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Political Analysis

Volume 21 Political Analysis Article 4

2020

Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in

Devin Smith Seton Hall University

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Recommended Citation Smith, Devin (2020) "Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 4. Available at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/pa/vol21/iss1/4 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI ·

Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt

Devin Smith

Devin Smith is a and International Relations major at Seton Hall University with a Middle Eastern Studies minor planning to graduate in May . The objective of his thesis was to investigate the factors that prevent the spread of democracy in Egypt. Upon graduation, Devin hopes to find a job in the nonprofit sector. while preparing the way for their chosen successors”1. ith the collapse of the While , Egypt’s longest- and the fall of authoritarian regimes serving self-styled ‘president’, seemed Win Eastern Europe and Central Asia entrenched against any sort of opposition that in the early 1990s, it appeared that global sought to even remotely stymie his wide- democracy was on the rise in what scholars reaching power, the 2011 have called “Democracy’s Third Wave”. proved that even modern Egypt’s longest Countries previously thought extremely serving president was not immune to a mass unlikely to become susceptible to democratic popular uprising. movements, such as Poland in 1989, had In the case of Egypt’s centralized executive finally overthrown the shackles of autocratic arena, unanticipated but relentless popular and transitioned towards protests in ’s as well as democratic rule. However, as more countries other major squares across every major city than ever before began the tumultuous journey overwhelmed the Interior Ministry’s towards democracy, the Arab world largely security apparatus. By physically defeating remained stagnant behind the curtain of the security forces in pitched street battles . over four days, protesters effectively shut Egypt in particular remained strongly down the country. This caused the military behind the fulcrum of even as it to intervene and deploy personnel and seemed that the world was largely leaving armored vehicles into the streets on January autocratic leaders such as Egypt’s Hosni 28. During the tense days after the military Mubarak behind. “During the and deployed and before Mubarak stepped 1990s, as dictatorships in Latin America, down on February 11, the NDP faded from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia collapsed, existence. The party’s paralyzed state was Egypt’s autocracy stood firm. Although complemented by the disappearance of the opposition movements across the developing police and security forces. As the standoff world vaulted into power through dramatic continued, and the world election victories, President Mubarak thwarted watched anxiously whether the military kindred campaigns against his rule. (Mubarak) would open fire on the protesters. The seemed to exercise almost unparalleled military, which has extensive economic domination and to have an extraordinary interests and has served as a regime’s core ability to preserve (his) own incumbency since 1952, reiterated the promise that it

1 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 122.

1 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI ·

would not. Time eventually ran out for Military Intelligence, assumed the presidency Mubarak and his executive elites as the with a dubious 96% of the vote in 2014.4 He Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has remained in power ever since. (SCAF) nudged them out the door.2 Egypt, with the exception of the brief The removal of Hosni Mubarak from power presidency of , has remained served as a powerful, inspirational message to mostly thoroughly autocratic since Gamal the Egyptian people that real change, however Nasser’s ascension to the presidency in 1954. unlikely it may have seemed, was possible. But why is that the case? In this thesis, I will The first round of presidential elections argue that a combination of foreign influence occurred on May 23–24, 2012. from Western and other Arab states, religious Muhammad Morsi, a senior Muslim extremism and sectarianism, and entrenched Brotherhood leader and president of the political interests within Egypt all play a hand Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in undermining democracy in Egypt. It is my (FJP), came in first with 24.8 percent of opinion that lasting, free democracy in Egypt, the vote. Ahmad Shafiq, a former military however unlikely, will always be possible if officer and Mubarak protégé who briefly these hurdles can somehow be overcame. served as prime minister in early 2011, Egypt, with a population of 95 million won 23.7 percent… (Morsi) campaigned people, has the largest population in the as the “candidate of the revolution” who and plays an important role as a would fight against the counter- regional power and key US ally in a revolutionary forces in the military, the constantly volatile region of the world. While judiciary, and the security services. it may seem counterintuitive for the United Morsi’s efforts were successful. He won States, which is often seen as a key 52 percent of the vote to Shafiq’s 48 liberalizing global force, to continuously ally percent. The military accepted Shafiq’s itself with and support an autocratic state such defeat and allowed Morsi to assume office. as Egypt, it is largely within the ’ For the first time in Egypt’s 5,000-year interest to support and reinforce the status history, the country had an elected national quo. “Rather than fostering democracy in an leader. In his inaugural address, Morsi incremental fashion, U.S. and Egyptian promised to be the president of all officials have promoted an autocratic security Egyptians and to build a new Egypt that is state that supports a U.S.-led regional order “civil, national, constitutional, and built around Israeli security and the projection modern.3 of U.S. influence over the Persian Gulf. By Unfortunately, Egypt’s experiment with contrast, public opinion in Egypt favors a democracy did not prove to be a lasting one. regional security order less dominated by the On July 3, 2013 the United States and , and a government removed Morsi from power barely a year after that respects political competition and civil had been sworn in. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a liberties”5. However, as the successive former general in the Supreme Council of the military regimes in Egypt show, it is not Armed Forces of Egypt and former Director of

