CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE RULE OF LAW STANFORD UNIVERSITY
BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER - STANFORD PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS
PAPER SERIES Number 3, November 2012
FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT
OMAR ASHOUR
PROGRAM ON ARAB REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, CDDRL
FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY gence within the police force of a cadre of reform- ist officers is also encouraging and may help shift Successful democratic transitions hinge on the the balance of power within the Ministry of Interi- establishment of effective civilian control of the or. These officers have established reformist orga- armed forces and internal security institutions. The nizations, such as the General Coalition of Police transformation of these institutions from instru- Officers and Officers But Honorable, and begun to ments of brutal repression and regime protection push for SSR themselves. The prospects for imple- to professional, regulated, national services – secu- menting these civil society and internal initiatives, rity sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of however, remain uncertain; they focus on admira- this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab ble ends but are less clear on the means of imple- states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is mentation. They also have to reckon with strong an acutely political process affected by an array of elements within the Ministry of Interior – “al-Ad- different actors and dynamics. In a contested and ly’s men” (in reference to Mubarak’s longstanding unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the minister) – who remain firmly opposed to reform. reform of Egypt’s security sector requires urgent attention. Government-led security sector reform initiatives have proved similarly problematic. After his ap- Egypt’s revolution of January 2011 was sparked by pointment as minister of interior in March 2011, the brutality of deposed president Hosni Mubarak’s Mansour Issawi sacked hundreds of generals and police and security forces. The most notorious and disbanded the SSI. However, many have criticized feared divisions of this security apparatus, State his reforms as cosmetic – the new National Secu- Security Investigations (SSI) and the Central Se- rity Apparatus continues many of the SSI’s prac- curity Forces (CSF), quickly became the target of tices, and officers’ past abuses remain largely un- revolutionary actors across the political spectrum. punished. From January 2012, a new parliament The SSI’s longstanding record of unlawful deten- dominated by former (largely Islamist) dissidents tions, disappearances, and systematic torture was – themselves victims of police brutality – took up well known; its “Human Rights Unit” was tasked the cause of SSR and approved amendments to not with protecting rights, but monitoring and re- the Law on the Organization of the Police. Again, pressing rights activists. The CSF, meanwhile, was though, there were criticisms of the reforms as in- seen as the armed enforcer of the regime’s will – sufficiently comprehensive, and the work of the stuffing ballot boxes or quelling demonstrations as parliament was in any case cut short when the body needed. was disbanded by a Constitutional Court ruling.
The cause of overhauling these institutions to The major obstacle to successful security sector ensure effective governance, oversight, and ac- reform in Egypt’s transition, however, has been the countability has been taken up by a range of stake- role played by the Supreme Council of the Armed holders since the revolution, with varying degrees Forces, an inherently SSR-averse body which re- of success. Civil society actors have taken the lead, tained executive powers until June 2012. Unlike in and one promising project is the National Initia- Tunisia and Libya, pro-revolution forces in Egypt tive to Rebuild the Police Force (NIRP). The emer- did not enjoy any real power in the immediate after-
ABOUT THe AUTHOR
Omar Ashour is a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and the Director of the Middle East Graduate Studies Program at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He is the author of The De-Radi- calization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements.1 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT math of their uprising, and the country’s first freely crimes, especially in the CSF, the SSI, and the elected parliament had a limited mandate. SSI’s successor the National Security Appara- tus (NSA). It will also be necessary to cleanse The election of President Muhammad Morsi and his the Public Prosecutor’s Office and State Security bold attempt to tilt the balance of power between Prosecution of officials who condoned or partic- the civilian administration and the military estab- ipated in abuses, including doctoring evidence, lishment have dealt a significant blow to opponents faking charges, or accepting “confessions” ex- of security sector reform. By reclaiming executive tracted via torture. powers for the presidency and culling Egypt’s top military brass and security sector chiefs, he has re- • Change the promotion criteria within the moved major obstacles to civilian control of the Ministry of Interior. A meritocratic system in armed forces and security apparatuses. Furthermore, which promotion is determined by performance, the president’s choices of ministerial appointments training, and qualifications should be established will allow him to advance a pro-reform agenda in and elaborated in the new police law. key areas through ministries that wield significant, if soft, power, such as the Ministry of Justice and the • Conduct a comprehensive review of Police Ministry of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs. Academy training curricula and systems. The review should focus on de-militarization of the The paper’s final section includes recommended police, as well as on altering training materials to steps to be taken as the newly-elected government reflect concepts of human security (as opposed to seeks to extend civilian control of the security estab- state security) and police functions as a “service” lishment – an initiative that will be an important test to society. both of Morsi’s administration and of Egypt’s dem- ocratic transition. These recommendations include • Restructure and downsize the Ministry of In- the following: terior. Non-security functions and departments should be separated from the Ministry of Interior. • Establish a presidential committee for secu- Activities for which the ministry is currently re- rity sector reform. This committee, composed sponsible such as Passport Administration, Civil of a range of reformist forces, should have the Records, Civil Defence, pilgrimage organization, specific responsibility and powers to reform and and others, should be placed under different min- restructure the Ministry of Interior and should istries. At the same time, the ministry should stop answer directly to the president. intervening in affairs outside its mandate, includ- ing media, culture, and academia. • Establish proper oversight and monitoring of the security sector. The Internal Monitoring • Provide the Central Security Forces with com- Sector (al-Taftish) should be empowered to do prehensive training in non-lethal riot control more than just investigating officers in reaction tactics. Internationally approved training proce- to complaints. It should be given a mandate to dures should be adopted, and the equipment nec- monitor and regularly appraise the performance essary for effective riot control should be sup- of police officers. Oversight by external bodies, plied. including an independent ombudsman and a rep- resentative prosecutor in each major police sta- • Draft a new police law to replace the Police In- tion, should be regulated in a new police law. stitution Law No. 109 of 1971. The law should be drafted while legislative powers are temporar- • Cleanse the Ministry of Interior and Public ily held by the President (until a new parliament Prosecutor’s Office through presidentially is seated). It should reflect all the aforementioned appointed committees. The Ministry of Interi- recommendations. or must be cleansed of officers who committed torture, murder, extra-judicial killings, and other
2 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT
