Sadat and His Legacy
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Empire's H(A)Unting Grounds: Theorising Violence and Resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan
Empire’s h(a)unting grounds: theorising violence and resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102631/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Manchanda, Nivi and Salem, Sara (2020) Empire’s h(a)unting grounds: theorising violence and resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan. Current Sociology, 68 (2). pp. 241-262. ISSN 1461-7064 10.1177%2F0011392119886866 Reuse Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item. [email protected] https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ Empire’s H(a)unting Grounds: Theorising violence and resistance in Egypt and Afghanistan Nivi Manchanda, Queen Mary University of London Sara Salem, London School of Economics Abstract This article thinks theory otherwise by searching for what is missing, silent and yet highly productive and constitutive of present realities’. Looking at Afghanistan and Egypt, we show how imperial legacies and capitalist futurities are rendered invisible by dominant social theories, and why it matters that we think beyond an empiricist sociology in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, we explore the ways in which portrayals of the country as retrogressive elide the colonial violence that that have ensured the very backwardness that is now considered Afghanistan’s enduring characteristic. -
Interview with Dayton S. Mak
Library of Congress Interview with Dayton S. Mak The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project DAYTON S. MAK Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: August 9, 1989 Copyright 2010 ADST Q: Dayton, when and where were you born? MAK: I was born in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, July 10, 1917. Q: Let's talk about the family, let's go on the Mak side. What do you know about them? MAK: The Mak original name was three-barrel Mak van Waay, which in Dutch would be Mak fon vei [pronounces in Dutch]. They were from Dordrecht, the Netherlands. The family had an antique showroom there, an auction house a bit like Sotheby's. Q: ...in... MAK: In Dordrecht. That was the Mak van Waay family. They then moved to Amsterdam. At the same time, anther part of the family, a son, I believe, wanted to establish a Mak van Waay firm in Dordrecht itself. According to Dutch law, they couldn't do that. There could only be one firm Mak van Waay, so they opened the Firma Mak in Dordrecht. The Firma Mak still exists, and the big building remains on the tour of the old city of Dordrecht. The Mak van Waay part, of which I'm a member, stayed in Amsterdam until about 15 years ago, when the last Mak van Waay died. He had no children. So, the Mak van Waay in Interview with Dayton S. Mak http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000739 Library of Congress Holland effectively died out. -
Case #2 United States of America (Respondent)
Model International Court of Justice (MICJ) Case #2 United States of America (Respondent) Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. United States of America) Arkansas Model United Nations (AMUN) November 20-21, 2020 Teeter 1 Historical Context For years, there has been a consistent struggle between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 2018, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. embassy located in Tel Aviv would be moving to the city of Jerusalem.1 Palestine, angered by the embassy moving, filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2018.2 The history of this case, U.S. relations with Israel and Palestine, current events, and why the ICJ should side with the United States will be covered in this research paper. Israel and Palestine have an interesting relationship between war and competition. In 1948, Israel captured the west side of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians captured the east side during the Arab-Israeli War. Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948. In 1949, the Lausanne Conference took place, and the UN came to the decision for “corpus separatum” which split Jerusalem into a Jewish zone and an Arab zone.3 At this time, the State of Israel decided that Jerusalem was its “eternal capital.”4 “Corpus separatum,” is a Latin term meaning “a city or region which is given a special legal and political status different from its environment, but which falls short of being sovereign, or an independent city-state.”5 1 Office of the President, 82 Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem § (2017). -
Omar-Ashour-English.Pdf
CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE RULE OF LAW STANFORD UNIVERSITY BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER - STANFORD PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS PAPER SERIES Number 3, November 2012 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT OMAR ASHOUR PROGRAM ON ARAB REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, CDDRL FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY gence within the police force of a cadre of reform- ist officers is also encouraging and may help shift Successful democratic transitions hinge on the the balance of power within the Ministry of Interi- establishment of effective civilian control of the or. These officers have established reformist orga- armed forces and internal security institutions. The nizations, such as the General Coalition of Police transformation of these institutions from instru- Officers and Officers But Honorable, and begun to ments of brutal repression and regime protection push for SSR themselves. The prospects for imple- to professional, regulated, national services – secu- menting these civil society and internal initiatives, rity sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of however, remain uncertain; they focus on admira- this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab ble ends but are less clear on the means of imple- states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is mentation. They also have to reckon with strong an acutely political process affected by an array of elements within the Ministry of Interior – “al-Ad- different actors and dynamics. In a contested and ly’s men” (in reference to Mubarak’s longstanding unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the minister) – who remain firmly opposed to reform. -
George W. Bush, Idealist
George W. Bush, Idealist MICHAEL J. MAZARR* As I write this, the war to liberate the Iraqi people from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein is under way. It is a war to prevent Hussein’s Iraq from be- coming a veritable factory of weapons of mass terror and destruction, and a war to deprive the world’s terrorist organizations of a friend and sponsor. It is many things to many people: justified, callous, unilateral, long-overdue, hopeful, perilous. But one thing it is not is representative of a world view conditioned by classical realism. There are many ways to understand the complexion of George W. Bush’s foreign policy and the group that runs it. One of them is through the lens of traditional frameworks for thinking about international relations. It is easy to forget, now, that the early conventional wisdom held that President Bush and his foreign policy team in fact embraced realism as their guiding philosophy. Virtually every Bush foreign policy appointee uttered the term at some point during the administration’s first year. ‘I am a realist,’ said Bush’s National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. ‘Power matters.’1 An interviewer returned from a conversation with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to divulge that ‘he has no code words or doctrine to describe his outlook, other than what he termed “old-fashioned” realism.’2 Candidate Bush himself, in his first major foreign policy speech (delivered in 1999), said that ‘a President must be a clear-eyed realist.’3 In practice, however, the Bush administration’s assumptions, doctrines and policies stem generally from a very different world view from that proposed by classical realism. -
US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53973-7 256 BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCE ARCHIVES Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Abilene James Earl Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta United Nations Archives and Record Management, New York City The British National Archives, Kew Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Archives, Online Department of State Freedom of Information ‘Released Documents’ Archive, Online PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS Interview with Fawaaz Traboulsi by Lynn Barbee, Published in MERIP Reports, No.61, October 1970, pp.3–5. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah by Mahmoud Soueid, Published in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.25, No.1, 1995. Interview with Yusif al-Haytham, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Published in MERIP Reports, No. 44 February 1976. Speech given by Fawwaz Traboulsi and Assaf Kfoury ‘Lebanon on the Brink’ Lebanese American University, 18 January 2007. Interview with Prince Farid Chehab, Former Director of Public Security, Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut, 2007. © The Author(s) 2017 255 C. Varady, US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53973-7 256 BIBLIOGRAPHY Interview with Adel Osseiran, President of the Council of Representatives, Lebanon, Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut, 2007. Interview with Said Akl, Lebanese Writer and Political Poet, Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut, 2007. Interview with Anbara Salam al Khalidi, Conducted by Laila Rostom, Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut, 2007. Interview with Raymond Edde, Former Lebanese Presidential Candidate and Former State Ministers, Jan 25 1970, Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut, 2007. -
Rethinking U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt
Rethinking U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt Amy Hawthorne OCTOBER 2016 RETHINKING U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT Amy Hawthorne OCTOBER 2016 © 2016 Project on Middle East Democracy. All rights reserved. The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, Washington, D.C. based 501(c)(3) organization. The views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of POMED, its staff, or its Board members. Limited print copies are also available. Project on Middle East Democracy 1730 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Suite 617 Washington DC 20036 www.pomed.org CONTENTS I. Introduction. 2 II. Background . .4 III. The Bilateral Economic Aid Program: Understanding the Basics. 16 IV. Why Has U.S. Economic Aid Not Had A Greater Positive Impact? . 18 V. The Way Forward . 29 VI. Conclusion . 34 PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY 1 RETHINKING U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT I. INTRODUCTION Among the many challenges facing the next U.S. administration in the Middle East will be to forge an effective approach toward Egypt. The years following the 2011 popular uprising that overthrew longtime U.S. ally President Hosni Mubarak have witnessed significant friction with Egypt over issues ranging from democracy and human rights, to how each country defines terrorism (Egypt’s definition encompasses peaceful political activity as well as violent actions), to post-Qaddafi Libya, widening a rift between the two countries that began at least a decade ago. Unless the policies of the current Egyptian government shift, the United States can only seek to manage, not repair, this rift. The next U.S. -
Rethinking Islamist Politics February 11, 2014 Contents
POMEPS STUDIES 6 islam in a changing middle east Rethinking Islamist Politics February 11, 2014 Contents The Debacle of Orthodox Islamism . 7 Khalil al-Anani, Middle East Institute Understanding the Ideological Drivers Pushing Youth Toward Violence in Post-Coup Egypt . 9 Mokhtar Awad, Center for American Progress Why do Islamists Provide Social Services? . 13 Steven Brooke, University of Texas at Austin Rethinking Post-Islamism and the Study of Changes in Islamist Ideology . 16 By Michaelle Browers, Wake Forest University The Brotherhood Withdraws Into Itself . 19 Nathan J. Brown, George Washington University Were the Islamists Wrong-Footed by the Arab Spring? . 24 François Burgat, CNRS, Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman (translated by Patrick Hutchinson) Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring . 28 Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) The Islamist Appeal to Quranic Authority . 31 Bruce B. Lawrence, Duke University Is the Post-Islamism Thesis Still Valid? . 33 Peter Mandaville, George Mason University Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong? . 37 Marc Lynch, George Washington University Rethinking Political Islam? Think Again . 40 Tarek Masoud, Harvard University Islamist Movements and the Political After the Arab Uprisings . 44 Roel Meijer, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and Ghent University, Belgium Beyond Islamist Groups . 47 Jillian Schwedler, Hunter College, City University of New York The Shifting Legitimization of Democracy and Elections: . 50 Joas Wagemakers, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands Rethinking Islamist Politics . 52 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Emory University Progressive Problemshift or Paradigmatic Degeneration? . 56 Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Hobart and William Smith Colleges Online Article Index Please see http://pomeps.org/2014/01/rethinking-islamist-politics-conference/ for online versions of all of the articles in this briefing . -
Islam - Washington's New Dilemma :: Middle East Quarterly
Islam - Washington's New Dilemma :: Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma Islam - Washington's New Dilemma by Benjamin Gordon Middle East Quarterly March 1996, pp. 43-52 http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma Benjamin Gordon is a consultant at Corporate Decisions, Inc., Boston, and a recent graduate of Yale College. Does the U.S. government have a coherent policy toward fundamentalist Islam? Fundamentalists themselves are convinced not only that Washington has a policy but that it is a consistent and aggressive one. Iran's former ambassador to the United Nations, Said Raja'i Khourasani, asserts that the American position "has not changed" over the years: "The language is always the same -- it is threatened or it is threatening."1 On the other side, scholars and diplomats tend to see incoherence in policy toward fundamentalists as they do about foreign policy in general. Richard Haass speaks for many when he holds that "public statements by administration officials about the purposes of U.S. foreign policy have been inconsistent or simply ambiguous.2 In fact, neither side is entirely correct. While there has been a coherent policy, it has changed over time. Since 1979, when Iranian fundamentalist Muslims overthrew Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Washington has undergone a series of subtle shifts in its policy toward fundamentalist Islam. From Presidents Reagan to Bush to Clinton, the U.S. government has migrated from rhetorical confrontation to timid outreach to outright accommodation. The following analysis focuses on official U.S. -