2 Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats : Regime Power 4 “Egypt election: Sisi secures landslide win,” BBC in Egypt and (Stanford, CA: Stanford University News, 29 May 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Press, 2012), 158. middle-east-27614776. 3 Bruce Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: , 5 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention : The Politics , and Democracy in the Arab World (New York, of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York, NY: NY: Princeton University Press, 2008), XII-XIII. Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.

2 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI ·

Egyptian public opinion that drives the itself with Soviet influence; further, Gamal government to action. Nasser’s Arab socialist and anti-imperialist Further working against the will of the policy paid off as it earned Egypt critical Egyptian people is how strongly the United economic and military support from the Soviet States supports autocratic regimes in Egypt Union. Nasser’s regime remained vehemently when deemed to be beneficial for Washington. opposed to the pro-western , “The problem for Washington was not that further demonstrating the general disdain for pro-U.S. authoritarianism would be followed the United States that Nasser’s regime had by more authoritarianism, but that the felt8. successor government, democratic or not, could turn Egyptian policies away from U.S. DÉTENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES preferences. Hence, U.S. officials worked to Following Gamal Nasser’s death in 1970, check Islamic political activity, either by however, his successor Anwar began cultivating a liberal option between the NDP reorienting Egyptian towards a (Mubarak’s National Democratic Party) and more pro-western approach. Facing a stagnant the or by squarely economy and the continued occupation of the backing Mubarak”6. , Sadat grew tired of the status quo and began making overtures to the west. EARLY AMERICAN- EGYPTIAN RELATIONS “In mid-1973, he seemed to most In order to best understand the relationship Egyptians and Arabs a pathetic leader, between Cairo and Washington, and later worthy of sympathy rather than anger. But Cairo and other Gulf States, it is important to the October (1973 Yom Kippur) War later consider the history of relations between the that year transformed his image to that of two, dating back to Egyptian President Anwar an instant national hero… What mattered Sadat’s split with Moscow. While there were was that Sadat had led the Arabs (with relations between Cairo and Washington Assad of Syria) into a fighting battle with dating back to the 1952 coup d’état, Cairo had an opportunity to defy the enemy and severed relations with Washington completely vindicate Arab dignity. The October War following the devastation that Egypt faced in for Sadat could have been what the 1956 1967’s Six Day War against Israel7. Israel, the Suez War was for Nasser, baptizing him as United States’ key Middle Eastern partner, a pan-Arab leader. However, in the preemptively struck Egyptian airfields, following months it gradually emerged effectively crippling the Egyptian air force that the man fought not so much in and paving the way for the relatively easy defiance of the West or against what is Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and perceived to be the West’s local surrogate , as well as the West Bank from (Israel), but rather to be accepted in the and the from Syria. West. He was even suspected of being Following the severance of U.S.-Egyptian eager to serve, along with Israel and the relations, Egypt was a firmly under the of , as another American influence of the Soviet Union. Faced with the surrogate in the area”9. embarrassment of Israel’s occupation of the While it may be disingenuous to refer to Sinai Peninsula, Egypt had closely aligned Sadat as an American surrogate, his relations

6 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 10. Leadership and Development in Arab Society, ed. Faud 7 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 15. Khuri (Beirut, : American University of Beirut, 8 Saadeddin Ibrahim, “A Socio-cultural Paradigm of 1981), 49. Pan Arab Leadership: the Case of Nasser,” in 9 Ibrahim, “The Case of Nasser,” 56.

