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ISIS Type of Organization ISIS Name: ISIS Type of Organization: Insurgent territory-controlling religious terrorist violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist jihadist pan-Islamist Salafist takfiri Place of Origin: Iraq Year of Origin: Al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2004; ISIS: 2013 Founder(s): Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; ISIS: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Places of Operation: ISIS has declared wilayas (provinces) in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Central Africa, Mali, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and the North Caucasus. Beyond this, the terror group has waged attacks in Lebanon, France, Belgium, Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Kuwait. Overview Also known as: ISIS Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq1 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers40 Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers2 Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers41 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)3 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq42 Al-Qa’ida in Iraq – Zarqawi4 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM)5 Two Rivers43 Al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers6 Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers Al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers7 44 Al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers8 Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers45 Al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria (QSIS)9 Southern Province46 Al-Tawhid10 Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad Bilad al Raafidaini47 Al-Tawhid and al-Jihad11 Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn48 Al-Zarqawi Network12 Unity and Holy Struggle49 Ansar Beit al-Maqdis13 Unity and Holy War50 Battar Brigade14 Unity and Jihad Group51 Brigades of Tawhid15 Wilayah al-Hind (India)52 Daesh16 Wilayat Badiya53 Dawla al-Islamiya17 Wilayat Barakah (Hasaka)54 Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa as-Sham18 Wilayat Kheir (Deir al Zour)55 Islamic Caliphate19 Wilayat Raqqa56 Islamic Caliphate State20 Wilayat al-Tarabulus57 Islamic State (IS)21 Wilayat Anbar58 Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)22 Wilayat Barqa59 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)23 Wilayat Coast (Al Sahel)60 Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)24 Wilayat Damascus (Dimashq)61 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara25 Wilayat Diyala62 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)26 Wilayat Fezza63 Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS)27 Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya64 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)28 Wilayat Halab (Aleppo)65 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Mozambique29 Wilayat Hama66 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Democratic Republic of the Congo Wilayat Idlib67 30 Wilayat Khorasan68 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)31 Wilayat Kirkuk69 Islamic State Pakistan Province32 Wilayat Ninawa70 Islamic Youth Shura Council33 Wilayat Salahuddin71 Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad (JTJ)34 Wilayat Pakistan72 Kateab al-Tawhid35 Wilayat Turkey73 Monotheism and Jihad Group36 Wilayat Central Africa74 Mujahidin Shura Council37 Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia38 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq39 Executive Summary: ISIS is an extremist group formed from al-Qaeda offshoots in Iraq and Syria. Since its formation in 2013, ISIS has worked to sustain a self-declared caliphate in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Ultimately, ISIS seeks to unite the world under a single caliphate, and to that end the group has begun to establish satellite operations in nine countries. Initially, ISIS gained support within Iraq as a Sunni insurgency group fighting what some Sunnis viewed as a partisan Shiite-led Iraqi government. The group has since garnered additional momentum as a result of the Syrian civil war, and has recruited up to 33,000 fighters from around the world. Thousands of foreign ISIS fighters are estimated to have been killed in battle, while some have returned—or are reportedly planning to return—to their home countries.75 ISIS finds its origins in al-Qaeda forerunner al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), formed by sectarian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. During the Iraq War and its aftermath, the group experienced a series of setbacks and restructurings, for a while going by the name the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). In June 2014, the group—then led by Iraqi extremist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—unilaterally declared a caliphate spanning eastern Syria and western Iraq, naming Baghdadi as its “caliph.” In his first speech as “caliph,” Baghdadi made clear that ISIS’s aspirations were not limited to any one region, 2 ISIS saying that the group sought to establish governance over all Muslims. Consequently, the organization changed its name from the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (or the “Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham”) to simply the “Islamic State.” Although ISIS controlled large swaths of territory across Iraq and Syria at the peak of its territorial control in the summer of 2014, the group lost the last of those territorial holdings over the course of 2017.76 At its height, ISIS controlled almost 40 percent of Iraqi territory. By April 2017, U.S.