INTRODUCTION disappearances, systematic torture, and rape had been documented by both human rights organiza- The January 25 Egyptian revolution was sparked by tions and Egyptian courts over the last three de- police brutality. The context was set by the murder cades, most media outlets never dared to cross of internet activist Khaled Said in June 2010 by two such “red lines” while Mubarak ruled. policemen, followed by the brutality of both offi- cers and plain-clothed “thugs”2 during the fraudu- This paper focuses on the politics of police reform lent parliamentary elections later that year. Janu- and oversight in Egypt, addressing several dynam- ary 25 was also Egypt’s Police Day. The date was ics that affect such efforts. These include the role no accident; “[We wanted] to ruin their party like played by the police and domestic intelligence they ruined our lives,” one activist from the April 6 (SSI) in provoking and sustaining public outrage movement3 said. Indeed, for many revolutionaries, before and during revolution; the reversal whereby the police were the main line of defense protect- those most oppressed by the SSI are now the stron- ing the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. “We gest force in the country’s new democratic poli- had to break it … I wish there was another way but tics; and the emergence of individuals and groups there wasn’t … Now we have got to fix it,” said a of police officers who are trying to reform a repres- young activist on the way to Tahrir Square on Jan- sive system. The paper begins with an overview of uary 28, 2011.4 Indeed, following the removal of the concept of security sector reform, drawing on Mubarak, security sector reform became an imme- lessons learned elsewhere. It goes on to discuss the diate objective of both revolutionary and reformist historical relationship between the police and poli- forces, regardless of ideological or political affili- tics in Egypt. The third section outlines some of the ations. reform initiatives proposed by stakeholders: civil society groups, reformist officers, the Ministry of By March 2011, accumulated grievances led to an- Interior, the dissolved parliament, and the presi- other confrontation, this time with State Security dency. The study concludes with an assessment of Investigations (SSI), the domestic intelligence ser- some of the obstacles to SSR in Egypt and policy vice. The evening of March 5 in Cairo was remi- recommendations for the country’s first elected ci- niscent of Berlin on January 15, 1990. Thousands vilian president, Muhammad Morsi. of Egyptian protesters stormed SSI headquarters not only in Cairo but also in Alexandria, Assyut, and other cities, just as German protesters had done to the offices of the hated Stasi. In both cases, the SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: PRINCIPLES, protests had been sparked by state security officers OBJECTIVES, AND LESSONS destroying files that documented their institutions’ Security sector reform (SSR) can be described as corruption and repression. Demonstrators gathered, “the transformation of the security system which attempting to safeguard what remained of the in- includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities criminating evidence. Details of secret graveyards and actions, so that it is managed and operated in and almost medieval dungeons, files of political a manner that is more consistent with democratic dissidents held for more than a decade, names of norms and sound principles of good governance, judges who helped to fix elections, and lists of in- and thus contributes to a well-functioning security formants – celebrities, religious figures, talk-show framework.”5 The philosophy behind SSR is rooted hosts, and “opposition” leaders – were all captured in human security: the idea that the primary objec- on camera and uploaded onto popular websites. tive of the security apparatus is the security of the Torture rooms and equipment were captured on individual citizen, not that of ruling regimes. It is an camera in every SSI building stormed by protest- idea that contrasts distinctly with the reality under ers. Even for apolitical Egyptians, the sheer volume Mubarak, where the daily threat for many law- and graphic detail of the released files were shock- abiding citizens was not al-Qaeda or the Mossad, ing. Although unlawful detentions, kidnappings, but the Egyptian security establishment itself.
3 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT
Ideally, the reform process should embrace all the death of General Francisco Franco in Novem- branches of the security sector, from the armed ber 1975, leading up to the transfer of power to forces to the customs authorities. The focus of this the Socialist Party following the country’s land- paper, however, will be limited to the Ministry of mark 1982 elections.9 In South Africa, a compre- Interior, which in Egypt includes the police, para- hensive reform program for national defense was military forces (Central Security Forces), and do- introduced in the White Papers of October 1994. mestic intelligence services (SSI, now renamed the This included the establishment of a new profes- National Security Apparatus). sional identity for intelligence personnel, bolstered by a code of conduct stressing compliance with Two core objectives of SSR processes are critical in democratic values, respect for human rights, and 6 the case of Egypt: adherence to the principle of political neutrality.10 More recently, in Indonesia the “New Paradigm,” 1. Establishment of effective governance, over- a framework for the democratization process, em- sight, and accountability in the security system. phasized the de-militarization of the police and 2. Improved delivery of security and justice ser- parliamentary oversight over the security services. vices.7 The latter measure was introduced under President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2000) and produced To achieve those objectives, any comprehensive three parliamentary commissions that monitor the SSR process must include a number of key initia- Indonesian security apparatus.11 In Georgia, the de- tives. First, oversight and accountability must be militarization of police was partly implemented be- improved, whether internally through the executive tween 2004 and 2005; the interior minister, deputy branch, through parliamentary oversight and legis- interior minister, and chief of domestic intelligence lation, or through the judiciary. Civil society actors, are now all civilians. Additionally, the interior min- and indeed individual citizens, can also play a role istry signed a memorandum on the monitoring of in enhancing accountability through independent detention centers with a human rights ombuds- monitoring mechanisms such as public complaints man.12 In Chile, following the repressive period of commissions, independent ombudsmen, or inspec- General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), the Senate tors-general.8 Defining a clear legal framework and approved the creation of a civilian National Intelli- mandate for the security services that integrates es- gence Agency (ANI) in 2003 and, pursuant to a law tablished human rights norms is also of crucial im- enacted in 2004, security agencies have to provide portance. all requested information to that body.13
Within the security services themselves, there is a Beyond these transitional cases, highly profession- need for enhanced capacity building through im- al security agencies in consolidated democracies proved police training, staff development, and per- are monitored by external bodies like the Intelli- sonnel policies. There must also be an emphasis on gence and Security Committee in the United King- decentralization and on “civilianizing” the police dom or the Security Intelligence Review Commit- force through measures such as ensuring civil- tee (SIRC) in Canada. Typically, these bodies have ian leadership, reforming ranking structures, and the authority to examine information concerning even redesigning uniforms. Ultimately, the securi- the activities of intelligence agencies and report ty services must build a new, de-politicized identi- back to the government or parliament. ty, based on a strong professional and meritocratic culture. In the context of other Arab states undergoing tran- sitions, security sector reform is similarly crit- These elements constitute the pillars of security ical and, as in Egypt, remains a sphere of politi- sector reform and the core of successful democra- cal contention. In Tunisia, the country that sparked tization in several other transitioning countries. In the Arab Awakening, the current interior minister Spain, such steps were gradually introduced after Ali Larayedh is a civilian who was himself a tor-
4 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT ture victim during the sixteen years he spent in jail for the country’s transition. On the positive side, it under the Ben Ali regime. The Tunisian Ministry was in many ways a “people’s army” – popular, of Interior laid out a comprehensive roadmap for legitimate, and inclusive. It avoided many of the reforming the country’s security sector in a white potential depredations which a single, hierarchical paper entitled “Security and Development: A rebel army might have inflicted on local popula- White Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia.” tions. At the same time, however, the absence of The paper discussed turning the security sector a clear command-and-control structure meant that “from a police order to a police service that can re- the units “coordinated” but did not “obey.” This led spond urgently to the new challenges of crime.”14 to a long list of rogue acts, the most shocking being However, leaders of the ruling Islamist al-Nahda the murder of rebel commander General Abd al-Fa- Party believe the White Paper was produced by tah Younis by his own side in July 2011. Since the former regime figures within the Ministry of Inte- removal of Qadhafi, rival provincial militias have rior who are not necessarily pro-reform.15 “There engaged in skirmishes in Tripoli and elsewhere, are some good elements. But it offers no compre- and these militias continue to exert some control hensive reform,” said Amer Larayedh, the head of over the executive branch.20 al-Nahda’s Political Bureau.16 The SSR process, however, does show some prom- Indeed, resistance to reform is evident within ise. The appointment of Salem al-Hasi as the head the ranks of the ministry, as the case of Colonel of the Libyan intelligence agency, the Foreign Se- Moncef al-Ajimi demonstrates. Al-Ajimi, the di- curity Apparatus (FSA), makes him the first civil- rector of the ministry’s “Intervention Forces,” was ian opposition figure to lead an Arab intelligence charged with firing on peaceful protesters in the service. Al-Hasi was a member of the armed wing towns of Thala and Qasarin during the revolution. of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya