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Download English Rules [ 10/15/20 ] 1.0 - INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 3 17.2.2 AIRMOBILE ASSAULT....................................................... 8 17.3 STRATEGIC MOVEMENT .................................................... 9 2.0 - GAME COMPONENTS ..................................................................... 3 18.0 - OFFENSIVES & COMBAT 2.1 THE MAP .................................................................................... 3 ............................................................. 9 18.1 2.2 PLAYER AID SHEETS .............................................................. 3 COMBAT RESOLUTION ........................................................ 9 18.2 2.3 SCENARIO BOOKLET ............................................................ 3 COLUMN SHIFTS ..................................................................... 9 18.3 2.4 PLAYING PIECES ..................................................................... 3 ASSETS ........................................................................................ 9 18.4 2.5 DIE ................................................................................................ 3 COMBAT RESULTS ................................................................10 18.5 LOSSES .......................................................................................10 3.0 - COUNTERS ....................................................................................... 3 18.6 RETREATS ................................................................................10 3.1 UNIT COLOUR CODES .......................................................... 4 18.7 ADVANCE AFTER COMBAT ..............................................10 3.2 COMBAT UNIT VALUES ........................................................ 4 19.0 - ENTRENCHMENTS ......................................................................10 3.3 UNIT AND GAME ABBREVIATIONS ................................ 4 20.0 - ALLIED UNITS AND STACKING OF MULTIPLE FACTIONS 11 4.0 - STACKING ......................................................................................... 5 21.0 - CAVEATS .......................................................................................12 5.0 - CONTROL OF SPACES .................................................................... 5 22.0 - INTERNATIONAL TENSION .......................................................12 6.0 - SETTING UP THE GAME ................................................................ 5 22.1 INTERNATIONAL TENSION EFFECTS ...........................12 7.0 - INITIATIVE ........................................................................................ 5 23.0 - COUPS D ETAT ............................................................................12 7.1 OPTIONAL RULE ..................................................................... 5 23.1 LOYAL FORCES.......................................................................12 23.2 COUP IN SYRIA ......................................................................12 8.0 - THE CARDS ...................................................................................... 5 23.3 COUP IN IRAQ .......................................................................12 8.1 ASSET CARDS ........................................................................... 6 8.2 EVENT CARDS ......................................................................... 6 24.0 - WAR IN LEBANON ......................................................................13 8.3 HIGH TENSION CARDS ....................................................... 6 25.0 - IS (DAESH) ...................................................................................13 9.0 - JOKERS ............................................................................................. 6 25.1 IS COUNTERS .........................................................................13 25.2 IS ACTIVATION ......................................................................13 10.0 - SPECIAL JOKERS ......................................................................... 6 25.3 COMBAT RESTRICTIONS ...................................................13 25.4 11.0 - STRATEGIC DEPOTS ..................................................................... 6 IS SUPPLY .................................................................................13 25.5 COUNTER-INSURGENCY ...................................................13 12.0 - SEQUENCE OF PLAY ..................................................................... 6 25.6 BACK TO NORMALITY .......................................................13 12.1 INITIATIVE PLAYER PHASE ................................................ 6 26.0 - KURDISH PESHMERGAS ...........................................................14 12.2 REMAINING PLAYER(S) ........................................................ 7 26.1 KURDISH COUNTERS .........................................................14 13.0 - TURN 1 ............................................................................................. 7 26.2 KURDISH ACTIVATION ......................................................14 26.3 COMBAT RESTRICTIONS ...................................................14 14.0 - SUPPLY ............................................................................................ 7 26.4 KURDISH SUPPLY .................................................................14 14.1 OUT OF SUPPLY EFFECTS .................................................... 7 26.5 KURDISH RIVALRY ...............................................................14 14.2 ARAB ALLIES & THE FREE IRAQI ARMY ........................ 7 26.6 BACK TO NORMALITY .......................................................14 14.3 SUNNI & AL SHAM MILITIAS IN IRAQ ............................ 7 26.7 PKK REBELLION ....................................................................14 14.4 FREE SYRIAN ARMY AND SUNNI & 26.8 PYD & KDP ..............................................................................14 AL SHAM MILITIAS IN SYRIA ............................................. 7 14.5 SHIA MILITIAS ......................................................................... 7 27.0 - US INVOLVEMENT ......................................................................15 14.6 LEBANESE ARMY & LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH............... 7 27.1 US MILITARY INTERVENTION ........................................15 14.7 KURDISH PESHMERGAS ...................................................... 7 27.2 US APPROVAL TO PLAY CERTAIN CARDS ...................15 14.8 IS UNITS ..................................................................................... 7 28.0 - RUSSIAN INTERVENTION .........................................................15 14.9 RUSSIAN TROOPS ................................................................... 7 14.10 US AND WESTERN UNITS ................................................... 8 29.0 - ALLIANCES ..................................................................................15 15.0 - REINFORCEMENTS & REPLACEMENTS .................................. 8 30.0 - FOG OF WAR ................................................................................16 16.0 - PLANNING (ALLOCATION OF OPERATIONAL 31.0 - HOW TO WIN ................................................................................16 POINTS - OPS) ........................................................................................... 8 31.1 CALCULATING VICTORY POINTS (VPS) .....................16 17.0 - MOVEMENT ..................................................................................... 8 32.0 - SCENARIOS ..................................................................................16 17.1 NORMAL MOVEMENT ......................................................... 8 33.0 - DESIGN YOUR OWN SCENARIO! ..............................................16 17.2 AIRMOBILE CAPACITY ......................................................... 8 17.2.1 STANDARD AIRMOBILE MOVEMENT ..................... 8 34.0 - DESIGNER S NOTES ..................................................................16 1.0 INTRODUCTION 2.2 PLAYER AID SHEETS Fitna – Global War in the Middle East (2013-?) is a 2 The Player Aids include the detailed Sequence of to 6 player, grand strategic level, card driven wargame Play and contain charts and information summarising depicting the various military confrontations in the the main rules, as well as the Combat Results Table, its Middle East and the emergence of IS (Islamic State in modifiers and effects. Iraq and Syria), from 2013 into the near future. The game allows players to simulate a major confrontation 2.3 SCENARIO BOOKLET between global actors (the US and Russia) and regional The scenario booklet includes 11 scenarios allowing actors (Israel and the Sunni and Shia states), who are the players to simulate: supported by their respective allies, involving militias - 1) The civil war in Syria: 2012-2013 (tutorial scenario of all kinds, but also Daesh (IS) and the Kurdish for 2 players; 6 turns); Peshmergas. The game thus allows you to play several - 2) The fight against IS: 2014-2015 (the maximum hypothetical conflicts that could arise in future years. extension of IS; 3-4 players; 6 turns); You can choose to play any camp (except IS which is - 3) The Kremlin counter-attacks: Russian intervention activated through event cards) and in doing so test your in Syria and the PKK rebellion in Turkey, 2015-2016 own strategies. (3-4 players; 6 turns); The number of players (from 2 to 6) depends on
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