REPORT OF THE SECUlITY COUNCn TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 16 July 1957 to 15 July 1958
GENERAL A55EMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS : THIRTEENTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/3901)
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NEW YORK. 1958 ( 74 P.) UNITED NATIONS
REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
16 July 1957 to 15 July 1958
GENERAL ASSEMILy OFFICIAL RECORDS : THIRTEENTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/3901)
New York, 1958 ~--_.._------_...._,...... _-_-...__..._....._...... _'_..._'"_._"''' .. ~'--~'-''''-----''~.~"-","" .,,",...... ,';~ 1
NOTE Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters corn hined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United " :0: ations document. ,
TABLE OF CONTENT!ii
1NTROIll'CTION vi
PART 1
Questions eonsidered hy the Security Counell under its responsiblllty for the maintenance of international pesce and seeurîty
Chaptcr 1. THE PALESTIl'ΠQUESTION
A. Letter dated -1- September 1957 from the permanent representative of Jordan, addressed to the President of the Securitv Council: Letter dated "5 September 1957 from the acting permanent representative of Israel. addressed to the President of the Security Couucil B. Report of the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization ...... " 2 C. Communications relating to the Mount Seopus incident. 5 D. Developments on the Israel-Syrian Armistice Demarcation Line 6 E. Other communications ...... 7
2. THE INDrA-PAKISTAN QUESTION A. Communications Iron: the Governments of India and Pakistan 8 B. Resumption of Security Council consideration of the India-Pakistan ques- tion . 8 c. Draft resolution submitted by Australia, Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States . 22 D. Swedish amendments to the joint draft resolution. . . 26 E. Report of the United Nations Representative.. .. 27 F. Further communications from India and Pakistan . 28
3. COMPLAINTS OF TUNISIA AND FRANCE A. Complaints resulting from an incident at Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on 8 Feb- ruary 1958 ...... 29 B. Complaints dated 29 May 1958 relating to incidents at Remada.... 31
4. LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENT.\TIVE OF THE SUDAN ADDRES&ED 1'0 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL...... 33
5. COMPLAINT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN A LETTER 1'0 THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DATED 18 APRIL 1958 ENTITLED: "URGENT !l-IEASURES 1'0 PUT AN END TO FLIGHTS BY UNITED STATES MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FRONTIERS OF THE SOVIET UNION" A. Inclusion of the item in the Council's agenda...... 34 B. Consideration at the 813th meeting of the CounciI, on 21 April 1958. . . . . 34 C. Further consideration by the Council ...... 37 It iii ( '''''/,l''r
Il. LETTER I>.\TED 22 SLn- l(),:iX FRO~t l'liE REI'RESENTAT\\'E OF LEIl,\NON CON CERXtNC; "CO~tI'LAtXT IlY 1.1':11,\:\0:-; 1:\ RESI'E('T OF A SIT1'ATIOX ARISINI; FR()~l 'l'liE I1'\TERVENTlO:\ OF l'liE U1'!TEll AR.\H IÜ:I'l'Hl.l(' IN l'Ill' INTERNAI. AFFAIRS nF LEIl,\XOl';. 1'111-: COl';TIX1'.\;-';CE OF wrncn IS LI"'EI.Y '1'0 E1'OAlI:(;ER ru i: .\I.\I:'\TEl';A1'\('I-: OF I:\TERNA,!'W:'\AI. l'E:\(,E :\;\1> SEtTRITY" ,\. Consider:ltion hy the Security Couucil B. Interim report of the Secretary-Geuernl C. First report Di the United Nations Ohservation Group in Lehanon D. Further consideration of the question hy the Security l oum-il
PART II
Other matters considered hy the Council
7. .\tntISSION OF NEW :\IE:\tHERS A. Application of the Federation of Malaya 5.1
1L Consideration of proposnl- relating to the applications of the Repnhlic of Korea, the Iktlhlcratic People'« Repuhlic of Korea, Viet-Nnm. the Demo- cratic Repuhlic oi Viet-Nam and the .i.\Iongolian People':; Repuhlic :'3
K 1{!'('O:\DfEl':IlATIOX FOR 1'11 Jo: .\1'1'01 xrxncx-r OF l'III' SEeRETARY-GENERAL OF 'l'IlE Uxrrnn NATIOKS .. ,,, .. 56 t ~). ELEcno::\ OF FIVE :\\E:\InERS OF l'III' INTERl':ATIONAL CO{'RT OF ./t:STIl'E 56
PART III
The JUilitary Staff Committea
10. \VORK OF THE :\lILITARY STAFF CO:\HUTTEE 57
PART IV
Matters snbmitted to the Security Counell which were not admitted to its agenda
Il. LETTER D,\TED 13 Al'GUST 1957 FRO:\f THE REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, IRAQ. TORDAN. LEBANON, LlBl"A, l\!OROCCO. SAUDI ARABIA. SUD.\N, SYRIA, TUNISIA. :\ND YEMEN, AllDRESSED TO TIIE PIŒSIDE::-i'T OF THE SF.Cl'RITY COUNCIL, CO::-i'- CERNING THE SITUATION IN Oè\fAN .. ,," .. . ,." , ".,.,' 58
PART V
I\'Iatters hrought to the attention of the Security Council but not diacussed in the Council
12. REPORTS 0l\T THE ~TIL\TEGIC TRl'ST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 61
13. REPORTS OF THE DISARMA:\lE~JT COMMISSION, .. ,, .. ,,,,. 61
14. COMMUNICATIONS FROl\[ THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. 61
15. COMMUNICATIONS FROl\I EGYPT RELATING 1'0 THE SUEZ CAKAL 62 16. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING l'IlE GULF OF AQABA .. '. ."' , . 62 IV Il. "1Ii.~_'-__IIliiI_NIIl_~"_" ..
Chaptrr Paçe r CON 17. CO~f ~1U:\J('ATIOI\S CO:\CER:\ING THF. ISI.A:\n OF (YI'Rt'S 62 FROM '-RNA!. CO~DIlJl\lC.\TIO:-:S CO:-lCF.R!':II\I~ "NI«';R IR THE SITUATION JN THE SOUTHER:\ l'ART OF r mc ARAIlL\l" l'E:-IIl''~l·I.A
lY. PANEL FOR II\\.)l·IRY AI\Il CO:\('JI.!ATION
20. CO~Il\lt:I\ICATION l"OI\ŒRI\I:\I; 'l'liE U:\lTED :\RAII REI'UllLIC
47 Appendices
I. Representatives aud deputv, nltcrnate and acting representatives accredited to the Sccurity Council ...... Ci:;
1I. Presidents of the Security Council. ciS
III. Meetings of the Security Council during the peri ml from J() july 1957 to 53 15 july lY58 ...... 66 lie of Representatives, Chairmcn and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff CO\11- 'emo- mittee (16 Jnly 195ï to 15 j nly 1958) S3 \ A. Representatives of cadi service 67 L OF 56 B. List of Chairmen t C. List of Principal Secretaries 6R 56
57
~AQ. SIA. ON- 58
61
61
61
62 62
v INTRODUCTION
The present1 report Ï3 submitted to the General As General Assembly, at its 695th plenary meeting on 1 srlllhh' 1>\" the Securitv Council in accordance with October 1957, elected Canada, ]apan and Panama as .\rtic:t· 2..1-. paragraph ,1. and Article 15. paragraph 1, non-permanent memhers of the Council to fill vacancies lIf the Charter. resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1957, of Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the bread the tenu of office of Australia, Cuba and the Philippines. lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a sub The newly-elected members of the Security Council stitute for the records of the Security Council, which con also replaced the retiring members on the Disarmament stitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account Commission which was established under the Security ui its deliberations. Council by the General Assembly ir. accordance with its resolution S02 (VI) of 11 january 1952, to carry for \Vith respect to the membership of the Security Coun ward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy dl during the period covered, it will be recalled that the Commission and the Commission for Conventiona1 Arma ments. 1 This is the thirieenth annual report of the Security Council III the General Assernbly. The previous reports were subrnitted The period covered in the present report is from 16 under the syml.ols /\/93, /\/366, :\1620, /\/9-15, A/1361, A/1873, july 1957 to 15 .luI)' 1958. The Council he1d forty-six .\/21oï, :\/2-137, .-\j2ï12•.-\j2935, A/315i and A/36-1~. meetings during that period.
1 vii - 10 ;nl 111.1 :lfl IiI: PART 1 1'1 t:l, du Questions eonsidered by the Securhy Council under its responsibility for the maintenance co: of international peace and security an
Chapter 1 th; \'11 THE PALESTINE QUESTION 1111 1 it ~ COI A. Letter dated 4 Septemher 1957 from the per take up the questions either simultaneously or consecu 1 th. m'tuent representatlve of Jordan, addreseed to tively in order ta avoid a procedural debate. " 'j, :trt the President of the Security Counell Decision: TIzI' agenda 1i'as adoptcd unanimously. an, Leller dated 5 September 1957 from the act A]ter the rcprcscntatizes of Jordan and of Israel had l ,}. ing permanent representative of Israel, ad bccn imnted ta take part in the discussion, the Council 1 dressed to the President of the Security decided, by 9 uotcs ta 1 (Iraq), ~dt" 1 abstention • re; Couneil (USSR), ta start 1(~tlt ltearing the preli»linary state w; mcnts of the tU'o parties directly concerned and ta post l1It 1. By a letter dated 4 September 1957 (S/3878), ponc until latcr its decision on the order of the dcbate. de. the representative of Jordan requested the President of SP] the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the 6. The representative of Jordan said that not only io Council ta consider a serious situation resulting from were the Israelis trying to establish the right of access ta, \'le: violations by Israel of a number of the provisions of the and control over, privately-owned Arab properties in the th:: General Armistice Agreement in the zone between the no man' s land area at J ebel El ).1 ukabber, which was cal armistice demarcation lines in the J erusalem sector. The under the control of the Truce Supervision Organization, it ] letter stated that, on 21 July 1957, a number of Israelis, out that they were also endeavouring to gain new strate mi under the protection of Israel security forces, had en gic positions of importance which would render practi tio tered the area in question and had started digging on it, cully impossible aIl defence of the Arab part of J erusalem. a Their action had continued during the succeeding days ï. On the question of the official international agree fUI and more Israelis had entered with bulldozers and trac ments governing the status of the J ebel El ::'1ukabber area yer tors. In spite of the fact that a protest and a formai rom ami signed by his Government, the representative of for plaint had promptly br ~n lodged, respectively, with the Jordan noted that during the fighting between the Arabs ha: Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and with and the jews in 1948, the Red Cross had established its 1 of \ the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Trnce Super headquarters at Government House and had been allowed ,1 tioi vision Organization, the Israelis had refused ta cease the use of an adjoining small section between Govern "1\ wit their activities. ment House and the Arab College owing to a number of ~ aIl !: 2. By a letter dated 5 September 1957 (S/3883). incidents jeopardizing the safety of the Red Cross per ")] res the representative of Israel requested that the Security sonnel. Negotiations had taken place between the Chair ,~ rel' Council consider a complaint hy Israel of violations by man of the Central Truce Supervision Board and repre fl gra sentatives of the two parties and, as a result, the area of ~ Jordan of the provisions of the General Armistice Agree '1\ cor ment, and in particular of article VIII, which providecl [ebel El Mukabber had been declared a neutral zone. wa for the establishment of a Special Committee for the pnr That decision embodied the following principles: (1) that he pose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements de all military personnel. equipment and installations in the for signed to enlarge the scope of the Agreement and to effect zone would be removed or destroyed ; (2) that the '1 improvements in its application. For the past eight years United Nations Truce Supervision Board would super sai vise the area and becorne responsible for the safeguarding Jordan had refused ta agree to the functioning of the i pre of individuals and their properties in the area; (3) that j Special Committee. me the neutral zone status given ta the area implied that in 3. At its 787th meeting on 6 September 1957, the Co dividual rights of ownership to lands and buildings in the Council had before it a provisional agenda containing the the area would not be affected once that agreement was complaint received from Jordan as sub-item (a), and the ane reached on 4 September 1948 (S/992). The maps at tior complaint received from IsraeJ as sub-item (b). tached to the cease-fire agreement of November 1948, l 4. The representatives of the United Kingdom of which showed the lines occupied by the respective fighting Great Britain and Northern Ireland and China supported forces, were later incorporated in the General Armistice i sen a proposaI made by the President to discuss sub-items Agreement of 3 April 1949. ~ bro ~ (a) and (b) jointly, while the representative of Iraq, 8. The representative of Jordan said that, after the cas supported by the representative of the Union of Soviet Mixed Armistice Commission had been organized in sid Socialist Republics, suggested that the sub-items be dis 1949. his Government had strongly objected ta the pro pla cussed consecutively. posals regarding partition of the Jebel El Mukabber area em or the drawing of any so-called civilian line. nel 5. The representative of the United States of Amer att ica thought the President's proposaI was a reasonable 9. Speaking of what was meant by the status quo and constructive one, but expressed his willingness ta 111 the J ebel El Mukabber area, the representative of an 1 .,...... \'l·~;tigatioll. .1 ordan -aid that the area was not, in priuciple tu lx' th, jordan romplaint, Il:ulldy ihr lsrael ~idl' of the Furtlu-r inhahit.«! :uhl the partie- hnd lx-eu preveuted from cross civilian linr e-tabli..he.l ill the (;UVI'r1l11lt'lIt l louse area lulv and 2 and ~ :\1 in,~ tlu- dl':narcation lim'" or from trespassing into the ill .1 erusalem, the representative of brad stated cate 1 ;uilltariu'(l characier ill~ arca, ln fart. the arca. fr.un ll>-lS uutil lately, had con ~orically thal 1111 l"lcllh'lIh of thr Israel defeuce forces the initial ..ta!.:l'" tinnni to rcmaiu un.ler the supervision ami control of the lud entered that arca dnriiu; th.u whol« l'tTiod .uul :-:Iid particulnr, Jordanian l 'lIitl',l :\atitlllS, It h.ul always heeu clearly understood thar the IIllly violations wer« thosl' which werv hl'illg and tronches and po t11,lt Oll!." thosl' civili ans who had beeu allowed to stay couunitted hv lordan : Iirst, [ordan h:1I1 l'n'l'tet! uiilitarv t )\"'1'. Jordan had use higlm':IY for military rlu-n- could cultivate their OWII properties and that they fortiticatious ill'~idt, tln- arca. 'whidl had hl'l'II 1II:l111l1't! 0;. brut'! militarv person could not make use of other people's properties in the:' many occasions hy Jordani.u Ir )Ops: SC('OIHl1y. .1 ordan area, had set IIp a sl'lItry post near the eastern galt' oi t iov with the l'xt=eptiou 0 had inspectcd the an 10, Tht' represeut.uiv« of Jordan requested : (1) ernment l lou«: insi.le the area : thirdlv, militarv traffic hi~hway 'throu~h police, up to approx that the activities in the area undertakcn hv Israel in had contir.uously used the coustructed the area, Those arts roustit uted flagrant violations hv ZOIlC with the stated violation oi the General Armistice Agreement he stopped the labourer», Unite: imuu-diatelv, and that the situation lx, re-established as Jordan of art ide III. pa"agraph 2, al;d article 1v, para graph 2. of tilt' (;e1lt'ral Armistice ,\gn'I'1I11'1It. lie urged noted that the police it had been prier to the activities of which Jordan had machine-guns. complained ; t2 \ that Israel he condemned for violation of the Conncil to dismiss the Jonlnnian complaint as Ill'ill~ 19. The ..\cting C thl' provisions 01 the t ieucml Armistice Agreement, without foundatiou either in fact or in law, article Ill, paragruph 2. article II. paragraphs 1 and 2. 15. After discussion on the question of the urtll'r 01 1- considcrc.l itself corn] and artidt, 1\', paragraph 3. thl' dehatt' allli of thl' dt'~;rahility of asking for reJlorts the zone in oreler te '," l .:\TSO ({id no~. hm 11. .-\t tIlt' i~-':th meeting on 6 Septem1Jer 1957, the from the Chid of ~taff uf the Trncl' ~upl'rvision 01' ganization, the l'l'l'sident sun1l11ell up b)" saying that so far J C)r tl'rms of referl'ncc rt'prt'sentative uf Israel said that his Govenullent had al the arl'a. ways hopt'd, l'\'l'r sinet' the Geut'ral Anllistice Agree the Coundl had not takl'n anv dedsion or rt'ached al1\' J~reement 20. The rt'Jlort sta IIIt'nt had heen signetl. that it \\"ould truh' be. as it was as to \\"hether suh:paragraphs (Il) and (b') illg of the recorels th: designed tu be, a' transition to peace, Unfortunately, de of the agenda \\"ere to he eliscussed joint1y or st'parately. had !Jccn left regrl'ttal. spite the frequent delihl'rations of the Council, the efforts He Ilotecl that the representatÎ\'e of thc Philippines had ';0111<' arguments adval for the rl'storation of the peace in the ~Iiddll' East hall moveel that the Couneil ~sk for two l'l'ports from the Chief of Staff of the Unite(l X ations Tmee Supervision ~ ,,11 0111 cl he given due yiddell meagre rt'sults. The principal reason had been • to he fully supported, that thl' Couudl had bet'u dealing with effect rather than 0rganization, one regarcling the Jortlanian complaint cause. Perhaps because uf this, the Couucil had not found and the other rt'garding the Israel complaint. So far, 21. Referring to t th~' it possible to go heyond those articles of the General Ar there hacl heen unanimity or at least a substantial maj 01'- ,;ist parties in fi\1( mistice Agre{'ment which referred specificaUy to condi ity in favour of calling for such reports. He believed that troversy. the Acting C tions ou the bardt'r and to examine the Agreement a~ there wa5 majority support for the suggestion that par- l Octohel' 1956 Israel 1 a \\"hole and, in particular, the parts which detenllined tkular urgency he gh'en to the l'l'port on the Jordanian ~ gency ~Iixed Armisti fundamental i~~ues of principle. During the past eight l'amplaint and that it shou1c1 reach the Council \\"ithin a expressed willingness years, the Go\'ernment of Israel had made frequent ef fortnight. He a150 considered that the majority of the ings. including suh-ce forts to secure the implementation of Article VIII, but memhers of the C0l1l1cii supported the view that both Armistice Commission had constantly met \\"ith an ohdurate refusaI on the part parties shoulcl he aclvised to refrain from taking any steps meetings except an ( of Jordan to carry out that clear and unmistakable obliga whkh coulel aggravate the tension in that area. under discussion. tion of the Agreement. The matter had been discussed lô, The representative of the Union of Soviet So 22. Israel had bec) \Vith the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff, but cialist Repuhlics said that it shoukl be entirely dear that pend its afforestation ail efforts to secure Jordan's compliance had failed. The the explanation made hv the President woulei not in anv the tranquillity \vhich : result \Vas that rights which Israel regarded as of cardinal way constitute approva(or sanction bv the Securitv Couri lllonths. Imt had indicr religious, educational and practical importance had been cil of the activities undertaken by Israel in the" neutral • sltspending the \\"ork, gravely prejudiced. He charged further that Jordan had zone. civilian activity on its constantly violated the provisions of article l, which 23. The Acting C \Vas the heart of the General Annistice Agreement, and B, Report of the Acting Chief of Staff of tbe pearec1 to he three w, he referred to the failure of the Secretary-General's ef United Nations Truce Supervision Organi. to transfarm the area forts ta secure Jordan's compliance \Vith article XII. zation land and apply article 12. His Government, the representative of Israel Agreement prohihiting 17. In compliance with the wishes expressed by the said, could not passively acquiesce in a selective inter marcation line into the pretation and implementation of the Armistice Agree members of the Security Com:cil. the Acting Chief of ~onne1; ( h) to revert ment by Jordan, and it therefore appealed to the Security Staff submitted a report (S/3892), dated 23 September April 1949; (c) to arr 1957, on the area hetween the 1ines (neutral zone) Council to use its influence to restore to fuU effect all take into account, to around the Government House area. He stated that 011 the articles of the Agreement, including articles VIII, l \Yhich had taken place 21 July 1957 Israel workmen had commenced to stake \ and XII, which laid down fundamental princip1es of ac 24. Alternatives (1 out part of the zone up ta what Israel considered to be a tion for the parties to the General Annistice Agreement. advisable, Alternative de facto civilian line separating the civilian activities of hasis for a solution. 13. Turning to the J ordanian complaint, the repre hoth parties. Later, earth-moving and agricultural equip should continue but b sentative of Israel stated that it should not have been ment had heen used bv those lahourers to l'ut roads and the land as establishecl brought to the Security Council at aU. In that particu1ar plough the land. The ;"ork hacl continuecl without inter- t registries shou1d .1150 1 case, the Government of Tordan had at least three sub ruption since 21 July 1957 and was still in progress. The sidiary bodies to which it could have brought its com declared purpose of the work was to prepare the land for } 25. \Vith a vie\\" te plaint before bringing it ta the Council. The Jordan Gov afforestation as part of a beautification project. \ of alternative (c), the ernment, hawever, had cefused to use those normal chan 18. The Acting Chief of Staff recaUed that, in Sep- t that: (1) the parties nels and had broug'i1t a trifling affair straight to the tember 1956, he had ordered an inspection of the \vhole in the zone; (2) such attention of the Security Council. area by United Nations military observers and had drawn the Mixed Armistice 14. After having examined the origins, the Listory the att~ntion of bath p~rties to .various military infringe order ta create an at conducive to frnitful di. and the present circumstances of the area mentioned in ments lt1 the zone whlch had been revealed by the in- 2 vestigntion. Further inspections were carried out on 15 should suspend ils afforestation project within the zone )uly and 2 and 3 August 1957. He stated that the de pt'nditllo: the outcome of such discussions: (4) such dis militarized character of the zone had been violated dur cussion he completed within a period of two months; (5) il1J: the initial stages of Israel's afTorestation project. In the Securitv Council he advised of the result of the dis particular, Jordanian troops had been seen in the zone, cussion. In'an addendum to the report dated 16 ~ovem and trenches and positions had been renovated. More ber 1957 (S/3892/Add.2), the Acting Chief of Staff over, Jordan had used the jerusalem-Bethlehem-Hebrcn stated that L'IIÎted :--: ations militarv ohscrvers had not highway for rnilitary traffic. During the same period, no observed any work proceeding in the area in question Israel military personnel had been observed in the zone. since 8 xovember 1Y57. with the exception of several Israel army officers who 26. In compliance with the wishes expressed at the had inspected the area on two occasions, Israel border 7R8th meeting of the Security Council, the Acting Chief police, np ta approximately fifteen men, were in the of Staff also submitted a report (S/3913) dated 31 Oc zone with the stated purpose of providing protection to rober 1957 relating to the Israel complaint against Jordan the labourers, United Nations rnilitary observers had which specifically referred to the provisions of article 110t('<1 that the police were armed with rifles and suh \'III. articles 1 and III, and article XII of the General machine-guns, Armistice Agreement.' 19. The Acting Chief of Staff reported that UNTSO 27. In a letter dated 8 Nove.nber 1957 (S/3907), '1;' considcred itself competent ta exercise surveillance over the representative of Jordan informed the Council that ~ the zone in arder ta maintain its demilitarized status, Israel had not heeded its decision taken on 6 September l~XTSO did not, however, possess any specifie authority 1957 and had continued to commit a series of violations I or ternis of reference with respect to civilian activities in in the area, a list of which was attached. In a letter dated the area, 1..J. November 1957 (S/391O), the representative of • 20. The report stated that it was evident from a read Israel charged that the J ordanian letter of 8 N ovember ...l il1R of the records that the civilian matters of the zone 1957 (S/3907) contained three serious misrepresenta had been left regrettably vague for many years, Although tiens designed to cast an unfavourable light on the legi sorne arguments advanced Il)" the parties had merit and timate activities of his Government: (1) the records of shonld be given due consideration, others did not appear the Security Council did not disclose any decision on the .tr ta be fully supported. question at issue; (2) the views of the Security Council 21. Referring to the past efforts of UNTSO to as were summed up by the President at the meeting of 6 r sist the parties in finding a solution ta the present con September-that summing-up did not include the state , travers)". the Acting Chief of Staff pointed out that since ment quoted by the representative of Jordan or any other Octoher 1956 Israel had declined to participate in emer expression in the samc or a similar sense: and (3) as the geney Mixed Armistice Commission' meetings, but hac1 Acting Chief of Staff had confirmed in his report, the > expressed willingness ta attend any other type of meet- General Armistice Agreement contained no provisions ings, inc1uding sub-committee meetings of the Mixed cletermining the legal status of the area and did not de Armistice Commission. Jordan had refused to attend any fine the respective rights and obligations of the parties meetings except an emergency meeting on the matter in the area, In another letter dated 18 November 1957 under discussion. (S/3914), the representative of Jordan submitted to the Council an additionaI list of violations that Israel had \ 22. Israel had been urged on several occasions to sus- 1 pend its afforestation work for the sake of maintaining cornrnitted in the area. the tranquillity which had prevailed in the area for many 28. In a further letter dated 11 November 195ï months, but had indicated that it did not fee1 justified in (S/3909), the representative of Jordan, referriug ta suspending the work, which it claimed was a perrnissible paragraph 7 (b) of the report of the Acting Chief of civiIian activity on its side of the so-called civilian 1ine. Staff (S/3892), stated that General Riley, Chief of 23. The Acting Chief of Staff stated that there ap Staff, in a Ietter dated 12 June 1949 to Colonel Dayan, peared ta be three ways to approach the problem : (a) Israel clelegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission, had ta transform the area between the 1ines into a no man's confinned the no man's land status of the area and, land and apply article IV (3) of the General Armistice further, that the crossing of the demarcation lines, as well • Agreement prohibiting an)' person from crossing the de as entry into the area, were prohibited to civilians, with the exception of United Nations personnel. The repre 0 4 ' marcation line into the zone except United Nations per ~ sonnel: (b) to revert to the conditions existing on 3 sentative of Jordan stated further that it appeared that a April 1949; (c) to arrive at an arrangement which would misinterpretation of the minutes of the Mixed Armistice take into account, to some extent at least, the changes Commission meeting on 12 June was at the base of a which had taken place since 1949. series of erroneous conclusions in the report of the Acting Chief of Staff. 24. Alternatives (a) and (b) did not appear ta be 29. At its 806th meeting, helcl on 22 N ovember .4 advisable. Alternative (c) appeared ta offer a reasonab1e 1957, the Council resumed consideration of the jor basis for a solution. Civilian activities of bath parties danian complaint. The representative of Jordan said at ~honld continue but he kept separate. The ownership of the outset that he had received information from his Gov the land as establishecl by a thorough search of the land ernment to the effect that Israel workers were still pur registries should also be respected. stùng their unlawful activities in the area. He then pro 25. \Vith a view ta finding a solution along the lines ceecled ta discuss the points raised by the representative of alternative (c), the Acting Chief of Staff recommended of Israel (788th meeting) and by the report of the Act that: (1) the parties mect and discuss civilian activities ing Chief of Staff (S/3892) and reiterated his Govern in the zone; (2) snch discussions be conducted through ment's position on the matter. the Mixed Armistice Commission machinery; (3) in arder to create an at1l10sphere which would be more 1 The ~curity Coullcil did not consider further the item conducive to fruitful discussion, the Government of Israel sl1bmitt . by Israel in the period covered by this report. 1 3 ,
