sign in sign up
<<
Home , Anwar Sadat, Gunnar Jarring, Mahmoud Riad, May 1971

THE RUSSIANS ARE GOING: , NIXON AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN , 1970-1971 By Craig A. Daigle* New evidence reveals that the was well aware of Sadat's intention to remove the Soviet military presence from Egypt and took steps over the summer of 1971 to ensure this end. We now know that President Nixon's decision to suspend the supply of aircrafts to at the end of June and his decision to press for reopening the as part of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel had as much to do with getting Soviets out of Egypt as it did with finding a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

The decision by Egyptian President Anwar hurried a letter to Leonid Brezhnev, al-Sadat to remove the Soviet military claiming the United States had "no presence from his country during the advanced knowledge of the recent events in summer of 1972 has often been viewed as Egypt," and assured the Soviet Premier that the first step on the road to the October the United States would "take no unilateral War the following year. By removing the actions in the " as a result of Soviet presence, it has been argued, Sadat the recent developments.(5) was also removing the major obstacle Early scholarly treatment of Sadat's preventing him from engaging in another decision to remove the Soviet military war with Israel.(1) Though Sadat insisted at presence has generally fallen in line with the time that the expulsion of the Soviets this official account. William B. Quandt, was simply a result of the growing for example, argued that the expulsion of differences between and ,(2) the Soviet advisors came at "curious" time and while others have argued that their in Washington since Nixon was removal was a direct result of the Soviet- preoccupied with an election campaign and American détente,(3) it seemed clear that would not risk his lead in the polls "by since Moscow was opposed to risking its embarking on a controversial policy in the new relationship with the United States by Middle East."(6) In his study of the Soviet- supporting Egypt in another war with Egyptian relationship, Alvin Z. Rubinstein Israel, Sadat had no choice but to ask for also concluded that "as far as can be their departure. determined Sadat consulted no one; his In Washington, American officials were decision was his own."(7) reportedly "shocked" to learn of Sadat's More recently, scholars have placed the announcement. later expulsion in the context of Soviet- recalled that Sadat's decision came as a American relations rather than in the "complete surprise to Washington," and he deteriorating relationship between Egypt quickly met with the Soviet ambassador to and Russia. In Raymond L. Garthoff's dispel any notion that the United States had view, it was the agreements reached colluded with the in reaching between the United States and the Soviet this end.(4) President Nixon, similarly, Union during the 1972 Moscow Summit, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 1 Craig A. Daigle which effectively put the Arab-Israeli decision to aggressively press for the conflict on the backburner, that became the reopening of the Suez Canal as part of an "last straw" for Sadat.(8) Henry Kissinger interim agreement between Egypt and reached similar conclusions in his 1994 Israel had just as much to do with getting study , in which he argued that the Soviets out of Egypt as it did with "the first sign that [detente] was having an finding a long-term peace agreement impact came in 1972 [when] Egyptian between Egypt and Israel. President dismissed all his Just as important, though, these new Soviet military advisors and asked Soviet sources demonstrate that the expulsion of technicians to leave the country."(9) the Soviet military presence had very little Without archival evidence, however, to do with preparing Egypt for another war several questions surrounding Sadat's with Israel. For Sadat, the decision to decision to expel the Soviet military remove the Soviets was clearly a decision presence from Egypt still remain: To what he had made from the earliest days of his extent did the United States have prior presidency to not only become much closer knowledge of Sadat's intentions? Did the to the West, but to avoid another war with United States work with Sadat in seeking Israel, which he knew Egypt would the removal of the Soviets? And was the undoubtedly lose. expulsion of the Soviet military presence from Egypt really the first step to the SOVIETS IN THE SINAI October War, as some have argued, or was From the earliest days of the Nixon it simply the easiest way for Sadat to tell administration, removing the Soviet the United States that he was prepared to military presence from Egypt was central take Egypt in a new direction? to American interests in the Middle East. New material emerging from American Since the mid-1960s, the United States had archives and summarized in this article watched Moscow increase its military and suggests that Sadat's decision to remove the financial support to Cairo, as the Soviet Soviet advisors was hardly the surprise that military worked closely with Egyptian American officials later claimed it to be. President in training Documents now declassified from State Egyptian pilots and acquiring and Department and National Security Council constructing naval bases along the Suez files, as well as numerous hours of Canal.(10) In the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt recorded conversations between President became virtually dependent upon Soviet Nixon and his senior foreign policy financial and military assistance in its advisors, show that as early as , struggle against Israel, and looked to the over a year before the expulsion of the Soviets for diplomatic support in bringing Soviet advisors, American officials were the war to an end. Recent evidence has also well aware of Sadat's intentions and shown that during the war the worked aggressively to ensure the removal had even prepared for a naval landing on of the Soviet presence from Egypt. Israel's shores to support the Arab states in Throughout the summer of 1971, these the event of an outbreak of hostilities.