Islamic Radicalism in the Palestinian Territories: a Comparative Analysis of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Home , Ata Abu Rashta, Jund Ansar Allah, Ramadan Shalah

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Islamic Radicalism in the Palestinian Territories: A Comparative Analysis of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Diploma Thesis BC. ET BC. TOMÁŠ KUBÍK

Supervisor: Mgr. Josef Kraus, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science Security and Strategic Studies Brno 2021

ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Bibliografický záznam

Autor: Bc. et Bc. Tomáš Kubík Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykova univerzita Katedra politologie Název práce: Islamic Radicalism in the Palestinian Territories: A Comparative Analysis of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Studijní program: Magisterský studijní program Studijní obor: Department of Political Science Security and Strategic Studies Vedoucí práce: Mgr. Josef Kraus, Ph.D. Rok: 2021 Počet stran: 249 Klíčová slova: Islamismus, Radikalismus, Západní břeh, Pásmo Gazy, Hnutí Hamás, Nestátní ozbrojení aktéři

2 ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Bibliographic record

Author: Bc. et Bc. Tomáš Kubík Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Islamic Radicalism in the Palestinian Territories: A Comparative Analysis of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Degree Programme: Master's degree programme Field of Study: Security and Strategic Studies Supervisor: Mgr. Josef Kraus, Ph.D. Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 249 Keywords: Islamism, Radicalism, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Hamas Movement, Armed Non-State Actors

3 ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Abstrakt

Diplomová práce pojednává o aktuálním bezpečnostním problému re- gionu Blízkého východu – radikálním islamismu na palestinských územích Západního břehu Jordánu a Pásma Gazy. Autor analyzuje současný vývoj tohoto fenoménu a s využitím teorie nestátních ozbro- jených aktérů detailně zkoumá hlavní skupiny radikální islamistické scény, které v posledních letech aktivně působily v těchto teritoriích. Hlavní ambicí výzkumu je komparace těchto aktérů na Západním břehu a v Pásmu Gazy. Výzkum přišel se zjištěním, že obě oblasti se značně liší v množství radikálních islamistických elementů a charakteru jed- notlivých skupin.

4 ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Abstract

The diploma thesis is devoted to the current security problem of the Mid- dle East region – a radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The author analyzes this phenomenon's current development and thoroughly examines the leading groups of the radical Islamist scene that have been active in these territories in recent years, using the theory of armed non-state actors. The research's main ambition is to compare these organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The research concluded that the two areas differ substantially in the amount of radical Islamist elements and individual groups' features.

ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Declaration of Authorship

Hereby I solemnly declare that I wrote the following master's diploma thesis on the topic of Islamic Radicalism in the Palestinian Territo- ries: A Comparative Analysis of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip only by myself. All resources and sources of information used were appropriately cited in the text and are listed in the list of used sources and literature.

Brno, January 18, 2021 ...... Bc. et Bc. Tomáš Kubík

ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RADICAL ISLAMIST GROUPS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Acknowledgement

At this point, I would like to express my great thanks to my supervisor Mgr. Josef Kraus, Ph.D., for help with choosing a topic and his valuable remarks that made my writing easier. Special thanks to Dr. Michael Barak for the provided interview, which contributed significantly to the research's final findings. The author also thanks Mr. Aymenn Jawad Al- Tamimi for consulting the results of the analysis. Last but not least, many thanks to my family and close friends, who supported me throughout my studies.

TABLE OF CONTENT

Table of Content

List of Figures 15

List of Tables 18

Note on Transliteration 19

Introduction 20

1 Theoretical Part 23 1.1 Overview of Previous Research on the Topic ...... 23 1.2 Definition of Key Concepts ...... 26 1.2.1 Islamism ...... 26 1.2.2 Salafism ...... 29 1.2.3 Salafi Jihadism ...... 30 1.2.4 Jihadism ...... 31 1.2.5 Takfirism ...... 32

2 Analytical Frameworks 33 2.1 Characteristics of Armed Non-State Actors ...... 33 2.2 Behavioral dynamics and relations between Armed Non-State Actors ...... 35 2.2.1 Categories of Armed Non-State Actors’ Relations ...... 39

3 Objectives and Methodology 42 3.1 Research Objectives and Questions ...... 42 3.2 Research Design ...... 44 3.3 Research Methods ...... 45 3.4 Applied Theories ...... 46 3.5 Research Scope ...... 47 3.6 Data Collection ...... 48 3.7 Limits of the Research ...... 50

11 TABLE OF CONTENT

4 Comparative Analysis 52 4.1 Historical Background of Radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories ...... 52 4.1.1 The Origin of Palestinian Radical Islamism ...... 52 4.1.2 The Beginning of the Radicalization Process ...... 54 4.1.3 The First Intifada and Evolution of the Hamas Movement 57 4.1.4 The Second Intifada and Hamas' Takeover of Gaza ...... 59 4.2 Current State ...... 63 4.2.1 West Bank ...... 66 4.2.2 Gaza Strip ...... 70 4.3 Characteristics of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank ... 78 4.3.1 Hizb-ut-Tahrir ...... 78 4.3.2 Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades ...... 87 4.3.3 Hamas' activities ...... 93 4.4 Characteristics of Radical Islamist Groups in Gaza Strip ...... 95 4.4.1 Hamas (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) ...... 96 4.4.2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad ...... 104 4.4.3 Popular Resistance Committees ...... 111 4.4.4 Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) ...... 120 4.4.5 Jaysh al-Ummah (Army of the Nation) ...... 126 4.4.6 Harakat as-Sabirin Nasran li-Filastin (Sabireen Movement) 133 4.4.7 Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem 141 4.4.8 Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (Islamic State in Gaza) ...... 148 4.4.9 Other Groups ...... 154 4.5 Summary and Comparison of Groups' Characteristics ...... 157 4.5.1 Summary ...... 157 4.5.2 Comparison ...... 160

12 TABLE OF CONTENT

4.6 The Behavioral Dynamics and Relations between the Groups ...... 164 4.6.1 West Bank ...... 164 4.6.2 Gaza Strip ...... 168 4.6.3 Comparison ...... 178 4.7 Summary of the Analysis ...... 180

5 Conclusion 185

Bibliography 189

Sources of figures 236

Appendix 243 Comparison of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in basic facts ...... 243 Map of Israel and Palestine Controlled Areas ...... 244 Interview Details ...... 245

Number of characters: 259 5111

1 The scope of work was exceeded with the supervisor's permission and due to the need to accomplish a complete analysis.

LIST OF FIGURES

List of Figures

Figure 1: Placement of ANSA arrangements according to the degree of trust and durability

Figure 2: Picture from one of the protests held by Salafists in Gaza in support of ISIS

Figure 3: Excerpt from a video from The Mujahideen of Gaza in the Is- lamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham, an ISIS group composed of fighters from Gaza

Figure 4: The primary logo of the organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Figure 5: Banner available on the HuT website

Figure 6: Screenshot from The Central Media Office of HuT encouraging the liberation of Jerusalem

Figure 7: One of the issues of Mukhtarat Magazine, a periodical of HuT

Figure 8: Emblem of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades

Figure 9: Propaganda banner from the AAMB website

Figure 10: AAMB fighters on a propaganda video

Figure 11: Emblem of the Hamas movement

Figure 12: Emblem of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Figure 13: Banner from al-Qassam Brigades website

Figure 14: One of the banners of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Figure 15: Propaganda of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades related to the COVID-19 pandemic

Figure 16: Emblem of Palestinian Islamic Jihad

15 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 17: PIJ's promotional material shows "preparation for waging jihad" with pictured former PIJ leaders (Fathi Shaqaqi, Ramadan Shalah) and current leader (Ziyad al-Nakhalah)

Figure 18: Propagational material from the official AQB website

Figure 19: Emblem of Popular Resistance Committees

Figure 20, 21: Emblem and the flag of al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades (Liwa al-Tawheed)

Figure 22: The banner of the Popular Resistance Committees

Figure 23: PRC's promotional material for Eid al-Fitr

Figure 24: Emblem of Jaysh al-Islam

Figure 25: An online magazine of the Army of Islam group called Nida al- Masra

Figure 26: Jaysh al-Islam fighters in a screenshot from the propaganda video

Figure 27: Emblem of the Jaysh al-Ummah

Figure 28: Flag of the Jaysh al-Ummah

Figure 29, 30: The banners of Jaysh al-Ummah posted within the bitcoin campaign. The second depicts the leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri,

Figure 31: The flag of the Sabireen Movement,

Figure 32: Emblem of The Great Prophet’s Brigades, military wing of Sabireen Movement,

Figure 33: Excerpt from The Great Prophet’s Brigades video demonstrating the strength of the Sabireen Movement military wing,

16 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 34: One of the posts on the official Twitter account of the Sabireen Movement calling for the liberation of Palestine,

Figure 35: The flag of the Mujahideen Shura Council, the same one used by ISIS,

Figure 36: Title image of one of the MSC propaganda videos entitled "Journey of Martyrdom"

Figure 37: One of the MSC contributions on social networks soliciting bitcoin donation

Figure 38: Screenshot from an MSC propaganda video calling for attacks on Israel

Figure 39: One of the emblems used by the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade

Figure 40: Excerpt from the SOHB video in which he reports responsibility for a missile attack in Israel

Figure 41: SOHB's extract from social media defending the missile attack of September 2015

Figure 42: The logo of the joint operations room of the Palestinian resistance movements

Figure 43: Billboards in Gaza depicting Qassem Soleimani and the epitaph "the martyr of Jerusalem"

17 LIST OF TABLES

List of Tables

Table 1: Major trends in Islamism

Table 2: Categories of ANSA arrangements

Table 3: Fundamental characteristics of Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Table 4: Fundamental characteristics of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades

Table 5: Fundamental characteristics of Hamas

Table 6: Fundamental characteristics of Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Table 7: Fundamental characteristics of Popular Resistance Committees

Table 8: Fundamental characteristics of Jaysh al-Islam

Table 9: Fundamental characteristics of Jaysh al-Ummah

Table 10: Fundamental characteristics of Sabireen Movement

Table 11: Fundamental characteristics of Mujahideen Shura Council

Table 12: Fundamental characteristics of Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade

Table 13: Summary of the main similarities and differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in group characteristics

Table 14: Summary of the main similarities and differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in group relations

18 NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Note on Transliteration

As the work contains several Arabic terms, personal and local names, and other related words, the author must clarify their English transcription. Many Middle Eastern experts use transliteration according to the Inter- national Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), which preserves full transcription with diacritical marks (macrons and dots). However, to facilitate reading, the author rewrites Arabic names in a simplified version without diacritical marks, consonants "ayn" ('a,' u, 'i) and "hamza" and does not distinguish between voiced and unvoiced consonant (e.g., al- Qaeda instead of al-Qa'ida, or instead of the utterly phonetic al-Qāʿidah; Quran instead of Qur'an etc.). There are exceptions in work only in those cases where there is no English equivalent for a given Arabic term or personal name, or these terms are usually rewritten in this way by other authors (e.g., al-Jaz'ara, Tabi' al-Tabi'in).

19 INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Understanding Middle Eastern politics is like playing three-dimensional chess underwater, with all the pieces moving simultaneously.”

Sir Mark Allen (Ranstorp 2017, VII)

This analogy aptly describes today's tangled reality of the Middle East conflicts, from which the interminable Israeli-Palestinian conflict stands out, influencing political discourse in the Middle East region for more than 70 years. Dozens of bloody wars have taken place against its back- drop, which has embroiled an intense hatred between the two nations, the traces of which continue to affect the lives of the current generation of Israelis and Palestinians. Even today, we cannot talk about calming down a situation that would signal a shift in finding a solution. On the contrary, conflicting attitudes persist, and new insurmountable obsta- cles to the two relations are emerging, due to which a solution to the conflict is still in sight.

To find some ways to resolve the disputes, it is necessary to pay increased attention to a comprehensive understanding of the issue, as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is often misinterpreted, or the topic is deliberately politicized by one of the actors in the conflict. A widespread phenomenon is ignorance of the Palestinian territories' realities when the region's developments are viewed from a "black and white" perspective, such as there are Palestinian terrorists and Israeli peacemakers, as is often accepted by the general public. Also, the lack of clarity in the contemporary situation in Palestinian territories must be appended, especially in the Gaza Strip, which has been practically cut off from the world since 2007. All these factors make the current development of the Palestinian

20 INTRODUCTION cause challenging, but, at the same time, an attractive research field within which new analytical outputs can still be taken place.

An essential role in better understanding Palestine's present situation is played by the scientific and academic environment, which seeks to contribute to the debate with ever new perspectives on research that would unravel this complex security problem. One of them is to draw attention to lesser-known actors on the Palestinian side, which are often overlooked, even though they impact the current form of the Israeli-Palestin- ian conflict. One of the key players in this regard are radical organized movements from the Palestinian Islamist scene, whose behavior significantly influences current events in the region.

The non-existence of all-embracing data on Islamic radicalism in Pales- tine is a significant research challenge. At least in the Czech professional environment, it is practically an unexplored area. There is also limited research on the current Palestinian Islamist scene in foreign literature, especially in the Gaza Strip, which is generally overshadowed by the larger West Bank. However, researchers' attention is mostly paid to well- known actors, such as Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Other actors, such as smaller groups, are generally sidelined, although they substantially shape the region's security reality. The evidence is the ongoing rocket or balloon attacks from the Gaza Strip, which are often accepted that only Hamas is responsible for them. However, it is a misconception, as other radicals are contributing to today's chaotic situation.

This work aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in the Palestinian territories, i.e., in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and its actors. Specifically, the work will focus on all major militant Islamist movements and their characteristics, behavior

21 INTRODUCTION dynamics, and mutual relations. The work's ambition is to compare all these aspects between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.2

In addition to the research potential and relevance in security studies, the impulse for choosing the topic of the work is also the author's effort to provide objective information that is not burdened by tampered stances from some states (e.g., Israel) and refute some politicized data that circulates mainly across media space. The author believes that comparing the phenomenon between the Palestinian territories will certainly yield hitherto unknown facts that could enrich current research on terrorism and Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. From a research point of view, this comparison can then be considered innovative regarding its optics, through which the issue is viewed.

In the following text, the author gradually introduces the work's theoretical part, used analytical concepts and methodological framing. The thesis then briefly discusses the historical background of Palestinian Islamic radicalism. This research's central part lies in the comparative analysis of the radical Islamist groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

2 A more detailed analysis of the research objectives is given in a separate chapter.

22 1 THEORETICAL PART

1 Theoretical Part

Above all, the work introduces the theoretical anchoring of research. The first part summarizes the existing literature on radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories, which mentions all crucial authors and their contribution to the scientific environment. In the course of the work, it is possible to come across several foreign terms, the meaning of which may not be obvious. Besides, some terms may overlap or complement each other, so there is a general ambiguity. Therefore, the second subchapter aims to conceptualize the basic concepts related to the topic of research and state their main characteristics. Attention is focused on terms such as "Islamism," "Radicalism,” "Salafism," "Jihadism," or "Takfirism."

1.1 Overview of Previous Research on the Topic

The topic of radical Islamism in the Palestinian arena is addressed in de- tail by Cohen and Levitt (2010) or Bartal (2015). For example, reports from Ganor (2011), Schweitzer and Brom (2013), Ghanem and Mustafa (2014), Dunning (2015), or Marteu (2018) partially complement them. Two essential points can summarize the central outputs of these studies. First, all the authors of the research argue that while the presence of radical Islamist elements in the West Bank is relatively marginal, their presence in the Gaza Strip is prominent and, at the same time, very unclear. Second, the researchers seek to recognize the threat of radicalism in both places, logically identifying it as more severe in Gaza. Depending on the author and the date of publication, the specific results differ, but they agree that Gaza's security situation is not just about Hamas, but there is a broader list of active actors who are less well known and more radical

23 1 THEORETICAL PART extremist due to links to al-Qaeda (older research) and the Islamic State (more recent research) or inspired by them.

A paper Deterred but Determined Salafi-Jihadi Groups in the Palestinian Arena by Cohen and Levitt (2010) from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy is one of the few that captures the complex situation of radical Islamist (specifically Salafi jihadist) actors in Palestine. The report discusses Palestinian radicalization, Salafism's growth in Palestin- ian society, and case studies of individual Salafi jihadist groups. The author used this work to provide a basic overview of the phenomenon until 2010, but current data were obtained from other sources (see below).

