Army Officers and Land Reforms in Egypt, Iraq and Syria

ARMY OFFICERS AND LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA

AYAD AL-QAZZAZ Sacramento State College

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the performance and achievement of the officers who control the governments of Egypt, Iraq and Syria in the field of land reform (upto 1967). 1 The main issue which our discussion revolves around is how successful these "officer governments" are in achieving land reform. Also, the reasons that account for the variation in the performance of these three regimes will be discussed. Our discussion will not go beyond June 1967, because the six-day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 introduced into the picture new elements and motiva- tions which must be taken into account in any study which extends beyond June 1967. Among these elements is the defeat of the armies of Egypt, Syria and, to a certain extent, Iraq. However, it is too early to assess and evaluate objectively and accurately the impact of this defeat on the implementation of land reform in these countries.

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON THE EVE OF LAND REFORM

In the three countries under study, agricultural production provides about two-fifths of total national income, absorbs well over half of the labour force, and brings in most of the foreign currency (except in Iraq where oil industry is more important). It also provides support for perhaps three quarters of the population and constitutes the entire mode of life for most of the people. Prior to land reform these three countries suffered from inequality and misdistribution of land and agricultural income. Extreme polarization and disequilibrium existed, particularly in Iraq and Egypt, between a very small number of big landowners and a large number of small landowners who owned insufficient land to support a family of three or four. Moreover, the area owned by medium landowners was relatively insufficient (Baer 1952: 385). In Egypt, 160 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN for instance, of 2,800,000 owners, two million owned one feddan or less each, with an average holding of half a fedddan (1 feddan = 1.038 acres), while 2,115 owned more than two hundred feddans each, with an average holding of 550 feddans. And among the latter, 188 held more than a thousand feddans each, with an average holding of 2,600 feddans (Gadallah 1962:13). In Iraq, 3,019 landowners possessed estates ranging from 100 to 1,000,000 donums (1 donum = 0.61 acres). The total area owned by this group was estimated to be 18,000,000 donums which included 600,000 owned by only 272 individuals (Mutar 1964: 287). In Syria the situation was less extreme. However, the landlords owned more than 60 percent of the country's cultivated land, and of that, over half was in the hands of less than 3,000 holders. The extent of such ownership is also indicated by the fact that in the Hamah district, the land of 110 out of 114 villages belonged to landlords Also, in the Akkari area east of Homs one estate included 60 villages (U.S. Army 1965: 249). This data shows us that side by side with poverty, squalor and wretchedness of the majority of peasants (fallaheen), we find most of economic and political power concentrated in the hands of a few landlords. Under such conditions, as is the case of most underdeveloped countries, agrarian reform became one of the most important steps necessary to arrest the galling poverty and to provide a starting point for economic progress and political stability. Important as it is, land reform however is of recent origin. It dates back only eighteen years in Egypt and twelve in both Iraq and Syria. Following independence from foreign control, the existing patterns of socio-political institutions were under the influence and control of the big landowners who benefited from the imbalance in the society. With industrial development only beginning, the landlords were the strongest economic group in the country. They also enjoyed the social prestige and the high standing which traditionally in the Middle East is attached to the ownership of land.2 Land- ownership rather than any principle of inherited status depends on the amount of land inherited or acquired, not on any inherited title. This economic significance together with the social standing enjoyed by the landowners of big estates were responsible for the distribution of the political power in their favour. Consequently, they were able to control and influence the political and economic institutions of their country and to have prominent say in the civic and national life (Harris et al 1958: 199). Winder's study on Syrian deputies LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 161 and cabinet Ministers shows that landowners constituted the largest group of deputies between 1919-1959 (1963: 11). Their percentage in the eight parliaments of this period was 38, 37, 52, 51, 54, 43, 33, and 42 respectively. Ze ltzer describes the civilian government of Syria in the following terms: (The government) "was a group of landowning families and large merchants who treated the country as if it were their own property; it controlled the high offices of the state and extracted from it open and concealed benefits" (1952: 238). Another investigation in Egypt by a newspaper found that among the 319 Egyptian members of parliament elected at the beginning of 1950, 160 were big landlords (Baer 1964: 208). War- riner, the noted British economist, asserted that in the thirty years of parliamentary government in Egypt not one measure was passed for the benefit of the fallaheen (1962: 11). On the contrary, one finds laws passed for the benefit of wealthy landlords. The decree issued by Ismail Sidky, the Prime Minister of Egypt in 1931, provides us with another pronounced example by which credit from agricultural banks was confined only to those who owned 200 feddans or more, which means, in the Egyptian context, big landowners. By this law millions of peasants were deprived of such credit when they were in dire need of it (Abdul Malik 1964 : 73). In Iraq too, the law No. 38 of 1933 specified the rights of the landowners and the obli- gations of the fallaheen. Paragraph 14 of the law stipulated that before the fallah could move from one place to another, he had to pay all his debts to the landowner, otherwise he would not get alternative employment anywhere else (Baer 1952: 389). This law practically converted the fallah and his family into land serfs who were bought and sold with the land.

