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30Th January–25Th February 2013 Security Trends NCCI’s Security Trends Analysis providesSecurity internal advice for TrendsAnalysis NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside your 30th January–25th February 2013 By organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed Analysis on to any third parties. [Type text] The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs once a month as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organizations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI’s member organisations to be made aware of any available information. We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and ensuring that it is ONLY circulated between members within your organisation General information is available to members at the NCCI website, www.ncciraq.org Please do not hesitate to contact us at [email protected] 2 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization Table of Contents Mukhtar Militia is Established .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 Attacks Against al-Sahwa Forces .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Oil Pipelines as Sites of Violence .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Protests and De-Ba’athification ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8 Syrian Refugees ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 3 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization Map of Iraq 4 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization Mukhtar Militia is Established On February 4th, Wathiq al-Batat, the leader of Hizballah in Iraq, announced the formation of a new militia named "The Mukhtar Army." Al-Batat's initiative is aimed toward promoting and taking responsibility for the protection of Iraqi Shiites who support the central government against opposition elements that may become violent, as protests have continued for the past two months in various governorates. According to IRIN, humanitarian news and analysis, al-Batat stated that the “Kurds have their militia to protect them; Sunnis have al-Qaeda; and Shiites have nothing… That is why we are forming this army - to protect Shiites and Iraqis in general from al-Qaeda and the Free Iraqi Army.” He continued by saying, “We will carry out attacks against them.” Though, other sources, such as Sout al-Iraq, have cited al-Batat in a more nationalist context with the ostensible goal to extend protection to everyone, saying that "The Mukhtar Army is an army of popular ideology, whose mission is to break the barrier between the people and the security services through a bond of national ideology." The Senior Deputy of the Interior Minister immediately rejected the formation of the militia and a few days after its announcement the government issued al-Batat's arrest, though no subsequent action has been taken against him. However, as yet, the Mukhtar Army has not been involved in any direct violence, although it has threatened families in the al-Jihad neighborhood. Most recently, according to al-Nas paper, al-Batat was reported to have 'mocked' the warrant, saying that "Elements of the Mukhtar Army exceed one million and it does not target Sunni nationals, but only those who want to withdraw Shiite rule." The politics of al-Batat's initiative, however, show that he is neither bolstering the government's legitimacy, nor unifying Iraq's citizenry in what he claims to be a national ideology. His para-government militia serves to thwart the central Iraqi security apparatuses by diverging their resources from real threats and dangers, while attempting to further divide the country along sectarian lines masked in an exclusive language of national unity, albeit only if followers adhere to a single political agenda. It is worth noting that public figures who have formed militias in the past, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, appear to be distancing themselves from blunt sectarianism and the threat of force by supporting popular demands and promoting dialogue across denominations. 5 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization Attacks Against al-Sahwa Forces Attacks against the Sahwa forces have been increasing lately as nationwide demonstrations spread and tensions rise among competing political groups. Several serious attacks have taken place against the anti-al-Qaeda group during the month of February, raising questions regarding internal security and the role of militias. Twenty two people were killed and forty four were wounded on February 4th in Taji, north of Baghdad, when a suicide bomber blew himself up, targeting al-Sahwa forces as they were collecting their salaries. This attack occurred right after al-Sahwa salaries were raised and a day after a coordinated attack on a Kirkuk police headquarters, killing thirty people. Another major attack on the Sahwa occurred on February 11th when Khalid al-Lahibi, an al- Sahwa commander and national reconciliation figure, was assassinated by small arms fire in Baquba, Diyala, according to Sout al-Iraq. Al-Shorfa reported that four of his body guards were injured in the attack. And subsequently, on February 19th al-Qaeda forces assassinated Riad Jawad, “military commander of the Madaen Sahwa forces, and killed him, his son and one of his bodyguards," a police chief told Al-Shorfa. Al-Sahwa forces are composed of a coalition of Sunni tribal groups who opposed al-Qaeda after 2006 and during the civil war (c. 2006-2008). Additionally, they are only approximately 50% integrated into the official security apparatus, making them not only an unstable organization but also potentially unpredictable and unaccountable for their actions. They are, however, viewed by al-Qaeda as traitors, which is why they are frequently under attack. On the other hand, because of their unofficial and semi non-governmental status, they may play an unexpected role in Iraq’s civil society to oppose non-democratic elements 6 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization Oil Pipelines as Sites of Violence Iraq’s oil pipeline, carrying oil from Baiji refinery, the country’s largest refinery, to Ninewa, was bombed twice in one week during February. The first attack occurred on February 17th and disabled the pipeline, while the second attack occurred on the 20th. Ninewa receives all of its domestic fuel imports from the pipeline, which was expected to have taken several days to repair before the second attack, according to Reuters. These attacks highlight not only Iraq’s fragile security situation in the northern provinces but also political tensions surrounding oil and oil labor, as violence has frequently focused on Iraq’s oil industry. Earlier in February, according to Lt. Col. Najm al-Dulaimi, the Iraqi army spokesman in Anbar, "Gunmen attempted to target a point that controls and regulates strategic oil pipelines between Iraq and Jordan in the city of Haditha, west of Ramadi, using mortars." He informed al-Shorfa, however, that the Iraqi army seized one mortar and five shells, and arrested three gunmen. Most recently, according to Aswat al-Iraq, oil workers in Wassit conducted a sit-in against the Chinese Waha company, demanding commensurate wages with working hours, the return of fired workers, and decent meals. Iraq’s oil industry affects, to a large degree, domestic and international policy, as episodes such as the Wassit incident and conflicts between Baghdad and the KRG regarding oil contracts often demonstrate. Frequent dissatisfaction among workers, fragile security environments, and opportunities for violence make oil and its transportation an easy target and very effective way to voice discontent. Though, as sit-ins and demonstrations illustrate, there is respect for civil disobedience and a growing abandonment of violence. 7 | NCCI | We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated
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