March 2020 MLM
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Summary from the Jihadi Forums
ICT Jihadi Monitoring Group PERIODIC REVIEW Bimonthly Report Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites The Second Half of July 2015 International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il This report summarizes notable events discussed on jihadist Web forums during the second half of July 2015. Following are the main points covered in the report: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban in Afghanistan) officially announces the death of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Emirate, from an illness. Following his death, many jihadist leaders and organization eulogize him. In addition, the Emirate announces the appointment of his deputy, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, as the new leader of the Emirate. Islamic State fighters from Turkestan call on Muslim residents of Turkestan to emigrate from their homeland and join the Islamic Caliphate under the leadership of Sheikh Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi. The organization also calls on Turkestani Al-Nusra Front fighters in Syria to defect and join the Islamic State. Sheikh Abu ‘Ubatdha Ahmad ‘Umar, the leader of Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen, releases his first message since being appointed to the role, regarding his organization’s resolve in the fight against the Crusader conspiracy to weaken Islam and to steal the natural treasures of Muslim lands. In light of this, he calls on tribes in Somalia to help wage jihad against the enemies of Islam and he calls on Muslims in Kenya to join jihad as well. According to him, his organization is ready and willing to absorb into its ranks Muslims from East Africa, including Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and Central Africa, due to their persecution at the hands of the local regimes. -
Al-Qa'ida Affiliates in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa
NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS AL-QA’IDA AFFILIATES IN ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA INFORMATION CUTOFF: JULY 13, 2017 Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Remains the head of AQ, but is competing with ISIS for leadership within the global jihadi movement and has been Al-Qa’ida Affiliate releasing propaganda to counter ISIS messaging in Syria since the declaration of its Strives to establish a caliphate in 2014. new affiliate in Syria composed of defectors from the Nusrah Front—a former al- Qa’ida affiliate. Al-Qa’ida in theArabian Peninsula (AQAP) Continues to fight the Yemeni military and the Iranian- backed Shia Huthis in Yemen and has acquired new weaponry and support from sympathetic Sunni tribes across the country. The Ansar al-Sharia branch of AQAP functions as an intermediary between local tribes and Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) AQAP. Maintains ties to local extremist groups and conducts small-scale attacks, targeting secular Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) activists, bloggers, and writers in Bangladesh. The group continues to expand throughout the Al-Shabaab region and recently swore its allegiance to the Afghan Taliban. Continues to target Western assets in the region and recently merged with four insurgency groups in North Africa—Ansar al-Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, al-Murabitun, and AQIM’s Sahara branch— Targets African to create Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin. This merger is an attempt to strengthen local ties and Mission in Somalia foster cooperation in the region. (AMISOM) forces, attacking government bases, as well as soft targets such as hotels and restaurants frequented by foreign diplomats and government officials. -
Mcallister Bradley J 201105 P
REVOLUTIONARY NETWORKS? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by Bradley J. McAllister (Under the Direction of Sherry Lowrance) ABSTRACT This dissertation is simultaneously an exercise in theory testing and theory generation. Firstly, it is an empirical test of the means-oriented netwar theory, which asserts that distributed networks represent superior organizational designs for violent activists than do classic hierarchies. Secondly, this piece uses the ends-oriented theory of revolutionary terror to generate an alternative means-oriented theory of terrorist organization, which emphasizes the need of terrorist groups to centralize their operations. By focusing on the ends of terrorism, this study is able to generate a series of metrics of organizational performance against which the competing theories of organizational design can be measured. The findings show that terrorist groups that decentralize their operations continually lose ground, not only to government counter-terror and counter-insurgent campaigns, but also to rival organizations that are better able to take advantage of their respective operational environments. However, evidence also suggests that groups facing decline due to decentralization can offset their inability to perform complex tasks by emphasizing the material benefits of radical activism. INDEX WORDS: Terrorism, Organized Crime, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, Networks, Netwar, Revolution, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mahdi Army, Abu Sayyaf, Iraq, Philippines REVOLUTIONARY NETWORK0S? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by BRADLEY J MCALLISTER B.A., Southwestern University, 1999 M.A., The University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 2003 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY ATHENS, GA 2011 2011 Bradley J. -
Volume XV, Issue 1 February 2021 PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 1
ISSN 2334-3745 Volume XV, Issue 1 February 2021 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 1 Table of Content Welcome from the Editors...............................................................................................................................1 Articles Bringing Religiosity Back In: Critical Reflection on the Explanation of Western Homegrown Religious Terrorism (Part I)............................................................................................................................................2 by Lorne L. Dawson Dying to Live: The “Love to Death” Narrative Driving the Taliban’s Suicide Bombings............................17 by Atal Ahmadzai The Use of Bay’ah by the Main Salafi-Jihadist Groups..................................................................................39 by Carlos Igualada and Javier Yagüe Counter-Terrorism in the Philippines: Review of Key Issues.......................................................................49 by Ronald U. Mendoza, Rommel Jude G. Ong and Dion Lorenz L. Romano Variations on a Theme? Comparing 4chan, 8kun, and other chans’ Far-right “/pol” Boards....................65 by Stephane J. Baele, Lewys Brace, and Travis G. Coan Research Notes Climate Change—Terrorism Nexus? A Preliminary Review/Analysis of the Literature...................................81 by Jeremiah O. Asaka Inventory of 200+ Institutions and Centres in the Field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Research.....93 by Reinier Bergema and Olivia Kearney Resources Counterterrorism Bookshelf: Eight Books -
