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Intelligence Report FEE5 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report ESAU L: THE FEDAYEEN (Annex to ESAU XLVIII: Fedayeen-- “Men of Sacrifice’y 1 NO 5 FEE5 . WARNING It is to be seen only by perso indoctrinated and authorized to receive// information within the Government to which#hsmitted; its security mwbe maintained in ac- cordance with1 1 \ I I egardless of the advantage d by the Director of Cen .. I A NOTE ON SOURCES This paper relies primarily on clandestine reporting, particularly for the internal structure and operations of the various fedayeen organizations. I The repostlng 1s quite guoa on poiiticdi as-wf the subject such as the maneuverings of the fedayeen groups, their internal disputes, and their ideological and tactical views. However, our information is more scanty on such important matters as the number of i armed men in each group, the sources and mechanics of funding, and details of the sources and methods of delivery of arms shipments to the fedayeen. I H TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FATAH AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) Fatah -- Background to February 1969, (I 1: 1 PLO -- Background to February 1969 c. 8 Fatah Takeover of PLO -- February 1969, ~ LI ,11 Fatah Attempts to Control the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) ~ , 15 Fatah Retains Its Identity, .20 Fatah Tactics and Operations, .24 Fatah Funding s 0 0 3 0 0 ' (I c 0 0 G 0 D 0 0 .26 THE A3IAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (ANMI AND ITS FEDAYEEN WINGS ANMo 0 f 0 0 c 0 0 0 c. 0 0 0 0 J li 0 9.0 c c .30 Background on the ANM's Fedayeen Wings, .32 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP 1 0 C U C 3 0 0 0 G u 0 u (I c c 35 Organization c 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 c c 0 3 c 38 Funding, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 c p 0 42 Popular Democratic Front for Liberatlon of Palestine (PDFLP) Strategy ., .44 Organization ,, .45 Funding, .48 PFLP General Command, , .51 1- I 1- (Contents Con t) . .~. .. __. ~ .. (Contents) Page SMALL, INDEPENDENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS Active Organization for the Liberation Of Palestine (AOLP). ............54 ?opular Struggle Front (PSF) .........56 Arab Palestine Organization. ........ .58 Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine ................59 DEPENDENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS Saiqa. ....................59 Arab Liberation Front. ............63 COMMUNIST "PARTISAN" FORCES Growing Support for Fedayeen by Arab Communist Parties. .............64 Shift in Soviet Line Reflected in Arab , Communist Policy ..............67 Decision to Establish Partisan Forces. ....71 Jordan Party Announces Partisan Formation. -72 Unified Fedayeen Command Rejects Application. ............... .73 On the "Liberation of Palestine" ...... .75 Organization and Operations. ........ .76 (Contents Con't) 1 (Contents) Page ATTEMPTS AT FEDAYEEN UNIFICATION Palestine National Council -- February 1969 . .80 The Palestine Armed Struggle Command. .82 Palestine National Council -- September 1969. .84 Unified Fedayeen Command -- February 1970 . .86 National Unity Agreement -- May 1970. .88 Palestine National Council -- June 1970 . .90 The PLO Central Committee . ' , . .93 The Jordan Crisis -- September 1970 . .97 . .. .. .. ESAU L: THE FEDAYEEN (ANNEX TO ESAU XLVIII: Fedayeen -- "Men of Sacrifice"i MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS This Annex has been prepared to accompany and document the essay, Fedayeen -- "Men of Sacrifice," published separately as ESAU XLVIII, This Annex discusses the fedayeen groups in some detail: their origins, ideological leanings, strategy and tactics, organization and funding, their ties to Arab sources of support, and efforts to unify, This Annex -- as ESAU XLVIII -- contains information available through 1 November 1970, Constructive comment an this Annex has been received from the Office,of National Estimates, The Office of Current Intelligence, and The Clandestine Service. In viewc however, of the complexitles of the fedayeen question, the quickly-changlng scene, and the uneven quality of avallable intelligence,- the judgments of this Annex should be considered pro- visional, Any comments on its data or judgments should be addressed to the Annex's author, Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, and to this Staff, Hal Ford Y Chief; DD/I Special Research Staff ESAU L: THE FEDLYEEN" (ANNEX TO ESAU XLVIII: Fedayeen -- "Men of Sacrifice") FATAH AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) Fatah - Background to February 1969 Fatah, which is today the most important fedayeen group, was founded in the 1950's by militant Palestinians dissatisfied with the inaction of other Palestinian or- ganizations. Its name means "conquest" and is a reverse acronym derived from the Arabic words for Palestine National Liberation Movement. Fatah leaders felt that Arab hesitation to initiate war against Israel resulted from lack of will rather than military inferiority, and saw Fatah's role as that of catalyst -- raising tensions between Arabs and Israelis in order to bring about war. Fatah's military wing, A1 Asifa (Storm Troops), was founded in January 1964 and by early 1965 had embarked on a campaign of sabotage raids against Israel.