Israeli expert Shaul Bartal, author of Jihad in Palestine, Political Islam and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2015), takes a close look at the Palestin- ian jihadist scene, where in addition to the radical Hamas movement, he also studies other extremist Islamist groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. A great merit is collecting primary data based on field research and interviews with some members of the examined organizations. On the other hand, it should be noted that the author pays attention only to the phenomenon of jihadism (omitting other types of radical Islamist groups) and devotes a substantial part to the theoretical interpretation of jihad. Furthermore, the book does not provide an up-to-date overview, as it was written in 2015.

It is also necessary to briefly present the research of Palestinian radical groups separately in both examined areas. If we focus only on the West Bank, the academia pays only peripheral attention to this topic. For the most part, information about radical Islamist groups in the West Bank appears randomly, and if so, in the context of another studied issue or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general and is only referred to in short

24 1 THEORETICAL PART sentences. Unique research is, for example, the work by Sunsehaugen (2011) concerning the Hamas movement exclusively in the West Bank.

On the other hand, there are various sources on radical Islam in the Gaza Strip from the available literature. Considerable research in this area is the work of Berti (2010 and 2011), International Crisis Group report (2011), Stockmarr (2011), Milton-Edwards (2014), Clarke (2017), or Irgens (2018). A very full-fledged source is a book by Björn Brenner Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance (2017), which provides a well-researched inside view of the Hamas government in Gaza through the field analysis data. In terms of the specific content of the above-mentioned research, the vast majority of them first introduce the process of Islamization of Palestinian politics, often in the context of the region's military-political situation, and the development of radicalism in Gaza itself. Almost every research discusses Hamas' role and influence on this territory's extremist environment. Some research then focuses on other Islamist (militant) groups in the Gaza Strip and their mutual relations. In this respect, the Gaza Strip can be described as a seedbed of radical Islamism, with a typically high heterogeneity level, whether it is an ideology, relationship to Islam, or advancing political goals of these actors. Another important conclusion of most researchers is that these groups often have antagonistic relations with Hamas, gradually culminating in the rivalry. As in the West Bank case, however, it is evident that current research (ca. in the last two years) on radicalism in Gaza is lacking, which implies that the author must rely on an extensive analysis of open sources.

25 1 THEORETICAL PART

1.2 Definition of Key Concepts

In recent years, the terminology associated with Islam has become less clear and concise for laypeople. However, there is also disagreement in the professional environment, where countless attempts have been made to define terms concerning radical Islam, which are often confused with each other (Ghanem and Mostafa 2014, 336). As Sedgwick (2015, 34) points out, these terms are also prevalent in the media space, although their true meaning is often misleading and inaccurate. Neverthe- less, most researchers and scholars (Mozaffari 2007, Ashour 2009, Hegg- hammer 2009, Saleem 2014) agree that the common denominator and overriding term is the word "Islamism," from which other relevant terms are derived. Therefore, this work will start with this concept.

1.2.1 Islamism The term "Islamism" has undergone a very dynamic development in history, during which its meaning has transformed several times. In recent years, Islamism was a topic relatively discussed already before the 9/11 attacks. The widespread boom was noticed until afterward by academics, the general public, and the media. Their interest intensified after the dramatic events associated with the Arab Spring, the migration crisis, and the Middle East's destabilization, which sparked a wide-ranging debate about Islamism and its streams. At present, a variety of “phony experts” comment on this concept, including opinion-makers, who use Islamism often only by simplified rhetoric (Čejka 2020, 12). Many pundits and academics point their efforts on define Islamism at separating the terms "Islamism" and "political Islam," but there is no consensus on what pre-

26 1 THEORETICAL PART cisely both terms mean. Other scholars (e.g., Schuck, 2013) perceive Is- lamists as enforcing Islamic law or seeking to implement Sharia in their territory.

From the professional literature, two main variants of the meaning of the term "Islamism" can be generalized (according to Čejka, 2020: 21):

• Islamism in the sense of a stronger intertwining of Islam with politics, which corresponds to the terms "political Islam," "politically activist Is- lam," or Islam as a political ideology (e.g., Desai 2006, cf. Martin and Bar- zegar 2009).

• Islamism as a form of Islamic fundamentalism, i.e., a profoundly conservative theological conception of Islam, based on various traditionalist or revivalist conceptions of Islam (e.g., Khatab 2012).

In contrast to the public or media space, Islamism is not necessarily associated with violence, political radicalism, or terrorism in the scholar environment. The scientific sphere views the concept more comprehen- sively as the connection between Islam and politics or ideology (Mozaf- fari 2007, 24, cf. Čejka 2020, 22).

Radical Islamism

Radical Islamism (or more commonly Islamic radicalism) is often referred to as the opposite of "moderate Islamism." However, the very distinction between radical and moderate Islamism is only a fundamental division due to the potential for huge differences between these two streams. Radicalism is characterized by the verbal expression (thought), but it can also be physical (radicalism in action), which can be selective at the same time - directed against specific goals (holders of state power,

27 1 THEORETICAL PART armed forces, but also against other Muslims), (Busman 2017, 7; Čejka 2020, 22; 70).

Islamist trends

As already mentioned, Islamism is a kind of superior category for other semantically similar terms. Based on this, Islamist movements can also be figuratively categorized, serving for one of the work's objectives (see the relevant chapter). In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the typology of Islamists, according to Ashour (2009), which distinguishes five significant trends in Islamism. They are Ikhwanism,3 Salafism, Jihadism, Tak- firism, and al-Jaz'ara.4 The essential features of these currents can be seen in the table below.

3 Ikhwanism is usually referred to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group or individual that are nonviolent (Ashour 2009, 7). 4 An Islamic trend that is linked exclusively to Algeria.

28 1 THEORETICAL PART

Islamist Historical Geopolitical Stance on Stance on trend origins scope democracy violence

Rejection National, (against Ikhawnism Egypt international Acceptance national (autonomous) regimes) Saudi Arabia Critical (but Salafism (Najd International Mixed mixed) province) International, national, Upheld and Jihadism Egypt Rejection secessionist/ promoted irredentist

Takfirism Egypt International Rejection Mixed al-Jaz'ara Algeria National Acceptance Pragmatic

Table 1: Major trends in Islamism (according to Ashour 2009, 11)

Given that the work deals with the topic of radical Islamist groups, the author in the following text will focus only on those streams that do not reject violence (are “violence-prone”), and at the same time, are generally interchangeable with Islamism. These include Salafism, Jihadism, among which Salafi Jihadism oscillates, and Takfirism.

1.2.2 Salafism Like Islamism, Salafism is very complex and not always easy to grasp phenomena. Salafism is usually not presented as a synonym for Islamism, but these two concepts cannot be completely separated due to the not entirely clear definable boundaries (Čejka 2020, 88). Salafism (or also Salafist Islam) can be characterized as “a philosophical outlook which seeks to revive the practices of the first three generation of Islam, known

29 1 THEORETICAL PART as “pious predecessors”5 ("al-salaf al-saliḥ" - hence the name Salafism) (Maher 2016, 7). Salafism thus calls for a return to the Quran and original Islamic values and practices. However, Salafism itself does not have a unified ideology and expression. For instance, they share fundamental values such as establishing a particular form of Islamic government and the Islamic concept of justice in society, but they often differ in achieving this (Wiktorowicz 2006; Deoneux 2011, 58; Čejka 2020, 88).

1.2.3 Salafi Jihadism The term “Salafi jihadism” was first used by the French orientalist Gilles Kepel in his work Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam (2002). He considers Salafist jihadists to be Muslims who combine their rigorous vision of Is- lam with the desire to be jihad fighters, in a militant sense. According to him, Salafist jihadism does not have a more profound tradition in Islam but arose in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the formation of local jihad in the 1980s (Kepel 2002). During this period, according to several authors (e.g., Stenersen 2018, 17), Salafist jihadism split off as a radical wing of Islamism. It is the war conflicts in the territory of Muslim states (especially the invasion of Iraq) that play an essential role in the fact that, according to Salafist jihadists, every Muslim has to show their devotion to God and wage a martyr war against the "god- less" West and the "apostate" regimes of the Muslim world (Maher 2016, 208, cf. Čejka 2020, 65).

5 These are generations of so-called Muhammad's companions, their successors and the successors of the successors. The first generation is known as the Sahaba (roughly until 690), the second Tabi'un (roughly until 750) and the third Tabi' al-Tabi'in (roughly until 810).

30 1 THEORETICAL PART

According to Hafez (2007, 66–70), contemporary Salafist jihadism is characterized by five elementary features:

• “the immense emphasis on the concept of tawhid (unity of God, or mon- otheism); • the emphasis on God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah), which defines right and wrong, good and evil; • the strict constructionist jurisprudence and the rejection of all innova- tion (bid‘ah) in Islam; • the permissibility and necessity of takfir (the declaring of a Muslim to be outside the creed, so that they may face execution); • the centrality of jihad in the path of God and against infidel regimes.”

1.2.4 Jihadism The term “jihadism” has also become popular in discussions on Islamism in recent years. The term itself did not appear until 1986 when it was used by the Israeli historian Haggai Erlich as a process of inclination towards jihad (Erlich, 1986, cf. Sedgwick, 2015: 35). Nonetheless, jihadism as an Islamic stream has its roots in modern fundamentalism in the late 19th century and the concept of “jihad” in the Palestinian context appears as early as the 1930s (Bartal, 2015: 1). The truncated concept of "jihad" (literally means “striving” or “struggling”) is often referred to as "holy war," or radical Islamist terror," and jihadism is then understood as a practical implementation (Kramer 2003).

In practice, every definition of jihadism emphasizes the use of violence, even if jihad does not primarily consist of violence.6 Thus, the authors

6 Islam (Sharia law) defines four types of jihad: jihad by heart as great (inner) jihad (religious self-cultivation, doing good, etc.) and three types of small (external) jihad - jihad by tongue (spreading the faith by word), jihad by hand (charitable and social activity) and jihad by the sword (defense of Islam by violence), (Mendel 2010, 32-35).

31 1 THEORETICAL PART usually provide a simple definition, where they refer jihadism as a sub- category of militant Islamism, which is described “by the use of violence to achieve political goals, but also the rejection of the nation state and international order” (Ibid., cf. Maher 2016, 10).

1.2.5 Takfirism Compared to other concepts around Islamism, takfirism is a lesser- known concept and a little different in meaning. To define this term, it is necessary to start with the word "takfir," which is the act of accusing a Muslim of "apostasy" (murrtadd) for abandoning Islam and becoming an infidel. In Arabic, it literally means an ex-communication from the community of believers (umma) (Ashour 2009, 9, cf. Blanchard 2009, 2). From this concept, Takfirism can be described as an ideology whose “basic assumption is to label the entire Muslim community (a village, a city, a country or the global Muslim community) as unbelievers, unless proven otherwise.” It is the difference between Takfirism and other Islamist trends, as they consider Muslim societies to be Muslim unless otherwise declared (Ashour 2009, 9–10).

32 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

2 Analytical Frameworks

The following text presents the analytical frameworks used for this research. In this part, the author clarifies the theory and concepts of armed (violent) non-state actors within which the conceptualization and oper- ationalization of research are conducted. The author chose to frame the research using the theory of armed non-state actors, given that the selected frameworks can penetrate the depth of the studied phenomenon (radical Islamist groups), identify causal relationships between the examined data, and thus find answers to research questions (see next chapter). The choice of each analytical framework is then separately ex- plained.

2.1 Characteristics of Armed Non-State Actors

In recent years, armed non-state actors (ANSAs) have dramatically shifted the conflict environment in the Middle East. Political instability in the region, accompanied by the fragility of states and in some cases their failure, further strengthens the military, political or social importance of these actors, such as terrorists, insurgent groups, or liberation movements (Berti 2016, 1). In general terms, ANSAs are defined as armed organizations operating outside the state's control and willing to use force (violence) to achieve their objectives. The professional literature usually mentions three dis- tinctive features of armed non-state actors. In addition to (1) the willing- ness and capability to use violence to pursue its goals, it is (2) non-inte- gration into formalized state institutions such as regular armies and (3) possession of a certain degree of autonomy concerning politics, military

33 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS operations, resources, and infrastructure (Petrasek 2000, cf. Hofmann and Schneckener 2009, 604; Berti 2016).

In order to understand ANSAs and distinguish their types, it is necessary to set fundamental indicators. The analytical framework, according to Williams (2008, 8), will serve this. He defines seven key dimensions:

1) Motivation and purpose – determine what drives the given actor, what is the specific motivation, and what the goals are. According to Williams, it is necessary to consider the means and strategies by which the actor tries to achieve his goals. The author of the thesis also includes here the ideology, which plays a key role in motivating the actor (e.g., according to Petrasek, 2000). 2) Strength and scope – specify the actor's geographically circumscribed area and what is its reach (national, transnational). At this point, one can also consider the military strength of the actor.

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources – determine the actors' financial resources, whether the funding is subordinated to higher goals, or the provision of funds is the central goal. According to Williams, it is vital to examine the relationship with the illegal economy at all levels.

4) Organizational structure – defines whether the structure is hierarchical or centralized because ANSAs do not have a unified structure. Some organizational structures can be understood as a hybrid, while it must be remembered that they may change over time, depending on the opportunities, environment, or actions of the opponent.

5) The role of violence – determines what role violence plays in achieving goals and what levels and forms of violence the actor applies. Violence is what distinguishes ANSAs from other non-state actors.

34 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

6) The relationship between ANSAs and state authorities – determines the degree of hostility to state authorities. In some cases, this relationship can be complicated and, conversely, can be based on cooperation.

7) The functions of ANSAs fulfill for members and supporting constituencies – define the extent to which the actor becomes an alternative form of government and assumes functions and responsibilities that generally fall within the competence of the state authority. Functions may include enforcing and maintaining security and order or forms of social security for residents. According to Williams, fulfilling these functions is more important than filling the territorial space.

As can be seen from the above, Williams' dimensions are handy for analyzing various armed non-state actors. Using this framework, it is effort- less to create basic profiles of these actors and thoroughly identify their attributes, which is precisely the purpose of this work.

2.2 Behavioral dynamics and relations between Armed Non-State Actors

The last applied analytical concept is the theory of the dynamics of behavior and relations between the ANSAs, given that the interrelationships among Palestinian radical Islamist groups will be further investigated. This part of the text aims to clarify the complex and diverse concepts of relationships between ANSAs (including their categorization). These various interactions greatly influence their behavior, including vital strategic goals, thus impacting the entire system under study.

The framework from the Annette Idler's study Exploring Agreements of Convenience Made among Violent Non-State Actors (2012) is used to meet the goal mentioned above. In her research, she examined the interactions

35 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS between Colombian armed groups and their positions to conclude arrangements. The work generated four key factors, based on which it is possible to examine the relationships among any ANSAs, including those in this thesis. These factors are:

• Drivers of decision-making

• Insights on violence

• Variation in repercussions on local communities

• Group-specific characteristics (Idler 2012, 78–80).

1) Drivers of decision-making

According to Idler's research, ANSAs resort to concluding agreements mainly due to economic motivation, because as in a "legal" environment, they also act as rational actors striving to maximize profits. Arrange- ments between ANSAs thus increase mutual comparative advantages. Another factor that appears to be key in the relationship between ANSAs is the spread of risk. Sub-contract relationships play an essential role in this regard. An example is contract killing, which ANSAs use to avoid being linked to specific crimes and to remain impunity. However, this does not seem to be the case for all types of ANSAs – different goals of organizations lead to different perceptions of comparative advantages and risk spreading, and thus to non-existent arrangements and the possibility of violent struggle (Ibid, 78).

Nevertheless, these general aspects need to be extended to more specific reasons why ANSAs enter into agreements. According to Idler (Ibid.), em- pirical evidence shows that these factors are:

• the degree of trust between groups,

36 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

• the local context,

• the role of the state forces and other external actors,

• the organizational structure of the ANSA group.

First, the degree of trust correlates with the agreements' stability and durability. If actor A does not trust actor B, they are unlikely to engage in a strategic alliance. Second, the local context determines the behavior of ANSAs and relationships with other non-state actors. Strong historical ties play an important role, where they are not expected to change, while the current context and interests of ANSAs testify to the lack of clarity about who supports whom, and therefore short-term agreements are more typical. An important aspect is the potential presence of an internal conflict in a given state, which affects the mutual relations between AN- SAs. Third, state forces and other external actors have a significant impact on ANSA decision-making. ANSAs form alliances if they feel they can defend themselves more effectively against state forces. It also applies to tactical alliances. External influences, such as political and economic ones, or other external actors (international organizations) influencing the decision-making ANSAs cannot be neglected. Finally, the type of organizational structure also dramatically influences their behavior and relationships. While hierarchical actors predominate over longer-term alliances (more strategic thinking), shorter-term agreements are more ad- vantageous for decentralized groups due to greater independence (Ibid., 78–79).

