come when the Muslim must pursue his goal and define his objective, working towards this objective until he attains it. As for misguided negligence, silly notions, heedless turns of mind, blind indecision and imitation: This is in not the way of the believer.

Full Devotion

MaulanaBesides this,Azad we would Library, like our people Aligarh to know that he Muslim who comprehends University this mission in all its aspects is the only one fit enough to respond to it, devoting to it all that may be demanded of him in terms of his person, wealth, time, and health:

‘If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your kindred, the wealth you have gained, the commerce in which you fear a

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decline, and the dwellings in which you delight, are dearer to you than Allah and his Apostle, and striving hard and fighting in his way, then wait until Allah brings about His decision (torment); Allah guides not the people who are rebellious.’

(Surah-at-Tauba (9), ayah 24)

For it is a mission which does not tolerate torn loyalties, since its very nature is one of complete unity, and whosoever is prepared to accept it will live through it as it lives through him. Whosoever is too weak for this burden will be deprived of the reward of those who strive, and will remain behind with the backsliders and the idle. Thus Allah will replace him with others who will carry His call:

‘Humble towards the believers and stern towards the unbelievers, fighting in the way of Allah, and never afraid of the blame of the blamers. That is the grace of Allah, which He bestows on whom He will.’ (Surah-al-Maa’idah (5), 54)

Clarity

We call mankind to accept a clear, well defined principle, which they acknowledge and are familiar with. They believe in it, and endorse its validity, they know that their salvation, prosperity, and peace of mind depend on it. A principle whose long lasting effect and suitability has been attested to by experience and the judgment of history.

Two Faiths

The difference between us and our people, although both of us agree on the same faith and principle, is that their faith is anaesthetized, lying dormant within their souls, Maulanaone to which Azad they do Library, not wish to submit Aligarh and act accordingly. Muslim Whereas University it is a burning, blazing, intense faith fully awakened in the souls of the Muslim Brotherhood.

There is an amazing spiritual quality which we (Easterners) as well as others, perceive in our own souls; namely, that we believe in our ideology with a faith which, when we discuss it, leads people to believe that it will drive us to shatter mountains, to

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give up our persons and our wealth, bear misfortunes, and struggle against adversities until we triumph over it or it triumphs over us. Nevertheless, once the hurly burly of debate grows quiet, and the group breaks up and go their own separate ways, each individual forgets his faith and ignores his ideology, giving no thought to further its cause, nor urging himself to put forth the slightest effort on its behalf. In fact, he may carry this forgetfulness and negligence so far that he will even act against it, unwittingly or not. Don’t you laugh in amazement when you see a man, thoughtful, active, and educated, within the space of two hours turn into an apostate among apostates, and a believer among believers?

This apathy, or forgetfulness, or negligence, or sleep, call it what you wish, has made us try to awaken this principle (the very same principle accepted by our people) within the souls of this beloved nation.

Various Missions

I shall return to my first statement, and say that the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood is the preaching of a principle, for in the East and West today there are various missions, principles, ideologies, schools of thought, opinions and objectives all of which sow division and war within the minds and hearts of men. Each one of them is beautified by its adherents: each one has its own propaganda, its own followers, its own devotees, and its own disciples. They claim special benefits and qualities about it, making such exaggerated pretensions that will appear attractive, captivating, and striking to people.

Propagandists

The propagandists of today are not like those of yesterday. They are educated, well equipped, and thoroughly trained specialists, particularly in the Western countries, where there are trained corps specializing in every ideology, clarifying its abstruse points, displaying its good features, and inventing new means and methods of disseminating this propaganda. They work out the easiest, most effortless and most Maulanaconvenient Azad ways to convinceLibrary, and convert Aligarh the minds of Muslimpeople. University

The Methods

Similarly, the methods of propaganda today are not like those of yesterday. The propaganda of yesterday consisted of a verbal message given out at a speech or a meeting, or one written in a letter. Today, it consists of publications, magazines,

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newspapers, articles, plays, films, and radio broadcasts. All this has made it easy to influence the minds of people, both men and women, in their homes, places of business, factories and pasture lands.

It became necessary for the propagandists to perfect all these means so that their efforts may produce the desired effect.

Now why am I making this digression? I shall say once more that the world today is saturated with propaganda of all sorts: political, nationalist, patriotic, economic, military, and pacifist. So what is the call of the Muslim Brotherhood alongside this confused welter?

This will give me the chance to speak to you on two matters: first, the simple, positive framework of our mission; then, afterwards, our stand with respect to each and every one of these other movements.

Do not judge me too harshly for this digression: I decided to write as I speak, and to discuss my topic in this manner, without any false pretense or complexity. I simply wish people to understand me as I am, allowing my message to reach their minds devoid of any fancy ornament and decoration.

