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Home , Anwar Sadat, Arab Liberation Army, Cabinet of Egypt, Deputy prime minister, Hassan Ibrahim, History of Egypt

THE CABINET OF , 1954 MUNUC XXIX

Cabinet Briefing LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Greetings Delegates!

Welcome to the first cabinet meeting of our new government. In addition to preparing to usher in a new age of prosperity in Egypt, I am a fourth year at the University of Chicago, alternatively known as Hannah Brodheim. Originally from New York City, I am studying economics and computer science. I am also a USG for our college conference, ChoMUN. I have previously competed with the UChicago competitive Model UN team. I also help run Splash! Chicago, a group which organizes events where UChicago students teach their absurd passions to interested high school students.

Egypt has not had an easy run of it lately. Outdated governance systems, and the lack of investment in the country under the British has left Egypt economically and politically in the dust. Finally, a new age is dawning, one where more youthful and more optimistic leadership has taken power. Your goals are not short term, and you do not intend to let Egypt evolve slowly. Each of you has your personal agenda and grudges; what solution is reached by the committee to each challenge ahead will determine the trajectory of Egypt for years to come. We will begin in 1954, before the cabinet has done anything but be formed. The following background guide is to help direct your research; do not limit yourself to the information contained within. Success in committee will require an understanding of the challenges Nasser’s Cabinet faces, and how the committee and your own resources may be harnessed to overcome them.

In this committee, you must be resourceful when reacting to crises and evaluating the changing situation. Similar to many crisis committees, you will take control of ministries with parallel powers, how relevant your ministry is depends on your ability to see the connections between the diverse challenges you will be faced with. How your influence waxes and wanes is entirely under your control, so interact with all other members as though you held the same initial influence. As you learn about your historical counterpart, always think about what abilities they possessed, what resources they had access to, and how you can utilize that during committee.

If you have any questions or concerns about this committee, the preparation process, or MUNUC in general, I encourage you to contact me. I look forward to meeting all of you come February.

Sincerely,

Hannah Brodheim President Chair, The Cabinet of Egypt, 1954 [email protected]

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX LETTER FROM THE CRISIS DIRECTOR

Dear Delegates,

My name is Alex Nye, and I am a fourth year studying Law, Letters & Society and International Relations. I am originally from Long Grove, Illinois, in the northern suburbs of Chicago. Though I never was a delegate as MUNUC, I had a great time last year as an assistant chair on the Bureau of Investigation and the year before as the crisis director for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

I’m looking forward to having a great time again this year as you all face the challenges of dealing with questions of war, peace, economics, ideology, and Middle East history. I am a confessed Model UN “addict,” both in high school and college, so I can’t wait so see how the unique combination of tension, asymmetrical conflict, and the problems of the idea of Arab unity plays out over the course of the weekend.

If you have any questions or concerns about this committee, the preparation process, or MUNUC in general, I encourage you to contact me. I look forward to meeting all of you come February.

Sincerely,

Alex Nye Crisis Director, The Cabinet of Egypt, 1954 [email protected]

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Ottoman Egypt

In 1517 Egypt, at the time ruled by the Malmuk Empire, was taken over by the . A remnant of an early government of Egypt, the were the military caste deeply rooted in early Egyptian thought. Even the conquering by the Ottomans, however, was insufficient to truly break the Mamluks’ power. The Mamluks continued to exert outsized influence on Egypt and prevented the country from being truly absorbed into the empire.

Struggles within the army in Egypt were common throughout this time. There were nearly continual mutinies and uprisings, as well as radical new religions taking form and being crushed. These acts made Egypt an easy military target, and in 1798 French General Bonaparte set his sights on conquering Egypt.

According to the French, Napoleon undertook his campaign to secure French interests in the region. Egypt was weak at that time due to inner power struggles that had divided the country and continuing attempts to be free of the rule of the Ottomans that had left much of the country damaged. The French easily took and swiftly gained control of the Delta and , although the Mamluks maintained control of . Great Britain, which was becoming involved in Middle Eastern and African affairs through its colonial program at the time, and the Ottoman Empire saw the French invasion as a point of unity, the destruction of which was in the interest of both their empires.

The joint Anglo-Ottoman forces destroyed most of the naval strength the French had brought to Egypt, and within three years the French troops completely withdrew from Egypt. Additionally, the power of the Mamluks was greatly reduced, having been tested by the combined pressure of the Ottomans and the French for so long. More significantly, Egypt’s importance to the Western world had been realized, putting the country in the global limelight.

Rise of Muhammad Ali

The evacuation of French forces left the Ottomans struggling to retake power from the much weakened Mamluks. Muhammad Ali, an Ottoman general, was part of this force and used his growing popularity in Egypt to quickly become the governor of Egypt quickly. By the death of Selim III of Egypt, Ali was well positioned to rule Egypt as he saw fit.

Once the last of the troops had been conquered, Ali began to implement his vision to make Egypt into a European style state. Among his main goals for the country were to build a strong military, centralize

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX power, and create an Egyptian empire. That said, Egypt’s position was fragile. Ali desired autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, but more than that he aimed to secure his family’s position in Egypt for the generations to come. In the early 1800s, he concentrated on conducting military campaigns on the Ottoman Empire’s behalf. Most notably, Ali sent soldiers, under the control of his son, to participate in the Ottoman-Saudi war from 1881 to 1818. The campaigns were successful, but not without cost for Egypt. The army grew disaffected, and the whole region needed new economic opportunities to become more prosperous and end its economic stagnation. Just to the west of Egypt lay and south of that ; together they represented valuable caravan trade and the possibility of revitalizing the army with captives. Beginning first with a strike west into Libya and then moving south into Sudan, Ali was able to take over Sudan without endangering Egyptian security. The new land would come to be treated as a single Egyptian entity, all of which came under Ali’s control.

Gaining this land significantly boosted Egyptian power. Not only did it represent a new source of revenue, but that revenue was utilized to modernize the . Ali began to train an army of conscripted and kidnapped into the armed services. Using officers recruited from outside the country and creating schools to train them in, Ali was eventually able to replace his mercenary army with a more reliable, native one. In addition to military schools, Ali brought in other western styles of education, expanding training for doctors and engineers to improve Egyptian society’s health and infrastructure.

The weakening Ottoman Empire was also a target of Ali’s ambitions. Ali pushed his armies onward, conquering and moving west. The death of the Sultan Mahmud of the Ottoman Empire further weakened the overextended forces, opening a path for Ali to , the heart of the Ottoman Empire. This possibility caused great concern in the , , Prussia, , and the Ottoman Empire itself. These states joined together to write the Convention for the Pacification of the in the summer of 1840. The Convention demanded that the Ottoman Empire be left intact and that Egypt return the conquered territory in Syria to the Ottoman Empire.

This treaty, inspired by the fear that a collapse of the Ottoman Empire would destabilize Europe, did grant Ali one significant concession: His descendants would have permanent control over Egypt as a part of the Ottoman Empire. Facing the threat from Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire, Ali chose the humiliation of returning the Syrian territories in order to protect his family’s ability to continue to rule Egypt.

Economic Changes

Ali did not merely impact the military and geographical structure of Egypt; he affected the entirety of the economic system. Ali chose to nationalize all the land in Egypt to create a new, more effective source of revenue for the government. This act was not, however, accomplished directly. Instead, Ali raised extremely high

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX taxes on land, which then caused the land to revert to the government when the land owners could not pay. This underhanded tactic raised the government’s revenues but cost dearly in support among the landowners. Considering the landowners relied on rents from the peasants living on the land and to a significant extent before Ali’s rise to power, on tax farming, these tax increases angered the local holders of power and therefore reduced Ali’s ability to implement his policies.

Ali effectively made the Egyptian government into a monopoly. All goods were sold through the government, which took a cut at every possible level to maximize government revenues that could be used for industrial development projects. Cotton was normally a valuable commodity because the textiles that relied on it were at the center of Western European and North American industrial capacity, but Ali used it in a way that turned the entire Egyptian to benefit his family’s pocketbooks.1

Ali also expanded the country’s production of military goods. He ordered the construction of a new navy, and factories began to turn out weapons in small quantities. However, all these economic efforts floundered due to Egypt’s lack of a highly professional bureaucracy and limited social mobility outside of government service. The lack of a professional bureaucracy proved unable to efficiently run the state monopolies while the limited social mobility made it impossible for a bourgeois class to emerge and begin amassing necessary for industrial development. Ali’s continued efforts made a significant impact, but his protectionist economic development policy all came to a stop when European intervention was triggered by the Ali’s step too far into Ottoman territory on a campaign to expand his domain.2 When Ali moved “within sight of ,” the European great powers decided to prop up the Ottomans (having earlier signed the Treaty of Balta Liman, which forbade territories under the control of the Ottoman Empire from maintaining protectionist policies and government granted monopolies) and swiftly forced Ali to capitulate. Soon the Europeans bombarded Beirut, which at the time was a territory under the control of Muhammad Ali’s son, Isma’il, and landed armies in the Levant, forcing Ali to retreat to somewhere near modern day Egyptian borders.3 Soon Ali capitulated to the British and as part of the agreement lost control of the Levant as well as all Egyptian domains other than the Sudan.

More importantly, Muhammad Ali gained hereditary governorship of Egypt (legitimizing his de facto independence from the Ottomans) at the cost of accepting the terms of the Treaty of Balta Liman.4 Ali could thus no longer continue his protectionist development policy of monopolies and tariffs. Egypt was now liberalized, and its markets were now opened to highly competitive European manufactured products.5 At the

1 Henry Louis GatesJr., “Why Was Cotton ‘King’?” PBS. Accessed June 14, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/ history/why-was-cotton-king/. 2 Metz, Helen Chapin, and . Federal Research Division. Egypt: a Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, U.S. G.P.O, 1991, accessed June 14, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/item/91029876. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX beginning of this era, Ali developed a particularly bad case of dysentery that was treated with heavy doses of silver nitrate. The silver nitrate treatments gradually caused Ali to lose his sanity and eventually robbed him of his physical health. By 1847, Ali no longer had the capacity to rule and abdicated in favor of his son, Ibrahim .6 The developing industries Ali had grown were soon rendered uncompetitive and subsequently crushed by the competition. Ali’s successors did not pursue reform with the same determination, limited by European policies and the European merchants that grew to dominate all sectors of the Egyptian economy.7

The Successors of Muhammad Ali

As promised by the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, Muhammad Ali started a legacy in Egypt. After his retirement from power in 1848, Ali’s son, Ibrahim, took power. Ibrahim’s rule was to be short lived, as he died of an illness only a few months later, leaving his nephew, Abbas I, to rule Egypt. Abbas quickly rolled back many of Ali’s changes. He dissolved the commercial monopolies, and even though the Egyptian government’s central government continued to expand, it was now being directed by either Egyptians that were trained in European institutions or by European advisory officials. Abbas’s rule too, however, was short lived and ended only six years after it began. With the end of the monopolies, the Egyptian government ended its attempt at national industrialization and adjusted itself to promote economic development projects for the purpose of expanding Egypt’s ability to export primary goods to Europe rather than for the purpose of building an industrial sector independent from the influence of European markets. The chief element of Egypt’s new economic policy was the , whose construction began under Abbas’s successor, Sa’id Pasha.