2) Insights on violence

37 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

One of the results of interactions between ANSAs is the level of physical violence. Long-term relationships based on trust are usually understand- able without violence. Conversely, in short-term agreements, violence may occur between ANSAs due to the potential higher probability of vio- lation. Similarly, the absence of violence suggests that failure to register violence for a long time indicates longer-term agreements between AN- SAs. However, Idler points out that the so-called "tense calm" is also a frequent phenomenon, during which time there is no violence, but it can be a harbinger of a turning point, after which violence can break out (Ibid., 79).

3) Variation in repercussions on local communities

The third factor deals with the local population, which is affected by the presence of ANSAs. Idler assumes that ANSAs in complex relationships ignore the boundaries that define states involved in internal conflict and those that do not. Based on this, the author claims that tense (violent) relations between ANSAs impact local communities, which also suffer from violence. On the other hand, the presence of violence against the local population by cooperating ANSAs is challenging to determine. How- ever, it varies depending on the length of the arrangement. Short-term arrangements between ANSAs create uncertainty, fear, and mistrust in local communities because no one knows who is on which side. For the long-term, this is not easy to register, given that actors often provide them with some form of shadow governance (hence the shadow provision of security) (Ibid., 79–80).

4) Group-specific characteristics

Finally, it is necessary to consider all the specific features of the ANSAs examined to improve the understanding of their interrelationships. First,

38 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

ideological closeness may be one of the main reasons for a longer-term agreement between actors. Groups tend to trust each other more if they are politically aligned. However, other specific factors may also play an important role (Ibid., 80).

2.2.1 Categories of Armed Non-State Actors’ Relations Within Idler's research, it is also possible to define the different types of relations between the ANSAs to examine radical Islamist groups' relations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The author explicitly mentions seven types of so-called arrangements of convenience in which ANSAs can engage. In the following table, they are classified into three clusters according to their durability. Subsequently, all the above types of arrangements are briefly introduced. One should bear in mind that these types are flexible and can intersect with each other.

Non-existent Short-term Arrangements Long-term Arrangements Arrangement Spot sales and barter Transactional supply chain Violent agreements relationships combat Tactical alliances Strategic alliances Subcontract relationships Pacific coexistence

Table 2: Categories of ANSA arrangements (Source: author, based on Idler 2012, 71–77)

1) Violent combat – occurs in a situation where there are mistrust and divergent or conflicting interests among ANSAs. There is no agreement on the sharing of a particular territory or business. That is why various disputes arise – from the threat of violence to violent struggles, for example, to expel or engulf another group, defend a territory or business, or get revenge for a previous event (Ibid., 71).

39 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

2) Spot sales and barter agreements – include the illegal sale of commodities, such as drugs or weapons, which are purchased immediately "on the spot," either for cash or as a barter agreement (e.g., exchanging weapons for drugs). This type of agreement is characterized by a low level of trust, as these are mostly one-off actions (Ibid., 72).

3) Tactical alliances – these are interim cooperation arrangements between a wide range of ANSAs. Since they are based on immediate bene- fits and personal considerations are often unstable, and with low institu- tionalization, mutual trust is rather low (Ibid., 73).

4) Subcontract relationships – represent relationships where one side ac- cepts an offer from another party to provide certain services for a specified time. It can be a one-time service (contract killing) or a longer-term requirement, such as hiring mercenaries. This type of relationship is already more institutionalized than the previous ones (Ibid., 74).

5) Transactional supply chain relationships – this relationship is based on the arm's length principle, meaning that actors respect their territories of influence. In them, they independently exercise economic, social, or political control. However, they can be connected through business commitments – the supply chain, where each party procures a certain function (e.g., extraction of raw materials) (Ibid., 75).

6) Strategic alliances – they consist of long-term commitments between different parties, characterized by a high degree of trust and institution- alization. They share their intelligence or business. A common phenomenon is the conclusion of a war pact against a third actor (Ibid., 76).

7) Pacific coexistence – shares similar features as transactional supply chain relationships but has a higher degree of trust and stability. In this arrangement, the actors have various agreements of non-aggression or

40 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS non-interference in the other's affairs. Although acting in parallel, they can broadly share the territory and provide each other with some elements of critical infrastructure (e.g., rivers and oil pipelines) (Ibid., 77).

The topic of types of arrangements between ANSAs is summarized under the following figure expressing their level of trust and durability.

Figure 1: Placement of ANSA arrangements according to the degree of trust and durability (Source: Idler 2012, 70)

41 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

3 Objectives and Methodology

In this chapter, the author deals with the work's methodological setting, an integral part of every research. The chapter first introduces the objectives of the work and research questions. Subsequently, the research design, used scientific methods, applied theories, its scope, data collection methods, and finally, the limits and problems of this research are clari- fied.

3.1 Research Objectives and Questions

The work sets several goals, which it wants to achieve. The general objective is to analyze Islamic radicalism's current reality in the Palestinian territories, i.e., the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and compare this phenomenon between these two areas. To penetrate the studied issue, the author focuses explicitly on extremist Islamist groups active in both Pal- estinian territories in recent years. Therefore, the work uses the theory of armed (violent) non-state actors in the second part of the analysis. For greater clarity, the author gradually presents the individual objectives of the work.

1) Firstly, this work aims to introduce the main radical Islamist movements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and, based on theoretical concepts of non-state armed actors, create their profiles. Within this aim, the author also seeks to find out the position and influence of these groups. The author opts for this aim given that there is a vague general knowledge of who (outside of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad) are leading militant actors in the Palestinian territories. The first research question can be identified as:

42 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

RQ1: Who are the key actors of the radical Islamist arena in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in recent years, and what are their characteristics based on the concept of armed non-state actors?

To answer the research question, the author uses the theoretical concept of violent non-state actors, according to Williams (2008), presented in a separate subchapter. Within radical Islamist groups' characteristics, the additional objective is to determine what radical Islamist ideology individual actors embrace (these ideologies are introduced in the first chapter). The secondary research question thus has the following wording:

RQ1.1: What specific radical ideology do individual Islamist groups adopt?

Given that this will be a comparative analysis of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the author defines a secondary research question:

RQ1.2: What are the main similarities and differences between radical Is- lamist groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

2) The second objective of the work is to examine the dynamics of behavior and relations between individual groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is currently no overview of which radical movements in the Palestinian territories cooperate and which ones are competing with one another. Therefore, a research question is defined with the following form:

RQ2: What are the relations between the individual radical Islamist groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip? How can they be categorized?

In this case, the author applies a theoretical concept from Idler (2012), who lists in her study the main factors of mutual relations between violent non-state actors and presents the categories of these ties. The author

43 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY will focus mainly on smaller groups' relations to the Hamas movement, which de facto controls the Gaza Strip. Again, the aim will be to compare this phenomenon between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, so the secondary research question will be as follows:

RQ2.1: What are the resemblances and differences in Islamist groups' relationships between the West Bank and Gaza Strip?

3.2 Research Design

In general, the work is conceived as a comparative case study within qualitative research. The study aims to identify the phenomenon (Islamic radicalism, extremist groups, respectively) and then examine the case that this phenomenon represents (Islamist radicalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip). As part of the study of the phenomenon, a comparison is conducted that is based on determined indicators from the analytical frameworks (see the chapter on conceptualization and operationaliza- tion). A comparative case study was chosen because it „aims to infer causal relationships between factors by systematically comparing in- stances of a phenomenon, namely, cases conceived as different configura- tions of variables or factors” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 20).

A study of Palestinian Islamist groups reveals various features of the phenomenon thanks to interpretive research on which this work is also based. Thus, the study can be described as instrumental case study within disciplined interpretive research (e.g., Baxter and Jack 2010, 550). The instrumental case study according to Stake (1995, 77) „provides insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory”. The advantage of this type of study is that „the case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized,

44 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY its ordinary activities detailed, and because it helps the researcher pursue the external interest”.

If we go even further in the depth of research design, the work can be called, for instance, single case study with embedded units, as the case study in this work is divided into smaller subunits (in this case, individual radical Islamist groups). According to Yin (2003), it will allow the researcher to explore a given phenomenon and related attributes and can be analyzed within subunits separately (within case analysis), between different subunits (between case analysis), or across all subunits (cross- case analysis).

3.3 Research Methods

The processing of the diploma thesis issue requires a multidisciplinary approach. As already mentioned, the work has mainly the character of qualitative research, which employs a comparative case study method. This research's dominant methods include comparison, which generally consists of comparing structurally similar or otherwise mutually essential phenomena. The predominant method also includes analysis, which decomposes the given phenomena and examines their elements and con- nections, or a description used to describe individual topics throughout the work. Regarding the type of analysis, which the work mainly uses, we can mention the content analysis. It aims to explore verbal, visual, behavioral patterns, themes, or biases (Leedy and Ormrod 2001, 155, cf. Wil- liams 2007, 69). The opposite of the analysis is the synthesis, which combines the examined elements into one only element, which is used to determine the relationships of armed non-state actors in the analytical

45 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY part. The author also uses standard research methods, such as the induc- tive method, thanks to which it is possible, for example, to generalize the outputs in the analytical part. The work is based on previous research on the topic, so one of the other common research methods is deduction, striving to draw detailed conclusions from general information. The ver- ification method cannot be neglected either, even if the work does not work with hypotheses. In the part of conceptualization and operational- ization, features, and indicators for measuring the investigated problems are presented, which are subsequently verified in the analytical part.

3.4 Applied Theories

An important part of the methodological framework is the use and application of theoretical concepts, which have already been indicated in the work's objectives. To find answers to research questions, the author applies three theoretical frameworks, which contain vital indicators. These are concepts by Phil Williams (2008) from his study Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security and by Annette Idler (2012) from her work Exploring Agreements of Convenience Made among Violent Non-State Actors. The discussion about the reasons for choosing these concepts is to be found in the chapter on conceptualization and op- erationalization. Besides, the author works with typologies, which are defined within these concepts. However, we cannot omit several applied theories according to selected authors, such as various definitions of key terms (radicalism, jihadism, etc.) or theories of armed non-state actors.

46 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

3.5 Research Scope

This research is limited in several different ways. First, from a geographical point of view, the work zeroes in only on the comparison of the Pal- estinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, so it does not focus on areas of the State of Israel, disputed territories (e.g., East Jeru- salem, Golan Heights) and regions where a large Palestinian community lives. In this respect, it is necessary to delimit the geographical scope of radical Islamist groups. The work pays attention only to those who operate only in the Palestinian territories, even if a particular group can simultaneously operate in these areas and elsewhere like in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, for instance.

Secondly, from a time perspective, the research is limited to the current development of the issue with a retrospective reflection for a maximum of five years, as it is not in the author's ability to describe the utter current reality due to the difficult availability of resources (see research limits). Although the research works with the historical background of the issue, it serves to create its overall picture and understanding of the phenomenon.

Thirdly, it is necessary to emphasize the delimitation of the research subject, which are radical Islamist groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A necessary condition is to determine which all groups belong to this category, which is a task in the chapter concerning conceptualization. There are many armed non-state actors in both Palestinian territories, but not all of them must accept Islamic fundamentalism or even jihadist ideology. Some of them are entirely nationalist and secular (e.g., Fatah, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). On the other hand, it is complicated to find the boundary between Arab nationalism and Islamic extremism

47 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY in the case of Palestinian movements (see below). The work also deals in the analytical part only with radical organized movements with militant features, not with individuals (e.g., radical clerics) or Islamist educational organizations, which can be considered relevant actors in the extremist scene.

3.6 Data Collection

During the work, the author has gathered data from several different sources. The main technique of data collection in this research is content analysis. It is a suitable tool for this research type thanks to the simple and straightforward finding of various relationships and causality between the examined data. The author justifies this choice of data collection method because it is widely used in similarly built research (especially in security studies). The second technique of data collection is an expert interview. The author conducted a semi-structured interview with Dr. Michael Barak, an Israeli expert on the Palestinian territories' security aspects, from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya. The interview contributed to the addition of lesser- known facts that are not publicly available or confirm some already as- certained findings. Details, such as the respondent's introduction, the course of the interview, and its partial transcription, are given in the appendix at the end of the thesis. The author also consulted the work and its results with Mr. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an independent analyst and expert on radical Islamism in the Middle East region.

To obtain the data, the author analyzed texts based principally on the primary literature, which are accessible from publicly available Internet sources – scientific articles and professional databases (e.g., ProQuest,

48 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

EBSCO, Google Scholar), official websites and government documents, or professional publications related to existing research. The author also re- lies heavily on data from respected databases specifically dealing with terrorist and militant groups (e.g., AFPC, CEP, GTD, Jihad Intel, ITIC, MEMRI, SITE Intelligence Group, TRAC7), or conflicts (e.g., ACLED). The work also draws information from communication materials and the radical Islamist groups' official websites and proclamations to cover the data in the analytical part. Furthermore, reports by locally placed NGOs are an essential source of information, especially on statistics on the Pal- estinian territories' political situation. The author uses reports from the International Crisis Group (ICG), or alternatively the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA). To gain insights on individual radical groups, the author uses field interviews conducted by researchers in the given place (e.g., Brenner 2017; al-Tamimi 2019a, and al-Tamimi 2019b). Secondary sources also cover a broad set of information in this work, used mainly to illustrate the issue better and add current information not available from existing research. Last but not least, author draws information from relevant Middle East- ern journalism or newspaper articles (e.g., Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Asharq Al-Awsat) or world-renowned news sites (e.g., BBC, New York Times). All the obtained data are analyzed and then sorted based on analytical concepts, or according to individual subchapters.

The author gains data exclusively from foreign language literature, in the vast majority of Anglo-Saxon provenance. An exception is the leading Czech experts in the field (e.g., Čejka 2020). Finally, the author's effort is to use data from Arabic sources, especially to describe the realities of

7 Only the free version of this database was used.

49 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY radical Islamist groups and their interrelationships (based on analyzes of Arab websites and communication materials of Islamist movements).

3.7 Limits of the Research

This research is limited by several rigors. One of the most significant limits is related to the data collection described above. The problem is the difficult availability of primary sources, both in terms of the limited number – the author must rely on publicly available sources and more difficult access to them. Thus, the research suffers from the fact that some information can only be found directly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or only the relevant security services have access to it. Field research is offered as a possible solution to overcome this problem, but it could not be carried out due to a low-security situation (Gaza Strip) or the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic during the writing this thesis. Another complication is related to the data about lesser-known Palestinian extremist groups that are practically internal and often based on estima- tions and speculations. It leads to another significant limit of the work, which is the author's insufficient knowledge of Arabic language, making difficult to obtain primary data on the studied groups. To overcome these hindrances, the author tries to draw from as much available data as possible, including translation of Arabic sources.

Another related limit is the verifiability of the obtained data. In this light, the first question is the accuracy of the information dealing with the researched individual Islamist movements, as outlined above. Secondly, it is a possible misinterpretation of the data and a potential bias from some sources, especially Israeli provenance. Israeli sources can purposefully

50 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY distort the data in their favor and change the view of the issue; for example, they may consider all armed actors in the Palestinian territories to be terrorists, while other states may consider them legitimate forces. Therefore, the author tried to forestall this limit in writing by drawing on objective and relevant sources and verifying possible Israeli data from other non-Israeli sources. However, the same applies to Palestinian origin sources, where we can also assume that some facts are skewed. The question also remains the possible bias and unreliability of the data by news servers (including non-Israel), which may also view the Pales- tinian question and its context from a biased perspective, with conclusions varying depending on the author. For all these reasons, it may not be easy to generalize the data in the analytical part.

Other limitations stem from the generally accepted pitfalls of qualitative research. The complication lies, for instance, in the diversity of the units studied (radical Islamist organizations), so the generalization of results and conclusions is problematic. In addition, the investigated security problem is still ongoing, so all investigated elements may change over time.

Finally, it is possible to draw attention to the limits resulting from the specified and limited scope of research. The individual chapters focus only on certain particularities and give a basic overview of the issue, not a detailed description.

51 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

4 Comparative Analysis

This chapter already deals with the work's central research topic – a comparative analysis of radical Islamism and its main actors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The text first aims to provide a brief historical background of radical Islamism in Palestine and present its current state to facilitate understanding of the following comparative part. The following are two cardinal parts, in which the author gradually analyzes the key attributes and interrelations of radical Islamist groups with a comparison of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

4.1 Historical Background of Radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories

Radicalization within Palestinian society is not a new phenomenon, but rather a historically deep-rooted one. Its development is primarily linked to the original non-violent political struggle for Palestinian independence, from which radical Islamist currents later separated. The following text analyzes this development, which is divided into several principal phases.

