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Thesis Morsi Geen Endnote Opmaak 1 UNIVERSITEIT GENT FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN An Islamist Caesar in Egypt’s Passive Revolution? A Discourse Theoretical Analysis of Morsi’s Hegemonic Project Wetenschappelijk artikel Aantal woorden: 9.865 Seppe Malfait MASTERPROEF MANAMA CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT PROMOTOR: DR. BRECHT DE SMET COMMISSARIS: DR. KOENRAAD BOGAERT ACADEMIEJAAR 2014 – 2015 An Islamist Caesar in Egypt’s Passive Revolution? A Discourse Theoretical Analysis of Morsi’s Hegemonic Project SEPPE MALFAIT Department of Conflict and Development Studies, Ghent University, Belgium ABSTRACT (ENG) This paper draws on Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to analyse the hegemonic struggle under Morsi’s presidency in Egypt. It uses the conceptual toolbox of Discourse Theory to render the discursive strategies of Morsi’s Renaissance project and the counter-hegemonic Tamarod campaign intelligible. Moreover, this article sets out to show the added analytical value of Discourse Theory for an empirical study of socio-political struggles that takes into account the contingent and constructed nature of the social. It complements Discourse Theory with the Gramscian notions of passive revolution, Caesarism and transformism to embed the research within the interlacing process of revolution/restoration. This paper contends that Morsi, who governed as a civil proxy for the Armed Forces, initially succeeded more or less to pacify the social field by convincing a wide range of people to inscribe their grievances in his project of gradual, orderly rebuilding. This rebuilding amounted to the restoration of the pre- revolutionary status quo with a strengthened position of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. It explores how Morsi’s increasingly antagonizing discourse pushed several disparate opponents into each other’s arms. Tamarod succeeded to destabilize Morsi’s discourse and unified the splintered opposition groups in an anti-Morsi bloc. This analysis, finally, clarifies the military intervention on 3 July 2013. ABSTRACT (NL) Dit onderzoek analyseert de hegemonische strijd in Egypte onder het presidentschap van Morsi aan de hand van de discourstheorie van Laclau en Mouffe. Het wendt het discourstheoretische begrippenapparaat aan om de discursieve strategieën van Morsi’s Renaissance-project en de contra- hegemonische Tamarod-campagne bloot te leggen. Daarnaast wil dit artikel aantonen dat discourstheorie een toegevoegde analytische waarde heeft voor empirisch onderzoek naar sociaal- politieke conflicten dat rekening houdt met de contingente en geconstrueerde aard van het sociale. Het discourstheoretische begrippenapparaat wordt aangevuld met de Gramsciaanse concepten ‘Caesarisme’, ‘passieve revolutie’ en ‘transformisme’ om het onderzoek in te bedden in het vervlochten proces van revolutie/restoratie. Deze studie betoogt dat Morsi, die bestuurde als ‘proxy’ voor het leger, er aanvankelijk min of meer in slaagde het maatschappelijk veld te pacificeren doordat hij een groot aantal groepen kon overtuigen hun eisen in te schrijven in zijn project voor stapsgewijze, ordelijke heropbouw van de natie. Deze heropbouw kwam neer op het herstellen van het prerevolutionaire status quo met een versterkte machtspositie van het leger en de moslimbroederschap. Dit onderzoek gaat na hoe het toenemend antagonisme in Morsi’s discours de verdeelde oppositiegroepen in elkaars armen duwde. Tamarod slaagde erin Morsi’s discours te destabiliseren en de versplinterde oppositie te verenigen in een anti-Morsi blok. Dit onderzoekt verklaart ten slotte de militaire interventie op 3 juli 2013. 1 Introduction On 3 July 2013, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) deposed President Morsi after millions of Egyptians had taken to the streets for days against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). A wide societal and academic debate emerged about whether these events constituted a counter- revolutionary military coup against a democratically elected president or a popular revolution against a dictator under a democratic veneer. Such binary categorizations limit our understanding of the complex processes underlying these events. My aim is twofold. First, drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory (DT), I will generate a new interpretation of the hegemonic struggle under Morsi that challenges mainstream accounts. I will deploy the DT interpretive instruments to explore the discursive strategy behind Morsi’s hegemonic ‘Renaissance’ project. Iwill to analyse both linguistic (speeches and interviews) and non-linguistic (policies, decrees, protests and places) data. I will explain how and why, after a period of relative socio-political peace, the Tamarod campaign successfully destabilized Morsi’s discourse by articulating a contesting popular