In the course of al-Ajimi’s trial, Minister Larayedh (NFSL) and spent more than two decades in exile attempted to remove the colonel from his posi- in the United States. “All of the Arab intelligence tion. In reaction, hundreds of policemen from the services were there to protect the regime and op- Bouchoucha barracks physically blocked access to press citizens. I will change that. The Libyan in- al-Ajimi and then organized a strike to protest his telligence will be under the control of the elected attempted dismissal.17 Around 13,000 members of executive and the direct oversight of the legisla- the Intervention Forces withdrew from key loca- tive assembly,” al-Hasi said upon taking his post.21 tions in several Tunisian cities and returned to their Whether he will succeed or not is another matter. barracks. “We will not be a scapegoat for the fami- Accusations have been levelled against al-Hasi lies of the martyrs,” said one of the protesting po- and his agents for allegedly tapping phones and licemen.18 As a result, Larayedh was forced to keep electronically monitoring Qadhafi loyalists using al-Ajimi in place at the ministry. In June, a military equipment inherited from the former regime. The court found al-Ajimi not guilty. Though Tunisia’s General National Congress and future parliaments military prosecutor will appeal the verdict,19 the in- will need to craft laws for oversight and control of cident revealed the level of internal resistance to the security and intelligence apparatuses, as well as reform faced by the Nahda-led government. a clear mechanism for enforcing that control. Such steps will require the help of the UN Mission in In Libya, successful security sector reform, along- Libya (UNSMIL) as well as independent experts. side demobilization, disarmament and reintegra- tion (DDR) processes, could well turn the oil-pro- Beyond its technical, organizational, and adminis- ducing country into a democratic Dubai. If it fails, trative dimensions, SSR is a highly political pro- however, we are likely to see further incidents such cess. Indeed, that political dimension can dictate as the September 11 attacks on the U.S. consulate the direction and success of the entire project. SSR in Benghazi and even the possibility of broad civil processes usually result from, and succeed because conflict. The decentralized nature of Libya’s “liber- of, major shifts in the balance of political power. ation army” has had several important implications Ultimately, successful SSR separates democra-
5 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT cies from autocracies; genuine democratization in cal Bureau. On August 22, 1952, only weeks after Egypt hinges on the effective reform of its secu- the July coup, the General Investigation Apparatus rity sector. was established. It was renamed the General Ad- ministration of State Security Investigations (SSI) in 1971 when Anwar al-Sadat assumed the Egyp- tian presidency. By the time of Mubarak’s ascent EGYPT’S POLITICAL POLICE to the presidency in 1981, the SSI had become the The history of police institutions in Egypt goes most powerful police sector in the country. It em- back to 1805, when Muhammad Ali, the ruler and ployed an estimated 100,000 individuals, and the so-called “founder of modern Egypt,” established a influence and authority of its captains exceeded small department to keep law and order in Cairo. In that of generals in other sectors. 1857, this department became the Ministry of Inte- Today, the mandate and internal organization of rior. Today, the ministry comprises a massive bu- the SSI remain vague. At time of writing, the SSI‘s reaucracy employing more than 1.5 million people: successor agency the National Security Apparatus officers, petty-officers, soldiers, conscripts, and (NSA) is the only sector whose internal structure is civilian administrators. This labor force includes undisclosed on the Ministry of Interior’s website. more than 831,000 full-time jobs and a complex However, a clear organizational framework can be network of more than 300,000 paid informants and drawn from the documents confiscated by activists 22 ex-convicts (for information gathering). who stormed SSI headquarters following the revo- lution, as well as from interviews with former offi- The Ministry of Interior’s involvement in Egyptian cers.23 From these documents, it becomes clear that politics has been well documented. Historically, the the mandate of the SSI was almost exclusively fo- position of interior minister has been manipulated cused on subduing, neutralizing, annihilating, or by different political forces. Following the 1919 co-opting dissent. revolution, Wafdist prime minister and liberal rev- olutionary leader Saad Zaghloul held the position Organizationally, the largest administrative com- in 1924 and used its authority against his political ponents within the SSI were the “general admin- opponents. Following the popular coup of 1952, istration,” organized either by region or by the- Gamal Abdel Nasser held the position and kept it matic specialization. Each general administration even when he became prime minister the follow- contained a number of successively smaller com- ing year. ponents: “central administrations,” “groups,” and then “units.” The largest of the general administra- Meanwhile, two major police sectors – State Secu- tions was Extremist Activity,24 whose mandate was rity Investigations (SSI) and the Central Security to counter any religious-based activism in the coun- Forces (CSF) sectors – have had significant impact try. (Some officers still refer to it by its former title, on the Egyptian political scene. The predecessors Religious Activism, or al-Nashat al-Dini.25) Sub- of the SSI date back to before 1952, when the “Po- units within Extremist Activity included Counter- litical Bureau” was in charge of reporting and oc- ing Brotherhood Activism, Extremist Organiza- casionally cracking down on dissidents. There is no tions, and Prison Security (tasked with countering comparison, however, between the influence of the Islamist political activism in prisons and detentions SSI and that of the Political Bureau. After the suc- centers). cess of their July 1952 coup, the victorious “Free Officers” dissolved the Political Bureau, which had Other SSI components that repressed political dis- been reporting on them in the years prior. Once they sent included the Student Activity Units, the Human faced political opposition and worker strikes in the Rights Units (whose mandate was to monitor and industrial town of Kafr al-Dawar, however, they suppress human rights activists), the Arab Activ- decided to reestablish a similar state security body ism Group (mainly tasked with countering the in- with the help of senior officers from the old Politi- fluence of Arab nationalists), Workers Units, and
6 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT the Sectarian Activity Group (which was mandated lence outside. We would ask the representatives of with dealing with Christian activists and included the candidates to leave. Then the stuffing begins ... a Church Activity Unit). In addition, there was the Back in 1995 only one officer, out of the 500 or so, General Administration for Foreign Activity (with refused to participate. He was a Major back then. units for Europe and America) and an Electronic His name is Omar Afifi.”31 Monitoring Group (responsible for monitoring in- ternet activists, with a unit specializing in hacking When asked about the incident, Colonel Afifi said, websites and blogs), and finally the state-of-the-art “I am not going to tell you that I was a hero … Al- Counter-Terrorism Group.26 Adly ordered us not to carry a gun or a police ID to avoid scandals. This meant that if the rigged bal- Whereas the SSI in general stands accused of sys- lots started falling from the huge black jackets they tematic torture, kidnapping, and illegal detentions, gave us, I would be torn apart by angry voters. I the majority of these accusations have been di- concluded that al-Adly and the police command- rected at the Extremist Activity administration and ers would sacrifice the officers like insects … and Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG). These groups for the dirtiest cause. This was a turning point for have also been accused of extrajudicial killings me.”32 and ordering assassinations. One former SSI of- ficer described an incident indicative of the insti- The other relevant police sector is the Central Se- tution’s casual abuse of power: “We arrested this curity Forces (CSF). It was established in 1969 to guy and Extremist Activity and CTG officers got address the police’s limited capacity to quell dem- into an argument. They got the information they onstrations following the military defeat of June wanted, but neither wanted the guy. Then a CTG 1967. Back then, the CSF was composed of 189 of- 33 officer ended the argument. He pushed the guy out ficers and 11,690 soldiers. On January 25, 2011, the window. It was Ramadan and he was late for the the CSF had more than 300,000 officers, soldiers, 34 suhur meal27 … The guy died instantly and it was and conscripts within its ranks. If the SSI was registered as resisting arrest ... They laughed about the brains protecting the regime, the CSF was its it afterwards.”28 CTG officers were also accused by muscle and iron fist. The arms used by the CSF re- a government-appointed fact-finding commission flect the breadth of its mandate: they range from of sniping at protesters in and around Tahrir Square armored vehicles and sniper rifles to iron bars and in January 2011. At time of writing, none had been electric prods. “This was Mubarak’s internal army 35 tried.29 against the people,” said one activist interviewed.
