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Abu Mus`Ab Al-Suri's Critique of Hard Line Salafists in the Jihadist Current

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Abu Mus`Ab Al-Suri's Critique of Hard Line Salafists in the Jihadist Current DECEMBER 2007 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 1 Abu Mus`ab al-Suri’s Salafism identify contemporary jihadists as While the term Salafism is historically simply radicalized elements within, or Critique of Hard Line associated with a late 19th and early as by-products of, a broader Salafist Salafists in the Jihadist 20th century Islamic reformist phenomenon. Instead, it may be more Current movement, today’s Salafists are very fruitful to speak of Salafism as one of different. Their main characteristic is several competing ideological strands By Brynjar Lia their strict emulation of the practices within the jihadist current. Furthermore, of the Prophet Muhammad and his one may identify a spectrum, or a the recent scholarly literature companions at the pristine Islamic continuum, of positions within the on al-Qa`ida has focused on studying age, and hence an abhorrence of any contemporary Salafi-jihadism, defined internal divisions and ideological later “innovation” (bid`a) in belief and by two extreme positions. schisms in the global jihadist current.1 religious practice, an obsession with This literature has uncovered important God’s oneness (tawhid), a rejection On the one extreme are hard line Salafist fault lines with regard to al-Qa`ida’s of human rationality and an extreme purists for whom doctrinal purity is of priorities on issues such as media and exclusiveness, even hatred, toward quintessential importance, even if it 3 propaganda efforts versus military other Islamic schools and tendencies. means fighting side battles, alienating organization. Differences over the Even if only a small segment of today’s allies and shattering any semblance of primacy of religious-theological purity Salafists support al-Qa`ida, the term a common front against the “Zionist- versus military-strategic effectiveness “Salafi-jihadism” has nevertheless been Crusader” enemy. At the other extreme have also come to light. latched to al-Qa`ida both by outsiders are hard line jihadists, who are primarily and by jihadist ideologues themselves. military strategists, and whose main This article aims at contributing to preoccupation is political outcome, not this literature by discussing the clash A common categorization of Salafism is doctrinal purity. between ideological purists and military Quintan Wiktorowicz’s typology that strategists in al-Qa`ida as seen through divides Salafism into three currents: Abu Mus`ab al-Suri belongs to the the writings of one of al-Qa`ida’s most purists, politicos and jihadists, united latter category. Even though he himself articulate and prolific writers, Mustafa by a common Salafist creed, but sharply was born into a Syrian Sufi family (the bin `Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, divided on how to interpret the context Rifa‘iyyah order in Aleppo), he came better known by his pen names Abu and reality in which the creed should be to adopt and defend Salafist doctrines 4 Mus`ab al-Suri and `Umar `Abd al- implemented. While a useful starting in his writings, but he did this only Hakim.2 Until his arrest presumably point, the typology provides little because it was the best strategy in the in Quetta, Pakistan in late 2005, al- guidance in terms of understanding current times. From his writings, it Suri was one of the most outspoken doctrinal disputes and conflicts becomes apparent that had he been 5 voices in the jihadist current. His within the jihadist current itself. born 20 years earlier, al-Suri would critical analysis of previous jihadist Furthermore, it may misleadingly have fought equally hard under Marxist experiences, especially on Algeria, or pan-Arab slogans. He styled himself provoked strong responses and debates. 3 Bernard Haykel, “Radical Salafism: Osama’s Ideol- as a writer, theorist and strategist, not Furthermore, his ambitions to integrate ogy,” Dawn, 2001. as a Muslim cleric. Together with many Marxist guerrilla warfare theory into 4 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Move- other leading jihadists, Abu Mus`ab the jihadist war fighting doctrine, to ment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:3 (2006): pp. al-Suri clashed with “purist Salafist” introduce self-criticism as an accepted 207-239. elements in al-Qa`ida on a number of genre and method in jihadist thinking 5 For the purpose of this article, Abu Mus`ab al-Suri’s occasions. While the specific issues and his attempts to critically analyze own definition will suffice. He defined the jihadist -cur varied greatly, they all revolved around the jihadist current “objectively” rent rather comprehensively, determined partly by ide- the general dilemma of how to strike a inevitably led to numerous clashes with ology and partly by its main enemies: “It comprises or- balance between ideological purity vs. orthodox and conservative