3 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · with the United States was certainly SADAT’S INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN unprecedented in Egyptian history. The 1973 TENDENCIES , while ultimately an Israeli While Sadat’s regime was becoming victory, saw Egyptian troops on the offensive increasingly cozy with Washington, Sadat for the first time since before Egypt’s began the dual tasks of tightening his grip on humiliating defeat in the 1967 Six Day War in Egyptian society and securing increasing an initially successful surprise attack against amounts of American weapons and military Israeli forces. Following the war, a newly equipment. Somewhat ironically, Cairo’s reinvigorated Sadat had reestablished relations increasing detente with Washington occurred with Washington, eventually shirking Moscow simultaneously with Sadat rolling back altogether. “While sought freedoms for the Egyptian people. territory and foreign investment, the White Washington, solely interested in a strong House wanted a strategic advantage over the military partner in the region to counter Soviet Soviet Union. The mutual benefits of a U.S.- influence and eliminating a military threat to Egyptian alliance only became clear to both Israel, generally reacted to Sadat’s growing sides, though, after Sadat took Egypt to strongman tendencies with apathy. war”10. In an attempt to balance Egypt’s budget Sadat’s shift from a Soviet client state to a deficit, Sadat cut government subsidies on vital American partner in the region was cooking gas, rice, and sugar in 1976, relatively quick, happening within the span of increasing the average Egyptian’s cost of only several years. Though a friendship treaty living by 15%. These subsidy cuts resulted in had been signed between Cairo and Moscow the greatest social unrest seen in Egypt in in 1971, Soviet military advisors were decades, with 30,000 protestors facing off expelled from Egypt the following year, and with police in Cairo. the friendship treaty itself was abrogated in “An estimated eighty people were killed, 1976, only two years after relations with hundreds were wounded, and 1,200 to Washington were reestablished. “In March 2,000 were arrested. The price revolt 1976, in a fresh bid for U.S. military traumatized Sadat, some say permanently. assistance, Sadat told Parliament to cancel He ‘was 100 percent changed by the Egypt’s friendship treaty with the USSR. In experience’ and ‘became aggressive,’ April, he denied Soviet ships access to recalled then minister of defense Abd al- Egyptian ports (although the Soviet Union Ghani Gamassy, who had led the military’s remained, for the time being, Egypt’s largest intervention. Sadat, who fancied himself to trading partner). After Sadat snubbed Egypt’s be liberalizing Egypt, warned that former patrons in Moscow, Washington began democracy had ‘fangs one hundred times selling C-130 military transport aircraft to sharper than the extraordinary measures’ of Egypt. Six C-130s were delivered in 1976, but dictatorship. During a two-hour television only after Kissinger promised Congress that broadcast on February 3, he pinned the riots the sales would not constitute a precedent and on Soviet agents and communist remnants that there would be no further Egyptian from Nasser’s administration. Egypt’s requests for materiel that calendar year. For enemies had exploited the November 1976 the next fiscal year, bilateral economic aid and elections to sow doubt and propaganda. In food subsidies to Egypt would top $1 order to preserve national unity and prevent billion”11. another “uprising of thieves,” Sadat would his earlier reforms, criminalize

10 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 15. 11 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 24.