identity. I will clarify how and why the SCAF reacted to the mass mobilizations of 30 June 2013. Discussions of DT have primarily concentrated within the theoretical realm of political philosophy. Empirical applications of DT have not grown abundantly. A second goal of this paper is to demonstrate the suitability and added analytical value of DT for empirical research on socio-political conflict. By employing DT we will avoid both empiricism ‘in which abstraction consists in the knowing subject isolating and extracting the essence from the real, and/or generalizing in an inductive fashion from a number of empirical observations’ and theoreticism ‘which either logically derives the explanations of concrete phenomena from the abstract concepts of a general theory, or subsumes particular events and processes under empirically verified laws’ (Howarth, 2005, pp. 321-322). Carpentier (2010, pp. 258-262) points out that Discourse Theoretical Analysis (DTA) uses the theoretical framework as a tool chest of ‘sensitizing’ concepts. ‘Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look ’ (Blumer, 1986, p. 148, my emphasis). I complement the DT toolbox with the Gramscian concepts of Caesarism, passive revolution and transformism. Using these ‘methodological searchlights’ (De Smet, 2014a) to analyse the events of 25 January and 30 June, De Smet (2014b) surpasses simplified explanations by untangling the intertwining processes of revolution and restoration with a focus on the role of the military. Embedding my analysis of Morsi’s presidency in these unfolding processes, I will discuss how and why Morsi failed to act as a Caesar to steer the SCAF-initiated passive revolution. Theoretical Framework Laclau and Mouffe draw on different intellectual currents to strip Marxist concepts of their economic determinist contents and revitalize them. They argue that the being of objects is socially constructed, contingent and historical. They refute the class reductionist idea that necessary laws determine the nature of social agents a priori . Moreover, they reject the objective character of interests of which agents are unaware. Rather, interests are ‘precarious historical products which are always subjected to processes of dissolution and redefinition’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, p. 96). They see a movement of de- essentialization in Marxist thought from Plekhanov to Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as intellectual and moral leadership which articulates a ‘collective will’ unifying a ‘historical bloc’ through ideology. Gramsci differentiated this hegemonic, consensual relation of leadership between directive and directed groups from the coercive relation of ‘dictatorship’ between dominating and dominated groups. Laclau 2 and Mouffe find Gramsci’s conception of hegemony very fruitful. However, they argue, the working class occupies an ambivalent position in Gramsci’s thought. Despite the transformation of the class identity by articulating to it a number of demands and struggles, its central role as articulator has a necessary character in the last instance because it is allocated to it by the economic infrastructure (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; 2001, pp. 7-47). I will now concisely clarify the key sensitizing concepts of DT. 1 According to Laclau and Mouffe, our understanding of reality, and therefore our reality itself, is discursively construed. Rather than possessing a foundational meaning, every element occupies a differential position in a discourse. These elements gain signification solely through their relation with other elements in the same discourse because ‘all identity is relational and all relations have a necessary character’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 106). Discourse comprises both (linguistic) concepts and (non- linguistic) signs, objects, actions, institutions, policies and events. Objects exist externally to thought, but it is only through their investment into discursive configurations that they obtain meaning in relation to other elements. The event of an earthquake occurs outside of one’s own will, but whether its specificity is construed as a natural incident or as a manifestation of God’s wrath, depends upon the configuration of a discursive field (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 105-114). A discourse is never a fully closed totality due to the ‘openness of the social’. Laclau (1988, p. 254) defines discourse as ‘a structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed.’ The dual impossibility of absolute fixation and non-fixation of meaning ‘implies that there have to be partial fixations’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112). Partial fixation or temporary stabilization of meaning is the outcome of an articulatory practice, or ‘any practice establishing a relation
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