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The London School of Economics and Political Science Gramsci View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by LSE Theses Online The London School of Economics and Political Science Gramsci in Cairo: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Passive Revolution and Failed Hegemony in Egypt under Mubarak, 1991-2010 Roberto Roccu A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2012 1 of 3 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 89,036 words. 2 of 3 Abstract Most existing interpretations of the thought of Antonio Gramsci in International Relations and International Political Economy are strongly influenced by the seminal account provided by Cox in the early 1980s. Recovering the hitherto neglected concept of philosophy of praxis, this thesis departs from the ‘Coxian orthodoxy’ and develops an alternative understanding of Gramsci that sees hegemony as a combination of coercion and consent emerging from the articulation on three overlapping dimensions, respectively involving the interaction of the economic and the political, the international and the national, the material and the ideational. The potential of this approach is illustrated by examining the unfolding of neoliberal economic reforms in Egypt in the past two decades. It is argued that, firstly, the interaction of economic and political factors produced the emergence of a neoliberal authoritarian regime with a predatory capitalist oligarchy playing an ever greater role. Secondly, articulation across different spatial scales brought about a passive revolution managed by the state with the aim of adapting to the globalising imperatives of capital accumulation without broadening political participation. Lastly, the performative power of neoliberalism as an ideology fundamentally reshaped economic policymaking in favour of the rising capitalist elite. This focus on the shift in class relations produced by – and itself reinforcing – neoliberal reforms allows us to understand how the already waning hegemony of the Egyptian regime under Mubarak gradually unravelled. The rise of the capitalist oligarchy upset relations of force both within the ruling bloc and in society at large, effectively breaking the post- Nasserite social pact. Passive revolution witnessed the abdication to the pursuit of hegemony on the national scale, with the attempt of replacing it with reliance on the neoliberal hegemony prevalent on the international scale. The success of neoliberalism as an ideology did not obscure the increasingly inability of the regime to provide material benefits, however marginal, to subaltern classes. Thus, the affirmation of neoliberalism in Egypt corresponded to the failure of hegemony on the national scale. 3 of 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements 4 List of figures 5 Introduction Rationale for a Gramscian Approach to Economic Reforms in Egypt 6 - Why Gramsci? Which Gramsci? Rationale and theoretical contributions 7 - Why Egypt? Rationale for case selection 11 - Caveats, or: what you should not expect from this thesis 14 - Argument in a nutshell and thesis outline 16 Chapter 1 ‘Recovering the Philosophy of Praxis’: Gramsci, Hegemony and the Global Political Economy 20 1.1. Introduction 20 1.2. Philosophy of praxis as historical dialectical materialism 22 1.2.1. Gramsci’s theory of history 23 1.2.2. Two-dimensional dialectic 25 1.2.3. Materialism beyond materialism 27 1.3. Towards a non-Coxian interpretation of Gramsci 29 1.3.1. From Robert Cox to the neo-Gramscian school 30 1.3.2 Threefold critique of the ‘Coxian Gramsci’ 33 1.3.3. Gramsci in this study 39 1.4. Hegemony 42 1.4.1. Hegemony in the ‘Prison Notebooks’ 43 1.4.2. Hegemony in mainstream IR: Gramsci unheard? 49 1.4.3. Hegemony in critical IR and IPE: Gramsci misheard? 52 1.4.4. Hegemony in this study 55 1.5. Conclusion 61 Chapter 2 The Gramscian Articulation Approach in Practice: Debates, Theories, Methods 63 2.1. Introduction 63 2.2. Forms of change: from accumulation regime to political regime? 