The 'Failure' of Political Islam? the Muslim Brotherhood's Experience In
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The ‘Failure’ of Political Islam? The Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in government. This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University. Lucia Ardovini B.A., M.A. PhD in International Relations June 2017 1 Declaration This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University. I declare that this Thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere. Word Count: 98.414 The extension to the word count has been granted by Professor Sharon Huttly, Pro Vice-Chancellor Education, on 19th May 2017. 2 Acknowledgements I have been writing and researching this thesis since October 2013, and it has taken me on an intellectual and personal journey through academia and literally across the Middle East. The ideas at the core of this thesis originated back in January 2011 when, as an undergraduate student, I was captivated by the popular uprisings spreading across the region. Since then, I have been fortunate enough to meet many people, in many countries, who generously contributed to the research presented in this thesis. My aims would have not been achievable without the unwavering support I have received from colleagues, friends, and family, and it is to them that I am most grateful. My sincere thanks go to my supervisor and friend, Dr. Simon Mabon, for his continuous support, patience, and enthusiasm. His guidance, encouragement and motivation contributed to making this journey one of continuous discovery and personal development. I would also like to show appreciation for the wonderful opportunities he has given me, first and foremost the one of working alongside him in the Richardson Institute, which grows in aims and impact every year. Special mention goes to Gareth, who has been the best friend and colleague to share this journey with, for the stimulating discussions and the endless support. I also want to thank Ludovica and Grant, who from students turned into best friends, and my partner Zane, who has been with me every step of the way. Last but not least, I would like to say the most heartfelt thank-you to my family, for supporting me throughout this journey since the day I left home at 18, to pursue my University studies in a country far away from home. This thesis would have not been possible without their endless love and belief in me. 3 Abstract On 30th June 2012 Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first post-revolutionary Egyptian President, marking the first time in the country’s history that an Islamist organisation legitimately ascended to power. This event dramatically changed political calculations across the region, and came with significant implications for both the Muslim Brotherhood and for the wider understanding of Political Islams. However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule was short-lived, as Morsi was deposed by a coup d’etat on 3rd July 2013. Since then, many have taken his deposition as proof of the incompatibility of Islamism and democratic governance, building on Oliver Roy’s argument of The Failure of Political Islam. This thesis explores the Muslim Brotherhood’s year in power to demonstrate that their removal is attributable to more than simply “undemocratic” choices and authoritarian tendencies, and analyses the sources of their political behaviour to highlight the importance of understanding Political Islam’s heterogeneous nature. This heterogeneity sets up a range of different ways in which groups engage with politics and state institutions – which is why the ideology cannot be reduced to a monolithic set of beliefs and practices. This understanding is key to the re-thinking of contemporary foreign policies towards the region, which are currently shaped by a homogenous view of Islamism and by its equation to extremism and violence. This thesis employs primary sources and data obtained from interviews with Egyptian activists and Muslim Brotherhood members, which investigated their role throughout the 2011 uprisings and up to July 2013. It provides a genealogy of the Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution from a grassroots movement into an Islamist political party, and analyses the organisation’s understanding of Political Islam to assess the implications of its deposition for the perception of the ideology as a whole. Ultimately, this thesis argues that the Muslim Brotherhood’s removal does not equal the end of Political Islam, but rather underlines the need for an understanding of the doctrine that is case-specific and that recognises the heterogeneity of its practices and manifestations. 