(11) sources show, the Nixon administration Following the Six-Day War, the Soviet took numerous steps to help Sadat remove Union became the primary source of the Soviet military presence from his financial and military support for country. We now know, in fact, that rebuilding Egypt's shattered army. In the Nixon's decision to suspend the supply of first six months following the war, almost aircrafts to Israel at the end of June, and his 80 percent of the aircraft, tanks and 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971 artillery Egypt had lost in June had been explosion in the region would almost replaced by the Soviet Union, and more certainly lead to a superpower than five thousand Soviet "advisors" were confrontation, he had to make a strong sent to Cairo in all phases of training, effort to find a solution to the ongoing planning, and air defense. These weapons conflict. allowed Egypt to continue fighting with But despite efforts over the next year to Israel over the next three years in an reach an agreement with Moscow, the attempt to reverse the territorial gains made Soviets continued to increase their military by Israel in 1967.(12) According to Alvin support to Egypt. New sources emerging Rubinstein, "the magnitude of the Soviet out of the former Soviet Union, for commitment [to Egypt] was unprecedented, example, indicate that in , surpassing in both quantity and quality the while Moscow was deliberating on a aid given to and exceeding proposed peace plan by Secretary of Sate the rate at which aid had hitherto been William Rogers, Soviet naval advisors given to allied or friendly countries." (13) were leading an operation against Israeli Early reports out of the Nixon forces in the Sinai.(17) And throughout administration seemed to confirm these 1970, moreover, Soviet pilots disguised in fears. In a paper prepared for a meeting of Egyptian uniforms took part in air combat the National Security Council on February operations in response to increased Israeli 4, 1969, it was determined that "the high- air assaults inside Egypt.(18) water mark of Soviet potential influence [in In , after three months of the Middle East] has not yet been reached." negotiations with the Soviet Union, Egypt, The Soviet Union, the report concluded, and Israel, Secretary of State Rogers was was determined to "reduce Western, and able to get Egypt and Israel to agree to a particularly American, positions and temporary ceasefire, putting an end to the influence in the Middle East, and to expand ongoing .(19) But within its own."(14) For Nixon, too, the continued minutes of the ceasefire taking affect, Soviet presence in the Middle East was the Nasser had violated its provisions by surest way the Soviets could "gain access constructing surface-to-air missile sites and to what [they] had always wanted--land, moving Soviet missiles into the canal oil, power, and the warm waters of the zone.(20) Mediterranean."(15) As he later Indeed, not until the ascension of Anwar commented to Secretary of State William al-Sadat to the Egyptian presidency Rogers, "The difference between our goal following Nasser's death in the fall of 1970 and the Soviet goal in the Middle East is did the United States see a realistic chance very simple but fundamental. We want of removing the Soviet presence from Peace. They want the Middle East."(16) Egypt. Unlike his predecessor, Sadat hoped With this in mind, President Nixon to reduce the Soviet military presence in authorized the State Department to begin his country, and he genuinely wanted to talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle negotiate a way out of his country's dispute East, in the hope that the two could find a with Israel. More importantly, he solution to the ongoing conflict between understood that the best way to recover the Israel and its Arab neighbors. Though in land lost to Israel in the 1967 war was not part, the President wanted to use these to strengthen itself military through the negotiations to determine Soviet flexibility Soviet Union, but to reach out to the United on what he considered more pressing States in the hope that the Americans could issues--Vietnam, SALT, and Berlin--he squeeze the Israelis into returning the truly believed that since any future occupied territories. During Nasser's Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 3 Craig A. Daigle funeral Sadat privately summoned Elliot commitments in a way in which we're sure Richardson, the highest-ranking American [is] satisfactory."(24) Rogers, too, official in attendance, and expressed to him expressed his satisfaction with Sadat's that under his direction Egypt was prepared proposals, but knew that his statements to become much closer to the West.(21) would mean nothing if the Israelis refused Two months later, Sadat sent a letter to to meet him half way. "If, in 1967, we Washington with the intent of affirming could have gotten from Egypt what they Egypt's independence from Soviet power. are now willing to give, Israel would have "You would be mistaken to think that been delighted with it," the Secretary of [Egypt] was in the sphere of Soviet State said before the National Security influence," the Egyptian president said Council. "Now, Israel is... unwilling to unambiguously. Instead, Sadat promised make a decision of any kind."(25) that Egypt "takes its decisions freely and For Rogers, Israel's intransigence independently," and assured President represented a clear evasion of the Nixon that if the United States "proves commitments they had made to the United friendly to us, we shall be ten times as States since the conclusion of the Six-Day friendly."(22) War. Since 1967, in fact, the Israeli In , in perhaps his most government had continually maintained overt statement about the Soviet presence that if Egypt was willing to accept Israel's since becoming president, Sadat told right to exist, and to make provisions for its , the United Nation's special security, that they would then negotiate a representative assigned to the Arab-Israeli return of the occupied territories. But now, conflict, that Egypt would terminate all as Rogers explained, the Israelis were states of claims of belligerency with Israel, simply refusing to come to the negotiating as well as respect Israel's "right to live table. "And if that is their response," he within secure and recognized said very clearly, "then the United States is boundaries."(23) Though there was nothing in one hell of a position."