30. Turning to the three proposais made il)' the were no provisions in the General Armistice Agreement Britain and Acting Chief of Staff in his report, the representative uf regarding the status of the zone. It had not been con America: Jordan stated that the acceptance of alternative proposai tended that the prohibition of the entry of the armed ''The S (r ) would amount to a legalization of the Israel viola forces of the parties into the area applied also ta civilians. • tion- in the area, He declared that nobody in Jordan Xo mies and regulations existed obliging the arrned "Reca/li coukl allow Israelis to take possession of Arab-owned forces of the parties ta prohibit the entry of civilians from of the COll lands. In ortler for the third alternative proposai of the their respective sides, In any steps ta rnaintain the status concerning Acting Chief of Statf to becoille just and practicable, he quo of the area, due regard should be paid ta the develop between t1 proposed that civilian activities of both parties in the ments that had occurred in the area with the consent Governmei area shoukl continue on the hasis of ownership rights as of the parties since the signature of the Armistice Agree "f/crvinl estahlished by a thorough search of land registries by the ment on 3 April 19-1-9. The status quo must, of nt'Ces dated 23 ~ :\1ixed Armistice Commission. sitv, also take into account the existence of a line which, Council'S 1 31. \\'ith regard ta alternative proposai (b ), the whether Jordan agrecd with it or not, had since 1949 United N Jordan representative said that although his country effectivelv divided the area into an Israel sector and a "Notin!J woul l he the one affected by the closing of the jerusalem Jordan ;ector. provisions Hethlehem-Hebron road, it preferred to face that incon 36. Turning ta the repoi t of the Acting Chief of that neithe venience in arder ta safeguard the General Armistice Staff, the representative ci Israel said that the civilian , any part ( Agreement an.l Arah rights of ownership in the area, line referred to in paragraph 7 (r) had been established spective d, by negotiation between the representatives of Israel and 32. The application of alternative proposai (a), the "J[otiuc Jordan on 23 June 19-1-9 and formed the basis of what representative of Jordan said, would not require a "trans the creatic l'ver statilS quo existed in the area, The first four chap formation" of the legal status of the area, which was that "1. Di ters of the report described the factual situation in the of a no man's land in the tenns of the General Armistice tians Tnt< Government House area and, as he had shawn, supported Agreement. As an alternative to proposaI (b), he wouId tivities wit the Israel position in nearlv l'very particular. Chapter V may be 1110 accept proposa! (a) if fully implemented. gave the Acting Chief ai Staff''s own conclusions, recom Armistice 33. In conclusion, the representative of Jordan made mendations and expectations, He supported the Acting below, bea the following points among others: the General Armistice Chief of Staff's rejection of the transformation of the ' it being Agreement remained the only legal agreement governing area into an uninhabited no man's land, or its reversion agreed, Is the status of the jebel El Mukabber area. There had ta the conditions existing on 3 April 1949. He had no owned pre never been an agreement for the division of the area objection to the suggestion that a reasonable basis for a use Israel- signed by the two Governments. The area had remained solution would be an agreement between the parties which under the supervision and control of UNTSO. Both would take into account, to sorne extent at least, the "2. Di under cornmon law and under the specifie terms of the changes which had taken place since 1949. The political of propert General Armistice Agreement, neither of the parties had or moral relevance of the suggestion of detennining the erty ownei any right ta make use of or appropriate the other's prop ownership of the land in the area was not explained nar "3. E1 erties. Israel's penetration into and activities in the area did it have any legal justification in that context. Chief of ~ constituted flagrant violations of the General Armistice 37. Concerning the recommendations made by the Agreement and of the siatus quo. The representative of "(a) T Acting Chief of Staff in his report, the representative of Armistice Jordan then repeated the request which he had submitted Israel stated that his Government was prepared ta discuss at the 787th meeting of the Council, and asked, in addi "(b) l civilian activities in the zone with Jordan at any time. 1 tion, that the Mixed Armistice Commission be directed would be Referring to the second recommendation, he stated that ties in the ta determine the rights of property ownership in the area Israel was prepared to meet with Jordan in the Mixed 21 JuIy 1 and to ensure respect of those rights; that the supervision Armistice Commission sub-committee or in the Special and control of U:0JTSO over the Jebel El Mukabber no the survej Committee constituted under article VIn of the General made for' man's land area be confirmed and that Israel be asked to Armistice Agreement, or at a meeting arranged in the co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission, which context of the J erusalem Area Commanders' Agreement. "(c) S was the competent organization to deal with violations of With regard to the third recommendation, the represen a period 0 the General Armistice Agreement. tative of Israel said that whatever justification there "(d) 34. The representative of Israel said that the corn might be for asking one party alone to refrain from exer the result plaint about the planting of trees in the Israel sector of the cising its legal rights in arder, by its passivity, to create an "4. C Government House area was an artificial charge designed atmosphere which was being poisoned by belligerent and General for no other purpose than to meet the exigencies of Jor provocative propaganda from the other, that suggestion Chief of dan's internal and external political situation. UNTSO had been overtaken by l'vents. The report inclicated that sion in c had competence to exercise military surveillance over the no work in the area had been observed since 8 N ovember ta this res zone under article IV of the Armistice Agreement, which 1957. His Government rejected the fourth recommenda prohibited the crossing of the demarcation lines by mili tion, that work should continue to be suspended for two \ "5. C tary forces of the parties, and not because that zone had months, as being completely unwarranted and as being " General at any time been formally dec1ared to be a demi1itarized in contradiction to the existing rights and obligations of the Ag area. UNTSO had not possessed authority over civilian of the parties, as recognized by the Acting Chief of Staff article II activities in the zone l'ver since the signing of the Armi in his report, He had no objection to the fifth recom armistice stice Agreement on 3 April 1949, as was attested by a mendation, that the Security Council be advised of the all their 1 statement of General Riley, the first Chief of Staff, at result of the discussion, nor to the expression of the Chief in the zon the ninth meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on of Staff's hope that the parties would fully co-operate 1 "6. C 12 June 1949. with UNTSO in restoring the demilitarized status of provided 35. The civilian activity of afforestation undertaken the zone. the imple by Israel did not constitute a violation of the General 38. At the 809th meeting 011 22 January 1958, the ment; an Armistice Agreement. The Acting Chief of Staff had Council had before it the fol1owing joint draft resolution "7. R stated in paragraph 7 of his report (S/3892) that there (S/3940) submitted by the United Kingdom of Great implement 4 , greement Britain and Xorthern Ireland and the United States of 39, Introducing the joint draft resolution, the repre een con America: sentative of the United States declared that since neither te arrned "Tire Saurit)' COlmcil, party enjoycd sovereignty over the area and no agree civilians. ment on the status or rights in the zone seemed to exist, "Recallinq its consideration on 6 September 1957, e armed it was the responsibility of the Security Council to pro of the complaint of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ans from vide for the regulation of the area so as to reduce tensions conceruing activities conducted by Israel in the zone he status and incidents between the two countries. He said that the between the armistice demarcation lines in the area of develop United States and the United Kingdom had accordingly House at J ~ consent Government erusalem ; sulnnitted a draft resolution which, in response to the e Agree .,Elaving considered the report relating to the zone Jordanian complaint, was designed to strengthen the )f neces dated 23 September 1957, submitted in response to the authority of the L'nited Nations in the area and to pro le which, Council's request by the Acting Chief of Staff of the vide for continued suspension of the activity which had ice 1949 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; given rise to the dispute, His conntry believed that the lr and a "Noting that the status of the zone is affected by the draft resolution pointed the way to a prompt and equitable provisions of the General Armistice Agreement and solution. Chief of that neither Israel nor Jordan enjoys sovereignty over 40. Statements in support of the joint draft resolu ~ civilian any part of the zone (the zone being beyond the re tion were made by the representatives of the United tablished spective demarcation Iines) : Kingdom, Panama, Iraq and China. The representative rael and "Motiuatcd by a desire to reduce tensions and avoid of France. while supporting it in principle, emphasized of what the creation of new incidents; that the question before the Council was of a particular ur chap "1. Directs the Chief of Staff of the United Na nature owing to the sui generis character of the demili n in the tions Truce Supervision Organization to regulate ac tarized zone around Government House. Accordingly, upported tivities within the zone subject to such arrangements as the solution envisaged by the draft resolution should not iapter V may be made pursuant to the provisions of the Generai be regarded as capable of being extended to problems i, recom Armistice Agreement and pursuant to paragraph 3 regarding other demilitarized zones where the elements of ~ Acting below, bearing in mind ownership of property there, the problems might weil be totally different. l of the ' it being understood that unless otherwise mutuaIly reversion 41. At the 8lOth meeting on 22 January 1958, the agreed, Israelis should not be allowed to use Arab : had no representative of J apan supported the joint draft resolu owned properties and Arabs should not be aIlowed to sis for a tion. use Israel-owned properties; es which 42. The representative of Jordan stated that, in spite east, the "2, Directs the Chief of Staff to conduct a survey of the fact that the draft resolution answered his requests political of property records with a view to determining props only in part, his Government nevertheless accepted it ning the erty ownership in the zone; hecause it contained a number of positive points. He ined nor "3. Endorses the recommendations of the Acting hoped that Israel would faithfu11y carry out the directives Chief of Staff to the end that: of the draft resolution and that its implementation would by the " (a) The parties should discuss through the Mixed alleviate the present difficulties in the zone. Should Israel tative of Armistice Commission civilian activities in the zone; sincere1y renounce its policy of systematic violation of the o discuss General Armistice Agreement and be prevented from de " (b) In order to create an atmosphere which ny time. 1 riving any political, military or economie advantages from would be more conducive to fruitful discussion, activi ited that its objectionable activities, tranquillity would prevail along ~ ties in the zone, such as those initiated by !sraelis on the demarcation Iines in Palestine. Mixed 21 July 1957, should be suspended until such time as Special the survey will have been completed and provisions 43. The representative of Israel stated that, since 8 General made for the regulation of activities in the zone; November 1957, his Government, without prejudice to :l in the its legal rights and position, had suspended in the Israel " (c) Such discussions should be completed within reement. sector of the zone those activities about which complaint a period of two months; and epresen- had been made. Commenting on the draft resolution, he ln there "(d) The Security Council should be advised of mentioned that it could in no way affect, add to, or de lm exer the result of the discussions; rogate from the binding force of the agreements which :reate an "4. Calls upo» the parties to the Israel-Jordan governed the legal relationship between Jordan and Israel. rent and General Armistice Agreement to co-operate with the The Government of Israel would observe the General iggestion Chief of Staff and in the Mixed Armistice Commis Armistice Agreement as it stood, and would abide by aIl ued that sion in carrying out these recommendations pursuant its obligations under international law, with the c1ear ovember • to this resolution; understanding that Jordan was bound to do the same. nmenda for two \ "5. Calls upon the parties to the Israel-Jordan Decision: The joint draft resolution was adopted General Armistice Agreement to observe article III unanimously.2 lS being " Iigations of the Agreement and prevent all forces referred to in of Staff article III of the Agreement from passing over the C. Communications relating to the , recom- armistice demarcation 1ines and to remove or destroy Mount Scopus incident 1 of the a11 their respective military facilities and installations in the zone; 44. By a letter dated 29 May 1958 (S/4011), the he Chief representative of Israel transmitted to the President of -operate "6. Calls upnn the parties to use the machinery the Council the translated text of the reply by the Prime tatus of provided for in the General Armistice Agreement for Minister of Israel to a question put to him in the Knesset the implementation of the provisions of that Agree on 28 May 1958 concerning the incidents on Mount ~58, the ment; and Scopus on 26 May. ssolution "7. Requests the Chief of Staff to report on the If Great implementation of this resolution," 2 See document S/3942. 5 45, B)' a letter dated 29 May 1958 (Sj4012), the Xlount Scopus was possible ~IS long as contacts und COll' obser Secretary-General informed the President of the Security 'licts were avoided. l'rnctical lI1('aSUf('S coukl be taken to perm COI Ill": il that in view uf the couuuunication regardiug' the avoi,1 contacts und contlicts in the future by the evacm fermi recent incident 011 Xluuut Scopus receive.l from the dele tiou of the seven hOUSl'S meutioned ÎlI the report and the .f queu gation of Israel, hl' hall requested the Chief of Staff tu prevention hy l 'uited Xations ohservers of Arab cultiva C'~1 n'port urgl'Iltly on all the circumstanccs surrounding the lion and ether activities dose to the .1 ewish buildings, (b) to th incident, in particular the death of Colonel Flint. I'atrolling hy the Israel police in areas inhabited or cul the .; tivated hv the Arahs had resulted in contacts and con 46. The Secretarv-tleneral circulated on t ï J\111(' surve JI)5~ a report (S/40jOl, dated ï June 195~, by :\I;ijor tlicts. slidl patrolling was not ordered by the "United nn 2 ccnuuaiuler" 'lin respective (;l'lIl'ral Carl Carlsson von l Iorn. Chief of Statf of Xations under whom their Israe nrens aruu-d :\rall and jcwish civilian police will be l':\'TSO, conceruitur the liring incident of 2(1 May t l).s.~ tians placed on duty". (f) Il had been argued that such patrol stay on :\Iount S":Up1IS, near .1 erusall'Ill. The n'port consistcd ling was necessary for security reasons. Such reasons of th n'l' parts: l'art 1 dealt with the fnctual details of porte the events in which the Chief of Staff's Representative could hardlv be invoked nnless there were, as indicated those for Mount Scopus, Lt.-Colond (;. :\. Flint, last his life nbove, contacts-which could he nvoided-e-between the Israe 1srael police and the Arah villagers, (d) There had Jeen and with the investigations on hoth skies; Part II de prese at varions times Israel complaints concerning (1) the -crihed the background of the incideut: Part II 1 set 55 presence of ordanian sokliers in the village of Issawyia, forth the conclusions of the Chief of Staff. .1 the and the possession of fireanns by the United (2) villagers, Secu 4ï, The Chief of Statf reportcd that the total num Xations ohservers hall been visiting Issawyia frequently agair ber of casnalties in the incident nmouuted to five killed : and they were satisfied that, following representations to in al i.e., Lt-Colonel Flint and four Israelis, with two Israelis the Mukhtars und action the jordaninn authorities, hy fire woundcd. He stated further that the provisional conclu occasional visits by soldiers to relatives or acquaintances mine sions of the investigations into the circumstances of the in the village were effectively checked. It shoukl be noted Dan death of Lt-Colonel Flint was that he had prohahly that allegations concerning firing by Issawyia villagers at unpr hecn shot hv a bullet fired from Iordaninn-controlled ter the Israel police had not heen prO\'ed. United Nations plam ritory to th~' north-north-east. . observers had not seen firearms while visiting Issawyia. had +.~. The Chief of Staff pninted out that the grave 52. Pending full implementation of the 7 July 1948 sued incident of 26 1\lay had heen preceded by similar incidents ,\greement, in accorclance with the statements referred to 5 of less gravity occurring from time ta time in an atmos in paragraph 1 of Dr. Francisco Urrutia's report of 18 the' phere of tension in which the 1srael police in the J e\\,ish ./anuary ll)S~. acceptancl' of what had been ealled the 28 J~ section of Mount Scopus were also involvecl. He stressed statlls qllo of 195+ might help in diminishing tension. As cons that partkular consideration should he given ta the con explainetl hy its initiator, General Burns, the poliey con had fliet between Arahs ancl Tsraelis in connexion with Arab sisted in maintaining the state of affairs as he had found il tian, civilians' activities ancl Israel patrolling in that area. in 1954. The fact that there existecl. as he had stated, no two complete description of th~ status of 1954 was, of course, 49. The c1ifti.rulties which had arisen in the western settl a difti.culty. The Chief of Staff stated that it might Le ancl eastern areas of Mount Scopus were connected with its a, worth considl'ring ho\\' the poliey could now be appliecl the "map contw\"l'rsy". There were two maps, the Chief delib in practice. l'roviclell it \Vas recognized that the polic)' of Staff noted. showing different limits for the demili the l applied to both sicles and had to be implemented by the tarized zone. On the Israel side. it was considered that ently United :\'atiOlls alone. without interference by either valiù map was that referrecl to in the first parag-raph spile t!l(' party, the question of existence or non-existence of sove of the ï .luly 1l)4~ :\gTeellient. i.e" the map "SCOPUS takel reign rights in the area between the "7 July" and "21 U:\''' c1atecl ~ Jul\' 1l)4~. On the Jordan sicle. it was con ' .. Am] .luly" lines. which had hecome a hurning question, could siclered that the 'valÎll map was 'the more carl'fully cle he left in abeyance llntil further agreement. 51 lineated map of the truce lines in the .lerusalem area, 39~ which was attachell to the Truel' Agreement signecl on ruar 21 J uly 194~. Consequently, sinC'l' the map recognized as D. Developments on the Israel.Syrian Armistice of si "alit! by Israel coveretl a larger area than the map recog Demarcation Line prat nized as valicl hy Jordan, there were on Mount Scopus nort sectors which Israel consic1erecl as being within the de 53, In an addendum dated 7 August 1957 (S/3844/ tach] militarized zone and .1 ordan as being in .lord,:nian-con Add.l) to a previous report of the then Acting Chief of mas. trollec1 territory. Staff regarding certain aspects of the \Vork of the United 5 50. Referring to the mission undertaken during De )Jations organ in the Demilitarized Zone established un JI 395 cember 195i-January 1958 hy Dr. Francisco lJrru der article V of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice that, tia, who had gone into the map question and had dis Agreement. report was made that the Acting Chief of arm cussecl it with the two Governments, the Chief of Staff Staff had advised the Government of Israel of UNTSO's '. vehi' stated that the evidence produced did not permit any intention to estahlish an observation post near the newly two progress towards a settlement of the controversy. The 26 erected bridge at the outlet of Lake Huleh, in the central aggr l\:1ay 1958 incident took place in the eastern area of sector of the Demilitarizecl Zone. He considered that tion Mount Scopus. Israel, on the basis of the "7 July 1948 such an observation post would be desirable ta reduce , map", considerecl that the area was in the Jewish section the risks of incidents, especial1y during the final stages 5 of the demilitarized zone, while Jordan, on the basis of of the Hllleh reclamation project. the that the "21 July 194t.C\ map" considered that it was not in the 54. The Acting Chief of Staff had been informed that demi1itarized zone, but in J ordanian-controlled territory. villa in Israel's view the ter111S of the General Armistice twe 51. The Chief of Staff smnmed up the existing situa Agreement did not entitle UNTSO to act in the Demili of J tion on Mount Scopus as follows: (a) Peaceful co-exist tarize.cl Zone without tllat country's consent and that on ence between the Arab villagers and the Israel police on C:\'TSO's announcement of its intention to establish an con 6 1 tacts and con observation post near H uleh bridge-without requesting and in the presence of United Nations observera. He de d be taken to permission fror.i the Israel Government-was not in con clared that at no time had any Israel army troops or ')' the evacm formity with the General Armistice Agreement. Couse vehicles heen present in the Demilitarized Zone. l'port and the quently, the Israel Government would not consider the W. By a letter dated 30 March 1958 (S/3983), the V~TSO Aral> cultiva announcemeut. In view of Israel's opposition representative of the l.'nited Arab Republic transmitted buildings. (b) to the establishment of the observation post in the area, to the Secretary-t iel1l'ral a note dated 29 March regard abited or cul the Acting Chief of Staff. in a Iurther effort to improve ing Israel aggressilln Ill! the borders of Syria-s-the north nets and con- surveillance in that area and as a practical mensure, had l'ru region of the United Arah Republic-s-during the the "United on 27 july 1957 directed, through the Chairman of the period hetween 2-t and 2i March 1958. cir respective Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, United Na olice will he tions military observers to ex tend the duration of their (lI. By a letter dated 2 April 195R (S/3985), the Lt sueh patrol stay in that area during their twice-a-day visits, He re representative of Israel drew the attention of the Security Such reasons porteel that the ohservers had been unable to carry out Couneil to the serions situation which had arisen on the , as indicated those instructions because of objections on the part of the border hetween Israel and Syria as a consequence of a -between the Israel authorities, who stated that they could sel' no series of aggressive acts committed by Syrian armed here had been present need for such a mensure, forces against Israel labourera engaged in digging a ling (1) the drainage canal in the Lake H uleh area, and against life ~ 55. By a letter dated 30 January 1958 (S/3945), and property in ueighbouring villages. of Issawyia, the representative of Israel drew the attention of the Iagers, United Security Council ta a new wave of Syrian aggression 62. On S April 1958, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO ria frequently against Israel which, on 28 January 1958. culminated infcrmed the Secretary-General of the acceptance by the esentations to in an attack by a Syrian unit with rifle and autornatic Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic of ln authorities, fire un Israel policemen who were engaged in clearing the Iatest survey finding in the area of Lake Huleh that acquaintances mines in the fields in the Demilitarized Zone east of the there had been certain encroachment on land in which oukl be noted Dan seulement. He stressed that the nature of that latest Arabs had property rights in the Demilitarized Zone ia villagers at unprovoked attack had left no room for doubt about its and that Israel had announced its intention ta take cor nited Nations planned and premeditated character and indicated that it rective action. I1g Issawyia. had been carried out in accordance with instructions is 7 JuIy 1948 sued by a responsible authority. E. Other communlcations its referred ta 56. By a letter dated 3Q J anuary 1958 (S/394<> ), report of 18 (i) COMPLAINT BY ISRAI:L AGAINST EGYPT CON CERN the representative of Syria, referring to the incident of ING RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY EGYPT ON THE 'en called the 28 january 1958, stated that an Israel military detachment g tension. As PASSAGE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL OF SHIPS consisting of twenty-five soldiers and an armoured vehide TRADING \VITH ISRAEL le policy con had entered the northern Demi1itarized Zone. In addi e had found it tion, an Israel reinforcement of thirty-five soldiers and 63. By a letter dated 23 Juy 1957 (S/3854), the lad stated, no two further annoured vehicles arrived from the Dan representative of Israel complained to the Security Coun Tas, of course. settlement ta join the first Israel detachment and support cil of the illegal conduct of the Government of Egypt, in t it might Le its action. In planning and execution, the incident was a connexion with the passage through the Suez Canal of IW be applied deliberate aet on the part of Israel. It was in line with the vesse! Brujitta Toit, The Government of Israel mt the policy the policy of the fait accompli which Israel had consist protested to the Council against the arbitrary actions by aented by the ently pursued in the Demilitarized Zone since 1951, de the Government of Egypt which were in violation of the ce by either spite the General Armistice Agreement and the decisions United Nations Charter and the internationally valid teuce of sove taken on severa! occasions by the Syrian-Israel Mixed principle of the freedom of passage through the Suez uly' and "21 ... Armistice Commission condemning that policy. Canal. uestion, coulcl 57. In another letter dated 4 February 1958 (S/ 64. In another letter dated 23 August 1957 (S/ 3948), the representative of Syria stated that, on 4 Feb 3870), the representative of Israel drew the attention of ruary 1958, a detachment of the Israel army, consisting the Security Council to a new instance of the methods of harassment and intimidation practised by the Government Il Armistice of sixty soldiers, escorted by four armoured vehides and proteeted by a "Mystère" jet aircraft, had entered the of Egypt in the Suez Canal against merchant shipping northern Demilitarized Zone. Other Israel arrned de trading with Israel. The Government of Israel regarded '57 (S/3844/ tachments, reinforced by mortars, were observed ta be the high-hanc1ed and arbitrary behaviour of the Egyptian cting Chief of massed opposite the northern Demilitarized Zone. authorities in the case of the :Mars as a gross violation of the United of the principle of free passage for shipping of al1 nations 58. In a further letter dated 11 February 1958 (S/ through the Suez Canal. stablished un 3950), the representative of Syria informed the Council ral Armistice " that, on 10 February 1958, a detachment of the Israel (ii) COMPLAINT BY ISRAEL AGAINST EGYPT CON ting Chief of arrny, consisting of fifty soldiers and two armoured of UNTSO's CERNING THE SEIZURE OF AN ISRAEL FISHING " vehicles, had entered the northern Demilitarizeel Zone at VESSEL (S/3898 AND S/3899) ~ar the newly two points. He stated that the continuation of those acts of in the central aggression and demonstrations of force rendered the situa 65. By a letter dated 7 October 1957 (S/3898), the >l1sidered that tion strained to the highest degree. representative of Israel protested to the Security Council ~le ta reduce , against the illegal act of violence, detention and depreda ~ 59. By a letter dated 14 February 1958 (S/3955), final stages tian committed on the high seas by agents of the Gov the representative of Israel informed the Security Council 1 that the clearing of mines from the fields of the Dan emment of Egypt against an Israel fishing vessel the ~ informed that village in the Demilitarized Zone near the border be Doron, sorne 30 miles off the Sinai coast opposite El ral Armistice tween Israel and Syria, undertaken during the months Arish. n the Demili of January and February this year, had been completed 66. By a letter dated 11 Oetober 1957 (S/3899), ent and that on 10 February. He noted that the operation had been the representative of Egypt informed the Security Coun ) establish an conducted with the knowledge and approval of UNTSO cil that the Israel boat Doron had entered the Egyptian 1 7 - territorial waters in the El Arish area and approached the Israel on 23 July 1953. He stated further that the Egyp coast of Sinai on 23 September in violation of the pro tian authorities had stopped the boat, h-ld its crew m visions of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement and custody and referred the matter to the Egyptian-Israel the Shipping Agreement concluded between Egypt and Mixed Armistice Commission for investigation, .'