64 2.2.1. Modernisation theory: development, democratisation and the middle class 65 2.2.2. Predatory elites: development, rent and the power of the powerful 68 2.2.3. Gramscian approach: regimes, social classes and articulation 70 2.3. Sources of change: the issue of spatial scale 76 2.3.1. ‘Swallowed’ by capital? Debates on economic change, scale and the state 76 2.4. Reasons for change: instrumentality and belief 83 1 2.4.1. ‘Capital ideas’ or ideas for capital? Debates on economic change and ideas 84 2.5. From theory to practice: evidence and methods 90 2.6. Conclusion 97 Chapter 3 Moving Away from the Etatist Paradigm? The Neoliberalisation of the Egyptian Economy 100 3.1. Introduction 100 3.2. Egyptian vagaries in brief, 1952-1990 101 3.2.1. The doomed route to Arab socialism, 1952-1973 102 3.2.2. Opening the door, but not quite, 1973-1990 105 3.2.3. Change and continuity in the Egyptian political economy 109 3.3. A success story? Stabilisation and adjustment 111 3.3.1. ‘The reckoning’ and macroeconomic stabilisation 111 3.3.2. ‘The IMF’s model pupil’: privatisation and liberalisation 115 3.4. From étatism towards neoliberalism? Weighing the evidence 118 3.4.1. Structural reforms in agriculture: giving land back to landlords 118 3.4.2. Structural reforms in industry: ‘no factories, no problems’ 120 3.4.3 Financial sector reforms: follow the money! 122 3.5. Conclusion 127 Chapter 4 The Emergence of Neoliberal Authoritarianism: The Articulation of the Economic and the Political 130 4.1. Introduction 130 4.2. Regimes, policies and politics: empirical study 132 4.2.1. Agriculture: state withdraws, business steps in, regime controls 133 4.2.2. Industry: the political rise of the business elite and institutional capture 137 4.2.3. Finance: technocrats, the infitah class and wealth concentration 141 4.3. Social structures, rulers and regime change: comparing theories 147 4.3.1. The case of modernisation theory: middle class or capitalist oligarchy? 148 4.3.2. The case of predatory elites: all in the hands of the rulers 149 4.3.3. The Gramscian case: structural change meets political logic 151 4.4. Articulation I: the emergence of neoliberal authoritarianism 154 4.5. Conclusion 156 Chapter 5 History of a Passive Revolution: The Articulation of International and National Scale 158 5.1. Introduction 158 5.2. Scales, institutions and economic change: empirical study 160 5.2.1. Agriculture: from ‘one-size-fits-all’ to the Egyptian way to neoliberalism 161 5.2.2. Industry: privatisation as a taboo, privatisation as a must-do 165 5.2.3. Finance: the politics of policy turnarounds 169 2 5.3. Global capital, national state and class structure: comparing theories 173 5.3.1. The transnational state case: state as a transmission belt of global capital? 173 5.3.2. The area studies case: global capital fooled? 177 5.3.3. The Gramscian case: international constraints meet national agency 178 5.4. Articulation II: U&CD, spatial scales and passive revolution 183 5.5. Conclusion 186 Chapter 6 Ideology Resurgent? The Articulation of Material Factors and Ideas 188 6.1. Introduction 188 6.2. Instrumentality, organic intellectuals and ideology: empirical study 189 6.2.1. Organic intellectuals: manufacturing consent for neoliberalism? 190 6.2.2. Paradigm change: instrumentality, belief and cognitive biases 194 6.3. Power, ideas and class relations: comparing theories 202 6.3.1. The materialist case: the functionality of ideas 203 6.3.2. The ideational case: ideas all the way down 206 6.3.3. The Gramscian case: materiality meets ideas 208 6.4. Articulation III: money, ideology and hegemony as exchange 210 6.5. Conclusion 213 Conclusion Articulating Hegemonies? Gramsci, Neoliberalism in Crisis and Tahrir Square 215 - Neoliberal authoritarianism as passive revolution: key findings 216 - Back to Gramsci: outline of the articulation approach 218 - Hegemony unravelling: a longer term perspective, 1952-2010 225 - Hegemony at home and abroad: the interscalar articulation of crises 228 - After Mubarak: from passive to active revolution, and back? 231 Appendix I – ERF and ECES working papers 235 Appendix II – List of interviewees 259 Bibliography 261 3 Acknowledgements The key idea behind this thesis – developing an alternative interpretation of Gramsci and illustrating it with reference to the Egyptian case – was fleshed out in the midst of the second year of the doctoral programme, after the discussion of a disastrous chapter with my supervisors. Joe Hoover and Laust Schouenborg lent their ears to my rants and supported me in the decision of abandoning the EU foreign policy path. A few weeks later, comments by Margot Light and Meera Sabaratnam encouraged me to pursue the research project that, albeit with the usual twists and turns of a doctoral dissertation, results in this thesis. While I am grateful for their support and friendship, I obviously absolve them from any responsibility for the shortcomings of this work. The change of topic also required a change in supervision. I thank Professor Karen Smith for her constructive criticisms on the previous project and for her recommendation to follow my theoretical inclinations.
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