The History of the Suez Canal and the Economic Development of Egypt in the Age of

Near the end of Ali’s reign, European economic imperialism and gunboat , diplomacy backed by the use or threat of military force, gradually eroded Egyptian sovereignty. As a result, a French diplomat by the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps was able to convince Sa’id Pasha, the of Egypt at the time, to accept an Act of Concession for the building of a canal in 1854. As part of the concession, the Universal Suez Ship Canal Company, better known as the Suez Canal Company, was formed as an international corporation that was owned through shares bought by various investors and headed by de Lesseps.

6 Rogan, Eugene L. The : A History, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 82. 7 Ibid.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX De Lesseps soon received an even larger concession from the Egyptians as construction slowed and the Egyptians’ inability to pay for the canal became even more evident, which allowed him the rights to operate the canal for ninety-nine years after completing the construction of the canal.

Construction on the canal began in 1859, and while the progress was frustratingly slow, the canal opened in November 1869 with a ceremony attended by European elites. However, according to William Cleveland’s A History of the Modern Middle East, the Suez Canal deal “was a financial disaster for Egypt and contributed to the country’s plunge into bankruptcy.”8 The location of the canal, the development of the oil tanker, and the choice to make petroleum products the main driver of industry in the Western world allowed for enormous growth in oil shipments from the Persian Gulf through the canal. Both the Southern areas of Iran and Egypt were areas of significant British interest. This is signaled by the fact that even as the empire decreased in size, Britain continuously garrisoned troops at the canal. Although Britain nominally gave Egypt independence in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, strong British military interests, presumably involving Britain’s need to protect the supply line between their Indian Ocean colonies and the British Isles, stipulated that the final version of the document had to reserve Britain’s right to protect the canal. This may have been due to the fact that the canal’s sea traffic has rapidly grown since it had opened.

That said, Egypt had grown dependent on the European powers throughout the 19th century, and European invasion of Egyptian sovereignty proceeded with the 1882 Caisse de la Dette Publique. This agreement, which was part of Egypt’s default on loans owed to European governments, established a commission made up of

8 The country was eventually declared bankrupt in 1875 when it stopped paying its debts that were held by European creditors.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX European creditor state representatives, which would administer the Egyptian state to service the national debt. The commission’s policies were quite similar to the modern day phenomenon of austerity, as seen in after the late 2000s financial crises. Specifically, the commission advocated slashing public spending and creating an environment that would encourage European investment. Although Egyptians resisted the commission, it was relatively successful at servicing the debt. However, the Egyptian military classes that had come of age during the previous generation, specifically Ahmad Urabi, eventually decided to resist European influence with force. In what is now known as the Urabi Revolt, the first nationalist or proto-nationalist movement in Egyptian history, Urabi’s party, in response to British anger at Urabi’s appointment as of War in 1882, helped facilitate anti-European riots, which transformed into an all-out mutiny against Egypt’s ruling class. This revolt, in which both sides utilized religious rulings and traditional Islamic symbols of sovereignty to gain legitimacy, culminated in a legal ruling by the Islamic courts supporting the Urabi’s political positions. These judges named the Pasha a traitor, which granted Urabi political legitimacy and forced the British to intervene militarily and put down the would-be revolution. The British intervention quickly crushed Urabi and expanded their control over Egypt, beginning a period of intense colonization that would continue until Egypt’s “independence.”

The British Attack

Britain decided they could not afford the uncertainty and violence brewing in Egypt. In July 1882 the British began a bombardment of Alexandria. From there, the next logical step was a land invasion. The British quickly took control of Egypt and supported Tawfiq Pasha as the ruler. This displaced the Ottoman Empire as the ultimate power over Egypt, which was a clear result of the Ottoman Sultan’s refusal to send troops to aid the British attack. While the British initially only intended to occupy Egypt briefly, Tawfiq had lost too much support in allowing the British in to stand on his own.9 Thus began Britain’s “veiled protectorate” over Egypt.

This veiled protectorate was able to maintain control of Egypt, but the nationalist groups that had formed in the 1870s and 1880s continued to exist. The clearly imperialist actions of Britain and their defeat of the Egyptian military left behind a legacy of military opposition to European involvement. Under these stages of British rule, paying off the debt was the primary focus of the foreign decision makers. Industry and education which would require more investment were neglected.10 Other incidents occurred to drive further nationalist sentiment. The 1906 Dinshawi Incident was a particularly violent fight between some villagers and a group of British officers. Escalating retaliation eventually resulted in the death of a British officer and the death of at least five Egyptians as well as the arrest of many more.11 Incidents like these and general discontent caused the

9 “Country Studies: Egypt,” The Library of Congress, (1990), http://countrystudies.us/egypt/26.htm. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX emergence of new nationalist political parties and newspapers. However, their influence was limited by strong British control and their willingness to use military force.

Egypt During

As the possibility of war in Europe grew, concession to the nationalist movements in Egypt began. A new constitution in 1913 finally restored a small amount of control by Egyptian representatives locally and nationally. However, this stepping back by Britain was a short-lived gesture. After the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, all pretenses about British control of Egypt were dropped, and Egypt officially became a British Protectorate.12

Direct effects of the war on Egypt were fairly limited: there was limited conscription and forced hosting of a variety of foreign troops. Cotton and food were requisitioned by the government at rates significantly below that of the market, but the effects of that were mostly felt after the war ended.

British Protectorate (1914-1922)

By this point in time the lack of diversification in the Egyptian economy was glaring, an estimated 90 percent of exports were cotton or products made directly from cotton.13 This lack of a diverse economy was due to a combination of several factors. First, the British were treating Egypt like any of their colonies, they wanted to purchase raw materials cheaply and then send finished products back to the colonies to be purchased there, thus the incentive for the British was to leave Egypt under-developed industrially. Second, there were significant benefits to British finished products and obstacles to industry and factories appearing in Egypt. Third, Britain had no interest in the longer term sustainable development of the Egyptian economy, thus even the investments that would normally have been undertaken in Egypt were prevented.

In March of 1919, many political figures attempted to negotiate Egyptian independence from Britain, and the Wafd delegation was created for this purpose. 14 However, when the delegation was thrown in jail by the British after causing too much of a disturbance, popular uprisings began across Egypt. Unlike previous uprisings limited to the military or a single social classes, violent clashes occurred in Cairo and across other cities in Lower Egypt. Students, government officials, professionals, and transport workers all participated. To the surprise of the British officials, even women were represented in the . Safia Zaghlul, wife of one of

12 By the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the British Forces in Egypt Announcing the Establishment of a British Protectorate Over Egypt: Cairo, December 18, 1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1919). 13 “Country Studies: Egypt.” (1990). 14 The Wafd delegation specifically wished to attend the Paris Peace Conference to lobby for Egyptian independence.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX the main Wafd leaders, led some of the women’s protests. In other areas women joined protests being led by men. In many ways this the first emergence of women into Egyptian politics.15

It quickly became apparent that Britain could not subdue the protests. General Edmund Allenby was named special high commissioner for Egypt expressly to reinstate control over the territory in a final attempt to regain control. Yet this move failed, and it was clear that the British would have to negotiate with the Egyptians. A compromise was quickly reached to allow the Wafd delegation to travel to Paris for negotiations. However, further attempts to decide Egypt’s future under the protectorate were continually boycotted by Egyptian nationalist leaders who demanded independence and were unwilling to accept any less.

In the summer of 1920, Lord Milner, the head of the mission to investigate the potential for granting Egypt “self-governing institutions,” met with , the leader of the Wafd delegation. Their negotiations resulted in an announcement in 1921 that an abolishment of the protectorate would be the basis of a new treaty with Egypt. Allenby wanted the new treaty to be negotiated with friendlier allies than Zaghloul, however. Thus in December 1921, Zaghlul was deported to the resulting in demonstrations, strikes, and violent clashes with the police.

Independence

On February 28 1922, Britain unilaterally declared Egypt independent. Reserved for the British in the declaration were the security of the communications of the in Egypt; the defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; and the Sudan.16 Sultan Ahmad Fuad became King Fuad I. A parliamentary body was established in which the was the primary force including those individuals who had previously been deported. Meanwhile the British continued to exert significant control over the country.17 Due to the initial declaration on Egyptian independence by Britain, political matters remained unsettled for quite some time in Egypt. The popularity of the Wafd party and of Zaghlaul specifically ensured a reliable ability to be elected into office, and Zachlaul himself became prime minister in 1924.18

In 1936 the last of the unsettled questions regarding independence between Egyptian and Britain were intended to be settled in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The Egyptian delegation was led by Wafdist leader and Prime Minister Mustafa Nahhas. Among the provisions of the treaty were the right of Britain to maintain military forces at the Suez Canal, virtual complete control of Sudan by Britain and, from the point of view of the nationalists, a complete failure on the part of the Wafd party to acquire true independence for Egypt.

15 Ibid. 16 “The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations,” Bulletin of International News 4, no. 19 (1928): 3-11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25638431. 17 “Country Studies: Egypt.” (1990). 18 John Marlowe, “Sa’d Zaghlūl,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sad-Zaghlul.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Other provisions of the treaty allowed Britain to impose martial law and censorship in Egypt for the next two decades in the case of an international emergency.19 Thus, while Egypt nominally was free from Britain after the signing of the treaty, it still had to contend with the British in a number of areas. Consequently, support for the Wafd government declined significantly after the signing of the treaty.

New Movements

This time of unrest was a fertile environment for new ideologies and groups to emerge. In 1928 Hasan al Banna established the . The group was fiercely nationalist and aimed to rid Egypt of foreign domination and influence to return to a purer form of religion and governmental practice. In 1933, Young Egypt was founded by a lawyer, Ahmad Husayn; it was one of the first Arab nationalist groups to emerge at this time. The group aimed to make Egypt an empire which could serve as an Islamic leader among Arab countries. Both of these organizations had a strong military bent: the Wafd methods of liberal constitutionalism seemed to have failed and more dramatic and forceful methods seemed necessary to truly free Egypt from the British.20

1948 War with

Over the next decade Egypt remained unstable. The willingness of the Wafd party to work with Britain for political gain and rampant decreased the party’s credibility significantly. Furthermore, repeated attempts to gain more autonomy for Egypt were shut down by Britain. This resentment culminated in 1948 with the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel, which caused outrage in Egypt. The successful establishment of Israel was seen as a new imperialist move by European nations and a threat to the entire region’s independence. Along with several other Arab nations Egypt attacked the newly formed country.21 They were poorly prepared and failed to coordinate with other Arab nations.22 The military’s weakness came as a surprise to the country, since the government had consistently claimed the military to be adequately equipped and trained for such a war.