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strikes and demonstrations (on penalty of “On March 17 and 19 (1978), (American life imprisonment with hard labor), and Secretary of State) Brown concluded the confine electoral competition to details of U.S. military assistance, the government-sanctioned parties. ‘We hereby linchpin of peace… Egypt would get end one period,’ Sadat proclaimed, ‘and we $1.5billion “in loans to finance begin a new one.’ A February 10 plebiscite procurement through fiscal year 1982 of approved the measures with a suspicious defense articles and defense services,” as 99.4 percent12”. well as $300,000 in economic assistance. The arrangement created an informal norm PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND WARMER that aid to Israel and Egypt would follow a RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON 3:2 ratio. On in Washington, Further compounding the situation of the Sadat and (Israeli Prime Minister) Begin Egyptian public’s rights were Sadat’s attempts signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, at a lasting, permanent peace with Israel. This along with texts covering West Bank put Sadat in a tough position as Israel was autonomy talks, normalization of deeply unpopular with not only the Egyptian Egyptian-Israeli relations, and Egyptian oil public, but also the Arab world writ large. sales to Israel. The treaty also capped Jordanian and Syrian territory was still under Sadat’s long quest for U.S. weaponry. Israeli occupation as well as the Sinai That summer, the United States sold Egypt Peninsula, inviting even more malice directed “several hundred air-to-air and air-to- at Israel from nearby Arab states. Despite the surface missiles,” 550 armored personnel fierce opposition to peace with Israel, Sadat carriers, “twelve batteries of Improved pressed on. Egyptian newspapers critical of Hawk air-defense missiles,” and 35F-4E Israel were shuttered, opposition parties Phantom fighter-bombers14”. suspended operations, and dissident members In the same year that the Egypt-Israel Peace of parliament were expelled in a plebiscite Treaty was signed, Iran, at the time one of the with 98.29% of voters approving13. While United States’ primary partners in the region, ’s human rights-focused underwent their 1979 Islamic Revolution, administration “regretted” Sadat’s de- ousting the Shah and severing diplomatic ties liberalizing policies, Carter nonetheless with the United States. With one of the pushed forward in promoting Israeli-Egyptian primary pillars of American foreign policy on peace talks. Sadat was at a particular the Middle East destroyed, the United States disadvantage, with the only concession Israel became increasingly reliant on Egypt as one of agreeing to being a full Israeli withdrawal its primary partners; Egypt was more than from the Sinai Peninsula. The West Bank and willing to fulfill this role in exchange for Golan heights would remain under Israeli military and economic aid. While Egypt occupation, Israeli settlement activity would became increasingly integrated into American resume, and Israel would not agree to any foreign policy in the region, Sadat continued form of Palestinian self-rule. However, with to become more despotic. While the economy Sadat’s primary goal being an Israeli was in shambles with inflation hovering withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and his around an astounding 30 percent, Sadat secondary goal being to secure American changed the Egyptian constitution through military aid, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty rigged plebiscite to establish Islamic law as was still signed in the in 1979. the primary source of legislation, remove the

12 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 25. 14 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 37. 13 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 30.

5 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · presidential term limits that would have removed him from power, and criminalize ANTIDEMOCRATIC COUP IN ALGERIA transgressive speech15. “Although Carter In 1991 Algeria, another despotic state in prided himself on being a human rights North Africa, underwent multiparty advocate, he refrained from criticizing Sadat democratic elections for the first time after about his plebiscites, censorship, and police decades of military rule; candidates from a repression. In fact, he depended on Sadat’s conservative , the Fronte autocratic prerogatives to conclude the Islamique du Salat won more than 80% of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty16”. open seats in Algeria’s parliament. In a move that sent a chilling message to Egyptian SADAT’S AND MUBARAK’S democracy advocates the Algerian military RISE TO POWER froze elections, effectively ensuring that they While Israel slowly withdrew from the held onto power. The United States, doubtless Sinai Peninsula over the three-year period concerned about the geopolitical implications stipulated in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, of an Islamist party taking power, stood by the Sadat increasingly turned Egypt into a Algerian military’s antidemocratic coup. As surveillance state. Concerned about critics of then US Secretary of State Jim Baker put it, the treaty sabotaging peace efforts, Sadat “Generally speaking, when you support significantly increased audio and video democracy, you take what democracy gives surveillance while also tripling the amount of you... If it gives you a radical Islamic riot police to 300,000. “In , fundamentalist, you’re supposed to live with the Ministry of the Interior arrested or it. We didn’t live with it in Algeria because detained more than 1,500 party activists and we felt that the radical fundamentalists’ views leading cultural figures, including the Coptic were so adverse to what we believe in and pope and the General Guide of the Muslim what we support, and to what we under-stood Brotherhood. The dragnet swept up interests of the United States to secularists, leftists, liberals, and Islamists. One be”18. victim was a young man in southern Egypt To observers in Algeria and Egypt alike, named Mohamed Islambouli. On , the United States’ continued support for the Mohamed’s brother Khaled and three fellow Algerian military over the democratically Islamic militants assassinated Sadat during a elected FIS sent the unfortunate message that military parade commemorating the war in the United States would continue to support 1973. Vice President Hosni Mubarak survived entrenched autocrats in order to secure their the shooting and assumed the presidency”17. own interests, leaving fledgling democratic With the assassination of Anwar Sadat, movements to falter if their interests don’t Hosni Mubarak went on to become the coincide with those of the United States. longest-serving and perhaps most autocratic president in Egypt’s history. In office from EGYPT AND THE Sadat’s assassination in 1981 leading up to the However, Mubarak never allowed 2011 Arab Spring protests that removed him elections as free as those in Algeria that nearly from power, Mubarak ruled for nearly thirty brought the FIS to power during his reign. years by continuing and expanding Sadat’s Egypt’s 1990 elections were boycotted by oppressive policies and by further cozying up opposition parties due to blatantly unfair to the United States. election rules and a lack of independent