Our Islam

Listen, Dear Brother: Our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term ‘Islamic’, though this word has a meaning broader than the narrow definition understood by most people. We believe that Islam is an all embracing concept regulating every aspect of life, prescribing for everyone it concerns a solid and rigorous order. It does not stand helpless before life’s problems, nor the steps that must be taken to reform mankind. Some people mistakenly understand that Islam is restricted to religious practices or spiritual exercises. Thus they limit their understanding to these narrow lines.

On the contrary we understand Islam broadly and comprehensively, regulating the affairs of men, in this world and the next. We do not indulge in this claim this nor extend upon it on the basis of our own prejudice; rather it is what we have understood Maulanafrom the Azad Book of AllahLibrary, and the lives Aligarh of the early Muslims.Muslim If the readerUniversity wishes to understand the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood in a sense broader than the mere word ‘Islamic’, let him take the Qur’an and free himself of any preconceived ideas and judgments. Only then will he understand what the Qur’an is about, and see in it the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood.

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Indeed, our mission is ‘Islamic’ in every sense of the word, so understand by it what you will, but remember your understanding is confined to the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of his Apostle, and the lives of the pious predecessors. Allah’s Book is the foundation and the pillar of Islam, the Sunnah of His Apostle is the explanation and commentary to his Book, while the lives of the Pious Predecessors (Allah’s grace be upon them) serve as practical models for those who want to carry out its commands and obey its teachings.

Our Attitude toward the Various Ideologies

Our stance with respect to the different ideologies (of our time) that have arisen like a stormy sea, dividing men’s hearts and throwing their minds into confusion will be is to compare them to our mission. Whatever is in accord with it is welcomed; but whatever clashes with it, we reject it. We believe that our mission is universal and all encompassing, but that does not mean that it turns its back on the beneficial aspects of any other mission, without familiarizing and consulting itself with regard to them.

Patriotism

People are at times seduced by the appeal to patriotism, at other times by that of nationalism, especially in the East, where they are aware of the abuse that the colonial West directs against them, abuse which has injured their dignity, their honour, and their independence; as well as exploited their wealth and shed their blood; and wherever they are suffering under the Western yoke which has been forced upon them, they are trying to free themselves with whatever strength, resistance, opposition, and endurance they can muster. The tongues of their leaders have been given a free rein, a stream of newspapers has gushed forth, their writers, their lecturers, and their broadcasters, are all working in the name of patriotism and the majesty of nationalism.

This is all well and fine. However, when you try to explain to the people (who are Muslims) that Islam is more complete, purer, loftier, and more noble than anything that can be found in Western speeches or European literature, they reject it and persist Maulanain imitating Azad the latter Library, blindly, claiming Aligarh that Islam belongsMuslim in one category University and this ideology in another. Some of them think that this is what splits the unity of the nation and weakens the solidarity of their youth

This mistaken notion is a danger to the Eastern nations from all aspects, and with this notion I would now like to turn to the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood and their

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mission: insofar as their attitude towards patriotism; the stance they approve of and desire for themselves, and are trying to convince the people to adopt with them.

Affection

If the advocates of patriotism mean love for one’s homeland, attachment to it and sentiment and affection towards it, it is something anchored in the very nature of the soul, for one thing; it is prescribed by Islam; Bilaal, who sacrificed everything for the sake of his creed and his religion was the same Bilaal who uttered the following sentiments in the House of exile, longing for Mecca, in verses overflowing with affection and replete with sweetness:

‘If only I could spend one more night In the valley (of Mecca), about me sweet smelling herbs and grass; Or if only I could come down some day to the waters of Majanna, And if Shama and Tafil shall ever rise up before me.’

The Apostle of Allah (PBUH) had listened to a description of Mecca by Usayyil, and his tears welled up in yearning for it. He said:’

‘O Usayyil, let our hearts rest quietly.’

Freedom and Greatness

Or if they mean that it is necessary to make every effort to free the land from its revengers, to defend its independence, and to instil the principles of freedom and greatness in the souls of its people then we are with them in this too. For Islam has greatly stressed this, as Allah (SWT) says:

‘Greatness belongs to Allah, His Apostle, and the believers, but the Maulana Azad Library,Hypocrites Aligarh do know not.’ Muslim University (Suraht-al-Munaafiqun (63), ayah 8)

And He says:

‘Allah will never grant to the unbelievers a way against the believers.’

(Suraht-al-Nisaa’ (4), ayah 141)

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Community

Or if they mean by ‘patriotism’ to reinforce the bonds which unite individuals within a given country, and to show them a way of utilising this reinforcement for their best interests then we also in agree with them on this. For Islam regards this as a necessary religious duty, and its Prophet (PBUH) said:

‘Be worshippers of Allah, and brothers.’

While the Noble Qur’an says:

‘O ye who believe! Do not take as confidants those who are not of you! they will not fail to cast disorder among you; they are pleased by what troubles you. Hatred has been revealed out of their mouths: what their breasts conceal is yet greater. We have made the signs clear to you, if you would but understand.’