This military humiliation was one of the motivations for the founding of a new secret organization: The Free Officers. Predominately organized by Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Free Officers began to plan a coup of Egypt’s government. The Free Officers movement was contained within the army and had a clear idea of what type of government and society they wished to establish with their coup. First and foremost was the destruction of the British occupation and its Egyptian supporters, the elimination of feudalism, the end of ’s domination of Egypt, the establishment of social equality, the formation of a strong popular army, and the

19 “Anglo-Egyptian Treaty,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Anglo-Egyptian-Treaty. 20 “Country Studies: Egypt,” (1990). 21 “The Arab-Israeli War of 1948,” Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war. 22 “Country Studies: Egypt,” (1990).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX establishment of a healthy democratic life. An important point to draw from these goals is that the Free Officers movement was essentially a liberal one. Rather than being driven by religion or the desire to return to the ways of the past, the Free Officers movement represented some of the more forward looking parts of Egyptian society.

The defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War also propelled the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose volunteer fighters performed effectively during the war. In fact, Muslim Brotherhood membership grew so quickly and was responsible for so many internal attacks on the British in Egypt that the organization was ordered to dissolve. Predictably, violence followed this pronouncement and thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood ended up being arrested along with members of Young Egypt.23

The Revolution of 1952

In the early 1950s, tensions in Egypt escalated significantly. In October of 1951 the Prime Minister introduced decrees ending the treaty established with Britain in 1936 and proclaiming Faruk King of Egypt and Sudan.24 The Wafd government began to support the Muslim Brotherhood and other paramilitary organizations in their guerrilla style war against the British.

As the violence continued into 1952, the British dismissed the Prime Minister only to discover that there were no political leaders strong enough to control the country. Furthermore, none of the nationalist groups were sufficiently well established to take power.25 The Free Officers spotted their moment in the chaos and realized they were in danger of being arrested by the king. On July 22 they determined to take power the following morning.

The Free Officers movement was still headed by Gamal Nasser, but the group included a diverse range of political views including Communists, Muslim Brotherhood members, and Wafdists.26 The group was primarily younger than 35 and was composed of members of social classes only recently permitted to enter military officer schools. One major member of the organization was Muhammad Naguib, who was designated as the public figurehead once the coup occurred. As a whole the group was well prepared to take power and made sure to secure the support of the Muslim Brotherhood before taking action. The coup was conducted quickly by a relatively small number of high level officers.

23 “Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Al Jazeera, February 6, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2011/02/201126101349142168.html. 24 Faruk being the son of King Fuad I. 25 “Country Sudies: Egypt,” (1990). 26 Botman, Selma. “Egyptian Communists and the Free Officers: 1950-54.” Middle Eastern Studies 22, no. 3 (1986): 350-66. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/4283127.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX As the Free Officers consolidated control over the next several days, they decided to send the King into exile and have his son, Ahmen Fuad, become King under a Regency Council. Ali Mahir, a previous Prime Minister, was requested by the Free Officers to head the new government. The members of the Free Officers were well aware their relative youth meant they needed to choose public leaders with more experience and broad support if they hoped to have a stable transition.

In 1953, Naguib became President and commander in chief. He was well respected in Egypt and carried the advantage of being significantly older than most members of the Free Officers. However, Nasser was well known to be behind the formation of the Free Officers. Nasser had been a beneficiary of the opening of officer’s school to non-aristocratic families under the Wafd government, and he believed the only way to prevent Britain from working against the long term benefit of Egypt was to completely remove all vestiges of British control.27

Civilian Rule

The new government was composed primarily of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) headed by Naguib and the civilian government headed by Mahir. The two sides did not work together efficiently, however, and the next two years included a power struggle between these civilian and military components of government. On September 7th 1952, Mahir resigned following the Democratic Movement for National Liberation denouncing the government as a military dictatorship and the brutal put down of striking workers.

27 Ibid.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Dramatic economic reforms quickly followed. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 was effectively a land redistribution bill. The size of landholdings was limited and land beyond that limit was purchased by the government at extremely low prices and then resold at an extremely discounted rate. Soon thereafter the minimum wage was raised, working hours were reduced, and measures to increase employment were laid out. Many of these reforms were not enforced until much later. In the education sector, university graduates were given employment in the government massively swelling the size of the bureaucracy. Overall education spending vastly increased. The new government was determined to right the wrongs of the past decades under the British as quickly as possible.

The Presidency of Naguib

On January 17, 1953, the government instated a series of radical political changes. A three-year transition time was declared to allow the new government to establish itself. During that time the RCC would be in charge and all other political parties were to be disbanded. On June 18 the monarchy started by Muhammad Ali was ended with the establishment of Egypt as a republic. Naguib became the first President and Prime Minister; Nasser became the and Minister of the Interior.28

Soon a power struggle developed between Naguib and the RCC, which was effectively directed by Nasser. Naguib resigned on February 23, 1954, and Nasser took the position of Prime Minister. The unrest and outrage caused by Naguib’s resignation presented a serious problem, and he was reinstated as President almost immediately.29 However, after a failed on Nasser in October of 1954, Naguib quickly lost all of his political capital. After the assassination attempt, Nasser led a massive political crackdown, arresting thousands of political dissenters whom he believed were acting against Egypt’s revolutionary aims. In this crackdown, Naguib was removed from the presidency and placed under , which allowed Nasser to become the uncontested .

28 “1953: Egypt Becomes a Republic,” , June 19, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/19/opinion/19iht-edold_ed3__44.html. 29 “Country Studies: Egypt,” (1990).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The following is a set of excerpts from a real CIA assessment of Egypt in 1953, only a year after the first coup and the deposition of King Farouk. When you read this document think about how you (and your character) would each respond to the following questions:

Where do you think Egypt’s influence on other Arab states in the 1950s comes from (from the view of an American in 2016-2017 as well as from the point of view of an Egyptian in the 1950s)?

What might the CIA statement “because of the influence which developments in Egypt are likely to have on the other Arab states” imply about what the US intelligence community thinks about what might happen in the near future to the governments of other state in the Middle East? What states do you think would be most affected and why?

What is the role of a political party style organization like the “Liberation Organization”30 in a state that is a “military junta?” Why would an autocratic, military government want to have a political party with civilian involvement?

Do you agree with the CIA assessment of divisions in the RCC before Nasser’s rise to power? In public, which group is your character loyal to? Why? What about in private? Why?

CIA National Intelligence Estimate on Probable Developments in Egypt, 1953

“Egypt is of major importance to western security interests because Western access to its territory in time of war is essential for effective defense of the Middle East and because of the influence which developments in Egypt are likely to have on the other Arab states.

“Egypt is now controlled by a military junta, the Revolutionary Command Council, which has espoused a program of internal reform and is currently attempting to secure Egypt’s foreign policy objectives through negotiation with, rather than defiance of, the West.

“Since overthrowing King Farouk in July 1952, the RCC has put an end to parliamentary government by abrogating the 1923 Constitution and abolishing all political parties, and has destroyed or neutralized major opposition groups. General Nagib is Prime Minister and has assumed

30 In other historical documents, this is referred to as the “Liberation Rally.”

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX extraordinary powers for three years. The RCC not only has control over the government and the ability to maintain public order, but it currently enjoys widespread public support for its domestic and foreign policies.

“The RCC has been able to achieve this political success, in spite of the handicap of inexperience, because its program has appealed to the important middle sector of Egyptian society, made up of students, government workers, professional classes, and small businessmen. The members of the RCC are themselves members of that social group, were educated in institutions where its emerging ideals predominated and accept the principles of Egyptian .

“Over the long run, however, the RCC will have to provide other means for this middle group to get a sense of participation in political life, or run the risk of dangerous opposition from the most politically conscious and influential members of Egyptian society. It is currently attempting to do this through the medium of the new official “Liberation Organization” which is designed to provide a new center around which political support for the new regime can be organized.

“A potential source of weakness in the RCC is its reported division into two factions on question of principle and tactics. One group, which includes General Nagib and which has dominated the RCC from the beginning, supports a policy of moderate nationalism and a tactic of toughness and militancy. Divisions within the RCC are likely to increase if the regime fails to make progress, thus decreasing the effectiveness of the government.”

Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution:

The following are Nasser’s thoughts on what the revolution is to achieve and what Egypt’s primary focuses should be.

“I have realized from the very beginning that our success depended on our complete understanding of the nature of the conditions we live in as related to our national history.31

“It was imperative that we should proceed with the two revolutions together. The day we marched along the path of political revolution and dethroned Farouk we took a similar step along the path of social revolution by limiting the ownership of agricultural land. I still believe until today that the revolution of July 23rd should retain its capacity for swift action and initiative in order that it may

31 Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Philosophy of the Revolution Book I. Dar Al-Maaref, 1954.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX fulfill the miracle of proceeding with the two revolutions simultaneously, contradictory as our action may appear to be sometimes.

“European society passed through the stages of its evolution in an orderly manner. It crossed the bridge between the Renaissance at the end of the and the Nineteenth Century step by step. The stages of this evolution systematically succeeded one another.

“In our case everything was sudden. European countries eyed us covetously and regarded us as a crossroad to their colonies in the East and the South.

“Torrents of ideas and opinions burst upon us which we were, at that stage of our evolution, incapable of assimilating. Our spirits were still in the Thirteenth Century though the symptoms of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries infiltrated in their various aspects. Our minds were trying to catch up the advancing caravan of humanity.

“At one time I complained that the people did not know what they wanted. They were not unanimous in their choice of the way to take. I realized later that I demanded the impossible and that I took no account of the circumstances of our society.

“We live in a society that has not yet crystallized. It is still boiling over and restless. It has not yet calmed or settled down, so as to continue its gradual evolution parallel with other nations which preceded it along the road.

“I believe, without paying any compliment to people’s emotions, that our nation has realized a miracle. Any nation, exposed to the same conditions as our country, could be easily lost. It could be swept away by the torrents that fell upon it. But it stood firm in the violent earthquake.

“It is true we nearly lost our equilibrium in some circumstances; but generally we did not fall to the ground. As I consider one normal Egyptian family out of the thousands that live in the capital, I find the following: the father, for example, is a turbaned ‘ fellah’ from the heart of the country; the a lady descended from Turkish stock; the sons of the family are at a school adopting the English system; the daughters the French. All this lies between the Thirteenth century and the outward appearances of the Twentieth.

“As I see this I feel within me I can comprehend the bewilderment and the confusion that assail us. Then I say to myself, ‘This society will crystallize; its component parts will hold together; it will

18

THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX form a homogeneous entity; but this necessitates that we should strain our nerves during the period of transition.

“Such are, then, the roots from which sprang our conditions of today. Such are the sources from which our crisis flows. If I add to these social origins the circumstances for which we expelled Farouk and for which we wish to liberate our country from every foreign soldier; if we add all these together, we shall discover the wide sphere in which we labour and which is exposed, from every side, to the winds, to the violent storm that raged in its corners, to flashing lightning and roaring thunder.

“In simple language, we cannot go back to the Tenth Century and wear its robes which strike us as being curious and ridiculous now-a-days. Neither can we lose our way in the ideas which appear in front of us utterly black without a single ray of light filtering through them. In the same way we cannot act as if our country is a part of Alaska in the Far North or as if we are on Wake Island which lies distant and deserted in the vastness of the Pacific… As I often sit in my study and think quietly of this subject I ask myself, ‘What is our positive role in this troubled world and where is the scene, in which we can play that role?

