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Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites the First Half of August 2015

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ICT Jihadi Monitoring Group PERIODIC REVIEW Bimonthly Report Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites The First Half of August 2015 International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il This report summarizes notable events discussed on jihadist Web forums during the first half of August 2015. Following are the main points covered in the report: Following a one-year absence, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri re-emerges in the media in order to give a eulogy in memory of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and to swear allegiance to its new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor. Al-Zawahiri vows to work to apply shari’a and continue to wage jihad until the release of all Muslim occupied lands. In addition, he emphasized that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is the only legitimate emirate. The next day, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor announces that he accepted al- Zawahiri’s oath of allegiance. In addition, various Al-Qaeda branches and jihadist organizations that support Al-Qaeda gave eulogies in memory of Mullah Omar. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, renews his oath of allegiance to the leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and praises the leaders of Al-Qaeda branches for fulfilling the commandment to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam. In reference to the arena of jihad in Syria, he recommends avoiding internal struggles among the mujahideen in Syria and he calls for the liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque from the Jews. He emphasizes that the United States is the leader of the heretics, and that all Muslims have an obligation to attack the United States and its allies, including Western countries and the Jews. Khalid Batarfi, a senior leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), calls on Muslims in the West – especially those in the United States and France – to carry out individual terrorist attacks such as the attack at Charlie Hebdo in Paris, and emphasizes that such attacks are a “strategic weapon” that successfully breaks enemy strongholds time and again. Abu Hamza al-Zinjibari, a senior AQAP commander, vows that when all is said and done the Houthis will be defeated. According to him, their power is already weakening as demonstrated by their withdrawal from stronghold locations. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that the Houthis still present a danger due to the alliance that they formed with the United States in order to crush the power of the mujahideen in Yemen. Islamic State (IS) fighters call on Muslims in Germany and Austria to move to the territories of the Caliphate or to carry out operations in Germany and “attack the heretics in their homes and International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il 2 kill them as they happen along their way”. In addition, the IS fighters vow to take revenge on German soil for Germany’s actions in Afghanistan and for its support in the battle against the Islamic State. International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il 3 Highlights ............................................................................................................................................... 2 New Publications ................................................................................................................................... 7 Ideology .............................................................................................................................................. 7 The Rift between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State ....................................................................... 12 Women and Jihad ......................................................................................................................... 14 Promoting the Myth of the Martyr ...................................................................................................... 14 Sheikh Osama bin Laden .............................................................................................................. 14 Mullah Omar – Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ......................................................... 15 Sheikh Abu-Uthman al-Ghaymrai ................................................................................................. 16 Other Jihadist Organizations ........................................................................................................ 17 Magazines ............................................................................................................................................ 18 Reports from the Field ......................................................................................................................... 19 Afghanistan-Pakistan ........................................................................................................................ 19 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan .............................................................................................. 19 The Islamic State in Khurasan Province ........................................................................................ 22 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan .......................................................................................... 23 The Arabian Peninsula ...................................................................................................................... 23 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ............................................................................................... 24 The Islamic State in Hijaz Province ............................................................................................... 26 Iraq.................................................................................................................................................... 26 The Islamic State – Baghdad ......................................................................................................... 27 The Islamic State – Saladin Province ............................................................................................ 27 The Islamic State – Nineveh Province .......................................................................................... 28 The Islamic State – Al-Furat Province ........................................................................................... 31 The Islamic State – Al-Anbar Province .......................................................................................... 31 The Islamic State – Al-Janub Province .......................................................................................... 32 The Islamic State – Kirkuk Province .............................................................................................. 32 The Islamic State – Al-Jazira Province .......................................................................................... 32 The Islamic State – Dijla Province ................................................................................................. 33 International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il 4 The Islamic State – Al-Faluja Province .......................................................................................... 34 Al-Sham [The Levant] ....................................................................................................................... 34 Syria .............................................................................................................................................. 35 Turkestan Party in Al-Sham .......................................................................................................... 37 Jaysh al-Fath ................................................................................................................................. 37 Ahrar al-Sham ............................................................................................................................... 38 Ajnad al-Qawaqaz ......................................................................................................................... 39 The Islamic State – Aleppo ........................................................................................................... 40 The Islamic State – Homs Province .............................................................................................. 41 The Islamic State – Al-Baraka Province ........................................................................................ 43 The Islamic State – Al-Khayr (formerly Deir Ezzor) Province........................................................ 44 The Islamic State – Damascus ...................................................................................................... 47 The Islamic State – Al-Raqqa Province ......................................................................................... 48 Ajnad Al-Sham .............................................................................................................................. 51 Jordan ............................................................................................................................................... 52 Lebanon ............................................................................................................................................ 52 The Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza
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