MILITARY OFFICERS: THEIR SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDES TO LAND REFORM

Unlike the civilian governments, the military officers who assumed seats of power in Egypt, Iraq and Syria during the 1950s regarded reform as an important problem which deserved immediate attention. 3 It seems to me that the reasons which underlay this commit- ment were as follows: 1. The army officers were recruited mainly from lower and middle classes. Thus they were closer to the feelings of the demoralized and defenseless masses and more sympathetic to 162 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

their cause. 2. Land reform provided the military officers with some source of legitimacy. As they came to power by extra-constitutional means they needed some justification for their act and behaviour. Land reform, besides being a potent psychological measure, provided them with a link with the masses of the peasants. Through land reform they tried to build up popular support in the hearts and minds of the millions of fellaheen who had lost hope of ever becoming owners themselves. 3. The third reason was to break the social and political power of the big landowners who resisted any programme of economic and social reform (Qubain 1958: 24). We will have more things to say about this point as our analysis develops. Although it is outside the scope of this paper, it is interesting to compare the stand of army officers of Egypt, Iraq and Syria with that of Latin America's on land reform. The attitude of the latter group, with a few exceptions, was either unfavourable or indifferent toward land reform. The question, "What is the single most serious problem your country faces?" was put to several dozen officers interviewed in Honduras, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Not one mentioned land reform (Johnson 1964: 147). Even the most radical military reformer stopped short of sponsor- ing genuine agrarian reform that involved a programme of re- allocation and redistribution of land. This stand of army officers in Latin America was underlaid by two reasons. First, the officer corps was recruited mainly from upper and middle strata which believed firmly in the sanctity of private property. Second, the officers' ties and personal interests with the landholding elite made them look askance toward any revolutionary agrarian reform and distrust any legislation designed to circumscribe the landholders' freedom of action (Johnson 1964: 149, Lieuwen 1965: 146).

NATURE AND SCOPE OF LAND REFORM

The first land reform law was inaugurated in Egypt on September 7, 1952. This was less than two months after the military coup of July 23, 1952. The law was regarded by many observers as a highly revolutionary step. In Syria, land reform was introduced immediately after the union with Egypt in 1958 (the union lasted only for three years and a half). In Iraq, land reform was among the first LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 163

important measures to be passed by the military government when it came to power on July 14, 1958. The laws in the three countries did not differ from each other in essentials but only in some minute details. This likeness is explained by the fact that the laws of land reform in both Iraq and Syria were patterned after the Egyptian model. The land reform by and large encompassed the following three broad elements. 1. A ceiling was placed on the size of holdings. Land above that ceiling was expropriated within a period of five years. The former owner was compensated with government bonds at three percent interest, redeemable over a long period of time. They were not negotiable except when invested in industry. They were, how ever, accepted as payment for fallow lands purchased from the government, as payment of taxes on land, and as payment of inheri- tance tax and any other tax imposed on land (El-Barawy 1952: 230). The expropriated land was then divided into small plots which were sold to the landless peasants and to those who owned land insufficient for their sustenance. The new owner paid the government, in equal installments over twenty years, the price paid to the original owner plus the cost of administration and interest. 2. The new owners were organized into cooperatives with membership being compulsory (Berger 1964: 223). The functions of these cooperatives were, first, to grant credit loans to their members according to the need of their land, and second, to provide the farmers with the requisites for the exploitation of their lands, such as seeds, fertilizers, cattle, and agricultural machinery. Also, they helped to organize the cultivation of land in the most efficient manner, to sell the principal crop to the account of their members, and to render all other agricultural and social services to the members. 3. The final element in land reform was to establish some safe guards for the farm workers and tenants who were landless. Usually this was done by setting minimum wages for the farm workers and maximum limit for the rent, and also by allowing the farm workers to organize into farm unions to defend their rights and interests and to advance their standard of living (Berger 1964: 223). 164 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