“I survey our conditions and find out we are in a group of circles which should be the theatre of our activity and in which we try to move as much as we can.

“Fate does not play jokes. Events are not produced haphazardly. Existence cannot come out of nothing.

“We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world not realizing our place therein and the role determined to us by that place. Neither can we ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much a part of us as we are a part of it, that our history has been mixed with it and that its interests are linked with ours. These are actual facts and not mere words.

“Can we ignore that there is a continent of Africa in which fate has placed us and which is destined today to witness a terrible struggle on its future? This struggle will affect us whether we want or not.

On Africa

“We cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility in helping, in every way possible, in diffusing the light and civilization into the farthest parts of that virgin jungle.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX “There is another important reason. The Nile is the artery of life of our country. It draws its supply of water from the heart of the continent.

“There remains the Sudan, our beloved brother, whose boundaries extend deeply into Africa and which is a neighbour to all the sensitive spots in the centre of the continent.

“It is a certain fact that Africa at present is the scene of an exciting ebullition. White man, who represents several European countries, is trying again to repartition the continent. We cannot stand aside in face of what is taking place in Africa on the assumption that it does not concern or affect us.

On

“Can we ignore that there is a Muslim world with which we are tied by bonds which are not only forged by religious faith but also tightened by the facts of history? I said once that fate plays no jokes. It is not in vain that our country lies to the Southwest of Asia close to the , whose life is intermingled with ours. It is not in vain that our country lies in the North- east of Africa, a position from which it gives upon the dark continent wherein rages today the most violent struggle between the white colonizers and black natives for the possession of its inexhaustible resources. It is not in vain that Islamic civilization and Islamic heritage, which the Mongols ravaged in their conquest of the old Islamic Capitals, retreated and sought refuge in Egypt where they found shelter and safety as a result of the counterattack with which Egypt repelled the invasion of these Tartars at Ein Galout.

“The third circle now remains; the circle that goes beyond continents and oceans and to which I referred, as the circle of our brethren in faith who turn with us, whatever part of the world they are in, towards the same Kibla in Mecca and whose pious lips whisper reverently the same prayers.

“As I stood in front of the Kaaba and felt my sentiments wandering with every part of the world where Islam had extended I found myself exclaiming, “Our idea of the pilgrimage should change. Going to the Kaaba should never be a passport to heaven, after a lengthy life. Neither should it be a simple effort to buy indulgences after an eventful life. The pilgrimage should be a great political power. The press of the world should resort to and follow its news; not as a series of rituals and traditions which are done to amuse and entertain readers, but as a regular political congress wherein the leaders of Muslim states, their public men, their pioneers in every field of knowledge, their writers, their leading industrialists, merchants and youth draw up in this universal Islamic Parliament the main lines of policy for their countries and their cooperation together until they meet again. [...] I recall I expressed some of these sentiments to His Majesty King Saoud. He said to me, ‘This is the real wisdom of the pilgrimage.’ Verily I cannot visualize a higher wisdom.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX On Power

“Imperialism is the great force that throws around the whole region a fatal siege.

“I thus began to believe after these facts became established within me, in one common struggle and repeated to myself, ‘As long as the region is one, and its conditions, its problems and its future, and even the enemy are the same, however different are the masks that the enemy covers its face with, why should we dissipate our efforts?’ The experience of what followed July 23rd increased my faith in a united struggle [to unify the Arab regions] and its necessity.

“I do not hesitate for one moment to mention that our united struggle would achieve for us and our peoples everything we wish and aspire to; I shall always go on saying that we are strong but the great catastrophe is that we do not know the extent of our strength.

“We make a mistake in our definition of power. Power is not merely shouting aloud. Power is to act positively with all the components of power. When I attempt to analyze the components of our power I cannot help but point out three principal forces of power which should be the first to be taken into account.

“The first source is that we are a group of neighboring peoples joined together with such spiritual and material bonds as can ever join any group of peoples. Our peoples have traits, com- ponents and civilization, in whose atmosphere the three sacred and heavenly creeds have originated. This cannot be altogether ignored in any effort at reconstructing a stable world in which peace prevails.

“As for the second source it is our territory itself and the position it has on the map of the world, that important strategic situation which can be rightly considered the meeting-place, the cross-road and the military corridor of the world. The third source is petroleum which is the vital nerve of civilization, without which all its means cannot possibly exist whether huge works for production, modes of communication by land, sea and air, weapons of war whether they are planes flying above the clouds or submarines submerged under layers of water. All these, without petroleum would become mere pieces of iron, rusty, motionless and lifeless.

“I have read lately a treatise published by The University of Chicago on the state of petroleum... [;] This treatise shows for example that to extract the petrol of Arab countries would not cost a great deal of money.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX “Petrol companies have spent 60 million dollars in Colombia since 1916 and have not found a drop of oil until 1936. These companies also spent 44 million dollars in Venezuela and did not find a drop of oil until after 15 years. These companies again spent 30 million dollars in the Dutch East Indies and have not struck oil until very recently. The final conclusion of this treatise is as follows:

“The capital necessary for extracting one barrel of petrol in the Arab countries is ten cents. The centre of oil production has shifted from the U. S. A., where oil wells have been exhausted, where the price of land is exorbitant, and where wages of workers are high, to the Arab territory, where the wells are untouched and in a virgin state, where expensive land can be had for nothing and where labour accepts subsistence wages.

“It is a fact that half the world’s reserve of petroleum is still underground in the Arab regions and the second half is distributed among the U. S. A., Russia, The Caribbean and other countries of the world.

It is also established that the average output of one well of oil per day is as follows:

• 11 Barrels in U. S. A.

• 230 Barrels in Venezuela

• 4,000 Barrels in the Arab Region

I hope I have succeeded in explaining clearly the degree of importance of this element of power.”

Having read the selections think about how you (and your character) would each respond to the following questions. Use these answers as jumping off points for your research.

1. What do Nasser’s “two revolutions” mean to you? What political changes or policies might they entail?

2. What challenges might be associated with land reform? What would a successful land reform do? Economically? Politically? Socially? What are the political, social, and economic risks associated with land reform?

3. What possible obstacles are there to Egypt’s modernization? Why might modernization be desirable or undesirable? Which parts of Egyptian society would benefit from modernization (this question becomes easier to answer after reading the section on Egypt’s economy)?

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX 4. What does Nasser mean when he writes “We live in a society that has not yet crystallized?” What is the connection between modernization and a “crystallized society?” What similarities/differences are there between Nasser’s /Pan-Arabism and other examples of nationalism you have encountered? How might Nasser’s conception of a crystallized nation conflict with other groups in Egyptian society as well as with other groups in the Arab world?

5. Other than being a very attractive concept, what implications might Nasser’s three circles (, African identity, and Muslim identity) have for Egyptian foreign policy? What are different ways to enhance Egypt’s power in these circles? In what ways might involvement in one improve or detract from Egypt’s status in another circle? What new developments are occurring in these circles in the twenty years after WWII?

6. What’s the intended audience for this document? Who does it appeal to and to what extent should Nasser’s nationalist vision drive policy.

As of today, the middle of 1954, Nasser and nearly every other Egyptian want the British out of the Suez Canal. In 1952, the British government informed Egypt there was “no strategic alternative to the maintenance of the British [operating] base on the Suez Canal.”32 Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, then declared the U.K. would not withdraw their troops from the Canal Zone unless Egypt joined the .33

Economic Problems: Import Substitution Based Industrialization and Nasser’s Plans

The State (and History of) Egypt’s Economy in 1954

Egypt’s economy functionally began industrialization in the 1920s. During that time, British investment flowed into Cairo and funded modernization of agriculture as well as infrastructure needed for agricultural export. Most, if not all investment during the early phase of industrialization was linked to industries where Egypt had a comparative advantage.34 In other words, investors were giving money to industries that Egypt’s climate was naturally suited to successfully produce.. As a result, industrial output was mostly related to cotton

32 Helen Chapin Metz, Egypt - The Revolution and the Early Years of the New Government: 1952-56, 1990, accessed January 23, 2013, http:// countrystudies.us/egypt/32.htm. 33 The Baghdad Pact was the British influenced and American coordinated equivalent of NATO for the Middle East. Technically, the Baghdad Pact was an alliance meant to contain the in Southwest Asia by binding together Britain, , Iran, , , and other capitalist allied states. Egyptian membership in the Baghdad pact would instantly isolate it from the Soviet Union and any potential aid that would enhance the public works Nasser wished to enact. 34 Comparative advantage is the ability of an individual or group of people to produce a product at a lower opportunity cost than any other group of people. Opportunity cost is what a group of people gives up for choosing a certain course of action. This is contrasted with absolute advantage, which is the ability of an individual or group of people to produce more of a product than anyone else given the same amount of resources.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX textiles, canned food, cigarettes, soap, and artisanal goods.35 These sectors tended to serve a purpose peripheral to Egypt’s cotton exports, so industrial industries only provided about 4 percent of all Egyptian jobs.

As Egypt entered the 1930s and nationalists entered the business sectors, industrialization expanded to reach a larger portion of the population. With institutions like Bank Misr, which restricted shareholding and all bank operations to Egyptian citizens, Egypt began to develop businesses both financed and operated by Egyptian citizens. This meant that businesses not related to the foreign interest dominated cotton export industry would finally be able to receive financing. Egyptian businesspeople of all religious creeds came together, financed, and ran businesses devoted to producing intermediary goods, which are goods used in the production of other goods. These goods would include cement, industrial chemicals, and paper.36

35 S. Aglan, “Industrial Development”, in El-Ghonemy, M. R. (ed.) Egypt in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges for Development. (London: Routledge- Curzon, 2003). 36 Ibid.

Cairo, 1954

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Egyptian-owned industries only expanded as the country entered the 1940s and the indigenous supply chains that developed over the 1930s fueled the development of a small manufacturing sector serving the needs of war production for the Allied Forces during World War II.37 However, the Egyptian industrial sector remained heavily linked to its export driven agricultural sector. This meant that Egypt’s industrial policies would ultimately be dependent on the attractiveness of Egyptian exports to foreign countries, and these foreign countries often happened to be European states with imperialist interests in Egypt.

