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SALAFI- JIHADISM in AFRICA BRIEF / 12 June 2021 SALAFI- JIHADISM IN AFRICA BRIEF / 12 June 2021 A winning strategy by SERIES Giovanni Faleg* Senior Analyst, EUISS Katariina Mustasilta Postdoctoral Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Summary › Violent extremism has become a grow- ing threat throughout the African conti- INTRODUCTION nent: all sub-regions have experienced the emergence of groups active across state Violent extremism keeps spreading in Africa, showing boundaries. notable resilience despite years of counter-extremism › Today, armed actors engaging in violent and prevention efforts by governments and interna- extremism in the continent are mainly af- tional actors (1)*. In addition to killing thousands, it filiated with Islamist militant groups and costs the affected regions an estimated $97 billion in particularly Salafi-jihadist ideology. lost informal economic activity each year (2). › The spread of Salafi-jihadism in Africa is Today, armed actors engaging in violent extremism fuelled by a combination of localised griev- in the continent are mainly affiliated with Islamist ances and transnational ambitions, while militant groups and organisations and particularly tactical and strategic flexibility has in- Salafi-jihadist ideology (3). Recent data indicates a creased the resilience of insurgent groups. dangerous expansion of Salafi-jihadist armed groups › Once it has emerged as a potent force, de- — often simply labelled as violent extremist or ter- feating Salafi-jihadism on the battlefield rorist organisations (4) — beyond the traditional hot- proves very difficult as groups show enor- spots in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of mous resilience, even when facing tacti- Africa to West Africa’s coastal states and Central and cal defeats. Southern Africa. The proliferation of militants linked to the Islamic State (IS) in particular and the infighting › A ‘coping strategy’ based on investments and complex ties among groups affiliated to different in equitable governance and security, pri- jihadist networks are raising growing alarm among oritising civilian protection, public service observers. delivery and community engagement can help counter the spread of Salafi-jihadism in the continent. © European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. GIOVANNI FALEG AND KATARIINA MUSTASILTA The worrying trend is reflected in the increase of acts 56 % of violence targeting civilians in the continent of violence designated as terrorism. According to the during the year. In addition to the conflicts fought Global Terrorism Index (GTI), sub-Saharan Africa between regimes and local branches of IS, conflicts was the second region in the world affected by deadly involving al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam terrorism in 2019, superseding the Middle East and wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) took place in Burkina Faso North Africa (MENA) for a second consecutive year (5). and Mali, while Kenya and Somalia fought conflicts Whereas globally the lethality of terrorism is somewhat against al-Shabaab. Altogether, according to the UCDP decreasing, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are data, 10 out of 18 African countries involved in armed experiencing a contrasting trend. Burkina Faso experi- conflict faced a militant Islamist organisation (11). enced the largest increase in terrorism in the world in In several countries such as Somalia, Burkina Faso 2019 with nearly 600 people killed in terrorist attacks. and Cameroon, new or reignited clashes involving Terrorism was assessed to have increased significantly extremist groups erupted alongside existing armed also in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo conflicts, thus adding to the complexity of their con- (DRC) and Niger, among others. Seven out of the ten flict landscapes. In comparison, in 2010 there were 10 countries most impacted by terrorist violence in 2019 active state-based armed conflicts in the continent, are located in the region (6). Similar developments con- with two countries (Algeria and Somalia) being heav- tinued in 2020. ily influenced by Salafi-jihadist insurgencies (12). What makes Salafi-jihadist groups (7) appear ‘in- vincible’? This Conflict Series Brief analyses how Growing multiplicity of armed groups Salafi-jihadism spreads across Africa and explores its potential future trajectories. (8) The first section of the While the familiar players such as al-Shabaab, Boko Brief analyses the broader picture emerging from recent Haram, and al-Qaeda have remained resilient in extremism-affiliated armed violence trends in the re- the countries where they first emerged — except for gion. The second section analyses three aspects making