OBJECTIVES OF LAND REFORM: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FAILURES

What we have said above is sufficient to capture the essential points of this paper. As stated earlier, our major concern is to see how successful the military regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria were in implementing and accomplishing the objectives of the laws of land reform. We are also concerned with variations in the accomplishments of the three regimes and how they could be accounted for. The criteria we will employ to measure and evaluate the accomplishments of each regime will be the objectives of the land reform laws. The political objectives aimed at destroying the social as well as the political power of the ruling oligarchy which had its roots in the big estates. The social objectives aimed at the creation of a new state of social equilibrium and prevention of agrarian unrest by the establishment of a new class of small landowners and by raising the standard of living of the agricultural workers. And the economic objectives purported to pave the way to industrialization by diverting capital from the purchase of farm land towards investments in industry.

Political Objectives. In Egypt, all the lands beyond the limit allowed by the agrarian reform were expropriated within the five year period as was stipulated by the law. Thus, by the end of 1959 about 450,000 acres had been expropriated (Berger 1964: 207). In Syria, the official estimate put the total area liable to expropriation at one million and a half hectors belonging to 3,240 owners. In 1963 only a little over a quarter of this area had been expropriated. By the end of 1966 (eight years after the enactment of the law) about 84 percent of it was expropriated (Syrian Ministry of Plan- ning 1968: 331). In Iraq, according to an official report the land subject to expropriation amounted to 4.7 million acres belonging to approximately 3253 landowners. By the end of 1966 (eight years since the inauguration of the law) 90 percent of this area had been expropriated (Iraq Ministry of Planning 1968: 159). There is no indication whatsoever of when the Iraqi officials would be through with the expropriation process. Iraq, like Syria, was far behind the schedule which was set to begin in 1963. It is evident from the preceding discussion of the confiscation process that it was complete in Egypt but incomplete in both Iraq LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 165 and Syria. Therefore, one can conclude that only the military regime of Egypt had realized the political objective of land reform. In other words, the military elite of Egypt was more successful in undermining the old power structure, which was under the control of the big estate landowners, and in reducing their influence to a minimum. In both Iraq and Syria, on the other hand, there are signs to indicate that some landowners did not lose their political power to any significant extent (Baer 1964: 161). This is due in large measure to the weakness of the central government in both the countries. These governments encountered many political upheavals and disturbances that diverted their attention and effort away from the application of many laws, including the land reform law.