1945-1954: Land Reform and the Beginnings of Economic Change

As agricultural exports remained the bread and butter of Egypt’s economy, there were not strong incentives to reform some of the structural problems in Egypt’s economy before the fall of Farouk. The centralized agricultural sector was dominated by a few large landowners known for abusing its peasant population. Fellahin, or peasants, were the primary producers in the economy, but lived lives in a manner similar to serfs in the Middle Ages. These people spent most of their time working extremely small sections of personal land and largely saw no benefits from globalization. In 1952, “70 percent of all Egyptian landowners had less than one-half acre for cultivation”38 and 6 percent of the landowners held 64 percent of all cultivated land. Massive inequality persisted in rural areas as families had to frequently decide between the need to produce cotton (which would provide cash on hand and appease larger landlords by contributing to exports) and produce the minimum amount of food necessary to survive. Students of American history may see stark similarities between the condition of the average Egyptian peasant and sharecroppers in the American South. Fellahin were some of the most dissatisfied with the Egyptian government when the revolution of 1952 happened; an American sociologist in 1957 reported that they were “subject to influences by agitators, filled with deep-seated mistrust nourished by past injustices, for they are among the poorest, sickest and most abused persons on earth.”39 Perhaps most important to the Free Officers when they would seize power, “Agricultural production [...] [had] failed to rise with the increase in population, thus reducing the standard of nutrition and creating a need for increased imports of , livestock and dairy products.”40

Egypt was very much caught between a rock and a hard place when the Revolution of 1952 happened. Egypt did not have a competitive enough (or independent enough from the agricultural sector) industrial field, and the agricultural industry that had generated Egypt’s wealth over the last two centuries was becoming less efficient and less politically sustainable for Egyptian workers. If agricultural production or the conditions of Egyptian peasants continued to stagnate, Egyptian cotton would no longer be competitive in the global

37 Ibid. 38 Stella Margold, “Agrarian Land Reform in Egypt1,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology Am J Economics & Sociology 17, no. 1 (1957), accessed , 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1536-7150.1957.tb00212.x. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX marketplace and Egypt’s main source of foreign currency (which it would need to feed its urban populations) would quickly dry up.

1952-1954: Import Substitution Based Industrialization and Land Reform

Inadvertently following many of M. Ali Pasha’s ideas about industrialization and in line with many of his post-colonial contemporaries, Gamal Abdul Nasser began the RCC’s revolution believing that he could set the Egyptian economy on the path to industrialization with a combination of import substitution, modernized agriculture, and building a professional class based on indigenous human capital.4142 The task of the council will be to realize this vision.

When the Free Officers Corps deposed King Farouk in 1952, the government gained a significant interest in industrial development as they began pursuing a policy of import substitution based industrialization. This economic development policy is based on the practices of figures like Alexander Hamilton, who espoused an “infant industry” argument for . Under this model, the country would develop industries it saw potential in with a combination of government subsidies43 and tariffs44 while emphasizing local control of industry.

The first sector the government considered competitive enough to kickstart industrialization was the Egyptian textiles industry, which had already undergone some industrialization during the era of British influence. The RCC directed the Egyptian government to heavily invest in the sector, which created something tantamount to state control of the textiles industry. In a way attempting to imitate the industrialization processes of the U.K. and the U.S., textiles seemed an obvious choice for developing a larger urban proletariat as well as a leading industry for industrialization. The government also turned its attention to some of the intermediary industries developed during the 1930s, but the main characteristic of Egypt’s start in import substitution industrialization (ISI) was state-led development.

Land and Agricultural Reform

The crown jewel of Nasser’s public works projects was the Dam, a proposed hydroelectric dam that would block the Nile River and drastically increase the amount of arable land in Egypt. As the Free Officers had initially enacted a land reform program aimed at redistributing the massive estates that had historically

41 The collective skills, knowledge, or other intangible assets of individuals that can be used to create economic value for the individuals, their employers, or their community. 42 This is essentially the policy of protecting and developing “infant industries” to compete with foreign, developed industries implemented by Alexander Hamilton in the early years of the United States of America. 43 A subsidy is a parcel of money given by a government to an industry or business to reduce the costs of their goods for the general population and artificially make the good price competitive internationally. 44 A tariff is a tax on foreign imports meant to make domestic goods more attractive to consumers.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX dominated Egyptian agriculture through a tax/sell program imitating those proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and IBRD (later known as the World Bank). The problem was that the program did not effectively break up enough of the land, leaving the military to expropriate it, and most of the redistributed plots were barely large enough to maintain subsistence agriculture.45 With more arable land, the government could get small farmers to buy plots at lower prices. This program is also set to displace many rural villages, but the social benefits are projected to drastically outweigh the costs. The system also fails to declare concrete property rights in areas where ownership is extremely traditional and rural traditions undermined the legitimacy of the government given land titles.46 However, all of these social programs that the Free Officers wished to enact cost money. In a world where development financing was highly politicized and private financing was extremely difficult to obtain without risk to national sovereignty, the Egyptians were quickly running out of funds for their social revolution.

Foreign Relations

As when any country faces a change in their government our relations with nearby countries are in flux. Understanding the history of nearby nations and how they relate to the government of Egypt past and present is our guide to how the international relations will play out in the future.

Syria

Syria was also under Ottoman rule with Egypt. After declaring independence in 1941, however, the French took control of Syria for the rest of World War II. Syria finally gained full independence from the French in 1946. Soon after in 1948, it entered the Arab-Israeli War, a fight against the declaration of Israel’s independence, alongside Egypt. The past couple years in Syria have seen massive instability with multiple coups, most recently in 1951 when Adib al-Shishakli took power and established a dictatorship. Despite this instability, relations between Syria and Egypt are quite positive.47

Part of this positive relationship comes from being trapped on the wrong side of many western powers alongside Egypt. Syria’s objection to the creation of Israel has prevented many Western nations from supporting the fragile country economically. Nevertheless, this disagreement has not prevented Western nations from being deeply interesting the development of Syria and meddling in the country’s political processes. Furthermore, both Egypt and Syria are recovering from colonialism and their efforts for independence. Neither is particularly beholden to any of the great powers of the world, making them natural allies.

45 Ray Bush, “Politics, Power and Poverty: Twenty Years of Agricultural Reform and Market Liberalisation in Egypt,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 8 (2007): doi:10.1080/01436590701637441. 46 Joel Beinin. Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, accessed October 26, 2016 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 47 “Syria 1949.” U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://www.us-foreign-policy-perspective.org/index.php?id=323.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX While Egypt and Syria certainly have very compatible, non-aligned policies, they have not yet set up a formal alliance. While Syria’s regime is based on the backing of the Arab socialist Baath Party, Nasser’s core comes from a military background. So far the two nations have collaborated mostly in the context of countering Israel. Iraq and Transjordan represent the primary obstacles to such a close alliance being formed because those two parties hold the most international support from the United Kingdom. These states remain leaders in the fight against Israel, but have dramatically different conceptions of the relationship the Arab world should have with the political West. This all being said, Syria represents another the only center of modern Arab thought outside of Egypt at this time. Therefore, the goal of Egypt in this time should be to form a closer relationship with Syria in the hopes of being able to exert more influence over the Middle East region as a whole.

Israel

The Jewish state, the world’s newest sovereignty, to be known as the State of Israel, came into being in at midnight on May 15, 1948 upon termination of the British mandate.

Recognition of Israel by the United States, which had previously opposed its establishment, came as a complete surprise to Israelis, who were tense and ready for the threatened invasion by Arab forces and had appealed for help to the . In one of the most hopeful periods of their troubled history, the Jewish people here gave a sigh of relief and took a new hold on life when they learned that the greatest national power had accepted them into the international community.48

However, Israel’s induction into statehood was western driven and hardly welcomed by the other countries in the Middle East. In 1948 following Israel’s declaration of independence, armies from Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq invaded the new country, thus beginning the 1948 Arab Israeli war. Soon after Yemen, Morocco, , and Sudan joined the attack aimed at preventing the creation of the Jewish State and the removal of the . The invasion was uncoordinated and ultimately unsuccessful due to rivalries between the various Arab states. The failure of the Egyptian

48 Gene Currivan, “Zionists Proclaim New State of Israel; Truman Recognizes” The New York Times, accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes. com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0514.html.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX military has been a thorn in the side of the government and citizens ever since. The final result was an armistice49 which each country signed individually with Israel. Egypt handled the administration of the and seized the during the war.

This fraught relationship between Egypt and Israel is founded on many things, but a significant part has to do with the growing movement. The end of colonialism has left many nations in the Middle East with a desire to assert their own cultures and push back against the West’s domination of their region. The introduction of Israel, a country which almost by default will lean towards western powers, endangers the region’s growing independence. Disputes over land ownership have also caused further tensions. As Egypt looks towards its future, the looming threat of a well-armed, western-supported adversary on its eastern border is a problem that must be addressed.

The United Kingdom

Egypt and the U.K. have a long history, and one with a great deal of resentment on the side of Egypt. While under the British as a protectorate, Egypt’s long-term interests were ignored in favor of the economic benefits for Britain. Even after the end of the protectorate the influence the U.K. chose to exert over Egypt tended to be towards Egypt’s detriment. However, the two countries are bound closely together over the Suez Canal. This tie is not only economic, given that many British soldiers continue to be stationed to protect the canal. Egyptians perceive the continuing presence of British soldiers as an affront to Egypt’s sovereignty and a sign of the U.K.’s continued imperialist agenda.50 However, the U.K. is extremely protective of the Suez Canal. Huge quantities of oil travel through the canal, thus the canal is a critical way to get resources from the Middle East to the U.K. With the fluctuations in Egyptian rule, the U.K. is reluctant to allow the Suez Canal to be put at risk. To defend against what they would understand as an illegal taking of the canal by the Egyptians, the British government has proposed an Anglo-Egyptian agreement along with the French to terminate the stationing of European troops on the canal by June of 1956 in return for continued British operation of the canal via civilian contractors.51 This agreement could conceivably end the intense hostilities between the Egyptian feyadeen and Europeans located in Egypt. However, there is uncertainty as to whether the British are sincere about their desires to truly leave the canal and end intervention in Egyptian affairs.

The U.K. could theoretically be a powerful ally to Egypt, but their support of Israel, primarily through military aid, while Egypt is greatly opposed to the nation is a difficult disagreement for either side to overcome.

49 and the Partition Plan; Israel after the 1949 Armistice Agreements, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1992). 50 51 “Anglo–Egyptian Treaty (1954).” Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/ encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/anglo-egyptian-treaty-1954.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Social Affairs

From the early 1900s to the Second World War, Egypt progressed through a period of social turmoil. Cultural modernization progressed at an extremely rapid rate and society’s traditional elements were gradually undermined in urban areas. In spite of the fact that much of this modernization occurred in areas with high levels of European influence, the Europeans did not necessarily facilitate the modernization of Egyptian society. Instead, Egyptian resistance and adaption to its semi-colonial situation stimulated immense cultural change. While on one hand a robust feminist movement emerged within Egypt as part of the modernization impulse, Muslim outrage responding to European Protestant proselytization allowed political Islam to emerge as an alternative method of modernization.52 The rights of women gradually became significant in Egyptian life between 1919 and the Free Officer’s Revolution.53 Nationalism allowed for a pathway for Egyptian women to gradually enter civil society as women continued to agitate within nationalist political parties for the ability to participate in universities and other areas of life. However, this agitation produced an equal and opposite movement of religious outrage among the more conservative elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although foundational members of the Brotherhood opposed polygamy and unjust divorce laws, other founding members did not support women playing a role outside of the home in society.54

With the beginning of the Second World War, international intervention and the war economy immediately forced a crackdown on all political activity in Egypt. Consequently, the Egyptian feminist movement froze in place while the Muslim Brotherhood continued to gain influence until a suspected assassination attempt drove Nasser to repress the organization in 1954.55 Although political activity is now highly restricted by Nasser, the feminist movement has re-emerged behind a by the name of Doria Shafiq. Shafiq, after a multi-day hunger strike, was able to secure a promise from President Naguib in early 1954 for a new constitution that would respect women.56 However, the question remains open as to the extent that the Nasser regime will honor these promises.