Chapler 2
THE INDIA·PAKISTAN QUESTION
1NTRODUCTORY NOTE: The twelfth annual report of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for the Security Council! contains il summary account of 1udia and Pakistan," the proceedings of the Couucil on this question that took 70. On 21 August 1957, India drew attention (S/ place at fourteen meetings held between 16 January and 3869) to a press report that Pakistan had begun to exe 21 February 1957. It also contains a surnmary of the cnte the Mangla Dam project located on the territory of report (5/3821) of Mr. Gunnar jarring, President of Jammu and Kashmir and declared that it was a further • the Security Council for the month of February 1957 instance of consolidation by Pakistan of its authority over who, under the terms of the resolution of 21 February the Indian territory of Jammu and Kashmir and of vio 1957 (5/3793), was requested to report to the Council, lation of the resolution of 17 January 1948 and of the In the period covered by the present report, the Se assurances given by the Chainnan of the UNCIP to the curity Council considered the India-Pakistan question at Prime Minister of India. fourteen meetings, held between 24 September and 2 71. On 3 October 1957, Pakistan stated (5/3896) December 1957. that the Mangla Dam project was being executed co operative1y by Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir authori ties, and that the project would greatly improve the econ A. Communications from the Govemments of orny of the Azad Kashrnir area, India, too, had carried India and Pakistan out a number of projects on its side of the cease-fire line, 67. On 29 April 1957, Pakistan drew the attention and if India's action could not be deerned to aggravate of the Security Council (5/3822) to a press report which the situation in terms of the resolution of 17 January said, inter alfa, that Jammu and Kashmir would be more 1948, Pakistan failed ta understand how the Mangla closely associated with India's development programme Dam project could be described as a violation of that and that it had been made a member of the Northern resolution. Zonal Council of India. Pakistan took a grave view of the situation created by India's action in detennining uni B. Resumption of Security Council consideration laterally the future shape and affiliation of the State of of the India-Paklstan question Jammu and Kashmir, and reserved its right to seek later further action by the Security Council in regard to that 72. On 21 August 1957, Pakistan requested (5/ matter. 3868) that the Security Council be called to discuss the report of Mr, Gunnar Jarring (5/3821) and to consider 68. On 5 August 1957, Pakistan notified the Council further action. Accordingly, the 791st meeting of the Se (5/3860) that, from information available to it, it ap curity Council was held on 24 September 1957 to con .. peared that India had settled in Jammu and Kashmir a sider the India-Pakistan question, large number of non-Muslims, who were not residents of 73. The representative of Sweden said that, in pur the State, By this act, India was contravening the Secu suance of the Security Council resolution of 21 February rity Council resolution of 17 Jannary 1948 (5/651) 1957 (5/3793), he, in his capacity as President of the which had asked the parties to refrain from doing or Council for the month of February, had visited India permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation. and Pakistan, and had submitted his report (5/3821) on This move was being made in order that India might 29 April 1957. He believed that with the submission of assert later that a plebiscite had become progressive1y his report, his duties under that resolution were more difficult because of changed circumstances. terminated. 69. On 9 August 1957, India informed the Council 74. The representative of Pakistan, after expressing (5/3861) that the aIlegations contained in the letter of disappointment at the failure of the Jarring mission, said Pakistan (5/3860) were false and baseless. No non-resi that every previous United Nations effort to resolve the dent of Jammu and Kashmir was permitted to become a dispute had met with failure because of India's refusaI to resident and no evacuee property could be allotted to any carry out its international obligations. It was gratifying non-resident. The refugees had fled from the Pakistan that Mr. Jarring had reported that both India and Paki occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir. India had not stan still stood committed to the resolutions adopted on 13 acted in contravention of the Security Council resolution August 1948 and 5 January 1949 by the United Nations of 17 january 1948 (5/651). The relevant facts were Commission for India and Pakistan. Mr. Jarring had re that Pakistan was in occupation of part of the territory ported that he had explored the question of plebiscite and of the Union of India by aggression and in violation of proposed ways and means by which any difficulties that the Security Council resolution of 17 J anuary 1948 and might arise could be met or at least mitigated, but that his :)Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, see 1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Tsueljtl: Official ReC01°ds of the Security Councll, Fourth. Year, Special Session, SflpplemC1lt .1\,'0. 2 (A/3648), pp. 46-72. Supplemellt No. 7, document S/1430, paras. 132 and 143. 8 1 T- nther that the Egy:p : sunestions bad not proved ta he mutually acceptable. been no question about Part 1 baving been successfully at, h-ld its crew ID The representative of Pakistan stated that with regard ta irnplemented, The Pakistan representative next pointed the .Egyptian-Israel ) this point, without divulging conversations of a confi out that bis country's menlbership' in certain regiona1 al nvesngation. 1 dential nature, he could say that bis Government bad ac liances and the receipt by it of military aid was an irrele cepted every suggestion and that it could be concluded vant factor in the consideration of the implementation of that Mr. Jarring's proposaIs were unacceptable ta India Part I, since what section B of that Part prohibited was alone. only the augmentation of the military potential of the 75. Mr. Jarring bad also referred, without defining forces under the control of the respective Governments in their nature, to grave problems which he thought might the State of jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan, he said, had • arise in connexion with and as a result of a plebiscite in not augmented in any way the military potential of its Kashmir. Pakistan considered that every conceivable forces stationed in the State. As regards section E of Part problem that had any bearing on the matter had already I, Pakistan had also fully implemented it, tians Commission for .. been discussed and taken care of in the two UNCIP 78. In ail previous negotiations, United Nations • resolutions. Pakistan had raised no problem and al! that mediators had concluded that what had prevented imple drew attention (SI needed ta be done was that the original agreement con mentation of the UNCIP resolutions was not Part 1 of ~1 had begun ta exe tained in the two UNCIP resolutions should be imple- of 1948 resolution, but the difference of opinion between cl on the territory of • mented without further delay. It was the changed attitude the two Govemments on the question of demilitarization. that it was a further ( of India in regard ta the plebiscite that was the problem, The Security Council had also accepted that position in of its authority over \ and it was ta this that Mr. Jarring had obviously re- its resolution of 30 March 1951 (S/2017IRev.1) and Kashmir and of vio ferred. India had alleged that if a plebiscite were held in 23 December 1952 (S/2883). While Mr. Jarring bad iry 1948 and of the Kashmir, the Muslims of India would be placed in jeop found himself unable to give a c1ear finding on the sup r the UNCIP ta the ardy. Such an argument was nothing short of an admis posed deadlcck conceming Part I, he had not, however, sion that Muslims were being held as hostages. Pakistan, supported the view that Part 1 had not been implemented. :an stated (5/3896) • on the other hand, had never threatened its Hindu minor In view of India's intransigence on that point, Mr. Jar being executed co ity. Furthermore, this argument had the obvious implica ring had inquired if the Governments would be prepared ad Kashmir authori tion that India was afraid that the voting in a plebiscite to submit to arbitration the question whether or not Part .ly improve the econ would go in favour of Pakistan and it was for that reason 1 had been implemented, Although the Govemment of dia, too, had carried , that it had been avoiding a plebiscite. Pakistan had been convinced that Part 1 had been im of the cease-fire line, 76. India, said the representative of Pakistan, had, plemented, it nevertheless had agreed to Mr. Jarring's deerned ta aggravate furthermore, alleged that two factors had stood in the request in order to demonstrate its anxiety to agree to any rtion of 17 J anuary , way of implementation of the UNCIP resolutions: first, steps which would facilitate a settlement. India, on the Id how the Mangla that Part 1 of the 13 August 1948 resolution, particularly other hand, had not agreed to that proposal, maintaining ; a violation of that its sections B and E had not been implernented by Paki that the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration. stan; and secondly, that it was incumbent on the Security In rejecting the proposaI of arbitration, India, in addition • Council ta express itself on the question of aggression to showing bad faith, had also maintained that its accept incH consideration and equally incumbent on Pakistan "to vacate that ag ance would have been interpreted as indicating that Paki stan had a locus standi in the matter. But Pakistan's locus question gression". As regards the allegation of aggression, the representative of Pakistan said that it had been sum standi had already been established, for that country was istan requested ( SI marily dismissed by Mr. Jarring as irre1evant to his task. as much a party to the two UNCIP resolutions as was called to discuss the f So far neither the Council nor UNCIP had regarded the India. 821) and to consider Indian allegation as worthy of consideration. Moreover, 79. Commenting on paragraphs 20 and 21 of Mr. ,t meeting of the Se UNCIP had been in possession of the full facts while J arring's report (S/3821), the representative of Palci ternber 1957 to con- ... framing its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 january stan said that there Mr. Jarring had obviously been re , 1949, and those resolutions had been accepted by India. ferring to the concern for changing iactors expressed to en said that, in pur 77. As regards the alleged non-implementation by him by India. Pakistan had expressed no concern in that ution of 21 February Pakistan of Part 1 of the 13 August 1948 resolution of respect. Such extraneous matters should not be invoked . as President of the UNCIP, the position was that Pakistan had reported ta avoid c1ear commitments or to confuse the real issues; y, had visited India full implementation of that part as far back as 30 May they had no connexion with the plebiscite pledge given report (S 13821) on 1949. Dr. Graham, the United Nations Representative to the people of Kashmir, Both Pakistan and India were ith the submission of " for India and Pakistan, had stated the position in this receiving military aid, directly or indirectly, and India's lat resolution were regard in paragraphs 29 and 36 of his third report (S/ defence expenditure alone was 140 per cent of Pakistan's 2611 and Corr.l)", as well as in paragraph 44 of his fifth total budget. The Pakistan representative said that he report 4. After the conclusion of the cease-fire understood Mr. Jarring's observations in paragraph 21 of tan, after expressing (S/2967) agreement, aIl negotiations which had been undertaken his report to mean that he wanted to impress on the Jarring mission, said Council the need for a speedy solution. Mr. Jarring had effort to resolve the were to secure implementation of the resolution of 13 wamed the Council that further delay might create further : of India's refusal to August 1948, it being accepted by both parties that Part ~ complications. rs, It was gratifying 1 had already been implemented. The excuse now being put forward that Part 1 had not been implemented was aoth India and Paki 80. After reiterating that the international agreement designed to reopen settled issues and to obstruct progress. lutions adopted on 13 between India and Pakistan as embodied in the two Hitherto, India had never refused to enter into negotia f the United Nations UNCIP resolutions was still fully in force, the represen tions conceming implementation of Part II on the plea Mr. Jarring had re tative of Pakistan said that India, in spite of its commit that Part l had not been implemented. India could have ition of plebiscite and ment to an intemationally organized plebiscite in Jammu reopened that question only if there had been any subse 1 any difficulties that and Kashmir, had neverthe1ess deliberate1y taken several quent violation of the cease-fire agreement, but there had nitigated, but that his steps to incorporate the State into India in violation of that agreement and Security Council resolutions. In fact, 1 5 January 1949, see 3 See Official Records of the Seclirity Council, Scuenih. y car, India had annexed Kashmir by aggression and the Coun i, F ourtk Year, SPc cial Special Stlpplemel!t No. 2. cil had the duty ta make India "vacate that aggression". ras. 132 and 143. 4 See Official Records of the SCCtWit3' Council, Eighth Yea.r, SPecial St~pplellle1!t No. 1. The Pakistan representative pointed out that in contrast .1 9 with India's attitude of defiance, Pakistan had made arisen 111 connexion with" the UNCIP resolutions to severa1 major concessions to obtain Indian imp1ementation which Mr. Jarring had referred were those that had of the UNCIP reso1utions. Pakistan had secured the arisen subseql1ent to the resoll1tions, such as the accentua, withdrawal of tribesmen as we11 as of its own nationals tion of aggression, annexation of territory and the rule oí from the State, agreed to demilitarization in a single, con terror in the Pakistan-occl1pied areas. tinuous· stage amI further agreed to U nited Nations sur 84. After drawing attention to Mr. Jarring's state veil1ance over the reduced Azad Kashmir forces and the ments in paragraphs 10 al1d 11 of his report, which he local authotities in that area. Pakistan had even com trusted the Council wOl1ld take fully into account, the promised on the question of setting up a11 all-parties Gov representative oí India stated that the responsibility far ernment in the State pending a plebiscite, on the under the failure of suggestions because they were not mutually standing that the Plebiscite Administrator would have acceptabJe to both parties could not be laid at the door 01 r overriding powers. Now, it was for the ·Counci1 to face one party, as Pakistan had sought to do. Mr. Jarring ~.., the issues raised by India's defiance. had taken no such position. ~. 81. The representative of Pakistan conc1uded by say ing that Part 1 of the 13 August 1948 reso1ution oí 85. The representative of India said that it was In- ~l·.·.,'...•·. VNCIP had been fully imp1emented and the Security dia's position that Part 1 of UNCIP's resolution of 13 Coulleil shou1d next proceed to bring about demilitariza August 1948 had not been implemented, and Mr. Jarring ~ cion so as to ensure a plebiscite in the State. The dispute had mentioned in paragraph 13 of his report Indía's stand ••,é under cOllsideration invo1ved a threat to the peace and on that point. Dr. Graham's reports had stated that only lo, the situation carne under the provisions of Artic1es 39 a part of Part I-the cease-fire part-had been carried t and 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter. In order to facili out. Bis re¡Jort must be read in its context, and India had . tate the task of the Council, Palcistan wou1d urge that aH always maintained that its conversations with him were of 1 troops, whether of India or Pakistan, should be with an exploratory nature. The representative of Pakistan had '1 drawn from the cease-fire 1ine and a United Nations misinterpreted paragraph 14 oí the Jarring report to Force be stationed on that line to prevent any vio1atiolls mean that Mr. Jarring had to1d India that the ql1estion of'¡· of it. Alternatively, Palcistan would be prepared to re aggression had been disposed of. That was not so. The move immediately every Pa1 'ohibi~~~n of any J negotiate t~e problems amicably, but negotiations could 246. The representative of France noted the ex- Tunisian 'ports, not be, carne~ on under thre~ts..H~ theref01:e. asked the planations given the Council by the representative of ntroop umts, as Council to adjourn after having iuvited Tunisia to carry Tunisia He agreed to the holding of a further meeting tory. on, ii!' ~onfo:mity with .~rticle 33 of the Charter, ~he on 4 J~ne. , rejecting the .. neg~ttatlOns .111.p~ogress with France, and ta restore im- 247. At the 82lst meeting of the Council on 4 June country, stated .. mediately within rts harder, l~): a return ta the status quo 1958, the representative of Tunisia, rejecting in detail mned camp for anteI1~ Mayf19h5S, the con:Ilt!ons nece~sfary for a spebed the charges set forth by the representative of France, ad- of 8 February conc u?lon 0 t ose negonations, sans actory ta oth duced a number of facts which he felt attested ta the good , doubt that the countnes, faith of his Government and its constant anxietv ta avoid I~isia constitu!ed 242. The representative of Iraq considered that Tuni- incidents, ta limit them if they should anse, and ta do ~la was causmg sia's sovereignty had been violated over and over again the maximum in order ta prevent the extension of the 'la, a1l:d. not the t and its peace disturbed by the armed forces of a nation Algerian war ta Tunisia. He rejected particularly the f TU11lsIa. Thus, t whose friendship and co-operation it was seeking. France, French thesis according ta which the French forces in pIe of non-inter- he said, had ta adjust more adequately ta the changing the Remada area enjoyed a special status and were ex- t situation. The conditions of modern times. The French military authori- empted from the measures applied elsewhere in Tunisia harte: was abu- ties were not yet accustomed ta respecting the sovereignty hy his Government. \Vhat Tunisia asked, he stressed, was gression on the and dignity of the Tunisian State. The Remada action simply the evacuation of the French military forces as a Article had been ~ constituted naked aggression, and France's complaint sequel ta the acquisition of its independence. ; of the Sahara ~ that Tunisia had not respected the modus. 'l'ivcnd~ .over- 248. The representative of France stated that he npted. ~rom the look~d t~e faet ~hat F~ench forces '.vere in Tunisia by would not reply in detail to the last statement of the re- Tunisian Gov- special dispensation which was Iorfeited by an~ act of presentative of Tunisia, He pointed out however that [ of.the modus aggressi01~ .. The Com.lcil should declare, he saId:. (1) France< had on a number of occasions suggested t1;e set- t :-"'~lch was the th~t Tunisia was entitled to ask for .the un.condltlonal tinz up of Franco-Tunisian investization commissions 1111SIa. Were the w!th~ra\Val of ~11 French forces from rts terntory; (2) and that the Tunisian Government harl declined ta adopt 'ould .th~s have tha~ rt was entItle~ ta be adequately anned for defe~ce such a course. He also pointed out that the help given ~d claiming that~, agamst any aggres~lon; (3) that France shoul? recogrnze the rebels by Tunisia was at the origin of the maj ority r~ce,. ho,,:ever, the freed~m and l,ndependence ~f the Algenan people; of the frontier incidents, and stated that the changes SI~C~ it beheved the Algerian question was the direct cause of the pres- brouzht about by Tunisia in the status quo were the cause otmtlOl.l and co- ence of French troops in Tunisia and for the attacks on of th~ most recent incident. He proposed that the meeting -American zood Tunisia ... d ti ti Oh d' be adjourned until 18 June 1958 m or er to allow con- l:;Oth~ f~s~ fe~v 243. At that stage, the representative of France, versations to take place between the parties. rance and Tuni- speaking on a point of order, drew the President's atten- Decision: The French proposai U.JaS adopted without )f the latter, he ~ tion to the fact that the Algerian question was not on objection. d db' the agenda. . e y ItS corn- 249. At the 826th meeting on 18 June 1958, the le Frtebn~h arn1Y 244. The President stated that the Algerian ques- representatives of France and Tunisia informed the [e es.; hshment tion, in fact, was not on the agenda. Council that under an exchange of letters on the previous by T r~c~ hd 245. The representative of Iraq, continuing his state- dav between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ie. th urc~a,t e ment, said that the Council should further declare: (4) o(Tunisia and the chargé d'affaires of France in Tunis, .:r f e l~: er, that FraIlce and the whole worId should recognize that it had been agreed that aIl French forces, \Vith the ex- ~n ~~e~ u( ~z~)s peace in North Africa \Vas one and indivisible, and that ception of. t~ose .st~tioned at Bizerte, would. ?e evacuated ·. G Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, aIl three independent and from TUl1lSIa "llthm four months. A provlSlona1 statute ationdmt reece, • sovereign, naturally formed one federal union; and (5) for the base at Bizerte would be the subjeet of e :ernth 0 c~lalse that an independent and united North Africa might enter negotiations. to e guern as I1ncî1 on 2 June luing his state egotiations con Chapter 4 lrces in Tunisia independence. LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1958 FRO~f THE REPRESENTATIVE OF 'ous indications THE SUDAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY.GENERAL by negotiation, lsingly contrary iliorities by the 250. By a letter dated 2û February 1958 (S/3963), the Sudan which is situated north of the town of Wadi la incident, he " the permanent representative of. the Sudan requested an HaHa, comprising the Saras, Debeira and Faras region. md of ilie mo urgent meeting of the Security Council "to discuss the The Egyptian note had demanded the handing over of stationed there. grave situation existing on the Suùan-Egyptian border, those two territories to Egypt. In a note dated 9 Febru It itself and the resulting from the massed concentrations of Egyptian ary, Egypt had further demanded that the inhabitants of ~nch forces had troops moving towards the Sudanese frontiers". In an those regions should participate in an 4.ryptian plebiscite that if France annexed communication, the Prime Mimster of the Su- to be held on 21 February. Despite several representa ~sentatives con 'an stated that, on 1 February 1958, the Egyptian Gov tians ta the Egyptian Govermnent to al10w sufficient by the Charter enl111l:''1t had sent a note to the Sudan Govermnent where time for the Government of the Sudan to study the mat ltions between in it had c1aimed sovereignty over the two following ter-raised at a time "lhen the Sudan was preparing itself Council would Sudanese territories: (a) the north-eastern part of the for general elections to be held on 27 February-the listing of com- Sudan, north of latitude 22 narth and (b) that part of Egyptian Govermnent had informed the Sudanese Gov- 1 33 and emment, on 16 February, that it had decided to send into Egypt with the Sudan, stressed that Egypt, a Condo the areas in question plebiscite officiaIs accompaniecl by minium Power, had recognized the Sudan as an independ frontier troops to conduct the Egyptian plebiscite. In an ent and sovereign State, and had settled amicably a ex effort to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute, the number of questions with the Sudan. His Government e of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan had gone to therefore deplored the hasty decision of the Govemment eting Caire on 18 February, but to no avail : huge infiltration of the Sudan to submit the present question to the: Secu of Egyptian troops was reported on the Sudan-Egyptian rit)' Council after having rejected several suggestions June border. The Sudan therefore requested the Security submitted by Egypt and before having exhaustecl re letail Council to meet immediately and use its good offices to course to other pacifie means such as, for examp1e, a , ad stop the impending Egyptian aggression. The Govem resort to the League of Arab States, a "regional ar good ment of the Sudan promised in addition to submit full rangement" in the tenus of Article 33 of the Charter. rvoid evidence of its unquestionable right to the disputed terri The tenu "impending aggression" usee! in the Sudanese o do tories. letter to the Security Council was unfortunate. Egypt t the had no forces, except border guards, near the Sudanese r the Decision: The Sccurity Council incluâcd the ques frontier. Although Egypt had well-founded rights to the es In tion in its agenda at its 812tlz meeting on 21 February disputed areas, he would refrain from discussing the legal , ex- 1958. and inuiied the representatives of the parties C011 aspect'> of the case. misia ccrned ta participate in the discussion. 