After the Accords Anwar Sadat
WMHSMUN XXXIV After the Accords: Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet Background Guide “Unprecedented committees. Unparalleled debate. Unmatched fun.” Letters From the Directors Dear Delegates, Welcome to WMHSMUN XXXIV! My name is Hank Hermens and I am excited to be the in-room Director for Anwar Sadat’s Cabinet. I’m a junior at the College double majoring in International Relations and History. I have done model UN since my sophomore year of high school, and since then I have become increasingly involved. I compete as part of W&M’s travel team, staff our conferences, and have served as the Director of Media for our college level conference, &MUN. Right now, I’m a member of our Conference Team, planning travel and training delegates. Outside of MUN, I play trumpet in the Wind Ensemble, do research with AidData and for a professor, looking at the influence of Islamic institutions on electoral outcomes in Tunisia. In my admittedly limited free time, I enjoy reading, running, and hanging out with my friends around campus. As members of Anwar Sadat’s cabinet, you’ll have to deal with the fallout of Egypt’s recent peace with Israel, in Egypt, the greater Middle East and North Africa, and the world. You’ll also meet economic challenges, rising national political tensions, and more. Some of the problems you come up against will be easily solved, with only short-term solutions necessary. Others will require complex, long term solutions, or risk the possibility of further crises arising. No matter what, we will favor creative, outside-the-box ideas as well as collaboration and diplomacy. -
Kissinger's Record: War and Terrorism
Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 17, Number 44, November 16, 1990 Once the revolt against King �ussein began, Israeli intel ligence on Sept. 20 reported that there was a massive invasion of Syria by Jordanian tanks to defend the Palestinians. Kis Kissinger's record: singer circulated these wildly exaggerated estimates in the name of the CIA, without revealing their Israeli origin. An war and terrorism drew N. Killgore of the State Department later said: "We started getting these reports as if it were EI Alamein. They were invading in full force." by Scott Thompson Kissinger argued that the Soviets were backing Syria to the hilt, to challenge the United States. As Kissinger brought On April 11, 1989, at a press conference of the Trilateral the world to the brink, Syrian Air Force Gen. Hafez aI-Assad Commission in Paris, Henry Kissinger said that he never lets refused to provide air cover for �yria's tanks, forcing their morality interfere with policymaking, which is one reason withdrawal from Lebanon. This gave Kissinger a "victory," why he "rather likes" Syria's Hafez aI-Assad. "God may for having faced down the Soviets. punish me" for it, Kissinger said. As a result of the crisis, King Hussein expelled all Pales Kissinger's relationship with Assad spans two decades, tinian organizations from Jordan; despite the fact that PLO and he was instrumental, with Israeli intelligence, in the leader Yasser Arafat suspended George Habash's Popular November 1970 coup that made Assad the strongman of Front for the Liberation of Palestine, whose terrorist acts had Syria. -
Iraq: Options for U.S
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE POLICY FOCUS IRAQ: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY LAURIE MYLROIE RESEARCH MEMORANDUM NUMBER TWENTY-ONE MAY 1993 Cover and title page illustrations from windows of the tom Bi-AmnW Mosque. 990-1013 THE AUTHOR Laurie Mylroie is Arab Affairs Fellow at The Washington Institute. She has previously taught in the Department of Government at Harvard University and at the U.S. Naval War College. Among Dr. Mylroie's many published works on Iraq are Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (with Judith Miller), and The Future of Iraq (Washington Institute Policy Paper Number 24). The views expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and should not necessarily be construed as representing those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Clinton administration inherited a flawed Iraq policy from the Bush administration, but, in formulating a new policy, it has failed to accurately define those flaws. Its emphasis on "depersonalizing" the conflict with Iraq by shifting the focus from Saddam Hussein to Baghdad's compliance with relevant UN resolutions may mean that the Clinton administration will eventually, if reluctantly, come to terms with Saddam's dogged hold on power and accept a diluted form of Iraqi compliance with the resolutions. Although that may be far from the administration's intent, the present formulation of U.S. policy may weaken the coalition and lead to that result nonetheless. The Clinton administration has stated that it will enforce all UN resolutions, including Resolution 687, which, inter alia, provides for stripping Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, and Resolution 688, which demands that Baghdad cease to repress its population.