52 Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). 53 Stephanie Margherio. “Feminists, Nationalists, and the State,” accessed October 26, 2016. http://www.loyno.edu/~history/journal/Margherio.htm. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX BIOGRAPHIES

Abbas Mustafa Ammar – Minister of Public Information and Social Affairs

Abbas Mustafa Ammar first made his name as a social scientist. Focusing on the rural Delta, Ammar sees population growth as a serious problem in Egypt, one which frustrates attempts to improve the average state of the Egyptian citizen. He has urged the creation of family planning services to help improve this situation.57 Ammar has consistently been an activist for the modernization of rural areas and developing strong family structures.

He has further helped Egypt’s recent attempts to develop stronger social welfare institutions, specifically orphanages and reduction of the birth rate.58 Ammar administers the public (rather than private or Islamic) social welfare institutions in Egypt. This can range from orphanages to hospitals. He also is the main minister in charge of international propaganda and advertising of Egypt.

Abd al-Hakim Amr – Commander in Chief of the Military

Abd al-Hakim Amr was born in 1919. He attended the Cairo Military Academy and was commissioned into the Egyptian Army after graduating in 1939. Amr rose quickly in the military and was a founding member of the Free Officers Movement. Having participated in the revolution in 1952, he is a close friend and associate of Nasser’s. Many feel he is too young and inexperienced for the responsibility of the position he has been given. The feeling is Nasser has an outsized trust in Amr courtesy of their past history together. There have even been resignations from the military to express their annoyance with Nasser’s choice.59

Amr has continued to upset some members of military by appointing close friends and family members to high ranks within the command structure of the military. Simultaneously he has striven to make the military more professional.60 Under Amr, defense spending has begun to increase in an attempt to fix the problems revealed by the War of 1948. Amr is responsible for determining military tactics and how the army should physically respond to orders given by the government.

57 Soraya Altorki, A Companion to the Anthropology of the Middle East (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). 58 Ibid. 59 Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution (Oxford: , 1992). 60 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Abd al-Hamid al-Sharif – Minister of Finance and the Economy

As Minister of Finance and the Economy, Abd al-Hamid al-Sharif has a dual mandate to control Egypt’s currency reserves and oversee tax collection and policy. Being able to control the currency means that al-Sharif can dictate when the Egyptian government should print more money. This action would increase the amount of money available to Egyptians, but increasing the money supply subsequently decreases the value of money already in the market. Al-Sharif will have to determine whether or not adding to the money supply is worth the risk of devaluing the Egyptian currency. Controlling taxation is a large responsibility as it means that al- Sharif oversees one of the major sources of the money available to the Egyptian government. Should taxes not be high enough, the cabinet will not be able to carry out its agenda. If taxes are too high, however, Egyptians will resent the government and potentially turn against Nasser’s vision for the country.

Dr. Abd El-Razzeq Sedki – Minister of Agriculture

Dr. Abd El-Razzeq Sedki takes great concern with the global issue of malnourishment. Recently, he has become an active participant in the newly formed United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. This organization holds great potential for helping Egypt develop its agricultural sector. As a part of the United Nations, however, working with the Food and Agriculture Organization poses certain challenges. Namely, the historical great powers, including the United Kingdom, hold a great deal of power in that organization. Navigating UN politics will be necessary if Sedki is to have the Food and Agriculture Organization aid Egypt.

As Minister of Agriculture, Sedki must ensure that Egypt produces enough food for its citizens that that said food meets safety standards. Historically, due to Egypt’s mostly desert climate, the country has had troubles producing enough crops to feed its population. While not as dire today as previously in Egypt’s history, this is nonetheless an issue with which Sedki must contend. One of the ideas he has begun to consider in this realm is desert cultivation. While the technology to grow plants in the desert is only in its nascent stages, it is an area that Sedki has indicated great interest in developing in order to strengthen Egypt’s agricultural sector.

Abdel-Wahab S. El-Bishry – for Military Production

Abdel-Wahab S. El-Bishry was born in 1915. He studied electrical engineering at Cairo University and studied military science as a postgraduate degree at the Military Science Graduate Staff College. He worked in the private sector for the first decade of his career, primarily on international projects. After the 1952 Revolution, his association with some of the Free Officers from his time in the military caused him to be tapped as the Minister of State for Military Production.61

61 Hasso Reschke and Heinz Schelle, Dimensions of Project Management: Fundamentals, Techniques, Organization, Applications (: Springer- Verlag, 1990).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX In this role, El-Bishry is responsible for getting additional military supplies for Egypt. The ultimate goal of making Egypt no longer reliant on foreign imports for weapons relies on his ability to jumpstart the manufacture of weapons within Egypt.62

Abdul Jalil Al-Omari – Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs

As the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, al-Omari is responsible for overseeing the maintenance of economic ties between Egypt and foreign states. Egypt is at a crossroads in its national history, and it is crucial its economy reflect the state’s growing health and prominence within the international community. While certainly a large amount of Egypt’s economic health will be decided at home, Egypt must also concentrate on becoming a player in the global economy as well as maintaining its positive connections to foreign financing. This mandate means that Egypt must seek to increase its trading partners and find new ways to distinguish itself economically.

In order to accomplish this mandate, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs is able to take advantage of his extensive contacts within the economic ministries of foreign governments. Specifically, al- Omari’s familiarity with these ministries grants him easier access to individuals with in-depth knowledge about foreign governments’ economies. Al-Omari is additionally able to allocate resources within Egypt to meet its responsibilities for international economic treaties into which Egypt has already entered. Importantly, the minister does not have the power to approve new economic partnerships between Egypt and foreign states—such an action requires the support of a majority of the cabinet.

Abdul Latif Baghdadi – Minister of Defense

Abdul Latif Baghdadi was born in 1917. He excelled in the military academy and rose in the Air Force. During the Arab-Israeli War he fought alongside the Arab Liberation Army and formed lasting friendships during that ultimately unsuccessful campaign. He was one of the original Free Officers and is a leading member of the Revolutionary Command Council. He has had good relations with not only Nasser but also with Naguib, as he was also the Minister of Defense under Naguib.63 After the 1952 Revolution, he was placed in charge of trying members of the former monarchy. While many lengthy prison sentences were passed down in judgement, they were mostly commuted to help maintain the stability of the country.64 As Minister of Defense, Baghdadi is in charge of the conduct and use of Egypt’s defense forces, an important role given Egypt’s current uncertain security situation.

62 Haig Nicholson, “Egypt May Be ‘Arsenal of Middle East’” National Library of , August 19, 1953, http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/ article/61090317. 63 Yoram Meital, Revolutionary Justice: Special Courts and the Formation of Republican Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 64 Goldschmidt, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Ahed Abdo Sharabasi – Minister of Public Works

Ahed Abdo Sharabasi is an intellectual, though one of the few cabinet members with little to no military background. Specifically, he is an intellectual historian interested in the early twentieth century Islamist reformer Rashid Rida. He fulfills what would normally be a fairly nonpolitical position. However, with the new plans for the Ashwan High Dam his position could be at the center of major debates about how to best provide water and power to those affected. His position primarily has to do with the administration of irrigation technology and ensuring access to water. Thus the new investments planned under the government of Nasser could feed directly through his ministry.

Ahmad Husni – Minister of Justice and Presidential Affairs

Ahmad Husni has been placed in an advantageous position as Egypt evolves. Known for his devotion to Pan- Arabism, he can now be at the forefront of making his dream a reality. Husni is an associate, though not a close friend with Nasser. Their mutual respect has ensured Husni’s rise coincides with Nasser, although Husni considers himself to be ideologically closer to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Husni has a powerful responsibility of maintaining Egypt’s justice systems. Husni oversees the economic courts, where private economic disagreements can be litigated and the primary courts, where more typical criminal and public law rulings are determined. While Husni oversees these areas, any choice on his part to directly influence trials will be under close scrutiny. Less scrutinized is Husni’s role in paying the salaries of judges.65

Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Bagouri – Minister of Religious Endowments

Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Bagouri does not merely have a history with the Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1940s, he tried, and failed, to become the leader of the entire organization. He did not take this defeat calmly. Instead, Bagouri decided to leave behind the organization entirely and focus on his related passion for Pan- Arabism and on Muslims outside of Egypt. Through his efforts, Bagouri began well acquainted with Muslim’s around the world, especially in Communist nations where they often occupied a tenuous position. These international connections provide Bagouri with a very different insight into the world than many other cabinet members, some of whom have lived almost exclusively within Egypt.

65 Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab, “An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research,” GlobalLex, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/ Egypt1.html.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX As Minister of Religious Endowments,66 Bagouri is in charge of the significant funding of religion related activities of the government. These funds are called Wakif and are religious endowments and trusts. The goals of these endowments are to fund philanthropic institutions throughout the Islamic world. These institutions support everything from orphanages, schools, and institutions of higher learning all the way to rural irrigation infrastructure. This ministry is not only meant to fund such organizations but is also a way to spread the message of Pan-Arabism, thus fitting neatly into Bagouri’s own passions.

Anwar – Editor of al-Gomhuria and Minister of State

Born in 1918 into a poor family, joined the military in the hopes of advancing his position within Egyptian society. He graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1938 and quickly became enraged at the interference of the British in Egyptian and Sudanese affairs. He was so enraged, in fact, that during World War II he aided the in the hopes of removing the British powers from Egypt, for which he was imprisoned by the British. Sadat eventually gained his freedom; his opposition to the British continued and he became a prominent member of the Free Officers, befriending Nasser and earning his position on the cabinet. Sadat has additionally been a member of Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood.67

As editor of al-Gomhuria, the state-run newspaper, Sadat has incredible influence over public opinion in Egypt. Sadat has exclusive control over what the newspaper published, and thus over what thousands of Egyptians read every day. Sadat’s role as Minister of State is mainly ceremonial, but he has used it as an extension of his power to influence public opinion as the editor ofal-Gomhuria . In this position, Sadat is given widespread recognition as a spokesperson for the Egyptian government. Holding such a prestigious position within the Egyptian government, Sadat is considered on the international stage to be a representative of Egypt’s policies and a major face of Egypt’s Free Officers movement. Although being Minister of State does not allow him to directly make policy, the influence he holds may be just as powerful.

