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Al-Qa'ida Affiliates in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa

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Al-Qa'ida Affiliates in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS AL-QA’IDA AFFILIATES IN ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA INFORMATION CUTOFF: JULY 13, 2017 Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Remains the head of AQ, but is competing with ISIS for leadership within the global jihadi movement and has been Al-Qa’ida Affiliate releasing propaganda to counter ISIS messaging in Syria since the declaration of its Strives to establish a caliphate in 2014. new affiliate in Syria composed of defectors from the Nusrah Front—a former al- Qa’ida affiliate. Al-Qa’ida in theArabian Peninsula (AQAP) Continues to fight the Yemeni military and the Iranian- backed Shia Huthis in Yemen and has acquired new weaponry and support from sympathetic Sunni tribes across the country. The Ansar al-Sharia branch of AQAP functions as an intermediary between local tribes and Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) AQAP. Maintains ties to local extremist groups and conducts small-scale attacks, targeting secular Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) activists, bloggers, and writers in Bangladesh. The group continues to expand throughout the Al-Shabaab region and recently swore its allegiance to the Afghan Taliban. Continues to target Western assets in the region and recently merged with four insurgency groups in North Africa—Ansar al-Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, al-Murabitun, and AQIM’s Sahara branch— Targets African to create Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin. This merger is an attempt to strengthen local ties and Mission in Somalia foster cooperation in the region. (AMISOM) forces, attacking government bases, as well as soft targets such as hotels and restaurants frequented by foreign diplomats and government officials. *Territory highlighted signifies area of operation, not control. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Al-Shabaab Al-Qa’ida Affiliate in Syria Peninsula (AQAP) Subcontinent (AQIS) Maghreb (AQIM) Leader Leader Leader Leader Leader Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, Qasim al-Rimi, Asim Umar, Abdelmalek Ahmad Umar, Unknown Age 66 Age 39 Age 43 Droukdel, Age 45 Age 47 Established 1988 Established 2009 Established 2014 Established 2007 Established 2006 Established 2017 Designated Foreign Designated Foreign Designated Foreign Designated Foreign Designated Foreign Designated Foreign 1999 2010 2016 2007 2008 Not Designated Terrorist Organization Terrorist Organization Terrorist Organization Terrorist Organization Terrorist Organization Terrorist Organization AQIS, AQAP, AQIM, Closest Affiliates Closest Affiliates AQ, AQIM, Al-Shabaab Closest Affiliates AQ, AQAP Closest Affiliates AQ, AQAP, Al-Shabaab Closest Affiliates AQ, AQAP, AQIM Closest Affiliates AQ AQ in Syria, Al-Shabaab Members (approx.) 300 Members (approx.) 4,000 Members (approx.) 500-600 Members (approx.) 1,000 Members (approx.) 6,000-12,000 Members (approx.) Unknown Official Propaganda Official Propaganda Official Propaganda Official Propaganda Official Propaganda Official Propaganda 22 83 15 45 82 N/A Released in 2017 Released in 2017 Released in 2017 Released in 2017 Released in 2017 Released in 2017 *Closest affiliates are defined by allegiance, number of joint statements, location, and shared resources..
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