Social Objectives. Many variations existed between Iraq and Syria on the one hand and Egypt on the other. While in the former there had been little progress, Egypt had travelled a long way toward realizing the social objectives and in bringing about a greater measure of social justice and equality. In Egypt the redistribution of expropriated land was completed by the end of 1959. About 150 thousand families comprising over a million persons, who owned no land or owned less than five acres before this law came into being, became each an owner of a piece of land that ranged from two to five acres, depending upon the fertility of the land and other factors. The rent fell down appreciably as a result of the ceiling on rent on agricultural land. This reduction in rent meant an increase in the income of the tenants. Some four million persons, along with their families, were officially estimated to have benefited from the ceiling on rent (Kerr 1963: 21). Allowing for official exaggeration, this suggests a notable improvement. The cooperative movement was a forceful stimulus and its membership extended to many small owners. It became popular and reasonably successful. The cooperatives on the whole were being well managed by capable technicians and were becoming a force for social as well as economic advancement (U.S. Army 1964: 270). The social tension and unrest, which were prevalent in the years preceding the military coup in 1952, disappeared (Baer 1959: passim). Before we turn to discuss Iraq and Syria a cautionary remark is necessary against any misunderstanding that might arise from the foregoing analysis about Egypt. I do not imply in this analysis that 166 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN land reform has solved all the social ills which beset the Egyptian fallaheen. Nor do I intend to imply that the law has benefited the whole peasantry. Such an implication is not realistic. No agrarian reform in Egypt, whatever it was, could provide land for all the peasants, nor could it increase the employment of farm workers. The point we are making is that no land reform could alter the fact that in Egypt there is too little land for too many people. Only 13,000 square miles out of 386,000 square miles are habitable. This area will be slightly increased by prospective irrigation works, such as the High Dam, which will increase the cultivable land by one percent. Population density in the habitable portion is above 1,900 per square mile, compared with a density of 763 per square mile in Belgium, which is one of the most populated parts of Europe (Hoskins 1960: 268). In Egypt, 99 percent of the total population lives on 4 percent of the land (Issawi 1963: 77). Thus, the conditions of the peasants who did not receive any piece of land will continue to be one of the most pressing problems. However, it is essential to keep in mind that substantial number of farmers have benefited from land reform either by receiving a piece of land or by enjoying the benefits of rent ceiling. The success of the social objectives in both Iraq and Syria was yet to be felt, In both the countries, the redistribution process has been taking place at a very slow rate. It demands and presupposes a great deal of hard and accurate work dealing with topographical surveys and maps, study of differences in land fertility, and investigation of the conditions of the farmer really entitled to get land. In addition, the redistribution process calls for men with technical requisites as well as a large staff for control. These things both the countries lack. We can expect, therefore, that the redistribution process will take much longer than confiscation and that it will fall far behind the five year limit put down by the law. In Syria, out of 1,260,742 million hectors, only 60 percent had been distributed by 1966, to some 23,396 families comprising 135,000 persons in about 680 villages (Syrian Ministry of Planning 1968: 331). In Iraq, by March 1966, only one million of 5.1 million donums of confiscated land were actually redistributed (1 donum=0.62 acres) (Warriner 1962: 91). The social unrest which existed prior to the inauguration of land reform, like the outburst by the peasantry of Shamiyah in 1958. a few months prior to the military coup of July LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 167 14, 1958 (Ministry of Guidance 1959: 267), did not disappear. The; movement from rural to urban areas, which started in Iraq after World War II and which the land reform was expected to curtail, did not decelerate its steady flow. On the contrary, the mismanagement; of land reform, the political dissension among the peasants, and other factors enhanced rural-to-urban migration. This led to the over- crowding of Baghdad and Basrah cities as well as the removal of the needed agricultural labour. Indeed, the sarifah dwellers in Baghdad, who were peasant immigrants, increased after the revolution of July 14 by 10 to 15 percent in comparison to the pre-revolution period (Ba'ali 1966: 362). The cooperative movement remained in a state of underdevelopment and did not replace the supervision and control of the landlords. As late as 1966, eight years after the inauguration of the law, only 368 agricultural cooperatives were registered with a membership of 45,767 farmers (Iraq Ministry of Planning 1968: 161). Economic Objectives. One objective of land reform was to divert capital from agricultural sphere to industry. This was totally unsuccessful in all the three countries in question. In Egypt, capital accumulated before the enactment of the law had been used by its owner exclusively to purchase land. After the law was enacted, capital was used for construction and purchase of urban property. One study discloses that in the years 1954-1956 the sum of private capital invested in industrial concerns was about 12 million Egyptian pounds (1 Egyptian £=$2.80), as compared to 100 million Egyptian pounds in immovable urban property (Baer 1964: 158). When the military government tried to stem this tendency by limiting rents on new buildings, the former landowners began to hoard their money in gold or to smuggle it abroad. It is precisely this fact which urged the state to take more active role in the industrialization process, which eventually led to the nationalization acts of 1961 and the imposition of control on major industries in 1963. In Iraq and Syria also the economic objectives were not realized. The scanty information available about both countries indicates that the former landowners attempted mainly to smuggle their money abroad, to Lebanon banks or to some European banks, particularly those in Switzerland. In Syria, for instance, one observer points out that the flight of capital reached a peak in 1958 and early 1959 168 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN when capital worth 1.20 million dollars was illegally transferred from Syria to Lebanon and European banks (Etzioni 1966: 114). Explanation of Differences in Accomplishments From the previous analysis of the land reform in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, one things of paramount importance stands out: the military regime in Egypt is more successful than its counterpart in Iraq and Syria. In this section I will attempt to explain what accounts for the success of the military government in Egypt. It seems to me that three important factors taken together will provide us with sufficient and satisfactory explanation of differences in the achievements of the military elite in Egypt, Iraq and Syria in regard to land reform: (1) stability of the political order, (2) bureaucracy and technicians, and (3) peculiarity of circumstances. Stability of the Political Order. Much depends upon the political stability of a given political system. Economic and social reconstruction pro substantial scale require concerted efforts and government initiative, and this will not be effectively provided if the government's attention is diverted to political upheavals and internal agitations. In short, political stability is a necessary prerequisite successful implementation of any comprehensive and lawful land reform. 4 Egypt, with the exception of the first two turbulent years after the coup, enjoyed a stable government. The officers who engineered and executed the coup d'etat of July 23, 1962 were still in control in 1957. Iraq and Syria, on the other hand, underwent numerous political upheavals and crises (see Al-Qazzaz 1967: 31-51, and 1970: 12-26). A good index for measuring the instability of the political systems to count how many successful and unsuccessful military coup d'etats took place in a certain period of time.5 In Iraq, since the initiation of land reform in September 1958 upto June 1967, there were two successful coups (in February and November 1963) and there were in addition five abortive coups. Syria, since the inauguration of land reform in 1959 upto June 1967, underwent four successful military coups in September 1961, March 1962, March 1963, and February 1966 and there were two abortive ones (on July 18,1963 and September 1966) (see Middle East Journal, Chronology Section, 1958-1967). It is clear, therefore. LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 169 that the political systems of Iraq and Syria were characterized by chronic instability in contrast to that of Egypt. Political instability had many implications which affected seriously the application of land reform law. We will take up only a few of them below. One consequence of instability was the high turnover of administrative personnel of high ranks, such as ministers and directors. In Iraq, for instance, eight different persons of different persuasions took charge of the ministry of land reform, i.e., an average of one minister per year since 1958 (see Middle East Journal, Chronology Section, 1958-1967). This high turnover not only delayed the execution of land reform law but also led to confusion in implementation of policy. It was quite common to see that one minister would emphasize redistribution of land as a panacea for all the social ills of the peasants, and immediately afterwards another minister would stress the cooperatives as the sole mechanism to rid the peasants of their chronic problems (Simmons 1965: passim). Another consequence of political instability was that after each coup, successful or not, many persons of needed skills were lost by death, dismissal, or imprisonment. This occurred because of their association with the previous regime or the abortive coup. These people were badly needed in countries like Iraq and Syria, not only because of their specialization but also of the difficulties involved in replacing them. It was not uncommon to leave these positions unfilled. It is very difficult to gauge the magnitude of the number of persons involved in such upheavals, but we can gather a few estimates concerning the number of persons arrested or killed in some of the coups. It must be kept in mind that there is no way of checking the accuracy of these estimates. Also, these estimates, besides being very crude, do not specify what kind of people were killed or arrested, nor their ranks and positions. In spite of these drawbacks, they are good illustrations for the point we are making. These estimates are as follows: (1) The Middle Eastern Affairs reported that "a wide purge took place in Iraq subsequently after the abortive coup of March 8, 1959, and that 5,000 to 6,000 civil servants, army officers, and political leaders were arrested" (Vol. X, No. 4, April 1959, pp. 208-209). No estimate of the killed persons is given. (2) Kerr in his recent book, The Arab Cold War, states that "The estimates of the number of people killed in the abortive coup of July 18, 1963, in Syria ranged into many hundreds" 170 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