(Surah-al-Imraan (3), ayah 118)

Conquest

Or if they mean by ‘patriotism’ the conquest of countries and sovereignty over the earth, Islam has already ordained that, and has sent out conquerors to carry out the most gracious and blessed of conquests. This is what He, the Almighty, says:

‘Fight them till there is no longer discord, and the religion is Allah’s.’

(Suraht-al-Baqarah (2), ayah 193)

Factionalism MaulanaHowever, Azad if Library, they mean by ‘patriotism’ Aligarh the division Muslim of the nation University into parties which engage in mutual throat cutting, hatred and reprehension, hurling accusations at one another, deceiving one another, and banding together to further their cause dictated by their desires, shaped by their personal motives and goals, and interpreted in accordance with their own selfish interests. Thus allowing the enemy to take advantage of this, encouraging this fire to blaze forth all the more fiercely, causing them to differ

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over the truth but be united on the false. Thus the enemy will prevent any communication or co-operation between the parties, but will allow them to communicate with him and to rally around him, such that they will only seek his company and those who associate with him. This type of patriotism is a forged one, which does no good neither for its advocates nor for people in general. Now you have already seen that we are on the side of those who call for patriotism, even those that do so ardently with respect to all its sound concepts returning the goodness back to the country and its people. You have also seen that this extensive and wide ranging patriotism is nothing more than part of the Islamic teachings.

The Limits of Our Patriotism

The bone of contention between us and them is that while we define patriotism according to the creed of Islam, they define it according to territorial borders and geographical boundaries. For every region in which there is a Muslim saying: ‘There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.’, is our homeland, inviolable and sacred, demanding love, sincerity, and sincere effort for the sake of its welfare. All Muslims in these geographical regions are our people and brethren: we are concerned about them, and share their feelings and sensitivities. Advocates of patriotism alone are not like this, since all that concerns those lies within a specific and narrowly defined region of the earth. This obvious difference is manifested whenever any nation desires to expand itself at the expense of others, for we would not approve of this at the expense of any Muslim nation. We only seek power so that we may all share it. But the advocators of fanatical patriotism see problem in this; and as a result, bonds of amicable relationship are snapped, power is dispersed, and the enemy strikes out by pushing each one against the other

The Goal of Our Patriotism Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University This is one factor. The second is that those who are only patriots and nothing else seek for the most part to free their own country, and then afterwards to build up its strength materially, just as Europe is doing today. We, on the other hand, believe that the Muslim is duty bound to give up his life, his blood, and his wealth to carry out this trust, namely, to guide mankind by the light of Islam and to lift its banner high above

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the regions of the earth, without desiring thereby wealth, rank, or power over anyone, nor the enslavement of any nation. One should desire only Allah’s Face and the world’s happiness through His religion and the raising of His word. This is what spurred on the pious predecessors (Allah’s grace be upon them!) to those saintly victories which astounded the world and went beyond anything history had known in all its swiftness, justice, nobility, and virtue.

Unity

I would like to draw your attention to the glaring error in the leading figure who says: that acting on this principle would tear apart the unity of the nation, which is composed of different religious elements. Now Islam, which is the very religion of unity and equality, maintains the ties of unity so long as the people continue to work for good:

‘Allah does not forbid you to deal with those who have not fought against you in religion and have not expelled you from your homes, with kindness and justice, for indeed Allah loves the just.’

(Surah-al-Mumtahinah (60), ayah 8)

Now then, from what source could dissension spring?

Do you not now see exactly how much we are in agreement with the most ardent patriots regarding love of the country’s well-being, sincere struggle for the sake of its liberation, its welfare, and its progress. We do, and we support everyone who endeavours to secure this with sincerity. Even more, I want you to know that their endeavour, if it should result in freeing the homeland and restoring its glory, would only represent a step in the right direction for the Muslim Brotherhood. For after that, they still have to raise the flag of the Islamic homeland above all the remaining regions of the earth, unfurling the banner of the Qur’an everywhere. Maulana Azad Library, NAligarhationalism Muslim University And now I shall speak to you about our stance towards the principle of nationalism.

Honour

If by the principle of nationalism, they mean that the descendants should follow the footsteps of their ancestors on the ladder to honour and grandeur; in their exceptional

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ability and resolution; taking them as good examples, that the greatness of the forefathers is something they may be honoured about, discovering bravery and magnanimity, then it is a worthy, fine goal which we encourage and advocate. Are we invigorating the ambitions of the present generation for any other reason than to spur them on to achieve past glories? Perhaps a clear directive for this may be seen in what the Apostle of Allah (PBUH) said:

‘Men are like treasure troves: the best of them in pagan times are the best of them in Islam, if they but knew’

So you see that Islam does not deny the virtues and noble aspects of nationalism.