Additionally, SSI, Criminal Investigations, and The history of the CSF is not, however, one of to- CSF officers have regularly been accused of rig- tally unswerving loyalty to the Mubarak regime. In ging elections, stuffing ballot boxes, and terroriz- a mutiny in 1986, CSF soldiers protested ill-treat- ing voters since the first parliamentary elections ment in camps and a possible increase in the period under Mubarak in 1984. Lt. Colonel Mahmoud of conscription (from three to five years). The pro- Abd al-Nabi, a co-founder of the Officers But Hon- testers burned camps and nearby tourist hotels, and orable (OBH) organization, outlined the details clashed with army forces. The mutinous CSF con- of the rigging process, in which he had partici- scripts were defeated in a few days, but hundreds pated since 1995.30 “Habib al-Adly, head of Cai- were killed. In the immediate aftermath, Interior ro’s General Security Directorate back then, asked Minister General Ahmed Rushdi was sacked, new around 500 officers to carry between 200 to 400 conscription regulations were enforced, and better pro-NDP ballots and to stuff the boxes with them. treatment was ordered. But that confrontation deep- The SSI and CSF officers were to provoke some ened the mistrust between the armed forces and the violence outside the voting center for distraction. CSF. “Let them try it again. We will happily crush Then the Criminal Investigation officers inside the them. We didn’t forget 1986,” a young Special 36 voter center would shut it down because of the vio- Forces army officer said in April 2012.
7 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT
Not long after the mutiny, the CSF became the proposed to address the repressive tendencies of main enforcer of a counter-insurgency campaign Egypt’s security sector. in the 1990s, primarily against the Islamic Group (al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya). The years of the conflict created animosities and vendettas between the CSF SECURITY REFORM IN A REVOLUTIONARY commanders and Islamic Group fighters, even after ENVIRONMENT: STAKEHOLDERS AND INI- the latter renounced violence and “apologized.” TIATIVES “The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is not gutsy enough. They shouldn’t allow Since March 2011, Egypt has seen more than ten murderers in the parliament. They should disband initiatives for Security Sector Reform. The propos- it, even if they have to stage a coup,” said a former als – which vary significantly in terms of quality CSF general, referring to the MPs of the Construc- and comprehensiveness – have been put forward tion and Development Party, the newly established by a range of stakeholders including civil society 37 political wing of the Islamic Group. groups, disenchanted police officers, the Ministry of Interior, and the parliament. Even after Mubarak’s removal on February 11, 2011, the brutal behavior continued. The CSF, Civil Society Initiatives NSA, and other security apparatuses (including the Military Police, which operates under the Ministry Civil society organizations have offered various of Defense) were involved in wide-scale repression initiatives focused on legal reform, oversight, and campaigns that resulted in more than 100 deaths civilianization of the security sector. Perhaps one of and thousands of injuries. The most infamous of the most comprehensive initiatives is the National these happened in: Maspero, mainly against Chris- Initiative to Rebuild the Police Force (NIRP). Put tian protesters (October 2011); Muhammad Mah- forward by a broad group of 19 authors (including moud Street, mainly against youth revolutionary police officers, academics, lawyers, and business- groups (November 2011); near the Cabinet build- men), the initiative goes beyond technical details, ing (December 2011); and in the Abbassiyya dis- and addresses the political dimension of the chal- trict of Cairo (July 2011 and April 2012).38 These lenge of security sector reform.40 various security apparatuses were also responsible for hundreds of torture cases, political detentions, The NIRP includes fourteen short-term and four- and military tribunals for civilians between Febru- teen long-term proposals. Six of the former focus ary 2011 and October 2012.39 on issues of transitional justice, such as holding police officers accountable for killing protesters. Overall, the legacies of the security establishment Three other demands relate to promotions and re- in general and the SSI and the CSF in particular had ferrals, and call for the replacement of the senior disastrous consequences for the Egyptian political leadership of the security establishment, includ- and social landscape, both prior to and during the ing “members of the Supreme Council of Police revolution. These institutions were the two princi- [the highest commanding body in the force] … pal tools used by the Mubarak regime to frustrate [and] directors of departments and branches of any meaningful steps towards democratization or State Security in all governorates where killings fighting corruption throughout the three decades of and wounding occurred during the revolution.” his rule. Such legacies have had, and will contin- This is in addition to the replacement of “all offi- ue to have, a significant impact on Egypt’s transi- cers and other members of the Criminal Investiga- tional period. Under SCAF, the abusive behavior tions department” with “trained officers known for of the security apparatuses persisted. In many re- their good conduct and behavior.”41 The remaining spects, Egyptian security apparatuses suffered and short-term proposals focus on the monitoring of still suffer from an entrenched pattern of abusive the police force. They include a proposal on soci- behavior. As a result, various initiatives have been etal monitoring, similar to initiatives implemented
8 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT in other SSR cases:42 “The interior minister should Before the revolution, several officers had spoken allow representatives of civil society organizations out against human rights violations and paid a high to enter police headquarters at any time, without price as a result. Colonel Afifi, referred to earli- notice, to inspect places of detention and the condi- er, was not the only one. Others included higher- tion of the detainees, and to access any information ranking officials, such as General Ibrahim Abd al- they require.”43 For the long term, the NIRP focus- Ghaffar, a former director in the Prisons Sector and es on redefining the police mandate, civilianizing one of only a few reformist generals. After oppos- the police force, reforming the admission process ing torture in prisons, he was threatened with de- of the police academy, abolishing the use of army tention by the former head of the SSI, Hasan Abd conscripts in the police, and implementing organi- al-Rahman.47 The cases of these officers, howev- zational restructuring. er, were individual exceptions. Prior to the revolu- tion, there was no organized, collective attempt to The NIRP is a thorough and ambitious initiative defy orders that violated either law or basic moral- that tackles the fundamentals of security reform. ity. Moreover, to make an example of them, almost Prospects for its implementation, however, appear all of these officers were smeared, demoted, or dis- limited. Aside from “calling on the minister of in- missed. While heroic, their efforts were hardly ef- terior” – a phrase often repeated throughout the fective in terms of SSR. NIRP document – it provides no clear course of action. Another important shortcoming of the ini- The revolution, however, gave rise to a new genera- tiative is a failure to address the factional make- tion of reformist officers. Many mid-ranking police up within the interior ministry. Any successful ini- officers responded to the systemic abuse by form- tiative will need to take into consideration the bal- ing groups pushing for internal reform. “We want ance of power between pro-status-quo generals and to save face and tell our people that we neither sold those willing to implement reforms.44 them nor killed them; the traitor al-Adly and his gang did. Now the whole police force is paying the The Disenchanted: Police Officers’ Initiatives price for his policies,” said Lt. Colonel Muhammad Salah, an officer commanding a CSF brigade and a As mentioned, the police force was directed by the member of the General Coalition of Police Officers Mubarak regime to suppress the January 25 Revo- (GCPO).48 Having emerged as the country’s larg- lution. It incurred heavy losses as a result. More est independent officers’ organization, the GCPO is than 95 