GEORGE LEN CZOWSKI / Universiry of California at Berkeley

ALSO BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI The Iran under the Pahlavis (Editor) Middle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age Oil and State in the Middle East The Politicql Awakening in the Middle East (Editor) in World Affairs Political Elites in the Middle East (Editor) Russia and the West in lran Soviet Advances in the Middle East United Stqtes Interests in the Middle Ecsl (Editor) FOURTH EDITION

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

ITHACA AND LONDON

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B AND J L. Copyright O 1952, 1956,1962,1980 by Cornell University TO

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First edition 1952 Second edition 1956 Third edition 1962 Fourth edition 1980

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,i ".-'T|!'EFFr'- 368 THE MTDDLE EA!T tN wonLD AFrAtt! TEBANON 369

the already surcharged atmosphert prcvailing among their followcrt, with the result- the military sensc) justificd thelr porllion by the necessity of Lcbanon's keeping on ing tension between the latter and thc Christian elements of Lcbanon. The Christians tricndly terms with the sunounding Arab world, which, they claimed, the one-sided considered, for example, public displays of Nasser's portraits in Moslem com- pro-Wcstern and anti-Cairo policy of President Chamoun had made impossible. By munities as an insult to the idea of l-ebanese independence and on some occasions thc same token, the predominantly Moslem leaders of the insurrection disclaimed an reacted to such provocations in a violent manner. These feuds and tensions wena exclusively Moslem character for their rebellion by pointing to their few Christian also reflected in the lrbanese newspapers, some of which were subsidized by allies. foreign embassies. In political terms this rebel coalition was opposed, in the first place, by thc The ideological cleavage had the effect of rendering the traditional struggle for government and those deputies in the recently elected parliament which supported power among the politicians more acute than ever before. Beginning with 1957 the it. These in turn were backed by the Phalanges Libanaises (Kataeb), an ovenrhelm- central issue in this struggle was President Chamoun's ambition to be reelected for a ingly Christian-Maronite party dedicated to the preservation of I*banese integrity second term in 1958. To achieve this the constitution would have had to be amended and independence, and reinforced by the militant members of the P.P.S., whosc by a two-thirds vote of the parliament. Anxious to attain his goal, Chamoun did not hatred of Nasserism pushed them into collaboration with lrbanese nationalists. The hesitate to use his influence to secure a solid majority in the parliamentary elections government, however, was gravely handicapped by its inability to count on the full of May-June 1957. As a result, certain traditional non-Christian leaders of Pan- support of the army. Although a majority of army officers were Christian, including Arab sympathies, such as Abdullah Yafi, Saeb Salam, and Kamal Jumblat were not its commanding general, Fuad Chehab, the rank and file were a hetercgcncoug elected. Deprived of a legal platform from which to voice their opinions, these men group which might easily split along ideological and confessional lines if expoeod to inevitably turned toward the street, seeking through extralegal means to reassert great strains. Consequently, the army played a rather passive role, contenting itself their role in lrbanon's political life. The conflict between Chamoun and the Pan- with the protection of government buildings and certain military objects, but rarely Arab opposition gained in intensity when merged with into the United attempting an offensive. Arab Republic. Pro-Nasser manifestations in l,ebanon grew in number and vio- This brings us to the military aspect of the rebellion. Insurgents had banicadcd lence, resulting in bodily clashes between groups of different orientation as well as themselves irr the Moslem quarter of , the Basta, under the leadership of in intemperate editorials in the press. By the late spring the tension had reached former Premier Saeb Salam, who, strangely enough, was enjoying without hindrance dangerous proportions and only a spark was needed to provoke a major conflagra- the facilities of the government-controlled telephone system. The second major tion. rebel stronghold was in Tripoli, where the scion of the local feudal family, Rashid Karamah, reigned supreme. The third was in the Shuf mountain district, where The lzbanese Civil War Jumblat's Druzes had taken the warpath. Furthermore, large portions of in Such a spark was provided when, on May 8, 1958, unknown assassins shot and the south and the east, along the Syrian border, found themselves under rebel killed