Political Community

Or if they mean by ‘nationalism’ that a man’s kin and his nation are the most deserving out of all mankind for his love and devotion, and the worthiest of his favour and striving [jihad], then it is the truth, for who does not think that the most deserving of mankind for his efforts are his people, when he has been raised and grown up among them?

‘By my life, a man’s kin are greater in forbearance toward him, even if they mount him on all kinds of saddles.’

Discipline

If what is intended by ‘nationalism’ is that all of us are put to the test and held accountable to work and strive, it is up to every group to accomplish this goal in all its aspects. Until we eventually meet, Allah willing, in the forecourt of victory, and then this division will have been a good thing indeed who is with us, to spur on the Eastern nations to form individual battalions, each one on its own battlefield, until we all gain Maulanathe felicity Azad of freedom Library, and liberation? Aligarh Muslim University

All this is fine and great: It is not rejected by Islam which serves as the criterion, thus our hearts are open to receive it, and we urge all to accept it.

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Fanaticism

If, however, what is meant by ‘nationalism’ is the revival of Pre Islamic customs which have been swept away, and distant memories that have been forgotten, while a successful civilization which has long been established is effaced, and it’s Islamic ties dissolved by nationalistic propaganda and racial glorification, as some states have done, annihilating the characteristic traits of Islam and Arabism even down to personal names, the letters of the alphabet and the vocabulary, then this version of nationalism is reprehensible, destructive in its consequences and evil in its results, causing the East great loss, to forfeit its heritage, prestige and most intrinsic qualities of honour and nobility. But this will do no harm to the religion of Allah:

‘And if you turn your backs, He will replace you with another people, and they will not be like you.’

(Surah-Muhammad (47), ayah 38)

Aggression

If what is meant by ‘nationalism’ is racial self-aggrandizement to a degree which leads to the disparagement of Other races, aggression against them, and their victimization for the sake of one nation’s glory and its continued existence, as preached for example by Germany and Italy (before and during the Second World War), as claimed by every nation which preaches its superiority over all others then this too is a reprehensible idea. It has no share in humanitarianism and means that the human race will liquidate itself for the sake of a delusion with no basis in fact and embodying not the slightest good.

Two Pillars Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University The Muslim Brotherhood do not believe in a nationalism containing these ideas or their like, nor do they advocate Pharaonism, Arabism, Phoenicianism, or Syrianism, or employ any of those epithets by which peoples rival. But they do believe in what the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), the Perfect Man, the most perfect teacher who has ever taught mankind the good, said:

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‘Allah has removed from you the arrogance of paganism and the vaunting of your ancestry: mankind springs from Adam, and Adam springs from dust. The Arab has no superiority over the non-Arab except by virtue of his piety.’

How splendid this is, how fine and just! Mankind are of Adam, and therefore they are equals, and people vie with one another in their works, and it is their duty to be rivals in doing good. Two firm pillars, which, if human life were only built upon them, would lift mankind up to the highest heavens! Mankind are sprung from Adam, therefore they are brethren and it is their duty to co-operate with one another, to keep the peace among themselves, to deal mercifully with one another, to guide one another toward the good and to vie with one another in performing good works. It is their duty to strive zealously, each within his sphere, so that mankind may advance. Have you ever seen humanity rise to heights loftier than this, or a teaching more excellent than this?

Characteristics of Arabism

Nevertheless, we are not denying that the various nations have their own distinct qualities and particular moral characters, for we know that every people has its own quality and its own share of excellence and moral fibred, and we know too that in this respect the various peoples differ from one another and vie with one another in excellence. We believe that in these respects Arabism possesses the fullest and most abundant share, but this does not mean that its peoples should seize upon these characteristics as a pretext for aggression. Rather, they should adopt them as a means of realizing the foremost task for which every people is responsible the renaissance of’ humanity. Probably you will not find in all of history any one of the peoples of this earth who have grasped this concept as fully as did that Arabian battalion consisting of the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH)

This is a digression demanded by the context of our discussion, but I would Maulanarather not Azad continue inLibrary, this vein, lest it Aligarhtake us too far afield.Muslim Hence I now University return to our chief point of interest.

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The Religious Bond

Now that you have learned all this, may Allah bless you, know that the Muslim Brotherhood regards mankind as divided into two camps Vis a Vis themselves: one, believing as they believe, in Allah’s religion and His book, and in the mission of His Prophet and what he brought with him. These are attached to us by the most hallowed of bonds, the bonds of creedal doctrine, which is to us holier than the bond of blood or of soil. These are our closest ‘relatives’ among the peoples: we feel sympathy toward them, we work on their behalf, we defend them and we sacrifice ourselves and our wealth for them in whatever land they may be, or from whatever origin they may spring. As for other people with whom we do not yet share this bond, we will be at peace with them as long as they refrain from aggression against us. We believe, however, that a bond does exist between us and them: the bond of our mission and that it is our duty to invite them to what we adhere to because it is the best that humanity has to offer, and to employ such ways and means to succeed in this mission as our faith has designated for that end. As for those of them who show hostility toward us, we shall repel their aggression by the most virtuous means through which such hostility may be repelled. If you wish to hear this authenticated by the Book of Allah, listen!