police stations and over 4,000 police ve- lobbying for official recognition as a police union hicles were torched during the 18 days of the up- with an elected leadership. At the time of writing, rising. Officers and soldiers faced public animos- the Ministry of Interior continued to resist those ef- ity, physical and verbal attacks, and reputation- forts and had even referred two GCPO leaders, Lt. smearing. “It is a broken army. More or less like Colonel Nabil Omar and Major Ashraf al-Banna, to the Egyptian army after the defeat of 1967,” said a disciplinary hearing for “the abdication of their Muhammad Selim al-Awa, a presidential candidate professional duties and disobeying orders.”49 who discussed security reforms with former inte- 45 rior minister General Mansour Issawi. These im- Smaller, like-minded organizations have also portant shifts have had an effect on the psychologi- emerged, including Officers But Honorable (OBH), cal state of many officers. “Many are in need of Warrant Officers But Honorable (WOBH), and Of- psychological rehabilitation. The revolution broke ficers Against Corruption (OAC). (OAC merged some of them, while others became more brutal with the Police Martyrs Rally movement to form and violent.... Both situations are equally bad,” said the GCPO at a later stage.) The initiatives pro- Tamer Makki, a former major in Public Security posed by these organizations focus on: cleansing and a current member of the upper house of parlia- the police force of corrupt generals; enhancing 46 ment. work conditions, training, media and public rela- tions; and increasing salaries and pensions. For ex-
9 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT ample, the GCPO began by laying out eleven objec- Restructuring and Reforms by the Ministry of tives, the first of which is to “enact a law to severely Interior punish anyone who physically attacks the police, as well as any police officer who gets convicted with On March 3, 2011, after sacking the Mubarak-ap- a crime.”50 pointed government of Ahmad Shafiq, SCAF ap- pointed a “revolution-friendly” government headed Some members of the GCPO have put forward their by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf. The appointed in- own SSR initiatives. One proposed by Lt. Colonel terior minister, Mansour Issawi, was a general who Halim al-Deeb, a former SSI officer who was head had retired 14 years earlier. Issawi, who was cred- of the Planning Unit in the Police Academy’s Insti- ited with earlier changes and reforms within the tute for Training Officers, highlights a number of Ministry of Interior, had a clean reputation and re- police abuses. Among these is the practice of put- mained popular among officers. On taking office, ting random citizens on political blacklists, then ex- he disbanded the SSI – with SCAF’s support – and torting them when they apply for jobs or promo- sacked or retired 505 major-generals, 82 brigadier- tions requiring a police report. According to al- generals, and 82 colonels.54 Meanwhile, the GCPO Deeb, “This practice was very common and helped managed to negotiate some benefits for officers, many officers to get rich.”51 The initiative also ad- including a new limit of eight working hours per dresses the institutional culture of the force. Al- day. Deeb laments a culture within the police that be- Some officers consider these reforms to be “the littles and ridicules human rights – partly, he says, largest changes in the history of the Ministry of In- a result of the fact that only SSI officers provide in- terior.”55 Others believe that they are merely cos- struction on human rights at the Police Academy.52 metic. “It is just an increase in the numbers of re- Al-Deeb outlines a series of proposals, including a tired generals, plus sacking some of the notorious new code of honor for the police force that stresses ones. Those generals should be in jail, not on pen- their political neutrality and independence and the sion and benefits,” said an ex-police major who par- service-oriented nature of their job. ticipated in the revolution. General Abd al-Latif al- The rise of reformist officers from the lower and Badiny, a former deputy interior minister, agreed: middle ranks is a good indicator of the changing “The budget of the Ministry of Interior is around 56 internal dynamics within the Ministry of Interior. EGP 85 billion ($14.1 billion) and there are some Under Mubarak, any opposition to the many abuses 37,000 officers. At least EGP 4.1 billion ($600 mil- of the security establishment was severely punished. lion) used to be distributed among al-Adly’s loy- Colonel Afifi, for example, had to flee Egypt and alists: around 300 generals and 50 colonels. This seek refuge in the United States following severe corruption has not changed much.… Let’s take the harassment and even an assassination attempt. His SSI as an example, the same notorious characters – minus a few – are running its successor, the Nation- crime was simply refusing to participate in the rig- 57 ging of elections – a far cry from the comprehensive al Security Apparatus.” reforms called for by this new cadre. “The balance General Issawi’s decision to dissolve the SSI and of power within the ministry is not the same. This is establish the NSA was initially applauded, but criti- the first time I see younger officers refusing to carry cisms quickly resurfaced. A number of factors sup- out orders violating the law. This is good. Though I port a negative assessment. Generally, the entire am worried about too much defiance,” General Abd process lacked transparency. There was no vetting 53 al-Ghaffar said in an interview. system put in place to guarantee that, pending in- vestigation, SSI officers suspected of serious human rights violations did not remain in the NSA. More specifically, the SSI-like intervention into seeming- ly every aspect of political life has remained intact. The NSA has eleven administrations58 comprised
10 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT of “groups” with vague mandates that range from SECURITY REFORM, SCAF, AND EGYPT’S “Monitoring and Analyzing Popular Discontent” DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION to “Human Rights Studies.” The SSI’s “Sectarian Activity” (in charge of monitoring Christian activ- Overall, a number of proposals for security sector ists) was renamed the “Protection of Religions and reform in Egypt have been put forward. To vary- Beliefs” with almost no other change, according to ing degrees, though, most of these initiatives suffer some observers.59 Meanwhile, the existence of an from a lack of comprehensiveness and a failure to “Appraisal of Security Performance” group risks consult best practices from other countries. Still, the reviving the SSI’s dominance over all other police main problem lies not in planning but in execution. sectors. This dominance stemmed partly from its There are many reasons for this. Unlike their coun- power to “appraise” performances of officers in terparts in Libya and Tunisia, pro-revolution forces other departments and therefore to control promo- in Egypt did not enjoy any real power in the im- tions, demotions, reprimands, and punishments. mediate aftermath of their uprising. Their influence on security matters – and on high politics in gener- The Parliament of the Revolution and Security al – was therefore quite limited. Within official in- Sector Reform stitutions, the revolutionary parliament had a limit- ed mandate, and due to SCAF’s retention of execu- An overwhelming majority of those elected to tive powers, it lacked the authority to sack ministers Egypt’s first post-revolution parliament were op- and form a government of its own. Additionally, the posed the Mubarak regime and participated in the MPs had either limited or no experience in SSR and uprising. Many of those elected were victims of the mechanics of its implementation. This applies police brutality and torture, most notably Islamist even to members of the parliament’s National Se- MPs from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and curity Committee. Justice Party (217 seats), the Salafi Nour Party (111 seats), and the Islamic Group’s Construction and SCAF’s own approach to SSR was anything but Development Party (13 seats). Unsurprisingly, this “revolutionary.” The generals sought only to tinker reversal of fortune meant that the two chambers of around the margins of the status quo rather than face the parliament were eager to discuss and imple- the consequences of genuine change. Even if there ment some of the aforementioned initiatives. They had been the political will within SCAF, the path to sought consultations on SSR through a