15 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention,.40. 17 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 41. 16 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 42. 18 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 59.

6 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · supervision, leading to an extension of terrorism and narrow-minded intolerance. And Mubarak’s grip on power. Further providing we will not turn back, nor will our belief in the Mubarak’s regime with a casus belli against rule of law be shaken. We will work towards opposition to the regime, a group of Egyptian consolidating our democracy gradually, radicals with military experience from fighting steadily, and in the spirit of tolerance and against the Soviets in Afghanistan called the cooperation that is known about the Egyptian Islamic Group attempted to assassinate people”. That year, Mubarak was elected to a Interior Minister Zaki Badr. This assassination fourth term, and had ruled longer than Nasser attempt, followed by another that mistakenly had21. Mubarak had also exceeded Sadat in the killed Speaker of the Parliament Rifaat number of arrests (25,000 to 19,000), Mahjub instead, brought Islamist movements casualties from political violence (2,386 to firmly into the crosshairs of the Egyptian 250), and accounted for 41% of all Egyptians security apparatus, triggering increasingly killed or wounded in political violence since bloody crackdowns. Badr defended this the 1952 Coup d’état. He was reelected newfound brutality by claiming “I only want president in 1999 by 93.79 percent of the to kill one percent of the population”19. vote22. Further accentuating the dire situation of Islamists in Egypt was the 1993 World Trade FREEDOM AGENDA AND MULTICANDIDATE Center bombing in New York City, carried out ELECTIONS by a Kuwaiti national mentored by Omar With the election of George W. Bush to Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian-born cleric President of the United States in 2000, his living in New York. Abdel Rahman was trademark Freedom Agenda resulted in a sentenced to life in prison for his role in the continued status quo for democracy and bombing, leaving American officials with the opposition activists in Egypt. “Even as Bush impression that supporting Mubarak’s fight called on Mubarak to lead the Middle East with Egyptian Islamists could end up leaving toward democracy, the United States America safer. Following the bombing, the depended on the Egyptian president to Clinton administration gave Mubarak’s interrogate al-Qaeda suspects, ease U.S. craft security apparatus a key role in the United through Egyptian waters and airspace, and States’ War on Terror against Islamic keep tabs on Gaza after Israel withdrew. extremists20. An uptick in terror attacks Political reform was pushed only so far as it carried out by Islamists, such as the United helped ensure the post-Mubarak regime would States Embassy bombings in Kenya and be pro-American. Hence, the Freedom Agenda Tanzania in 1998, led to increasingly was not a turning point for U.S. foreign draconian measures carried out by both the policy, but a variant of the existing United States and Egypt. approach”23. In 1999, Mubarak addressed Egypt’s Bush even went as far as to say in 2002 trajectory while receiving an honorary degree that “There are some in the world who don’t from Georgetown University: “The road to like President Mubarak because of what he democracy is a long one, and we travel it with stands for, a more open society. He’s been a confidence. We have not turned back under great leader of Egypt, and there are extremists the most difficult conditions, economic who don’t like him. And to the extent that we hardships, social pressures, malicious can help round up those extremists that would

19 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 59-60. 22 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 61. 20 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 60. 23 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 70. 21 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 67-68.

