Prime-timePrime-time NationalismNationalism TheThe rationalrational andand economiceconomic underpinningsunderpinnings ofof thethe JuneJune 3030 nationalistnationalist “hysteria”“hysteria” Osama Diab Dissertation presented in fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences 2018 Faculty of Political and Social Science Ghent University Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sami Zemni Co-Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Jo Van Steenbergen Prime-time Nationalism The rational and economic underpinnings of the June 30 nationalist “hysteria” Osama Diab Dissertation presented in fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences 2018 Faculty of Political and Social Science Ghent University Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sami Zemni Co-Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Jo Van Steenbergen 2 To Iman Khattab, who lived long enough to see the start of this project, but left me too early to witness its end. 3 The Fatherland was the home wherein God has placed us, among brothers and sisters linked to us by the family ties of a common religion, history, and language. – Giuseppe Mazzini We have […] a single, universal language. And we possess a religion which most of us share, ways of performing our activities, and a blood which is virtually one flowing in our veins. – Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid 4 Acknowledgements I have a large number of “invisible hands” that have unknowingly contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I would therefore like to start by thanking those who might not have contributed directly to this project, but whose support was still indispensable to its completion. I would like to first express my gratitude to my colleagues at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) who have been very patient and understanding of my frequent PhD disappearances, and have shown nothing but support throughout the long months of writing this dissertation. I would also like to thank my friends and family who have also been understanding of my need to disappear and migrate to a different continent for an extended period of time to get the needed focus for finishing this project. I would like to extend special appreciation to my partner Severine Chavanne who had to endure the often-dizzying PhD emotional roller-coaster, and all the uncertainty and precarity it had coloured our life with. For the more direct contributions, I would like to thank Maher Hamoud, Andrea Teti and Mohamed Gad for the invaluable feedback they provided on different parts of the text. Their suggestions in their respective areas of expertise helped me considerably in working to improve the text. Needless to say, I claim full responsibility for any faults or defects in it. I would also like to thank Katleen Maes and Khaled Diab for providing their English-Dutch translation service free-of- charge. A special thanks goes to Omar Jabary Salamanca who suggested the title of this work over a casual conversation after I had presented the research to my colleagues at the Department of Conflict and Development Studies at the University of Ghent. I would also like to thank members of my defence committee Zeinab Abul-Magd, Koen Bogaert, Ifdal Elsaket, Vivienne Matthies-Boon, Christopher Parker, and Brecht de Smet whose engagement with this work and feedback was of immense value. Last, but most certainly not least, I would like to express my uttermost gratitude to the supervisor of this work Sami Zemni who guided the whole process from its moment of inception until completion, and who have battled with my endless drafts despite his overly busy schedule. For someone who does not consider himself a “natural academic”, I can only owe the completion of this dissertation to Sami’s support, patience and trust, but also to his constructive and detailed critique. 5 Abstract This dissertation is an attempt to address the ultra-nationalism of the June 30, 2013 period from a new and still largely unexplored angle, that is, the function it served the businessmen who have supported the dissemination of this discourse through their media outlets. In order to do this, this research utilizes theories and tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in order to examine the forces and interests—including economic—behind the diffusion of such discourse. The study uses as its sample three of the most popular talk shows which were at the forefront of spreading this ultra-nationalist discourse. The talk shows were screened on private media channels owned by businessmen that have started their process of wealth accumulation as a result of the 1970s open-door policy, mostly during the Mubarak era and in close alliance with state institutions. Although analyzing discourse critically takes into consideration the broader context in which