Class Politics and Ideology in Revolutionary Egypt

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Class Politics and Ideology in Revolutionary Egypt Class Politics and Ideology in Revolutionary Egypt Matthew Wainscott, BA (Hons.) Macquarie University Department of Modern History, Politics, and International Relations Submitted: 11/02/2018 Table of Contents Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter Outline 11 Chapter One: 17 A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 17 Existing Approaches 19 Antonio Gramsci: A Brief Introduction 24 Gramsci in this Thesis 27 Reading Gramsci 28 Gramsci and the State 31 Historical Bloc 36 War of Manoeuvre/War of Position 41 Passive Revolution 43 Counter-Reformation 51 Hegemony 53 Conclusion 58 Chapter Two: 61 STATE DEVELOPMENT, CLASS, AND IDEOLOGY IN EARLY CAPITALIST EGYPT 61 The Origins of Egyptian Capitalism 63 British Rule, Social Class, and the Rise of the Wafd 66 Egyptian Nationalism 71 Corporatism and the Moral Economy 76 Class Structure in Pre-Nasser Egypt 81 Nasser’s Egypt 85 Nasser’s Decline 91 Conclusion 94 Chapter Three 98 SADAT AND THE ORIGINS OF EGYPTIAN NEOLIBERALISM 98 Sadat: Uncertain Beginnings 101 Political Consolidation 103 Economic Reconfiguration 107 The Impact of Camp David 110 The Foundations of Neoliberalism 113 Class Divisions in A Neoliberal World 117 The Reconstitution, Or Restoration, Of Class Power 120 Neoliberalism and the International Institutions 124 Neoliberalism, Class, and Ideology in Sadat’s Egypt 127 Sadat’s Demise 131 A Door Left Ajar 132 Chapter Four 136 MUBARAK 1981-2004: THE NEOLIBERAL STATE TAKES SHAPE 136 Political Torpidity and Attempted Reform: 1981-1987 139 IFI Agreements 146 Mubarak and Subaltern Struggles 159 Class in Rural Egypt 160 Islamism and the Growth of the Pious Bourgeoisie 163 The Working Class and an ‘Immoral’ Economy 167 Conclusion 171 Chapter Five 173 MUBARAK II, 2004-2011 173 Gamal's Cabal: The Neoliberal Takeover of the NDP 175 Ahmed Nazif and the Government of Businessmen 181 Egypt and Global Capital 185 Rising Discontent: Resistance to Nazif’s Neoliberalism 187 Working-Class Resistance 189 The Rural Struggle Continues 194 Liberal Opposition 196 Rising Tide of Disaffection 198 Alternative Capitalisms 201 Crisis Comes to a Head 204 Chapter Six 208 REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 208 18 Days of Revolt 209 The Failure of the ‘Republic of Tahrir’ 215 SCAF and the Restoration of the Neoliberal State 218 Morsi’s Fleeting Success 221 The Fall of Morsi 225 Conclusion 228 Chapter Seven 229 SISI TRIUMPHANT 229 The Military Moves 232 Building a Mass Base 234 Sisi’s Rule 240 Coercion, Civil Society, and Sisi’s Hegemony 244 The ‘Securocratic State’ and the Spectre of Terrorism 247 The Ideology of Coercion in Sisi’s Egypt 251 Capitalism Under Sisi 256 Sisi and Egypt’s Future 263 CONCLUSION 265 BIBLIOGRAPHY 273 SUMMARY Egypt’s revolution of 2011 has attracted a significant degree of scholarly attention in the years following the dramatic events since Mubarak’s ousting. Attempts to explain these events have come from a variety of theoretical standpoints, with a recent wave of Marxist explanations leading the radical interpretations of the events. These works identify the material conditions that ordinary Egyptians were subject to as one of the most significant explanatory factors in their analyses, but tend to downplay discussion of ideology. This thesis looks to the theory of Antonio Gramsci to explain the alarming continuity of authoritarian rule in Egypt, and places current events in a longer history of Egyptian capitalism. By focussing on the dialectical interconnection of the economic structures and the ideological superstructures, this thesis analyses how the dominant ideologies from Egypt’s early integration in the world capitalist system have been reproduced, diluted, and systematically perverted by the regimes of republican Egypt. Separating class groups on the grounds of ideological affiliation, rather than strictly on their place in the nation’s relations of production, allows for the contest between various political blocs under the leadership of competing fractions of the bourgeoisie to be at the core of the analysis. As such, while accepting that the uprising against Mubarak’s rule was an organic expression of popular revolt against his rule, this thesis argues that the revolution was quickly subverted by a counter-revolutionary pushback by the bourgeoisie in its various guises. The ensuing contest between three fractions of the capitalist class, divided on ideological lines rather than economic, has demonstrated the enduring relevance of nationalism and the notion of a moral economy between state and workers. Ultimately, by looking at Egypt as an integral state- in which there is a dialectical unity of civil society and political society, we