7 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · do harm to the President or his government or resources that may leave American aid the people of Egypt, we will do so”24. culpable for Mubarak’s strong-arm tactics, the The military alliance between Cairo and aid and training could have been cut or Washington proved to be useful to both withdrawn. It never was. nations during the 2003 , where Up until 2005, Egyptian elections saw the Egypt was more than happy to provide free Egyptian public voting either yes or no on a access to the for American single candidate nominated by the Egyptian military personnel en route to the Persian parliament, with the candidate always being Gulf. Following ’s overthrow either Mubarak or his predecessors. Worried and the discovery that Iraq was not in fact that parliament could be swayed to nominate harboring weapons of mass destruction, Bush either his increasingly popular son or another framed the invasion as part of his Freedom charismatic leader, Mubarak asked parliament Agenda; a free, democratic Iraq would make to amend the constitution to allow the Middle East more free. But while the Bush multicandidate presidential elections. Though Administration was promoting democracy in lauded by American officials such as Iraq, it was doing the opposite in Egypt. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Mubarak was now in his seventies, and election process itself remained as corrupt as without a vice president or a clear successor. ever. Opposition leaders were forbidden from With the American-led Iraq War, and by campaigning, election observation teams were extension American foreign policy in the prevented from monitoring election sites, Middle East shown to be extremely unpopular members of Mubarak’s NDP Party blatantly with the Egyptian public in opinion polls, a intervened, and government-backed thugs and shift towards democracy or Mubarak’s death security forces blocked opposition supporters or overthrow could very easily lead to a new from voting. , leader of the Egyptian government overtly hostile to opposition el-Ghad Party and the leading American interests. Indeed, 98 percent of opposition candidate, was arrested on Egyptians polled held an unfavorable view of fabricated charges. Mubarak won by a margin the United States. Despite the optics and of 88.6% of the vote, only 5% less than the rhetoric, Bush’s Freedom Agenda would in no last plebiscite. A US embassy cable cautioned way challenge the status quo in Egypt, and the that while the elections “undermined two countries would continue to work together Mubarak’s credibility as a leader of militarily25. democratic reforms and… strained our ties Following the Iraq War, Egyptian police, with Egypt… The bedrock of our strategic diplomats, and soldiers continued to receive interests with Egypt remains as important as training from the United States in the name of ever”27. counterterrorism, with millions of dollars from the US State Department’s Antiterrorism ENTRENCHED, GRIDLOCKED POWER Assistance Program being sent to Egyptian Egypt’s failure to democratize along with security forces. These same ‘counterterror’ its continual trudge on an authoritarian path trainees were found in the State Department’s despite growing democratic movements in 2004 human rights report to be responsible for other countries once seemingly inhospitable to “torture, extralegal detention, mass arrest, and democracy such as Poland, Mali, , and unlawful killing”26. Had the United States Argentina is due to issues largely local to been truly bothered by this flagrant abuse of Egypt rather than any overarching cultural or

24 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 73. 26 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 86. 25 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 85-86. 27 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 92-96.

8 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · demographic reasons. Mubarak’s National have not always remained quiet on their desire Democratic Party, and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s for Egypt and other Arab states to military junta following his election in 2014, democratize, especially under Bush’s Freedom completely refuse to allow any sort of Agenda, Egyptian responses have remained opposition movement to freely and fully cosmetic without making the country any participate in politics28, leaving whichever more free31. Mubarak’s decision to implement strongman is in power with complete authority multicandidate elections in 2005, for instance, to run the country as he wishes. Egypt’s was greeted with commendation by American formidable security forces, backed by officials but ultimately failed to bring about American training, weapons, and funding, any lasting change to Egyptian politics. Even have been effectively used to protect the after opposition leader Ayman Nour was interests of Mubarak, and eventually el-Sisi, to arrested and tortured following these destroy organized opposition and ensure the supposedly multicandidate elections, regime’s power remains unchecked. Washington’s only response was to release a Mubarak, el-Sisi, and their forebearers press statement calling for Nour’s release prevented opposition advocates, be it liberal, based on ‘humanitarian concern’32. A visit by Islamic, or anything else, from converting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Egypt their popular bases among the Egyptian the following year saw no mention of Nour, people into political gains. Mubarak’s now- who remained a prisoner until 2009 and shuttered National Democratic Party eventually had to flee the country. effectively provided the only source of Egypt’s development of a neopatriarchal political advancement available to any society, defined by Hisham Sharabi as a Egyptian for decades, allowing the party to process where a state blends patrimonial survive any sort of dissent from either the culture into its institutions33, further limits Egyptian public or the very few dissident Egypt’s ability to democratize. Dependency party members29. The National Democratic on the state for economic wellbeing, Party, or the Egyptian military following el- underdevelopment of social and economic Sisi’s rise to power in 2014, also provided a factors, the ruling regime’s authoritarian mechanism for mediation between Egypt’s relationship with the Egyptian public, the political elites, preventing defections from the fragmentation of organized opposition and party and eliminating any outside political successive defeats of both organized movements as opportunities for elites to opposition and movements leave the oppose the government.30 Egyptian people apathetic, depoliticized, and Egypt’s continued alliance with the demoralized34. In effect, the regime has made United States despite the massive itself inevitable. humanitarian shortcomings of authoritarian regimes since Anwar Sadat demonstrates a INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER ARAB STATES failure on America’s part to effectively Egypt is far from the only autocracy in the promote democracy. While American officials region, with other conservative monarchies,