253. The Egyptian representative then statecl that he , was 251. The representative of the Sudan stressed that as a had informed the Secretary-General, who had expressed his Government had done everything in its power to to him his concern regarding the situation along the :' avoid bringing its complaint to the United Nations and Sudan-Egyptian border, that his Government would t he had exhausted aIl possibilities of reaching an equitable adopt a peaceful and neighbourly attitude towards the e l'e and peaceful solution within the short time at its disposai. Sudan and was determined to avoid any act or statement that The administrative bounclary between the Sudan and which might modify that attitude. In that spirit of con set Egypt, confirmed in a number of Egyptian Orders and ciliation his Government had justpublished a com sions enactments, had rernained unaltered for over fifty-five muniqué in which it stated its decision to postpone the idopt years and had been, furthermore, the subject of agree settling of the frontier question until after the Sudanese ;ïven ment between the ex-Condominium Powers. The areas elections. Negotiations were to begin for the settling of ority claimed by Egypt had not participated in previous Egyp aIl undecided questions after the new Sudanese Govern mges tian elections, nor had Egypt objected when the Sudan ment had been chosen. cause had held elections which included electorates in them. eting Egypt apparently wanted to confront the Sudan with a 254. Statements were macle by the representatives of con- fait accompli. While his Government had emphasized its the United States, ]apan, the United Kingdom, Iraq, preparedness to start discussions with Egypt immediately France, Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re publics expressing hope that the two parties would be (haut after the Sudan elections, Egypt had refused to defer consideration of the matter until then, and had even able to settle the question at issue peacefully by negotia insisted that the Sudanese elections should not be held tian and that in the meanwhile neither party would do , the in the areas concerned, which was a clear infringement anything to aggravate the situation. The President con the of the sovereignty of the Sudan. The Sudanese represen c1uded the meeting by summing up the views of the vious tative then outlined a number of measures his Govern Council to the effect that it took note of the assurances Ffairs ment had taken to settle the question peacefully. of the representative of Egypt regarding the postpone unis, 252. The representative of Egypt, after reca1ling the ment of the settlernent of the frontier question until after : ex numerous ties of friendship and brotherhood linking the Sudanese e1ections. iated atute t of Chapter 5 COlUPLAINT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DATED 18 APRIL 1958 J ENTITLED: "URGENT MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO FLIGHTS BY UNITED STATES MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS IN THE DIREC TION OF THE FRONTIERS OF THE SOVIET UNION" 1A. Inclusion of the item in the Council's agenda Decision: The Cowncil included the item zn its iVadi agenda at ifs 813Hz meeting, on 21 April 1958. gion. 255. By a letter dated 18 April 1958 (S/3990), ~l' the permanent representative of the Union of Soviet So of 1;, B. Consideration at the 813th meeting of the ~bru il cialist Republics stated that the threat to the cause of COlIDCil, on 21 April 1958 ts of peace arising out of the numerous cases of flights in the iscite Î direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union by United 256. At the 813th meeting, the representative of the enta States bornbers carrying hydrogen bombs had made it Union of Soviet Socialist Republics introduced the fol cient imperative that its complaint entitled : "Urgent rneasures lowing draft resolution (S/3993): to put an end to flights by United States military air mat 1 "The Security Council, itself craft arrned with atcmic and hydrogen bombs in the di -the rection of the frontiers of the Soviet Union", should be "Hœoinq esamined the question submitted by the l.lOV-'" considered by the Security Council without delay. Soviet Union concerning 'Urgent measures to put an J 34 hat Egypt, a Condo end to flights by United States military airerait armed ducted peaee propaganda and would we1come it if the as an , with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of United States were to engage in such propaganda. It Sudan independ cl settled amicably a the frontiers of the Soviet Union', attached great significance to the role of the United Na l'ln. His Government "Considerinq that the practice of making such flights tions in ensuring peace, and expected the Council ta take m of the Government inereases tension in international relations, eonstitutes a stand on the question which would be in harmony with question to the Secu a threat to the security of nations and, if continued, the principles and purposes of the Organization. :1 several suggestions may lead to a breach of world peace and the unleashing 25<:. The President, speaking in his capacity as re having exhausted re of an atomic war of annihilation, presentative of the United States of America. stated that h as, for example, a the Soviet charge was untrue and that the United States the United States to refrain from send ates, a "regional ar "Colis upon had done nothing which was in any way dangerous to e 33 of the Charter. ing its military aireraft earrying atomic and hydrogen peace. The United States had done nothing that was not used in the Sudanese bombs towards the frontiers of other States for the wholly consistent with the so-called peaceful co-existence IS unfortunate, Egypt purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging resolution. Nothing that the United States had done ls, near the Sudanese military demonstrations." could be regarded as anything except the requirements founded rights to the 257. The Soviet representative stated that the ques of legitimate self-defence, undertaken in the face of con m discussing the legal tion before the Council was of momentous importance for tinued resistance to countless efforts bv the United States the maintenance of international peace and security. Re over a period of more than ten years to settle the dif re then stated that he cently, he said, aircraft of the United States Air Force, ferences between it and the USSR through negotiations. 1, who had expressed with atomic and hydrogen bombs on board, had repeatedly The United States had failed again and again to discover ~ situation along the flown over the Arctic regions in the direction of the any willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to take Government would USSR. The circumstances of such flights were fairly well positive steps towards easing tension, eliminating fear, attitude towards the known from reports of the United Press, confirmed by and freeing a11 resources for constructive and peaceful . any act or statement the Command of the United States Ai. Force, which purposes. In recent months, the Soviet Union, turning its In that spirit of con made it clear that, whenever radar screens of the United back on the United Nations, on the Disarmament Com ,tpublished a com States indicated unidentified objects, American military mission, on the Security Council, on the decision of the ision to postpone the personnel thought that they were guided missiles, ballis General Assembly, on the normal uses of diplomacy, on ti! after the Sudanese tic rockets or similar items. Upon closer inquiry, it had all the machinery available for consultation and negotia 'in for the settling of turned out every time that these blips on radar screens tion, had demanded that there be a meeting of Heads of rw Sudanese Govern- were caused by electronic interference or by meteorites. Governments for the professed purpose of easing tension United States aircraft had hitherto returned to their and solving outstanding problems. Diplomatie exchanges bases as soon as it appeared that the alarm was false. at the highest levels were taking place with the Soviet the representatives of But if American service men did not ascertain in time Government to seek possibilities of agreement by which iited Kingdom, Iraq, that a flying meteor was not a guided missile, American the goal of peace could be attained. The fact that charges Soviet Socialist Re aircraft might approach the border of the Soviet Union of a United States threat to peace should be made at the wo parties would be and the latter's security needs would result in the taking moment when United States and Soviet representatives peacefulIy by negotia .> of immediate measures to meet and remove the threat. were trying to resume serious discussions was perp!exing. ither party would do On the other hand, Soviet radar screens also, from time to The United States Government profoundly regretted this . The President con time, showed blips caused by meteorites or electronic action of the Soviet Union, at a moment when Soviet up the views of the interference. If, in such cases, Soviet aircraft were like leaders were proclaiming their desire for a meeting of lote of the assurances wise to take off from their airfields, air squadrons of the Heads of Governments. It was against this background ;arding the postpone two sides might rneetond draw a conclusion that an actual that he would ask the Council to view the issue presented er question until after attack by the enemy was taking place. The world would by the Soviet complaint. then find itself caught in an atomic war, The United Na 260. Stressing the possibility of a surprise attaek and tions would be remiss in its dutY to maintain international the destructive power of modern weapons, the United peace and security if it did not take the necessary meas States representative stated that until all fears of surprise ures to eliminate the threat caused by the attempts of attack had been banished by effective international ar American bombers to approach the frontiers of the USSR rangements, the United States was compelled to take with aggressive purposes. Those flights were a manifes a11 steps necessary to protect itself. Rowever, aircraft of tation of a definite and deliberate policy, involving prepa the Strategie Air Command had never been launched LIST REPUBLICS ration for rocket and atomic warfare by the United States except in a carefully planned and controlled way, A ) 18 APRIL 1958 and its allies in the North Atlantic bloc. Such dangerous procedure was followed which ensured that no such air UNITED STATES measures which thwarted the interests of peace were craft could pass beyond its proper bounds, far from the being undertaken by the United States precisely at the 1 IN THE DIREC- Soviet Union or its satellites, without additional un time when preparations were under way for convening a equivocal orders, which could come only from the Presi conference of the Heads of Governments in order to re dent of the United States. The routes flown and the duce international tension and remove the danger of a procedures followed were not only in no sense provoca éd the item zn its new war. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had car April 1958. tive, but could not possibly be accidental causes of war. ried out a large-scale reduction of armed forces, and had Re emphasized that the United States had no aggressive decided to discontinue unilateralIy the testing of all types intentions against any country and its words and deeds :h meeting of the of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The General Assembly spoke for themselves. If a mutual inspection system, like il 1958 at its twelfth session had unanimously adopted a resolu the open-skies proposaI submitted by President Eisen tion on the peaceful co-existence of States. However, hower at Geneva in 1955, could be put into effect, no representative of the actions of the United States, such as that about which s introduced the fol- massive air attack could be launched in secret. But the the USSR had presented complaints, were incompatible Soviet Union had refused to join hands in setting up a with that resolution. true inspection system. It had even rejected with scorn 258. Some might claim that the Soviet Union was proposals for starting such a system on a smaller basis m submitted by the raising this question for propaganda purposes. However, in the Arctic region. If the Soviet Union were seeking a : measures ta put an the Soviet Union did not mind being told that it con- . rneans to contribute to peace, and particularly to dis- 1 35 "·"",,,.,..., ."'''~'',",.,."" ..",,",, ...",~,,,,,,",,,,. : armament, it coulet. among other things, agree ta a meet- at preventing such a situation as the one which was now 268. The representat i • ing ai the Disarmament Commission, which had been before the Council, Those contradictions could he ex USSR chargee as franklj , enlarged a' the ln" session of 'he General Assernbly for plained only hy ; desire for propaganda. After aIl, why r backward move along the 1~ the express purpose of meeting the Soviet Union's should an immediate meeting of the Council be convened so far towards a summ 1 news. y t'ar after vear, the United States had made new on a question which was not new? The ~1ights in question the Great I'owers to COll f proposais and started iresh approaches : the Baruch Plan, had heen going on for several years and were justified larlv in the field of dis :.J the atoms-for-peace plan, the open-skies plan, the pra- not only by the lack of arrangements, since the Soviet wotlld vote against the S l posals on the unification of Germany and of Korea, the ~ .~. 1" Il refused to enter into such arrangements, but also 269. The President. t . proposais for free exchange of information and ideas, the by the constant threat of atomic weapons and the Soviet States of America, havin proposals which had led ta the liberation of Austria, were policies of constant intervention. Cor.structive solutions t draft resolution ta the \ a few of the initiatives taken by the United States, while were within close reach. The Disarmament Commission Union of Soviet Socialis the Soviet Union had at no time been able ta enlist the could in effect meet forthwith if the Soviet Union were reply on behalf of his ( support of ·he United Xations far any of its major ready ta participate in its work. He found it deeply dis hy the representatives of propaganda th-mes. Ta calumniate the United States, as couraging that this complaint should be submitted at the countries inter alia, witl the Soviet Union was doing at the present meeting, was very moment when preparations for the summit confer moved, therefore, that th not the action of someone who wanted a summit confer ence were beginning in Moscow, until 3 p.m. of the followir ence ta succeed, nor the action of someone who wanted 264. The representative of the L:nited Kingdom rejected, he moved that tl peace. shared the feeling of the representative of France in that until the following clay a 261. The represent-itive of Canada found no sufficient respect. In the absence of an agreed system of disarma 270. The representatii basis for calling the Council into urgent session. The ment, the free world was ohliged, in self-protection, ta Colombin considered that Council, he stressed, should not be used as a forum for be in a constant state of readiness as a deter1 ent ta at bers on the TJSSR dra staternents and manoeuvres designed to foster unrest and tack, and the United Kingdorn was confident of the deep pressed, it would he con suspicion in international affaira. Canadian concern was sense of responsibility with which the United States Gov quest for an urgent consi heightened by the fact that positive proposals against sur ernment had undertaken and carried out its share of the pone a decision on it. TI prise attack with which Canada was closely associated task, 1t was an abuse of C nited X ations procedure to come might again meet to he had been disn.issed with ridicule by the Soviet Union. to the Council or the General Assemhly for propagauda views on other points mac If the allegations put forward by the Soviet Union were purposes and it was manifestly alisurtl to suggest that the serions, they should be related to measures designed to mensures about which the Soviet C nion was complaining 271. The second Sovi reduce the danger ot surprise attack. Instead, the Coun were aimed at threatening the security of other countries. the representative of the cil had bren treated to an angry recitation which had 265. The representative of Japan regretted that the publics stated that what Ettle ta do with meeting th" problel11s. Canada was as complaint had been hrought without prior consultations attempt to gag the debate. saciated with its allies in certain essentiaI defence ar b(;tweel~ the parties, especial1y since United States air United States Departmel rangements, and it intended to cnntinue them in what craft had been engaged in the flights in question for many Defense and military eXI l'ver form l~quired. However, it had no aggresslve or years. He felt that due note should be taken of the well as to reports in the prO\"ocative intent and this had been made clear to the United States assurances that aIl measures had been that they confirmec1 that Soviet Gm"ernment before. Referring to an ex~hange taken to eliminate anv accidentaI cause of atomic war and were engaged in provoca of letters between the Heads of the Canadian and the that the flights were- designed to guard against surprise the frentiers of the Sovie Soviet Governments in Jauuary 195R, he emphasized that attack. The mistrust among TIations, the fears of surprise flights were carefully cor Canada was still ready to co-operate in measures of in attack mid the resulting international tension were the entail the risk of accideni spection and control involving Canadian territory as a hets underlying the situation. The Soviet Union had atomÏc war would not sui pan of a disarmament agreement and "ound it regrettable reiterated its \viPingness to contribute to the improvel11ent peoples or to minimizc tl thai the Soviet Union had dismissed proposaIs involving of the international situation, and the J apanese Govern Experience had shown tl the Arctic region as being of no interest. He calle~ on ment he1d the view that the sure \Vav to achieve that end proof system to guard agai the Soviet Union to co-operate in setting up a systetil lay in the settle nent of the Jlsarmament problem under aIarms. One could not di of control and inspection in that region. the aegis of the United N:ltions. The USSR drait resolu human bchaviour. For ex: of the theory of preventiv 262. The representativ~ of China recalled that Article tion did not respond to the requirements on this score. He urged the States concerned to n:ake a most serious craft carrying atomic bOIT 33 of the Charter enjoined all parties ta a dispute to re viet Union, and having sort first 0: aIi ne~otiation, eliquiry, mediation and the endeavour to resume negotiations for an agreement on disarmament, and expressed the earnest desire that a being headed for a target other means of peaceful settlement. The Soviet Union, because of an atta~k the he said, by not having made representations ta the Gov meeting of the Disarmament Commission should be con the theory of the first blo ernment of the United States and by having resorted to vened without delay. propag~nda in the Council, showed that it was intetc~ted 266. The representative of Iraq considered that the 272. As to the hints uot in t.1-}e reia.,,::ation of international tensiorl but in open Soviet charges did not facilitate the talks currently in Council might hamper t!l ing an additional front in the cold war. The item, he was progress for the convening of a suml11it meeting. There he considered it contrary convinced, did not deserve the serious consideration of the was everv reason ta believe the United States in its that the party which bro COLlI1cil. The one beneficent step would be an agreement rejection -of the charge that its aircraft were endangering vocative flights hampered to prevent surprise attack. Unfortunately, constructive peace and security, and his delegation would not entertain flights which endangered proposaIs in that respect had not been adopted, because snch a char;f'. It sincerely hoped that every effort wonld effect on the talks. of Soviet obstruction. oe made to r,'move the danger of war, through peacefnl 273. 'Vith regard to 263. The representative cf France pointed out that negotiation in accordance with the Charter and within warning system to preve the Soviet Union h8d invoked the resolution on peaceful the framework of General Assembly recommendations, Gnion, he said, had mad co-existence while .werlooking the resolution on disarl11a 267. The representative of Colombia found the as part of a comprehensiv ment which provided for the convening of 1:he Disarma United Statt's position most justified, and could not sup danger 0.. atomÏc war COl ment Sub-Committee and the establishment of technical port the Soviet cirait resolution. Recalling the position "iÏng the atomic weapon. groups of experts tu study the systems of inspection of his Government dUTing the disarmament debate at not be solved by dint of particularly against the possibility of surprise attack. The the twelfth session of the General Assembly, he stressed however, sought to retur Soviet Union itself, he sai[/, had paralysed the work its support for the methods of controlled disarmmnent negotiations to organs wh which was to lead to the establishment of a system aimed proposed by the United States and the Western Powers. ship, were incapable of cop 36 268. The representative of Panama regarded the way to tackle it would he to consider it at a conference USSR chargee as franklv harruful and as representing a of Heads of Governments, but this had so far not been backward move along th~ road which had been travelled possible owing to the resistance of the United States sa far towards a summit conference. He called upon in the first instance, and the United Kingdom and France 1I1l1U~ the Great Powers to compost' their differences, particu in the second. shoul larlv in the field of disarmarnent, and stated that he 274. Finally, the representative of the Union of So l't'vit' \Vottld vote against the Soviet draft resolution. viet Socialist Republics stated that the representative of in~ t 269. The President, the representative of the United the United States had side-stepped free discussion in the topic States of America, having proposed to put the USSR Council and resorted to the machinery of voting. As a arrau draft resolution to the vote. the representative of the protest, he would therefore withdraw his draft resolution. l.OUt' Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated his wish to sions reply on behalf of his Government to questions raised C. Further consideration by the Council area ; by the representatives of the I,'nited States and other tion, countries inter alia, with regard to disarmament, He 275. At the 8I4th meeting of the Council, on 29 cussu moved, therefore, that the meeting should be adjoumed April. the representative of the United States of America wouk until3 p.m. of the following day. The motion having bee.i introduced the following draft l'l'solution (S/3995): gradu rejected, he moved that the meeting should be adjourned "The Security Council, shouk until the following clay at 10.30 a.rn, inspec "Considcrinq further the item of the USSR of 18 270. The representatives of the United Kingdom and April 195R. 2ïf Colombin considered that the views of the Council mem .\ suppo ..X otini) the development, particularly in the Soviet bers on the TJSSR draft resolution having been ex mittec Union and the United States of America. of growing pressed, it would he contrary to the USSR's own re of a 1 capabilities of massive surprise attack, quest for an urgent consideration of the matter to post pone a decision on it. The Council, on the other hand, ..Believing that the establishment of measures to se might agnin meet to hear the Soviet representative's allay fears of such massive surprise attack would Chapter 6 LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON CONCERNING: "~COlUPLAINT BY LEBANON IN RESPECT OF A SITUATION ARISING FROM THE INTER. VENTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON, THE CONTINUANCE OF WHICH IS LIKELY TO ENDANGER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTER. NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" A. Consid..ration by the Security Council from Syria ta individuals and hands in Lebanon rebelling agaÎnst the establish~J authorities, and the waging of a 296. By a letter dated 22 May 1958 (S/4007). villient rac!io amI press cml1paign in the United Arab Re the representative of I.ehanon requested that an urgent puLlic calling for strikl's, dl'1110nstrations and the over meeting of the Coundl be held to consider the follo\Ving thro\V of the estahlished authorities in Lebanon. l[ul'stion: "Comp!aint hy Ll'hanon in respect of a situa tion arising from the intervention of the United Arab Decision: At ifs 818th lIleeting (27 Moy 1958), I\t'JJtlblic in the internaI affairs of Lebanon, the con the ColOt cil Îltcludcd the letter of thc rt'prescntathle of tilluance of which is like1y ta endanger the maintenance Lcballol/ in its l1f/cnda. of international peacl' and security." The intervention, it 29ï. The representative of the Union of Soviet So \l'as stated, incllllled the infiltration of armed brnds from cialist Repuhli,'s statl'c! thereafter that the fact that his Syrb.. the partkip~tion of United Arab Hl'pnblic na de1egation did not abject to the consideration of the tionals in arts of terrorism and rebellion against the es matter should not be construed as in any \Vay constitut tablished authorities in Lebanon, the supply of an11S ing an acknO\vledgement of the validity of the complaint 39 or as meaning that his delegation cousidered suhmissîon unprcccdenred 1'ress campaigu conducted by the United Security COl oi the matter to the Council to he justiûed. Arab Republic agaiust Lehanon, Quotiug a series of l'X recourse, Th 2t)~. At the invitation of the President the represen cerpts from the Egyptian and Syrian Press, he declared happened at tatives of Lebanon and of the United Arab Republic that for man)' months il had been waging a campaign bers-Iraq, .. look places at the Council table, of vilification of the Government of Leoanon, of open Yemen-e-had incitemeut of the people of Lehanon to revoIt against of the Leagu :!t)\,>. TIlt' representative of Iraq. pointing out that their t ioverument. and of open support of the subversive everything tl the Arab League was to discuss the Lebanese complaiut activities goiug on in Lebanou, among all t1 un ,~l May, moved that the Council postpone discussion request the ( of the question until 3 June. 30ü. A similar campaign had bcen carried on by the United Arah Repuhlic radio. ln that connexion, he noted plaint to the thar the radio difïered from the Press in two respects: ons Lebanese Decision s ,'Ifta a short cxchanç« of riezes, the mo their domest r"/,rest'1/t,/ti~',· in the East 1I10re people listeued ta the radio thau l'l'ad tion of tl/,' of Iraq 'l('(z.s adoptcd usthou: means : and objcction. the newspapers, and. whatever might he sait! about the Press, noue would deny that in the United Arab Republic tion and im 300, In a letter dated 2 Tune 1958 fSj4018), the the radio was controlled by the Government. been accepter representative of Lebanon stated that, in accordance with mise, but u a request from the League of Arab States that considera 3üï. The unmistukable aim of the campaign, the re had opposed tion by the Council of the Lebauese complaint be post preseutative of Lelxmon concluded, was to overthrow the existing régime in Lehunon and ta replace it with one 312. The poued for a hrief period, his Governmeut would appre tinued, conn date that the Council meet on 5 June, 1I10rL' subservient to the will of the United Arab Re public, The only sin of Lehanon in the eyes of the latter isolated facts the Security Deeisions o,It the Sl.'nd mcctinq (5 June) , tir,' was indeed thnt it wus independent and followed a policy Co/meil dccidcd ta /,OSt/,Ol1" consideration of the item of friendship towards, and co-operation with, the Western 313. Ace for anothcr day in 'Z'it'Zi' of th," [act that the Arab League world. Lebanon, the mz.s thcn IlOldin!l its last mcctùu] 01l the subjcct. Chamoun's \ 308. When the independence of a country was thus candidacv fOI 301. At the 823rd meeting (6 June), the represen threatened hv external intervention, the situation was dicated that tative of Lebanon said that, since the Arab League had automatically one in which the Security Council was in one of intern taken no elecision on the Lebanese complaint, his Gov terested. Xa region in the world was more sensitive than tian of any i ernment was now bonnd, much to its regret, ta press the the Near East, and a slight change in the delicate balance issue before the Council, The intervention of which it of forces and power there could lead to incalculable con 314. The complained was increasing bath in scope and in intensity. sequences. As was demonstrated by the intense concem continued, w 302. Declaring that there \Vas continuing massive, that hael been expressed by aIl the major Powers, the Anns were 1 iIlegal ancl unprovokeel intervention in the affairs of Leba question \Vas pre-eminently one involving the maintenance of a Gcvcnll non by the United Arab Republic. he Iisted a series of of intemational p':'ace auel security. His delegation asked clearly. The facts which, he said. proveel the a\.'tLlal existence of that that the unprovoked massive intervention stop, that Leba rested Syrial intervention. He dteel a number of cases to show that non's indepenclenCl' he preserwù and strengtheneel, and contrasted w' amts were supplied on a large scale from the United Arab that, as a l'l'suIt. the threat ta intemational peace and of those Svri 1 securitv inherent in the situation he removed. No one of the OllPO 1 Republic ta subversive elements in Lebanon. There were .