Fathi Radwan – Minister of Communications

Fathi Radwan was born in 1911. Originally trained as an attorney he became well known as a playwright. In 1933 along with Ahmad Husayn, he founded Misr al-Fatat, Young Egypt, as a new political party. Striving to reinvigorate members with patriotic ideals the party drew the favor of King Faruq. It was a close parallel to the Young Turks movement under Ataturk in Turkey. One of the many ways Radwan strove to improve patriotism in Egypt was encouraging investment into local manufacturing firms to remedy the damage left by

66 Also called the Awqaf. 67 “Anwar Sadat,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anwar-Sadat.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX the short sighted policies of the English.68 However, in 1944 Radwan split with the other founding members of the party and joined the Watani Party. He quickly lost favor and was imprisoned prior to the revolution.69

Radwan is thus one of the oldest members of the cabinet and has always had significant influence in Egyptian politics. While most of his writings are not deeply political, he has stayed acquainted with political movements. His writings have consistently striven to reinvigorate Egyptian theater of folklore thus landing solidly with most of the cabinet in his desire to push Egypt forward not just economically but also culturally.

As the Minister of Communications, Radwan’s responsibility mimics the FCC in the United States. He is in charge of the cultural policy of Egypt. His goal is not only to help the growth and development in Egyptian culture but also to push an overall social solidarity. The avenues of the ministry are many, including the ability to produce radio, art shows, public arts program, and control state media.

Hamed Basara – Governor of Cairo

In charge of the largest city in Egypt, the Governor of Cairo holds an incredibly powerful position within Egyptian society. The Governor is the executive authority in Cairo, and thus he is able to control every aspect of the city’s administration that is not superseded by the national government. This power is incredibly important for certain areas, including spending on municipal goods, including the city’s police force, and preserving historic artifacts that are within the city limits. The Governor must also oversee the city’s growth, with has accelerated in recent years. This growth means that the city must, among issues, find new means for housing its increasing number of citizens, address sanitation issues, and create a cultural program that follows the national government’s goals.

Hasan Marai – Minister of Commerce

As Minister of Commerce, Hasan Marai is responsible for overseeing the trade of goods within Egypt. This could include the movement of any number of goods within Egypt or across its borders. Many of these goods include foodstuffs or cotton, which Egypt is historically known for producing. That said, one of the newest areas that Marai is focusing on is energy, specifically the trade of oil. As Egypt looks forward to expanding its presence on the world stage, oil holds great promise for its high price. With extensive potential oil sources on the , Marai is extremely interested in exploring the possibility of using oil to bolster Egypt’s economy.

68 Arthur Goldschmidt, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 69 Noor-AIman I. Khan, Egyptian-Indian Nationalist Collaboration and the British Empire (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX As Minister of Commerce, Marai controls the implementation of tariffs on goods coming into and leaving Egypt. Should he be able to develop the oil industry on the Sinai Peninsula, this would bring a great deal of power to his ministry as an incredible amount of money would begin to be collected through tariffs. Marai must keep this potentiality in mind while simultaneously working to maintain his ministry’s day-to-day operations.

Hassan Ibrahim – Minister for Presidential Affairs

Born in 1917, held a long career in the Egyptian military like many of his fellow ministers on Nasser’s cabinet. After graduating from Egypt’s Air Force Academy, Ibrahim fought in various military campaigns. Eventually, however, he joined the Free Officer’s Movement and worked to end British influence in Egypt. This work allowed him to gain favor with Nasser, which resulted in Ibrahim’s ascension to the role of Minister for Presidential Affairs.70

As Minister for Presidential Affairs, Ibrahim works closely with the President to organize diplomatic, political, and social agendas. Through this power, Ibrahim can control what individuals the President comes into contact with and, to a lesser extent, the stated goals of these meetings. These meetings could be with high-level diplomats from other countries or with political leaders within Egypt. Additionally, the power to create social agendas means that Ibrahim is closely engaged in the battle to continue Egypt’s progressive social agenda. The type of engagements that the President holds shows to Egypt’s general population what the priorities of the national government are. Ibrahim thus holds great influence over public perception of Nasser’s agenda.

Jamal Salem – Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Transportation

Born in 1918, Jamal Salem has held a long career in the military, graduating from Egypt’s military academy in 1938 and fighting in the 1948 war against Israel. Salem eventually grew disenchanted with the Egyptian government, and became a proud member of the Free Officers movement, mostly due to his deep opposition to the British occupation of Egypt and Sudan. Salem, in fact, was one of the most radical members of the Free Officers movement, arguing in favor of executing King Farouk instead of exiling him from Egypt as most of his colleagues desired. While Salem did not achieve his goal on that front, he maintained his prominence in the revolutionary movement, prompting Nasser to give him the roles of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transportation within the new government.71

70 “All the Revolution’s Men,” Al Ahram, July 2002. 71 “All the Revolution’s Men,” Al Ahram, July 24, 2002.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX As Deputy Prime Minister, Salem is responsible for overseeing Egypt’s Parliament. While this role is mostly ceremonial, it does afford him a large number of contacts with Egyptian lawmakers. Salem is able to use these contact to promote Nasser’s agenda within Parliament and take. The more concrete aspects of his power, however, come from his role as the Minister of Transportation. Salem must oversee Egypt’s airports, roadways, and railroads. This job includes the maintenance of these facilities as well as overseeing the expansion of transportation networks between Egyptian cities and rural areas.

Kamal al-Din Hussein – Minister of Education

Like many of his fellow members of the Cabinet, Kamal al-Din Hussein had a career in the military that led him to his current position within the Cabinet. He is, however, generally more opposed to Nasser’s vision for Egypt than his other colleagues on the cabinet. Hussein is generally more right-wing than the other ministers on the cabinet, and this can translate into isolation for him on some issues related to social modernization. As many of the important education institution in Egypt have historical connections to religious education, Kamal al-Din Hussein had ties with the intellectual fathers of political Islam (which found its expression in the Muslim Brotherhood).

Hussein controls Egyptian national education policy.72 Overall, he must work to increase the rate in Egypt, which is a major factor that holds back Egyptian economic development. If Egypt is to be able to compete on the international stage, its citizens must have a basic level of education to be able to work along with foreign counterparts. Finally, education is still mostly centered in urban areas. In developing the education system, Hussein will need to consider how to ensure that Egyptians throughout the country are receiving an education.

Mahmud Azmi – Ambassador to the United Nations

As Ambassador to the United Nations, Azmi wields considerable influence over Egypt’s relations with various foreign governments and international organizations. This is in many ways a difficult position to hold because of Egypt’s difficult relationship with the UN. While Nasser’s government is generally in favor of the UN’s mission of promoting international cooperation, it is nonetheless against the domination of the organization by large powers such as the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.73 Azmi controls all of Egypt’s relations with the UN, including the staff that visits the UN headquarters and enters negotiations with other governments through UN organizations. This position offers Azmi the strong chance to promote the emerging non-alignment movement. Because Egypt is generally pro-international cooperation but against

72 , “Obituary: Kamal el-Din Hussein,” The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-kamal-el-din- hussein-1101828.html. 73 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX the domination of the UN by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Ambassador must attempt to make the UN an organization in which the voices of smaller states, such as Egypt, are heard and valued.

Mahmoud Fawzi – Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mahmoud Fawzi was born in 1900. Born into a relatively well-off family, he attended University of Cairo studying law and pursued postgraduate studies in England, the United States, and . He is fluent in in English, French, Italian, Spanish, Japanese, Greek, and Amharic (Ethiopian).74 As a result, Fawzi has held many important diplomatic posts in , Israel, and the United Kingdom; he also served in the United Nations for a time.75 Of course as a result Fawzi has many international connections but has always striven to avoid playing political games in his positions.76

This commitment explains Fawzi’s appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs despite his involvement in the previous government. As Fawzi helps implement Egyptian foreign policy, directs negotiations with foreign governments, and is the initial Egyptian point of contact for foreign governments.

Mirrit Ghali – Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs

Mirrit Ghali has strong feelings about income inequality, publishing in 1946 a manifesto, Agrarian Reform, with his friend and colleague Ibrahim Madkur. The manifesto criticized the Wafd government for failing to reform the country and address the problems in the educational, agricultural, and health fields. Ghadi also saw the lack of housing as a sign of the problems facing the country. To counter these issues Ghadi proposed a progressive income tax to help redistribute wealth in the country.

Ghali was appointed as Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs under Naguib, a position which he was again offered under Nasser. In this new government his ideas are almost too conservative; what is unthinkable to the conservatives, is barely radical enough to suit the radicals.77 This is partially due to the relative wealth of his family and their prominence in Egyptian society. Additionally, his belief in Malthusian principles, that population growth is the primary cause of economic problems, is a belief that many members of the Cabinet do not share.78

74 Simon C. Smith, Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath (London: Routledge, 2008). 75 “Mahmoud Fawzi,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mahmoud-Fawzi. 76 James P. Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 77 Contesting Antiquity in Egypt 78 Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX As Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs Ghali is tasked with modernizing the culture of rural areas and expanding state control over traditionally tribal areas. This includes the large amount of land upon which Bedouin society exists.

Mohammed Helmy Bahgat – Egyptian Representative to the board of the Suez Canal Company

Mohammed Helmy Bahgat was born in 1904. After studying law, he obtained his doctorate studying commercial law in Paris. He then served for several years as a professor of Civil Law at Cairo University. After leaving academia, Bahgat began to serve as a judge. He traveled widely negotiating as the Minister of Commerce and Industry under Naguib. In that role he tried to better Egypt’s position in a variety of economic agreements. Soon he moved into the private sector where his past studies and experience eventually landed him on the board of the Suez Canal. In this position, Bahgat must represent the interests of the Egyptian government in negotiations with the directors of the Suez Canal Company.

This position was a natural fit for Bahgat. He has a deep understanding of the needs of the Egyptian government but also a strong understanding of the legal basis for the control of the Suez Canal. Throughout his career he has avoided publicity and public disputes. However, he is reliable in always desiring to put the needs of Egypt first.7980

Monim Attia – Secretary of Intelligence

The Secretary of Intelligence is responsible for overseeing the activities of Egypt’s domestic and international spy organizations. This power indicates that the secretary maintains a portfolio with detailed information on foreign actors who may pose a threat to Egyptian national security. Similarly on the domestic side, the Minister has information on Egyptians who potentially pose a threat to the Free Officers Movement. Since the movement is so new, much of the information is incomplete, and the secretary will need to work to streamline Egypt’s intelligence operations if he is to effectively fulfill his duties. Besides maintaining these files, the Secretary of Intelligence controls a limited staff to conduct espionage within Egypt, and, very occasionally, outside of Egypt as most operations are technically under the purview of the Ministry of Interior. He works closely with the Minister of Interior in order to maintain Egyptian national security.

