CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE RULE OF LAW STANFORD UNIVERSITY BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER - STANFORD PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS PAPER SERIES Number 3, November 2012 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT OMAR ASHOUR PROGRAM ON ARAB REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, CDDRL FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY gence within the police force of a cadre of reform- ist officers is also encouraging and may help shift Successful democratic transitions hinge on the the balance of power within the Ministry of Interi- establishment of effective civilian control of the or. These officers have established reformist orga- armed forces and internal security institutions. The nizations, such as the General Coalition of Police transformation of these institutions from instru- Officers and Officers But Honorable, and begun to ments of brutal repression and regime protection push for SSR themselves. The prospects for imple- to professional, regulated, national services – secu- menting these civil society and internal initiatives, rity sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of however, remain uncertain; they focus on admira- this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab ble ends but are less clear on the means of imple- states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is mentation. They also have to reckon with strong an acutely political process affected by an array of elements within the Ministry of Interior – “al-Ad- different actors and dynamics. In a contested and ly’s men” (in reference to Mubarak’s longstanding unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the minister) – who remain firmly opposed to reform. reform of Egypt’s security sector requires urgent attention. Government-led security sector reform initiatives have proved similarly problematic. After his ap- Egypt’s revolution of January 2011 was sparked by pointment as minister of interior in March 2011, the brutality of deposed president Hosni Mubarak’s Mansour Issawi sacked hundreds of generals and police and security forces. The most notorious and disbanded the SSI. However, many have criticized feared divisions of this security apparatus, State his reforms as cosmetic – the new National Secu- Security Investigations (SSI) and the Central Se- rity Apparatus continues many of the SSI’s prac- curity Forces (CSF), quickly became the target of tices, and officers’ past abuses remain largely un- revolutionary actors across the political spectrum. punished. From January 2012, a new parliament The SSI’s longstanding record of unlawful deten- dominated by former (largely Islamist) dissidents tions, disappearances, and systematic torture was – themselves victims of police brutality – took up well known; its “Human Rights Unit” was tasked the cause of SSR and approved amendments to not with protecting rights, but monitoring and re- the Law on the Organization of the Police. Again, pressing rights activists. The CSF, meanwhile, was though, there were criticisms of the reforms as in- seen as the armed enforcer of the regime’s will – sufficiently comprehensive, and the work of the stuffing ballot boxes or quelling demonstrations as parliament was in any case cut short when the body needed. was disbanded by a Constitutional Court ruling. The cause of overhauling these institutions to The major obstacle to successful security sector ensure effective governance, oversight, and ac- reform in Egypt’s transition, however, has been the countability has been taken up by a range of stake- role played by the Supreme Council of the Armed holders since the revolution, with varying degrees Forces, an inherently SSR-averse body which re- of success. Civil society actors have taken the lead, tained executive powers until June 2012. Unlike in and one promising project is the National Initia- Tunisia and Libya, pro-revolution forces in Egypt tive to Rebuild the Police Force (NIRP). The emer- did not enjoy any real power in the immediate after- ABOUT THE AUTHOR Omar Ashour is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and the Director of the Middle East Graduate Studies Program at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He is the author of The De-Radi- calization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements.1 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT math of their uprising, and the country’s first freely crimes, especially in the CSF, the SSI, and the elected parliament had a limited mandate. SSI’s successor the National Security Appara- tus (NSA). It will also be necessary to cleanse The election of President Muhammad Morsi and his the Public Prosecutor’s Office and State Security bold attempt to tilt the balance of power between Prosecution of officials who condoned or partic- the civilian administration and the military estab- ipated in abuses, including doctoring evidence, lishment have dealt a significant blow to opponents faking charges, or accepting “confessions” ex- of security sector reform. By reclaiming executive tracted via torture. powers for the presidency and culling Egypt’s top military brass and security sector chiefs, he has re- • Change the promotion criteria within the moved major obstacles to civilian control of the Ministry of Interior. A meritocratic system in armed forces and security apparatuses. Furthermore, which promotion is determined by performance, the president’s choices of ministerial appointments training, and qualifications should be established will allow him to advance a pro-reform agenda in and elaborated in the new police law. key areas through ministries that wield significant, if soft, power, such as the Ministry of Justice and the • Conduct a comprehensive review of Police Ministry of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs. Academy training curricula and systems. The review should focus on de-militarization of the The paper’s final section includes recommended police, as well as on altering training materials to steps to be taken as the newly-elected government reflect concepts of human security (as opposed to seeks to extend civilian control of the security estab- state security) and police functions as a “service” lishment – an initiative that will be an important test to society. both of Morsi’s administration and of Egypt’s dem- ocratic transition. These recommendations include • Restructure and downsize the Ministry of In- the following: terior. Non-security functions and departments should be separated from the Ministry of Interior. • Establish a presidential committee for secu- Activities for which the ministry is currently re- rity sector reform. This committee, composed sponsible such as Passport Administration, Civil of a range of reformist forces, should have the Records, Civil Defence, pilgrimage organization, specific responsibility and powers to reform and and others, should be placed under different min- restructure the Ministry of Interior and should istries. At the same time, the ministry should stop answer directly to the president. intervening in affairs outside its mandate, includ- ing media, culture, and academia. • Establish proper oversight and monitoring of the security sector. The Internal Monitoring • Provide the Central Security Forces with com- Sector (al-Taftish) should be empowered to do prehensive training in non-lethal riot control more than just investigating officers in reaction tactics. Internationally approved training proce- to complaints. It should be given a mandate to dures should be adopted, and the equipment nec- monitor and regularly appraise the performance essary for effective riot control should be sup- of police officers. Oversight by external bodies, plied. including an independent ombudsman and a rep- resentative prosecutor in each major police sta- • Draft a new police law to replace the Police In- tion, should be regulated in a new police law. stitution Law No. 109 of 1971. The law should be drafted while legislative powers are temporar- • Cleanse the Ministry of Interior and Public ily held by the President (until a new parliament Prosecutor’s Office through presidentially is seated). It should reflect all the aforementioned appointed committees. The Ministry of Interi- recommendations. or must be cleansed of officers who committed torture, murder, extra-judicial killings, and other 2 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT INTRODUCTION disappearances, systematic torture, and rape had been documented by both human rights organiza- The January 25 Egyptian revolution was sparked by tions and Egyptian courts over the last three de- police brutality. The context was set by the murder cades, most media outlets never dared to cross of internet activist Khaled Said in June 2010 by two such “red lines” while Mubarak ruled. policemen, followed by the brutality of both offi- cers and plain-clothed “thugs”2 during the fraudu- This paper focuses on the politics of police reform lent parliamentary elections later that year. Janu- and oversight in Egypt, addressing several dynam- ary 25 was also Egypt’s Police Day. The date was ics that affect such efforts. These include the role no accident; “[We wanted] to ruin their party like played by the police and domestic intelligence they ruined our lives,” one activist from the April 6 (SSI) in provoking and sustaining public outrage movement3 said. Indeed, for many revolutionaries, before and during revolution; the reversal whereby the police were the main line of defense protect- those most oppressed by the SSI are now the stron- ing the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. “We gest force in the country’s new democratic poli- had to break it … I wish there was another way but tics; and the emergence of individuals and groups there wasn’t … Now we have got to fix it,” said a of police officers who are trying to reform a repres- young activist on the way to Tahrir Square on Jan- sive system. The paper begins with an overview of uary 28, 2011.4 Indeed, following the removal of the concept of security sector reform, drawing on Mubarak, security sector reform became an imme- lessons learned elsewhere.