Parliamen- effective reform would not have been an easy one. tary Committee on National Security.60 Before a “If I sacked all those involved in the violations – Constitutional Court verdict resulting in the disso- and there are a lot of them – and if I don’t have the lution of parliament, the legislative body approved funding to reintegrate them or give them alternative amendments to Law No. 109 (1971) on the organi- civilian jobs or proper pensions, we would be cre- zation of the police force. ating disasters,” said one influential army general.62 As the experiences of Chile and the former Soviet The new version of the law removed the president’s Union suggest, he has a point. While sacked securi- right to act as the head of the Supreme Council of ty officials in these countries did not pose a signifi- the Police and amended articles relating to salary cant threat to the course of political transitions, they controls and the status of certain ranks in the force. did often join or form organized crime syndicates Yet some MPs and activists expressed frustration that continue to plague their societies. with the amendments. “There were 70 Egyptians killed in Port Said Stadium, and we have a group A final challenge to SSR is related to the balance of generals running the interior ministry like an or- of power inside the Ministry of Interior. Accord- ganized crime syndicate. And all the revolutionary ing to GCPO and OBH officers, some deputy inte- parliament does is try to amend a few articles on rior ministers – “al-Adly’s men,” as they call them salaries and pensions,” said one MP.61 – continue to resist any serious attempt at reform. The GCPO issued a statement on the tragic clashes of Muhammad Mahmoud, which left 51 protesters
11 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT dead.63 It concluded that the government’s use of ed civilian administration and the military estab- violence was shameful and unnecessary.64 As one lishment has so far been successful. After only two GCPO officer noted: “The ones responsible for this months in office, not only was the president able massacre are Generals Sami Sidhum and Mohsen to annul the Constitutional Declaration enforced Murad, [the heads of Public Security and the Cairo by SCAF in June 2012 (which stripped the presi- Security Directorate].… Both were promoted from dency of many of its powers), but also to forcibly Deputy to First Deputy Interior Minister after the retire those who had issued it: Field Marshal Mu- Muhammad Mahmoud massacre.… No serious in- hammad Hussein Tantawy and his deputy General vestigation was done for tens of deaths and thou- Sami Anan. It was the first time in Egypt’s history sands of injured…. The man arguing for negotia- that a serious attempt had been made by an elected tions with protesters and meaningful internal re- civilian to control the armed forces and security es- forms [General al-Badiny] was reprimanded. What tablishment. exactly does this tell you?”65 A range of circumstances – particularly the mas- The acquittal in Mubarak’s trial of the generals sacre of Egyptian troops in the Sinai and the sub- who, as deputy interior ministers, ran the country’s sequent removal of ancien regime generals – have repressive institutions will have some serious con- strengthened the president’s capacity to balance sequences for Egypt’s SSR prospects as well as the civil-military relations. In the new cabinet of Prime transition process. Hasan Abd al-Rahman, the head Minister Hisham Qandil, formed on August 2, only of the SSI, Ahmad Ramzi, head of the CSF, Adly ten of the 35 ministries went to pro-revolution Fayyid, head of Public Security, Ismail al-Shaer, forces, with the other ministers being a combina- head of the Cairo Security Directorate, Osama tion of old-regime figures and technocrats without Youssef, head of the Giza Security Directorate, and any publicly declared political affiliation. But the Omar Faramawy, head of the 6th October Security choice of those ten ministries was strategic. Five of Directorate, were all found not guilty of killing pro- them – the Ministries of Information, Higher Ed- testers. Life sentences were handed down to Hosni ucation, Youth, Labor, and Housing – were given Mubarak and his interior minister Habib al-Adly, to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Jus- but both sentences will be appealed. The verdicts tice Party (FJP). Other pro-revolution elements as- reinforced a culture of impunity within the security sumed control of Education, Legal and Parliamen- services. And they were not – by any means – an ex- tary Affairs, Industry and Foreign Trade, and most ception. A series of other verdicts acquitting dozens importantly, the Justice Ministry. All of these min- of officers also accused of killing protesters fol- istries wield significant, if soft, power and represent lowed. Those acquittals include the infamous case official institutions which can enhance the- capac of General Farouq Lashin, head of the Qalyubia ity of pro-change forces to mobilize students, work- Security Directorate, and three other generals ac- ers, and youth. These institutions can simultaneous- cused of killing more than 20 protesters. These ac- ly give reformist elements religious legitimacy (via quittals empowered the anti-reform faction within the Ministry of Religious Endowment), and remove the ministry, but not for very long. the threat of judicial repression (via the Ministry of Justice) while strengthening unofficial networks on the ground. SURGICAL STRIKES: MORSI AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND SE- Moreover, beyond the culling of SCAF’s top brass, 66 CURITY APPARATUS the Sinai massacre sparked the process of remov- ing some of the most powerful generals across The aforementioned challenges to SSR have been the security sector. These included the head of the mitigated by the election of Egypt’s first civilian General Intelligence Directorate (Murad Muwafi), president. A bold attempt by President Muhammad head of the Presidential Guard (Nagib Moham- Morsi to tilt the balance of power between the elect- med Abd al-Salam), head of the Military Police
12 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT
(Hamdy Badin), head of the Cairo Security Direc- result of the meeting, it was arranged for General torate (Mohsen Murad), and the head of the Central Sir David Richards, the chief of Britain’s defense Security Forces (Emad al-Wakil). These generals staff, to visit Sinai and oversee the formation of a all shared an anti-reform stance, defiance of elect- British team of field experts from the Department ed civilian rule, and a desire to maintain as many for International Development who will advise on Mubarak-era policies and practices as possible. the two issues of stabilizing Sinai and SSR. Two of these generals, Badin and Murad, were spe- cifically accused by several revolutionary and re- The involvement of the United Kingdom, the formist groups, including the GCPO, of organizing United States, and other democracies in SSR is a campaign of repression against revolutionaries. useful for knowledge transfer – for example, over- sight training for MPs, non-lethal riot control train- Overall, the purging of these generals removes ing for the CSF, and de-politicization – as well as a major obstacle to civilian control of the armed advanced equipment supply and training. However, forces and security apparatuses. But a comprehen- direct Western support of Egypt’s SSR process may sive SSR process will have to go well beyond the be used by anti-reform generals, Mubarak regime removal of a few of the anti-reform generals. The remnants, and even some opposition groups to de- balance of power does seem to have shifted some- legitimate SSR as a foreign conspiracy to weaken what towards the country’s newly elected civilian or infiltrate the country’s security services. Morsi’s authorities, led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Free- rivals may well use such cooperation to further ad- dom and Justice Party (FJP). In the FJP’s Renais- vance an “Islamist-Western” conspiracy theory and sance Project – the official program adopted by the undermine the credibility of the president and the organization – SSR features as one of seven pil- fortunes of his party in forthcoming parliamentary lars. Given the experiences of the Brotherhood in elections. Mubarak’s prisons, current threats to domestic se- curity, and the shift in the balance of power, SSR In any case, what remains certain is that, ultimate- is likely to remain at the forefront of the organiza- ly, no democratic transition is complete without tar- tion’s priorities. geting abuse, eradicating torture, and