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Facing Off with ISIS G20 Leaders Vow to Fight ISIS Despite Differences

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Facing Off with ISIS G20 Leaders Vow to Fight ISIS Despite Differences November 20, 2015 5 Cover Story Facing off with ISIS G20 leaders vow to fight ISIS despite differences Thomas Seibert Istanbul eeting in the after- math of the Paris at- tacks, world leaders gathered in Turkey pledged to redouble Mefforts to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) but carrying out that promise will be difficult as conflicting inter- ests of key players remain. Participants at the Group of 20 (G20) meeting of heads of state from the world’s biggest economies vowed to step up action against ISIS by improving intelligence shar- ing, increasing border controls and sharpening air travel security to keep militants from crossing inter- national boundaries. The decision came after police in Paris found evidence that one of the attackers, who killed more than 125 people in a string of shootings Leaders of G20 observe a minute of silence in memory of Paris attacks at G20 summit in Antalya. and bombings on November 13th, had registered as a Syrian refugee entering Greece via Turkey. Turk- ity of turning ‘radical’ as soon as allies against ISIS, Ankara is con- sealing the border for ISIS fighters, said he did not expect the Paris ish officials said their security forc- they get the money and the weap- cerned that the Kurds’ real aim is while Turkish officials complain of bombings to usher in a new era of es had warned France about one of ons.” to set up a Kurdish state along the a lack of coordination with Western broad international cooperation the bombers and had foiled an ISIS US President Barack Obama said Turkish border. intelligence services in identifying to fight ISIS. He said the United attack in Istanbul that had been Washington would “redouble our and arresting militants. States remained unwilling to com- planned to coincide with the Paris efforts, working with other mem- Participants at the Following the Paris attacks, mit ground troops, preferring air assaults. bers of the coalition, to bring about Group of 20 (G20) Turkish officials said their country strikes “as the least risky option”. “We are concerned over the acute a peaceful transition in Syria and to notified French police in 2014 and At the same time, Russia was stick- and growing flow of foreign terror- eliminate” ISIS. France reacted to meeting of heads of again in 2015 about ISIS suspect ing to its support for Syrian Presi- ist fighters and the threat it poses the Paris bombings by increasing state from the Omar Ismail Mostefai, identified as dent Bashar Assad, while other for all states,” the G20 leaders said air strikes on ISIS targets in Syria. world’s biggest one of the Paris bombers, without players such as Turkey, Qatar and in a statement. “We are resolved to However, experts agree that air economies vowed to hearing back from France. Only af- Saudi Arabia wanted Assad to go. address this threat.” strikes will not be enough to defeat ter the Paris attacks did French au- “In this chaotic environment, it is Analysts said the Paris attacks the jihadist militia. Even after the step up action thorities ask Turkish counterparts hard to see any significant change” showed the West’s strategy to con- shock of the Paris attacks, no ma- against ISIS. if they knew anything about Moste- after the Paris attacks, Ozcan said. tain ISIS in Syria and Iraq with the jor power offered to send ground fai, a Turkish official said, insisting “We will talk a lot about the Paris help of air strikes and support for troops to Syria to fight ISIS. Cutting the flow of foreign fight- on anonymity. bombings but there won’t be a big local anti-ISIS militias was no long- The method of encouraging local ers in and out of ISIS-controlled “The case of Omar Ismail Moste- change.” er enough. forces to increase the fight against parts of Syria and Iraq is another fai clearly establishes that in- Even short-term steps against “This is no longer a fight within the radicals on the ground is meet- task facing countries exposed to telligence sharing and effective ISIS were made difficult by unan- the boundaries of the Middle East ing with problems as well. The the threat posed by the militants. communication are crucial to swered questions, Ozcan said. “If and Mesopotamia,” Murat Yetkin United States and Turkey disagree Turkey, which shares a 900-km counterterrorism efforts,” the offi- you drive ISIS away from a certain wrote in the Hurriyet Daily News. over whether the Syrian Kurds’ border with Syria, says it is increas- cial said. “The Turkish government area, who should replace them?” “This is no longer a fight that can Democratic Union Party (PYD) and ing border security and erecting expects closer cooperation from its he asked. be dealt with by air strikes and its militia People’s Protection Units fences and walls along some sec- allies in the future.” so-called ‘moderate’ locals on the (YPG) could be a partner. While tions of the frontier. Nihat Ali Ozcan, an analyst with Thomas Seibert is an Arab Weekly ground with the high possibil- Washington regards the Kurds as Critics say Turkey is far from the Tepav think-tank in Ankara, contributor in Istanbul. ‘Jihadi John’ killed on eve of Paris attacks Mahmud el-Shafey Emwazi’s execution videos, in was “reasonably confident” that monitoring Emwazi at the time, ister David Cameron said after an- which he brutally beheaded pris- Emwazi was killed in the drone played a role in his radicalisation. nouncing Emwazi’s death. oners while spouting Islamist strike, obtaining 100% confirma- Despite being on a watch list, “He posed an ongoing and serious London propaganda, had been a major re- tion is problematic given the area Emwazi made it to Syria in 2013. He threat to innocent civilians not only cruiting tool for ISIS and his death where attack occurred. ISIS has quickly rose through the ISIS ranks in Syria but around the world and in his guy was a human represents a major blow for the yet to issue a statement confirming from guarding Western captives in the UK, too. He was ISIS’s lead exe- animal. Killing him group. Emwazi’s death and some observ- Idlib to executing them. It was also cutioner and let us never forget that “ has probably made ers say the group could carry out here that he earned his nickname he killed many, many Muslims, too. the world a little bit of Emwazi, born in retaliatory attacks. “Jihadi John”, one of four British And he was intent on murdering a better place,” Penta- Kuwait in 1988 Following the announcement of guards who were nicknamed after many more people. So this was an gonT spokesman Steve Warren said Emwazi’s death, UK intelligence re- the Beatles. act of self-defence. It was the right on the death of infamous Islamic moved to the United vealed that it was on high alert and Emwazi was the most high-pro- thing to do,” Cameron added. State (ISIS) executioner “Jihadi Kingdom in 1994. monitoring 750 British citizens, file British national to join ISIS, UK Labour Party leader Jeremy John”. some 450 of whom had returned with estimates that some 1,600 Corbyn questioned the extrajudi- Mohammed Emwazi, also known “This is significant of course be- from Syria. The announcement Britons have travelled to Iraq and cial killing. “It appears Moham- as “Jihadi John”, was killed in a US cause ‘Jihadi John’ was something came just before the Paris terrorist Syria to fight for the group. Officials med Emwazi has been held to ac- drone strike in the ISIS self-de- of an ISIS celebrity if you will — the attacks, with analysts saying that hope his death will serve as a deter- count for his callous and brutal clared capital Raqqa on November face of the organisation in many ISIS has issued renewed calls for rent. crimes. However, it would have 12th after a reign of terror in which senses… so there is a significant those who want to join it but can’t been far better for us if he had been he had killed at least seven Western blow to their prestige. He was a to stay and undertake attacks in the Mohammed Emwazi, held to account in a court of law,” he and Japanese hostages. primary recruitment tool for that West. also known as Jihadi said. Dressed all in black, his features organisation,” Warren said. Emwazi, born in Kuwait in 1988 But for many, Emwazi’s death hidden behind a balaclava, Em- Emwazi’s death represented a moved to the United Kingdom in John, was killed in a couldn’t have come sooner. Beth- wazi’s London accent had been much-needed propaganda victory 1994. Former friends and acquaint- US drone strike in any Haines, daughter of murdered the last thing heard by American for the West. “If confirmed, the ances spoke to the press recalling Raqqa. aid worker David Haines, expressed journalists James Foley and Steven targeted killing of Emwazi will be a someone who was quiet and shy, relief at the news. “After seeing the Sotloff, British aid workers David tactical and psychological achieve- completely unlike the knife-wield- “I have always said that we news that ‘Jihadi John’ was killed, I Haines and Alan Henning, US aid ment for the anti-ISIS coalition,” ing executioner he became. CAGE, would do whatever was necessary, felt an instant sense of relief, know- worker Peter Kassig and Japanese the British Guardian newspaper’s a London-based advocacy group, whatever it took, to track down ing that he wouldn’t appear in any- nationals Kenji Goto and Haruna Middle East Editor Ian Black wrote.
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