4.1.1 The Origin of Palestinian Radical Islamism The origin of radical Islamism in the Palestinian political arena is closely associated with the representative of Salafism and the persona Sheikh Izz al-Din Abd al-Qadir al-Qassam, who appeared on the revolutionary

52 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS scene in 1920 (Bartal 2015, 1, cf. RedCrow Intelligence 2016).8 Sheikh is also described as the first Palestinian Islamist to use the concept of jihad practically. In the first phase, he followed up on his radical teachings from previous anti-colonial experiences to pursue jihad against the Brit- ish Empire in the 1930s through his al-Jahadiyah movement (Bartal 2015, 1; Dunning 2015, 287; Čejka 2020, 128-129). Sheikh eventually died in the name of jihad in the battle of Yaabed in 1935 (Hamdan 1967, 177).

The liquidation of the Palestinian radical sharpened the already highly confrontational mood of the Palestinian Arabs. After the death of al-Qas- sam, his teachings were followed by hundreds of supporters who accepted his radical ideas, which became the basis for a massive uprising known as the Arab Revolt (Tessler 1994, 230). These followers continued under the name Fasael Izz al-Din al-Qassam (al-Qassam companies) in crimes committed against Jews and foreign powers. Al-Qassam's teachings have often appealed to secular organizations, such as the Pal- estine Freedom Front of Ahmad Jibril, which named one of its units, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, in the 1960s (Bartal 2015, 2). The late cleric cult became a symbol of martyrdom in later years for other emerging radical groups - Hamas named its armed wing after the Qassam (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) or self-made missiles, which it began firing towards Israel (Schanzer 2008, 43).

In the 1930s, the emerging Palestinian revolt attracted the Egyptian Mus- lim Brotherhood (MB), which began to spread its influence in the region.

8 Skeikh was originally from Syria, and even before coming to Palestine, he was involved in leading the anti-colonial struggle against the Western powers (against Italy in Libya and against France in Syria).

53 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A significant milestone was the year 1946 when a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was officially established in Jerusalem with the parent organization's extensive support in Egypt. Two years later, its membership base expanded to 12,000 to 20,000 supporters (Litvak 1997, 147). After the failures of The Israel War of Independence (1948-49) and the establishment of the State of Israel, the Palestinian branch of MB split into two main areas: the Gaza Strip under Egyptian control and the West Bank under Jordanian rule. With the introduction of foreign rule over Palestinian communities in exile, the Palestinian jihadist scene has fragmented and found itself without prominent Muslim figures filling the gap (Ibid.; Ghanem and Mostafa 2014, 338). Until the 1970s, Salafist ideology in Pal- estine was largely limited to the academic environment (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 8).

4.1.2 The Beginning of the Radicalization Process The turnaround came in the late 1960s, especially at the beginning of the 1970s, when the conditions were suitable for political Islam development among the Palestinians. Salafism, including its extreme versions, had grown in popularity due to the Six-Day War in 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and intensified again during the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Hroub 2008, 160; Ganor 2011, 588). A significant factor in the spread of Salafism in Palestinian society has been the continuing radicalization of academia. The return of many Pal- estinian students or Islamic clerics studying at religious universities in Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in this regard (Berti 2011, 73-74, cf. ICG 2011, 5). Salafist ideas' leading promoter in the Gaza Strip was Saudi Sheikh Salim Sharab, under whose teachings religious movements were founded (Brenner 2017, 69). Furthermore, what must not be overlooked

54 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS is a new strong current of young Israeli Arabs studying at Islamic colleges in occupied Judea and Samaria in the West Bank led by Islamic activists from the MB. This generation has mostly changed the course of the Is- lamic Revolution and directed it to Israel (Rekhess 1998, 73–84, cf. Co- hen and Levitt 2010, 8, cf. Ghanem and Mostafa 2014, 338-339, cf. Bartal 2015, 3-4).

On the other hand, the militant form of Islamism has not yet fully pre- vailed at this time. Palestinian society has not allowed terrorist groups (including secular ones) to gain the necessary support in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and has largely rejected violent activism (Ganor 2011, 590).

At this time, typical features can be found that also apply to today's Pal- estinian radical Islamism. The dominant mission of Islamism at the time was preaching and missionary missions (salafiya dawiya), but at the same time, violent jihad against unbelievers and enemies of Islam (salafiya jihadiya) began to be profiled (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 8). Jihad itself is already understood as the concept of liberating the Palestinian Arabs from the Zionists and the State of Israel. Its culmination was to be for every Palestinian Muslim self-sacrifice and death in the name of God ("the holiness of death") and thus protect Islam (Bartal 2015, 3-4).

At this stage, it is essential to emphasize that already at this period, a major dividing line can be found between the Salafist scene in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thanks to the already mentioned division of the MB branches. Islamist groups in both areas mostly had the same strategic goals (destruction of the State of Israel) but often differed on achieving this. It was particularly about what activities to prefer over others (propaganda, politics, military events). Another split was the understanding of

55 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS jihad or Islamic interpretation in general - the most radical groups saw jihad as a personal responsibility that falls on every Muslim. In contrast, the more moderate saw jihad as a commandment for all only when the Caliph redeemed the Islamic nation (Bartal 2015, 4).

The primary differences also lay mainly in the use of violence. In the West Bank, Islamist groups were far more "loyal" to official local authorities and did not engage in violent activities like Gaza's radical groups. Salafists in the West Bank have focused much more on teaching a strict interpretation of Islam, and the form of "radicalization" has taken place verbally - mosques that did not accept this strict version of Islam could be attacked in this regard, but on the other hand without using violence against Israel or the Palestinian Authority (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 8). To sum up, while Islamists in the West Bank have participated peacefully in politics, Islamists in Gaza have focused on building secret networks and increasingly engaging in violent actions. However, as Brenner (2017, 80) points out, most Salafists in Gaza were still committed to non-violent currents of Islamist ideology at the time. In any case, Salafism's development in Gaza was much faster and more powerful, which was also influenced by local political and socio-economic conditions (Gunning 2008, 31).

One of the critical moments in the establishment of political Islam among Palestinians was the establishment in 1973 of the Islamic Center (al-Mu- jamma al-Islami - abbreviated Mujamma), originally a social institution that later coordinated the Brotherhood's political actions in the Gaza Strip (Sunsehaugen 2011, 30). The organization, founded by Sheikh Ah- med Yassin, the later founder of Hamas, became widely popular, mainly

56 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS due to its charitable and educational activities. Crucially, since its inception, more emphasis has been placed on Islam than on Palestine itself (Mishal and Sela 2000, 20; Dunning 2015, 290).

In summary, Palestinian Salafism in both Palestinian territories has consistently promoted the Palestinian cause since the 1970s but has not adopted a nationalist approach - that is, it has sought to differentiate itself from established nationalist movements such as Fatah or the PLO. On the contrary, it gradually approached Islam's extreme interpretation as a later Salafi jihadist group (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 8).

4.1.3 The First Intifada and Evolution of the Hamas Movement The 1980s, especially the second half, were full of violence and terror due to frustration among young Palestinians (referred to as the second and third generations), which opened the door to radical Islamist ideologies outside Palestinian mosques and Islamic schools. Educated young Pales- tinians were exposed to the increasing politicization and radicalization of student movements, which later led to the formation of new political and ideological organizations (Ganor 2011, 591-592). These often extremist and militant groups, acknowledged as peripheral, also opposed mainstream and secular counterparts (Fatah, PLO). In the early 1980s, they were considered by the occupation authorities to be more threatening than Islamists, whose activities were even ironically legalized by operating licenses (McGeough 2009, 41). Islamist groups set up their own social and educational programs to provide young people with alternative solutions based on a "return to Islam." Radical interpretations of Is-

57 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS lam have appealed to many initially "silent" Palestinians, who have begun to embrace this ideology as the basis for their problems (Ganor 2011, 594).

Proponents of radical ideologies supporting the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Israel and Palestine under Sharia law have begun to reach far more violent methods. It led to more frequent armed clashes with Israe- lis; until then, terrorist attacks or other forms of violence in the name of jihad against Israeli civilians and security forces were rare (Sayigh 1992, 250).

All these factors resulted in the unleashing of a wave of violence in De- cember 1987, known as the First Intifada. Just days9 after its sparking off, the most important Palestinian fundamentalist movement, Hamas, emerged. It formally arose from the Gazan Muslim Brotherhood and the Mujamma, as mentioned earlier, at the initiative of top leaders such as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Abdul' Aziz al-Rantisi. During this period, Ha- mas's biggest competitor - the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - also gained popularity (Hroub 2006, 13).

On the other hand, neither Mujamma before the intifada nor Hamas tended to incline violence as a method of promoting the Islamization of society. The decision to engage in the violent struggle was "dependent on a change to no deadline process" (Abu-Amr 1993, 11). Islamists in the West Bank and Gaza, the Brotherhood and Hamas, differed in their approach to violence. Young Palestinians encouraged violence, especially in Gaza, while older leaders called for traditional policies - Sheikh Yassin

9 Some sources (IGC 2004, 6) state that Hamas was formed just before the first intifada.

58 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS argued that the time for violent jihad was yet to come because the process of Islamizing society was incomplete (Gunning 2008, 37).

After the first intifada, Palestinian Islamist movements focused on community development, Islamic teachings, and dawah10, making Salafist movements rooted in Palestinian society (Dunning 2013, 197-204). Moreover, after the Oslo Accords in 1995, there was a significant de-escalation of violence, when, as Roy (2011, 143) points out, the real battle was no longer military, but moved to an ideological environment where it fought for "changes of thought through Islam." Islamists in Palestine already had high social and moral authority during the 1990s, but their political influence remained relatively marginal until the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, especially in the West Bank (Jabr 2007, cf. Dun- ning 2015, 292). One of the first Salafist movements was Hizb al-Tahrir (also known as Hizb-ut-Tahrir), which sought to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Gaza Strip. However, this non-violent movement opposed Hamas and its idea of Islamizing Gaza (Paz 2006).

4.1.4 The Second Intifada and Hamas' Takeover of Gaza Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada (also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada) accompanied by brutal bloodshed, the ideology of radical Islam- ism once again provided a suitable refuge for many Palestinians, either for motivational reasons or as a solution for their difficulties (Dunning 2015, 292). Specifically, for example, in this violent uprising, the rate of the Shahid complex rose sharply, allowing any frustrated Palestinian to be granted "martyr status" whether or not he was an active jihad fighter (Dunning 2013, 81-89). Through Islam and the general assurance of faith

10 Proselytizing or the “call to Islam”.

59 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS in God, Islamist groups have offered their followers a degree of psycho- logical and mental support (Dunning 2015, 292).

The growing popularity of Hamas-led Islamist organizations' armed resistance meant even more significance to moral conservatism and traditional Islamic values after the Second Intifada. This popularity had a major impact on Hamas's decision to engage in Palestine's political processes, which meant even greater politicization of Palestinian Islamism. All this even though his two key charismatic leaders died in the violent conflict with Israel - Sheikh Yassin and his successor Abdel Aziz Rantissi (Ghanem and Mustafa 2014, 341). Based on Brym and Arat (2006, 855) data, Hamas' popularity has only doubled within the intifada. Besides, in 2001, according to surveys, Islamist institutions were the second-largest emergency food provider after UNRWA (OCHA and UNSO 2001, 18).

All these factors led to Hamas's participation in the 2004-2005 municipal elections, and in particular to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in January 2006, where it was able to defeat Fatah by a large margin (74 seats out of a total of 132)11 and the right to form a new Pal- estinian cabinet (Brenner 2017, 29). Thanks to the political victory, Ha- mas legitimately controlled the Palestinian Authority, led by Ismail Hani- yeh as Hamas's prime minister and senior leader. The election results were followed in June 2007 by a violent clash with Fatah militants, which later led to the group's "physical" defeat. Fatah was thus effectively pushed out of Gaza, which Hamas had utterly controlled. Hamas and Fa- tah's strife resulted in a large-scale political crisis in Palestine, which foreshadowed its present form - the division into the West Bank under

11 Hamas did not run under its name but formed a political party called “Change and Reform List for the election” (Brenner 2017, 29).

60 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Fatah's control and the Hamas-led Gaza Strip, which has practically cut itself off from the world. Despite ongoing confrontations, efforts have been made to normalize relations (e.g., with Egypt's aid), but these have so far been unsuccessful (Ghanem 2009). More recently, the reconciliation efforts are still ongoing between the PA and the Palestinian factions. Negotiations show that there are still profound differences between the two sides. The proof is one of the last meetings held in this way between the PA representatives and the leaders of Hamas and the PIJ, which took place in September 2020, aiming to discuss the US Middle East peace plan and the intended annexation of part of the West Bank. Despite conflicting positions, all parties involved appear to be able to coordinate anti-annexation activities in recent months. In 2020, this was supported by a joint approach to the fight against coronavirus outbreak in the Gaza Strip (Boxerman 2020).

If we look back at the development of radical Islamism in Palestine, Is- rael's withdrawal from Gaza in August and September 2005 and the overall takeover of the Palestinian enclave by Hamas have had a huge impact on the increased presence of radical Islamism in Gaza, as the activism of militant jihadist Salafist elements has spread significantly. An- archy and the vacuum created by the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah also contributed to an increase in the number of radical movements, making the Gaza Strip the main pocket of Palestinian violent Salafist cells (Berti 2010, 5, cf. ICG 2011, 7).

The first established radical Salafist groups officially appeared in Gaza, according to an ICG report (2011, 1), in December 200212, with the first

12 The exact year varies by author. According to Brenner (2017, 70), Salafists who advocated violence did not appear in Gaza until 2005. Al-Mughrabi (2015) states 2006, Marteu (2018, 95) even 2011.

61 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS attack being carried out by a group called Jund Allah. In the same year, Israeli President Ariel Sharon announced that the presence of al-Qaeda members was detected in Gaza, but it was denied by PA representatives (BBC 2002). It was not until 2006 that Hamas seized Gaza that they acknowledged the presence of al-Qaeda-linked Salafi jihadists in Gaza and even the West Bank, which PA President Mahmoud Abbas called an ally of Hamas (The Sunday Times 2008).

From an organizational perspective, the newly formed radical movements represented a relatively loose network of smaller groups of radicalized Palestinians who questioned the legitimacy and hegemony of Ha- mas or the PIJ. According to them, the main reasons for resisting Hamas were its departure from true Islam, its mild fight against Israel and its involvement in political processes in Palestine, and its participation in the 2006 elections, which radical currents considered secular (Berti and Gutiérrez 2016, 1062; Milton-Edwards 2014, 1). It was also influenced by Yassin's decision on the so-called period of calm (tahdiyah) and the proposal for a unilateral armistice with Israel (hudna), (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 108-109). For these reasons, several of their members also left Hamas, especially its radical armed wing of the al-Qassam Bri- gades, and joined the emerging movements (ICG 2011, 1). According to data from 2010, the Salafi made up the jihadist movement (only in Gaza) to 50 percent of former Hamas fighters, or members who moved from another group (Brenner 2017, 76).

From a purely military point of view, these groups did not initially pose a grave security threat, but rather a "nuisance" (Berti 2011, 74). At first, they were represented by individuals firing rockets through a security

62 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS fence toward Israel to provoke friction between Hamas and Israel. How- ever, it should be noted that over time, their violent activities increased (more frequent bombing in public spaces), became more organized, and at later stages already posed a particular security challenge for Hamas (Brenner 2017, 68).

4.2 Current State

As in the second intifada, within the escalation of tensions during the Is- raeli Operation Cast Lead (2008-09), the effects of the Arab Spring (especially the Syrian Civil War and ISIS onset) or the armed conflict in Gaza in 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), the support for Islamism and its radical versions increased. The trigger for violence between Palestinians and Israelis was primarily the so-called wave of terror, which has lasted since 2015. Particularly between 2015 and 2016 (also known as the "Stabbing" or "Knife Intifada"13), there was a rapid increase in attacks that strengthened the extreme Islamist ideologies of Salafi jihadist groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (ITIC 2019a; MFA 2021). To better illustrate, this escalation of violence is visible with a vast increase in the number of rockets fired at Israel, as shown in the graph below.