(1967:116). Undoubtedly the killing, dismissing, and arresting of many efficient and specialized persons, which accompany these coups, would constitute a heavy blow to the speed and efficiency of the application of any law, including the land reform one. Another consequence of political instability was that it led to changes in many laws, including that of land reform. These laws were changed on the ground that they were enacted by the previous regime. The Syrian case in this regard is very striking. The government which came after the coup of September 1961 revised the land reform law of 1958 by increasing the amount of land that landowners might keep. The government which followed the coup of March 1962 issued, on May 2 of the same year, a new decree repealing the revision introduced in the land reform law by the previous government and essentially re-establishing the 1958 law (see Middle East Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 1963, p. 105). The government which came after the coup of March 8, 1963 introduced several important modifications in the land reform law. Perhaps the most significant change was to lower the ceiling on landowning and to make the limits flexible in accordance with fertility of land (U.S. Army 1965: 205-251). Such a swift change in the content of the law would invariably lead to confusion and create a heavy burden on the administration. It would also reduce the productivity of land. The last but not the least consequence of political instability was what has come to be called "brain drain." The term is used in this paper to designate two different but related processes. One is the migration of educated and professional persons trained within a given country to other countries. The second is concerned with students of a given country who go abroad to pursue their study and decide not to return to the homeland upon the comple- tion of study. What concerns us here is the implication of political instability in Iraq and Syria for the brain drain. In the absence of any statistical information on the subject we are left with no choice but to report some personal impressions and speculations, and a few bits of information gained through personal talks with Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis. These show at least five implications of political instability in Iraq and Syria. (1) Talented persons may leave the country and students may decide not to return to the homeland because the government is pursuing a policy different from the one they like. Fear of being jailed or mistreated lies behind such a LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 171 decision. (2) The government might refuse to permit students to return because of their different ideology or point of view, on the assumption that they may encourage subversive activities. (3) Talen- ted persons may decide to leave the country, or students may decide not to go back home, not because of political reasons but rather because of what accompanies political instability and frequent change in the government, such as insecurity, frustration, worry, and so on. (4) Political instability diverts the attention of the government from pursuing a systematic policy of inducing and encouraging students abroad to come back home. (5) Political instability diverts the attention of the government from focusing on economic and social development programmes that would open up opportunities for highly trained personnel and hence eliminate or at least remove some of the discontent among such people. In the absence of such programmes they would complain that they are working in jobs which do not fit with their level of specialized education. This in turn would increase the rate of brain drain. 6 To conclude my remarks on brain drain I would like to point out that Iraq and Syria have suffered much more heavily than Egypt in loss of trained personnel as a result of political instability. The estimate for Syria is that between 20 and 40 percent of Syrian students who study in the U.S. do not return, for Iraq it is between 20 and 30 percent, and for Egypt between 2 and 3 percent. The implication of these estimates would be more meaningful if we remember that the overwhelming majority (approximately 80 percent) of the students studying abroad from Iraq and Syria specialize in various fields of engineering (Arab Information Center 1966: 64).