(26) in his statement to Jarring that directly President Nixon appeared to be equally mentioned the removal of the Soviet frustrated by Israel's reluctance to respond presence from Egypt, there was little doubt favorably to Sadat's new overtures, and that by coming to terms with Israel Sadat began to question America's continued would quickly eliminate the need for commitment to Israel when they would not maintaining the vast Soviet military live up to their obligations. "Why do we presence in his country. provide the arms," he asked, if Israel American officials clearly interpreted refuses to negotiate? The President had his statements as an opening. In a recently grown tired of Israel's games and believed declassified recording of a meeting of the it was time to increase the pressure on National Security Council on February 26, Israeli leaders. "We cannot be in a position 1971, Secretary of State Rogers and where we [continue to provide aid] and Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco can be Israel says we won't talk," he said in heard explaining to President Nixon the response to Rogers's comments. "That's significance of Sadat's recent gestures. In what it gets down to."(27) Sisco's view, the Egyptians had now given Nixon's frustration with Israel, however, concrete assurances that Israel should find did not mean he was completely behind acceptable. "They have said categorically, Sadat. In fact, he made it quite clear during 'We will join in a peace agreement with the the meeting of the NSC that he "had no Israelis.' They have spelled out these peace confidence at all about the Egyptians,"(28) 4 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971 and was highly skeptical about whether the you can feel secure… [and] if necessary Egyptians could be trusted after breaking we'll fly the goddamn planes.'" But, Rogers similar promises to the United States just maintained, "what [the Russians] want is to six months earlier. In addition, the keep it right where it is because then they President affirmed that for the time being get the whole Arab world sore at us."(31) the United States would "maintain the [military] balance in [Israel's] favor," as THE SADAT-ROGERS well as support Israel's claim of "secure CONVERSATIONS: NEW EVIDENCE and defensible borders." Until recently the details of Sadat's Still, both Nixon and Rogers believed conversations with the Secretary of State that with Nasser out of the picture and with has remained somewhat ambiguous. In his Sadat's recent statements there was a memoirs, Sadat said only that he and reasonable possibility of getting Egypt and Rogers discussed the importance of his Israel to agree to some form of an interim (Sadat's) previous overtures, but made no settlement. At the very least, Nixon knew reference to any future guarantees about that with the chances of a summit with the removing the Soviet military presence from Soviet Union still about a year away, and his country.(32) Mahmoud Riad, Sadat's with little progress being made in Vietnam, foreign minister who was also present he had some time to maneuver on the during the conversations, later wrote that Middle East. Yet any agreement, the Rogers was continually "harping" on the President maintained, must address the Soviet theme, but did not mention the Soviet military presence in Egypt. "They've extent to which the Soviets were also on got to quit messing around over there," he Egyptian minds.(33) said firmly to Rogers and Sisco. "That has Rogers's cables to Washington to be part of the deal."(29) following his talks in Cairo were equally The following month, and just days evasive on the Soviet theme. In his before Rogers was set to depart on a ten- telegram to President Nixon, Rogers day tour to the Middle East, which seemed genuinely impressed that Sadat had included direct talks with Sadat in Cairo, made a true commitment to peace, but the President and Secretary of State again regarding the Soviets Rogers mentioned discussed the importance of removing the only that Sadat "said some things about Soviets from Egypt. "Egypt is not as [their] presence which I will report to you concerned about a war as she was before personally."(34) Alexander Haig's memo to because she's got pretty good defenses President Nixon the following day also now," Secretary Rogers explained to made no reference to Sadat's views on the President Nixon. The Soviet Union has Soviet presence inside Egypt, saying only strengthened Egypt considerably." In fact, that "Secretary Rogers concludes his visits he said, Egypt possessed "the strongest to the with the general defensive position outside the Soviet Union observation that the trip added a measure of in terms of SAM [Surface-to-Air Missiles] confidence in our relations with the sites... so that they feel much more UAR."(35) comfortable defensively than they did With the opening of the Nixon before."(30) At the same time, though, presidential tapes, however, we now know Rogers insisted that neither the Egyptians that much more was discussed between nor the Soviets had any interest in another Rogers and Sadat than previous accounts Arab-Israeli war. "It's quite clear that they have led on. Indeed through two separate are saying to Egypt 'we're going to give recordings of conversations held between you all kinds of defensive equipment so Secretary Rogers and President Nixon Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 5 Craig A. Daigle immediately following Rogers's return United States government to be more from Egypt, the Secretary of State can be evenhanded, and he left Secretary Rogers heard thoroughly detailing his discussion with a clear message to take back to with Sadat, making it clear to President Washington that he believed would not Nixon that removing the Soviet military only end the continued impasse but would presence had become central to Sadat's change the direction of American policy in strategy. the region for years to come: "I want to "I know what's uppermost in your mind give you this promise," Sadat said and I want to talk about it at once… and unambiguously to Rogers. "If we can work that's the Soviet Union," Rogers quoted out an interim settlement… I promise you, Sadat as telling him. "I don't like the fact I give you my personal assurance, that all that we have to depend on the Soviet Union the Russian ground troops will be out of as much as we do. I am a nationalist. I want my country at the end of six months. I will to remain a nationalist… I don't want to keep Russian pilots to train my pilots have to depend on anyone else. The only because that's the only way my pilots can reason I have is because we were learn how to fly. But in so far as the bulk of humiliated and I had no place to turn."(36) the Russians--the ten or twelve thousand-- According to Rogers's account of the they will all be out of Egypt within six conversation, the financial burden of months if we can make a deal."(39) maintaining the Soviet presence in Egypt The significance of Sadat's proposal was was weighing heavily on Sadat. In the not lost on Rogers. Since the earliest days three years following the Six-Day War, of the Nixon administration, he had been Egypt's military expenditures, including the trying to negotiate an end to the Arab- costs of the Soviet advisors, almost Israeli conflict only to see his efforts come doubled, rising from $718 million in 1967 up short time and again. The idea that to $1.26 billion in 1970.