28 Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, 32 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement on 151. Conviction of Egyptian Politician Ayman Nour,” The 29 Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, White House, December 2005, https://georgewbush- 156. whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/200512 24-1.html. 30 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 29. 33 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 31-32. 31 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 29-30. 34 Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 33.

9 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · military dictatorships, and other forms of circumstances, rather than that of religious and totalitarian governments all tangled in a cultural traditions. In the words of a young political web, especially following the events Algerian that supported the soon-to-be of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts. overthrown FIS, “In this country, if you are a Demonstrating just how interconnected the young man… you only have four choices: you Arab world is, the UAE was accused by can remain unemployed and celibate because Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood elements of there are no jobs and no apartments to live in; granting refuge to criminals from Mubarak’s you can work in the black market and risk regime, including former prime minister being arrested; you can try to emigrate to Ahmad Shafiq after losing the 2012 France to sweep the streets of Paris or presidential election. Shafiq faced charges of Marseilles; or you can join the FIS and vote corruption for his role in Mubarak’s regime35. for Islam”38. Faced with a dauntingly stubborn “With mass protests in Bahrain in spring status quo that leaves the majority of 2011, and smaller protest movements in Saudi Egyptians in relative poverty while the elites Arabia, , and , the GCC (Gulf continue to thrive, Egyptians turn to Islamic Cooperation Council) states decided on a movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. common strategy toward the Arab Spring ‘Rais’, the translation of abroad and the protests at home: protests in ‘president’, more directly translates to a other Arab states could be supported if this person in a leadership position as the head of a served geopolitical interests, but there was group, leaving the term ‘president-for-life’ not zero tolerance for protests or demands for as alien to an Egyptian or a Tunisian as it may reform at home, where security and stability be for an American39. Rachid al-Ghannouchi, remained priority number one”36. The various a Tunisian politician, argued that since North Gulf States drew from different types of African elite “speak a different political support; opposed the Muslim language from the masses, there will Brotherhood, which is banned in Saudi inevitably be an authoritarian dictator. In other Arabia, in favor of Wahabi elements more in words, the processes of Westernization as line with the Saudi’s interests; the UAE experienced in North Africa in the past remained opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood century lead not to democracy but to and welcomed important officials from authoritarianism. What is needed in order to Mubarak’s regime after its downfall; sensing transcend that situation is a program that can an opportunity to increase its influence at the bridge the gap between the elite and the expense of other Gulf states, largely masses- and this can be provided by Islam”40. backed the Muslim Brotherhood37 As demonstrated by the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2012 Egyptian REIGION AND AUTOCRACY elections, Islamic populist opposition to The reason for sustained popular support authoritarian regimes in the Arab world are for Islamic movements in Egypt is primarily demonstrated to be willing to work within derived from political and economic flawed, existing political structures in order to

35 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf : Bahrain, Saudi John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford, Press, 1997), 93. CA: Stanford Briefs, 2013), 116. 39 John Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents: The 36 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 118. Islamic Community and the State in North Africa,” in 37 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 119. Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed. 38 Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis” in Press, 1997), 12. Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed. 40 Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 14.