the text has emerged, CDA is sometimes criticized for having contexts that are ahistorical and synchronic (looks only at a given moment in time). Therefore, the study broadens its context to also include the historical dimension. Accordingly, the second half of this study explores the historical links of how nationalism served economic functions in Egypt since the second half of the 19th century. The focus is on shifts and ruptures in official nationalist discourse, and how the past is in a continuous process of change and restructuring based on present considerations. This rational adoption of nationalist discourse based on economic considerations attempts to offer an alternative narrative to the dominant discourse that described the June 30 ultra-nationalist discourse as hysterical, irrational and emotionally charged. Given that key players in disseminating such “hysteria” were rational economic men, these descriptions are therefore unsatisfactory. The study also argues that these views are linked to the dominant notion that the rational development of modern capitalism only influenced nationalisms in European contexts, whereas in non-European settings nationalism is often presented as a way to mimic Europe’s development and copy its example. 6 Abstract (NL) Samenvatting Dit proefschrift is een poging om het ultranationalisme van de periode rond 30 juni 2013 te bespreken vanuit een nieuw en grotendeels niet onderzocht standpunt. Dit wil zeggen: als een hulpmiddel voor zakenmensen die de verspreiding van dit ultranationalistische discours ondersteunden via hun mediakanalen. Hiervoor gebruikt dit onderzoek de theorie en de middelen van de ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) om de machtsverhoudingen en belangen, inclusief economische, die een rol spelen in de verspreiding van zulks een discours te bestuderen. De studie gebruikt drie van de meest populaire praatprogramma’s die de voorhoede vormden van dit ultranationalistische discours als voorbeeld. De drie shows werden uitgezonden op particuliere mediakanalen die het eigendom zijn van zakenlieden die hun rijkdom begonnen te vergaren als gevolg van het open-deur beleid van de jaren 70, voornamelijk tijdens het Mubarak tijdperk en in nauwe alliantie met de staatsinstellingen. Hoewel een kritische analyse van het discours rekening houdt met de bredere context, is de context meestal synchroon en wordt deze op een bepaald moment bekeken. Maar deze studie neemt ook de ruimere historische context in acht. Bijgevolg gaat de tweede helft van de studie na hoe het nationalisme, historisch gezien, de economische doelstelling van Egypte diende sinds de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw. Daarom ligt de focus op verschuivingen en breuken in het officiële nationalistische discours, en op hoe het verleden een voortdurend proces van verandering en herstructurering is, gebaseerd op de huidige overwegingen. Deze rationele manier om het nationalistische discours voor te stellen, gebaseerd op economische overwegingen, poogt een tegenwicht te bieden aan de overheersende beschrijving van het ultranationalistische discours van de periode rond 30 juni als hysterisch, irrationeel en emotioneel geladen. Aangezien de hoofdrolspelers in het verspreiden van die “hysterie” rationele zakenmensen zijn, waren deze beschrijvingen onvoldoende. Deze studie betoogt ook dat deze denkbeelden verbonden zijn aan het overheersende idee dat de rationele ontwikkeling van het moderne kapitalisme alleen het nationalisme in een Europese context beïnvloedde, terwijl het nationalisme buiten Europa gezien werd als een manier om het meer geavanceerde Europese model te imiteren. 7 Table of contents Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………..…...…5 Abstract (EN)………………………………………………………………….………6 Abstract (NL)……………………………………………………………….…………7 Introduction…………………………………………………………...….……………13 Chapter 1: The research design……………………………………………....……….22 1.1 The field of nationalism studies, its history and gaps………...………………..…22 1.2 The research problem and questions…..………………………………………….36 1.3 Conceptual and theoretical framework…………………………..……………..…37 1.4 The study’s multimethodical approach….…….…………………………………..43 Part I Three level analysis of private TV’s nationalist discourse at the time of June 30, 2013…………………………………………………………………….…….56 Chapter 2: Prime-time nationalism………………….……………………………….57 2.1 Introduction……………………………………….………………………………57 2.2 The TV Shows………………………………….…………………….………...…58 2.3 Egyptocentrism without anti-Arabism…………….…………………………...…63 2.4 Anti-Americanism………………………………………………………..….……70 2.5 Heavy use of Islam………………………………………………………..………73 2.6 Non-identity assaults: Economic failings and business rivalry…………....……...77 2.7 Findings and conclusion………………...……………………………….….....….79 Chapter 3: The meso-level analysis of the nationalist discourse of three private channels