(37) "I'll tell you," Sadat was now willing to include the Sadat told Rogers, "you may not believe removal of the Soviet military presence this but it is the truth: I have to pay for from his country in addition to agreeing to everything… I can't afford it. It's a drain on sign a peace agreement with Israel was me. We should be spending money for simply something the United States could other [things]. I pay for it all in hard not ignore. "For as much as we would like currency… I pay for the salaries and to be friendly as hell with you, we can't as expenses of the Russians who are here… I long as you have this number of Russians need the money for other things."(38) here," he told Sadat in response to the Though these statements in some ways Egyptian's new promises.(40) echoed what Sadat had been telling Rogers acknowledged that he too was American officials during the preceding frustrated with Israel's refusal to respond months, the Secretary of State seemed favorably to the proposals put forth during genuinely surprised by Sadat's discontent the preceding months, and he understood with the Soviet Union. Like Rogers, Sadat that Sadat desperately needed a deal to believed that the Soviets had no interest in maintain his power. But the Secretary of seeing the immediate return of the State made it clear that Israel would occupied territories to the Arab states. So continue with their pattern of behavior, and long as Israel controlled these areas, he the United States would continue to reasoned, the Soviets would continue to support Israel so long as the large number justify the expansion of their military of Russian troops remained in Egypt. "On presence in the region. He pleaded for the the other hand," Rogers told Sadat, "once 6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971 that is not the case, once they've left, or work out some interim settlements on the most of them, it's a different Suez, we'll renew diplomatic relations with ballgame."(41) you… and I think others will too."(44) What seems even more evident from the As soon as he returned to Washington, presidential recordings, however, is that Secretary Rogers told the President that he Sadat's decision to expel the Soviet believed Egypt had made a commitment to presence from Egypt had very little to do peace that the United States could not with preparing Egypt for another war with afford to ignore. He explained to Nixon Israel. For Sadat the Soviet removal was that Sadat wanted to be sure that any future the most overt way he could tell the United deal is phrased in such a way that it did not States that he was serious in wanting to appear as if Sadat had made any change their existing relationship. He concessions, but he had no doubt that was assured Rogers that the position he took something that could be easily with regards to Jarring's memorandum in accomplished. "The thing I want to February--his decision to live in peace with emphasize," the Secretary of State can be Israel, to sign a peace agreement with heard telling President Nixon in the Oval Israel, and to stay out of Israeli internal Office on , "[is] I think that it is affairs--was because he thought that was possible that if he stays in power, that we what the West wanted. "There's no reason can make a breakthrough here that will why the Arabs should be closer aligned to have tremendous importance… If we can the Soviet Union," he said to Rogers. "My pull this off, it will be a step toward peace people like the West better."(42) no one thought was possible."(45) To be sure, Sadat was even willing to President Nixon was clearly intrigued accept an American military presence in by what he was learning during his two the region as part of a force conversations with Rogers. While it was so long as Israel would agree to return still not clear whether Sadat would remain Egypt's land. "I have no interest in in power long enough to see these promises violating the security interests in anything through, he also understood that Egypt had you want to do, in anything the United been much more forthcoming than the Nations wants to do, or anyone else wants Israeli leaders had been during the to do," he pleaded with Rogers. "I don't preceding months, and well understood that want to bother Israel… I'll sign an this was by far the best offer he had agreement… I just want my land received from any Arab leader about back."(43) furthering American objectives in the Before the meeting concluded, Sadat region. expressed to Rogers that he hoped the time True, Nixon was concerned about how had come where the United States would colluding with the Egyptians would affect change its relationship with Egypt, the relationship he had built with Moscow believing that with the Soviet presence during the preceding years. Would the removed from his country, there could be a Soviet Union, for example, increase their much more evenhanded approach to the military aid to North Vietnam if they conflict. "I realize too that you can't change learned that the United States was secretly overnight," he said. "You've sort of built a seeking their expulsion from Egypt? Or monument in your relationship with Israel would Moscow withdraw its most recent that can't be affected quickly, but can be offer of an anti-ballistic missile agreement changed over a period of time. And if you if the President's efforts to remove the can do that, I'm prepared to change our Soviet military presence came to light? relationship with you." He said, "if we can (46) Still, the President obviously Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 7 Craig A. Daigle recognized that this was his chance to served… by tilting the policy... on the side finally get the Soviets out of Egypt and he of 100 million Arabs rather than on the side seemed prepared to accept the risks that of two million Israelis."(51) moving them out might entail. President Nixon, though, fully Accordingly, on , 1971, Nixon understood that his window of opportunity sent Secretary Rogers a TOP SECRET/EYES to "tilt" American policy toward the Arabs ONLY memorandum in which he clearly was extremely narrow. In fact, he made it authorized the Secretary of State to press quite clear to Secretary Rogers that "unless the Israelis into an agreement so as to [he] was able to get some kind of a ensure the expulsion of the Soviet forces settlement now with the Israelis on the from Egypt. "Under these circumstances," Suez or some other issue, there was not Nixon said referring to Sadat's recent going to be any kind of settlement until revelations, "it is essential that no more aid after the 1972 elections." By that time, he programs for Israel be approved until they knew, "the Soviet will have had no other agree to some kind of interim action on the choice but to build up the armed strength of Suez or some other issue."