79 “Egypt’s Suez Expert; Dr. Helmy Bahgat Badawi Hobby is Reading Low,” The New York Times, October 5, 1956, http://www.nytimes.com/1956/10/05/ archives/egypts-suez-expert-dr-helmy-bahgat-badawi-hobby-is-reading-law.html?_r=0. 80 “Egypt Nationalizes Suez Canal Company; Will Use Revenues to Build ; Nasser Retaliates Against West’s Denial of Aid,” The New York Times, July 27, 1956, http://www.nytimes.com/1956/07/27/archives/egypt-nationalizes-suez-canal-company-will-use-revenues-to-build. html?_r=0.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX Mostafa Amer – Minister of State of Antiquities

Mostafa Amer is the first person to hold his position as Minister of State of Antiquities. His appointment is the result of a new push by the government to prevent the theft of antiques by foreigners or locals and their sale on the black market.81

Amer is a prehistorian, and his expertise in Egyptian antiquities has uniquely prepared him for this role.82 This is a position balanced between two major tasks: the identification of stolen objects with the corresponding negotiations and legal actions necessary for their return and the placement of policies to prevent theft from initially occurring. Amer is the first Egyptian to head this already existent service. Previously it was run by the French, with the obvious resulting conflicts of interest causing numerous scandals. The laws in Egypt regarding antiquities are detailed but essentially declare that all antiquities to belong to the state. This position gives Amer a great deal of oversight into a thriving industry and, with that, a great deal of responsibility.83

Nour al-Din Tarraf – Minister of Public Health

As Minister of Public Health, Tarraf must work to protect the physical health of Egyptian citizens. This includes a number of different powers. On a basic level, Tarraf controls a small number of state-run hospitals throughout the country. These hospitals are generally in large cities and are used by an increasingly large number of Egyptians; if the country is to continue growing at current levels, the number and quality of health care facilities must grow alongside it. Tarraf must also respond to any public health crises. Such a crisis could be the outbreak of an infectious disease. If such an event were to occur, it would be up to Tarraf and his team of doctors to contain the problem before it grows out of hand. Of course, if the problem becomes too large the entire cabinet will be forced to take control of the response to the crisis.84

Rawya Ateya – First Female Parliamentarian in the Arab World

Born in 1926, Rawya Ateya has consistently fought against British influence in Egypt since she was a young woman. She has been particularly effective in her fight against the British due to her advanced degrees from Cairo University in a variety of subjects such as education, psychology, and Islamic studies, all of which was incredibly rare for a woman at the time to achieve.85

81 “A Brief History of the Supreme Council of Antiquities,” The Supreme Council of Antiquities, http://www.sca-egypt.org/eng/sca_history.htm. 82 Brian M. Fagan, The Oxford Companion to Archaeology, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 83 “National Legislation Protecting Egypt’s Cultural Heritage,” Echo, http://www.e-c-h-o.org/chlaw.php. 84 Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt: 1923 – 1973 (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008). 85 Ne’maat Magdi, “Rawya Ateya: The First Egyptian Female Deputy after the Revolution,” Al Rai, February 2, 2010.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX As the first female parliamentarian in the Arab World, Ateya holds a particular and historic role within Nasser’s Cabinet. Since there is no explicit role within the Cabinet that relates to gender policy within Egypt, Ateya has assumed this role. She wields a large amount of influence over Nasser regarding women’s issues, and she has advocated for more progressive policies toward , including paid maternity leave. Given her position, when Ateya speaks publicly, Egyptian women tend to follow her beliefs, giving her a great deal of soft power within Egypt. Additionally, while many members of Nasser’s cabinet are wary of Western powers due to the history of imperialism in Egypt, Ateya is generally more open to working with Western, capitalist countries such as the United States.

Salem Saleh – Minister of National Guidance.

Salem Saleh was born in 1920. He was born in Sinkat, Sudan which was then a part of Egypt. He then attended the Royal Military Academy of Egypt and Sudan. He was incredibly successful academically and served in the War of 1948. He joined the Free Officers and began a member of the 8-member executive committee. He thus had a very significant role during the Revolution of 1952.

Salem was given the positions of Minister of National Guidance and Minister of State for Sudanese Affairs in 1953 by Naguib. As Minister of Culture he is a strong proponent of Arab nationalism and Arab culture. Saleh has not had a light hand in his role as Minister of National Guidance, either under Naguib or currently. He has exerted tight control over journalists, making it clear that his preferred narrative of the improvements in Egypt must be maintained. Specifically he has in the past threatened journalists who spread rumors, targeting journalists who have “deviated from the upright path.”8687 As Minister of National Guidance Saleh is not only in charge effectively of national propaganda but frequently travels throughout Egypt to help spread his view of how Egypt should progress forward.

Umm Kulthum – Cultural Ambassador

Born around the turn of the century to a rural family, Umm Kulthum gained the attention of talent scouts at a young age and began a career as a singer in Cairo. Kulthum quickly rose to fame and became one of Egypt’s most famous singers of the twentieth century. While she was living in Cairo, Kulthum maintained her family’s conservative rural values, something that would later endear her to members of the Free Officers Movement. She has traveled throughout the Arab world for her career, and in so doing she has brought great notoriety to Egyptian art and culture.88

86 Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution. 87 “Rigden Incident: Comments by Maj Saleh Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance,” The National Archives, http://discovery.nationalarchives. gov.uk/details/r/C6437337?descriptiontype=Full&ref=FO+371/102849/item. 88 Virginia L. Danielson, “Umm Kulthum,” Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Umm-Kulthum-Egyptian-musician.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX On the Cabinet of Nasser, Kulthum serves as the country’s Cultural Ambassador, promoting Egyptian culture domestically and abroad. While this role may seem ceremonial, the way that Kulthum chooses to present Egyptian culture will greatly influence how Egyptians and foreigners interpret the cultural vision of Nasser’s government. Kulthum regularly goes on artistic tours and gives artistic performances, and it is through these performances that she can insert her own opinions about what the social situation in Egypt.

Zakaria Mohiuddin – Minister of the Interior

Zakaria Mohiuddin became the Minister of the Interior in 1953. Previously, Mohiuddin had attended Military College, closely following the rise of Nasser himself. He taught professionally in the Officers Military College, and eventually became a leading member of the Free Officers Movement. When it came time to assign positions in the new government Mohiuddin knew he had the choice of potential roles.

His chosen role, Minister of the Interior, has broad responsibility. In an overarching sense he is responsible for the internal stability of Egypt. Mohiuddin has ensured that he has sufficient tools to perform his role. As Minister of the Interior he has the right to direct police activity and must additionally ensure the security of Egypt’s borders.89

89 “Prominent Egyptian ‘Free Officer’ Dies at 94,” Ahram, May 15, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/41741/Egypt/Politics-/ Prominent-Egyptian-%E2%80%98Free-Officer%E2%80%99-dies-at-.aspx.

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX APPENDIX

Ministers,

Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs covertly acquired the following document while in Washington, DC for a dinner summit with U.S. President Harry S. Truman. Proceed with caution; while we acquired the document through dubious means, it presents serious concerns for Egypt’s relations with the United States.

—President Nasser

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX COMMITTEE RULES

I. Rules of the Body

1. This committee is the Cabinet of Egypt in 1954.

2. Gamal Abdel Nasser is the President of Egypt and will serve as the mostly impartial chair for this cabinet. He will be enforcing the rules outlined below but reserves the right to alter rules to promote committee function.

3. The Cabinet is composed of Ministers appointed by the President who serve at his pleasure.

4. Members of the Cabinet are expected to show courtesy and respect toward other Members at all times.

5. Members of the Cabinet will dress in western business attire.

6. The official working language of this iteration of the Cabinet of the Egypt is English.

II. Committee Format

1. At the beginning of every session, the President will call roll. All members arriving late must make their presence known to the President before speaking or voting.

2. The Cabinet will operate in continuous moderated informal session with a speaking time to be set by the President. Cabinet members may set a topic or change the speaking time by motioning to do so.

3. All delegates must vote on procedural matters; no abstentions will be permitted.

4. Below are the procedural points and motions accepted in committee:

i. Motion to Adjourn—dismisses the committee until a set return time. The motion requires a second and a simple majority to pass.

ii. Point of Personal Privilege—can be invoked by a Minister if they believe that their ability to fully participate in committee is being impeded in any way. The point may interrupt a .

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX iii. Point of Order—can be invoked if a delegate believes that the rules of committee procedure are not being appropriately adhered to. The point may not interrupt a speaker. iv. Point of Inquiry—can be invoked if a delegate has a question regarding parliamentary procedure. The point may not interrupt a speaker. v. Point of Information—can be invoked if a Minister has a question regarding a substantive matter. The point may not interrupt a speaker. vi. Motion to Suspend the Rules—temporarily suspends standard procedure for activities such as introducing documents or holding a question and answer session. The motion requires a simple majority to pass. vii. Motion for a Moderated Informal Session—sets a specific topic and speaking time for a set duration. The motion requires a simple majority to pass. viii. Motion for an Unmoderated Informal Session—allows Ministers to converse with one another without designating one speaker at a time. Unmoderated informal sessions may also be used to write or merge documents. The motion requires a simple majority to pass. ix. Motion to Introduce a Document—allows a directive, communiqué, or press release to be introduced to the committee. Minister must specify a method of introduction. The motion requires a simple majority to pass. x. Motion to Table a Document—withdraws the specified document from committee consideration and reserves it for future introduction. The motion requires the support of all of the document’s sponsors or else a simple majority to pass. xi. Motion to Move into Voting Procedure—closes debate and initiates voting on introduced documents. The motion requires a two-thirds majority to pass. Once passed, all Ministers are forbidden from moving in or out of the room except in case of emergency. Ministers may vote in favor of the document, against the document, or abstain from voting. A document will be considered to have passed if it receives more votes in favor than against with certain exceptions discussed below. xii. Motion to Divide the Question—specifies an element of a document out for separate committee consideration. The motion is entertained once the committee has entered voting procedure and

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THE CABINET OF EGYPT, 1954 MUNUC XXIX requires a simple majority to pass. One the motion has passed, the specified element is voted on and then either struck from, or rejoined to, the rest of the document per simple majority decision.

III. Committee Documents

1. Directive—directs the financial, human, material resources available to the Cabinet of the Russian Federation to take actions that are within the Cabinet’s purview. Directives require a minimum of 1/6th of the Ministers present as sponsors or signatories.

2. Press Release—issues a statement from the Cabinet to the public, clarifying the Cabinet’s position or any information regarding an external matter. Press releases require a minimum of 1/6th of the Ministers present as sponsors or signatories.

3. Communiqué—sends a message from the Cabinet as a whole to another entity—either foreign or domestic. Communiqués may be designated for public release or marked as classified. Communiqués require a minimum of 1/6th of the Ministers present as sponsors or signatories.

4. Indictment for Treason—marks a Minister for investigation. Indictments must be submitted in writing and note the Minister being accused as well as the specific treasonous action committed. Indictments will be entertained at the discretion of the chair and require a simple majority to pass. Once passed, the suspect will be put on trial by the committee with a Minister chosen to act as prosecutor. The suspect will be permitted a chance to defend him or herself before the committee votes. A 2/3rds vote is required for a guilty verdict. If found guilty, the committee will propose methods of suitable censure which will then be chosen through a simple majority.

5. Personal Directive—orders the Minister’s division or personal assets to take specific action. This is submitted to the crisis room and not the committee for review. Enactment will be determined based on detail provided as well as overall feasibility and response will be provided either through note or committee update.

6. Note of Clarification—asks for information on substantive matters. May be sent either to the chair or to the crisis room at delegate discretion.

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