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Fault Lines: Sinai Peninsula 20 OCT 2017 the Sinai Peninsula Is a Complicated Operational Environment (OE)

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Fault Lines: Sinai Peninsula 20 OCT 2017 the Sinai Peninsula Is a Complicated Operational Environment (OE) Fault Lines: Sinai Peninsula 20 OCT 2017 The Sinai Peninsula is a complicated operational environment (OE). At present, there are a number of interconnected conditions creating instability and fostering a favorable environment for the growth of Islamic extremist groups. Egypt is battling this situation with large-scale security operations, yet militant activity is not diminishing. The Egyptian government, in coordination with the Israeli government, is placing renewed interest on countering insurgent actors in the region and establishing a lasting security. Despite its best effort, Egypt has been largely unsuccessful. A variety of factors have contributed to the continued rise of the insurgents. We submit there are four key fault lines contributing to instability. These fault lines are neither mutually exclusive nor are they isolated to the Sinai. In fact, they are inexorably intertwined, in ways between Egypt, Israel, and the Sinai Peninsula. Issues related to faults create stability complications, legitimacy concerns, and disidentification problems that can be easily exploited by interested actors. It is essential to understand the conditions creating the faults, the escalation that results from them operating at the same time, and the potential effects for continued insecurity and ultimately instability in the region. FAULT LINES Egypt-Israel Relations - Enduring geopolitical tension between Egypt and Israel, and complex coordination needs between are “exploitable dissimilar and traditionally untrusting cultures, has potential for explosive effects on regional stability. sources of Political Instability - Continued political instability, generated from leadership turmoil, mounting security concerns, and insufficient efforts for economic development may lead to an exponentially dire security situation and direct and violent instability in the challenges to the government. human domain; Political Alienation - Years of neglect combined with a decade of Israeli occupation has created an environment where the Sinai people feel politically disenfranchised, indignant, and desperate and this puts the population in a vulnerable position to be they can be real or influenced by external stakeholders. perceived.” Economic Deprivation - A lack of economic opportunities, discrimination against the Bedouins for rightful employment, and the growth of an illicit economy fosters an ideal operational environment for insurgent activity. Source: GCKN Fault Line Methodology, 2017 Proportion Egypt population of households below lower total: 97,041,000 FAULT poverty line (%) North & North Sinai South Sinai: LINES 608,000 16.2% Greater Egypt: 96,433,000 South Sinai Bedouin (if exploited) Population: 300,000 - Assessment of impact SINAI (EGYPT) 1.2% 400,000 Extreme Egypt-Israel Relations MODERATE 1 Improbable with major consequence High Risk Significant HIGH Risk 2 2 Political Instability Very likely with moderate consequence Major 3 4 1 Political Alienation SIGNIFICANT 3 Probable with major consequence Moderate Risk Moderate SIGNIFICANT 4 Economic Deprivation Improbable with extreme consequence CONSEQUENCE Low Risk Minor Highly Improbable Probable Very Pervasiveness, Importance, & Recovery Unlikely PROBABILITY Likely Pervasiveness Egypt-Israel Relations Importance 1 Recovery Implications: Pervasiveness The failure of Egypt to govern and govern well in the Sinai is most readily Political Instability Importance 2 Recovery exploited by groups like the Islamic State. This political miscarriage combined with a lack of economic opportunities is fostering an ideal vacuum for extremism Pervasiveness (Fault Lines 2-4). 3 Political Alienation Importance Recovery Moreover, exploitation may elevate a renewal of historical and cultural tensions Pervasiveness disrupting peace and collaboration between critical stakeholders in the region Economic Deprivation Importance (Fault Line 1). 4 Recovery APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED WEST BANK SINAI PENINSULA GAZA BEDOUIN TRIBES Rafah Tiaha Egypt/Sinai Timeline Since World War II Port Said Yamit Mediterranean Dead Sea Akharsah Dawaghrah Sea Suwarkah 1945 February 1945: Egypt declares war on Germany and Japan to become a Port Said Samanah El Arish founder-member of the post-war United Nations, as decided during the Romani Yalta Conference. Nasaid Nasaid Bili Tarabin 28 APR 1936 - 26 JUL 1952 SUEZ CANAL SUEZ March 28, 1947: British vacate last permanent military installation in Egypt Qantara Abu Aweigla Saadiyin Aqailah November 29, 1947: UN votes for partition of Palestine between Palestinians and Jews ISRAEL following the end of the British Palestine Mandate Ismailia Quseima May 15, 1948: End of the