Bureaucracy and Technicians. A successful application of land reform law requires a well trained administrative staff, and necessita- tes skilled services of a large number of agricultural engineers, sta- tisticians, social workers, and economists, and an efficient organiza- tion for land survey and registration. Egypt has a better chance than both Iraq and Syria in realizing the above stated objective of law, because she has a better trained body of civil servants (Harbison 1959: 4-5). On the other hand, Iraq and Syria are handicapped by acute shortage of highly talented manpower in the government and the underdevelopment of their administrative machinery. Egypt had by 1952 an established administrative machinery with many technical experts, and it was therefore better equipped than its counterpart in 172 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

Iraq and Syria to take charge of implementing the land reform law. Furthermore, in Egypt before the military coup of 1952, there were three big universities with over sixty thousand (today over 150 thousand) students on rolls, and a few hundred engineers and technicians in different fields, including agriculture, graduating every year. Iraq and Syria had each only one small university prior to land reform, and only a few persons of required skills graduated every year. To illustrate the point we are making in regard to the shortage of skilled and talented persons, we will cite but one example from Syria. In 1958 when land reform was introduced, it was reported that about 600 engineers would be needed to supervise the land subject to confiscation and its redistribution while the total number of engineers in the whole country in that year was 470 (Dabbagh 1962: 10).

