GEORGE LEN CZOWSKI / Universiry of California at Berkeley ALSO BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI The Middle East Iran under the Pahlavis (Editor) Middle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age Oil and State in the Middle East The Politicql Awakening in the Middle East (Editor) in World Affairs Political Elites in the Middle East (Editor) Russia and the West in lran Soviet Advances in the Middle East United Stqtes Interests in the Middle Ecsl (Editor) FOURTH EDITION CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON t., , rh ,* DSoa-,8 L*4b t q"kb B AND J L. Copyright O 1952, 1956,1962,1980 by Cornell University TO All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be re- produced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. Published in the United Kingdom by Comell University Press Ltd., 2-4 Brook Street, london WIY 1AA. First edition 1952 Second edition 1956 Third edition 1962 Fourth edition 1980 International Standard Book Number (cloth) 0-8014-1273-0 Intemational Standard Book Number (paper) 0-8014-9872-4 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 79-17059 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: Library ofCongress cataloging information appears on the last page ofthe book, ,i ".-'T|!'EFFr'- 368 THE MTDDLE EA!T tN wonLD AFrAtt! TEBANON 369 the already surcharged atmosphert prcvailing among their followcrt, with the result- the military sensc) justificd thelr porllion by the necessity of Lcbanon's keeping on ing tension between the latter and thc Christian elements of Lcbanon. The Christians tricndly terms with the sunounding Arab world, which, they claimed, the one-sided considered, for example, public displays of Nasser's portraits in Moslem com- pro-Wcstern and anti-Cairo policy of President Chamoun had made impossible. By munities as an insult to the idea of l-ebanese independence and on some occasions thc same token, the predominantly Moslem leaders of the insurrection disclaimed an reacted to such provocations in a violent manner. These feuds and tensions wena exclusively Moslem character for their rebellion by pointing to their few Christian also reflected in the lrbanese newspapers, some of which were subsidized by allies. foreign embassies. In political terms this rebel coalition was opposed, in the first place, by thc The ideological cleavage had the effect of rendering the traditional struggle for government and those deputies in the recently elected parliament which supported power among the politicians more acute than ever before. Beginning with 1957 the it. These in turn were backed by the Phalanges Libanaises (Kataeb), an ovenrhelm- central issue in this struggle was President Chamoun's ambition to be reelected for a ingly Christian-Maronite party dedicated to the preservation of I*banese integrity second term in 1958. To achieve this the constitution would have had to be amended and independence, and reinforced by the militant members of the P.P.S., whosc by a two-thirds vote of the parliament. Anxious to attain his goal, Chamoun did not hatred of Nasserism pushed them into collaboration with lrbanese nationalists. The hesitate to use his influence to secure a solid majority in the parliamentary elections government, however, was gravely handicapped by its inability to count on the full of May-June 1957. As a result, certain traditional non-Christian leaders of Pan- support of the army. Although a majority of army officers were Christian, including Arab sympathies, such as Abdullah Yafi, Saeb Salam, and Kamal Jumblat were not its commanding general, Fuad Chehab, the rank and file were a hetercgcncoug elected. Deprived of a legal platform from which to voice their opinions, these men group which might easily split along ideological and confessional lines if expoeod to inevitably turned toward the street, seeking through extralegal means to reassert great strains. Consequently, the army played a rather passive role, contenting itself their role in lrbanon's political life. The conflict between Chamoun and the Pan- with the protection of government buildings and certain military objects, but rarely Arab opposition gained in intensity when Syria merged with Egypt into the United attempting an offensive. Arab Republic. Pro-Nasser manifestations in l,ebanon grew in number and vio- This brings us to the military aspect of the rebellion. Insurgents had banicadcd lence, resulting in bodily clashes between groups of different orientation as well as themselves irr the Moslem quarter of Beirut, the Basta, under the leadership of in intemperate editorials in the press. By the late spring the tension had reached former Premier Saeb Salam, who, strangely enough, was enjoying without hindrance dangerous proportions and only a spark was needed to provoke a major conflagra- the facilities of the government-controlled telephone system. The second major tion. rebel stronghold was in Tripoli, where the scion of the local feudal family, Rashid Karamah, reigned supreme. The third was in the Shuf mountain district, where The lzbanese Civil War Jumblat's Druzes