13 It is named for many stabbing attacks by ISIS operatives, especially in Jerusalem.

63 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Chart 1: Annual Distribution of Rocket Fire from the Gaza Strip (Source: ITIC 2019a)

When it reached a dramatic peak, the increase of rocket incidents in Gaza Strip (2014 Gaza war) also correlates with the radical sphere's growth. During this period, the jihadist ideology of ISIS powerfully expanded in Palestine (Marteu 2018, 95). A further increase in tensions occurred during the so-called Great March of Return protests (March 2018-December 2019), Gaza–Israel clashes in November 2018, and some months during 2019 and 2020. During these periods, large numbers of rockets, mortar shells, or, more recently, kites and helium balloons with incendiary material from the Gaza Strip were fired, which is still valid today (ICT 2018). Despite the rise of Islamist competitors, Hamas remains the leading Is- lamic fundamentalist organization to maintain its military superiority in Gaza during this period, but its position is being sought to undermine rival Salafi jihadist elements. In the West Bank, the situation remains similarly confusing, with the difference that no exclusively Islamist group is in power (PCPSR 2015; Marteu 2018, 95).

As indicated above, at present, the phenomenon of radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories is far more dispersed and less tangible. The

64 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS transformation of the radical branch of Islamism was significantly affected by the question of governing Palestine's ideological price and the revolutionary change in the Islamic environment in the Gaza Strip. Radi- cal Islamist ideology has long lingered in Palestinian nationalist movements. However, today the concept of Islamism goes beyond movements like Hamas, and this ideology is driven by far more radical groups and currents of Islamism (Cohen and Levitt, 2010, 1, cf. Stockmarr, 2011, 4, cf. Marteu 2018, 95).

As Cohen and Levitt (2010, 1) summarize, a large number of hardliners promoting religious-political activism (violence) have lost confidence in established Palestinian movements (in addition to Hamas and PIJ, e. g., the Popular Resistance Committees). On the contrary, far lesser-known Islamist groups could attract them and drag them to their side, which mostly allowed them to carry out a more extremist version of jihad. These Salafist jihadist groups then consider militant Islam as one of the pillars of their struggle to create a supranational Islamic state (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 1, cf. Schweitzer 2015).

On the whole, today's radical Islamism is very different in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, both in terms of the number of active groups, their strategic goals, the level of violence, and other factors. Today, the question remains whether modern Salafi jihadist organizations still have the ca- pacity to spread their radical ideologies in both Palestinian territories (RedCrow Intelligence 2016). Besides, the differences between radical groups and established Palestinian political organizations are still evident today. In the following text, therefore, a general comparison of both territories is made.

65 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

4.2.1 West Bank The ongoing Israeli presence in the West Bank and the Palestinian Au- thority's security oversight led by Mahmoud Abbas have largely pre- vented extremist Islamic ideologies from flourishing, despite al Qaeda's prominent official positions on the Palestinian cause (Hegghammer and Wagemakers 2013, 281-282). Nevertheless, today's activities of radical groups in the West Bank are not eliminated, from Hamas to organizations inspired by Salafi jihadism of Al Qaeda or ISIS. In the 1990s and early millennium, Palestinian Islamic Jihad was well established in the West Bank, specifically in Jenin and Hebron, before moving its activities more to Gaza (Marteu 2018, 96).

According to data from 2010, no established Salafi jihadist elements were observed in the West Bank that would have committed violent activity for a long time. The threat to West Bankers is thus posed by individuals supporting the global jihadist struggle, who, against the background of the ongoing wave of terror, can carry out violent attacks in the name of Islam, or at the very least to plan them. In addition, there is relatively relevant potential for the radicalization of the large Salafist community in the West Bank, which may occur during certain trigger events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this regard, Salafist missionaries (salafiya dawiya), who are continually active in the West Bank in providing an ideological basis based on similar al-Qaeda or ISIS statements that can reach many other (originally non-violent Salafists), play a crucial role (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 10-11). Salafists' radicalization exclusively in the West Bank is thus associated with a relatively simple way of praying, educating, forming groups of devoted followers of the strict version of Islam and their self-organization (Spyer 2008).

66 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Salafist groups' violent activities in the West Bank are largely linked to the more powerful and radical Islamist scene in the Gaza Strip. The proof is the Hamas movement's presence, which established itself in the West Bank through the shadow of its rival Fatah only after the election suc- cesses in 2005 and 2006, both by militant force and public support. Dur- ing the escalation of violent incidents in the following years resulting from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's escalation, Hamas became involved in supporting the armed resistance, but its strength was marginal compared to Gaza. In the context of current political events, such as Israel's plans for the annexation of the West Bank, Hamas in the West Bank today calls for a unification of resistance against the Israeli occupiers, which Israel can understand in violent connotations (Al Jazeera 2020a).

In the context of the rise of the Islamic State in 2014, it is necessary to mention its influence on Palestinian radicalism in the West Bank. Com- pared to the Gaza Strip (see below), this influence did not manifest itself in the West Bank, which corresponds to the general development of radical Islamism, mentioned above. However, this does not mean that the ISIS elements in the West Bank were utterly dormant. Although Palestin- ian society rejects ISIS's activities by a majority, there is still relevant support for it. Despite negligible numbers, several Palestinians have joined the Islamist radicals combating under the ISIS flag in Syria. The direct presence of ISIS-inspired Salafists in the West Bank is characterized by covert and secret activity, especially in cities such as Hebron, Na- blus, and Jenin. There are known cases of isolated incidents carried out by ISIS operatives or counter-terrorist operations by Palestinian security forces or the IDF against Palestinians planning attacks on behalf of ISIS (Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016, 159-160). Stabbing, vehicular and shooting attacks have been widespread since 2014 and have begun to

67 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS raise strong concerns (ITIC 2019b). Jihadist media called for a new intifada and stabbing attacks connected with tensions over the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem or attacks on Israel and US targets in response to US President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital in 2017 (Marteu 2018 96). Arrested radical sympathizers often supported ISIS ideologically or financially, which still proves to be a significant feature of Salafi jihadists in the West Bank till today (Schweitzer and Brom 2013, 1-3; Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016, 159-160).

Finally, it is crucial to summarize the necessary conclusions for analysis in the following chapter on radical Islamism's main actors in the West Bank. In analyzing specific actors of the radical Islamist scene in the West Bank, it is exceedingly difficult to detect these phenomena compared to the Gaza Strip (see below). It is because no large networks of radical Is- lamists are currently established in the West Bank. The absence of extremist organizations in this Palestinian part is influenced by several factors that the work has indicated in earlier parts of the work. Chiefly, it is the constant presence of strict security control by the Palestinian Author- ity and Israel, which has not allowed radical Islamist groups to take root there. The enormous interest of the Israeli security forces in eradicating any jihadist signs has visibly been reflected in the level of radical Islamist groups' activities, which instead have turned into a hidden environment (Barak 2021).

Nevertheless, the presence of radical Islamist entities in the West Bank is not completely suppressed. For the reasons presented above, there is a potent matrix of Islamist extremism, from which radicalized individuals capable of committing violent actions in the name of Islam emerge from time to time. Given the strategic geographical position of the West

68 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Bank (proximity to Syria, but also to Lebanon), the influence of foreign jihadist organizations sending their operatives to carry out terrorist attacks cannot be overlooked. In the context of radical Palestinian Islam- ism, it is necessary to emphasize the West Bank's interconnectedness with the Gaza Strip, despite the different types of political governance (for more, see the discrete comparison). They are radical entities from the Islamist scene in Gaza - especially Hamas, the PIJ, or the Salafi jihadist environment, trying to operate and achieve the same strategic goals in the West Bank. (see e.g., Shitrit and Jaraba 2014; Batrawi 2016).

Strictly speaking, even though the work in this part cannot analyze almost any established actors of radical Islamism in the West Bank, the author tries to identify the main elements of radical militantism that affect this territory. The AFPC report (2020) on Islamist activity in the Pales- tinian territories lists only two main groups active separately in the West Bank: al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. However, based on a thorough analysis of the data, the author found that the former is dis- putable to label it Islamist, given that it is associated with secular Fatah. Even so, the report states that it uses Islamist symbols and slogans. The latter is then problematic due to the low level of militantism, as the group does not have an armed wing. Nevertheless, the report states that both groups are relevant actors of Palestinian radical Islamist arena. It is in line with the TRAC database (2020), which also describes both organizations as religiously extremist and present in the West Bank. Besides, the groups that operate primarily in the Gaza Strip but partially extend into the West Bank must be attributed. In this case, it is mainly Hamas, whose activities will be subjected to a brief analysis. Therefore, the author identifies the following as the principal radical Islamist groups in the West Bank:

69 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

• Hizb-ut-Tahrir • Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades • Hamas' activities in the West Bank14 There is also evidence of other extremist groups' activities, which are, however, difficult to identify and therefore analyze (e.g., lone wolves inspired by the Islamic State).

4.2.2 Gaza Strip As already indicated, after Hamas took control of the Palestinian coastal enclave in June 2007, many smaller actors emerged on its territory, es- pousing radical Islamist ideologies. These groups had enough space to form, but many of them disappeared as quickly as they appeared. During this period, there was a high turnover of members among several smaller groups, including Hamas, which applied a harsh approach to some former members, such as killings and arrests (Brenner 2017, 68-69). An example is the prominent August 2009 incident in which Hamas members raided the Ibn Taymia Mosque in Dir al-Balah, killing 24 Salafists after declaring an Islamic Emirate in Rafah in southern Gaza (Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016, 157; Clarke 2017). The event is widely regarded as the nucleus of Salafi jihadist entities' spread and the rise of organized groups promoting these radical Islamist ideologies in the Gaza Strip. Some groups began to operate in hidden cells, within which they continued violent activities, which significantly complicates the availability of quality data on these actors (Brenner 2017, 68-69).

14 It is worth noting that Hamas, as such, is analyzed (within Williams' theoretical model) in the chapter on the Gaza Strip.

70 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Although the individual Islamist groups operating in Gaza belong to the same broader category, they have certain social and ideological gaps. Ac- cording to Brenner (2017, 73), the main distinguishing feature is the extent to which they identify with the extremist ideologies of al-Qaeda or ISIS and how they exclusively practice jihad, especially when it comes to pursuing local or global jihad. For example, not all groups have necessarily been forceful and accused Hamas members of being kuffar (infidels) (Ibid., 73-74).

With growing tensions between radical Salafists and Hamas or the PIJ, a wave of violence arose in Gaza. Since their emerging in Gaza, these extremists have focused on getting rid of corruption and non-Islamic institutions directly in Gaza and have shared a desire to actively attack West- ern targets (the "far enemy" approach). Examples are attacks on West- ern-influenced institutions or Western journalists and tourists. Their ideology of "pure resistance" has found a place in physical violence and cyberspace as well (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 9).

However, this considerable inspiration from ideology or the strategic and tactical model of al-Qaeda, or more recently ISIS, does not mean that these global terrorist groups directly control them. Despite little information about individual groups, their connection to al Qaeda or ISIS can be refuted rather than confirmed (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 9; Mandel- baum and Schweitzer 2016). That confirms today's trend of many militant Islamist groups embracing and acting on behalf of the established and attractive jihadist brand al-Qaeda and ISIS. It is one of the reasons why, over the years, many indigenous groups with a national Islamist ideology in Gaza have turned into a Salafi jihadism with a transnational focus on global Islamism (Kramer 2008, 68-73). Some groups (e.g., Jaysh

71 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS al-Islam) then directly cite statements by al-Qaeda or ISIS leaders, which they also claim as their ideological leaders. Many of these groups then took over the operational focus from al-Qaeda or ISIS, when they began to threaten Jews and Americans (e.g., Ali 2008).

From a current point of view, it is appropriate to focus on the influence of the Islamic State, whose ideology much inspired the young Salafi jihadist current in Gaza. The significant expansion of ISIS influence in the coastal strip went hand in hand with the strengthening of the self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2014, which brought about the establishment of clandestine jihadist organizations. Hamas strongly opposed them, using its security forces to eliminate them (Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016, 157).

Figure 2: Picture from one of the protests held by Salafists in Gaza in support of ISIS (Source: al-Tamimi 2014) ISIS's support was mainly based on the spread of jihadist propaganda in the online space, such as a video in June 2015 threatening Hamas that bloodshed would move from Levant to the Gaza Strip. Rising criticism of Hamas by Salafi jihadists and the growing popularity of ISIS have led to

72 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS new extremist organizations in Gaza. As early as 2014, Islamists announced the establishment of an ISIS branch in Gaza, which swore allegiance to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Ibid., 158). However, ISIS headquarters refused to recognize the local groups as its province due to their propensity for sectarianism and factionalism, and low violence against Israel, which is against the conditions published in Dabiq, the English propaganda magazine of ISIS (Dabiq 2015). Later, recent active ISIS-inspired groups such as the Sheik Omar Hadid Bait al-Maqdis Bri- gades (also known as the Islamic State in Gaza) and Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem were set (Schweitzer 2015).

The presence of jihadists in Gaza was also significantly affected by the Islamic State's establishment in the Sinai Peninsula, which became their close ally in neighboring Egypt. Radicals in Gaza often provide refuge to Sinai terrorists and exchange economic and military aid through an extensive network of underground tunnels (Ibid.). According to Marteu (2018, 94), tunnels are still widely used by Islamists for smuggling, but thanks to the counter-terrorism actions of Israel and Egypt, only 15% of the original network remains. By strategically deploying its affiliates, al- Baghdadi sought to unite jihadists within Gaza and within the region as well (Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016, 158-159). Following the physical defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, a slight decline in supporters can be detected, whose presence in Gaza is still trying to refute Hamas publicly. The fact remains that the Salafi elements related to ISIS remain in Gaza and are trying to build on ISIS's success to date (al-Mughrabi 2020).

It should be briefly mentioned that the influence of ISIS is tangible on the opposite level as well – i.e., many radicals from Gaza went to fight in Syria or Iraq on behalf of ISIS. According to estimates by Mandelbaum and

73 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Schweitzer (2016, 160), up to 200 Palestinians joined the Islamic State around 2015. There is evidence that in Syria, Gazan fighters formed their own contingent called “The Mujahideen of Gaza in the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham”, which belonged to the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Brigade at that time (al-Tamimi 2014).

Figure 3: Excerpt from a video from The Mujahideen of Gaza in the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham, an ISIS group composed of fighters from Gaza (Source: al-Tamimi 2014)

If only the scene of the most extreme current of Islamists (Salafi jihadists) in Gaza is analyzed, today's network consists of self-radicalized Palestin- ian militants and those who have left, from their point of view, moderate Hamas or other groups. Brenner (2017, 73) also emphasizes the role of young Palestinian refugees who have been and are far more prone to religious radicalization. Furthermore, Gaza's territory, despite its small size, is very contrasting. There are considerable differences and a kind of incomprehension between its center - Gaza City and the rest of the area, which is perceived as a periphery inhabited by poorer parts of the popu-

74 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS lation who may be the target of potential radicalization (Ibid.). We cannot forget foreign fighters returning from the Middle East battlefields or just foreign sympathizers. Egyptian warriors played a critical role in this regard (Harel 2009, 26).

As for the specific total numbers of radical Salafists in Gaza, estimates vary depending on the author. According to Williams (2009), it was estimated at 4,000-5,000 closely related members in 2009, with the number of followers reaching up to 50,000 (Spyer, 2009). By contrast, according to Sayigh (2010, 4), the conservative estimate of Salafi jihadists active in Gaza was 2,500-3,000. Some sources report even lower numbers, such as Brenner (2017, 76), who, based on field data, tend to range from 1,000 to 1,500. Based on an interview with one of the leaders of the radical group in 2014, the estimate is up to 4,000 (Daraghmeh, 2014). Israeli expert Aviv Oreg claims about 1,000 Salafists (Ibid.). Extreme estimates speak of up to 11,000 militants inspired by al-Qaeda (Qannan, 2010). In this respect, it is imperative to set who all belong to radical Islamists - for example, are they all Hamas members or just members of the al-Qassam Brigades? Besides, each author understands this fact differently. Hence, the real number of all Palestinians classified as Islamic radicals is challenging to estimate without "hard" data.

At present, there is no comprehensive list of radical Islamist organizations active in the Gaza Strip that have been thoroughly analyzed. For this purpose, it is necessary to use data from professional databases, which name the current tally of these groups. Older analyzes (Berti 2011; ICG 2011) list Jaysh al-Islam and Jund Ansar Allah as the strongest extremist factions. Both groups have so far operated in Gaza, strongly opposing Ha- mas and trying by all means to spoil any rapprochement between the

75 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Palestinian Authority and Israel (ICG 2011, 7). Brenner (2017, 74), also based on data from 2011, is joined by the Jaysh al-Umma, Ansar al-Sunna and Tawhid al-Jihad movements, which together with the two groups mentioned above, they formed the five largest Salafi jihadist organizations in Gaza at that time.