ending the impunity of the security services, with effective The Brotherhood’s approach to SSR is gradual, and meaningful civilian control of both the armed however, not revolutionary; working within the forces and the security establishment. This will be rules of the system rather than fundamentally alter- the true test of both Morsi’s presidency and Egypt’s ing them. The most recent case in point is President democratic transition. Morsi’s appointment of General Khaled Tharwat as the new head of the NSA in October 2012. Tharwat comes from the very core of the SSI. He used to POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS head “Internal Activity,” the general administration in charge of monitoring and investigating civil so- Several steps remain to be taken on the difficult and ciety groups, political parties, and media outlets. At politically complicated path toward establishing one point, he also headed the “Countering Brother- democratic control of the Egypt’s security sector. hood Activity” group. Outlined below are a set of policy recommenda- tions explaining what they entail: On the more strategic front, the presidency has sought advice from both independent experts and 1. Establish a presidential committee for secu- foreign officials. President Morsi met with British rity sector reform. prime minister David Cameron during the United Nations General Assembly’s meetings in Septem- In order to ensure that SSR remains a prime focus ber to discuss how the United Kingdom can help of the Morsi presidency, and to strengthen execu- with the situation in Sinai. The British experience tive control over the process, a committee with the in security sector reform was also discussed. As a specific responsibility and powers to reform and
13 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT restructure the Ministry of Interior should be es- repeatedly blocking such access. tablished, answering directly to the president. The committee should include reformist figures from 3. Ensure oversight training for Members of the Ministries of Interior and Justice, reform-mind- Parliament. ed judges, at least two representatives from the pro- There will be a need to offer specific training for reform police organizations, a representative from MPs and other civil society groups engaged in the the Public Prosecutor’s Office (not associated with process of monitoring the security sector. Such ex- the State Security Prosecution), and a representa- pertise in training is offered by IGOs (such as the tive from the lawyers’ syndicate, as well as civil so- United Nations) as well as several NGOs. ciety activists and independent experts. 4. Cleanse the Ministry of Interior and Public 2. Establish proper oversight and monitoring Prosecutor’s Office. of the security sector. In order to achieve justice and establish a meaning- The establishment of proper oversight and monitor- ful reform process, the Ministry of Interior must be ing of the behavior and practices of police officers cleansed of anti-reform generals and lower-ranking is integral to successful SSR. The Internal Monitor- officers who committed torture, murder, extra-ju- ing Sector (al-Taftish) should be empowered to do dicial killings, and other crimes, especially in the more than just investigating officers in reaction to CSF, the SSI, and its successor the NSA. It will complaints. It should be given a mandate to moni- also be necessary to cleanse the Public Prosecu- tor and regularly appraise the performance of police tor’s Office (most notably State Security Prosecu- officers. This internal accountability mechanism tion) of officials who condoned or participated in has to be transparent and its results known to the inhumane treatment, including doctoring evidence, public, including the number of complaints made faking charges, or accepting “confessions” given against officers each year and the process by which under torture. the Taftish is investigating them. Meanwhile, over- sight by external bodies such as the public prose- The cleansing process should be conducted by in- cutor’s office, the parliament, the National Council vestigation committees appointed by the president. for Human Rights, and civil society groups should These committees should include former police be regulated in a new police law, replacing the cur- commanders with reputations for ethical conduct, rent Police Institution Law No. 109 of 1971. Civil judicial figures, representatives of human rights or- society groups could sign a memorandum of under- ganizations, and victims of torture. The files and standing with the Ministry of Interior, regulating documents of the Internal Monitoring Sector (al- such a monitoring procedure. Taftish) and the SSI should be reviewed by the com- mittees to acquire a complete picture of the profes- Additionally, an independent ombudsman with sional history of the generals and officers under in- direct access to the presidential office should be cre- vestigation. As part of this process, the Ministry of ated to deal specifically with violations in the secu- Interior should initiate a series of promotions to re- rity sector, while a representative prosecutor (wakil place offending generals with younger, mid-ranking niyaba) should be installed in each major police sta- officers. tion to ensure oversight and facilitate investigations. Finally, on an international level, President Morsi 5. Change the promotion criteria within the should facilitate visits by the United Nations Spe- Ministry of Interior. cial Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu- mane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and The promotion criteria inside the Ministry of In- the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Sum- terior should be significantly altered. At present, mary or Arbitrary Executions. Both have been un- they are based primarily on graduation class, age, successfully demanding access to Egypt since 1996 and time spent in the force. A meritocratic system and 2008, respectively, with the Mubarak regime in which promotion is determined by performance,
14 FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT training, and qualifications should be established ments, in addition to those proposed by the presi- and elaborated in the new police law (see below). dential committee. Most importantly, it should in- clude clauses regulating external oversight, em- 6. Conduct a comprehensive review of Police powering internal monitoring, and criminalizing Academy training curricula and systems. torture and degrading treatment (with a clear defini- tion in congruence with international law). A comprehensive review of the curricula and train- ing manuals of the Police Academy and other 10. Pass a freedom of information law. Police Institutes should be conducted. The review should focus on de-militarization of the police, as A freedom of information law should be passed, well as on revising training materials to reflect con- either by the forthcoming parliament or by the pres- cepts of human security (as opposed to state secu- ident during the current interim period in which he rity) and police functions as a service to society. holds legislative powers. Such legislation should The four-year compulsory residence in police fac- facilitate public oversight of government officials ulties (which insulates students from the society to ensure the Ministry of Interior’s budget is spent with which they will be interacting) should be aban- on providing security for citizens rather than endan- doned. As part of a new alternative system, univer- gering them. The law should both regulate “affirma- sity graduates could be admitted for one- or two- tive disclosures” (whereby the ministry automati- year training in police sciences. cally publishes certain classes of information with- out a request) and establish an information request 7. Restructure and downsize the Ministry of process (enabling citizens to request information in Interior. the Ministry of Interior’s possession which is not automatically published). An independent body of Non-security functions and departments should be judges, civil society groups and Ministry of Interior separated from the Ministry of Interior. Activities commanders should advise on the law and regularly for which the ministry is currently responsible, such review the process of information disclosure. as passport administration, civil records, civil de- fence, and pilgrimage organization, should be as- signed to a different ministry. At the same time, the ministry’s interventions – often in the form of requesting security approvals – in the spheres of media, culture, and academia should be brought to an end.