~ several thousand armed men currellt1y engagecl in sub coulll "accuse Lehanon, which had alwa.vs worked for United Arah versive activities in Lehanon. most of whom operatecl Iwace. of harbouring any designs on others. Alon€' among Lehanese G near the Syrian borders in the north in the Bekaa valley the countrÎl's in the J\liddle East, it had no fonnal safetv and those an ancl in the south. His Govemment had no doubt at ali, conferring arrangement with other Powers outside tile 315. As from aIl the evielence it hacl gathered, that aIl the annS area. amI depended primarily upon the United Nations l'ven if it we used by those men had b _en supplieel to them from S)'ria. fur its safdv. His Govenunent's case was thus a test encl' on the for the United Nations: if intervention in the affairs of : 303. The representative of Lebanon then listed a generaUy ga' one sma11 country should ùe allowed, how could any other Press. series of cases concerning the training in subversion on small country feel secure again? His Govemment had the territory of the United Araù Republic of elel11ents tried direct contacts \Vith the United Arab Republic, but 316. The from Lebanon. under the direction of Syrian officers, to no avail. It had resorteel to the Arab League, but no have submitt e1ements which had been sent back to Lebanon ta sub decision had been taken and the intervention, far from Ilot done so vert its Government. A further list of cases, which he ahating, hati actually increased in intensity. should be ca reacl to the Council, proveel, he said, that U niteel Arab said that the Repl1blic civilian nationals residing in Lebanon or pass 309. The representative of the Uniteel Arab Republic Lebanon, wit ing into Lebanon had participated there in subversive ernphasiz(èd his regret at having to speak on stlch a deli guard, of th anel terrorist activities. He adduced further cases to show cate nmtter. The complaint before the Council, he ob The many l that United Arab Republic governmental elements had servet!. hael been suhmitteel onlv after the disturbances in public, on th Leùan~m had become very serious. In order to meet the also participatecl in subversive anel terrorist activities and 317. In in the elirection of rebe11ion in Lebanon. situation. the Govemment of Lebanon had endeavoured ta b>1Ve it an international aspect, to prove that the dis Araù Republ 304. In that connexion, he stated that mel11bers of turbances in Lebanon were clue to foreign intervention 16 May 195L the Syrian and Egyptian anneel forces had been impli and not to the position of the Government itself with the inelepend catecl in such activities, anel he elescribeel a series of inci respect to elomestic matters. interference i dents involving alleged incursions by groups of Syrian 318. The 310. His Government categorica1ly rejected the slan army personnel into Lebanese territory. cern regardin der that the United Arab Republic had interveneel in the 305. That the massive intervention he hael described cIelegation w affairs of Lebanon. was aimed at undermining and thus threatened the in that magnitu depellL1ent existence of Lebanon was obvious, he feIt, 311. The bringing of the complaint before the Arab Republics. Ii from the material evidence he had suhmitted. The validity League had heen merely a stratagem on the part of vieleel with 11 of that view was also supported by the violent and utterly Lebanon, aimeel at proving that, in coming before the of the Arab 40 nited Security Council, Lebanon had exhausted l'very regional 319. The representative of Iraq said that the situa f ex- recourse, This, he said, was corroborated by what had tion was serions, and affected other Arab States as well lared r happened at the meeting of the League. Six of its mern as Lebanon, )aign bers-Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and 320. The representative of the United Kingdom con open Yemen-e-hnd proposed a resolution whereby the Council sidered that the situation as revealed by the representa ainst of the League would have decided : (1) to put an end to tive of Lebanon and substantiated by a wea1th of ascer rsive 't everything that might disturb the atmosphère of security tainable facts gave cause for very considerable disquiet, among ail the member States by l'very means; (2) to whieh had not been dissipated by the very general state r the } request the Covernmeut of Lebanon to withdraw its corn ment of the representative of the United Arab Republic, ioted plaint to the Security Council : (3) ta appeal ta the vari 321. The representative of the United States of cds: ons Lebanese groups ta end the disturbances and to settle America said that the Lehanese charges were very serious read their domestic disputes by peaceful and constitutional . the means : and (-+) ta send a conunittee tu calm the situa and were gravely disturbing, The United States urged ublic tion and implement its decision. That resolution had that l'very step be taken, by aIl concerned, ta maintain been accepted by his Govenunent in a spirit of compro respect for the indepenùence and the integrity of Lebanon mise, but nnfortunately the Govenunent of Lebanon and to prevent any actions or developments inconsistent ~re- i had opposed it. with that objective. r the one 312. The Lebanese represeutative's staternent, he con 322. The representative of France emphasized the Re- tinued, containcd manv inaccuracies and was based on concern with which his Government viewed the grave atter isolated facts and reports which it would be difficu1t for situation described by the representative of Lebanon. ,\ the Security Council to assess. oIicy i 323. The representative of Colombia said that his item , 313. According ta the leaders of the Opposition in delegation was concerned because of the facts presented 'J Lebanon, the disturbances were due mainly to President by the representatives of Lebanon and the United Arab thus Chamoun's wish to revise the Constitution to permit his Republic. Since the Council had postponed consideration was candidacy for a second terni of office. Press reports in of the matter three times to await the result of the meet dicated that according to those leaders, the situation was ing of the Arab League, it was important that it be fully i m- than one of internal Lebanese politics and there was no ques infonned of what had transpired at that meeting. ance tion of any interference by the United Arab Republic. 324. The representative of the Union of Soviet So con- 314. The Lebanese representative's aI1egations, he cialist Republics considered that the representative of cern continued, were not supported by any concrete pro of. Lebanon had failed ta demonstrate convincingly the al the Anus were not difficult to obtain, and the responsibility leged intervention of the United Arab Republic in the ance of a Gcvernment in that connexion must be established domestic affairs of Lebanon. If the situation of which iked clearlv, The Lebanese Government's claims to have ar it complained had in fact existed for a considerable period eba- rested Syrian Army men and other foreign agitators of time, the Lebanese Government could have brought its and contrasted with the faet that there was no record of any complaint earlier. More important was the fact that there J and of those Syrians having been brought to trial. As leaders was nothing to indicate that the Lebanese Government one of the Opposition in Lebanon attested, it was not the had tried ta settle its alleged dispute with the United for United Arab Republic whieh arrned the Lebanese: the Arab Republic through normal bilateral means. In that .ong Lebanese Government distributed anns ta its partisans, connexion, it was aIso noteworthy that the complaint etv- and those arms went from one person ta another. had been macle simultaneously in the Arab League and the 315. As for the so-called radio and Press campaign, the Security Council. The fact that the Arab League Ions even if it were substantiated it could not have any influ had failed to arrive at a unanimous decision because the test ence on the l'vents in Lebanon. The radio and Press Lebanese Government had not seen fit ta endorse the j of : generally gave only news published by the Lebanese unanimous proposaI of all the other members of the :her Press. League raised the question whether pressure had been had put upon it by certain circles that were not interested in but 316. The United Arab Republic, he said, could alsa lessening tensions in the area. He also noted that a no have submittecl a complaint against Lebanon, but hael statement made by the Opposition parties of Lebanon on 'om not done so because it felt that that kind of difference 22 May made it c1ear that there \Vere in Lebanon opin should be capable of solution through other channels. He ions which differed radieaUy from those dc:veloped by the said that the;e had recently been a mass expulsion from blic Lebanese representative, and according ta which the Lebanon, \Vithout explanation or any kind of legal safe charges against the United Arab Republic \Vere designed leli- guard, of thousands of United Arab Republic nationals. ob- to j ustify c1aims for foreign interference and for foreign The many Lebanese citizens in the United Arab Re troops, who presumably woulel not be Arabs. The USSR l111 public, on the other hand, continued to be well-treated. the considered that the settlement of questions regarding the red 317. In conc1usion, the representative of the United Lebanese Govenllnent was an inalienable right of the iis- Arab Republic rl'called President Nasser's statement of Lebanese people, and no other Government had any ion 16 May 1958, that his Govemment upheld and respected right to interfere in any such matter. Any attempt to rith the independence of Lebanon and \Vould not permit any make use of domestic matters in Lebanon in order to ex illterference in its affairs. ert pressure abroad or elsewhere might result in nefarious consequences not only for the inclependence of the Leba atl- 318. The representative of Japan expressed deep con cern regarding the disquieting situation in Lebanon. His nese Imt also for the fate of peace in the N ear and Middle the East. He expressed the conviction that no Power would ~ c1e1egation was particularly disturbed that a dispute of that magnitude should have arisen between two sister permit itself to intervene in the domestic aflairs of Leba rab Republics. He suggested that the Council should be pro non in any way. of videe! with more complete infonnation on the meetings 325. The representative of Iraq stated that no resolu the of the Arab League clealing with the problem. tion had been adopted ullanimously by the Arab League ~ 41 lt~-)<:;. ....t;."'~~~~<:;;'oA:C'~!;t:.~"""'fo.;~i..t;''''~''~~'''''''''''~I'l'r.i~J.''''''\'~,l'","'~,\."~~"t,j;.t\i,t>:t'lA,~;w»"",,,,XJllrn".:,>,I~";';i~'... ,~,,,,,,,,,,!<~~,.,.,,~~~·,,,%~~"",~iQW,~",,"~~""'~""''''''~''\~WV~''.~''''~h'''''r'·." ",~,.j,>~,,~':O, and rejected by Lelxmon. The Governments of Iraq and that they consisted of articles by Lebanese news agencies , ment Jordan. at least, had not supported such a draft res~lution, and .~o:tnml!s~s. He q~~teù ~~tracts f~olll the Lebanese •• by th 326. The representative of Canada said that his dele- Pt~ss l:Ontall11n~ att~cks ,agams~ th~ GovenU~l~nt ?f the { man) gatien had taken note uf the grave and detailed account ~Illted Arab Republic, ~very 1Illa~1I:able actrvity 10 tl~e of th given to the Council in support of, the Lebanese charges. ~eld, of, propagauda af?a111l'~ the United Arab Rep~bl~c draw lIt' welcomed the assurances provided by the representa- l:on:1I1u~t!. to, be auth~nze~ 111 Lebanon. He uoted. that I~ Iraq. tive of the United Arab Republic regarding his Govern- wa~ obvions that sO~l1etll11eS th~ U.A.R. radio was " the p ment 's attitude towards the independence of Lebanon, obliged to respond to tnose accusations. \ It w 32i, The representative of Panama said that the . 335. I.-Iad th: G.overnlllent ?f Leban01~, ,rea!ly been g~~t Council was obviously dealing with a grave situatill1~. :.Ig:~ to fi,n~1 a .~OIUtl~11 of tl~e dl~pute. he sat~, u would L~lJa He supported the proposal that the Council receive addi- l:~rt~l1I1Iy hm,e a~l:e~teù. the re::s~Iutlon of the ~r,\b League. tional information regarding the proceedings of the Arab L ntor!unately. ,It IMÙ ::s:eme:1 111t~nt Ol~ &ettmg the pro.b- 34 L 'atrue h lem discussed in the Security Council 111 arder to err- clear ~'b • r. " • culate tendentious propagande against the United Arab soon 32~. 1h.e Prc::ilde!lt, spe~kmg a~ the representative Republic anù to use the Council to solve domestic ques- stopp of CInna. said that while he did nor wish to draw any finn tiens conceming only the Lebanese themselves, conclusions at that stage, he had gained the impression , .. " . . ) 34: that the situation in Lebanon was quite serions, and. un- 3~~. SO~lle ,13,?OO ~Ittzel~::s of, ~he Umted Arab Re- Repu le-s settled, might lu.ve grave consequences not only for ~ubhl:, ,~I~ l:~ntmu~d" Il.\~ been. ~xpelleù f~?m L~banon sava Lebanon but also for other States in t'le Middle East and ,l.nù, despite ,1 I1\ul1~~r ot protests, no, pla~::slble explana- b); th elsewhere non had been obtained. Moreover, the Governrnent of hecau s • Lebanon had treated the diplomats of the United Arab readv . 329., The rt'preset~tative of Lebm:on confirmed the Republic in a manner contrary to the rules of interna- proba VIC\\' ot the representative of Iraq that it was erroneous to tional law. For sorne time Lebanon had been the scene tional su;' that any u!lanimous draft resolution had beel~ sub- of plots hatched against the United Arab Republic, in 50.00 ~e nlltteJ to the l,ùvl'mment of Lebanon at .meetmg of particular by the 111embers of a terrorist group known as ment' the Arab League: Thl'rt, had been no tlllanlllllty whatso- Syrian nationalists, to whom the Lebml0n Govemment of th l'ver at that meetmg, had distributed weapons. Notwithstanding those facts, than 330. Dealing \Vith the statement of the representa- ~is Govenull~nt had tried to solve the problem in the to be' tive of the United Arab Republic. he observed that it lranle\Vo~k ot ~I~ Arab League, but had encountered activi proved the existence of the intervention of the United systematlc ~pposlt10n on 0e part of the leaders of Leba- to Iivl 0n relterat~d Arab Repuhlic in Lebanon's affairs since that representa- n. , He that hls Government had always con- 343 tive had referred in detail ta matters connected \vith the sldered that an 1I1depelldent Lebanon would be an ete- the S internaI situation in Lebanon. For allyone to take the ment of stability mId peace in that part of the world. of the ~ide o~ t~e ~ppo~ition in an~ther country seemed to him 33i. The representative of Lebanon infonned the Se- watch mac!tmsslhle 111 ,vlew of Artlcl~ 2, paragr;lph 7. of the curity Council that the situation was becorning very ." ., was t Charter. He relterated that hls Govenmlent had made serious and that infiitratioll and the flow of anns into to tll( ~o Leban~n efforts come to an arrangeme,nt \Vith the United. Arab were increasing. He requested the Council ta and 11 Republtc, but unfortullately aIl ItS attempts had fatled. meet continuously until it had disposed of the item. occurr ~31. At the 824~h meetin~ (10 June), the represen- 338. In reply to the statcment of the representative tihoul tatl\'e of Ir~q suhnlltted copIes of the summary r~cord of the United Arab Republic, he emphasized that his cumst; of the meetmg of, the .~rab League at BenghaZI, as Government had tal(en the utmost care to sift the facts some: drawn up.by the Secret~nat,of the ,League, and a sum- presented by it to the Council and that he could l'foduce 1 Coune mary of hls Govermnent ::; pomt of vlew presel1ted there. aIl the relevant documents and prove their complet~ ve- Such : tel1se 332. The representative of the United Arab Republic radty. The representative of the United Arab Republic, i. tion, J reviewed the eddence submitted by the representative of he continued, had dealt at mO$t \Vith 15 to 20 per cent Lebanon, and replied to various exmnples cited by that of the facts dted by Lebanon and had clearly Iittle, if 4022) representative, Not only were the aIleged facts far from an}ihing, to say against the remaining facts. Moreover, " established. he said, but there was no proof of any re- the United Arab Republic representative had not proved « sponsibility on the part of the Government of the United that there was any error. Leb Arab Republic., Poi:1ti,lg out that the mountain people 339. Concerning the question of the Press, he de- Re ~nd t:le o~~er t~b~s 111 L~ban~? \vere known to be anned, clared that the mast significant thing was that Egyptiml repl ne expres::sed pd.rtlcular :;u:pnse ~t .the .statement that all ancl Syrian newspapers presented only material that in- pub those, enga~ed m subwrslVe actlvl~y 111 Lebanon we;e flanled and encouraged rebellion and anti-govemmental « w~th fr~m supplted arms the Umte,cl Arab Republtc. activity in Lebanon. In contrast, although parts of the to p Moreover, It \Vas not dlfficult to obtmn arrns, Lebanese Press might criticize Egypt and Syria, other illeg 333. He also rejected the Lebanese representative's parts defendec1 the point of view of Egypt. There was othe allegation concerning subversive training of elements from nothing like that in Egypt, and official denials requested Lebanon on the territory of the Ur,ited Arab Republic. by the Lebanese Government had never appeared in the essa Similarly, the allegations regarding the participation of Eb'}'ptian Press. As for the argument that the radio of the United Arab Republic civilian nationals in subversive the Unite(1 Araù Republic was replying to the LebmIese " and terrorist activities in Lebanon, which for the most radio, there \Vas no comparison whatever between the rity part comprisec1 isolatecl cases, did not contain anything two; the Lebanese radio triec1 to be as fair and as objec- Gen that could in any \Vay establish the responsibility of his tive as humanly possible. • 344. Government. 340. The account of the meeting of the Arab League United 334. He then reviewed sorne of the Press reports given by the representative of the United Arab Republic, 345. quoted by the Lebanese representative and pointed out he continuecl, was incomplète and inaccurate. The docu- cialist 42 ""'·"~'G.~"~"",,""'i.ir".1..~:~~~<:..;N',I~· .. _~...... ~-....I:~·~'....,;;.'''-,:.··,1.~·-:\;· _-;;-;""\."'.('.~l".t:i~i"\"\M~;~"'-:;"::- :__ .1;..l:.:.~~\_;n ..... ;,.~~~~t:l::':./'I:;iI4;"~~~~"';;li~Ü,~~~x.'V~'QI.;.~:ltt''&:'''''''w:.'~~, vs agencies . ment quoted by that representative had not been approved serions Due, designed to faeilitate an improvement of the ~ Lebanese ' by the League itself, What had in fact happened was t~at situation. in the ~ ear . East•.and accordingly required I~nt ?f the: many of the delegations hall simply awaited the reaction con~I~1tatlOn . by ddl'~atlOns ;\'Ith tl~e;r. (,o,vernments. A VItY m the of the Lebanese Government ta the text that had been decision on it that mght woukl not Ile justified, ) Repub1~c drawn up, and at ~east three. rep:esentatives, those of 346. The Lebanese representative's statement had uot lted. that it Iraq. Jordan, and Llhya: had {bssoclat~d themselves from persuaded him of the validity of the charge made against radio was " lite proposal as soon as it had heen rejected by Lebanon. the United Arab Republic. l'hl' representative of the i It was also notl'\Vort}lY. he added, tha~ an amendment latter had given a detailed analysis showing that the l'vi- eally been t proposed hy the U~l1ted A~a1l Rep~lbl!c, to the .effect denee produced was either unfounded or in no way in- l, it would that there was n? mtervention by it lU the affairs of volved his Goverument, To obtain a correct picture of lb League. Lebanon, had received no support. the events in Lebanon and of their causes, it was neces- the prob 341. The Lcbanese Government had always made it sarv to take into accouut published statements by prOl,ui- 1er ta cir clear that it was ready to withdraw any complaint as nent representatives of the Lebanese people expressmg tited Arab won as the massive intervention in Lebanese affairs was opinions quite contrary ta those developed by the Leba- estic ques- stopped, uese. representative. The USSR representative proceeded . 'th tl t t t f U it d A Il to cite a number of such statements and concluded that ,342.1 n connexion WI le rea men 0 111 l' ra l' Leb 1 h 1 f Arab Re R 1li . 1 b L b h' G t Id what had mppened m anon was t mt t e peop e 0 epu l IC nationasye arion, lS overnmen .COll that country, profoundly discontented hv their Govern- l Lebanon say a gooll, deal about the tr~atment ~f Leban.~:e natlona.ls ment's decision to acc~pt the Dullf's-Eisénhower doctrine ~ explana IlY the U;uted Arah fepllbl~, bi\dld not 1': Isth ~ do sc and the consequently increased dependence of their coun- -', rnment of O X'cdause t iat \~'is â 'f ra 0 1 Sf COlcli am. 1 ~ wa~ try on United States monopolies, had launched a large- ited Arab to ~tal oE:Jasl'~n~t ~ ~xpu ~t?n If interna rea /ll prOVIC e 1( dorf\ 0 scale popular movement in support of the Constitution ~rolJa 1 y no more t an, Ille.. ra epu lC na- and national independence and in opposition to colonial- the scelle tionals from Lebanon, and ernphasized that there were 'Th t ' t 1 nts in Lebanon had been ~public, in 50.~ 0 s , r' h '1 . 1. b H' C lsm. e curren 111 ema eve knù\Vll as • Y:IallS Iv.mg appl y lU e anon...IS Jov.l't;t- the result of the indignation of the masses, and repre- ment s p~ltJen:e wI~h the op~nly pro-OpposItlUn actlvlty sented the organizecl stmggle of the Lebanese people )vernment of the Egyptmn dlplomats m Lebauon had beell more . ". . l' A' " Leb ose facts, -1 F' 11' lIt . fi 't cl rt for thelr constttutlonai ng ItS.••1lV lUterveutlOn lU - a- \1 th an ~xemp ary, ma y, It too \: a mos. lU III e cre U.l y non's internaI affairs. in~luding iilten'ention by the Se- nt in the to ,b:,he,:e that. Leba~lOn,was eng~ged m any subvl'rsl\'e cttrity Council, ' 'ould be inadmissible; it was indeed the lcountered actl~lt)' ,m Syna ~r ll~ Egy:pt. HiS country \Vanted only dutv of the Council to rebuff attempts at outside inter- of Leba iVays con to lIve 111 peace \\'lth lts nelghbours. vention in the intemal affairs of Arah States. There were e an ele 343. The representative of Sweden considered that manv indications that a ntlluber of Western Powers world. the Security Council had reason' to give the statements sought to utilize the events in Lebanon to intervene in nI' the parties serions consideration and to keep a close the countrv's internaI affairs and to exert more pressure d the Se watch on the situation and its further development. Tt on the A;ab States. The possibility of intervention was lÏng very , was l'vident that foreigu interference might contribute openlv discussecl in official circles in the United States lrms iuto ta the aggravation of internaI antagonisms in Lebanon and the United Killgdom, and military preparations had :ouncil to and make a settlement difficult, If such interference had been made by those Powers in the Eastern Mediter- item. llccurïed, it was deeply to he deplored, and every effort ranean. esentative should ~e made to bring about a correction, In the cir- 347, Large amounts of armameuts had been dis- that his cumstances, there might be justification for considering patched to Lebanon and hacl been used against the Leba- the facts some arrangement for investigation or observation by the nese people. AlI of those military operations \Vere dearly 1produce , Council itself with a view to clarifying the situation. provocative in nature and constitutecl direct preparation lplete ve Such a measure might contribute to the creation of a less for amled intervention against that people. The attitude Republic, 1. tense atmosphere in connexion \Vith the Lebanese situa- of the United States and the United Kingdom was ex- per cent tian. He sub:l1itted the fol1owing draft resolution (SI plainecl by the oil pipelines in Lebanon and by the great little, if 4022) : importance the)' attached to the strategic position of that 'loreover, "The Security Council, country. lt proved ((Having JU'ard the charges of the representative of 348. Those preparing armed intervention reserved an Lebanon conceming interference by the United Arab important role in it for the aggressive Baghdad bloc. , he de Republic in the intemaI affairs uf Lebanon and the The Western authorities tried to justify their actions by Egyptian reply of the representative of the United Arab Re- the false allegation that the mass movement in Lebanon that in public, had beeu inspired by the United Arab Republic, a charge rnmental ((Decides to dispatch urgently an observation group decisively refuted bath by the Govemment of the latter s of the and by leaders of the Opposition in Lebanon, It was to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no more than obvious that the appeal of the Government of ia, other illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of anus or Lebanon to the Arab League had been ifltended to de- lere was other matériel aeross the Lebanese borders ; 'equested ceive the Arab peoples and that that Government had no d in the «Autlzorbes the Secretary-General to take the nec- serious intention to reach a settlement of the issue by di- radio of essary steps to that end; rect negotiations with the United Arab Republic or by :"ebanese "Requests the observation group to keep the Secu- means of the assistance of friendly Arab States. But veen the rit)' Cottllcil currently infomlecl through the Secretary- such manoeuvres could no longer deceive world public lS objec- GeneraL" opinion or the Arab peoples. The Soviet Government's position was that any and all attempts to utilize the • 344. The representatives of the United States and the clomestic situation in Lebanon as a reason for intervention United Kingdom expressed their support of the proposaI. , League from abroad constituted a serious situation which could {epublic, 345. The representative of the Union of Soviet So give r::;e to grave consequences, not only for the future le docu- cialist Republics said that the Swedish proposai was a of Lebanon but also for the cause of peace in the N ear and A? l-"-:~li;;I~-~Sl. The Council should reject the complaint would cease, and it appeared that there was an external ~ of the Government of Lebanon as baseless and force which did not permit the ending of such attacks, ~ unjustified. ,... 3S1. The representative of Iraq theu proceeded to ~. 