‘The believers are none other than brothers; therefore, make peace between your two brothers’

(Suraht-al-Hujuraat (49), ayah 10)

‘Allah does not forbid you to deal with those who have not fought against you in religion, and have not expelled you from your homes, that you should treat them with kindness and justice, for indeed, Allah loves the just. He forbids you only those who fought against you in religion, and expelled you from your homes, and helped to expel Maulana Azad Library,you, that you should Aligarh take them asMuslim friends’ University

(Suraht-al-Mumtahinah (60), ayah 8-9)

Perhaps through this, I have revealed to you an aspect of our mission which will not leave it ambiguous or enigmatic in your mind. And perhaps after this, you will know

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what kind of organization the Muslim Brotherhood is.

In Face of Religious Differences

I will now speak to you on the subject of our mission with regard to religious differences and sectarian opinions.

Joining, Not Separating

Know first, may Allah enlighten you, that the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood is a general one unaffiliated with any particular sect, and that it does not favour a certain opinion known by a people to have a certain ‘tint’, or any preconceptions and conclusions. It addresses itself to the heart and core of religion, and we would like to see various interests and points of view unified so that our work may be more productive and our results greater and more significant. For the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood is pure and unsullied, unblemished by any stain, and it is on the side of truth wherever it may be found, warmly espousing unanimity and detesting deviance. The greatest trial from which Muslims have suffered has been that of separatism and disagreement, while the basis of all their victories has been love and unity. The last of this Ummah will prosper only through the same means as did the first: this is a fundamental principle and acknowledged goal to every Muslim Brother. It is an article of belief firmly anchored within our souls, we owe our origin to it, and we appeal to others to accept it.

Differences Are Inevitable

Withal, we believe that differences in the subordinate aspects of religion are absolutely unavoidable. It is impossible for us all to be united on these matters, opinions, and schools of thought for a number of reasons. Among these are differences of intellectual capacity to undertake profound investigation, or incapacity to do so; conscious grasp of rigorous proofs, or ignorance of them; and varying ability to Maulanapenetrate Azad into the depths Library, of ideas and theAligarh interconnectedness Muslim of essential University truths. Formal religion is contained in Qur’anic verses, Ahaadeeth and texts subject to intellectual exposition and judgment within the bounds set by language and its rules, and on this score people are very much at odds and there is no escaping difference in opinion. Also among these factors are breadth and paucity of knowledge. One individual will have heard of something that another has not, and the next one will be in a similar

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predicament. Malik said to Abu Ja’far:

‘The Companions of the Prophet of Allah (PBUH) have been scattered about in the various military settlements and each group has its store of knowledge. If you compel them to accept one opinion, there will be civil strife.’

Also among these factors are differences in environment, so that adaptation to each will differ according to the different nature of each environment. You will see Imam Ash-Shafi’i (May Allah reward him) delivering legal opinions according to the old circumstances of Iraq and according to his new opinions in Egypt. In each case he was acting in accord with what seemed perfectly clear and lucid to him; in neither case did he go beyond ferreting out the truth.

Another among these factors, is difference in the degree of inward confidence placed in a received tradition as it is promulgated; for while you may regard one particular narrator as authoritative, according to this particular imam, and feel quite satisfied with him, accepting him wholeheartedly, you may find him regarded as faulty by another imam, because of what he may know of his real circumstances.

Also among these factors are differences in the evaluation of religious proofs; for this will consider, for example, one will say that the course of action adopted by the people as a whole has priority over the welfare of one individual, while that one disagrees with him, and so forth.

Unanimity on Minor Details is Impossible

All these contributing factors have convinced us that unanimity on even a single question culled from the minor details of religion is a hopeless wish. Nay, it is even incompatible with the nature of religion, since Allah desires only that this religion last, survive, and endure for ages and an eons. It is for this reason easy, flexible, simple, and Maulanamild, without Azad rigidity Library, or severity. Aligarh Muslim University We Excuse Those Who Differ with Us

We will try to find an excuse for those who differ with us regarding some minor matters. We feel that this difference will never be an obstacle to friendly relations, mutual esteem, and co-operation for the good; that the broad, sweeping concept of Islam

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will contain both us and them within its excellent bounds and capacious limits. Are we not Muslims as they are? Do we not wish to achieve peace of mind as they do? Do we not claim that we wish for our brethren what we wish for ourselves? In what way do we then differ? Why should not our views be a subject for discussion among them, as their views are among us? Why should we not understand one another in an atmosphere of serenity and affection, where the instigation to mutual understanding exists?