had taken the warpath. Furthermore, large portions of Lebanon in Such a spark was provided when, on May 8, 1958, unknown assassins shot and the south and the east, along the Syrian border, found themselves under rebel killed Nassib Metni, editor of Al-Telegraf, a newspaper lately known for its outspo- control. ken Pan-Arabism and previously identified with Communist sympathies. Pan- The rebels were enjoying the active support of the newly formed United Arab Arabists immediately blamed l*banese nationalists, while launching strong attacks Republic, which from its Syrian province was supplying them with arms, muni- on President Chamoun and Premier Sami es-Sulh for tolerating and abetting acts of tions, money, and some personnel. Furthermore, several Lebanese border ports terrorism against their political opponents. By May l2 antigovernment riots reached were shelled and attacked by military raiding parties from Syria. Throughout the the proportions of an armed insurrection. Politically the rebels formed themselves major part of the rebellion the government forces controlled merely 18 kilometers into the so-called National Front, a loose coalition comprising those Sunni Moslem out of Lebanon's 324-kilometer boundary with Syria.s The rest was under rebel leaders who had lost parliamentary seats in 1957, the Druze faction of Kamal control and open to easy penetration from the Syrian side. Mule-pack trains of Jumblat, the Moslem followers of Rashid Karamah of Tripoli, the Moslem youth military equipment made regular inroads into lrbanon through these long stretches organization Naiiada headed by the radical Pan-Arabist Adnan Hakim, the Shia of unprotected border. Moslem faction of Ahmed Assad of Sidon (another loser in the 1957 elections), a In view of the army's passive role; much of the brunt of defense3gainst the variety of pro-Nasser elements in the Bekaa Valley and other parts of the country, rebels had to be borne by armed volunteer groups. Not infrequently the latter were and last, but not least, certain Christian elements opposing President Chamoun. Thc organized and led by the members of the P.P.S., whose superiororganization and latter included the influential clan of Franjiyeh of Zgharta in northem Lebanon, experience (especially true of Syrian refugee army offtcers affiliated with the party) represented by their kinsman Ren6 Muawad. Furthermore, in one of the ironical naturally placed them in a position of military leadership. It was such a heavily twists of history, the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Paul M6ouchi, gave hir implicit blessing to the insurgents, largely because of a personal Prpsidcnt fcud with tFor a detailcd account of thc civll wrr, reo Frhlm l. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washlngton, D.C,, Chamoun. Christians participating in the National Front (though not ovorly activo in r96r ), '*.-*,.i-."....q-rEil'r.".,' 370 THI MTDDLE EAt? tN wonLD AtrtAIll I,EBANON ,71 P.P.s.-staffed group which, at the "battle" of shemlan, succcssfully stopped sion directed from the ncrve-ccnlcr in Cairo. With an eye to preventing lurther Jumblat's Druzes in their attempt to cupture the Beirut airport and invadethe ciiy. spread of Pan-Arab revolution (with its anti-Western implications), thc Unitcd Politically, the objective of thc u.A.R.'s interventiorwas not quite clear. To States decided to send military forces to lrbanon with the immediate task of some extent it could be explained as a simple policy president of revenge against defending the latter's sovereignty and independence. In a special statement Prcsi. chamoun-a man vilified in the pan-nrau prcss as an' ag"ent of British dent Eisenhower declared that this action was undertaken at the explicit rcquest of intelligence-for his hands-off policy during the suez war and roitris harboring of the govemment of lrbanon. The first contingent of 3,600 American marines landcd the dissenters and plotters from syria. lrbanon, according to this expranation, was in Beirut on July 15 , followed by further units qf the army. American troops took no to be punished for its treason to the Arab cause and for becoming an imperialist base action in the conflict: they merely stayed, distributed on the beaches and at tho directed against Arab unity and liberation. once this punishm"it *u, inflicted, the airport. But their very presence constituted an important factor in the situation, rest remained uncertain. As a maximum target one might suspect Nasser,s desire to Closely following them to Beirut came Robert Murphy, under secretary of state for incorporate Lebanon into the U.A.R. There-is no conclusive evidence that this was political affairs, with the task of attempting a peaceful solution of the strife, Nasser's real goal. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, it is doubtful whether kba_ In the meantime President Chamoun declared that he would not seek rcelection non's rebel leaders (with.the possible exception of Najjada's leader, Adnan Hakim) for the second term, thus depriving the opposition of their main argument for really desired it.