3.:1.9. The representative of Iraq emphasized the good describe other means of subversion which he said were j intentions and friendly sentiments of his Government being employed throughout the Arab world and, in par 1 and people in respect of all their Arab brethren, The ticular, in Lebanon, The situation represented a phase problem raised in the Lebanese complaint, he said, af cf Soviet penetration of the Arab world, he said, for true • fected the whole of the Middle East and indeed the whole Aral> nationalism would abhor both the aims and the free world. If subversion and interference in Lebanese methods employed. His Govenunent hoped that the Se atfairs were penuitted to continue and to succeed, no curity Council, having found that the Arab League had country in the Middle East could feel secure, Lebanon failed ta achieve a satisfactory settlement of the trouble, was a peace-loving country which had done no harm to wonld take appropriate measures to protect not only any ether country. lt had enjoyed peace until the advent Lebanon hut other Arab States as well, inc1uding Iraq. of Nasserism in the Arab world. Other Arab countries from communism and Nasserism. Aggression and inter , had also been afïected to a greater or lesser degree. Nas vention with the intention of undermining legitimate serism, he continued, was the design of President Nasser Governments should be stopped immediately, dominate the Arab world, or at least to turn the Arab 352. Replying to the USSR staternents, he declared States into satellites of Egypt by fomenting revolutions, that those who were violating the Constitution of Leba using the communist method of subversion from within. non were those who were rising against it, not the Gov An Arab State had to choose between obedience to Nas ernment which was acting in accordance with it, If ser's policies and dictation, and bcing subjected to violent Lebanon had not brought the issue to the Security Coun • attack and subversion. Iraq and Jordan had faced the cil al" -l the Arab League at the same time, he added, he problem and had insisted on retaining their independ was «mvinced the United Arab Republic would not have ence, Iraq, which for its own safety had joined the de agreed 10 the meeting of the Arab League. fensive Baghdad Pact, acting in accordance with Articles 353. The representative of France agreed that it was 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter, coutinued to up to the Lebanese people alone to decide what policy be attacked by the Cairo radio, in the same manner as they wishec1 to follow. But who, in the democratie conn Lebanon had been subjected to such attacks and to sub tries, represented the people, if not the elected Parliament version when it had endorsed the Eisenhower doctrine. .nd a Government that had the confidence of the people? In other words, no Arab country was free to co-operate 1'0 endeavour to question the legitimacy of a Government with the West without President's N asser's consent. invested with national representation was in itself an at "Positive neutrality", the cornerstone of Nasserite for tempt to unc1ermine the national sovereignty of a country eign policy, meant in practice to antagonize the West and was a violation of the Charter. and seek help from the Soviet Union. If Arabs chose otherwise and acted freely they were to be branded as 354. The detailec1 faets cited by the representative agents of imperialism, The trouble in Lebanon was es of Lebanon made it clear that, even if the authorities of ... sentially an international problern reflecting the attempts the United Arab Republic had, in fact, incurred nv other of the USSR, working through the United Arab Re responsibility, they had been greatly remiss in their duties public, to obtain a foothold in the Middle East. In that as regards control over their own frontiers, and activities connexion, he declared that the USSR supported Presi on their territory, or originating from it, by rebels in dent Nasser's dream of domination over the Arab world, conflict with the !egitimate Government of Lebanon. a support intended to pave the way for Soviet dom-nation Witn regard ta the assurances that the United Arab Re of that world. In Lebanon, President Nasser was apply public respected the independence and sovereignty of ing the subversive methods of international cornmunism, Lebanon, he noted that what the Lebanese Government namely to arouse and exploit dissatisfaction with pre complained of was intervention in its internal affairs. vailing conditions, to undermine the authority of the There were more subtle methods of jeopardizing a State's State by creating chaos, and ta provide men and anns independence than that of a frontal attack. It was enough for a revolution. There always were a number of causes for that purpose to be sure of collaborators inside the of frustration and dissatisfaction in the Arab world, in country itself, and ta furnish them with the means of cluding Lebanon. The Arabs faced the need for rapid taking power. Should the attempt be successful, the new politieal, economic, and social change. The Arab world leaders would, of course, refuse nothing to those who had was frustrated by the tragedy of Palestine and events in helped them, and that would be the end of the rea1 in Algeria. The Arab peoples, who yearned for unity, dependence of the country in question. found themselves separated by boundaries not of their 355. If any State was entitled to expect comprehen own making. Both Russian and Egyptian-Syrian propa sion and friendship from others, it was !:urely Leban)n. ganda had done much to exploit that state of affairs, Its people had given the whole world the rare example of hut hac! done nothing for the development of a democratic a community which, despite religions differences, had, politieal system of govemment. The masses in the Arab until v€:ry recently, remained cLèply united, hannonious world had not been told the whole truth about commu and without fanaticism. It would be not Tllerely regret nisl11 and N asserim, and that was why they had falleu table but also dangerous for other States in a similar victims to exploitation. position if that fine balance were to be destroyed. The only crime of which the Lebanese Government has been 350. The statements of the Lebanese representatîve guilty had been its desire to decide for itself, in agree \Vere fully corroborated by Iraq's experience. The Cairo :i1e.nt with the m.ajority of its own. Par~iament, the poliey radio consistently called on the people of Iraq to revoIt lt mtendecl to follow, and to remam faIthful to its tradi against their Goveml11ent, whose l11emhers were described ?onal f;iends~ips. ~t was because it had refused to align as traitors. Appeals to President Nasser ta stop sl1ch ItS forelgn pohcy wlth that of another country that it was broadcasts had been of no avail, despite promises that they today confronted with a rebelliol1 supplied from abroad. -~ 44 e WOlS an externa1 That was a negation of the princip1es of the Charter, and 360. The representative of the United Arab Repub . of such attacks. it was also a dangerous game that imperilled the peace lie, he continued, had not attempted to deny the campaign hen proceeded ta and security of the entire Middle :-<.s1. Tt was the Secu of incitement and vilification carried on by the Press and iich he said were rity Council's chay to take urgent mensures to avoid a radio of the United Arah Republic and hnd argued that, vorld and, in par greater deterioration of the situation, and accordingly he since the question of radio campaigns were not capable presented a phase supported the Swedish draft resolution. of endangering international peace and security, the Council was not competent to consider them. The l, he said, for true 356. The representative of the United States said Council could not he expected to accept such an attitude. the aims and the that it was clear that there had been out side interference ~ ot only was radio propaganda especially powerful and oped that the Se in the internal affairs of Lehanon in order to promote dangerous in the conditions of the Middle East but, in Arab League had civil and the efforts of the strife impede constituted its resolution 290 (1 V) of 1 December 1949 on ..Es mt of the trouble, authorities to restore order and tranquillity, and that the sentials of peace", the General Assernbly had called on protect not only interference had occurred from the territory and bv ~ f ember States to refrain from anv threats or acts, direct '11, including 1raq, means of the facilities of the United Arab Republic, Hfs or indirect. aimed at impairing thé freedom, independence ression and inter Governrnent desired good relations with ail States in or iutegrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and mining legitimate the and the creation of Middle East deplored circum subverting the will of the people in any State. He also diately. stances which obstructed such relations. The Securitv cited General Assernbly resolution 110 (II) of 3 N0 not ignore the grave situation nents, he declared Council could confronting vember 1947, which had been introduced by the USSR. stitution of Leba it, a situation which involved fundamental questions con 361. The total picture which emerged was a sombre t it, Ilot the Gov cerning the responsibilities of the Organization and its lance with it, If Mernbers, and in particular the principle of non-inter one, he said, and the assertion that the United Arab Re le Security Coun • vention ernbodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Char public had not provided an)' assistance ta the rebels in ime, he added, he ter. The United Nations must be particularly alert in Lehanon was hard to accept at face value. A particularly t disturbing aspect was the implication that was wrong ic would Ilot have protecting the security and integrity of small States from it ue. interference by those whose resources and power were for Lebanon to have brought its complaint ta the Secu larger. Egypt itself had benefited in that respect in 1956. rit)' Council. If the representative of the United Arab igreed that it was The United States. having in mind the same Charter Rcpuhlic meant that the question should have been ecide what policy principles on which United Nations action had been settled in the Arab League, the answer was that the Leba democratie coun based in 1956, was firmlv determined to continue its nese Government had made every effort to find a solution -lected Parliament support of the integrity and independence of Lebanon. at the meeting of the League. Did that representative lee of the people? reallv mean that the Government of Lebanon was in the of a Government 357. Lebanon could be proud of the existence of a wrong if it was not willing to do what it was told by the as in itself an at political Opposition, hut the fact that there was such an United Arab Republic? He hoped that the Council would gnty of a country Opposition was no justification whatever for external adopt the Swedish draft resolution as expeditiously as attacks of any kind upon the Government in office. Leba possible, as an ùnmediate practical measure caIculated to he representative non had nlready demonstrated its ability to govem itself stabilize the situation and renuce the threat ta peace and the authorities of through modem Iiberal traditions and surely \Vould con security. ineurred nu other tinue to do sa if others did ne: exploit nonnal differences 362. At the 825th meeting (11 June), the repre iss in their duties of opinion for purposes of their own. sentative of ]apan stressed his Government's support of ers, and activitics 358. He assumed, in view of the statements of the the Charter principles of respect for the political inde it, by rebels in representative of the United Arab Republic, that the pendel1ce of Member States and non-interference in their ent of Lebanon. Govemment of that country would take ail possible domestic affairs. The Securitv Council should exert its United Arab Re measures to ensure that efforts to uphold the authority utmost efforts towards a soiution of the problem. He :l sovereignty of of the legally constitutec1 Government of Lebanon and to hoped that the matter would remain within the frame nese Government re-establish law and order \Vere not obstructed bv activi work of the Ur;ited Nations and that peaceful settlement internaI afIairs. ties based on the territorv or bv means of the -facilities \vould he pursued. The Swedish draft resolution \Vas mdizing a State's of the United Arab Reptiblic. He hoped that the Coun certainly one of the realistic approaches to the problem, :k. It was enough cil w mld help to bring about an end ta interference by aud his delegation would support it. Irators inside the the United Arab Republic in Lebanon. 363. The representative of Panama interpreted the ':th the means of 359. The repr~sentative of the United Kingdom said Swedish draft resolution as involving the establishment of leeessful, the new that his delegation's information supported the conten an observation committee which would ensure that there to those who had tions of the representative of L~banon and that his Gov \Vas no infiltration of armed persons or matériel across .cl of the real in- ernment had not bem impressed by the attempts made the Lebanese borders. The proposed group would not by the representative of the United Arab Republic to have the authority ta investigate past l'vents, and its ~pect cOl11prehen- characteristies \Vould resemble those of the Peace Obser deny or make light of those charges. The USSR repre 1 8urely Leban)n. sentative, he observed, did not appear ta be aware that vation C0l11mission. He would vote for the Swedish e rare examp1e of the Govenunent of Lebanon existed. That representative draft resolution on that understanding. differences, had, had quoted from Opposition spokesmen to show that the 364. The representative of Col0l11bia dec1ared that he lited, harnlOnious cOl11plaint was unwarranted. That was one-sided, since \Voulel vote in favour of the Swedish draft resolution. )t rl1erely regret there were countries where there was no Opposition to 365. The representative of Canada said that the pri Ites in a sinlllar quote. Moreover, th(; United Nations "las an association l11ary aim of the Swedish proposal was to provide United ~ destroyed. The of Governments, and the complaint had been brought to Nations maehinery for dealil1g \Vith acts of iIlegal infiltra rnment has been the Council in the name and on behalf of the Government tion of personnel and a supply of arms which were, un . itself, in agree of Lebanon. Tt was profoundly disturbing that the USSR fortunately, contributing to the state of unrest in Lebanon al11ent, the policy representative apparently supported external incitement and \Vere dear evidence of interference from outside Mul to its tradi to a constitutional Opposition to abandon constitutional that country. He hoped that the action proposed in the • refused ta align metl:ods in favour of violence against the ordinary popula Swedish draft resolution could be taken swiftly and effi- untry that it \Vas tion and the constituted authorities, carried on with arms 1 See Genera! Assemb!y reso!ution 377 A (V) of 3 Novem ied frol11 abroad. supplied from abroad. ber 1950. ,.._.._.._------_...---.. --~"", ...... _------_....._--... ciently and that it would help to avert the spreading dis they could count upon a modicum of protection from pub- order in Lebanon, which might have dangerous implica the United Nations. It would also test whether the iaign tions not only for that country but for the area as a Urganization was capable of handling indirect aggression and whole. and intervention. that, 366. It was obvions that the Council's response to iable Decision: Lebanon's appeal for assistance could hardly be effective The Siocdish draft resolution (S/4022) the United ; made nf the 1 Aral> 'nll11ent respon : hoped .. perous, lat the repre visaged :rs had re con- 1 !lever Jlelll of : Leba ~n mis ~ntire1y repre ted the tablish : is no ,ms or 51 , , PARTH , Other maltera considered by the Council C"..apter 7 ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS A. Application of the Federation of Malaya 424. On 3 September, the representative of the USSR submitted the text (S/3877) of the following 421. By cablegram dated 31 August 1957 (S/3872) draft resolution: adclressed to the Secretary-General, the Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs of the Federation of "The Security Council, Malaya submitted the application of the Federation for "Having examincd the application of the Mongolian admission ta membership in the United Nations. A dec People's Republic for membership in the United Na laration of acceptance of the obligations of the Charter tions, was submitted at the same time, In a letter dated 1 "Recommenâs to the General Assembly (0 admit September (S/3874) oddressed to the President of the the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the Security Council, the representatives of Australia and United Nations." the United Kingdom requested an early meeting of the 425. On 4 September, the representative of the Security Council to recommend the admission of the United States of America, in letters (S/3880 and SI Federation of Malaya. On 3 September, the same two 3881) addressed to the President of the Security Coun representatives submitted the following joint draft resolu cil, referred to General Assembly resolutions 1017 A and tion (S/3876): B (XI) and requested an early meeting of the Council "The Security Council, to consider the applications of the Republic of Korea and "Ha7ing examined the application of the Federation of Viet-Nam. of Malaya for membership in the United Nations, 426. On 6 September, the following joint draft reso (1Recommends to the General Assembly that the lution was submitted by Australia, China, Colombia, • Federation of Malaya be admitted to membership in Cuba, France, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United Nations." the United States (S/3884): 422. The Security Council discussed the matter at "The Security Council, its 786th meeting (5 September 1957). AIl the members "Having examined the application of the Repuplic of the Security Council made staternents welcoming the of Korea for mernbership in the United Nations, application of the Federation of Malaya, which they re "Recommends to the General Assemb1y that the garded as fully qualified for membership, and supported Republic of Korea be admitted to membership i.l the the joint draft resolution. United Nations." Decision: The joint draft resolution (S/3876) was 427. On the same date another joint draft resolution adopteâ unanimo1tsly. (S/3885) was submitted by the same sponsors as fol lows: B. Consideration of proposaIs relating to the "The Security Council, applications of the Republic of Korea, the "Having examined the application of Viet-Nam for Democratie People's Republic of Korea, Viet· membership in the United Nations, Nam, the Democratie Republic of Viet.Nam and the Mongolian People's Republlc "Recommends to the General Assembly that Viet Nam be admitted to membership in the United Na 423. As was indicated in the previens annuai report tions." of the Security Council to the General Assembly,1 the Secretary-General, on 4 March 1957, had transmitted ta 428. On 9 September, the representative of the the Council the text (S/3803) of General Assembly USSR submitted an amendment (S/3887) to the joint resolutions 1017 A and B (XI) conceming the applica draft resolution concerning the application of the Re tions of the Republic of Korea and of Viet-Nam. In a public of Korea (S /3884) according to which the Se cablegram dated 1 September 1957 (S/3873) addressed curity Couneil would recommend that the Democratie to the President of the Security Council, the Foreign People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea 1;finister of the Mongolian People's Republic repeated be admitted simultaneously to membership in the United his Government's application for membership in the. Nations. United Nations as weIl as its readiness to assume and 429. At its 789th meeting (9 September 1957), the fulfil all the obligations of the Charter. Council adopted an agenda in which General Assembly resolutions 1017 A and B (XI), together with the l Official Records of the General Assembl», Twelfth Session, relevant United States letters, were listed as sub-items Supple1lfe1~t No. 2 (A/3648), paras. 576~597. (a) and (b), and the cablegram from the Mongolian 53 People's Republic, together with the relevant USSR resolution 918 (X) of 8 December 1955, which referred letter, was listed as sub-item (c). The Council agreed to the problem of unification of such States, it had heen that the items wouId be considered in that order, but that eruphasized that the first obligation of the United Na any member could speak on one or more of the sub-items tions to such States was to promote their unification. But at the same time. the propcsal to admit only South Korea constituted a 430. The representative of the United States de one-sided approach which could only worsen existing clared that no country had a greater daim to membership relations between the two parts of Korea. Simultaneous in the United Nations than the Republic of Korea. The admission of the Democratie People's Republic of Korea United Nations had recognized the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea would be an objective and un as the only Iawful Government in Korea, a recognition biased approach which would emphasize the necessity of confirmed in blood. The General Assembly had re bringing about the unification of Korea by peaceful means peatedly voted in favour of Korea's admission, but that and would establish the necessary conditions of contact great Asian nation had been deprived of its most ele and co-operation between the two parts of the country mentary right by an alien force which would not concede for the purpose of unification. the right of nations and peoples to live their own lives 438. Allegations that the Democratie People's Re in their own way. public of Korea did not follow a peaceful foreign policy 431. The representative of the United Kingdom, were contradicted by the facts, which were that it had stressing the special interest of the Council and the repeatedly sought unification by peaceful means and that United Nations as a whole in the affairs of Korea, said its proposaIs had always met objections by the South that the regrettable fact that that country was still divided Korean authorities and the United States. was no reason to refuse the natural and legitimate daim 439. Dealing with the question of the admission of to membership of the Repuhlic of Korea, whieh his Gov Viet-Nam, the US SR representative pointcd out that the ernment recognized as the only Iegitimate Government international agreement reached at the Geneva Conference of Korea and whicl- .vas fully qualified for membership. of 1954 had provided for the holding of general elections 432. The representative of China emphasized the ties in 1956 in Viet-Nam for the purpose of unifying the between his country and Korea, and the sympathy with country. The participants in that agreement were per which the Chinese people had watched the Korean strug manent members of the Security Council: they had un gle for independence. It was clear that the Republic of dertaken to support the admission to the United Nations Korea was qualified for membership, and he hoped that of a unified Viet-Nam and not of parts of it. The impie a recommendation for its admission might at last he mentation of the Geneva agreements, and particularly of adopted. the provisions for elections, had met with the detetmined opposition of the authorities of South Viet-Nam, which 433. The representative of the Philippines said that had been encouraged in every way by the United States. the manner in which the Koreans hau successfully re The discussion of the admission of Viet-Nam, especially pelled the forces of aggression and reconstructed their in the form proposed in the joint draft resolution, could country deserved the recognition of the United Nations. only encourage the South Viet-Namese authorities to con The Security CounciI must give the Republic of Korea tinue disrupting implementation of the agreement. Ac the support it deserved, by voting for its admission, since cordingly, the USSR delegation proposed to postpone it had aIl the qualifications for membership. consideration of the question of the admission of Viet 434. The representative of France, reiterating his Nam until the unification of that country. Government's support for the application of the Republic 440. Turning to the application of the Mongolian of Korea, also stressed the fact that the Republic of People's Republic, the USSR representative declared Korea was particularIy entitled ta the favourable con that that State remained a victim of the policy of dis sideration of the Securitv CounciI because the United crimination which ran counter to General Assembly reso :.;ations had been obliged -to intervene in arder to defend Iution 918 (X). A number of countries, through their the existence of Korea against external aggression. "otes in the Security CounciI, and especia1Iy by means 435. The representative of Colombia considered that of the veto of the Chiang Kai-shek representative, had the Republic of Korea fulfilled the conditions laid down made impossible the implementation of the Assembly's in the Charter for membership and that it was high time decision. The attitude of such countries was the more that the Korean people were permitted to enjoy the unjustified in that many had previously supported the priviIeges of membership in the United Nations. admission of the Mongolian People's Republic. There 436. The representative of Australia, expressing the was no question that the Mongolian People's Republic nope that the Council would adopt a positive recommen fully met a1I the requirements of the Charter and there dation concerning the admission of the Republic of Korea, was every reason for it to become a Member of the stressed the importance of the principle that the people United Nations. of any State that met the requirements of the Charter 441. The representative of the United States denied should not be excluded from the henefits and responsi the assertion that the United States encouraged the Re bilities of membership in the United Nations if that public of Korea in aggressive plans and declared that people desired to accept those responsibilities. The ap there would he no problem of division of Korea and Viet plication of the Republic of Korea had long been out Nam if the Soviet Union would permit free elections. standing, and it was weIl known that it had heen blocked 442. The representative of Sweden said that his by the Soviet veto power in the Council. Government had previously hesitated to support applica 437. The representative of the Union of Soviet So tions for memhership of States which were not yet com cialist Republics said that the question of the admission plete in the sense that their boundaries were not yet of Korea and Viet-Nam to the United Nations remained definite and recognized by other States. In supporting complicated by the fact that those countries were still the admission of the Republie of Korea, his Govern divided. At the time of the adoption of General Assembly ment's attitude had been decided by the consideration of 54 nber 1955, which referred ' .