However, current data from databases (AFPC 2020; TRAC 2020) indicate that some groups are no longer active, some of them splinter, some have been consistently active, or new ones have emerged, often inspired by the Islamic State. These include, for example, the Majlis Shura al-Mujahe- deen, the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, or the Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem. The current radical scene in Gaza is thus fragmented among several groups about which there is not much information, or some groups united and formed one movement. There is also the high connection of many groups with the ongoing insurgency on the Sinai Peninsula. The fact remains that many smaller groups (excluding Hamas, PIJ, PRC) from those present in Gaza around 2011 continue to operate actively in this territory, such as Jaysh al-Islam, or Jaysh al-Umma.

The most significant radical Islamist groups in the Gaza Strip that appear to be active today are listed below based on the open-source analysis data. The author of the work decided to narrow their number to eight main ones, which seem to be the strongest today. The author justifies these organizations' choice because even current sources devoted to militant Islamist organizations present these groups (these are mainly professional databases AFPC and TRAC, or e.g., Marteu 2018). Through the intersection of these sources, the author compiled a list of these actors below. In addition to the actors listed below, many other smaller militant groups operate in Gaza (e.g., Jaljalat, Swords of Truth, and others), but

76 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS there is almost no information about these groups in recent months, or these groups are likely in decline. At the same time, there are also several smaller factions, mostly linked to ISIS, about which there is great confu- sion about who they are (e.g., The Group of Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem). As already outlined, for example, Brenner (2017) states in his study that at the time of his writing, the strongest groups in Gaza (except Hamas, PIJ, or PRC) were Jaysh al-Islam, Jund Ansar Allah, and Tawhid al-Jihad. However, it is obvious that the author does not use current data, and according to the analysis of this work, the Jund Ansar Allah group is now dysfunctional or dormant, and Tawhid al-Jihad, or An- sar al-Sunna merged with the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. Another factor in narrowing the groups to eight is the limited scope of work, due to which the author cannot focus on all organizations.

The following groups will then be subjected to a thorough analysis. At the end of the chapter, there is also a summary of other, less important groups.

• Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), • Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), • Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), • Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), • Jaysh al-Ummah (Army of the Nation), • Harakat as-Sabirin Nasran li-Filastin (Sabireen Movement), • Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, • Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (Islamic State in Gaza).

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4.3 Characteristics of Radical Islamist Groups in the West Bank

This chapter already discusses the chief actors of the radical scene in the West Bank, focusing on their characteristics, according to Williams' theoretical concept (2008). As already mentioned, the following radical Is- lamist groups' selection is limited to the most relevant, without which a complete analysis could not be made.

4.3.1 Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Figure 4: The primary logo of the organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021)

Hizb-ut-Tahrir or Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (translated as "Party of Liber- ation" or "The Islamic Freedom Party") is an international Islamist organization seeking to unite Muslim communities under a common Is- lamic caliphate. The Palestinian offshoot is one of the central branches of

78 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS the broader political movement and today is one of the largest local affiliates. Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) was founded in 195315 in East Jerusalem, which was then occupied by Jordan (CEP 2020a, 1). The founder was Sheikh Muhammad Taqi al-Din bin Ibrahim al-Nabhani, who ran a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Haifa since 1946 (Abu Zaydah 2009, 28). Within a few years, the organization had become a global movement, like the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Bartal (2015, 153), HuT origi- nated from a spin-off from the Jordanian branch of MB, but in the form of a union under Ottoman law, not as a political party. HuT currently operates in more than 40 countries worldwide, including Western, Arab, and Central Asian countries, despite being banned in some countries (a total of 13, including all Arab countries except Lebanon, Yemen, and the UAE). The organization is currently headquartered in Beirut, Lebanon, and the current leader is Ata Abu Rashta (CEP, 2020a, 1-2). According to several sources (Spyer 2007; AFPC 2020: 6), the Palestinian branch in the West Bank is centered on promoting nonviolent jihad and educational activities.

1) Motivation and purpose

Hizb-ut-Tahrir reports on its official website that it is a political party whose ideology is Islam, which seeks within the Muslim community (Um- mah) to restore the Islamic caliphate and government by what Allah revealed (hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021a). The goal of HuT is to spread this dogma among all Muslims and thus return Ummah to a "pure era," before any bad and damaging influences that they said penetrated Islam. HuT seeks to return to the Islamic way of life in Dar al-Islam (Muslim regions)

15 According to some sources (Bartal 2015, 153), this movement's roots go back to 1952.

79 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS according to Sharia rules and spread Islamic dawah activities to the world. The ultimate goal is to overthrow the current regimes and change a corrupt society to restore the caliphate. Massive anti-Western propaganda also serves this purpose (Bartal 2015, 153-154; hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021b). HuT is profoundly hostile to Israel and is sharply opposed to its occupying government in the West Bank (AFPC 2020, 6).

The group declares itself to be a non-violent group and refuses to use violent means to achieve the above goals (Ahmed and Stuart 2009, 4). It also publicly states that it does not engage in terrorist activities or have an armed wing (AFPC 2020 6). However, despite all this, the group is involved in or inciting violent incidents in the West Bank, as in other Mid- dle Eastern countries (CEP 2020a, 1). Similarly, the HuT ideology as a whole has, according to several sources (Ahmed and Stuart 2009, 20-25; CEP 2020a, 1), extremist features close to jihadism, or at least radical Salafism, which essentially justifies its placement among radical Islamist groups in the West Bank. The group itself distances itself from al-Qaeda or ISIS's radical doctrine on its website (pal-tahrir.info 2015). However, it calls for violence and offensive jihad against Jews, not only in Palestine but also in Western countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, Den- mark). HuT believes that the territory under Israeli administration should return to the rule of Islamic law. The movement has also publicly supported suicide bombings or rocket attacks in the West Bank or Gaza Strip on several occasions (Ahmed and Stuart 2009, 28; CEP 2020, 3).

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Figure 5: Banner available on the HuT website (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2017)

2) Strength and scope

HuT is an underground network in the West Bank for which there is not many accurate data in terms of membership. The HuT probably has several hundred members, whose numbers have been suppressed by intervention by the Palestinian Authority (ECFR 2020a). Based on an interview with a Hamas member, Høigilt et al. (2011, 7) estimates the number of active members of HuT to one thousand. However, the real number of supporters is much higher, as evidenced by a demonstration in Hebron in 2007, where 10,000 HuT supporters gathered (Spyer 2007). Accord- ing to the AFPC report (2020, 6), there are no details regarding the membership base of the Palestinian branch of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, but it is widely recognized as a small cell compared to other branches, although it is considered central. The group's current strength lies in its involvement in many social and educational projects, through which it seeks to sabotage all initiatives it considers anti-Islamic (see below) (Høigilt 2014, 518; Koren, 2020).

According to Høigilt et al. (2011, 7) HuT holds a stronghold mainly in Hebron, the most populous city in the West Bank, where it is estimated to be most popular. It also has branches in the Old City of Jerusalem and Abu Dis, al-Azariya, Ramallah, al-Bira, Beit Hanina, and Beit Safafa (Koren

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2020). Other locations of the only Palestinian branch of HuT are debatable given the group's global nature, where it is not possible to discern the extent to which the Palestinian branch has an impact. Still, the group's influence and presence in the Gaza Strip are minimal (Høigilt 2014, 506). It is worth noting that HuT, as a whole, has been involved many times in transporting radicals to Syria to join ISIS (CEP 2020a, 4).

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

The financial resources of HuT are not officially known, but it can be assumed that, as a local offshoot of the global movement, it raises funds by several different means. The CEP report (2020a, 8) lists private donations as the primary way of raising finance. Another significant share is fundraising based on printed leaflets or lectures, where they call for financial support. It is also impossible to omit donations from abroad in any form (e.g., cryptocurrencies). Raising funds as such, however, is not the fundamental goal of the organization but serves to implement the above mentioned.

4) Organizational structure

HuT, as such, has a hierarchical structure with local offshoots. As already mentioned, HuT in the West Bank represents a tight-knit and a hidden cell, the details of which are not publicly available. It is said to be strongly centralized, and members are devoted and obedient to central leadership (Abou Zahab and Roy 2004, 9-10). As a local branch, it is plain that it has its emir, who coordinates its activities and is accountable to the global leader, Ata Abu Rashta (Koren 2020). The organization encourages both men and women to join the movement and become active members (CEP 2020, 4). The primary means of recruiting new members

82 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS is to gain public support through the organization of various religious seminars and the publication of pro-Islamic publications (Ibid., 8).

5) The role of violence

As already outlined, the relationship of HuT to violence is very problematic. On the one hand, the movement claims that its activities are based on non-violent means, which wants to differentiate itself from the violent activism of Salafi jihadists (Høigil 2014, 513). On the other hand, in his public proclamations (e.g., in 2009), it states that Jerusalem's liberation is impossible to achieve by peaceful activism and would sit on the fence. On the contrary, according to them, the only solution to expel the Jews is to mobilize and use military force (hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2009, cf. Bartal 2015, 155). Such proclamations were printed on leaflets during several demonstrations held by HuT. Also, on the publicly available website of The Central Media Office of HuT, many press releases criticize anti-Is- lamic attitudes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, indirectly inciting violence (hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021b). More recently, the group has issued a statement criticizing US President Donald Trump's move to declare Jeru- salem the capital of Israel, which he sees as an incentive to violence (hizb- ut-tahrir.info 2017). It stated that "the liberation of Al-Quds and Al-Aqsa Mosque can only be through leaders such as Salahuddin." It visibly indicates that HuT is waiting for legitimate authority to declare offensive jihad for the caliphate to be established, as many researchers agree (Ah- med and Stuart 2009, 21; Høigil 2014, 519). According to a report by Fighel (2013, 1), a dramatic shift in HuT ideology in the West Bank has been detected since 2013, as for the first time, it directly calls for waging jihad in a violent sense.

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Figure 6: Screenshot from The Central Media Office of HuT encouraging the liberation of Jerusalem (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2017)

The HuT movement is also directly linked to specific violent incidents in the region. In 2003, a British citizen associated with HuT committed a bomb attack in Israel, although the movement refuted the attack's connection (Malik 2006). Fighel (2013, 1) states that the first armed presence of the movement was registered in the West Bank in November 2013, when three operatives from a radical cell affiliated with HuT, preparing to carry out terrorist attacks in Yatta and Hebron, were killed. Two guns and an explosive device were found in their car. It was pre- ceded by the arrest of other extremists in Yatir and Nablus (Ibid.). Sev- eral former HuT members have also joined terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, or the Nusra Front (CEP 2020a, 28). In 2016, the perpetrator of a shooting attack in the Ramot neighborhood had a black HuT flag hidden in his car (Koren 2020). The GTD database does not register any HuT attacks in the West Bank (GTD 2018a). At present, HuT continues to hold non-violent protests across the West Bank, despite strict interventions by the PA (AFPC 2020, 6).

6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

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As analyzed earlier, HuT has a hateful relationship with state authorities (Fatah-dominated PA). HuT believes only in Muslim nationality, so it rejects the legitimacy of PA, PLO, and Fatah as well as the Palestinian nationality that Hamas strives for (Bartal 2015, 155). The HuT leadership has publicly accused President Abbas and his government of apostasy for its anti-Islamic values of governance and the fulfillment of orders for "infidels, occupiers and colonists" (Toameh 2018). It led to several party rallies in all parts of the West Bank or East Jerusalem, attended by tens of thousands of supporters. A common slogan was "the Caliphate is the rising power" (AFP 2020, 6; Bartal 2015, 155).

With the growing popularity of HuT, the government movement has become increasingly controversial, making the PA take a hard line on HuT members and start arresting many of them (Høigil 2014 508). In 2011, it was declared an illegal organization (Awad 2011). Currently, the relationship between PA and HuT is still tense, and PA continues to suppress any public HuT activities (see, e.g., Toameh 2018).

Figure 7: One of the issues of Mukhtarat Magazine, a periodical of HuT (Source: hizb- ut-tahrir.info 2021b)

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7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

HuT does not provide an alternative government to its supporters; however, given the establishment of a global caliphate, this is a future ambition. The current support towards its members and supporters lies primarily at the ideological level. They pay great attention to his extensive media appearances, such as Al-Raya Magazine, Al-Waie Magazine, Al- waqiyah TV, and other channels, informing about current events related to PA and international politics and Israeli actions (hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021b).

Current HuT activities in the West Bank focus primarily on supporting students at universities and seeking to "agitate and educate" instead of violent activities (ECFR 2020a; AFPC 2020, 6). As can be seen from field data, Høigilt et al. (2011) and Høigilt (2014), currently it seems that HuT plays an essential role in strong social conservatism and influences the activities of youth and cultural organizations that get involved in liberal practices (e.g., mixed-gender workshops, music education, etc.). Accord- ing to a recent study by Koren (2020), the movement has been gaining noticeable support in recent months, and its impact is more significant than it seems.

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4.3.2 Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades

Figure 8: Emblem of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (Source: Aurora 2019)

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (also known as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Bat- talion) is a coalition of several Palestinian armed forces operating in the West Bank. The group's name comes from the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusa- lem, which Muslims consider to be the Noble Sanctuary (Durns 2019). It is considered the armed wing of the secular Fatah movement, but according to several sources (Ibid.; AFPC 2020, 5), it uses Islamist symbolism and motives. The Jihad Intel database (2020) also identifies it as an Is- lamist organization. The organization was formed in September 2000 during the second intifada, since which, in addition to Hamas and PIJ, it has been involved in violent actions against Israeli military personnel and settlers (U.S. Department of State 2019). The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Bri- gades (AAMB) originally consisted of a small loose network of former Fa- tah and Hamas fighters, mostly initiated by militants from the Balata refugee camp near Nablus (ECFR 2020b). From the beginning, the AAMB sought to expel Israel from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state (Jihad Intel 2020a). Due to the number of attacks on Israel, the

87 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

AAMB is designated as a foreign terrorist group (FTO) by the US, Israel, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the European Union (TRAC 2020a).

1) Motivation and purpose

As already mentioned, the AAMB was born during the second intifada to strengthen the armed resistance against Israel. The group's primary ideological roots lie in Palestinian nationalism and its allegiance to the Fatah movement. From this point of view, Islamist ideology was not at the Bri- gades' birth (The Mackenzie Institute 2015). The questionable influence of Islamist beliefs on the functioning of the AAMB divides many authors in the literature. E.g., Durns (2019) states that the name of the movement already means that the group has an Islamist belief contrary to secular Fatah. According to him, the Brigades also use Islamist symbolism and rhetoric. Katz (2016) considers AAMB to be Islamic-fueled Fatah operatives sent by him to carry out the worst attacks. Besides, in 2011 the group, along with Hamas and other radial groups, issued a statement la- menting Osama bin Laden (Durns 2019). It can also be deducted from the group's website (nedal.net) that the AAMB is very close to the Islamic creed - as evidenced by the veneration of their martyrs who fell in the name of Allah and Jihad, like other Islamist organizations in the Palestin- ian territories (nedal.net 2021a).

Therefore, it is manifest that more moderate and extreme supporters within the Brigades have adopted radical Salafist doctrine over Palestin- ian nationalism and anti-Zionism. It is generally accepted that some AAMB group members carry out attacks on motives combining nationalist and religious reasons (Barak 2021).

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On the contrary, what all the authors agree on is the clearly stated goal of the AAMB, which is to push Israel out of the Palestinian territories by armed resistance and to create its state (The Mackenzie Institute 2015).

2) Strength and scope

The AAMB membership is divided into several autonomous cells loyal to the Fatah movement. Since 2009, when Hamas sought peace, some of the Brigades have joined forces with other groups, but another has continued violent attacks. Due to this, the exact number of members is unknown today, but their number is estimated at a few hundred (U.S. De- partment of State 2019). The difficulty of the estimates is complicated by the high level of secrecy of his cells and the numerous arrests or deaths of members. The total number has probably fluctuated in recent years (The Mackenzie Institute 2015, cf. Durns 2019).

At the beginning of its establishment, the AAMB was present in Ramallah and Bethlehem or Nablus and Jenin in Upper Samaria, where several suicide bombers came from (Katz 2016). The organization operates primarily throughout the West Bank, but it has shifted much of its activities to the Gaza Strip due to P.A. interventions in recent years. In Gaza, it has a division called "Nidal al-Amouodi" and, since 2017, the first military base called "The Martyr Yasser Arafat Base," along with training facilities where they work with Hamas, PIJ, and others with local factions (MEMRI 2018). Members of the movement are also in a Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon. Refugee camps have been one of the greatest martyrs' sources (The Mackenzie Institute 2015; Durns 2019).