The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership And
The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security July 2017 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence Led by the University of Maryland 8400 Baltimore Ave., Suite 250 • College Park, MD 20742 • 301.405.6600 www.start.umd.edu National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence About This Report The authors of this report are Gina Ligon, Michael Logan, Margeret Hall, Douglas C. Derrick, Julia Fuller, and Sam Church at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. Questions about this report should be directed to Dr. Gina Ligon at [email protected]. This report is part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project, “The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles” led by Principal Investigator Gina Ligon. This research was supported by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs through Award Number #2012-ST-061-CS0001, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB 1.12) made to START to investigate the role of social, behavioral, cultural, and economic factors on radicalization and violent extremism. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. -
Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites the First Half of August 2015
ICT Jihadi Monitoring Group PERIODIC REVIEW Bimonthly Report Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites The First Half of August 2015 International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Additional resources are available on the ICT Website: www.ict.org.il This report summarizes notable events discussed on jihadist Web forums during the first half of August 2015. Following are the main points covered in the report: Following a one-year absence, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri re-emerges in the media in order to give a eulogy in memory of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and to swear allegiance to its new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor. Al-Zawahiri vows to work to apply shari’a and continue to wage jihad until the release of all Muslim occupied lands. In addition, he emphasized that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is the only legitimate emirate. The next day, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor announces that he accepted al- Zawahiri’s oath of allegiance. In addition, various Al-Qaeda branches and jihadist organizations that support Al-Qaeda gave eulogies in memory of Mullah Omar. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, renews his oath of allegiance to the leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and praises the leaders of Al-Qaeda branches for fulfilling the commandment to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam. In reference to the arena of jihad in Syria, he recommends avoiding internal struggles among the mujahideen in Syria and he calls for the liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque from the Jews. -
Black Hole: the Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt
Human Rights Watch May 2005 Vol. 17, No. 5 (E) Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt I. Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 1 II. Torture in Egypt and the Prohibition Against Involuntary Return ................................. 5 The Prohibition against Refoulement.................................................................................... 8 The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism................................................... 9 III. Who are the Jihadists? ......................................................................................................... 10 IV. The Role of the United States ............................................................................................ 13 V. Bad Precedent: The 1995 and 1998 Renditions ................................................................ 19 Tal`at Fu’ad Qassim ...............................................................................................................19 Breaking the Tirana Cell ........................................................................................................21 VI. Muhammad al-Zawahiri and Hussain al-Zawahiri .......................................................... 24 VII. From Stockholm to Cairo: Ahmad `Agiza and Muhammad Al-Zari`........................ 30 Ahmad `Agiza’s trial...........................................................................................................33 VIII. -
ONLINE JIHADIST PROPAGANDA 2019 in Review
ONLINE JIHADIST PROPAGANDA 2019 in review Public release Contents 1. Key findings ............................................................................................................... 3 2. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5 3. Islamic State (IS): striving for post-state relevance .................................................. 6 3.1. Loss of territory in Syria leads to demonstration of force in peripheries ............... 6 3.2. IS falls back on guerrilla tactics ................................................................................ 9 3.3. IS synchronises its media campaigns to demonstrate an esprit de corps ............. 11 3.4. IS supporters emphasize the role of women and children ................................... 14 3.5. IS struggles to keep its footing online ................................................................... 15 4. Al-Qaeda (AQ): a network of local militancy and focused incrementalism ............ 18 4.1. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) ......................................................... 20 4.2. Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (al-Shabab) ...................................................... 22 4.3. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ............................................................. 23 5. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) extends its authority over Idlib .................................. 27 6. Running themes across jihadi groups .................................................................... -
Al Qaeda 2020 Website.Indd