8. Provide the Central Security Forces with training in non-lethal riot control.
The Central Security Forces will need comprehen- sive training in non-lethal riot control tactics. Inter- nationally approved training procedures should be adopted, and the equipment .necessary for effective riot control should be supplied.
9. Draft a new police law.
While legislative powers are temporarily held by the president (until a new parliament is seated), a new version of the Police Law should be drafted to replace the Police Institution Law No. 109 of 1971. The law should include all aforementioned ele-
15 NOTES
1. Omar Ashour can be reached at [email protected]. The author would like to thank several former generals and officers who wish to remain anonymous for their insightful comments and generous sharing of their knowledge on the subject matter. The author is also grateful to Shadi Hamid, Tamara C. Wittes, Yezid Sayigh, and Samuel Plumbly for their feedback and help while writing this paper. 2. The term “thugs” or baltagiyya is commonly used to describe hired attackers, who disrupt political gatherings (demonstrations, sit-ins, electoral campaigns, queues in front of electoral centers, etc.). They are usually a mix of ex- convicts, criminal elements, and plain-clothes policemen. They can be armed with anything from knives and swords to tear-gas bombs and AK-47 automatic rifles. 3. A leftist youth revolutionary movement that co-organized the January 25 protests and marches. 4. Author’s interview with activist, Cairo, November 21, 2011. 5. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD-DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD Publications, 2007), 20,
27. A meal eaten before sunrise to prepare for fasting during Ramadan. 28. Author’s interview with former SSI officer, Cairo, February, 2012. 29. Tharwat Shalaby, “Taqrir lajnat taqassi al-haqa’q: Qannasat al-dakhilia qatalu al-mutadhahiriyn (Report of Fact Finding Committee: The Snipers of the Interior Ministry Murdered Protestors),” Al-Ahaly, April 19, 2011. A summary of the report was published by al-Masry al-Youm, and can be found at
al-Amn al-Harbi) of the Egyptian Military Intelligence, General Abbas Mukhaymar. Among the tasks of this unit is the suppression of any ideologically inspired activism or political discussion within the army, with a specific focus on Islamist activism. 61. Author’s discussion with former member of parliament, Cairo, May 24, 2012. 62. Author’s meeting with Egyptian Armed Forces general, Cairo, November 22, 2011. 63. Amnesty International, “Agents of Repression,” 7. 64. “GCPO” statement, February 1, 2012. 65. Author’s interview with GCPO officer, Cairo, March 15, 2012. 66. In this attack, an armed group killed 16 Egyptian border guards and stole two armored vehicles, before crossing into Israel. One of the vehicles was destroyed by Israeli helicopters, and a fire-fight with Israeli soldiers ensued, in which six were killed. ABOUT THe BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER - STANFORD UNIVERSITY PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS
The Brookings Doha Center - Stanford University “Project on Arab Transitions” – a joint initiative be- tween the BDC and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University (CDDRL) – aims to generate comprehensive analysis of the conditions impacting democratic transition in the Arab world. Because there have been so few democratic transitions in the Arab world, historically, as well as a current lack of cross-regional studies on the topic, there is a real need for better understanding among Western scholars and policymakers and their Arab counterparts about what can and should happen next regarding Arab countries undergoing transition.
This project combines academic rigor, informed field research, and policy relevance to systematically ana- lyze and illuminate the nature of Arab transitions, focusing on issues such as electoral design, constitution- drafting, political party development, and national dialogue processes. By engaging Arab and Western scholars and practitioners from diverse backgrounds, this project provides new voices and original schol- arship from the Arab region and beyond to help inform policy and development assistance to countries of strategic importance. ABOUT THe brookings doha center
Based in Qatar, the Brookings Doha Center is an initiative of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., that advances high-quality, independent policy analysis and research on the Middle East. The Center maintains a reputation for policy impact and cutting-edge, field-oriented research on socioeconomic and geopolitical issues facing the broader Middle East, including relations with the United States.
The Brookings Doha Center International Advisory Council is co-chaired by H.E. Sheikh Hamad bin Jas- sim bin Jabr Al-Thani, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the State of Qatar, and Brookings President Strobe Talbott. The Center was formally inaugurated by H.E. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani on February 17, 2008. It is funded by the State of Qatar. Salman Shaikh serves as its director.
In pursuing its mission, the Brookings Doha Center undertakes research and programming that engages key elements of business, government, civil society, the media, and academia on key public policy issues in the following four core areas:
(i) Democratization, political reform and public policy; (ii) Middle East relations with emerging Asian nations, including on the geopolitics and economies of energy; (iii) Conflict and peace processes in the re- gion; (iv) Educational, institutional, and political reform in the Gulf countries.
Open to a broad range of views, the Brookings Doha Center is a hub for Brookings scholarship in the re- gion.
ABOUT THe PROGRAM ON ARAB REFORM AND DEMOCRACY AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY
The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University examines the different social and political dynamics within Arab countries and the evolution of their political systems, focusing on the prospects, conditions, and possible pathways for political reform in the region.
This multidisciplinary program brings together both scholars and practitioners – from the policy making, civil society, NGO (non-government organization), media, and political communities – as well as other actors of diverse backgrounds from the Arab world, to consider how democratization and more responsive and accountable governance might be achieved, as a general challenge for the region and within specific Arab countries.
The program aims to be a hub for intellectual capital about issues related to good governance and political reform in the Arab world and allowing diverse opinions and voices to be heard. It benefits from the rich input of the academic community at Stanford, from faculty to researchers to graduate students, as well as its partners in the Arab world and Europe. Brookings doha center publications
2012 From Bad Cop to Good Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, Omar Ashour
Between Interference and Assistance: The Politics of International Support in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya Brookings Doha Center Transitions Dialogues
Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It) Policy Briefing, Salman Shaikh
Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism Policy Briefing, Stéphane Lacroix
Brookings Doha Energy Forum 2012 Policy Paper Brookings Doha Center Report
Voting for Change: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of First Elections in Arab Transitions Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, Ellen Lust
Libyan Islamism Unpacked: Rise, Transformation, and Future Policy Briefing, Omar Ashour
The Beginnings of Transition: Politics and Polarization in Egypt and Tunisia Brookings Doha Center Transitions Dialogues
Drafting Egypt’s Constitution: Can A New Legal Framework Revive A Flawed Transition? Brookings Doha Center-Stanford Paper, Tamir Moustafa
Liberalizing Monarchies? How Gulf Monarchies Manage Education Reform Analysis Paper, Leigh Nolan
2011 Young, Educated and Dependent on the Public Sector: Meeting Graduates’ Aspirations and Diversifying Employment in Qatar and the UAE Analysis Paper, Zamila Bunglawala
How Stable is Jordan? King Abdullah’s Half-Hearted Reforms and the Challenge of the Arab Spring Policy Briefing, Shadi Hamid & Courtney Freer
Nurturing a Knowledge Economy in Qatar Policy Briefing, Zamila Bunglawala
Managing Reform: Saudi Arabia and the King’s Dilemma Policy Briefing, Leigh Nolan
Political Violence in North Africa: The Politics of Incomplete Liberalization Analysis Paper, Anouar Boukhars