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Gilbert Ramsay Phd Thesis

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Gilbert Ramsay Phd Thesis CONSUMING THE JIHAD: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE SUBCULTURE OF INTERNET JIHADISM Gilbert Ramsay A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2011 Full metadata for this item is available in Research@StAndrews:FullText at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3607 This item is protected by original copyright Consuming the Jihad An Enquiry into the Subculture of Internet Jihadism Gilbert Ramsay A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. October, 2011 I, Gilbert Ramsay, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. Date………………………….. Signature of candidate……………………………... I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date…………………………… Signature of supervisor……………………………. In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below. The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis: - Access to printed copy and electronic publication of thesis through the University of St Andrews. Date…………………………… Signature of candidate……………………………... Signature of supervisor……………………………. ! Abstract Recent years have seen a great deal of interest in phenomena such as Al Qaida ‘terrorism’, Islamic ‘radicalism’ or, increasingly, ‘jihadism’ - on the Internet. However, as I argue in this thesis, much work in these areas has been problematic for a number of reasons. Much literature has been narrowly focused on the security issues which it pre-judges the content to raise, and has therefore taken some aspects too literally while ignoring others. Conversely, where authors have addressed ‘jihadi’ content or ‘electronic jihad’ as a phenomenon unto itself, they have had difficulty making sense of it within religious studies or political communication frameworks. In this dissertation, I propose an alternative approach. Deliberately eschewing frameworks based on pre-existing conceptions of religion or politics, I draw, instead, on the academic literature on fandom and subcultural media consumption. Using this conceptual lens, I attempt to analyse jihadism on the Internet (which I define in terms of online consumption of, and identification with self-described ‘jihadi’ content) as a subcultural phenomenon on its own terms. I argue that, without necessarily denying the role that beliefs and ideals expressed in ‘jihadi’ content may sometimes have in sustaining the physical violence of the ‘global jihad’, the cultural practices which constitute Internet jihadism have a tactical logic of their own which may not always coincide with the ‘strategic’ interests of ‘global jihad’. By better understanding what ‘ordinary’ jihadis, most of whom will never participate in violence, get out of their practices, and how they negotiate the apparent contradictions of their situation, I suggest that we may be better placed to understand not only why some jihadis ‘fail’ to negotiate these contradictions, but also, perhaps, to raise questions about how popular media consumption works more generally. ! Contents !"#$%"&%'()&*+,#$()#,"&% % % % % % % 3% -.)/#$(%0&$1%2,.)3,*4%)&3%#.$%5&#$(&$#% 1.0: Introduction 5-8 1.1: Information War and Cyberterrorism 8-12 1.2: Terrorism ‘on’ the Internet 12-17 1.3: From Terrorism on the Internet to Jihadism on the Internet 17-21 1.4: Jihadism as Internet Islam 21-27 1.4: Jihadism as Internet Politics 28-31 1.5 Conclusion 31-32 -.)/#$(%'6"1%7)&3"4%)&3%8$3,)%9:;<:+#:($% 2.0: Introduction 33-34 2.1: Popular Culture and Cultural Studies 34-36 2.2: Youth Subcultures as Authentic Popular Culture 36-39 2.3: Fans as Subcultural Consumers of Mass Media 39-42 2.4: New Waves of Fandom Theory 42-43 2.5: Redefining Fandom 43-45 2.6: From Fandom to Consumer Culture 46-47 2.7: Cultural Theorists: De Certeau, Bourdieu, Maffesoli 47-53 2.8: Conclusion: Making Use of Concepts of Fandom 53-57 %-.)/#$(%'.($$1%'.$%!$#&"=()/.,<%8$#."3% 3.0: Ethnography and the Internet 59-65 3.1: The Application of the Netnographic Method to Covert Research 65 3.2: Entrée 65-66 3.3: Data Collection 66-70 3.4: Analysis and Interpretation 70-72 3.5: Research Ethics 72-76 3.6: Complicity? 