al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has these extremist groups particularly resilient and facili- significantly weakened in Algeria over time — many of tating their spread in the continent. Based on the find- these groups have also expanded their attacks and in- ings, the third section demonstrates the dangers of such fluence into new areas and countries. New groups have adaptability, using two foresight scenarios for 2025. emerged and factional infighting and fragmentation Finally, the concluding section outlines the main policy have led to the formation of splinter groups. As a re- implications: what needs to change to prevent violent sult, conflict dynamics have become more complex and extremism from derailing Africa’s Agenda 2063 (9)? horizontal — e.g. increased fighting between groups affiliated to al-Qaeda and IS — and mapping the dif- ferent groups and their relations has become more dif- ficult. The insurgency in northern Mozambique exem- plifies the difficulties in defining local groups and their MAIN VIOLENT EXTREMISM relation to transnational actors in areas where access- ing information is challenging. In early 2021 the insur- TRENDS IN AFRICA gents’ ties to IS appear ambiguous and there are many question marks around the nature of these ties and the The expansion of violent extremism in Africa is associ- unity of the group (13). Amid this complexity, four key ated with five trends: (i) the rising share of violent ex- protagonists with often multiple factions and fluctu- tremism in the broader armed conflict landscape; (ii) ating ties of conflict and cooperation can be identi- the growing multiplicity of militant groups; (iii) the fied (at the moment) as setting the scene for violent changing territoriality of groups; (iv) a nexus between extremism in the continent: al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Salafi-jihadism and communal violence; (v) varying JNIM and the local affiliates of IS. perceptions and impact of extremism within countries. The rising share of violent Changing territorial dynamics extremism in armed conflicts On a territorial level, the mapping of violence designat- ed as terrorism and armed intrastate conflicts shows Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme strong overlap. Traditionally, the capacity of groups (UCDP) show that Africa experienced 25 active to penetrate (or not) a region or country has been as- state-based armed conflicts in 2019, which is the sociated with state weaknesses and a history of civil highest number of armed conflicts the continent has conflicts. This makes it easier for groups to exert and witnessed since 1946 (10). Of these conflicts, nine (more maintain, or intentionally give up, territorial control than one-third of the total) involved groups affiliated (defined as ‘territoriality’). This does not only entail with the Islamic State, which was also responsible for violence and terror. From JNIM in Mali to al-Shabaab 2 T SALAFI-JIHADISM IN Africa | A WINNING strategY Salafi−jihadist−affiliated The spread of Salafi−jihadist− affiliated in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, armed groups violence in Africa advance and maintain territorial presence by a com- violence in Africa bination of coercive tactics and providing governance Spatial distribution of conflict events involving jihadist−affiliated groupsSpatial indistribution Africa, 2000−2020 of conflict events involving services, either by replacing existing local institutions jihadist−affiliated groups in Africa, 2000−2020 altogether or by co-opting these (14). In some cases, state elites have passively allowed a group to exercise 2000−2006 control, or acquiesced in its presence, such as in the ALGERIA case of Boko Haram in its early years in Nigeria (15). MOROO 2006-07 Other times, counterterrorism operations have made GSC gianc t significant gains against violent extremists (e.g. AIM . Operation Serval in northern Mali in 2013) and/or a state’s capacities have been strong enough to impede MALI AD insurgent groups from establishing a significant foot- NIGER hold in a country or an area within a country. However, NIGERIA empirical evidence shows that neither context equates Early 2000s to a defeat of Salafi-jihadism as such. As the situation Bok M Se. I in Mali demonstrates, military onslaught on an or- SOMALIA ganisation tends to displace it rather than eradicate it. 2006 E' Once military pressure subsides, there is a high risk of S S, a strong comeback and an expansion of extremism if ventually y. the state’s governance capacities have not improved in the area and the group has meanwhile sought shelter elsewhere (16). Where the state is relatively capacitated, such as in much of Kenya or Tanzania, Salafi-jihadism 2007−2013 tends to be limited to clandestine networks and terror- ist
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