Palestine Mandate / US and USSR recognize state of Israel / Armies Ayaidah Huwaitat of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq cross into Palestine and the irregular Arab Liberation Army Ismailia attacks Jewish sites. North SinaiBir Hasana Azazmah 1950 Bir Gifgafa Israeli War of Independence / 1948 War / al-Nakbah (the disaster). July 23, 1952: Egyptian Revolution: military coup of the Free Officers, led by General King Farouk Muhammed Naguib, seizes power from King Farouk, who flees into exile, abdicating for the Bir Thamada Tiaha JORDAN infant King Fuad. Ahaiwat 18 JUN 1953 - 14 NOV 1954 June 1953: Junta declares the end of the monarchy and Neguib becomes president and prime SUEZ CANAL SUEZ minister. Suez Kuntilla El Shatt February 23, 1954: Neguib resigns after failing to rewrite constitution to be more representa- Huwaitat tive. Deputy Prime Minister and former Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser seizes power. Nakhl 1955 Ain Sudr Ahaiwat October 29-November 5 1956: Suez Crisis, AKA Operation Musketeer (Brit- Suez ain and France), Suez-Sinai Campaign (Israel), or the Tripartite Aggression Thamad (Egypt). Tarabin March 11, 1957: Last Israeli forces leave Sinai. Taba Muhammad LEBANON Naguib SYRIA Golan 1974 Heights Alaiqat 14 NOV 1954 - 28 SEP 1970 1960 Badarah Tarabin West Abu Zenima Bank Ain Furtaga Hamadah Um Bogma Nuweiba Gaza Awarma Strip Gulf of Abu Rudeis ISRAEL Suez South Sinai Qararshah Jabaliyah Feiran Awlad Said 1965 JORDAN SAUDI ARABIA Gamal Abdel St. Catherine Gulf of Nasser Red Sea Abu Durba Jabaliyah Dahab Aqaba Bani Awlad Wasil Said 28 SEP 1970 - 6 OCT 1981 Six Day War Jun 1967 SAUDI ARABIA Tor EGYPT Muzainah September 28 1970: Nasser dies of a heart 1970 attack, Vice President Anwar Sadat becomes Na'ama Bay president of Egypt. Israeli army forcibly removes over 1500 Bedouin Sharm el Sheikh families from lands on Rafiah Plain along Gaza border to create security zone. New Jewish Ras Mohammed Red Sea Anwar farming settlements are built following the 010 20 40 60 80 Sadat removal. Arab labor is imported from Gaza. Kilometers October 6-22 1973: October War / Yom Kippur War Sadat introduces al-Infitah (“the opening”) economic program to roll Tribal data: de Jong, Rudolf E. A Grammar of the Bedouin Dialects Boundary data: GADM, Natural Earth v2.0 6 OCT 1981 - 14 OCT 1981 back parts of Nasser’s socialist system to stimulate the economy and of Central and Southern Sinai. Boston: Brill, Leiden, 2011. Imagery: Derived from 90M SRTM (NASA) 1975 encourage foreign investment. Canceling of social welfare benefits caused civil unrest and foreign investment mainly was made in the tourism industry. September 17, 1978: Camp David Accords signed WEST GAZA BANK SINAI PENINSULA 164 March 26 1979: Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed, stipulating full Israeli withdrawal form Sinai 26 SECURITY & EVENTS Rafah within three years 2 1 Port Said Yamit Sufi Abu Taleb Mediterranean Dead Sea October 6, 1981: Anwar Sadat assassinated by Egyptian military members of al-Jihad for his Sea 82 2 (acting) 1980 failure to uphold shari’ah, Western leanings and dealings with Israel. Vice President Hosni Port Said 1 El Arish Mubarak assumes power, which he holds until 2011. Romani 14 OCT 1981 - 11 FEB 2011 3 23 April 1982: Last Israeli settlements in Sinai SUEZ CANAL SUEZ are destroyed by IDF and last Jewish forces Qantara 1 Abu Aweigla withdraw. Egypt regains control of Sinai 25 April 1982: Multi-National Force Observers ISRAEL force assumes its mission. 67 4 Massive Egyptian tourism development in South LEBANON Ismailia Quseima Sinai begins Egyptian government “Egyptianization” SYRIA 1979 Golan 1 North Sinai 1985 resettlement campaign of Nile Valley Egyptians Heights Ismailia 2 Bir Gifgafa Bir Hasana ZONE D to Sinai begins. 2 The MFO and a West 1 ZONE C limited Israeli Hosni Mubarak Bank ZONE A Bir Thamada Only the MFO and force of four JORDAN infantry Gaza Egyptian police, Strip battalions. One Egyptian ZONE B except in the north ISRAEL 29 CANAL SUEZ mechanized near Rafah where 11 FEB 2011 - 30 JUN 2012 Suez Kuntilla El Shatt infantry Four battalions of Egyptian Border division Egyptian border Guards are allowed 114 units equipped Nakhl 1990 JORDAN Ain Sudr with light Suez weapons Thamad LEBANON 4 SYRIA Golan 1982 Heights Taba SAUDI ARABIA Mohamed Hussein EGYPT West Tantawi 1995 Bank 3 20 JUN 2012 - 3 JUL 2013 Gaza Strip 1 ISRAEL Abu Zenima 6 Ain Furtaga Um Bogma 1 Nuweiba JORDAN Gulf of Abu Rudeis Suez South Sinai Feiran 2000 13 Gulf of St. Catherine Aqaba SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA Abu Durba 2 Dahab Mohamed Morsi EGYPT Red Sea 10 1 4 JUL 2013 - 8 JUN 2014 Tor 1 Conict 1 Series of bombings in South Sinai against tourist locations and Multinational Force Observers events between 2005 personnel in transit by Tawid wa Jihad, an Egyptian Islamist group composed of mainly Na'ama Bay Bedouins and Palestinians from North Sinai. 105 1 Jan and
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