•. th~ dcsirahility that th!' Repubhc of Korea accept the the Soviet veto power in the Security Council. Vier-Na..n f such States, it had been r obligations of membership. and particularly the stipula met the requirements of the Charter and should be ad :atian of the United Na tion of the Charter conccrning the peaceful settlement of mitted without further delay. His country had been note their unification. But international disputes. deeply impressed il)' the efforts made by the Governrnent and people of Viet-Nam ta develop and strengthen the outh Korea constituted a 443. The representative of Iraq, recalling that his State in the face nf great difiiculties, including the in ild only worsen existing c1e1egation had repeatedly upheld the necessity of making flux of nearly a million refugees from Communist op li of Korea. Simultaneous 1the United :\ations a universal organization and the view pression and their resettlement in Viet-Nam. eople's Republic of Korea .. that pence and justice could be achieved effective1y only Id be an objective and un rhrough the co-operation of all nations. said that in the 450. The representative of the Philippines declarel mphasize the necessity of r li~ht of tilt' relevant criteria and in view of the desire that Viet-Xam was fully qualified for membership. The : Korea by peaceful means • ('xpr('ssed Ily the General Assembly, he would support United Xations would gain immeasurably by admitting iary conditions of contact , the admission of the Republic of Korea. a nation that had 'von recognition for itself by its dedi two parts of the country ! cated efforts to fight an alien ideology and maintain its 444. AI the i90th meeting (9 September 1957), the democratie way of life despite powerful forces that would President. speaking as the representative of Cuba. said undermine it. Democratie People's Re- that no orher State sa wc)! deserved admission to mem a peaceful foreign poliey hership as the Republic of Korea. It fulfiIled aIl the 451. The representative of Colombia, recalling his , which were that it had , delegation's support of the principle of universaIity of the conditions required under Article 4. The fact that part r peaceful rneans and that of ils territory was under the control of a foreign Power Organisation. hoped that on that occasion or in the near objections by the South 1 could not he permitted to be an obstacle to its admission future the wish of the people of Viet-Nam to belong ta ited States. fI Ir rhat occupation was maintained in contravention of a the United Nations, just like other free peoples, would . ,'1 stion of the admission of United ~ations resolution. The first step towards the re he fulfilled. tative pointcd out that the unification of Korea must he the admission of the Re 452. The representative of Sweden said that his at the Geneva Conference Jluhlil of Korea to membership. de1egation would vote for the joint draft resolution for olding of general elections f the same reasons rs he had given in connexion with the Decisions: The CS.l,'R 11111C1ld11lcnt (S/3887) ta the purpose of unifying the application of the Republic of Kcrea. hat agreement were per- ioint draft resolution (S/3884) was rejected by 9 votes to1 (fT SR). ,lt'ith abstention (Sweden). The joint ·~53. The reoresentative of the Union of Soviet So ty Council : they had un- j S 1 draft resolution (S/3884) rccciued 10 votes in favour cialist Republics 'said that, whereas the Soviet Union was on ta the United Nations 1 striving for the implementation of the df':-;~;(ms of the of parts of it. The imple- ~ and 1 aqainst (USSR). It uxis not adoptetl, the negative rote bcinq that of a permanent niember of the Council. Geneva Conference of 1954, the 'United . ':~' ~s ...vas re ments, and particularly ofj sponsible for the fact that free elections anu the unifica . met with the determined 445. The representative of France, recalling the his tion Viet-Xam in 1956 had not tc-ken place. He moved South Viet-Nam, which toric ties linking his country to Viet-Nam, said that in that the Council postpone a decision on the question of vay by the United States. 1954 Viet-Nam, like Cambodia and Laos, had solemnly the admission of Viet-Nam until that country han become 1 of Viet-Nam, especially _ beeu recognized by France as a sovereign and independ unified, int draft resolution, could ent State, having aIl the attributes conferred upon such 'l'amese authorities to con- a State hy international law. Viet-Nam fully met the re 454. The representative of the United States ob 1 of the agreement. Ac- quirements stipulated in Article 4 and his delegation served that one reason why the Government of Viet on proposed ta postpone hoped that the Council would recomrnend its admission Xam had refused to hold the nation-wide elections called If the admission of Viet- ta the United Nations. for in the Geneva agreements was its apprehension that the elections in the north wonld not be free. lat country. 446. The representative of the United States said cation of the Mongolian that much of the sad experience of the Republic of Korea 455. The President, speaking as the representative t representative declared had heen shared by Viet-l\am. Hs people asked only for of Cuba, recalled that his delegation had consistently sup tim of the policy of dis- the right ta arder its affairs free from alien domination ported the application of Viet-Nam, whose people had o General Assembly reso- J and ta enjo)' the benefits of the collective security and struggled :leroieally agaillst invaders in the service of a : countries, through their l11tltUal help offered by membershi.p in the United Na foreign Power. and espeeially by means tions. They had proved their love of peace and their Decisions: The USSR motion to postpone a deci :-shek representative, had ahility to fulfil the obligations of the Charter. His delega sion on the application of Viet-Nam until that country tation of the Assembly's tion was confident that their rights to membership in the had becol1le unified was rejected by 10 votes to 1 countries was the more United Nations would not long be denied. (USSR). The joint droft resolution (S/3885) reccÏ7Jd previously supported the 1 447. The representative of the United Kingdom said 10 '['otes in fœlJoll1" and 1 against (USSR). It was not Jeople's Republic. There • that his Goverl1lnent stood by the agreements arrived at adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent 19oIian People's Republic during the Geneva Conference of 1954. Unfortunately, 11lember of the Council. of the Charter and there it had not so far proved possible to carry out the measures ~come a Member of the 456. The representative of Crina reiterated his dele for the unification of Viet-Nam which had been en gatioll's objection to the admission of the Mongolial1 visaged at the time. But the United Kingdom considered People's Republic. The regime in that area was neither the United States denied .. that the application of Viet-Nam for membership was democratic nor Mongolian. The so-called MongoIian Peo tates encouraged the Re- . fully justified and that Viet-Nam would be a notable ple's Republic was a Soviet colony" plans and declared that "' a~Idition ta the many new nations admitted in the pre vision of Korea and Viet- VlOus two years. 457. The representative of the United States said permit free eleetions. that his Gcvenmlent did not think Outer Mongolia was 448. The representative of China citing the close ties qualified. independent or a State, and therefore opposed : Sweden said that his between his country and Viet-Nam, said that admission its admission. itated to support applica of the latter would be a notable contribution by the 458. The representative of the United Kingdom said which were not yet com- • United Nations to the cause of wedd freedom. lOundaries were not yet ,. he would abstain in the vote on the USSR draft resolu el' States. In supporting 449. The representative of Australia said that, like tion because his delegation was not convinced that Outer of Korea, his Govern Korea, Viet-Nam had been waiting for admission for a Mongolia possessed the il1dependence and freedom of ac d by the consideration of number of years and its admission had been bIocked by tion required to carry out the obligations of the Charter. 1 55 1 Althongh his delegation had been prepared to give Outer States rt'~ardillg the application of the ~Ion~olian l'l'o, Mongolia the '>enent of the ~, ·~bt on 13 December 1955. ple's Republic was obviously that the political system when it had voted for its admission (704th meeting). the there was not to the Iikillg of the United States Govcrn misgivings it had entertained at the time about the quali meut, Thar, however, was a matter for the Mongolian fications of several States had been proved fully justitied people to decide. in the case of Hungary and had made it less inclined to 462. The representative of Sweden said that his dele taken on trust l' ~~ R assurances about the degree of in gatien would follow the line it had takeu 011 previous dependence enjoyed Il)' Outer Mongolia, occasions, hasil.g itself on the principle of universalitv. 459. The representative of the Philippines said that and would accordingly vote ill faveur of the USSR draft he would vote against the L'"':,R draft resolution because resolution. his delegation dit! not believe that the so-called Mongolian People's Republic fulfilled the requirements of member- ·Hi3. The President. speaking as the representative of 1 • Cuba, said thar he wOIII<1 vote against the CSSR draft S.'IP· resolution. The so-called Mongoliau People's Republic 460. The representative of Australia said that Outer had 110 legal existence and was Ilot a truly sovereign Mongolia still appeared to beur many of the aspects of a Statc. Moreover, a large number of men from it had 4(k~. dependent arca under Soviet control in a large number oi taken part ill the aggrt'ssioll agaiust Korea, an act which Draft Rnies its internai affairs, and secmed entirelv under Soviet con hat! been condemned repeatedly by the United Nations. trol in regard to its foreign affairs. Because of its doubts, twenty-six his delegation would abstain in the vote. Decislone Tire USSR draft resolution was rejected 461. The representative of the Union of Soviet So by 5 ~'oics 10 :: (Stoedcn, USSR) unth 4 abstentions cialist Republics said that the position of the United (Australia, France, Iraq, United Kingdom). Clurpter 8 RECOMMENDATION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY.GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 464. The five-year term of office of Mr. Dag Ham 465. At its 792nd meeting, held in private on 26 marskjold as Secretary-General of the United Nations, Septernber 1957. the Security Council took up the ques tion of such a recommendation and unanimously decided 1 which commenced on 10 April 1953. was due to expire to recommend to the General Assembly at its twelfth 1 in April 1958, In accordance with Article 97 of the Char session that Ml'. Dag Hammarskjold he appointed as ter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Secretnry-General of the United Nations for a new five year term of office. On the same day, the President of the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council informed the President of the General Assembly Council, of the Council's recommendation (A/3682). Chapter 9 ELECTION OF FIVE MElUBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 466. On 5 September 1957, the Secretary-General Koo (China), 8 votes: Mr, Gaetano Morelli (Italy), transmitted to the Security Council and the General As 10 votes; Sir Percy Spender (Australia ), 10 votes; and sembly a list (S/3879) of the candidates nominated by Ml'. Bohdan Winiarski (Poland}, 6 votes, The President national groups for the election to be held during the notified the President of the General Assernbly of the course of the twelfth session of the Assembly in order to result of the vote, and suhsequently informed the Council fill the five vacancies which would occur on 5 February that as Ml'. Badawi, Ml', Koo, Sir Percy Spender and 1958 owing to the expiry of the terms of office of five :\11'. Winiarski had also obtained an absolute majority of members of the International Court of ] ustice, the votes of the General Assembly, they had been de ~ 467. At the 793rd and 794th meetings (1 October clared elected. For the purpose of filling the fifth seat, the Council proceeded to a second ballot, whieh resulted 1957), the Couneil proceeded to vote by secret ballot on in no candidate obtaining the required majority, On the the candidates included in the Iist (S/3879 and Add.l third ballot, Ml'. Jean Spiropoulos (Greece) reeeived 6 3). On the first ballot, the following five candidates re votes, and after having also received the required ab ceived the required absolute majority of votes: Ml'. Ab solute majority of votes in the General Assembly, he was deI Hamid Badawi (Egypt), 8 votes; Mr, Wellington declared elected. 56 PART DI The Military Staff Committee Clulpter 10 WORK OF THE MIUTARY STAFF COJ\Il\IITTEE LETl 4(l<~, The ~1 ilitary Staff Committee bas been functioning continuously under the Draft Rules uf l'rocedure during the period under review and has held a total of twenty-six meetings without making further progress on matters of substance. 4(1(~ Egypl .\rahi: 3~();; to COI aggre, ~ orth alHI'(' 4ie .\rah ('0111r dom 1 taken ( iovcr ( hll:m ence 1 "een l.'uiter -l-ïl .'~6() ) the al' ~;> matte: within the C -l-~?1- cluded cil's i 4ï3 the re her S c' & askecl .~ curity action l iuterru would large severe -ti..J. J~ for a ~ Britis Ji il forces of th showe ried a had i of On tian. t the ql 57 crmuent for militarv Kingdom Goverrnuent ils action, in support ~I 11:-l':l1 and Oman. , -labilil'< "i that nrea n kllO\ni to bl' artin'. PART IV 1 Il,,t !tt-CII cluvked, th , [elt far hevond the Su iHult('r~ submitted to the St'l'llrit~, Couneil whicb l\ ..-re not udmitted to its ageuda l 'nited Kiugdom re charge':- against his (;( dation and he truste.l C"aptpr 11 ("('ed further with the t 4i7, Tht' represen LETTER IlATEn l:~ AV(;{lST 1957 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF E(;YPl" IRAQ. JORDAN. lhat a charge of aggr, LEB \~()N. LIB\ A. :UOROCCO. SAUDI ARABIA. SUDAN. ~YRIA. Tl:NISIA AND YEl\IEN. cern :\1oreover, the f AnDRE~SEn 1'0 THE PRESIDENT OF TIlE SECURITY COUN<:IL. CON(;ERNING THE SITUA. taken place and that TIO~ hv eleven Xlemher Ste IN OMAN (lI that charge. l ~ ndei Securitv Council had ·HII). 011 13 .\lIgll.;t 1q:;i. the representatives of 34 and .) ~ of the Charter. The daim that the military item, onlv tu dete: Egypt. Iraq. j ordan, l.elxmou. Libya, Morocco, Saudi phase of the Oman question was over was an attempt il aggressioll h:111 been c( Arabia, Sudan, Svria, Tunisia and Yémen requested (SI to cover up the fact that the British military interven of the competence of t 3~CJ:; and :\d(1.1 ) the l'resident of the Security Council tion hall heen in contravention of the Charter. It would tion believe.l that Arti to couvcne an urgent meeting to consider "the armed he regrettable, if in a serions situation like the one heforc expressly permittecl th aggre,;sion hy the l'nitcd Kingdom of Great Britain and it, the Council's meeting ended without it taking ap take enforcemeut meas \orthern Irelnud agaill.;t tilt' indopcudence, sovcreignty propriate mensures to protect the rights of the people of the peace, hreach of th and -erritorinl intl'grity (li the' Inuunate oi Oman". l iman. in matters which wer 4iO. The letter of the representatives of the eleven 475. Tl1\' representative of the United Kingdom op jurisdiction of an)" St: .\rah States dcclmed that the people of Oman had he posing the inscription of the item on the agenda, chnrac United Kingrlom woul come victims of an armed aggression by the United King terized the complaint as inconsistent, incoherent and im charge of aggression. 1 dom l ;owrnml'nt, and that the aggression had latterly proper, 1t was clearly out of prudence that the complain of the United Kingdoi taken the form of full-scalc war. The United Kingdom ants had not invoked Chapter VII of the Charter which argument it would P dealt with nggressiou, but had referred the matter under t iovemmeut was seeking ta destroy the sovereignty of However, in connexioi ( hnan. a country long independeut and whose independ .vrticlc 35 as a dispute or a situation. Underlying the former Solicitor-Gener cnce had hecn reaffirmed in the Treatv of Sib which had complaint was the assumptiou that there was an inde declared that intervent heen entered into between Muscat and Oman, with the pendent State of Oman. In facto however, there was no admissible, l'ven if it h L'nitcd Kingdom Government acting as intermediary. sovereign State of Oman, Oman being only a district in of the Government c the dominions of the Sultan of :\Iuscat and Oman, The treaty, in suppressing : 471. In a cahlegram dated 17 August 1957 (S/ Sultan hac! already protested that the matter felI ,vithin 3~6ô), the Sultan of :\Iuscat and Oman protested against his internaI juriscliction, The military action taken by -m~. The l'l'present: the action of the eleven Arah States and stated that the British for~cs was at the request of the Sultan, ta assist complicated legal quest matters ta which their letter rcferred fel1 exclusivelv him to restore order in the face of a revoIt encouraged with reference to the Si within hi,; internaI jurisdiction anù were no concern of and supported from outside. not !juite dear as to wl the C nited Xations. 476. The representative of the United Kingdom went tan of :\Iuscat's daim and other controversial 4Î2. The letter of the eleven Arab States was in on to say that the sovereignty of the Sultan over the coasta! areas of M llscat and the mountainous district of Oman ta enable the Cound duded in the provisional agenda of the Security Coun Therefore, the Philippi dl\ i83rd meeting held on 20 August 1957. had heen recognized in various international treaties. The Sih agreement of 1920 was not an international treaty position on the merits 473, In the discussion on the adoption of the agenda. hetween t\\"o separate States. It was an agreement con favour of the inclusion the representative of Iraq stated that eleven Arab Mem cluded. after a certain trouble in the interior had been -1-79. The represent her States. acting under Article 35 of the Charter, had put down. between the Sultan on the one hand, and a a~ked de1egation had alwavs il for urgent consideration of the matter by the Se number of trilJal leaders in Oman on the other. The intervention and had fa curity Coundl because they felt that the United Kingdom agreement had allowed Omani tribes a measure of local of those questions, but action in Oman. besides endangering the maintenance of autonomy, but it had in no ,vay recognized Oman as an was a domestic prob1en international peace and security in the J\Iiddle East, independent State. Relations that had been good for within the jurisdiction \\"ould establish a precedent in the relationship between thirty-four }'ears following conclusion of that agreement of the Treaty of Sib large and small States contrar}' to the who1e concept of became bad in 1954, when Gha1ib bin Ali, successor of given a. certain measu sovereignty as the basis of world order. Imam Mohammed, defied the authority of the Sultan reignty of the Sultan an ·1-i..1-. The representative of Iraq said that Oman had and claimed to be an independent ruler. That revoIt had sig1led that Treaty a. for a long time enjoyed an independent status and the received little support from the people of Oman and the rather as a l'l'present British military intervention in collaboration with the Sultan had been able to assert his authority without diffi given greatu' autonon forces of the Sultanate of Muscat constituted a violation culty. Consequently, Imam Ghalib had rcsigned his of ~man had, through a of the Charter. Press reports of the 1ast few weeks fice in 1955 and the tribes had expressed their loyalty ta mtervention bV the U "hower! that large-scale military operations had been car the Sultan. Recentl}', however. Ghalib bin Ali and his that the propo~ed item ried out against Oman. 1t was dear that foreign troops ambitious brather, Talib, had again begun a revoIt. In of the Coundl, the Ct had intervened with the object of subduing the people the present case they had been better prepared and had inclusion in the agenda of Oman and occupying their country, The Iraqi delega been more extensively supported From outside the cotm 480. The represent, tion, therefore, believed that the Coundl should indude try than during 1954-1955. In those circumstances, the cialist Repttblics stated Sult~n the question in its agenda in accordance with Articles had felt obliged to ask the United Kingdom Gov- sentative had attempted 58 ~,:.. '_-...:lllIit p= ."'. ,., .. ernuu-nt for militarv and air assistance, The United of his (;m'erlmlt'pt's intervention in the internal affairs Kingdom Governmeut had accede.l to that request, and "i the IwoPIt- of Ouian and had tried to justify its military it- action. in support of the legitimat(' Govenuuent of actron ln' refcrrinJ,: to 0101 traditional tics between the ~d u-cat and Oman, luu! beon in the interest of the Iuitcd Kingdolll and the ~u1tan of Xluscat. l lowever. ,lahilit\ IIi that an'a wln-re subversive forces had lx-en no colonial ties couk1 serve a~ a justitlcation for British kIlO"'I; tu Il.' active. 1i 111l' di-turbances in Oman had armed intervention in Oman, The ~o\'it'l delegalion Iullv Ill.t hl'l'n clu-cked, the consequences might have been agreed with the eleven Arab States which had described Ielt far bevoud the Sultanate of Xluscat and Oman. The the British intervention :IS "armed aggrt'ssion" in their 1'uited Kingdom representative concluded that the lcttcr. .\Ii availahle information clearlv showed that the dlarge" against his ( iovernmeut wcre without any Ioun Hritish for..t'~ had conducted largc-scale military opera dation and he truste.l the Council woukl decline to pro tions with the help of most modern weapons. The varions n'{'<\ further with the matter. Press reports had also made it ch-ar that the aggressin' .+ii. l'hl' representative of the Philippines observed actions of the Inited Kingdom were dictated Ily nothing ihat a charge of :Iggrt'ssiou should hl.' a matter of con more thau the interests of British and Anglo-Americau cern Xloreover. the fact that military intervention had oi! companies and that the so-calied friendly aid ta the laken place and that the complaint had heen submitted Sultan of :M uscat was in fact aimed at seizing oil hv eleveu Xlemher States gave colom to the seriousness reserves in arras belonging to the Arab peoples. Since 01 that charge, l 'nder Article 39 uf the Charter. the the British military action constituted a violation of the Securitv Council had no alternative but to consider the basic priuciples of international law and of the United item, il onlv to determine whether or not an act of Xations Charter. the Soviet delegation would support aggressiull h:ld been committed. As regards the question the request of the eleve11 Arab States that the Council of the competence of the Council, the Philippine delega shoukl consider the t·vents in Oma11 and should take tion helieved that Article 2. paragraph 7, of the Charter effective mensures to put an end to the United Kingdorn's expressly perrnitted the United Xations ta intervene and aggressiou, take enforcement mensures where there was a threat to .j.~1. At the 784th meeting (20 August 1957), the tht' pt'ace. hrt'ach of the peace. or aet of aggression, even representative of the L'nited States said that his 1 See ODieia/ Re Sessio/l. Supp/clIlenl 60 Ji': ISlllll Il of that :in~- the PART V ouse itiou hroll~bl here Mntl('rl4 10 the attention of the Securhy Council but nol diseussed in the Council Ihl' the Chapter 12 iflict ided : the REPORTS ON l'liE STHATEGIt: TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS bate ever 41)1. The n'port of the Trusteeship Council ta the 492. On 1~ June 195R, the Secretary-General trans in it , ~l't'urilv Council on the strategie Trust Territory of the mitted to the Security Council the report (S/4031) re l l'adlie. 1slatuls, con'ring the period from 15 August ceived from the representative of the United States of }lIS() tll 12 .lui)' 11157 (S/3X52). was trnnsmitted to the America on the administration of the Trust Territory dom L'ouucil on 17 .1 uly 11157. for the period 1 July 1956 ta 30 June 1957. ad r iade lient was aI\(l Chapter 18 11\'\' th.u REPORTS OF l'IlE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION Il a and 403. B)' a Ietter dntcrl 30 Scptember 1957 (S/ Suh-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (OC/ 153. 3Xl)3), the Chainuau of the Disarmamcnt Commission 112 and DC/113), together with the verbatim records Il'l'n forwardecl to the ~elTl'larv-l il'Ileral, for transmission to and related documents of the n'levant meetings of the had the Sccurity L'ouncil, thl' fourth and fifth reports of the Commission. Its the tory le. Chapter 14 ncâ. tlic (:OI\IlUUNICATIONS FROM l'IlE ORGAMZATION OF AMERICAN STATES Illet' itcd 4l}4. On 27 Mav 11)57. the Chairman of the Council mittee was established to collaborate with the Govem the of the Orgauization of American States (OAS) trans ments of Honduras and Nicaragua in complying with the mitted to the Secretury-t ~elll'ral for the information of recommendations of the Council of the OAS for a peace (SI the Secnritv Council, ill acconlance with Article 54 of ful settlement of the controversy in accordance with the ~ba the Charter, a l'l'port (S/3~%) suhmitted to the Council American Treaty of Pacifie Scttlement (Pact of Bogota) uni of the O:\S h)' tilt' Investigating Committee which it had which the two countries had ratified. 1 ;sed estahlishcd undcr its l'l'solution of 2 Mav 1957 ta in 495. Hy further Ietters dated 8 and 23 July 1957 that vestigate on the spot the facts and antecedents of a dis- (S/3857/Rev.! and S/3859), the Chairman of the eful , pute betwcen Honduras and Nicaragua, The l'l'port, Council of the OAS transmitted ta the Secretary-General .on which covered, inter ali«, the activities of the Cornmittee for the information of the Security Council ané of the 'avy in effccting a ceasc-Iirc, stated in its conclusions that the International Court of Justice the texts of two agree -m dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua involved the ments signed by the Governments of Honduras and Ni l'Ïth validity of an arbitral award Il)' the King of Spain on 23 caragua in respect of their dispute. By the first agree ight Decemher 190(i on the question of the houndaries be ment, which was embodied in a l'l'solution adopted by the tween the two countries. Also trnnsmitted were two reso Council of the OAS on 5 July, the two countries agreed Intions approved by the Council of the OAS on 17 and to submit ta the International Court of Justice their 2..J. l\Iay 1957. under which the activities of the Inves differences with respect ta the Award of the King of tigating Committee were terrninated and an ad hoc Cam- Spain on 23 December 1906; the second agreement, I Sec Official Records 61 r./rapter 15 dose at the repr r.O:'\Il\Il1~IC\TI()NS FlUHI EGYPT RELATIN(; TO THE SUEZ CANAL outlining and stat .