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ISIS Propaganda and United States Countermeasures BearWorks MSU Graduate Theses Fall 2015 ISIS Propaganda and United States Countermeasures Daniel Lincoln Stevens As with any intellectual project, the content and views expressed in this thesis may be considered objectionable by some readers. However, this student-scholar’s work has been judged to have academic value by the student’s thesis committee members trained in the discipline. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees. Follow this and additional works at: https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons Recommended Citation Stevens, Daniel Lincoln, "ISIS Propaganda and United States Countermeasures" (2015). MSU Graduate Theses. 1503. https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/1503 This article or document was made available through BearWorks, the institutional repository of Missouri State University. The work contained in it may be protected by copyright and require permission of the copyright holder for reuse or redistribution. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ISIS PROPAGANDA AND UNITED STATES COUNTERMEASURES A Masters Thesis Presented to The Graduate College of Missouri State University In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies By Daniel Stevens December 2015 Copyright 2015 by Daniel Lincoln Stevens ii ISIS PROPAGANDA AND UNITED STATES COUNTERMEASURES Defense and Strategic studies Missouri State University, December 2015 Master of Science Daniel Stevens ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is threefold: 1. Examine the use of propaganda by the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and how its propaganda enables ISIS to achieve its objectives; 2. Examine the United States Government (USG) response; 3. Evaluate the effectiveness of the USG response and how it can be improved. The goal of ISIS is to overturn the Middle East, attack westerners in the region and in the West, and create one all-encompassing Islamic State. ISIS’ innovative use of propaganda has been central to its success. ISIS uses propaganda more effectively than previous terrorist groups. What is unique about ISIS propaganda is its success at luring disaffected Westerners to its side. The messages of ISIS propaganda are interpreted by studying the teachings of key jihadist theologians and by examining the content of ISIS propaganda. The approach in this thesis is to listen to what ISIS has to say about itself and its objectives. The struggles and short comings of the USG response are attested to by former directors of USG counter terror messaging. This paper reveals the USG’s response to ISIS propaganda falls short in effectively addressing the full range of ISIS propaganda’s diversity in messages, audiences, and platforms. For the government to effectively undermine the effectiveness of ISIS propaganda, it must accept the need for more creativity and diversity in its messaging, and find a role it can play in conjunction with a supportive private sector capable of engaging in diverse messages to diverse audiences across diverse platforms. KEYWORDS: ISIS, terrorism, propaganda, western, counter measures This abstract is approved as to form and content _______________________________ David Peck Chairperson, Advisory Committee Missouri State University iii ISIS PROPAGANDA AND UNITED STATES COUNTERMEASURES By Daniel Stevens A Masters Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College Of Missouri State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies December 2015 Approved: _______________________________________ Mr. David Peck _______________________________________ Dr. John P. Rose _______________________________________ Mr. Ilan Berman _______________________________________ Dr. Julie Masterson: Dean, Graduate College iv TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary ..............................................................................................1 II. Definition of Terms .............................................................................................6 III. ISIS History, Ideology, and Strategy. ................................................................9 ISIS is a threat to the Middle East and the West ................................................9 ISIS’ ideology informs ISIS’ objectives, strategy, and propaganda messaging .........................................................................................................16 ISIS’ battle field success comes from its assimilation of Baathist commanders and intelligence experts ..............................................................21 Brutality is central to ISIS’ strategy of polarization and recruitment. .............25 ISIS’ innovative propaganda strategy both supports and is driven by its ideology, battlefield success, and use of violence. ..........................................30 IV. ISIS Uses Propaganda For Diverse Messages To Diverse Audiences Across Diverse Platforms............................................................................................ 32 ISIS uses apps and various online platforms for mass communication ...........33 ISIS causes fear by using propaganda as a tool for psychological warfare. ....36 ISIS uses video to effectively communicate to target audiences. ....................39 Dabiq is the official ISIS magazine .................................................................49 ISIS uses the Internet and mobile apps to reach out and recruit new members ...........................................................................................................52 The classical literary journey of a ‘hero’ is the most basic theme of terrorist recruitment. ......................................................................................................53 New recruits help recruit others through word of mouth .................................54 ISIS uses social media to engage in personal messaging. ...............................54 ISIS actively recruits women ...........................................................................56 Profiles of western women who joined ISIS ...................................................59 Converts and ISIS recruits come from non-Muslim backgrounds as well. .....66 ISIS propaganda is vulnerable to some of its own claims ...............................72 V. The United States Government’s Response To ISIS Propaganda Falls Short In Effectively Addressing The Full Range Of ISIS Propaganda’s Diversity In Messages, Audiences, And Platforms. ........................................................76 State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications .76 Non-Government Organizations Countering ISIS Propaganda .......................85 The CSCC responds to some but not all ISIS messages. .................................90 Women and new converts to Islam are not specifically targeted by USG counter-propaganda..........................................................................................96 Problems with USG Approaches ....................................................................98 Evaluation of Criticism ..................................................................................105 VI. Recommendations For The USG And Private Sector. ..................................108 v VII. Conclusion ....................................................................................................113 Works Cited .........................................................................................................115 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure1. Map for projected Islamic State. ...............................................................9 Figure 2. Major ISIS attacks and arrests since Sept. 2014-Aug. 2015. .................13 Figure 3. Where Islamic State’s supporters are tweeting from. .............................34 vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Islamic State (ISIS) threatens to overturn the entire Middle East and to attack westerners in the region and at home. The objective of ISIS is the creation of a unitary Islamic state or “Caliphate” encompassing all regions that have at any point in history been under Islamic control and, potentially, territories with significant Muslim populations. This includes the greater Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, South and Central Asia, and parts of Europe. This ISIS state directly challenges the US policy of creating and supporting a stable and representative government in Iraq, as well as US interests in promoting free, prosperous and liberal societies across the region. ISIS has also called for and inspired attacks against the West making ISIS a threat to the US and the rest of the Western world. The U.S. government now considers ISIS a greater threat than al Qaeda (AQ). ISIS represents an old threat in a new way. It has developed because the instability and lack of authority in Syria and Iraq has created a geopolitical vacuum ripe for exploitation by terrorist groups with territorial ambitions. ISIS evolved from an al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group involved in the Iraq insurgency into an aspiring state actor. ISIS is creating a brutal police state after the mold of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The creation of the ISIS state is guided in part by Baathists who previously worked for Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Baath Party is a trans-border socialist Arab nationalist party. One of its
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