elements, ganizations, groups, assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, political utility. especially the strong Salafist current in symbolic figures and the individuals who have adopted al-Qa`ida. the ideology of armed jihad against the existing regimes These clashes suggest that the spread of purist Salafist doctrines in the jihadist in the Arab-Islamic world on the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling by not what Allah said (bi-ghayr current from the 1980s onwards has not ma anzala Allah), by legislating without Allah, and by been a source of strength and renewal, giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel but instead constituted a considerable 1 Vahid Brown, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership enemies of the Islamic nation. The jihadist current has obstacle to jihadist mobilization, and Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989-2006 (West Point, NY: Com- also adopted the program of armed jihad against the co- has more often than not served to bating Terrorism Center, 2007), available at www.ctc. lonialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis handicap and cripple jihadist groups by usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp; Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: that those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Mus- embroiling them in schisms and internal Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge & New York: Cam- lims.” See `Umar `Abd al-Hakim (Abu Mus`ab al-Suri), conflicts. bridge University Press, 2005). The Global Islamic Resistance Call. Part I: The Roots, 2 For his biography, see Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global History, and Experiences. Part II: The Call, Program and There are reasons why jihadist Jihad: The Life of al-Qa`ida Strategist Abu Mus`ab Al-Suri Method (Arabic) (Place and publisher unknown, Decem- ideologues like al-Suri came to use (London & New York: Hurst and Columbia University ber 2004), p. 685. Hereafter cited as The Global Islamic such vitriolic and harsh words about Press, 2007). Resistance Call. leading Salafist clerics. Al-Qa`ida’s DECEMBER 2007 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 1 struggle against the United States and school; its ideological character was unfortunately not an option, however, its European and Arab allies—Saudi multifaceted, evolving and open to new because, as al-Suri pointed out, “most Arabia, in particular—has always influences. In al-Suri’s analysis, the of the jihadists chose the Salafist depended on a minimum of political- jihadist current’s ideology derived from doctrine, jurisprudence and program”; religious legitimation, which explains a variety of sources. It was “a mixture in this way, “the problem came to us, why there is far more literature on of jihadist Qutbist organizational eventually.”13 jihadist websites dealing with the ideology, the Salafist creed and the question “why jihad?” than “how Wahhabite call.”8 While Qutbism had Al-Suri viewed the various conflicts jihad?”6 been dominant until the 1980s, doctrinal emanating from the disputes over Salafism and Wahhabite theology had Salafist doctrine as a significant security Since the mid-1990s, leading Salafist begun to make an impact during Arab hazard for the jihadist movement, and a clerics from Saudi Arabia and Yemen participation in the Afghan liberation considerable threat to the movement as have refuted Usama bin Ladin’s war during the 1980s. Its influence on a whole: message and defended their regimes the jihadist current has grown ever against jihadist propaganda. Al-Suri since.9 It causes internal strife among took considerable interest in these Muslims and within the resistance disputes, and he authored a long study Salafism as a Source of Internal Discord movement itself at a time when that detailed and analyzed Bin Ladin’s and Conflict we are being invaded by the and the London-based Saudi dissident Abu Mus`ab al-Suri witnessed with American and Zionist Mongols leader Saad al-Faqih’s criticism of unease the growing influence of Salafist and their war machines, and at Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Baz and Shaykh hard line ideologues in al-Qa`ida. a time when their satellites are Mohammed bin Salah bin ‘Uthaymin, Historically, doctrinal disputes within eavesdropping on our ideological two of Saudi Arabia’s most famous murmurs and monitoring our scholars.7 Seeing himself not as a daily movements…14 religious cleric who could challenge the “He styled himself as clerics on their turf, al-Suri found it a writer, theorist and Furthermore, the arrogant exclusiveness most useful to launch his attack through propagated by Salafist doctrinarians the words of the two most well-known strategist, not as a Muslim has led to the inability of the jihadist Saudi dissidents, one from the reformist cleric.” current to form alliances and cooperative camp and the other from the jihadist relationships with other Islamic camp. The intended audience was clearly militants.15 The Salafist
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