~l)( J, Fllllowing the consideration hy the Security ·197. By a letter dated 20 May 1958 (5/-1-01-1-), the 502. l'(lnlll'i! (li the item eutitled "Situation created by tilt' Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic represen uuilatvrnl action oi the Egyptian t iovermnent in hringing transmitted to the Secretary-ticneral, with reference tu Ceneral 10 ail l'nll tlll' system of international operation of the paragraph 8 of the Declaration on the Suez Canal and the 1 The pre Sm'z Canal, wlrich wa« confirmed and completed by the arrangements for its operation, the text of II('a COl\ll\IUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE GULF OF AQABA .j.Q8. In May and June 1957, the Security Couneil ceptionally 10\V altitude over Saudi military positions and had received communications from the representatives of had attempted a Ianding before being made ta withdraw. lsrael and Saudi Arabia concerning incidents in the Gulf This charge was denied by the representative of Israel L1f Aqaba.! in a letter dated 8 November (Sj 3006), -1-99, In a letter dated 6 November 195ï (Sj3905), 500. In a letter dated 25 November (Sj3918), the 506. the representative of Saudi Arabia charged that on 28 representative of Saudi Arabia charged that on 14 No the repre October an Israel military aircraft had circulated at ex- vember an Israel military aircraft had again circulated the Secu at a very low altitude over Saudi territory and ll1i1itary Yemeni t l :-'n' (;,'I/,'r,l! ,L"s,'mb!y. Offi.-ùl! Rcc,Jrd... : Tœelfth Sessioll, positions. The representative of Israel denied this allega dom duri Sut'''!'''lt'nt X,). :: ,:\:3(>48), l11apler 15. tian in a letter dated 26 November (Sj3919). The lette planned the territ if those a of Yeme Cllapter 17 Secl1rity 50ï. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS sentative randum e 501. In a letter dated 13 June 1958 (Sj4025), ad partition of the island could not be achieved by lawful by Yeme dressed to the President of the Securitv Council the re means, the Turkish Governl11ent had decided ta impose Yemen-A p:'esentative of Greece cire\\' the attenti~n of the Council it by force bath in Cyprus and on the international level. forces sin ta the grave situation created hy reeent l'vents in Cyprus, Accordingly, violence had been unleashed in Cyprus and United which he stated had international implications endanger Tnrkish Governl11ent officiaIs of the highest level had sion, stat ing peace and security in the eastern ::\Iediterranean. The threatened direct intervention by Turkish l11ilitary forces, dents alle attaek~ letter went on to charge that attacks by the Turkish The representative of Greece went on ta express regret ). in minorit)' on Cyprus against the life, honour and property that the British authorities in Cyprus had not been able ta the pl' (lf the Greek population of the island constituted a pre to prevent the attacks nor protect the Greek population Aden Pr meditated and planned aggression and that the sudden of the island, despite the responsibility placed on the Kingdom cruption of \'iolence and hatred had been artificially British Admini3tration under the Charter for ensuring on 20 Ja created by the Turkish Go\'ernment and its agents in the Iife and destiny of a people in a 110n-self-governing demarcate arder ta sen-e nationalist Tnrkish political aims. Since territory. The situation \Vas very grave, and deserved the J Kingdom' 62 1 close attention of the Security Council. With his letter, Cyprus question and to aggravate the already tense situa the representative of Greece transmitted a memorandum tion prevailing on the island. He also transmitted a memo outlining fourteen specifie complaints relating to incidents randum replying in detail to the fourteen specifie charges and statements, contained in the memorandum transmitted by the Greek S/4014), the , 502. In a letter also dated 13 June (S/4026), the representative. \rab Republic representative of Turkey transmitted to the Secretary 504. In a letter dated 19 June (S/4033), the repre , reference tu l .eneral information concerning recent l'vents in Cyprus. sentative of Greece submitted comments on the letter Canal and the 1 The problem of Cyprus, he declared, had originated in (Jf 1Cl June from the representative of Turkey and de of 11l':\(\s of 1951 with the Greek demand for the aunexation of that fended the accuracy of the charges made in his original of the Suez island. Greece had brought the question ta the General complaint of 13 June. Greece regarded the Cyprus proh . h)' represen Assembly, and at the same time the Greek community lem as an issue of freedom and self-determination and on Cyprus had resorted to terrorist methods, with a view essentially a United Nations problem, According1y, t't't'SSor to the 4 of the stock to securing the annexation of the island to Greece without Greece was detennined to abide by any decision of the ompnny. l'hl' taking into consideration the legitimate and historie rights United Nations. The situation required conciliation, and full and final and interests of Turkey and ignoring the existence of Greece had aJways remained ready to respond to any heders of the the Turkish population of Cyprus, That group considered sincere and constructive move, He considered, however, 1 }.Jationaliza- itself entitled to the right of self-determination and wished that the Turkish demand for partition as a pre-condition ta live under the protection of Turkey by the partition to any settlement was much more like a Diktat. He also 1 the Interna- 1 Ipment, under of the island. To illustrate his contention that the Turkish transmitted a note containing supplementary data to sup greement had t community in Cyprus had long lived under unbearab1e port his charges that Turkish officiaIs had threatened until the l'OU- r conditions and had recently had new hardships imposed direct intervention, as weIl as information concerning 'l'ment imple upon them, he cited a number of acts of violence which demonstrations held in Istanbul. agent for the had occurred since 3 June 1958, involving the death of 505. In a letter dated 24 June (S/403.5), the repre mies provided Turkish residents and damage to their properties. sentative of Turkey stated that no new points had been flairs of the , 503. In a letter dated 16 June (S/4028). the repre raised br the letter of 16 June (S/4026) from Greece. litY ta recall sentative of Turkey replied to the points raised in the Accordingly, he maintained his previous view that the 1 extended bv , letter dated 13 June from the representative of Greece Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations had mal Bank. . (S/4025), charging that that letter constituted an at attempted to use a high organ of the United Nations for tempt by the Greek Government to disseminate false in the dissemination of false information and unfounded formation and unfounded accusations against the Turkish accusations, in an effort ta obscure the heavy responsi Government and Turkish residents in Cyprus, and was hilitv which the Greek Government bore for the initiation, only one among a series of actions by which Greece had continuation and recent aggravation of the situation on recently undertaken ta confuse the issues concerning the Cyprns. Chapter 18 positians and ta withdraw, COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN PART tive of Israel OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 3/3918), the 506. Bya letter dated 27 February 1958 (S/3%9), joint conciliation comnnssions on the frontier for the t on 14 No the representative of Yémen informed the President of purpose of adjusting disputes had, unfortunately, not been ain circulated the Security Council of a series of alleged violations of accepted by Yl'men. Moreover, Yl'men had repeatedly and military Yemeni territory committed by forces of the United King proclaimed its ambitions to absorb the territory of Aden d this allega dom during the period 21 January to 20 February 1958. Protectorate and had recently intensified its subversive ~). The letter charged that they were demonstrations of a activities among the tribes of Aden. planned and persistent campaign of aggression against 508. Bya letter dated 17 April (S/3989), the repre the territorial integrity of Yémen. The letter added that sentative of the United Kingdom charged that Yemeni if those acts of aggression did not cease, the Government forces had made two more attacks against the Aden of Yémen would be obliged to raise the matter before the Protectorate and that British forces had taken measures Security Council. in se1f-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the 507. By a letter dated 6 March (S/3977), the repre Charter. sentative of the United Kingdom transmitted a memo 509. By a letter dated 2 May (S/4OO1), the repre randum concerning an investigation of the charges made sentative of Yl'men denied the charges set forth in the ed by lawful by y l'men. It also listed a series of violations of the United Kingdom communications of 6 March and 17 ed to impose Yémen-Aden border aJlegedly committed by Yemeni April, stating that they were aimed at diverting public aational level. forces since 21 January 1958. The representative of the opinion from British acts of aggression and suppression United Kingdom, denying Yemen's charges of aggres of the liberation movernents in the so-called British Pro 1 Cyprus and est level had sion, statec1 that investigation had shown that the inci tectorates, The letter charged that British planes had at ilitary forces. dents alleged had either not taken place or had originated tacked villages inside Yernen, causing loss of lives and in attacks hy Yemeni forces themselves, With reference property damage. The most disquieting aet of aggression, xpress regret ~ iot been able ta the problem of the boundary between Yl'men and the the letter went on, was the occupation of the Sultanate ek population Aden Protectorate, the representative of the United of Lahej, about 19 April, by more than 4,000 British laced on the Kingdom recalled that the two Governments had agreed, troops which had concentrated on the provisional fron for ensuring on 20 January 1951, to establish joint commissions ta tiers between Yl'men and that Sultanate. Such aets con ;elf-governing demarcate the boundary in disputed areas. The United stituted a grave threat to the peace, and the Government Kingdom's proposaIs made in November 1957 to set up of Yl'men would welcome the establishment of a neutral deserved the ~ 63 1 comnussion ta iuvestigate 011 the spot the destruction SIL Hy another letter (Sj4044) , dated 9 july caused h)' British forces within Yi-nu-ni territory. 1%~. the representative of the United Kingdom stated SIO. A letter dated 7 :'lIa)' (:-'/4()()4) from the thar on ~ J~lly a platoon of Aden Protectorate levies had representative of the l 'nitcd Kingdom charged that on her-n fired on across the frontier from Yémen by heavy the previous la)' British two!'s and planes had beru machine guns located near the tOWII of Harib. British air fired upon hy Yemeni forces opcrating from posts il jurl'l's had taken mensures in self-defence ta silence thèse legall)' estahlished within Aden, and from Yemeu, British machine g111lS. ln the action which followed, one British forces hall taken mensures in self-Ill'Îl'nce tu silence the aircraft had heen hit and had crashed in Yemeni territory gunfirt'. while one Yemeni anti-aircrnft gun hall been destroyed, Chapter 19 PAl'tEL Io'OR INQUIRY AND CONCILIATION 512. On 30 Decemher 19Sï. the Secrctarv-Geueral Assembly resolution 268 D (III) of 28 April 1949 ta circulatcd for the information of the members of the , serve five-year terms as members of the Panel for Security Couneil a revised list (Sj3929) of persons r designated by Membcr States in pursuance of General Inquiry and Conciliation. Chapter 20 nHIMlTNICATION {~ONCERNING THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 513. On ï March 1958 the Secretary-General corn the Secretary-General to communicate the content of municated ta the President of the Security Council the tiie previous note ta the States Mernbers, as weIl as ta text of two notes from the Minister of Foreign Affairs the principal and appropriate subsidiary organs of the of the United Arah Republic (S/39ï6). In the first United Nations. In the same note, the Government of note. dated 24 February 1958, the Minister for Foreign the United Arab Republic declared that the Union henee Affairs notified the Secretary-General that a plebiscite forth was a single Member of the United Nations, bound , held in Egypt and Syria on 21 February 1958 had re by the provisions of the Charter and that aIl treaties sulted in the establishment uf the United Arab Republic, and agreements concluded by Egypt or Syria with other 1 C having Cairo as its capital. and in the election of Presi countries would remain valid within the regional limits dent Gamal Abdel Xasser as President of the new Re prescribed on their conclusion and ln aecordanee with the public. The second note. dated 1 Xlarch 1958, requested principles of international 1:1\'11'. .. de by CIz Co ~ , CIII ~'. 1', Fra 64 -4), dated 9 July • cd Kingdom stated )tectorate levies had 11 y l'men by heavy If Harib. British air ence ta silence these illowed, one British APPENDICES in Yemeni territory Se('urit~· id been destroyed. J. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatlves aecredited to the Council The following representatives and dcputy, alternate Iraq ;JI1d acting representatrves were accredited to the :\11'. Moussa Al-Shabandar Security Council during the period covered hy the Mr. l Iashim jawad prrsent report: Mr, Mohammed FadHJ j amali Australiat lIfr. Kadhim Khalaf MI'. E. Ronald "'alker \1 l', Abdul Majid Abbas :\11'. Brian C. Hill f 28 April 1949 ta Ja/,llI/:l of the Panel for ("lIlada:l :\11'. \Ioto Matsudaira :'Ir. R. A. !\IacKay ~Ir. Masnyoshi Kakitsuho \1r. C. S. A. Ritchie l'l/I/ama:! :\11'. John W. Holmes \1 r. .1 orge Illueca \11'. Geoffrey Stuart Murray \[1'. Ernesto de la Ossa :\11'. John G. H. Halstead l'hili]:/,ines1 China General Carlos P. Romulo :\11'. Tingfu F, Tsiang Mr, José D. Ingles \11'. Chiping R. C. Kiang ate the content of Mr. Mauro Mendez ibers, as we11 as ta Colombia Siccdcn iary organs of the MI'. Francisco Urrutia :MI'. Gunnar V. j arring the Government of MI'. Alfonso Araujo .:\11'. Claes Carbonnier 11 the Union hence Mr. Carlos Vesga Duarte ited Nations, bound Mr, Alberto Zuleta Angel Id that a11 treaties Union of Soriet Socialist Rcpublics )1' Syria with other CubaI MI'. Arkady Aleksandrovich Sobolev ;',[1'. Georgy Petrovich Arkadev the regional limits MI'. Emilio Xufiez-Portuondo Mr, Klirnent Danilovich Levychkin accordance with the MI'. Carlos Blanco Dra. Uldarica Mafias L'nitcd K inqdotn of Great Britain and .\"ortlicrn Freland France Sir Pierson Dixon ~Ir. P, 11. Crosthwaire MI'. Guillaume Georges-Picot \11'. Harold Beeley MI'. Louis de Gmringaud Xlr, Pierre de VaucelIes l 'lIitcd States of America MI'. Pierre Ordonneau MI'. Henry Cahot Lodge \\'ad~\Vorth 1 Tenu of office ended 31 December 1957. Ml'. james J. 2 Term of office began on 1 j anuary 1958. Xl r. James W, Barco II. Presidents of the Security Council The following representatives held the office of Presi- [l'lit] • dent of the Security Council during the period covered Mr. Hashim jnwad (1 10 30 Xovernher 1957) by the present report: Pltilippincs C/zil/a General Carlos P. Romulo (1 to .lI Decernber 195i) .:\11'. Tingfu F. Tsiang (16 to 31 July 1957) Ssccdcn Colombie ~fr. Gunnar V. Jarring (1 1031 j anuary 195R) MI'. Francisco Urrutia (1 to 31 August 1957) t Cuba Union of Soviet Socialist Rcpublics MI', Emilio l\uiiez-Portuolldo (1 to 30 September 1957) Xlr. Arkady Aleksnndrovich Sobolev (1 to 28 February 1958) France United Kùurdom of Great Britaiu and Northern. Freland 1111', Guillaume Georges-Picot (1 to 31 October 1957) Sir Pierson Dix on (1 to 31 March 1958) 65 {·uil..d States of .'11111"';("11 China ~lr. Henry Cahot Lodge (i tll JO .\prit 1958) MI'. Tingfu F. Tsiang (1 to 30 June 1958) c"(lIIada Colombie ).[1'. C. S. A. Ritchie (1 to 31 May 1958) Mr..Ylfonso Arauio 11 to 15 July 1958) III. Meetings of the Securîty Council during the period from 16 July 1957 to 15 July 1958 Dote -'lutiull Dou August 1957 February 1958 i~3rd Adoption of the agenda (Letter 20 Letter dated 14 February 1958 18 dated 13 August 1957 from the from the permanent represen permanent representatives of tative of France to the Presi Egypt, Iraq, Jordan. Lebanon, dent of the Security Council Libya, ~f orocco, Saudi Arabia, concerning : "Situation result Sudan, Syria and Yemen ad ing from the aid furnished by dressed to the President of Tunisia to l'l'bels enabling the Security Council) them to conduct operations 7~4th Ditto 20 from Tunisian territory di rected against the integrity of Consideration of the report of 21 785th French territory and the safety the Security Council to the (privatc) of the persons and property General Assernbly of French nationals" September 1957 RUth Letter dated 20 February 1958 21 786th Admission of new Members 5 from the representative of the 787th The Palestine question 6 Sudar, addressed to the Secre 7R~th Ditto 6 tal'y-General 71'9th Admission of new Mernbers 9 April 1958 700th Ditto 9 8Uth Complaint of the representative 21 791st The India-Pakistan question 24 of the Union of Soviet Social ist Republics in a letter to the 792nd Recommendation for the appoint 26 ruent of the Secretary-Genera1 President of the Security Council dated 18 April 1958 of the United Nations entitled : "Urgent measures to October 1957 put an end to fiights by United 793rd Election of live mernbers of the 1 States military aircraft arrned International Court of Justice with atornic and hydrogen 794th Election of one mernber of the bombs in the direction of the International Court of Justice frontiers of the Soviet Union" 795th The India-Pakistan question 9 814th Ditto 29 796th Ditto 9 815th Ditto 29 ï9ïth Ditto 25 May 1958 798th Ditto 29 816th Ditto 2 November 1957 817th Ditto 2 799th Ditto 5 818th Letter dated 22 May 1958 from 27 800th Ditto 11 the representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of 801st Ditto 13 the Security Council concern S02nd Ditto 15 ing : "Complaint by Lebanon 803rd Ditto 18 in respect of a situation arising 804th Ditto 20 from the intervention of the 805th Ditto 21 United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, The Palestine question 22 806th the continuance of which is 807th The India-Pakistan question 22 like1y to endanger the main December 1957 tenance of international peace and security" 808th Ditto 2 January 1958 June 1958 809th The Palestine question 22 819th Letter dated 29 :May 1958 from 2 the representative of Tunisia 810th Ditto 22 to the President of the Se February 1958 curity Council concerning: 811th Letter c1ated 13 February 1958 18 "Complaint by Tunisia in re from the permanent represen spect of acts of armed aggres tative of Tunisia to the Presi sion committed against it since dent of the Security Counci1 19 May 1958 by the French concerning: "Complaint by Tu military forces stationed in its nisia in respect of an act of territory and in Algeria" aggression committed against Letter dated 29 May 1958 from it by France on 8 February the representative of France 1958 at Sa'riet-Sidi-Youssef" to the President of the Secur- 66 DfIU Slfbj«t June 1958 plaint by Tunisia in respect of oJune 1958) ity Council concerning: (a) acts of armed aggression com "The cornplaint brought by mitted against it sirice 19 May France against Tunisia on 1958 by the French military [uly 1958) 14 February 1958" and (b) forces stationed in its territory "The situation arising out of and in Algeria" the disruption, by Tunisia, of Letter dated 29 May 1958 from 57 to 15 July 1958 the modus oiuendi which had the representative of France been established since Feb to the President ot the Secur ruary 1958 with regard to the ity Council concerning: (a) Dole "The cornplaint brought by February 1958 stationing of French troops at certain points in Tunisian ter France against Tunisia on 14 !bruary 1958 18 ritory" February 1958" and (b) "The mt represen '1 situation arising out of the 820th Ditto 2 othe Presi disruption, by Tunisia, of the rity Council 821st Ditto 4 modus vivelldi which had been ation result 822nd Letler dated 22 May 1958 from 5 established since February 1958 furnished by the representative of Lebanon with regard to the stationing :Is enabling addressed to the President of of French troops at certain : operations the Security Council concern points in Tunisian territory" erritory di ing: "Complaint by Lebanon integrity of t in respect of a situation aris July 1958 id the safety Î ing from the intervention of 827th Letter dated 22 May 1958 from 15 .nd property the United Arab Republic in the representative of Lebanon 15" the internai affaira of Lebanon, addressed to the President of ~bruar)' 1958 21 the continuance of which is the Security Council concern tative of the likely ta endanger the main ing: "Complaint of Lebanon othe Secre- tenance of international peace in respect of a situation aris and security" ing from the intervention of 823rd Ditto 6 the United Arab Republic in April 1958 824th Ditto 10 the internai affairs of Le 21 epresentative 825th Ditto 11 banon, the continuance of oviet Social which is likely to endanger Letter dated 29 May 1958 from 18 letter to the 826th the maintenance of inter the representative of Tunisia le Security national peace and security" April 1958 to the President of the Secur 828th Ditto measures to ity Council concerning: "Corn- 15 ts by United -craft armed i hydrogen IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretarfes of the Military Stail Committee ction of the oviet Union" (16 July 1957 ta 15 July 1958) 29 29 A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE May 1958 Period o{ Service from 16 J11ly 1957 2 CHINA 2 27 Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army 16 July 1957 to present tirne f 1958 from Captain Wu Chia-hsun, Chinese Navy 16 July 1957 to present time of Lebanon President of FRANCE Ici! concern by Lebanon Général de Brigade M. Pénette, French Army 16 July 1957 to 19 December 1957 ation arising Général de Brigade J. B. de Bary, French Army 20 December 1957 to present time ition of the Capitaine de Vaisseau E. Cagne, French Navy 16 July 1957 to 7 March 1958 ublic in the Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy 8 March 1958 to present time If Lebanon, If which is UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS r the main Major General 1. M. Saraev, Soviet Army 16 July 1957 to present time itional peace Colonel A. M. Kuchumov, USSR Air Force 16 July 1957 to present time Lt. Commander Y. D. Kvashnin, USSR Navy 16 July 1957 to present time June 1958 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 2 f 1958 from Vice-Admirai Sir Robert Elkins, Royal Navy 16 July 1957 to present time of Tunisia Air Vice Marshal A. D. Selway, Royal Air Force 16 .Tuly 1957 to 12 March 1958 of the Se Air Vice Marshal W. C. Sheen, Royal Air Force 13 March 1958 to present time concerning : Major Genera! V. Boucher, British Army 16 July 1957 to 18 June 1958 misia in re Major General J. N. Carter, British Army 19 June 1958 to present time med aggres ainst it since UNITED STATES OF AMERICA the French tioned in its Lt. General T. W. Herren, US Army 16 July 1957 to 31 July 1957 lgeria" Lt. General B. M. Bryan, US Army 1 August 1957 to present time f 1958 from Vice-Admirai F. W. McMahon, US Navy 16 July 1957 to present time of France Lt. General W. E. Hall, US Air Force 16 }uly 1957 to present time f the Secur- 67 B. UST 0' CHAIRIoIItN (16 /111.\, 1957 1o 15 July 1958) M~m.., D.,. C".i..-. D,lel/.HOM 3l7th 18 July 1957 Lt, General 110 Shai-lai, Chinese :\rmy China 3l8th 1 Aug. 1957 Général de Brigade M. I'énene, French Army France 3l9th 15 Aug.1957 Capitaine de Vaisseau E. Cagne, French Xavy France 320th Z9 Aug.1957 Capitaine de Vaisseau E. Cagne, French Xavy France 32lst 12 Sept. 1957 Major General I. :-'1. Saraev, Soviet Arrny USSR 3.?2nd 26 Sept. 1957 ),!ajor General I. :-'1. Saraev, Soviet Arrny US SR 323rd 10 Oct. 1957 Major General V. Boucher, British Arrny United Kingdom 324th 24 Oct. 1957 Commodore J. C. C. Henley, Royal Xavy United Kingdom .?25th 6 ~ov.1957 1.t. General B. M. Bryan, US ..\rmj· l'nitcd States 326th 21 ~ov.1957 Lt, General R M. Bryan, US ..\rmy lnited States 327th 5 Dec, 1957 Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army China 328th 19 Dec, 1957 Lt. General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese ..\rmy China 329th 2 Jan. 1958 Général dl' Brigade J. B. de Hary, French Army France 330th 16 Jan. 1958 Général de Brigade J B. de Hary, French Army France 331st 30 Jan. 1958 Capitaine de Vaisseau E. Cagne. French Navy France 332nd 13 Feb. 1958 Colonel A. ),[, Kuchumov, USSR Air Force USSR 333rd 27 Feb. 1958 Major' General 1. M. Saraev, Soviet Arrny US SR 334th 13 Mar, 1958 Vice Admirai R. F. Elkins, Royal Xavy United Kingdom jj5th 27 M..:-. 1958 Major General V. Boucher, British Army Uniterl Kingdom 336th 10 Apr. lQ58 l.t. General B. M. Bryan, US Army L'nited States 337th 24 Apr, 1958 Lt. General B, M. Bryan, US Arrny United States 338th 8 May 1958 LI. General Ho Shai-lai, Chincse Army China 339th 22 May 1958 Lt, General Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army China 340th 5 June 1958 Général de Brigade J. B. de Bary, French Arrny France 341st lQ June 1958 Général de Brigade J. B. de Bary, French Army France 342nd 3 July 1958 Major General I. M. Saraev, Soviet Army USSR C. LIST OF PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES (16 July 1957 to 15 1Il1y 1958) 1tfuh'ng Dat. Principal S6crdary Deleçation. 317th 18 July 1957 LI. Colonel ]. Soong, Chinese Army China 318th 1 Aug, 1957 Lt. Colonel G. Bucher, French Army France 319th 15 Aug.1957 LI. Colonel G. Buchet, French Army France 320th 29 Aug.1957 LI. Colonel G. Huchet, French Army France 321st 12 Sept. 1957 Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army USSR 322nd 26 Sept. 1957 LI. Colonel V. V. Kramar, Soviet Army USSR 323rd 10 Oct. 1957 LI. Colonel K. R. Farquhar, British Arrny United Kingdom 324th 24 Oct. 1957 LI. Colonel K. R. Farquhar, British Army United Kingdom 325th 6 Nov. 1957 Colonel R. L. Inman, US Army United States 326th 21 Nov.1957 Colonel R. L. Inman, US Army Unitcd States 327th 5 Dec. 1957 Lt. Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army China 328th 19 Dec, 1957 LI. Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army China 329th 2 Jan. 1958 LI. Colonei G. Bucher, French Army France 330th 16 Jan. 1958 LI. Colonel G. Buchet, French Army France 331st 30 Jan. 1958 Capitaine de Vaisseau E. Cagne, French Navy France 332nd 13 Feb. 195f: Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army USSR 333rd 27 Feb. 1958 Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army USSR 334th 13 Mar. 1958 LI. Colonel K. R. Farquhar, British Arrny United Kingdom 335th 27 Mar. 1958 Group Captain J. R. Wilson, Royal Air Force United Kingdom 336th 10 Anr, 1958 Colonel R. L. Inman, US Army United States 337th 24 Apr, 1958 Colonel R. L. Inman, US Army United States 338th 8 May 1958 Lt. Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army China 339th 22 May 1958 Lt. Colonel J. Scong, Chinese Army China 340th 5 June 1958 Capitaine de Ccvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy France 341st 19 June 1958 Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy France 342nd 3 July 1958 Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army USSR • 68 1