(47). The Israel's neighbors to the point that another President strongly believed that Mideast war will be inevitable."(52) As far had "diddled us along" during the previous as Sadat was concerned, the President two years and that it was now time for the acknowledged that "he obviously does not Israeli government to make the hard want to have a Soviet presence in Egypt." decisions. "In the month of June or July," On the other hand, he told Rogers, "if his he told Rogers, "[they] must bite the bullet policy of conciliation fails, he will either as to whether they want more U.S. aid at have to go along with a new program of the price of being reasonable on an interim accepting Soviet aid or lose his head, either agreement or whether they want to go at it politically or physically."(53) alone."(48) The President acknowledged that there THE EGYPTIAN-SOVIET TREATY were certainly times when the national OF FRIENDSHIP security interests of the United States is It was with great surprise, therefore, that better served by siding with Israel. "Where just three weeks after Sadat had assured the Soviet Union is obviously siding with Rogers that he wanted the Soviets out of Israel's neighbors," he wrote, "it serves our Egypt, and just one day after President interests to see that Israel is able to not only Nixon issued his instructions to Rogers to defend itself but to deter further Soviet ensure that end, that the United States encroachments in the area."(49) This, he learned of the new Egyptian-Soviet Treaty said, is what had influenced him in coming of Friendship and Cooperation. Signed down hard on the side of Israel in between Sadat and on maintaining the balance of power in the , 1971, the treaty reaffirmed the area at a time when Soviet influence in Egyptian-Soviet relationship, and provided Egypt and other countries surrounding for continued Soviet military, economic, Israel has been particularly strong.(50) But and cultural aid, as well as an Egyptian in this instance, Nixon believed, with the commitment to pursue a socialist course possibility of moving the Soviet military regardless of who was in power.(54) presence out of Egypt, and with the In the West, the treaty was generally likelihood of getting Egypt to enter a peace interpreted as solidifying the Soviet agreement with Israel, he strongly felt that influence in Egypt. Shortly after the new "the interests of the United States will be agreement, 8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971 editorialized that "except for religion, it is hell of a lot that they didn't already have in difficult to think of a major area of informal treaties. So this is just window Egyptian life which Mr. Sadat has not now dressing, I'm quite convinced of that."(60) promised to bring closely under Moscow's Sadat, too, tried to downplay the guidance."(55) The Washington Post significance of the new Egyptian-Soviet similarly argued that the treaty by Russia treaty. He explained to American officials and Egypt "destroys the widespread notion in Cairo that the treaty did not mean that he that Sadat… had managed to diminish the did not want an interim agreement or the Soviet influence [in Egypt]."(56) And reopening of the Suez Canal, nor did it Henry Kissinger was so convinced the mean that the United States should treaty was a new foundation in the Soviet- discontinue its diplomatic role in helping Egyptian relationship that he quickly sent a the two sides achieve an agreement. "Tell letter to President Nixon asserting "the Secretary Rogers, tell President Nixon, that treaty would give the Soviet Union a veto everything I said when Secretary Rogers over [any] future negotiations."(57) was here in May and when I saw Sisco Secretary Rogers, on the other hand, later still stands."(61) disagreed with those assessments. As the Indeed, so convinced was Rogers that Nixon tapes show, upon learning of the the new treaty was nothing but a Egyptian-Soviet treaty Rogers informed smokescreen, that instead of reassuring the President Nixon that the treaty in no way Israelis of the American commitment to the reversed the assurances Sadat had made to Jewish state, the Secretary of State him back in early May. In Rogers's view, informed the Israeli government that the the treaty was simply a diversion from the shipment of aircraft (Phantoms) would be Egyptian side, and a move from the suspended at the end of June unless they Russians to solidify the relationship that agreed to some concessions on an interim they knew they were losing.(58) "I think agreement with Egypt.(62) On , what [the Soviets] are trying to do is make Nixon told Rogers over the telephone that it appear that they have not lost their if asked by the press about the change in position with Egypt," the Secretary of State U.S. policy he would say only that "we're told President Nixon over the telephone on still trying to persuade the parties involved . "They don't want to threaten to continue the cease-fire and also to make anything because that would really make progress toward a settlement either on an Sadat mad as hell. So what they are doing interim or other basis."(63) But Nixon was is trying to figure out other ways to make it clearly behind the new direction Rogers appear that there has been no change in was moving down, believing that it was their relationship."(59) critical "to keep that bargaining position From the Egyptian perspective, because you have to be in a position… to moreover, Rogers almost blatantly hold it [financial and military assistance] dismissed the treaty as a smokescreen. Not over their heads."(64) only did he believe that Sadat was using Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, this treaty to continue the flow of arms in appeared quite disillusioned about new the event that an agreement was not path that Nixon and Rogers were going reached, but after carefully studying the down in the Middle East. Throughout the provisions of the treaty Rogers knew that spring of 1971, he had been secretly the document changed nothing in the working with the Israeli Ambassador to the existing Egyptian-Soviet relationship. "I United States, , in hope of think he's trying to play both ends against negotiating an agreement with Israel on his the middle," he told Nixon. "It didn't say a own.