AL QAEDA Quick Facts Geographical Areas of Operation: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, North Africa, and Somalia Numerical Strength (Members): Exact numbers unknown Leadership: Ayman al-Zawahiri Religious Identification:Sunni Islam Quick Facts State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism (2019) INTRODUCTION Born out of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the Cold War, Al Qaeda would grow over the ensuing decades to become one of the most prolific and consequential global terror groups to ever exist. Its mission – to form a global movement of Islamic sharia governance rooted in Wahhabi and Ikhwani religious philosophies and to wage war against the United States and its allies – has taken the cellular organization to South and Central Asia, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, the South Pacific, and Europe. The organization has killed thousands of people, and instigated a now-decades old war with the events of September 11, 2001. In contrast to its ideological progeny and current rival, the Islamic State (IS), Al Qaeda tries to blend in with the societies it eventually seeks to politically co-opt. This has led to the formation of several satellite organizations, each of which operate at various capacities and different capabilities. After a period of relative inactivity on the global jihad stage, Al Qaeda is now seemingly reemerging. The 2020 assassination of U.S. Navy servicemembers in Pensacola, Florida, the fall of the Islamic State’s physical caliphate, and continued activity in both Afghanistan and North Africa all signal the group’s continued viability, as well as its ongoing desire to reclaim the mantle of the world’s preeminent Islamist extremist organization. -
An Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study Pamela G
Al-Shebab: An Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study Pamela G. Faber October 2017 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. This document contains the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the sponsor. Distribution DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. SPECIFIC AUTHORITY: N00014-16-D-5003 10/27/2017 Request additional copies of this document through [email protected]. Photography Credit: Michael Markowitz, CNA. Approved by: October 2017 Dr. Jonathan Schroden, Director Center for Stability and Development Center for Strategic Studies This work was performed under Federal Government Contract No. N00014-16-D-5003. Copyright © 2017 CNA Abstract Section 1228 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) states: “The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide for the conduct of an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the United States’ efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al- Qaeda, including its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents since September 11, 2001.” The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) asked CNA to conduct this independent assessment, which was completed in August 2017. In order to conduct this assessment, CNA used a comparative methodology that included eight case studies on groups affiliated or associated with Al-Qaeda. These case studies were then used as a dataset for cross-case comparison. This document is a stand-alone version of the al-Shebab case study used in the Independent Assessment. CNA is publishing each of the eight case studies separately for the convenience of analysts and others who may have a regional or functional focus that corresponds to a specific case study. -
ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt Or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment
JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment by NORMAN CIGAR Abstract: The emergence of ISIS has represented a significant security risk to U.S. interests and to regional states. In Yemen, the ISIS threat has evolved within Occasional Paper #1 the country’s devastating civil war and, while its lethality has declined, this study Villanova University suggests it remains a factor of concern, Villanova, PA and assesses the challenges and options available for the US and for the November 2020 international community for dealing with this threat. ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment by Norman Cigar “The fight against terrorism is far from over” Leon E. Panetta, Former Director CIA, 25 August 20191 Introduction and Terms of Reference Even in its short history, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has posed a significant security challenge both to U.S. interests and to regional states. As the ISIS Caliphate disintegrated recently in its heartland of Iraq and Syria under a succession of blows by its international and local adversaries, the focus of the international community often shifted to ISIS’s outlying branches. However, contrary to early optimism, ISIS has proved a stubborn survivor even in its Iraq-Syria core, while its presence in branches or affiliates in areas such as the Sinai, the Sahara, West Africa, Mozambique, Yemen, and Khurasan (Afghanistan/Pakistan) also continues to be a significant security threat to local and international interests.2 Moreover, each theater of operations presents a unique set of characteristics, complicating the fight against such local ISIS branches. -
Contemporary Jihadi Militancy in Yemen
CONTEMPORARY JIHADI MILITANCY IN YEMEN HOW IS THE THREAT EVOLVING? ELISABETH KENDALL JULY 2018 POLICY PAPER 2018-7 CONTENTS * 14 COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES * 15 DECENTRALIZATION AND/OR * SUMMARY FRAGMENTATION * KEY POINTS * 18 PART FOUR: ISLAMIC STATE IN YEMEN * 1 INTRODUCTION * 21 CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD * 2 PART ONE: FORMATION & EVOLUTION * 27 ENDNOTES * 4 PART TWO: AQAP GOALS & GOVERNANCE * 32 ABOUT THE AUTHOR * 5 LOCAL INTEGRATION AND BRANDING * 32 ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE * 6 TRIBAL RELATIONS * 8 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT * 8 YOUTH ENGAGEMENT * 9 SIGNS OF DECLINE IN AQAP * 11 PART THREE: CURRENT AQAP CHALLENGES & PRESSURES * 11 INCREASING COUNTERTERRORISM STRIKES * 12 DWINDLING SUPPORT * 14 WEAK LEADERSHIP © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images SUMMARY KEY POINTS Regional conflict and internal chaos have allowed militant jihadi * The two core goals of AQAP are expelling infidels from Muslim lands and introducing an Islamic regime that would rule groups to rise and flourish in Yemen. This paper analyzes two by Islamic law. While these goals have remained constant, circumstances and experience have refined AQAP’s approaches of the most prominent such groups, al-Qaeda in the Arabian to engaging local populations in the pursuit of these goals. Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISY), by * The main challenges and pressures facing AQAP, some of which scrutinizing the factors that led to their respective ascents, and are shared by ISY, include increasingly frequent counterterrorism strikes, dwindling public support, weak leadership, poor examining the challenges and pressures that have caused their communications, and decentralization and/or fragmentation.