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Figure 9: Propaganda banner from the AAMB website (Source: Nedal.net, 2020a)

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

AAMB's financial resources and access to them are ambiguous. Several sources (The Mackenzie Institute 2015; U.S. Department of State 2019; AFPC 2020, 5) state that most of the funding is likely to come from Iran through Hezbollah, providing the facility with training facilities and information (Durns 2019). However, the overall scope of support remains hidden. Iran allegedly takes advantage of its current weak leadership and seeks to control it with financial support to spread influence and anti- Israel operations (AFPC 2020, 5). According to Durns (2019), the Bri- gades also obtained funding from the smuggling of weapons and other illegal goods at the beginning of its existence.

4) Organizational structure

Due to the above-mentioned localized cells, the AAMB has a decentralized structure with a permanent lead. Each of these cells then has a different degree and degree of dependence on Fatah. Most of these factions are then named after some Brigades' fallen members (Durns 2019). Ac- cording to a report by The Mackenzie Institue (2015), the group's central management is weakened since some of the cells have ceased operations and, conversely, some are continuing their activities, as mentioned

90 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS above. However, as Durns (2019) points out, the high degree of decen- tralization provides the group with appropriate protection from the intelligence community.

During its existence, the movement had several leaders, most of whom were arrested or eliminated by Israel. The last of these was Hatem Abu Rizek in October 2020, who died during clashes with PA security forces (i24News 2020). According to Durns (2019), the current leader is Hassan al-Qassas. One of the most influential AAMB leaders, Marwan Barghouti, is serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison (DiscoverTheNetworks.org 2021).

Figure 10: AAMB fighters on a propaganda video (Source: Nedal.net 2020b)

5) The role of violence

AAMB members are committing violent attacks both in Israel and within the West Bank. Since its inception, the primary modus operandi has been small-arms attacks, since 2002, the primary violent method has been suicide bomb attacks on civilian targets, as well as sniper attacks on check- points, or firing rockets (The Mackenzie Institute 2015). The group claimed responsibility for the first female suicide attack in Israel in 2002. The AAMB also launched several rocket attacks, notably in 2010-2012,

91 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS from the West Bank and in cooperation with other militant groups from the Gaza Strip. In 2015, the movement openly declared war on Israel and continued to attack Israeli soldiers and civilians (U.S. Department of State 2019). In 2016, massive clashes broke out between AAMB members and PA security forces in Nablus, killing current AAMB leader Ah- med Izz Halawa (Rasgon 2016). AAMB members also participated in the Great March of Return protests, during which some of them lost their lives (ITIC 2019b). The GTD database (2019b) records the group's last attack in December 2018, when several Palestinians affiliated with the AMMB threw incendiary devices on a bus near Efrat in the West Bank. As such, violence plays a crucial role in achieving AAMB's strategic goals.

6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

The AAMB's relationship with the Palestinian Authority, represented by the Fatah movement, from which the Brigades seceded, has changed dramatically over the years. Since the founding of the organization, in Yasser Arafat's era, Fatah has visibly led and significantly funded the AAMB for violent actions against Israel. It was also continued by Arafat's successor, Mahmoud Abbas, who even financially supported the organization's im- prisoned members. The turning point came in 2007, when Abbas announced all Palestinian armed militias' disarmament, while much of the Brigade's membership remained active. Since then, the link between the AAMB and Fatah as such has been perceived as rather indirect, although there is still evidence of a financial link between the two actors (Durns 2019). It is worth noting that Fatah is fragmented among other factions, which differ in their loyalty to the ruling office. Therefore, the AAMB cooperates to a greater extent with those groups that continue the armed resistance. It is apparent in many AAMB communication materials (see

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Nedal.net 2021b). Since the AAMB's defiance of disarmament, there has been great tension between the PA and the most extreme currents of a group close to Islamist groups. The result has been the many arrests or killings of several Brigade leaders (see above). Many AAMB members still do not accept Fatah's current leadership and instead support Mu- hammad Dahlan, Abbas's rival (Durns 2019).

7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and state constituencies

The AAMB is a purely military organization that does not seek to provide any other functions to its members and supporters as an alternative government. The organization's primary function is to continue fighting against Israel by terrorist methods, so they gain their supporters by building on strong nationalism. AAMBs are continually active on communication channels, through which they spread their propaganda with anti-Israel motives. On a well-developed website, they comment on news from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on a daily basis (Nedal.net 2021b). In their media appearances, they often demonstrate their military strength and skills, such as footage from training camps - most recently from the Gaza Strip (e.g., MEMRI 2017; Ibid., 2018, Nedal.net 2021c). An- other part of the contributions is often devoted to their martyrs' profiles (Nedal.net 2021a).

4.3.3 Hamas' activities It is also necessary to briefly summarize the presence of Hamas in the West Bank, which is negligible compared to the Gaza Strip, but a certain impact of its activities in Gaza is also detected in Judea and Samaria. Alt- hough the ruling Fatah was relatively successful in disbanding Hamas' military infrastructure and banning all of its welfare activities in the

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West Bank, it failed to offer a compelling management model or political alternative. Also, the socio-economic situation under PA did not improve much, which contributed to frustration, and the emergence of extremist tendencies (Shitrit and Jaraba 2014). In addition, the close conflict in Syria has increased the presence of Salafi jihadist elements in the West Bank. It has just revealed a vacuum that is trying to fill Hamas with its clandestine activities. According to the daily al-Modon (2019), the Pales- tinian Authority is still concerned about the repetition of the second intifada scenario when it overlooked the growth of Hamas's military power in the West Bank.

According to Barak (2021), it is currently difficult to estimate the impact of Hamas on radicalization in the West Bank, given the lack of reliable data. According to his estimates, the popularity of Hamas across Pales- tinian society is around 25-28 %, which corresponds to the results of the PCPSR survey (2020).

The organizational structure of Hamas in the West Bank is still in its in- fancy, as the movement does not have a political or military apparatus, as is the case in the Gaza Strip (Abu Amer 2018). Hamas's presence primarily consists of setting up hidden and independent militant cells driven from Gaza to carry out acts of violence that include shootings and stabbings, kidnappings, and bombings. These sleeping cells' task is to re- cruit new operatives, mostly young Palestinians, or purchase weapons. Indirect recruitment through cyberspace is also common (Gross 2020). Barak (2021) also emphasizes the importance of strong family and clan ties - the so-called khamula, between Palestinians in the West Bank, who have long been loyal to the ideology of Hamas and spread its dawah teachings.

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Evidence of Hamas's increasing activities is the opposing of multiple interventions by the PA or Israel. In many cases, it was a matter of thwart- ing planned attacks and arresting suspected radicals. The attacks in the West Bank themselves are generally common - but it is often difficult to determine whether the perpetrator was Hamas or whether they were independent actions by uncontrolled Palestinians. In one of the last raids in December 2019, IDF arrested and confiscated senior figures from a local branch of Hamas in Hebron (TOI 2019a). Another intervention followed in November 2020, when Haman leader Hassan Youssef was arrested in the West Bank (Boxerman 2020).

In recent years, Hamas has also engaged in resistance to Israel in the West Bank through media channels, where it regularly encourages Pal- estinians to act violently. According to Hamas leadership's latest statements, the movement is trying to resume activities in the West Bank, but without further details (Ibid.).

Hamas is not the only radical Islamist group in Gaza trying to infiltrate the West Bank. Another such actor is, albeit to a lesser extent, the Pales- tinian Islamic Jihad, and radicalized individuals identified with al-Qaeda or ISIS ideology. Like Hamas, PIJ's violent activity involves sending operatives to the West Bank to carry out terrorist attacks (Shitrit and Jaraba 2014).

4.4 Characteristics of Radical Islamist Groups in Gaza Strip

In this chapter, attention is focused on analyzing the characteristics of the prominent militant Islamist organizations in the Gaza Strip. As al-

95 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ready presented in the previous sections, the analytical framework, according to Williams (2008), is used to meet this partial goal of the thesis, which distinguishes seven basic features of violent non-state actors. As in the previous section, these attributes are applied in the following text to individual case studies of radical Islamist groups in Gaza.

4.4.1 Hamas (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades)

Figure 11: Emblem of the Hamas movement (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) Hamas is the most significant Palestinian militant Islamist group. The name is an Arabic acronym for Harakat al-Muqawana al-Islamiya, meaning the Islamic Resistance Movement.16 The word Hamas itself means "zeal" in Arabic. As mentioned in the previous section, the organization was established as a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 on the first intifada threshold, formed by Palestinian nationalists led by spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Hamas has since taken on the role of leader of the Palestinian movement in the armed resistance against

16 Lesser-known names include al-Tiar al-Islami (The Islamic Stream) or al-Athja al- Islami (The Islamic Trend), (CEP 2020b, 1).

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Israel, which was initially perceived as a religious duty (AFPC 2020, 2). Hamas embodies a complex hybrid player, holding a wide range of functions in the Palestinian enclave, from civilian administration and social services through its civilian wing to security provision. This activity and military operations against Israel are rendered by the Izz al-Din al-Qas- sam Brigades (IDQB). The current leader of the movement is Chief of the Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh. The organization is declared a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Japan. Other countries classify only the IDQB as a terrorist group (CEP 2020b, 1).

1) Motivation and purpose

As can be seen from the official website of the Hamas movement (hamas.ps), as well as from several other sources (Khroub 2006, 17-21; AFPC 2020: 1-3; ECFR 2020c; TRAC 2020b), the primary motivation for the formation of the group was a call for violent resistance against Israeli occupation and liberation of Palestinian territories. The movement de- tached from MB due to its refusal to engage in a violent struggle. In addition to this immediate goal, the liberation of the historic Palestinian territories and, consequently, establishing an Islamic state from the West Bank to the Mediterranean based on Sharia law became a key objective. These goals were enshrined in Hamas' 1988 charter (mithaq), where Pal- estine is considered waqf, land endowed to Muslims by Allah (Hamas Covenant 1988; AFPC 2020, 2; hamas.ps 2020).

The ideological doctrine of Hamas is thus a blend of Islamism and Pales- tinian nationalism, where, as it described, nationalism is part of the religious creed (Hamas Covenant 1988). However, as analyzed in the historical background, the role of Islamic principles in ideological beliefs has

97 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS receded considerably over the years, and Hamas has become a pragmatic movement combining national, religious, and political narratives (Huzen 2019, 35). The proof is the modification of the founding charter and the addition of a new political program in 2017, which came after a change in the organization's leadership. In this program, Hamas distanced itself from its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood, and also essentially em- braced the idea of rebuilding Palestine along the pre-1967 boundaries. On the other hand, the document confirmed Hamas's commitment to armed resistance as the only means of protecting its people (hamas.ps 2017; ECFR 2020).

As for determining the current Islamist ideology of Hamas, it is quite challenging given its variability. It is obvious that the strategic goals are based on the principles of Islamic fundamentalism and jihadism if jihad is understood as a path to resistance. It should be noted that jihadism applies only to the Palestinian territories, not to the global mindset (Dun- ning 2015, 301; CEP 2020b, 1).

Figure 12: Emblem of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Source: Jihad Intel 2020)

2) Strength and scope

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Given its size, Hamas has a large membership base. As for a purely military force, the al-Qassem Brigade is an extraordinarily organized and heavily armed military group responsible for the largest proportion of attacks on Israel. Current estimates of the Brigades' total strength indicate that Hamas has up to 20,000 combat-ready men (IISS 2018). An- other 20,000 armed members represent the police and security forces (Executives Forces), so the organization's total armed force is around 40,000 fighters (Saleh 2014, cf. CEP 2020b, 6). Extensive military capabilities, ranging from automatic weapons, bombs, explosives to well- known Qassam rockets cannot be neglected (IDF 2020).

The organization's scope is considerable – in addition to the Gaza Strip, it is also headquartered in the West Bank and maintains several local branches across the region (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar). As the ruling entity, it has, of course, the most significant influence in Gaza (CEP 2020b, 1).

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

Hamas has considerable and diverse financial resources - starting from donations from Palestinian and other supporters, its own charity organizations, and, last but not least, funding from foreign states, mostly from Iran and the Gulf countries (U.S. Department of State 2019). The Report Counter Extremism Project (2020b, 6-10) lists the main ways of financing Hamas charities, taxes and the tunnel economy, cryptocurrencies, and foreign investment.

In particular, financial assistance from Iran is extensive, reaching an estimated $ 30 million per month in 2019 (Bachner 2019). It is worth noting that the deterioration in relations between Hamas and Iran, especially around 2011 due to Hamas' reluctance to engage in the Syrian war

99 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS alongside Bashar Assad, has led to a halt in much of Iran's financial flows. Another major donor is Qatar, which invests heavily in the Gazan economy ($ 1 billion since 2012 according to Kubovich 2019), then also Saudi Arabia and Turkey (CEP 2020b, 9-10). Tax fines imposed on smuggled goods through Gazan tunnels amounted to $ 500 million per year in 2014 (Laub and Barzak 2014). However, today a smaller amount is estimated due to the destruction of most tunnels by the Egyptian government (Pel- ham 2012). Fundraising campaigns have also been a popular way of raising funds in recent years (fund.alqassam.ps 2019).

Figure 13: Banner from al-Qassam Brigades website (Source: CEP 2020b, 8)

4) Organizational structure

Hamas is a large organization with several separate bodies. The basis is a hierarchical structure divided into three main branches - consultative councils, social services wing, and military wing (IDQB) (Levitt 2006, 10- 11). The overarching political and decision-making body is The Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura), responsible for consulting on the Qur'anic principles and their application (Hovdenak 2013, 64). The principal authority is the political bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi), chaired by Ismail Haniyeh. Hamas headquarters has moved several times in recent years (under the previous leader Khaled Meshaal) - first in Syria, then in Qatar,

100 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS and partly in Egypt. At present, the seat of the political bureau is again Gaza. The command structure is divided into two parts: the domestic, operating in the Palestinian Territories (Gaza Strip and West Bank), and the exile, which is active abroad. Hamas also has political bureaus and shura councils at the regional level, where it defends its members' interests, including the diaspora and prisoners in Israeli jails (Laub 2014; CEP 2020b: 5; ECFR 2020c).

Al-Qassem Brigades then represent a separate wing with its own structure. The level of autonomy and independence from the central structure is also the subject of heated debate among the Hamas leadership. One side argues that the Brigades operate entirely independently, the other argues that the military wing is part of the political apparatus that controls it and gives orders (see, e.g., Mandaville 2014, 282).

5) The role of violence

Within the declared goals, violence is a fundamental component on which Hamas bases its activities. Major violent tactics include suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, armed assault, and shootings (U.S. Department of State 2019, cf. TRAC 2020). Hamas is a militant organization that, since its inception, has committed an enormous number of attacks on Israel, the background of which has already been analyzed in the previous section. Firing rockets towards Israel remains the main violent mean - at the end of the Gaza war in 2014 alone, some 4,600 rockets were launched from Gaza (Issacharoff 2016). At present, their number has decreased rapidly against the background of peace negotiations, but they continued to take place during 2020, as did Hamas-organized protests at the borders. It should be noted that rocket attacks are also

101 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS carried out by other radical Islamist groups (see below). Since 2020, Ha- mas fighters have also begun to use new tactics in the form of balloon bombs - clusters of balloons attached to primitive explosives that they send across the Israeli border (Hendrix et al. 2020).

Figure 14: One of the banners of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Source: alqassam.ps 2020a)

6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

Given that Hamas represents the highest authority in Gaza, only the relationship towards the Palestinian Authority formed by the West Bank- based Fatah can be analyzed at this point. Hamas has a critical relationship with PA, which culminated in the internal conflict in 2006-2007 and Hamas' takeover of Gaza. Since then, there has been a de facto severance of any contacts due to the PA's decision to stop armed resistance to Israel and peace negotiation efforts. Although this conflict continues today, relations have recently converged, and reconciliated attempts took place, such as Cairo talks in November 2020 or before in Istanbul in September 2020 (Al Jazeera 2020b).

7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

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Hamas is a unique non-state actor in the Gaza Strip, responsible for all functions as a ruling entity. After taking control of the coastal enclave and its blockade, Hamas exclusively provides the Palestinian population with alternative government functions, such as social, religious, charitable, economic, or media services, as well as holding political, ideological, and military functions. Through various welfare projects, Hamas is seeking to gain popularity among grassroots Palestinians (CEP 2020b 1). How- ever, as Frisch (2015, 7) points out, Hamas "failed to engage in true state- building for the general welfare of Palestinians," despite well-organized social and charitable activities. The factual cut-off from the world is still reflected in the low standard of living in this territory.