The very Companions of the Apostle of Allah (PBUH) used to have differences of opinion, but did this create large differences between them? Or did it sunder or dissolve their solidarity? By Allah, no! There is nothing improbable in the tradition concerning the afternoon prayer among the Banu Quraydha.

If these men differed with one another even though they were, of all mankind, the closest in time to the Prophetic age and the most familiar with the context in which its precepts were revealed, who are we to cut one another to bits over trifling differences of no importance whatsoever? If the imams, who were the most erudite of mankind with respect to Allah’s Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, differed and disputed with one another, why should we not be satisfied with what satisfied them? If differences arose concerning the most well-known and unambiguous of detail, such as the call to prayer which is performed five times a day, with relevant texts and historical traditions being handed down in attestation, what have you to do with the fine points of such questions, which originate in learned discussion and painstaking research?

There is one more matter worth looking into. People used to have recourse to the Caliph and the law enforcement agency of the Imamate when they differed, and he would judge between them, and his decision would settle the dispute. Where is the Caliph these days? If this is the way matters stand, the best thing that Muslims can do is look for a qaadi (judge, scholar) and submit their case to him, since if they disagree without resorting to competent authority, it can only propel them into further disagreement. MaulanaThe Azad Muslim Library,Brotherhood are Aligarhacquainted with Muslimall these considerations, University and are therefore the most forbearing of men with those who differ with them. They recognise that every people has some knowledge, and that there is some truth and falsehood in every call. They are keen to search out the truth and hold fast to it, and they try, with forbearance and sympathy, to satisfy those who disagree with their viewpoint. If they are satisfied, then well and good; and if they are not satisfied, they are still brethren in

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the faith, and we ask Allah’s guidance for us and them.

This is the attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood Vis a Vis their opponents on questions of minor details in Allah’s religion. Perhaps I can summarize it for you by saying that the Brotherhood permit differences of opinion, detest fanaticism in outlook, and try to arrive at the truth and to convert men to it through the gentlest methods of forbearance and affection.

To the Cure!

Diagnosis

Brother, know and learn that nations, in terms of their strength, weakness, youth, old age, health, and sickness, are like human individuals, without exception. For even when you look at a human being, strong, sound, and enjoying good health, you will see him at another moment in time, seized by illness and beleaguered by maladies. Ailments and pains undermine his strength, and he continues to complain and groan until Allah’s mercy (SWT) overtakes him by the hands of a skilled physician and well trained specialist who knows the locus of the complaint and diagnoses it expertly, discovering the area of the infection and working with dedication to cure it. And lo and behold, after a time you will see the same patient with his strength returned and his health restored to him. He may even be in better condition after his treatment than before it. Imagine exactly the same situation with respect to nations: the changes of time confront them with threats to their very existence, breaking apart their solid structure while disease infiltrates the surface appearance of their strength. It continues to work away at them without interruption until it wreaks its damage upon them, and they turn out weak, the covetous eyeing them with greed, and the spoilers robbing them. They have no strength to repel the spoiler, and cannot ward off the greed of the covetous.

They can only be cured by these means: knowledge of the locus of the ailment, endurance to put up with the pain of the treatment, and an expert who will undertake it until Allah fulfils his will through his hands, and brings the cure to a successful Maulanaconclusion. Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

The Symptoms

Experience has taught us, and events have given us the knowledge, that the disease afflicting these Eastern nations assumes a variety of aspects and has many symptoms. It has done harm to every aspect of their lives, for they have been assailed

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on the political side by imperialist aggression on the part of their enemies, and by factionalism, rivalry, division, and disunity on the part of their sons. They have been assailed on the economic side by the propagation of usurious practices throughout their social classes, and the exploitation of their resources and natural treasures by foreign companies. They have been afflicted on the intellectual side by anarchy, defection, and heresy which destroy their religious beliefs and overthrow the ideals within their sons’ hearts. They have been assailed on the sociological side by lewdness of manners and morals, through the sloughing off of the restraints of the humanitarian virtues they inherited from their glorious, fortunate ancestors; while through imitation of the West, the viper’s venom creeps insidiously into their affairs, poisoning their blood and sullying the purity of their well-being. They have been assailed through the workings of a positive man-made law which does not restrain the criminal, chastise the assailant, or repel the unjust; nor does it even for one day take the place of the divinely revealed laws which the Creator of creation, the Master of the kingdom, and the Lord of souls and their Originator, has set down. They have been assailed also through disorder in their policy of education and training, which stands in the way of effectively guiding their present generation, the men of the future and those who will be responsible for bringing about their resurgence. They have been assailed on the spiritual side by a death dealing despair, a murderous apathy, a shameful cowardice, an ignoble humility, an all pervading impotence, a niggardliness and an egocentricity which prevent people from making any effort, preclude self-sacrifice, and thrust the nation from the ranks of earnest strivers into those of triflers and gamesters.