76-78 -.)/#$(%7":(1%5&%9$)(<.%">%?#.$%2,.)3,@% 4.0: Introduction 79-80 4.1: Jihad, Jihadism and ‘the Jihadi’ 80-82 4.2: Searching for ‘the Jihadi’ 82-88 4.3: Constructing ‘The Jihadi’ 88-96 4.4: Jihadi Anashid/Poetry 97-103 4.5: Jihadi Animation 103-106 4.6: Jihadiyyat and Ideological Factionalism 106-110 4.7: Partisan Difference in Three Jihadi Videos 110-117 4.8: ‘Entering the Jihadi’ - Webspace and Jihadi Content 114-117 4.9: Conclusion 117-119 % % % -.)/#$(%7,A$1%7"(:4*%)*%2,.)3,%B$;*/)<$% 5.0: Internet Jihadism as a Collective Enterprise 121-122 5.1: Basic Characteristics of Jihadi Forums 122-126 5.2: Emergence of Jihadi Forums 126-129 5.3: Security Concerns 129-132 5.4: Purpose of Jihadi Forums 132-137 5.5: Al-Sayf: ‘Reading’ a Forum 137-141 5.6: Splits and Dissolutions 141-147 5.7: Analysis: Geeking the Jihad? 147-149 -.)/#$(%9,C1%D$,&=%)%2,.)3,%"&%#.$%5&#$(&$#% 6.0: ‘Jihadis’ on the Internet 151-153 6.1: The Jihadi Manhaj 153-163 6.2: Electronic Jihad? 163-170 6.3: Inhabiting Jihadi Ideology – Online Jihadi Identity 170-185 6.4: Internet Jihadi Perspectives on the Internet Jihadi: Irhabi007 and Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi 185-191 6.5: Conclusion: Jihadism as Clubculture? 192-194 -.)/#$(%9$A$&1%2,.)3,*4%)&3%,#*%E,*<"&#$&#*% 7.0: Jihadi Da‘wa 195-198 7.1: Jihadis Confront the Other 198-200 7.2: ‘I Am the Muslim Network’ 200-205 7.3: Criticism of an Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb Hostage Ransoming 205-208 7.4: A Dispute over Targeting in Iraq 206-208 7.5: An Attack on Detractors of the Jihadis 219-215 7.6: A Jihadi Response to a Critical Challenge 215-221 7.7 Conclusion 221-224 -.)/#$(%F,=.#1%-"&<+:*,"&%% 8.0 Introduction 225-227 8.1 Internet Jihadism and Radicalisation into Violence 227-232 8.2 Jihadism as Fandom 232-237 8.3 What Might Jihadism Do? 237-241 8.4 Whither Internet Jihadism? 241-245 8.5 Further Questions 245-247 8.6 Some Final Remarks 247-249 1 2 A Note on Transliteration In this dissertation I have generally followed the system of transliteration advocated by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Where the original of a text is in Arabic, it is transliterated in full, with the exception that initial hamza is omitted. ‘ayn is a forwards apostrophe. Hamza is a backwards apostrophe. Macrons are placed on long vowels. Emphatic consonants are indicated with a dot under the letter. T! marb"#a is written ‘a’ normally, and ‘t’ if it is sounded in an i$!fa construction. Alif-l!m (connected by a dash to the following word) may lose its alif through elision, (necessitating another dash), but never its l!m as well. Sun letters remain shibboleths as usual. As recommended by the IJMES, proper names are transliterated in part, where they derive from an Arabic original. The letters stay the same, but the diacritics are lost, and ‘ayn and hamza make do with an apostrophe directed whichever way the word processor decides to put it. They also gain some capitals, so for instance I write Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, not ab" mu%‘ab al-s"r&. For Arabic names which have been encountered ready-transliterated, this transliteration is used. ‘Younis Tsouli’ stays ‘Younis Tsouli’. Arabic words familiar in English are generally spelled without diacritics. There are some exceptions to this. Where I particularly mean an Arabic word to be approached as an Arabic word - not an Arabic word which gets used in English, I sometimes emphasise this by spelling it as such. So sometimes ‘jihadi’, becomes jih!d". Arabic web forums often have their own suggested English transcription, for example, Al Mojahden Electronic Network. Sometimes, I prefer to re-transliterate these into a more conventional English 3 spelling - Al Mujahidin Electronic Network. When I use the former in this case, I am talking about the forum as it talks about itself in English. When I use the latter, I have in mind that I am relaying content as it is encountered in Arabic. Sometimes, I keep a silent t! marb"#a as a final ‘t’, where the word would be unrecognisable to an English speaker without it.
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