Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt

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Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt Political Analysis Volume 21 Political Analysis Article 4 2020 Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt Devin Smith Seton Hall University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/pa Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Smith, Devin (2020) "Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 4. Available at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/pa/vol21/iss1/4 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · #$#$ Understanding How Foreign Influence and Strongman Policies Prevent Democracy in Egypt Devin Smith Devin Smith is a Diplomacy and International Relations major at Seton Hall University with a Middle Eastern Studies minor planning to graduate in May >?>@. The objective of his thesis was to investigate the factors that prevent the spread of democracy in Egypt. Upon graduation, Devin hopes to find a job in the nonprofit sector. while preparing the way for their chosen successors”1. ith the collapse of the Soviet Union While Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s longest- and the fall of authoritarian regimes serving self-styled ‘president’, seemed Win Eastern Europe and Central Asia entrenched against any sort of opposition that in the early 1990s, it appeared that global sought to even remotely stymie his wide- democracy was on the rise in what scholars reaching power, the 2011 Arab Spring protests have called “Democracy’s Third Wave”. proved that even modern Egypt’s longest Countries previously thought extremely serving president was not immune to a mass unlikely to become susceptible to democratic popular uprising. movements, such as Poland in 1989, had In the case of Egypt’s centralized executive finally overthrown the shackles of autocratic arena, unanticipated but relentless popular communism and transitioned towards protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square as well as democratic rule. However, as more countries other major squares across every major city than ever before began the tumultuous journey overwhelmed the Interior Ministry’s towards democracy, the Arab world largely security apparatus. By physically defeating remained stagnant behind the curtain of the security forces in pitched street battles authoritarianism. over four days, protesters effectively shut Egypt in particular remained strongly down the country. This caused the military behind the fulcrum of autocracy even as it to intervene and deploy personnel and seemed that the world was largely leaving armored vehicles into the streets on January autocratic leaders such as Egypt’s Hosni 28. During the tense days after the military Mubarak behind. “During the 1980s and deployed and before Mubarak stepped 1990s, as dictatorships in Latin America, down on February 11, the NDP faded from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia collapsed, existence. The party’s paralyzed state was Egypt’s autocracy stood firm. Although complemented by the disappearance of the opposition movements across the developing police and security forces. As the standoff world vaulted into power through dramatic continued, Egyptians and the world election victories, President Mubarak thwarted watched anxiously whether the military kindred campaigns against his rule. (Mubarak) would open fire on the protesters. The seemed to exercise almost unparalleled military, which has extensive economic domination and to have an extraordinary interests and has served as a regime’s core ability to preserve (his) own incumbency since 1952, reiterated the promise that it 1 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 122. 1 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · #$#$ would not. Time eventually ran out for Military Intelligence, assumed the presidency Mubarak and his executive elites as the with a dubious 96% of the vote in 2014.4 He Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has remained in power ever since. (SCAF) nudged them out the door.2 Egypt, with the exception of the brief The removal of Hosni Mubarak from power presidency of Mohamed Morsi, has remained served as a powerful, inspirational message to mostly thoroughly autocratic since Gamal the Egyptian people that real change, however Nasser’s ascension to the presidency in 1954. unlikely it may have seemed, was possible. But why is that the case? In this thesis, I will The first round of presidential elections argue that a combination of foreign influence occurred on May 23–24, 2012. from Western and other Arab states, religious Muhammad Morsi, a senior Muslim extremism and sectarianism, and entrenched Brotherhood leader and president of the political interests within Egypt all play a hand Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in undermining democracy in Egypt. It is my (FJP), came in first with 24.8 percent of opinion that lasting, free democracy in Egypt, the vote. Ahmad Shafiq, a former military however unlikely, will always be possible if officer and Mubarak protégé who briefly these hurdles can somehow be overcame. served as prime minister in early 2011, Egypt, with a population of 95 million won 23.7 percent… (Morsi) campaigned people, has the largest population in the as the “candidate of the revolution” who Middle East and plays an important role as a would fight against the counter- regional power and key US ally in a revolutionary forces in the military, the constantly volatile region of the world. While judiciary, and the security services. it may seem counterintuitive for the United Morsi’s efforts were successful. He won States, which is often seen as a key 52 percent of the vote to Shafiq’s 48 liberalizing global force, to continuously ally percent. The military accepted Shafiq’s itself with and support an autocratic state such defeat and allowed Morsi to assume office. as Egypt, it is largely within the United States’ For the first time in Egypt’s 5,000-year interest to support and reinforce the status history, the country had an elected national quo. “Rather than fostering democracy in an leader. In his inaugural address, Morsi incremental fashion, U.S. and Egyptian promised to be the president of all officials have promoted an autocratic security Egyptians and to build a new Egypt that is state that supports a U.S.-led regional order “civil, national, constitutional, and built around Israeli security and the projection modern.3 of U.S. influence over the Persian Gulf. By Unfortunately, Egypt’s experiment with contrast, public opinion in Egypt favors a democracy did not prove to be a lasting one. regional security order less dominated by the On July 3, 2013 the Egyptian Armed Forces United States and Israel, and a government removed Morsi from power barely a year after that respects political competition and civil had been sworn in. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a liberties”5. However, as the successive former general in the Supreme Council of the military regimes in Egypt show, it is not Armed Forces of Egypt and former Director of 2 Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats : Regime Power 4 “Egypt election: Sisi secures landslide win,” BBC in Egypt and Syria (Stanford, CA: Stanford University News, 29 May 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- Press, 2012), 158. middle-east-27614776. 3 Bruce Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, 5 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention : The Politics Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (New York, of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York, NY: NY: Princeton University Press, 2008), XII-XIII. Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3. 2 POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XXI · #$#$ Egyptian public opinion that drives the itself with Soviet influence; further, Gamal government to action. Nasser’s Arab socialist and anti-imperialist Further working against the will of the policy paid off as it earned Egypt critical Egyptian people is how strongly the United economic and military support from the Soviet States supports autocratic regimes in Egypt Union. Nasser’s regime remained vehemently when deemed to be beneficial for Washington. opposed to the pro-western Baghdad Pact, “The problem for Washington was not that further demonstrating the general disdain for pro-U.S. authoritarianism would be followed the United States that Nasser’s regime had by more authoritarianism, but that the felt8. successor government, democratic or not, could turn Egyptian policies away from U.S. DÉTENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES preferences. Hence, U.S. officials worked to Following Gamal Nasser’s death in 1970, check Islamic political activity, either by however, his successor Anwar Sadat began cultivating a liberal option between the NDP reorienting Egyptian foreign policy towards a (Mubarak’s National Democratic Party) and more pro-western approach. Facing a stagnant the Muslim Brotherhood or by squarely economy and the continued occupation of the backing Mubarak”6. Sinai Peninsula, Sadat grew tired of the status quo and began making overtures to the west. EARLY AMERICAN- EGYPTIAN RELATIONS “In mid-1973, he seemed to most In order to best understand the relationship Egyptians and Arabs a pathetic leader, between Cairo and Washington, and later worthy of sympathy rather than anger. But Cairo and other Gulf States, it is important to the October (1973 Yom Kippur) War later consider the history of relations between the that year transformed his image to that of two, dating back to Egyptian President Anwar an instant national hero… What mattered Sadat’s split with Moscow. While there were was that Sadat had led the Arabs (with relations between Cairo and Washington Assad
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