(65) More importantly, he feared that Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 9 Craig A. Daigle if the United States negotiated an policy. "I know you don't want to discuss it agreement between Israel and Egypt now, [but] the Middle East camp is really without the assistance of the Soviet Union getting screwed up," he said to Nixon. "I it would severely hamper his efforts and think they [the State Department] have negotiating a summit in Moscow the done too many things that, in my view, following year. have produced an explosion. And they've The Soviet Union, meanwhile, seemed cut off now--the airplanes have been cut off equally concerned about the direction of to Israel at the end of this month, which is American policy in the Middle East. In a going to produce an explosion amongst the meeting with Henry Kissinger at Camp Jewish leaders here. And all of this for no David on June 8, the Soviet Ambassador to discernable objective."(68) the United States, Anatoly Dorbrynin, To be sure, Kissinger believed that the professed to be completely baffled by what negotiations he had been conducing with Nixon and Rogers were trying to the Israeli Ambassador were severely accomplish in Egypt. "Did you really think undercut by the recent steps taken by you can push the Soviet Union out of the Nixon and Rogers. He had assured Rabin Middle East?" he asked Kissinger. that the United States would continue According to Dobrynin, Rogers's trip to supplying the Israelis with weapons, and he Cairo was taken very badly in the Soviet felt that the best way of getting a peace Union and, as he told Kissinger, "it didn't agreement in the region was not to go over make any sense from any other point [of to the Egyptians, but to so increase the view] either."(66) strength of the Israelis that the Arabs would Whether Dobrynin truly believed that have no other choice but to make Egypt would not remove the Soviet concessions on their own. Moreover, he presence from their country or whether he simply could not understand why Nixon was just trying to make it appear that the was allowing Rogers to be so aggressive in Soviets had not lost ground with Sadat is the Middle East when there were more difficult to say. At the same time, though, important things--the rapprochement with the Soviet ambassador made it known that China, détente with the Soviet Union, and regardless of what progress the United the ending of the --to worry States had made with Egypt there would be about. "The thing we need for the next two no interim agreement without Soviet months is quiet," he explained to Nixon. approval. "We can always prevent a "We don't want to get the Russians lining settlement if you push us to it," he up with the Egyptians and get everybody promised Kissinger. "We got a 15-year steaming up with a big Mid-East crisis. I treaty out of the Rogers visit and we have think we should just slow that process taken adequate precautions, you can be down a little bit for the next two or three sure."(67) months."(69) Less than a week after his discussion Despite Kissinger's warnings, Nixon with Dobrynin, Kissinger brought these seemed convinced that he had to get the concerns to the President. In fact, on the Israelis to accept the provisions of the morning of June 12, as President Nixon interim agreement. Recently declassified was getting ready for his daughter's records of a meeting of the National wedding later that afternoon, Kissinger can Security Council held at the Western White be heard in Oval Office questioning House in San Clemente on July 16, 1971, President Nixon about the State show that Nixon gave clear instructions to Department's handling of Middle East Rogers to continue pressing for the interim 10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971 agreement, and instructed Sisco to go back and the United States," he said. But "press to Israel to "narrow the gap" between the Golda. Press her hard."(75) Egyptian and Israeli positions on an interim The records of Sisco's conversations settlement.(70) with Prime Minister Meir indicate that the The President wanted to be careful that Israeli government had no intentions of Sisco's trip to Israel would in no way making any agreement with the Egyptians. overshadow his recent announcement that Throughout his five days in Tel Aviv, in he (Nixon) was planning to visit the fact, not once did Prime Minister Meir give People's Republic of China in early 1972, any indication that she was willing to sit and he made it clear to Sisco that he did not down with Sadat, nor did she seem eager to want the United States to "get into a accept the very limited disengagement position where we would trigger a agreement that Sisco had brought with confrontation for which we do not have an him.(76) "The cabinet showed no answer." Still, there was no doubt that inclination to alter its [position]…. nor was Nixon wanted Sisco to play it very tough there any give on the other fundamental with the Israeli government. "Don't issues bound up with the partial promise a damned thing," he told Sisco. agreement," Yitzhak Rabin admitted years "This is not going to be a free ride this later of their meeting with Sisco.(77) time. From now on it is quid pro quo."(71) What still is not clear even with Kissinger once more objected to the fact documentary evidence, however, is the that the United States was continuing to extent to which the Israelis were aware of withhold military supplies to Israel. He told Sadat's intention to remove the Soviets in the President that the military balance in exchange for an interim agreement. At one the region was now shifting towards the point in his conversation with the Prime Arabs, as Israel was no longer in a position Minister, Sisco hinted that Sadat "would to win a war quickly, and could now be like to use an interim settlement as a way to engaged in another prolonged war of alter the Soviet presence," but attrition.(72) But Rogers assured President acknowledged he had no way to "tell [her] Nixon that both the State and Defense whether he means it… and whether he can Departments had just gone through another produce it."(78). At the same time, Sisco extensive review of the military balance in made it clear to the cabinet what the cost of the Middle East and concluded that the not reaching an agreement with Cairo balance still remained in Israel's favor. would entail. "In the Vietnam climate of Sisco, too, reiterated that with the addition our country," he explained, "the situation is of Soviet weapons into the region over the such that if we ever get to that point… preceding four years, it was next to [where] hostilities have broken out, impossible to recreate the conditions of Egyptians have called in help from the 1967 in which the Israelis were able to win Russians and the Russians are helping an overwhelming victory.