4 Contents Timeline …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...8 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………13 Chapter 1: Political Islams ……………………………………………………………………………………….29 1.1 The dual nature of the Islamic faith: the religious and the political …………………...32 1.2 Core tenets of Political Islam: the Sunni-Shi’a schism ………………………………………..34 1.3 Political Islam: Initial Definitions and Misconceptions ……………………………………….36 1.4 Hassan al Banna and Abu ala Mawdudi: the origins of (Sunni) Political Islam and emerging tensions …………………………………………………………………………………………………..40 1.5 Sayyd Qutb: the ‘radical’ turn ……………………………………………………………………………47 1.6 Shi’a Islamism: The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran …………………………………….51 1.7 The “Islamic Threat” and Western Perceptions ………………………………………………….58 1.8 Oliver Roy and “Failure”……………………………………………………………………………………. 63 1.9 Failure and Destitution Compared …………………………………………………………………….65 1.10 Post Islamism …………………………………………………………………………………………………..68 1.11 Emerging Trends: Islamist Winters VS Islamic Awakening …………………………………69 1.12 Methodology ………………………………………………………………………………………………… .73 1.13 Conceptual Approach: Historical Sociology ……………………………………………………..77 1.14 Max Weber’s “Comparative Historical Sociology” ……………………………………………80 1.15 Fred Halliday’s “International Sociology”………………………………………………………….82 1.16 Framework: Historical Sociology and the Muslim Brotherhood ………………………..86 1.17 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………………87 Chapter 2: The Ikhwan and Egypt: the religious meets the political …………………………90 2.1 Genealogy and Historical Context ……………………………………………………………………..92 2.2 Religion, Society and Geopolitics in Egypt ………………………………………………………….97 2.3 The Muslim Brotherhood: inception and narrative(s) ………………………………………105 2.4 The Politicisation of a Religious Movement ……………………………………………………..108 2.5 Radicalization and Use of Political Violence …………………………………………………….112 2.6 The Brotherhood as a double-edged sword: source of legitimacy or threat? …..116 2.7 The Muslim Brotherhood and Civil Society: “a state within a state” …………………121 2.8 Membership and usra: the “family system” ……………………………………………………..124 2.9 An history of Internal Divisions …………………………………………………………………………127 2.10 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………………….132 5 Chapter 3: “Preachers not Leaders”: the rise and fall of the Freedom and Justice Party ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………135 3.1 A Revolution in the making ………………………………………………………………………………137 3.2 Political Successes and Internal Schisms …………………………………………………………..142 3.3 Lead up to January 25th: regime change VS. change of regime ………………………..144 3.4 The Muslim Brotherhood and Jan. 25th: the status quo VS. opportunity for change ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………147 3.5 The Brotherhood’s revolutionary youth: the key to success? …………………………..152 3.6 Transition ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..156 3.7 Freedom and Justice Party ………………………………………………………………………………169 3.8 FJP: Significance and Political trajectory ………………………………………………………….164 3.9 Parliamentary Elections and the road to Presidency …………………………………………167 3.10 Internal Divisions come to the fore ………………………………………………………………..172 3.11 The Islamist takeover? …………………………………………………………………………………..177 3.12 Conclusion: Preachers, not Leaders ……………………………………………………………….178 Chapter 4: The “Ikwhanisation” of the state VS. the “statification” of the Brotherhood………………………………………………………………………………………………………….181 4.1 The ‘Moderation Paradox’ & the downfall of the MB ……………………………………….185 4.2 Ideological and Organizational Challenges ……………………………………………………….188 4.3 A Rocky Start …………………………………………………………………………………………………..192 4.4 The Brotherhood’s “Renaissance Project” ……………………………………………………....195 4.5 Morsi’s “100 Days Plan”……………………………………………………………………………………197 4.6 The Brotherhood’s Constitution: the beginning of the end? …………………………….200 4.7 The MB’s Constitution Examined ……………………………………………………………………..203 4.8 The Beginning of the End: The Battles of Ittihadiya ………………………………………….208 4.9 Back to Square One …………………………………………………………………………………………211 4.10 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 213 Chapter 5: July 2013 Coup d’Etat/Morsi’s deposition= failure of Political Islam? …..216 5.1 Tamarod, Sisi, and the Coup …………………………………………………………………………….218 5.2 The “Failure of Political Islam?” Assessing Roy’s Claim……………………………………..220 5.3 The FJP in power: Islamist government or democratic transition? …………………..225 5.3 (1) Morsi and the SCAF: legacy of civil-institutional relations …………………………..227 5.3 (2) An Islamist Constitution………………………………………………………………………………229 5.3 (3) Morsi’s Moment on Gaza …………………………………………………………………………..232 5.4 The MB Government ……………………………………………………………………………………….234 5.5 Reasons for Failure ………………………………………………………………………………………….237