What hope is there for a nation against which all these factors, in their strongest manifestations and most extreme forms; imperialism and factionalism, usury and heresy and licentiousness, disorientation in education and legislation, foreign companies, despair and niggardliness, impotence and cowardice, and admiration for the enemy, an admiration which prompts one to imitate him in everything he does, especially his evil acts. MaulanaOne Azad of these Library,diseases alone is sufficientAligarh to kill Muslimoff numerous proud University nations, and how much longer, now that it has spread among all, in every nation without exception? If it were not for the resistance, imperviousness, hardihood, and strength of those Eastern nations whose enemies have been contending with them and assiduously inoculating them with the germs of these diseases for a long time, until they finally imbedded themselves and hatched, if it were not for these qualities, their traces would have been

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long ago swept away and wiped out of existence. But Allah and the believers will not tolerate this.

Brother, this is the diagnosis which the Brotherhood make of the ailments of this Ummah, and this is what they are doing in order to cure it of them and to restore to it its lost health and strength.

Hopes and Feelings

Brother, I would like you to know, before I talk to you about these means, that we do not despair of ourselves, that we hope for a great good, and that we believe that only such despair stands between us and our success. For if hope grows strong within us, we shall arrive at this great good, Allah willing, and therefore we do not despair, nor does despair force its way into our hearts, Allah be praised!

Everything around us gives glad tidings of hope, despite the forebodings of pessimists. If you were to visit a sick person, and found him declining gradually from speech to silence and from motion to immobility, you would feel that he is close to the end, that his cure would be a difficult matter, and that his disease was gaining ground. And if the reverse took place, and he began to move gradually from silence to speech, and from torpor to mobility, you would feel that he was close to being cured, and that he was making progress on the way to health and vitality. A period of time had come over these Eastern nations during which they had grown torpid, and inactive. But now they are seething with a waking consciousness is embracing all aspects of life, and they are flaring up with a vital and forceful awareness and sharpened sensibilities. If it were not for the weight of their shackles on the one hand, and their lack of direction on the other, this awareness would produce the most striking results. But these shackles shall not endure forever: time is change, and in the twinkling of an eye Allah changes things from one state to another. The direction less ness shall not remain so forever; guidance comes after bewilderment, and stability after anarchy, for Allah’s is the command before and after! Therefore, we never despair the verses of Allah (SWT), the Traditions of His MaulanaApostle Azad (PBUH), HisLibrary, Sunnah (SWT) Aligarh as regards theMuslim teaching of nationsUniversity and the exaltation of peoples, and all He has related to us of these matters in His Book all of these proclaim an immense hope for us, and guide us toward the path of a genuine resurgence, for the Muslims know this if they have studied.

Just read the noble Qur’anic verses at the beginning of Surah-al-Qasas:

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‘Taa-Seen-Meem. These are the verses of the clear speaking Book. We shall relate to thee part of the story of Moses and Pharaoh in truth, to a believing people. Lo, Pharaoh was exalted in the earth and made its people into groups rendering weak a party among them, slaughtering their sons and keeping alive their women. Lo, he was of those who spread corruption. And We desired to show favour to those who had been rendered weak in the earth, and to make them leaders and to make them inheritors; and to make them strong in the earth, and to display through them, to Pharaoh and Haman and their soldiery, what they were guarding against’

(Surah-al-Qasas (28), ayahs 1-6)

Read these noble verses and you will see how the vain one oppresses through his brutality and exults in his strength, satisfied with his tyrannical power and forgetful of the Eye which observes him. But just as he is rejoicing in his fortune, God seizes him with the grasp of the Mighty, the Powerful, for it is Allah’s will invariably to succour the wrong and to help the downtrodden and those rendered weak. For the vein crumbles at its very foundation, but the truth is solidly built and firmly supported, and those who cling to it will be triumphant. After reading these noble Qur’anic verses and their like in the Unassailable Book, not one of the Islamic nations believing in Allah, His Apostle, and His Book, has any excuse to give way to despair and hopelessness. When will the Muslims apply themselves to God’s Book?

For similar reasons brother, and there are many of such in Allah’s religion the Muslim Brotherhood do not despair of Allah’s succour being sent down to these nations, despite the difficulties which can be seen before them. In the light of this hope, they carry on the task of the earnest and the hopeful, for it is Allah of whom aid is sought!

As for the means which I promised you I would discuss, they are three basic principles Maulanaabout which Azad the ideology Library, of the Brotherhood Aligarh revolves. Muslim University

The proper program of action: The Brotherhood have found it in God’s Book, the Sunnah of His Apostle, and the precepts of Islam, when the Muslims will understand these as they should be: fresh, pure, and far removed from the spurious and the

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untrue and when they devote themselves to the study of Islam on this basis, simply, broadly, and comprehensively.