(73) them, the U.S. may be confronted with an As the meeting concluded Nixon gave awful decision: does it intervene or not the Assistant Secretary a clear mandate to intervene in order to protect the situation? take with him to Israel. "Joe, I want you to Nobody can predict what that decision press Golda on this because I think there is would be."(79) an opportunity," Sisco later recalled of the This is not to say that the Israelis would instructions President Nixon gave him have altered their position had they had while in San Clemente.(74) "Don't cause a confirmation of Sadat's plan to expel the major donnybrook [crisis] between Israel Soviets from his country. In fact, it is quite evident from the documentary record that Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 11 Craig A. Daigle the Israelis were far more concerned with implications of Sadat's strategy from the the fact that the United States had shut earliest days of his presidency: removing down the supply of Phantoms than they the Soviet military presence was not only were with the continue Soviet military the most direct way he could avoid another presence in Egypt. "If I were Sadat," Prime Arab-Israeli war, but it was the surest way Minister Meir reasoned with Sisco, "I to align Egypt with the United States and would say to myself, I am now in a change the balance of power in the Middle position where Israel is not getting planes. East for years to come. What am I waiting for? Until the U.S. will begin to deliver planes? This is the *Craig A. Daigle is a Ph.D. student in the time."(80) history department at George Washington Moreover, the Prime Minister could University. He is currently working on a simply not believe the fact that Sadat was study of William P. Rogers as Secretary of trying to cut ties with the Soviet Union. State during the Nixon administration. Mr. She referred Sisco to Mahmoud Riad's Daigle wishes to thank David Geyer, recent trip to Moscow in which the Walter Hixon, , Egyptian Foreign Minister affirmed the Christopher Morrison, and James G. Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship as Hershberg for their comments on earlier well as received further guarantees of drafts of this article. Soviet arms.(81) "At any rate," she said, "there is talk about August being a month NOTES of many activities… of [Soviet Defense 1. David Kimche, The Last Option: After Minister Marshall Andrei] Grechko coming Nasser, Arafat, and : The to Egypt, of Egyptians going to Moscow. Quest for Peace in the Middle East (New What is Grechko going to talk about? A York: Scribner's, 1991), pp. 22-24. cultural agreement? Pushkin translated to 2. New York Times, July 19, 1972. See ?"(82) also, Anwar al-Sadat, "Where Egypt Still, there can be no doubt that Prime Stands," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 Minister Meir's refusal to work with Egypt (), pp. 114-123, and Sadat, In during the summer of 1971 effectively put Search of Identity: An Autobiography an end to the idea of the interim agreement. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. That Sadat decided to expel the Soviets less 230-231. than a year later without any formal 3. Henry Kissinger, Years settlement from Israel, or any indication (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), pp. 1276- that the Israeli government was willing to 1300. return Egypt's land only lends credence to 4. Memorandum of Conversation (hereafter Sadat's assertions that the Soviets had cited as Memcon), Kissinger and Dobrynin, become an increasing burden to his country July 20, 1972, National Archives (hereafter and that he wanted to become much closer cited as NA), Nixon Presidential Materials to the West. (hereafter cited as NPMS), NSC Files, Box Those who insist, therefore, that the 494; Kissinger, White House Years, p. expulsion of the Soviets was simply a 1295. result of the improving relations between 5. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Leonid the United States and the Soviet Union, or Brezhnev, July 27, 1972, NA, NPMS, NSC somehow believe that this was his first step Files, Box 131. on the road to another confrontation with 6. William B. Quandt, Decades of Israel have failed to see the broader Decisions: American Policy Toward the 12 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971

Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 16. Nixon, RN, pp. 477. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 17. Isabella Ginor, "Under the Yellow Arab 1978), pp. 152-153. Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes: 7. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Operation Kavkaz and the War of Attrition, Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence 1969-1970," History, Vol. 3, No. Relationship since the June War 1 (October 2002), pp. 127-156. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 18. Ibid. See also, Richard B. Parker, The 1977), pp. 188-191. Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle 8. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and East (Bloomington: Indiana University Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations Press, 1993), pp. 141-145. from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: 19. For a text of the ceasefire agreement, The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 355- see Post, August 14, 1970. 20. 356. On the agreements reached between Korn, Stalemate, pp. 259-272; the United States and the Soviet Union 21. Interview with as during the Moscow Summit, see Kissinger, seen in The Fifty Years War: Israel and the White House Years, pp. 1246-1252; Arabs (New York: Public Broadcasting Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Corporation, 1998), Disc II. See also, Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 276-277. Cold War Presidents (New York: Random 22. Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 277- House, 1995), pp. 256-262. 278. 9. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New 23. Department of State Telegram 328 York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 739. from Cairo, February 16, 1971, NA, This view was earlier expressed in the first NPMS, NSC Files, Box 1160. volume of his memoirs. See Kissinger, 24. Recording of a Conversation of the White House Years, pp. 1276-1300. National Security Council, February 26, 10. Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the 1971, Cabinet Room, NA, NPMS, White Middle East: From World War II to House Tapes (hereafter cited as WHT). For Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge a written record of the meeting, see University Press, 1990), pp. 68-73, and Memcon, National Security Council Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, pp. 30- Meeting: The Middle East, February 26, 32. 1971, 11:45 am, the Cabinet Room, NA, 11. Isabella Ginor, "The Russians Were NPMS, NSC Files, Box H-112. Coming: The Soviet Military Threat during 25. Conversation 48-4, NA, NPMS, WHT. the 1967 Six-Day War," Middle East 26. Ibid. Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, 27. Ibid. No. 4 (December 2000), pp. 44-59. 28. The written memcon of the 12. David A. Korn, Stalemate: The War of conversation attributes this line to Rogers. Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in However, a close examination of the the Middle East, 1967-1970 (Boulder: recording clearly indicates that that Westview Press, 1992), pp. 53-57. statement was made by President Nixon, 13. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 30. not Secretary Rogers. 14. NSC Interdepartmental Group For Near 29. NA, NPMS, WHT, Conversation No. East and South Asia, "Basic U.S. Interests 48-4. in the Middle East," January 30, 1969, NA, 30. Recording of a conversation between NPMS, NSC Files, Box H-20. and William P. Rogers, 15. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of April 22, 1971, 3:41 pm – 4:35 pm, Oval Richard Nixon (New York: Touchstone, Office, Conversation No. 486-7, NA, 1978), pp. 477. NPMS, WHT. See also, H.R. Haldeman, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 13 Craig A. Daigle

The Haldeman Diaries: Inside The Nixon 47. Letter from Richard Nixon to William White House (Santa Monica: Sony P. Rogers, May 26, 1971, National Electronic Publishing Inc., 1994), April 22, Archives, Record Group 59, Lot Files, 1971. Office Files of William P. Rogers, Box 25. 31. Conversation No. 486-7, NA, NPMS, 48. Ibid. WHT. 49. Ibid. 32. Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 281- 50. Ibid. 282. 51. Ibid. 33. Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle For 52. Ibid. Peace in the Middle East (: Quartet 53. Ibid. Books, 1981), pp. 197-202. 54. For provisions of the treaty, see 34. Department of State Telegram 2660 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, pp. 143- from Cairo, May 7, 1971, NA, NPMS, 153, Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle NSC Files, Box 1162. East, pp. 77-79, and Riad, The Struggle For 35. Memo from Brigadier General Peace in the Middle East, pp. 204-206. Alexander Haig, Jr. to President Nixon, 55. New York Times, , 1971. , 1971, NA, NPMS, NSC Files, Box 56. Washington Post, , 1971. 1162. 57. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1284. 36. Recording of a Conversation between 58. Recording of a Conversation between Richard Nixon and William P. Rogers, Richard Nixon and William P. Rogers, May 10, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation May 28, 1971, White House Telephone, No. 496-13, NA, NPMS, WHT. Conversation No. 3-166, NA, NPMS, 37. Korn, Stalemate, p. 210. In Korn's WHT. book, the figures are mistakenly given in 59. Conversation 3-166, NA, NPMS, the billions instead of millions. WHT. 38. Conversation 496-13, NA, NPMS, 60. Ibid. WHT. 61. Department of State Telegram 1639 39. Recording of a Conversation between from Cairo, July 6, 1971, NA, NPMS, NSC Richard Nixon and William P. Rogers, Files, Box 134. , 1971, Oval Office, Conversation 62. Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger 501-4, NA, NPMS, WHT. to President Nixon, "Current State of Play 40.Conversation 501-4, NA, NPMS, WHT. in the Middle East," June 26, 1971, NA, 41. Ibid. NPMS, Box H-20. 42. Conversation No. 496-13, NA, NPMS, 63. Recording of a Conversation between WHT. Richard Nixon and William P. Rogers, 43. Ibid. May 31, 1971, White House Telephone, 44. Ibid. Conversation No. 3-203, NA, NPMS, 45. Ibid. WHT. 46. On , 1971, President Nixon 64. Conversation No. 3-203, NA, NPMS, announced that the United States and the WHT. Soviet Union had agreed to work out an 65. For a description of Kissinger's "back ABM agreement and "certain measures channel" negotiations with Yitzhak Rabin, with respect to the limitation of offensive see Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs strategic weapons." For provisions of the (Berkeley: University of California Press, agreement see, Garthoff, Detente and 1996), pp. 190-218; and Kissinger, White Confrontation, pp. 167-170. House Years, pp. 1280-1283.

14 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004)

The Russians are Going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet Presence in Egypt, 1970-1971

66. Memorandum of Conversation between decided." See Riad, The Struggle For Peace Anatoly Dobrynin and Henry Kissinger, in the Middle East, pp. 206-208. June 8, 1971, , NA, NPMS, 82. Memorandum for the Record, Meeting NSC Files, Box 491. between Golda Meir and Joseph Sisco, July 67. Memcon, Dobrynin-Kissinger, June 8, 30, 1971, NA, NPMS, NSC Files, Box 134. 1971, NA, NPMS, NSC Files, Box 491. 68. Recording of a Conversation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, June 12, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 518-3, NA, NPMS, WHT. 69. Conversation No. 518-3, NA, NPMS, WHT. 70. Memorandum for the Record, NSC Meeting on the Middle East and South Asia, July 16, 1971, San Clemente, NA, NPMS, NSC Files, Box H-112. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Telephone interview with Sisco, March 5, 2001. 75. Interview with Sisco as seen in the Fifty Years War, Disc II. See also, Oral History Interview, Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, March 19, 1990, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Georgetown University. 76. Memorandum for the Record, Meeting between Golda Meir and Joseph Sisco, July 30, 1971, NA, NPMS, NSC Files, Box 134; Telephone interview with the Sisco, March 5, 2001. 77. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, p. 201. 78. Memorandum for the Record, Meeting between Golda Meir and Joseph Sisco, July 30, 1971, NA, NPMS, NSC Files, Box 134. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. On June 29, 1971, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad traveled to Moscow for the exchange of ratification of the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. While in Moscow, Riad discussed with Brezhnev continued arm shipments to Cairo and received Brezhnev's approval for another Arab-Israeli war if "Egypt so

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004) 15