* The majority of Asifa's missions were conducted by teams of four or five Asifa members who infiltrated into Jordan from Syria, then crossed into Israel for quick strikes. In late 1966, however, Asifa was also used by Syria to camouflage operations on the Israeli border by Syrian army units. This increase in raids across the Syrian-Israeli border served to raise tension and resulted in Israel's November 1966 attack on Syria *Israel waited until May 1965 before retaliating for the first time against Asifa; at that time it destsoyed two Asifa bases in Jordan in an effort to compel Jordan to restrain the fedayeen, -1- and an escalation in threats and counter-threats." This scenario corresponded to one which Fatah might well have * drawn up. The founders of Fatah were reportedly members of - the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Liberation Party -- both conservative groups with strong ties to the oil kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Fatah has there- fore always benefited financially from the contributions of wealthy Palestinians in these countries. Somewhat ironically, however, the chief benefactor of Fatah in its early days was Syria, one of the most radical of the Arab states. This seeming paradox arose from the fact that while .Fatah was politically conservative in intra- Arab matters, it was at the same time the most actively militant of the anti-Israeli Palestinian groups, and this made it attractive to the Syrians. During the mid-l960's, and particularly from the time of the February 1966 seizure of power in Syria by a more militant Baathi group until the June 1967 war, Syria provided training, arms, publicity, and planning assistance to Fatah. In addition, the Syrian Baath government arranged contacts between Fatah and China, Cuba, and North Vietnam; this resulted in Chinese provi- sion of some equipment, medical and financial assistance, and even some training to Fatah in this prewar period. The June 1967 war marked the beginning of Fatah's gradual move away from dependence on Syria. Even before the war, Fatah had resisted Syrian Baathi attempts to impose control over it. The defeat of Syria and corres- ponding decline in Syrian Baath prestige, combined with the rise in Fatah's own prestige as the result of its actively militant approach, prompted Fatah to seek independ- ence pnd to look elsewhere for help. It indeed found willing backers among Arab nations that wished to capitalize on Fatah's popularity. *In November 1966 Israel also attacked As Samu in Jordan in retaliation for Fatah raids across the border. I I Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1967 and early 1968, Iraqi units, stationed in Jordan after the June war, had reporte6ly been instrumental in funnelir'g aid to Asifa in Jordan and in providing general support; this had apparently been very importaiit before Fatah built up a popular base of support. Following Israel's attack on Karamah, Fatah's popularity increased and the relative significance of Iraqi support declined. (The Fatah spokesman Hani Hasan asserted in December 1969 that following Karamah the numbers of Fatah fighters increased from 720 to 3000.) Iraq's interest in sup- porting Fatah was probably evoked largely by the cooling of Fatah's relations with the rival Baath regime in Syria and Baghdad's desire to expand its influence among the fedayeen. In the summer of 1968 Iraq reportedly agreed to Arafat's request for training of Asifa members in anti-aircraft defense. Fatah also received considerable quantities of small arms from Algeria in the fall of 1968. this represented a decision not a Fatah request. In December the naa said tn at AL rerrea ICS support 0th money and scholarship) from the PLO to Fatah. This shift probably reflected Fatah's increasing popularity as well as a preference for Fatah's independent position over the dependence of the still UAR-controlled PLO. In its search for funds, Fatah also turned to the USSR. , On 2 July 1968, two days before Nasir's departure on a visit to Moscow, Fatah leader Arafat ar- rived tin Cairo. Arafat had been officially named Fatah spokes- man in the spring of 1968, though he had been one of the organization's leaders from its inception and had previously been regional head of Asifa. Arafat apparently' now asked that Nasir intercede with the Soviets to change their position towards Yasir Arafat Chairman PLO the Palestinians, supposedly Cell tral Committee and Fa tah - 4- I I . _. - ._. .. .- . .. .. , . .. .. ~. because he felt that Arab solidarity behind the fedayeen was weakened by the lack of Arab Communist support, al- thought it seems more likely that Arafat's chief motiva- tion was a hope to get material assistance and an in- creased degree of political respectability through Nasir's intercession. In any event, Nasir agreed, and Arafat either accompanied or followed him to Moscow.
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