Believing workers: For this reason, the Brotherhood have taken it upon themselves to apply what they have understood of Allah’s religion without indulgence or slackness. God be praised, they believe in their ideology, are satisfied as to its goal, and are confident that Allah will sustain them while they remain devoted to Him, and so they will forge ahead under the guidance of Allah’s Apostle (PBUH).

A determined, trustworthy leadership: The Muslim Brotherhood have found their leadership to be of this character, and so they are obedient to it and work under its banner.

This, Dear brother is a summary of our mission. It is a general description which has a more in-depth explanation. A dream which has to be turned into reality and you are like the ‘Joseph’ of these dreams. If the path we are treading on appeals to you, place your hands on ours and join with us on this path. May Allah grant us success, for only on him do we depend. He is our best of trustee, protector and helper!

Allahu-akbar, wa lillahil-hamd.

Allah is Great and all praise is due to him.

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

www.slideshare.net/IslamicBooks/our-message-hasan-al-Banna.

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5. Speech Delivered by President Gamal Abd al Nasser at Port s said on the Occasion of Victory Day on 23 December 1961

In 1956, the people sacrificed- they gave their blood and there were martyrs- we did not grudge this blood or these martyrs--- the people were not frightened by brute force, they were not frightened by the great powers; Britain, France and Israel did not frighten them......

I am confident, fellow brethren, that it was the great struggle that you undertook in 1956 which has opened for us the way to build the new society. I am also confident that the whole of the people of the U. A. R. have taken the same stand and fought and struggled as you did for the sake of its freedom and its independence throughout all those long years which have passed. We have fought and we have struggled. We were undaunted by imperialism and all its methods, and we were not intimidated by the tyrannical powers neither was imperialism, with its policy which is based on sowing the seeds of dissension amongst us, able to overpower us. The proof of this is that today we are living in freedom. We are neither dominated by open imperialism nor by disguised imperialism, but we are enjoying political freedom because we have struggled to gain our political freedom. We are enjoying this political freedom because we have taken it upon ourselves to put an end to political domination. The people have risen and struggled throughout all those long years during which we suffered from imperialism, foreign domination and occupation in order that we might be liberated. We thank God, fellow brethren, that we are able to enjoy this freedom today. Our struggle has borne its fruits. We, our fathers and our forefathers before them, have long struggled for the sake of this freedom. We have always stood face to face with the foreign exploiting domination, and we have never wavered from our stand in any way whatsoever......

Today, brethren, after this long struggle, the way has been paved for the realisation of our hopes to build the society we desire, the society in which prosperity and welfare regain supreme, the society in which class differences disappear, no masters, Maulanano slaves, Azad but all areLibrary, the sons of one Aligarh nation working Muslim for the Mother University- country and everyone feeling himself on an equal footing with his fellow- citizens and fellow beings......

This second revolution is the people’s revolution, a revolution, for every son of this nation, a revolution for social justice, a revolution for the removal of class

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differences. By this I mean that we aim, while forging ahead with our revolution, that the society we desire, the society every one of us desires for himself and for his children, the society in which prosperity and welfare shall reign supreme, shall be no capitalistic nor feudalistic dictatorship, no exploitation, no monopoly, but only social justice and equality of opportunity for every able- bodied son of the nation--- no exploitation in any circumstances or under any condition of man by man.....

We say sufficiency and justice--- justice is equality of distinction and not dictatorship of capital, nor dictatorship of feudalism, not political nor economical nor social exploitation. Justice is that the wealth of this country be justly and equally owned by all sons of this country each according to his work. This is justice. As to sufficiency, it is to work, strive, sweat, and build in order that we increase our national income. In order to increase our share of the wealth of this country, we nationalized the banks, the insurance companies and a number of factories and trading companies. We also nationalized all foreign trade, fifty percent of the Anglo- Egyptian Petroleum Company, and some other companies. We also nationalized what is over L. E. 10, 000 in some other industries. In this way, rights were restored. Mean were restored to its owners, means of production in which they employed the workers. What does the worker have? He has his work. The capitalist? He has his money. The capitalist employs the workers. The wages of the workers were 25% of the profits whereas the few capitalists gained 75%. Is this justice? Is this the law of right, the law of God? Is this the law of justice, the law of God? Is this Islam? Is this religion? Is this Christianity in any way? This is exploitation and imperialism. This is the co-operation between imperialism, reactionism and exploitation. Who can accept this? All the profits went to a small group, while one million workers received the wages of five thousand persons, and five thousand persons got thrice as much as one million workers. This means that the capitalists, the five thousand capitalists, took thrice as much as the pay of one million workers, as profits. Is this the law of God? Can anyone accept this?

Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University

James L. Gelvin, "The Modern Middle East: A History" (2004). Oxford University Press. USA. pp. 307-308.