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From Al-Qaida Affiliate to the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate: the Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis)

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From Al-Qaida Affiliate to the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate: the Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis) Nanyang Technological University Block S4, Level B4, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg Policy Report FROM AL-QAIDA AFFILIATE TO THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC CALIPHATE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) Ahmed S. Hashim December 2014 Military Studies Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore 2 Who and What is ISIS/IS? The dramatic victories of the Islamist militant astounding military successes? Similarly, what group—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was behind its leader’s decision to declare a (ISIS) in the summer of 2014 culminated in Caliphate? Will it replace Al-Qaida, with whom the declaration of the Caliphate or Islamic it has been feuding, as the primary Islamist State (IS) under the leadership of Abu Bakr al- militant group? Will the United States and its Baghdadi. These twin events have alarmed the allies succeed in defeating the Islamic State or international community. ISIS and the Islamic merely just thwart it? What will happen to its State has been the subject of enormous followers, particularly the thousands of foreign literature that often baffles due to the profusion fighters, if concerted and effective military of unverified and contradictory information. action by the United States and its allies Telling the story of ISIS and its creation, the manage to destroy the Islamic State’s system of Islamic State is a work in progress. Confusion control over people, territory and infrastructure still reigns concerning who ISIS is—a fact that in both northern Iraq and eastern Syria? This was also reflected in the endless and fruitless report is a reconstruction from a multitude of debate over what to call it.1 open sources seeking to provide a concise overview of its origins, ideology, goals and More important are the questions about ISIS military operations in Iraq and Syria from 2003 that have arisen during the course of 2014. to the present in order to help governments What does it want? What accounted for its understand and deal with this phenomenon. The Origins of ISIS/IS ISIS/IS has its origins in an obscure militant returned to Afghanistan, where he ran an group.2 In 2000 a Jordanian one-time criminal- Islamic militant training camp near Herat. No turned-Islamist named Abu Musa’b al-Zarqawi evidence exists that he had much interaction (AMZ) stood up a group called Jama’at al- with Osama bin Laden or his organisation, the Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) to fight the Jordanian Al-Qaida. AMZ claimed that it was Abdullah government.3 Having no luck in taking on Azzam, the Palestinian Jordanian Islamist the Jordanian authorities, Zarqawi travelled thinker who exhorted Arabs to go fight the to Afghanistan to go fight on the side of the Soviets alongside the Afghan Mujahidin, who Afghan Mujahidin—resistance—in the Jihad influenced him on the path of jihad: “We used or holy war against the Soviets. He arrived to receive some audio-cassettes recorded by after the departure of the Soviet troops and Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, may he rest in peace. soon returned to his homeland. Once again his He had a great influence on my decision to efforts to fight the well-entrenched Jordanian engage in jihad.” 4 monarchy came to naught and he eventually 1 The nomenclature issue in this report is simple: the group will be known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) until its transformation into the Islamic State (IS) in June 2014. The predecessors of ISIS will be known by their own names at the time of existence. For more details, see Zack Beauchamp, “ISIS, Islamic State or ISIL? What to call the group the US is bombing in Iraq,” OSINT Journal Review, September 17, 2014. 2 This section is derived from Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency, Adelphi Paper, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Routledge, 2009 and several other works that will be cited accordingly throughout the analysis. 3 Robert Rabil, “The ISIS Chronicles: A History,” The National Interest, July 17, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis- chronicles-history-10895… Bobby Ghosh, “ISIS: A Short History,” The Atlantic, http://theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/ isis-a-short-history/376030/ 4 “Translation of Old Al-Zarqawi Interview, Says God’s Law Must Rule ‘Entire World,” GMP2006121181001, Jihadist Websites – Open Source Report, December 06, 2006, Open Source Center, https://wwwopensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/ PTARGS_0_0_5766_972_0_43/htt 3 Image credit: Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. 