10 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · promote democratic processes41. Despite external, to making governance less arbitrary western support for ‘risk-free democracies’ and authoritarian”45. where, according to John L. Esposito, “opposition parties and groups are tolerated as CONCLUSION long as they remain relatively weak or under The threads leading to the prevention of government control and do not threaten the democracy in Egypt are incredibly complex ruling group”42, Mohamed Morsi and deeply entangled with one another. demonstrated that truly free elections can Foreign support for oppressive Egyptian bring Islamic leaders opposed to Western regimes, frequently originating from the influences into power. United States or other Arab states, prop up While political parties with doctrine based “stable” dictatorships while leaving in Islamic ideology have problems of their democratic activists to their own devices. own that are best addressed in a different Ironically, Egypt’s key position as an paper, they often provide the best, if not the American ally in the War on Terror in the only legitimate opposition to Middle Eastern regime has been used by Egyptian officials as , with the Muslim Brotherhood in an opportunity to promote increasingly Egypt serving as no exception. Michael draconian and authoritarian measures, with Hudson, a political scientist focused with the government officials free to act without Middle East, wrote that democracy is not an interference from either their American or “ideal condition but… a process through Gulf allies or the Egyptian public. which the exercise of political power by However, as suggested by the Arab regime and state becomes less arbitrary, Spring revolt in 2011 and other instances of exclusive, and authoritarian”43. Despite the autocracies collapsing in similar countries in staggeringly broad array of values and politics the region, democracy remains a possibility that various Islamic factions prescribe to, for the nation. Mubarak’s thirty one-year reign Islamic parties in Egypt represent a chance at was ended by mass protests in the streets, as achieving Hudson’s view of democracy. was Morsi’s presidency. The Egyptian people, While Morsi’s brief presidency was certainly oppressed for decades, demonstrated once that flawed and not without its own autocratic they were tired of inefficient, autocratic rule. tinges, it was not was not anymore It remains to be seen if the same level of antidemocratic than other regimes in transition protests can be seen under the increasingly from autocratic rule44. “Ideas of just rule, despotic rule of General el-Sisi. religious or otherwise, are not fixed, even if some radicals claim that they are. Such REFERENCES notions are debated, argued, often fought about, and re-formed in practice. The issue is Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age not whether such debates are occurring but of Democratization. Cambridge, UK: how to recognize their contours, as well as the Cambridge University Press, 2007. obstacles and the false starts, both internal and

41 Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 8. 44 Shadi Hamid, Meredith Wheeler, “Was Mohamed 42 Voll, “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents,” 9. Morsi Really an Autocrat?” The Atlantic, 31 March, 43 Dale Eickleman, “Muslim Politics: The Prospects for 2014, Democracy in North Africa and the Middle East,” in https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/ Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, ed. 03/was-mohamed-morsi-really-an-autocrat/359797/. John Entelis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 45 Eickleman, “Muslim Politics: The Prospects for Press, 1997), 19. Democracy in North Africa and the Middle East,” 38.

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Stacher, Joshua. Adaptable Autocrats : Political Economy Analysis.” In Islam, Regime Power in Egypt and Syria. Democracy, and the State in North Stanford, CA: Stanford University Africa, edited by John Entelis, 93-126. Press, 2012. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997. Rutherford, Bruce. Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in Voll, John. “Sultans, Saints, and Presidents: the Arab World. New York, NY: The Islamic Community and the State Princeton University Press, 2008. in North Africa.” In Islam, Democracy, and the State in North “Egypt election: Sisi secures landslide win.” Africa, edited by John Entelis, 1-16. BBC News. 29 May 2014, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Press, 1997. middle-east-27614776. Eickleman, Dale. “Muslim Politics: The Brownlee, Jason. Democracy Prevention: The Prospects for Democracy in North Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance. Africa and the Middle East.” In Islam, New York, NY: Cambridge University Democracy, and the State in North Press, 2012. Africa, edited by John Entelis, 17-42. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Ibrahim, Saadeddin. “A Socio-cultural Press, 1997. Paradigm of Pan Arab Leadership: the Case of Nasser.” In Leadership and Shadi Hamid, Meredith Wheeler, “Was Development in Arab Society, edited Mohamed Morsi Really an Autocrat?” by Faud Khuri, 30-61. Beirut, The Atlantic, 31 March, 2014, Lebanon: American University of https://www.theatlantic.com/internationa Beirut, 1981. l/archive/2014/03/was-mohamed-morsi- really-an-autocrat/359797/. Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement on

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12 POLITICAL ANALYSIS – VOLUME XX - 2020

POLITICAL ANALYSIS – VOLUME XX - 2020