Army Officers and Land Reforms in Egypt, Iraq and Syria
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ARMY OFFICERS AND LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA AYAD AL-QAZZAZ Sacramento State College The purpose of this paper is to discuss the performance and achievement of the officers who control the governments of Egypt, Iraq and Syria in the field of land reform (upto 1967). 1 The main issue which our discussion revolves around is how successful these "officer governments" are in achieving land reform. Also, the reasons that account for the variation in the performance of these three regimes will be discussed. Our discussion will not go beyond June 1967, because the six-day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 introduced into the picture new elements and motiva- tions which must be taken into account in any study which extends beyond June 1967. Among these elements is the defeat of the armies of Egypt, Syria and, to a certain extent, Iraq. However, it is too early to assess and evaluate objectively and accurately the impact of this defeat on the implementation of land reform in these countries. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON THE EVE OF LAND REFORM In the three countries under study, agricultural production pro- vides about two-fifths of total national income, absorbs well over half of the labour force, and brings in most of the foreign currency (except in Iraq where oil industry is more important). It also pro- vides support for perhaps three quarters of the population and constitutes the entire mode of life for most of the people. Prior to land reform these three countries suffered from inequality and misdistribution of land and agricultural income. Extreme polarization and disequilibrium existed, particularly in Iraq and Egypt, between a very small number of big landowners and a large number of small landowners who owned insufficient land to support a family of three or four. Moreover, the area owned by medium landowners was relatively insufficient (Baer 1952: 385). In Egypt, 160 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN for instance, of 2,800,000 owners, two million owned one feddan or less each, with an average holding of half a fedddan (1 feddan = 1.038 acres), while 2,115 owned more than two hundred feddans each, with an average holding of 550 feddans. And among the latter, 188 held more than a thousand feddans each, with an average holding of 2,600 feddans (Gadallah 1962:13). In Iraq, 3,019 landowners possessed estates ranging from 100 to 1,000,000 donums (1 donum = 0.61 acres). The total area owned by this group was estimated to be 18,000,000 donums which included 600,000 owned by only 272 individuals (Mutar 1964: 287). In Syria the situation was less extreme. However, the landlords owned more than 60 percent of the country's cultivated land, and of that, over half was in the hands of less than 3,000 holders. The extent of such ownership is also indicated by the fact that in the Hamah district, the land of 110 out of 114 villages belonged to landlords Also, in the Akkari area east of Homs one estate included 60 villages (U.S. Army 1965: 249). This data shows us that side by side with poverty, squalor and wretchedness of the majority of peasants (fallaheen), we find most of economic and political power concentrated in the hands of a few landlords. Under such conditions, as is the case of most underdeveloped countries, agrarian reform became one of the most important steps necessary to arrest the galling poverty and to provide a starting point for economic progress and political stability. Important as it is, land reform however is of recent origin. It dates back only eighteen years in Egypt and twelve in both Iraq and Syria. Following independence from foreign control, the existing patterns of socio-political institutions were under the influence and control of the big landowners who benefited from the imbalance in the society. With industrial development only beginning, the land- lords were the strongest economic group in the country. They also enjoyed the social prestige and the high standing which traditionally in the Middle East is attached to the ownership of land.2 Land- ownership rather than any principle of inherited status depends on the amount of land inherited or acquired, not on any inherited title. This economic significance together with the social standing enjoyed by the landowners of big estates were responsible for the distribu- tion of the political power in their favour. Consequently, they were able to control and influence the political and economic institutions of their country and to have prominent say in the civic and national life (Harris et al 1958: 199). Winder's study on Syrian deputies LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 161 and cabinet Ministers shows that landowners constituted the largest group of deputies between 1919-1959 (1963: 11). Their percentage in the eight parliaments of this period was 38, 37, 52, 51, 54, 43, 33, and 42 respectively. Ze ltzer describes the civilian government of Syria in the following terms: (The government) "was a group of landowning families and large merchants who treated the country as if it were their own property; it controlled the high offices of the state and extracted from it open and concealed benefits" (1952: 238). Another investigation in Egypt by a newspaper found that among the 319 Egyptian members of parliament elected at the beginning of 1950, 160 were big landlords (Baer 1964: 208). War- riner, the noted British economist, asserted that in the thirty years of parliamentary government in Egypt not one measure was passed for the benefit of the fallaheen (1962: 11). On the contrary, one finds laws passed for the benefit of wealthy landlords. The decree issued by Ismail Sidky, the Prime Minister of Egypt in 1931, provides us with another pronounced example by which credit from agricultural banks was confined only to those who owned 200 feddans or more, which means, in the Egyptian context, big landowners. By this law millions of peasants were deprived of such credit when they were in dire need of it (Abdul Malik 1964 : 73). In Iraq too, the law No. 38 of 1933 specified the rights of the landowners and the obli- gations of the fallaheen. Paragraph 14 of the law stipulated that before the fallah could move from one place to another, he had to pay all his debts to the landowner, otherwise he would not get alternative employment anywhere else (Baer 1952: 389). This law practically converted the fallah and his family into land serfs who were bought and sold with the land. MILITARY OFFICERS: THEIR SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDES TO LAND REFORM Unlike the civilian governments, the military officers who assumed seats of power in Egypt, Iraq and Syria during the 1950s regarded reform as an important problem which deserved immediate atten- tion. 3 It seems to me that the reasons which underlay this commit- ment were as follows: 1. The army officers were recruited mainly from lower and middle classes. Thus they were closer to the feelings of the demoralized and defenseless masses and more sympathetic to 162 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN their cause. 2. Land reform provided the military officers with some source of legitimacy. As they came to power by extra-constitutional means they needed some justification for their act and be- haviour. Land reform, besides being a potent psychological measure, provided them with a link with the masses of the peasants. Through land reform they tried to build up popular support in the hearts and minds of the millions of fellaheen who had lost hope of ever becoming owners themselves. 3. The third reason was to break the social and political power of the big landowners who resisted any programme of econo- mic and social reform (Qubain 1958: 24). We will have more things to say about this point as our analysis develops. Although it is outside the scope of this paper, it is interesting to compare the stand of army officers of Egypt, Iraq and Syria with that of Latin America's on land reform. The attitude of the latter group, with a few exceptions, was either unfavourable or indifferent toward land reform. The question, "What is the single most serious problem your country faces?" was put to several dozen officers interviewed in Honduras, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Not one mentioned land reform (Johnson 1964: 147). Even the most radical military reformer stopped short of sponsor- ing genuine agrarian reform that involved a programme of re- allocation and redistribution of land. This stand of army officers in Latin America was underlaid by two reasons. First, the officer corps was recruited mainly from upper and middle strata which believed firmly in the sanctity of private property. Second, the officers' ties and personal interests with the landholding elite made them look askance toward any revolutionary agrarian reform and distrust any legislation designed to circumscribe the landholders' freedom of action (Johnson 1964: 149, Lieuwen 1965: 146). NATURE AND SCOPE OF LAND REFORM The first land reform law was inaugurated in Egypt on September 7, 1952. This was less than two months after the military coup of July 23, 1952. The law was regarded by many observers as a highly revolutionary step. In Syria, land reform was introduced immedia- tely after the union with Egypt in 1958 (the union lasted only for three years and a half). In Iraq, land reform was among the first LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 163 important measures to be passed by the military government when it came to power on July 14, 1958. The laws in the three countries did not differ from each other in essentials but only in some minute details.