4 Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, al- the state of Islam. We would then Zarqawi moved to Iraq. There he developed go forth to reconquer the Muslim extensive ties with Ansar al-Islam (“Partisans lands and restore them to the Muslim of Islam”), a Kurdish Islamist group in the nation…I swear by God that even if extreme northeast of the country. In March the Americans had not invaded our 2003, the United States invaded and occupied lands together with the Jews, the Iraq. A brilliant conventional campaign led to Muslims would still be required not to the erroneous belief on the part of the George refrain from jihad but go forth and seek W. Bush Administration that Iraq would the enemy until only God Almighty’s stabilise and progress towards democracy. shari’ah prevailed everywhere in the By summer 2003 the Sunni minority—toppled world…Our political project is to expel from their position of power in Iraq with the this marauding enemy. This is the first downfall of Saddam Hussein—launched a step. Afterwards our goal is to establish deadly insurgency. The insurgency consisted God’s shari’ah all over the globe…6 of five distinct groups. Four groups were composed largely of Iraqis from the former In pursuit of his goals AMZ left a trail of death regime, nationalists, tribal elements and and destruction within Iraq. JTJ differed various local Islamist fighters. The fifth group considerably from other Iraqi insurgent consisted of a smattering of Iraqis and foreign groups in its tactics. Rather than using only fighters who joined AMZ and his group JTJ. guerrilla tactics in ambushes, raids and hit- and-run attacks against U.S. forces like the The goals of JTJ were: (i) to force a withdrawal other groups did, it relied heavily on suicide of coalition forces from Iraq; (ii) to topple the bombings, often using car bombs or individual Iraqi interim government; (iii) to assassinate suicide bombers. It targeted a wide variety of collaborators with the occupation regime; groups, including the Iraqi Security Forces, (iv) to target the Shia population; and (v) political and religious figures, civilians, foreign to establish an Islamic state in which the civilian contractors, and the United Nations and Shari’ah—God’s Law—would reign supreme. humanitarian workers. AMZ was very adept at AMZ declared that the political platform of using the Internet to promote his message, his organisation was clarified by a particular recruit personnel and terrorise his enemies. saying attributed to Prophet Mohammed: “I Zarqawi’s volunteers posted messages from was sent to the world with a sword in my hand their leader and videos of beheadings on until all worship would be devoted to Allah multiple servers to avoid delays in downloading alone.” 5 AMZ further elaborates his breath- and also making it difficult for the material to taking project: be removed from the World Wide Web. We will fight in the cause of God until His shari’ah prevails. The first step is to expel the enemy and establish 5 ibid. 6 ibid. 5 AMZ joins Al-Qaida AMZ brought his group under the loose iii. Propagate the message that “there is control of Osama bin Laden, with the group no god but God”, to all the countries in officially pledging allegiance to Osama’s Al- which Islam is absent. Qaida network in a letter in October 2004. The iv. Wage jihad to liberate Muslim new organisation known as Tanzim Qai’dat territories from infidels and apostates. al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (or Al-Qaida in v. Fight the taghut ruling Muslim lands. Iraq—AQI—in English) provided Al-Qaida with vi. “Establish a wise Caliphate” in a ready-made base from which to strike the which the Sharia rules supreme U.S. and AMZ with the prestige of being part as it did during the time of Prophet of a brand name; this drew recruits, financial Mohammad. and logistical support. vii. “Spread monotheism on earth, cleanse it of polytheism, to govern AQI elaborated a more cohesive ideological according to the laws of God…” 7 vision than AMZ’s original organisation. In March 2005, AQI published its “creed AMZ and Al-Qaida Central (AQC) the top and methodology” in which it expressed its leadership saw eye to eye on ideology and determination to promote and defend tawhid— goals. Problems arose over AQI’s modus monotheism—and eliminate polytheism. operandi and tactics in Iraq. AMZ’s tactic of Anyone who did not believe in the essential engaging in mass civilian casualties—earning unity/oneness of God was an infidel and him the sobriquet “sheikh of the slaughterers”— subject to takfir [excommunication] and death. aroused grave concern in his mentor, Abu AQI expressed the belief that the Prophet Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a leading Salafist Mohammad is God’s messenger for the thinker based in Jordan and among Al-Qaida entire human race.
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