Peculiarity of Circumstances. This factor rests on the fact that land reform in both Iraq and Syria followed in essence the same line as the one in Egypt. The former two countries imitated blindly what fitted Egypt's circumstances, without taking into consideration the peculiar characteristics of their respective countries. In both Iraq and Syria the state is the biggest landowner. The public domain consists approximately of two-thirds in Iraq and one- third in Syria of the total arable land, forests, and pastures. This contrasts with Egypt where the public domain, before the initiation of land reform, comprised only 17 percent of the total arable area (Baer 1952: 384). Redistribution of the land of the state domain instead of confiscation of the land of landlords as a first step might provide better measures for land reform. Such a step avoids many of the adverse consequences which usually accompany the application of comprehensive land reform, particularly when the state machinery is inadequately equipped to cope with such formidable tasks as the refusal of the landlord to cultivate land or to continue supervising it till the land is ready to be redistributed to the peasants. Also, on some occasions, the landlords over-exploit land to extract as much profit as possible from it, as it is confiscated without concern for soil conservation and without making any further investments to maintain the productive capacity of the land (Ben-Moshe 1961: 34). The method of cultivation in Iraq and Syria differs enormously from that in Egypt. While in the former it is extensive, in the latter LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 173 it is intensive. Intensive agriculture has been practised in Egypt since the introduction of perennial irrigation at the start of the century, and land is cultivated to its full capacity. Indeed, the yield per acre in Egypt is regarded as one of the highest in the world, if not the highest (Kerr 1963: 18), whereas in Iraq and Syria the extensive method is followed, only half of the land is cultivated each year, and yields are very low. It is estimated that the yield of a piece of land of equal size in Iraq and Syria equals one-third of the yield in Egypt. Therefore, when limitation was imposed on the size of holdings by the land reform, it generated stronger resistance and protest on the part of the landlords in Iraq and Syria than in Egypt. Indeed, they even actively attempted to sabotage the execution of the law. Land reform in Iraq and Syria was thus much harsher than that in Egypt. An indication of this can be seen from a glance at the maximum holding allowed in the three countries: in Egypt 200 acres, in Syria 200 for irrigated land and 750 acres for rain-fed land, and in Iraq 200 for irrigated land and 1125 acres for rain-fed land (Saba 1959: 8). A third difference, which is partially related to the second one, is that land productivity in Iraq and Syria is not as uniform as in Egypt (Saba 1959: 9). In both the countries productivity is widely different in different parts of the country. Hence, it is very difficult to limit the size of the holdings into two simple categories such as irrigated and non-irrigated. Finally, Egypt has a highly complex and efficient system of irrigation which was already in operation before the military coup. All the dams, barrages, regulators and canals are owned and maintained by the government who carefully controls the distribution of water, thus obviating inequalities which might otherwise result from local and sectional rivalries. Further, cotton seed, the main crop of Egypt, is entirely controlled by the ministry of agriculture (Issawi 1963: 137). In Iraq and Syria the picture is a different one, where in addition to the fact that the irrigation system is not very well developed, it is in many cases under the control of the landlords, except for the very big dams. Therefore, when land reform was promulgated by imposing a ceiling on the holdings, landlords reacted by neglecting irrigation. Since the governments of these countries were incapable of taking charge of irrigation, and the cooperatives were insufficiently developed to do so, land reform resulted in slack production of the land. 174 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the above analysis that military government per se is not a sufficient condition for successful implementation of the goals of land reform. Although military regimes are characteri- stic of Egypt, Iraq and Syria, their accomplishment record concerning land reform is not the same. Egypt was much more successful in realizing the social and political objectives of land reform. Three factors seem to explain the Egyptian success: first, a high degree of political stability, second, a high level of bureaucracy, and third, the uniform soil and the governmental control of the irrigation system. In Iraq and Syria the political system was unstable, the bureaucracy was underdeveloped, and the irrigation system was not under governmental control.

NOTES

1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference on "Social Development in the Middle East" at the University of California, Berkeley in January 1970. I am indebted to Lloyd Anderson, my research assistant, Samira Al-Qazzaz, my wife, and Caroline Schaefer for their editorial and typing assistance. 2. Wilbert Moore suggested that ownership of land involves the principal basis of security, prestige, and power in the traditional social structure (1965: 27). 3. On the point why the military assumed power in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, see Al- Qazzaz 1969: 31-51, and 1970: 9-10. 4. It should be mentioned that political stability is by no means the only factor. Other factors do play an important role, such as the availability of capital, social overheads, and availability of high level manpower. 5. A better index for measuring the instability of the political system in these countries is to count not only the successful and unsuccessful coups but also how many plots had been uncovered before their execution and how many anti- government demonstrations, strikes, and other political disturbances had taken place. The latter have the same effects as the coups, though at a much smaller scale. Counting the number of plots is. however, very difficult because plots are by definition illegal and they mature under conditions of secrecy. It is also very difficult to know whether what the government claims about discovering a plot is true or not. Sometimes the government makes up the story of such a plot in order to get rid of a special person or a group of persons by accusing them of conspiratorial behaviour to undermine the regime. Sometimes the other way around is also true; that is, there is a real plot but the government in question does not announce it, in order to avoid any idea the people might form that the regime is shaky. With regard to anti-government demonstrations, strikes, riots, and so on, I was unable to obtain any accurate and sufficient information about its number, magnitude and effect, so that any meaningful generalization is rendered LAND REFORMS IN EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA 175

impossible. Because of these reasons, plots, anti-government demonstrations, strikes, and so on will not be considered in this paper. 6. I do not imply in my observations here that political instability is the only reason for brain drain, but rather that it is one of the major factors accounting for brain drain in Iraq and Syria.

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