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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in Thesoviet-Afghan War William C Naval War College Review Volume 56 Article 15 Number 3 Summer 2003 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in theSoviet-Afghan War William C. Green Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Green, William C. (2003) "The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in theSoviet-Afghan War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 56 : No. 3 , Article 15. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/15 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOOK REVIEWS 165 Green: The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in theSoviet-A damage to civil liberties than to the na- American Scientists has published a tion’s physical well-being. “Once alien- twenty-page listing of American mili- ated, an ‘unalienable right’ is apt to be tary operations dating from 1948 to forever lost.” He documents this asser- 1999, documenting how the United tion with a list of police killings of in- States (like the nations of Orwell’s nocent people in their homes and of 1984) has an “enemy of the month indefensible searches and seizures. club” and thus engages in a “perpetual While a reasonable reader may dismiss war” hoping for “perpetual peace.” This these discomforting examples as well theme is underdeveloped, however, and researched exceptions to normal law Vidal’s discussion of the United States enforcement activity in the United emphasizes domestic repression, while States, Vidal also brings up the chang- his reprinted chapters focus too exclu- ing nature of the law. He refers to U.S. sively on an apology (in the Platonic v. Sandini (1987), which established sense of an explanation) of Timothy that police were able to seize property McVeigh. permanently from an individual if the Altogether, Perpetual War for Perpetual property has been used for criminal Peace presents a provocative argument purposes, even if the individual has had that will be of intellectual appeal to no involvement with any crime. This professional military officers. It is ad- ruling has highly negative implications, mittedly an alternative perspective, but considering that 90 percent of Ameri- it may give members of the American can paper currency has traces of narcot- national security community insight ics on it from use in the drug trade. into how our European allies think, as Vidal also points out a common prob- well as our Third World adversaries, lem that is not commonly pondered— who often share Vidal’s perspective. the incidence of homosexual rape in the Vidal’s arguments are intriguing, but U.S. prison system, a violation of the the brevity of the new parts of this cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause work ultimately leaves his thoughts of the Bill of Rights. For anyone who incomplete. doubts that such punishment is state sanctioned, Vidal quotes a state attor- MICHAEL MORGAN Captain, U.S. Army ney general who refers to this practice in a public statement made in the course of his official duties. He is remi- niscent of the military author Colonel Charles Dunlap, U.S. Army, in his ref- Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, eds. The erences to blatant disrespect to Presi- Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in dent Bill Clinton on a naval vessel by the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: U.S. Ma- seamen, who called Clinton “the Prae- rine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. 416pp. torian Guard of the Pentagon,” and our (no price given) “ruling junta.” What could be both more poignant and There is one other weakness: the book ludicrous than Commander Abdul Baqi fails to address properly the meat of the Balots’s account of his survival of a issue that its title promises—“how we firefight in which his closest friend was got to be so hated.” The Federation of killed? “I saw a lot of Soviets coming at Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003 1 166 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 15 me and they were all firing (they put operations as in Bear, but the works are ten bullet holes through my baggy trou- not parallel texts. sers)....Habib Noor told me that, un- The present work consists of fourteen less we crossed the stream to the north, chapters and a conclusion, composed of we would not be able to engage the So- two to sixteen stories apiece. Each viets....Iranacross and jumped but chapter illustrates a different type of landed directly into the stream. ‘Oh, Al- tactical combat. There is a short discus- lah,’ I cried, ‘you have killed me with- sion of the tactic before each chapter out dignity.’ Then I made a big jump, I and a commentary at the end. This for- don’t know how since even a tank can’t mat has been used in military writing for clear it, but I did and got out of the many years (such as in the study Infantry stream.” in Battle, edited by George Marshall, This episode is recounted in Ali Jalali Military History and Publications sec- and Lester Grau’s book The Other Side tion of The Infantry School, 1934). of the Mountain. The two editors are However, in recent decades the implicit well known for a sequence of publica- analysis this approach provides has tions on unconventional warfare going been greatly strengthened by the more back to the early 1990s. For those who explicit case-study method. If these sto- follow this field, it is no surprise that ries had been written and presented as they are employed at the U.S. Army’s formal case studies, some existing distinguished Foreign Military Studies weaknesses could have been avoided— Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. the chief one being burying the chapter Their highly readable compilation is a “Blocking Enemy Lines of Communica- significant contribution to the literature tion” halfway through the book, despite on guerrilla warfare, and it has im- the editors’ and contributors’ amply mense implications for the contempo- demonstrated contention that logistics rary (at this writing) U.S. intervention dominated the Soviet war in Afghani- in Afghanistan. stan and was its chief strategic (not tac- The work consists of ninety-two “vi- tical) factor. gnettes” of tactical action, with a few The thematic organization of the chap- longer accounts of more protracted op- ters is a powerful approach, but it erations, all based on interviews with means sacrificing any sense of chrono- mujahideen participants. The book was logical development. As a result, there inspired by a Russian text used at the is little sense of the evolution of Frunze Combined Arms Academy, de- mujahideen tactics during the war or of tailing Soviet tactical action in Afghani- their interaction over time with Soviet stan. Jalali and Grau earlier produced tactics, despite occasional references an English translation of that book un- to such evolution in the chapter com- der the title The Bear Went Over the mentaries. In fact, the work places Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Af- unreasonable expectations on the back- ghanistan (National Defense Univ. ground knowledge of the reader. A Press, 1996). The Other Side of the summary of the war’s origins, conduct, Mountain points out when one of its and outcome is badly needed. A table short stories covers the same actions or listing each major mujahideen faction, with its leader, ideology, and sponsors, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/15 2 BOOK REVIEWS 167 Green: The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in theSoviet-A would also be helpful, as these factions although their contributors always re- are referred to throughout the narrative. ferred to “Russians,” they have changed The book might also have addressed this throughout to “Soviets.” Did the popular myths or conceptions about same process occur in transcribing the the war—for example, the U.S. view interviewees’ descriptions of guerrilla that distribution of Stinger antiaircraft operations? In this book even the most missiles to the mujahideen broke the irregular of mujahideen commanders back of Soviet air support and hence seems to have a perfect grasp of U.S. was the decisive point of the struggle. military terms and phrasing, implying The editors at a number of points indi- an equal grasp of the concepts behind cate their disagreement with this view the words. but never provide a formal rebuttal. Unfortunately, the book’s proofing and On the other hand, the book capri- editing is distractingly bad, which is a se- ciously provides detailed background rious handicap in a work containing so information on such relatively trivial many foreign words and names. An end points as the official U.S. Army load sheet includes production credits for the weights for mules, Central Asian horses, book—it seems only appropriate that and camels. one is listed for “Book Editing and The book has a strong geographic Desing.” A particularly unfortunate re- bias—most of the actions it describes sult of this hasty editing is found in the are in the vicinity of Kabul or on the commentary following a chapter on ur- route connecting Kabul and Jalalabad. ban combat. On first reading, this evalu- Most of the remaining actions are in ation of a mujahideen bombing of a city the Kandahar area. There is nothing market appears actually to be a defense from the Herat region, or the area of terrorist attacks on civilian noncom- around Maz~r-e Shar§f, or the Panjshir batants.
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