Nassib Metni, editor of Al-Telegraf, a newspaper lately known for its outspo- control. ken Pan-Arabism and previously identified with Communist sympathies. Pan- The rebels were enjoying the active support of the newly formed United Arab Arabists immediately blamed l*banese nationalists, while launching strong attacks Republic, which from its Syrian province was supplying them with arms, muni- on President Chamoun and Premier Sami es-Sulh for tolerating and abetting acts of tions, money, and some personnel. Furthermore, several Lebanese border ports terrorism against their political opponents. By May l2 antigovernment riots reached were shelled and attacked by military raiding parties from Syria. Throughout the the proportions of an armed insurrection. Politically the rebels formed themselves major part of the rebellion the government forces controlled merely 18 kilometers into the so-called National Front, a loose coalition comprising those Sunni Moslem out of Lebanon's 324-kilometer boundary with Syria.s The rest was under rebel leaders who had lost parliamentary seats in 1957, the Druze faction of Kamal control and open to easy penetration from the Syrian side. Mule-pack trains of Jumblat, the Moslem followers of Rashid Karamah of Tripoli, the Moslem youth military equipment made regular inroads into lrbanon through these long stretches organization Naiiada headed by the radical Pan-Arabist Adnan Hakim, the Shia of unprotected border. Moslem faction of Ahmed Assad of (another loser in the 1957 elections), a In view of the army's passive role; much of the brunt of defense3gainst the variety of pro-Nasser elements in the Bekaa Valley and other parts of the country, rebels had to be borne by armed volunteer groups. Not infrequently the latter were and last, but not least, certain Christian elements opposing President Chamoun. Thc organized and led by the members of the P.P.S., whose superiororganization and latter included the influential clan of Franjiyeh of Zgharta in northem Lebanon, experience (especially true of Syrian refugee army offtcers affiliated with the party) represented by their kinsman Ren6 Muawad. Furthermore, in one of the ironical naturally placed them in a position of military leadership. It was such a heavily twists of history, the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Paul M6ouchi, gave hir implicit blessing to the insurgents, largely because of a personal Prpsidcnt fcud with tFor a detailcd account of thc civll wrr, reo Frhlm l. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washlngton, D.C,, Chamoun. Christians participating in the National Front (though not ovorly activo in r96r ), '*.-*,.i-."....q-rEil'r.".,' 370 THI MTDDLE EAt? tN wonLD AtrtAIll I,EBANON ,71 P.P.s.-staffed group which, at the "battle" of shemlan, succcssfully stopped sion directed from the ncrve-ccnlcr in Cairo. With an eye to preventing lurther Jumblat's Druzes in their attempt to cupture the Beirut airport and invadethe ciiy. spread of Pan-Arab revolution (with its anti-Western implications), thc Unitcd Politically, the objective of thc u.A.R.'s interventiorwas not quite clear. To States decided to send military forces to lrbanon with the immediate task of some extent it could be explained as a simple policy president of revenge against defending the latter's sovereignty and independence. In a special statement Prcsi. chamoun-a man vilified in the pan-nrau prcss as an' ag"ent of British dent Eisenhower declared that this action was undertaken at the explicit rcquest of intelligence-for his hands-off policy during the suez war and roitris harboring of the govemment of lrbanon. The first contingent of 3,600 American marines landcd the dissenters and plotters from syria. lrbanon, according to this expranation, was in Beirut on July 15 , followed by further units qf the army. American troops took no to be punished for its treason to the Arab cause and for becoming an imperialist base action in the conflict: they merely stayed, distributed on the beaches and at tho directed against Arab unity and liberation. once this punishm"it *u, inflicted, the airport. But their very presence constituted an important factor in the situation, rest remained uncertain. As a maximum target one might suspect Nasser,s desire to Closely following them to Beirut came Robert Murphy, under secretary of state for incorporate Lebanon into the U.A.R. There-is no conclusive evidence that this was political affairs, with the task of attempting a peaceful solution of the strife, Nasser's real goal. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, it is doubtful whether kba_ In the meantime President Chamoun declared that he would not seek rcelection non's rebel leaders (with.the possible exception of Najjada's leader, Adnan Hakim) for the second term, thus depriving the opposition of their main argument for really desired it. More likely Cairo's objictive was the satellization of Lebanon, staging the revolt. This was a welcome development from the American point of leaving it an autonomous unit with its special political institutions and customs. view, inasmuch as it was imperative to differentiate between American defonsc of Furthermore, it has not yet been made clear whether President Nasser initiated lrbanese independence, on the one hand, and American support of Presidcnt Cha' intervention or merely gave approvar to the actions of his emotionally motivated moun as a politician, on the other. After considerable negotiations, which also took Syrian lieutenants in . Murphy to Cairo, the following solution was accepted by the interested partics: The U.A.R.'s intervention converted the civil war from a mere domestic event President Chamoun would stay in office until the end of his term in Septembcr l95t; into an intemational issue. Lebanon appealed, first, to the Arab [-eague, where, as then he would relinquish his position to a new, legally elected president, pr€sum' could be expected, it found no practical solace; then, on June 6,-to the united ably General Fuad Chehab, commander of the army, whose compromise candidacy Nations. Presenting his country's case before the security councir, lrbanon,s proved acceptable to all the warring factions (including, allegedly, President Nasser Foreign Minister charles Malik accused the of massive of the U.A.R.). The new regime was to follow a principle of "no victors, no intervention. on June r0 this alegation was upheld by secretary Dulles, who said vanquished ' ' to reflect a general policy of reconciliation. The National Pact of I 943 there was "irrefutable evidence'' of U.A.R. interference in Lrbanon. rrr, ,.r.t arv was to be fully observed. This unwritten agreement, concluded between the princi' the Security council voted to send a team of UN observers to Lebanon. The team, pal Christian and Moslem leaders of [.ebanon, Bishara el-Khuri and Riyadh cs' headed by the Swedish general odd Bull, assembled in Lebanon a few days later. Sulh, at the time of the struggle for independence, provided that Moslems would with 94 observers (166 by mid-August), the team was numericaly inadequate to join Christians in a common loyalty to the sovereign state of Lebanon if the Chrir. throw a tight cordon around Irbanon. Moreover, it did not ort any patrors at tians (1) renounced their traditional policy of seeking Western protection and intcr. night' Furthertnore' it was denied "urry access to certain areas controlteO ty ttre rebels. As vention and (2) shared with the Moslems in a ratio of 6 to 5 the public offlcos, a consequence, infiltrators could easily evade its observation posts. on July 4 the legislative and administrative, of the republic. Implicit in these arrangements wac UN observer group reported to the Security Council that it found no evidence of the promise that the post-civil-war govemment of lrbanon would deemphasizc ite massive Syrian infiltration. Dismayed, the government of lrbanon stated in its links with the West (such as the formal acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine) and official commentary that the observers' findings were either ircorclusire, misread- would, indeed, steer a middle course between the West and its surrounding Arab ing, or unwarranted' It stated that the U.A.R. had continued its massive infiltration environment. even after the arrival of UN observers in Lebanon. Furthermore, convinced that it It should be pointed out that in agreeing to this solution the insurgents had could not count on practical assistance from the , G gor.-*"r, abandoned some of their earlier demands, such as the immediate resignation Of appealed to the United states for direct military aid under the provisions of the Prcsident Chamoun and the evacuation of American troops before theglection of tho Eisenhower Doctrine. new president. These concessions were due partly to the removal of a valid domestic If there was any hesitation in the state Department _ as to the right course to cause for continuing the insurrection and partly to the uncertainty whether Presidcnt follow, it was dispelled by the revolution which occurred in of ruty 14. As Nasser would be unwilling to continue his support of the rebels in view of tho viewed from washington, the events in Baghdad constituted another link in a chain prcsence of American forces. On July 3l , General Fuad Chehab was elected prcsi' of dramatic developments marking pan-Arabism. the forward march of dent of thc Rcpublic by the Chambcr of Deputies by a 48 to 7 vote. The sevcn votcs Momentarily it looked as if the whols existing political structure of the Arab East went to Raymond EddC. Dcspite there important developmcnts, sporadlc flghtlng were to crumble under the brows of miritant propaganda, subversion, and aggres- contlnucd until carly Scptcmbcr, On Scptembcr 23, Fuad Chchab assumcd the