gain a fuller understanding of the disheartening outcome of the Tahrir revolution Statement of Originality This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself. _____________________________ Date: 11/02/2018 Matthew Wainscott ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Though writing a doctoral thesis often feels lonely, the support, encouragement, and enthusiasm of many people made this possible. I have accrued intellectual and emotional debts that I will likely never be able to repay in full. Firstly, I need to thank my supervisors, Dr. Lloyd Cox and Dr. Jumana Bayeh, who have been unfailingly encouraging and supportive. Their thoughtful criticisms and suggestions have kept the project moving forward, and it simply would not have been possible without them. I also owe thanks to the many other members of the department, but particularly the late Associate Professor Morris Morley. It was his undergraduate course on revolutions that ignited my passion for study. He was a wonderful scholar, and genuinely supportive and caring. He will be greatly missed. To my fellow PhD students, I owe a great deal of gratitude for your support, your intellectual stimulation over (long) lunches, and just as importantly, your encouragement and humour. Chelsea, Govand, Tanya, Cheryl, Cam and Jarrod were all great help at various points along the way. Finally, but by no means least importantly, Anna. More than anybody else you endured the emotional rollercoaster that this project has been, and did so with incredible patience. Without the sacrifices that you made, this could never have happened. This thesis was supported by the generous provision of an Australian Postgraduate Award Scholarship. INTRODUCTION “More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state” - Ralph Miliband; The State in Capitalist Society1 The eruption of widespread popular protest in Egypt in January 2011 prompted surprise and alarm in the West. The apparent suddenness of the explosion of political turmoil, and that it had seemingly spread from one country to another, was cause for deep concern in distant capitals from Washington and London to Brussels and Berlin, to say nothing of those authoritarian Middle Eastern states closer to the upheaval. Yet closer observers of Egyptian politics were not so surprised. Many scholarly articles placed the uprising in the context of the steady, decades-long accumulation of political and economic grievances by 1 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Merlin Press, 2009), 3 1 subaltern classes.2 These were closely associated with the consolidation of unpopular neoliberal modes of governance. In the years leading up to the 2011 revolutionary moment, a few commentators and academics observed that something eventually had to give, even if the timing was uncertain.3 That ‘something’ finally did begin to give on 25 January, 2011. The security forces’ brutal 2010 beating and murder of a young man, Khaled Said, precipitated the initial protests that would eventually topple the US-supported Mubarak dictatorship. This was a pivotal moment in what would soon come to be labelled the region’s ‘Arab Spring’. The optimism of the protestors was palpable, and for a time seemingly unquenchable, even in the face of brutal repression. Protests begat more protests, and the numbers of people committed to the streets steadily multiplied. The revolutionary fervour touched many throughout the world who had little prior interest in Egyptian politics (many of whom have expressed little interest since), with thousands of people showing their support for the protests across both social 2 For a small sample of this extensive response, see: I. Aoudé, “Egypt: Revolutionary Process and Global Capitalist Crisis,” Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3, 2013; J. Beinin, “Workers and Egypt’s January 25 Revolution,” International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 80, 2011; K. Bogaert, “Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics Behind Three Decades of Neoliberalism in the Arab World,” Middle East Critique 22, no. 3, 2013; R. Bush, “Egypt: A Permanent Revolution?” Review of African Political Economy 38, No. 129, 2011; M. Dixon, “An Arab Spring,” Review of African Political Economy 38, no. 128, 2011; “The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Potential for Democratic Politics,” Review of African Political Economy 38, No. 129, 2011; A. Teti and G. Gervasio, “The Unbearable Lightness of Authoritarianism: Lessons from the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 2, 2011 3 The best single example of this is the edited volume: R. El-Mahdi and P. Marfleet, Egypt: The Moment of Change (London: Zed Books, 2009) 2 and traditional media.4 The sudden explosion of revolutionary fervour
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