-backed Iraqi forces had reduced ISIS’s control of the country to less than 7 percent.77 On July 10, 2017, the Iraqi government announced the liberation of Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul, where Baghdadi had declared ISIS’s caliphate three years earlier.78 Following the November 17 recapture of Rawa, the last ISIS-held town in Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared military victory over ISIS in the country.79 In June 2017, U.S-backed forces began an offensive to drive ISIS out of its declared capital in Raqqa, Syria.80 On October 17, 2017, American-backed forces announced the liberation of Raqqa, and on November 21, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared that ISIS had been driven out of Syria by Iranian-backed forces.81 By December 2018, ISIS retained only a small foothold in the Syrian town of Baghuz along the Syrian-Iraqi border.82 In March 2019, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an assault on ISIS forces in Baghuz and retook the town.83 Notwithstanding ISIS’s territorial losses, security officials expect ISIS to remain a threat and lead an ongoing insurgency in the region.84 In February 2021, Mazloum Abdi, general commander of the SDF, reported that ISIS is “trying to revive itself” and continues to threaten regional and global security.85 According to a February 2021 report by the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, ISIS remained a “cohesive organization and continued to operate as a low-level insurgency in Iraq and Syria,” while its strategy, capabilities, and group cohesion “remained largely unchanged.”86 The report also determined that while the international Coalition and its local partners have prevented ISIS from resurging, they have been unable to degrade ISIS to the point it no longer poses a threat.87 Observers in Europe allege ISIS remains a threat on the continent, though to a lesser extent than it did when it maintained its caliphate. ISIS no longer has the capabilities to launch large-scale attacks in Europe, but it continues to inspire individuals to carry out smaller attacks such as stabbings and vehicle attacks.88 Despite its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, ISIS continues to maintain and expand its global presence. The group has declared wilayat (provinces, governorates) in Iraq, Syria, Egypt,89 Libya,90 Algeria,91 Yemen,92 Saudi Arabia,93 Nigeria,94 Afghanistan,95 and the North Caucasus.96 Within the first seven months of 2019, ISIS announced new provinces in India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Central Africa as it sought to reassert itself after the loss of its territory in Iraq and Syria.97 Citing ISIS’s violent activities in Africa, the United States in March 2021 designated ISIS’s provinces in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.98 Beyond this, the terror group attracts considerable sympathy or has waged attacks in Turkey,99 Morocco,100 Tunisia,101 the Philippines,102 Lebanon,103 Bangladesh,104 Indonesia,105 and the Palestinian territories.106 ISIS sympathizers have also carried out lone-wolf attacks in a variety of Western countries such as France107 and Belgium.108 In January 2020, ISIS announced a “new phase” that would shift its focus from the remains of its caliphate onto Israel.109 ISIS has historically funded itself through extortion, robbery, human trafficking, and the highly lucrative oil industry. However, ISIS lost approximately $500 million in income between 2014 and 2015 due to loss of territory and military setbacks amid sustained coalition airstrikes. 110 The group has also lured significant numbers of recruits through online propaganda, including videos and magazines produced in English, French, German, and a variety of other languages.111 ISIS recruiters have also been successful on social media platforms and encrypted messaging services such as Telegram.112 Under its self-proclaimed caliphate, ISIS imposed sharia (Islamic law) and was notorious for killing civilians en masse, often by public execution and crucifixion. Since losing its territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has shifted its strategy in those countries from holding territory to insurgency against the state. ISIS encourages followers to undertake lone-wolf attacks using inexpensive means such as vehicles, knives, and homemade explosives. Despite ISIS’s territorial losses, its propaganda continues to inspire lone-wolf attackers such as Khalid Masood, who killed seven people in a ramming-and-stabbing attack in London in March 2017. While ISIS’s dreams of a global caliphate are unlikely to ever be realized, the group will continue to cause significant damage wherever it is able to gain a foothold.
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