Figure 15: Propaganda of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades related to the COVID-19 pandemic (Source: alqassam.ps 2020b) Hamas uses an extensive media campaign to communicate with its supporters. It is mainly performed by Hamas-run al-Aqsa, or al-Risalah media outlet, which informs about news related to the Israeli occupation and the promotes of Hamas propaganda (Halewa 2020). The media channels of al-Qassam Brigades are also a significant contributor to the formation of the propaganda image (alqassam.ps 2020).

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4.4.2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Figure 16: Emblem of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Source: cleanpng.com 2020)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), in Arabic “Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Fi- lasti”17, is a militant Islamist group initially founded in 1979 (or 1981, according to some authors) in Egypt as an offshoot of the Muslim Broth- erhood (MB). The organization was formed by two Palestinian members of MB Fathi Shikaki and Abd al-Aziz Awda, who were studying in Egypt. The impetus for establishing the group for them was the excessive mod- eration of MB, whose activities did not serve to solve the Palestinian issue (Levin 2018). In the 1980s, after persecution by the Egyptian government, the movement moved to the Gaza Strip, where it operated as an underground organization involved in sporadic attacks on Israeli and Egyptian security forces. During the first intifada, the PIJ command moved to Lebanon and Syria, where it began cooperating with Lebanon- based Hezbollah and established its franchises, which are still active to-

17 Names such as Islamic Jihad, al-Awdah Brigades, Saraya al-Quds (military wing, meaning Jerusalem Brigades), and others also appear (U.S. Department of State 2019).

104 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS day (Fletcher 2008, cf. CEP 2020c, 1-4). In the 1990s, the al-Quds Bri- gades (AQB)18 and Hamas took part in many terrorist acts against Israeli targets. In 1997, the United States recognized the PIJ as a terrorist organization. It is currently the largest Islamist group in Gaza after Hamas. The current leader, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, is based in Damascus, Syria (Levin 2018, cf. CEP 2020c, 1-4).

1) Motivation and purpose

As can be seen from several statements from the PIJ's military wing website (Saraya.ps), the organization's goal is to create an Islamic state with Sharia law principles in the territory of today's West Bank, Israel, and the Gaza Strip (Saraya.ps 2020a). Since its inception, the PIJ has been heavily inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution and its wilayat al-faqih concept, although it is an exclusively Sunni organization. This inspiration was later reflected in the PIJ's de facto support by the Iranian regime (see below). The main goals of the PIJ have been from the beginning the rejection of "any peaceful solution to the Palestinian cause" and the belief that the only option for the liberation of Palestine is a solution through jihad (holy war) and martyrdom. It thus rejects a total of two-state solutions and any negotiations with Israel, and therefore advocates its military destruction. PIJ's representatives lead the conflict with Israel as a religious conflict, the essence of which is the recapture of Palestine as a religious duty (Levin 2018, CEP 2020c, 1-2).

PIJ states in several articles on the website that it “pledges their people to continue the path of resistance, jihad, and struggle with weapons in hand

18 AQB initially conducted military operations under names that varied from "Saraya al-Jihad" to "Saif al-Islam" and then "Islamic Mujahid Forces" (Saraya.ps 2020a).

105 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS and the blood of martyrs” (Saraya.ps 2020b). The PIJ is thus engaged in violent jihad, although the group was not originally exclusively militant. The Al-Quds Brigades were not set up until later stages, and the violent operations themselves did not begin until the first intifada in 1987. On the other hand, unlike Hamas, the PIJ is more focused on military solutions, so it does not seek political participation on the domestic scene and has no ambition to become a political leader. In this respect, it is worth noting that the primary purpose of PIJ is not the provision of social services, so it is far less responsive to society than Hamas (Fletcher 2008, cf. CEP 2020c, 2).

In terms of the accepted Islamist ideology, PIJ is combining jihadism with several other Islamist beliefs. The Counter Extremism Project (CEP 2020c, 1) states that PIJ identifies with Sunni Salafism, jihadism, as well as Takfirism, as they accuse other Muslims (PA representatives) of apostasy.

Figure 17: PIJ's promotional material shows "preparation for waging jihad" with pictured former PIJ leaders (Fathi Shaqaqi, Ramadan Shalah) and current leader (Ziyad al-Nakhalah) (Source: Saraya.ps 2020) 2) Strength and scope

The exact total membership of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is currently unknown. According to a conservative estimate by the U.S. The State De- partment (2019) had less than 1,000 members; however, the group

106 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS claimed in 2011 that it had 8,000 combat-ready members in Gaza (Bal- mer and al-Mughrabi 2011, cf. Gedalyahu 2011). In 2019, the estimate was 6,000 militants (Halbfinger 2019). The number of al-Quds Brigades fighters is estimated at 15,000 (Mansharof 2020, 1).

The group operates primarily in the Gaza Strip, to a lesser extent in the West Bank, as well as in Lebanon and Syria. However, PIJ representatives, or at least supporters, are spread throughout the Middle East, including, for example, Iran (al-Ghoul 2014a). Al-Quds Brigades coordinates through its staffs a regional network of its cells, which carry out local operations against Israeli targets. From this perspective, the group has a slight transnational reach (ICEP 2020c, 3).

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

In 2019, a PIJ spokesman said that Iran had been a major foreign partner in providing finance or military equipment since the group's inception (TOI 2019b). Even according to several sources (U.S. State Department 2019), the group's primary financial source is Iran, whose financial contribution to the PIJ budget has been rising significantly since the 1990s. In 1998, support was $ 2 million per year (Sisk 1998), while at the end of 2013, it was already $ 3 million per month (Balousha 2013). The PIJ's relationship with Iran strengthened, especially during the Syrian conflict when the Hamas leadership refused to support Bashar al-Assad's regime (Asharq al-Awsat 2012). PIJ's financial dependence became particularly acute during its economic crisis 2015-2016 (Mansharof 2020, 2). Accord- ing to another study (Levitt 2014), Iranian financial transactions to PIJs are between $ 100 and $ 150 million per year. Currently, Iran maintains a financial allocation of between $ 30-70 million per calendar year and is

107 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS therefore considered a full-fledged Iranian proxy (i24News 2016; Levy 2018; Halbfinger 2019).

Nevertheless, Iran is not the only foreign finance provider to the PIJ; reportedly, another is Qatar. Financial aid currently amounts to several million dollars a month (Halbfinger 2019). Qatar is currently on trial for expressing support for the main Palestinian Islamist movements (Hamas and PIJ) through its three financial bodies, Qatar Charity, Masraf Al Ra- yan, and Qatar National Bank. The lawsuit accuses Qatar of cooperating with these institutions, which send money to terrorist groups in the Mid- dle East under the guise of charitable donations. These institutions are then somehow connected to members of the royal family (Hananio 2020, cf. Kredo 2020). PIJ also receives limited financial and logistical support from Syria and foreign sympathizers from various collections (e.g., in the USA) (CEP 2020c, 3).

Regarding the role of finance for the PIJ, the analysis of the data shows that while finance is a vital part of achieving key objectives (destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic State), but con- trolling it is not a central ambition and is not subject to tactical and strategic objectives.

4) Organizational structure

The organizational structure has a hierarchical composition, topped by leadership, which is commanded by a secretary-general. Until 2018, the leader was Ramadan Shallah, who has held this position since 1995. The new and current secretary-general is Damascus-based Ziad al-Nakhalah, from where he coordinates the PIJ's activities in Gaza (ICEP 2020, 3). The PIJ is governed by a government political council consisting of 15 members. Nine members are elected by ballot voting, which last happened in

108 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

September 2018, when all existing members were replaced during the first international elections. Elections take place every four years. Two members are then elected by the secretary-general and the remaining four by the council. This council defends members' interests in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Israeli prisons, and abroad (Abu Amer 2018).

The armed wing of the al-Quds Brigades consists of regional commands, as outlined above. Each member of the regional leadership receives orders from the central leadership for operations, which they transfer to the cell under their responsibility (ICEP 2020, 3). In November 2019, AQB leader Baha Abu al-Ata was eliminated during an Israeli target killing, followed by an outbreak of clashes (Islam Times 2019).

5) The role of violence

Engagement in violence is an integral part of the organization's activities due to the ideological doctrine of violent jihad presented above. The role of violence thus plays a crucial role in achieving the goals of the PIJ movement. The vast majority of PIJ's violent activities are covered by rocket fire or mortar shells to Israel, and others mostly include bomb attacks, knife, firearm attacks, or hostage-taking, even in their enemy's territory (e.g., U.S. Department of State, 2019). In particular, the last major con- frontation with Israel in November 2019 marks the intransigence of violence as a critical element of the PIJ's activities. During this period alone, 450 rockets were fired at Israel (Kajjo and Jedinia 2019).

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Figure 18: Propagational material from the official AQB website (Source: Saraya.ps 2020) 6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

In this dimension, it is first essential to define what we mean by state authorities in the context of the Gaza Strip's political situation. Firstly, an account can be taken of the Palestinian Authority officially administering the Palestinian Territories, but its de jure power in Gaza is almost limited. The PIJ, like most more radical groups, has a critical approach to its representatives, in which it opposes the tendencies of the PA to cooperate in any way with the State of Israel. The PA is deemed corrupt by Western secularism and an illegitimate leader of the Palestinian people (Haaretz 2020). Therefore, it is more appropriate to state the relationship with the de facto ruling authority of Hamas (for more, see a separate subchapter). It can generally be characterized as a complicated relationship oscillating between tense rivalry and close cooperation. Evidence of this is cooperation in the military field, such as conducting violent communal actions, the most well-known of which are coordinated suicide bombings. On the other hand, they have ideological divisions (see above) that led to isolated security incidents, such as in 2013, when a Hamas police officer killed a missile unit commander after ordering rockets to be fired during an agreed peace between Hamas and Israel (Levin 2018).

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7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

As already mentioned, the PIJ has, to a large extent, only a military and defense function in the Gaza Strip, unlike Hamas. For example, the provision of security had proved when PIJ fighters protected Palestinian pro- testers at a border fence with Israel during an armistice in 2019 (Halbfin- ger 2019). The PIJ does not impersonate an alternative government role in terms of social welfare, given that its competitor does so. However, this does not mean that sometimes it does not resort to social activities. In 2013, for example, the PIJ distributed food packages and other provi- sions across Gaza to represent Hamas, which ran out of funds after sev- ering relations with Iran (Akram 2013). Through its media, it also seeks to support the families of fallen martyrs and based on the teachings of Islam, some ideological support for its constituents (Saraya.ps, 2020c). According to recent surveys, public support for PIJ in Gaza reaches about five percent (Halbfinger 2019).

4.4.3 Popular Resistance Committees

111 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Figure 19: Emblem of Popular Resistance Committees (Source: Qaweim.com 2020)

The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) is a Palestinian militant network operating in the Gaza Strip, established in September 2000 during the ongoing second intifada. The organization was formed by Fatah's defectors, who opposed Palestinian autonomy, and later joined by the operatives Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, PFLO, or even Hamas and PIJ. Thus, the PRC is a mixture of members of several different actors in Gaza and is therefore often seen as a coalition of many anti-Israel groups (ITIC 2011, 4 cf. Durns 2018). The name itself expresses the concept of seeking common armed resistance combining all Islamic organizations (Halevi 2006).

The founder is a former member of Fatah and Tanzim Jamal Abu Sam- hadana, who in 2006 became the head of the new al-Qassam dominated police forces (Brenner 2017, 84). Members of the armed wing, called al- Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades19, have been involved in attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets since its inception, publicly declaring their goal of destroying the State of Israel and genocide its people (Isseroff

19 Also known as Liwa al-Tawheed (The Tawheed Brigade) (Jihad Intel 2020b).

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2008, Qaweim.com 2020a). The PRC maintains close ties with the PIJ and Hamas, with which it participates in security inside Gaza and jointly un- dertakes violent actions, such as the well-known abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The PRC is referred to as a terrorist group by Israel and the United States. It is believed to be the third strongest militant faction in the Gaza Strip after Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The current leader since 2012 is Ayman al-Shashniya (Aurora 2019, cf. AFPC 2020: 4, cf. ECFR 2020d).

1) Motivation and purpose

The Popular Resistance Committees do not have an official document or manifesto to proclaim their ideology. Though, their public statements, available on their official website Qaweim.com, appear to be sufficient to understand. The primary motivation for establishing the PRC was to support the attacks on Israel and, as mentioned, its position against the con- ciliatory approach of the Palestinian Authority or Fatah in the struggle for Palestinian independence during the 1990s (Durns 2018). The PRC promotes radical Islamist ideologies within which it is very close to Ha- mas. Unlike Hamas, it has no affiliation in the Gaza political arena, although it announced a political party's founding in 2007 (Isseroff 2008). The PRCs often emphasize in their statements the role of jihad on the path of Allah as the only way to liberate Palestine and the "duty of implementing Sharia law entrusted to all members of Ummah" (Qaweim.com 2020a, cf. Iseroff 2008; ITIC 2011, 4; Jihad Intel 2020b). Like al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades, the PRC believes that there are only two camps – a camp of faith and Tawheed and a camp of infidelity and revenge, between which the holy war is taking place (Jihad Intel 2020b). However,

113 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS according to current data, al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades deviates ideologically slightly from the PRC in recent years, as it is much closer to the Salafi-jihadist doctrine. According to Al-Tamimi (2021), it is allegedly connected to ISIS, but did not publicly admit it. The group as such advocates relentless armed resistance in all its forms until (according to them) Satanist Israel is defeated and expelled from Palestine (Qaweim.com 2020a). Nevertheless, their stated goal is "only" the recon- struction of Palestine based on pre-1967 borders (Isseroff 2008; ECFR 2020d).

In addition to being inspired by Hamas, they are referred to as the "Ira- nian sub-contractor" due to Hezbollah's considerable influence. In addition to the similar insignia of both organizations (outstretched hand rising from the al-Aqsa Mosque and holding an AK-47 assault rifle), there are the uniforms of the fighters or the PRC flag with the words "And kill them (the infidels) wherever you overtake them" (Durns 2018). Even these initially inconspicuous aspects speak of Iranian influence within the PRC, which, like the PIJ, is perceived as an Iranian proxy (Azani et al. 2020, 6).

Figure 20, 21: Emblem and the flag of al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades (Liwa al-Ta- wheed), (Source: ECFR 2020; Jihad Intel 2020)

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2) Strength and scope

At present, estimates of the exact numbers of PRC members differ. The problem is that many PRC members are fluctuating among other radical groups in Gaza. It is safe to say that the group is the third largest in Gaza and today has several hundred members (Durns 2018). According to Newton (2017), the group can have up to 3,000 members. Current analyzes show that the number of supporters of the "hardcore" is limited and, given the current weak leadership, the group plays a rather supporting role in Hamas or the PIJ in Gaza (Durns 2018). The AFPC report (2020, 5) confirms that the PRC remains a low-profile organization but can always provoke a violent conflict with Israel. The PRC warns on its website that it will develop its military strength and capabilities and that weapons will remain loaded until the Zionist enemy is defeated (Qaweim.com 2020b).

The PRC is actively present in Gaza and, in recent years, in the Sinai Pen- insula, where it collaborates with Salafi jihadist groups. There are also signs of expanding its operations to the West Bank, where it was actively operating during the second intifada. The PRC - Popular Struggle Coordi- nation Committee (PSCC) also runs in the West Bank, but unlike the PRC, it seeks non-violent resistance to the Israeli occupation (NGO-monitor 2020). It was a common phenomenon to send their operatives to commit terrorist attacks here. In the past, efforts to build infrastructure for weapons and missiles have also been detected here (JVL 2020a). Overall, from this point of view, the scope of the PRC's activities can be described as transnational, given that they are also visible outside the Gaza Strip.

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

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The methods of financing the PRC are diverse, which testifies to the maintenance of relatively good relations with several other groups in Gaza. According to several sources (e.g., Durns 2018), the group is directly financially supported by Hamas and Hezbollah. Based on this fact, it is likely that the PRC indirectly obtains funding from Iran through these beneficiaries. The PRC is often referred to as Hezbollah's closest friend on Israel's southern border. The Shiite organization covertly provides financial assistance for violent actions by PRC operatives or arms supplies. The financial value is usually in the range of hundreds to thousands of dollars (Ibid.). However, exact data on specific values of external finances expressed, for example, per year, are not available.

The current trend in obtaining PRC funding is the use of cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin. The ITIC reports (2019) and Azani et al. (2020) draw attention to spokesman al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades' call for his supporters to send money via virtual currency. Since 2015, in close cooperation with Hamas, the PRC has provided a virtual wallet in block- chain via the social networks Twitter and Telegram, to which anyone could send money. Under it, over 4,500 transactions were made over four years, and bitcoins were "mined" daily (Azani et al. 2020, 4). The virtual wallet was subsequently used to finance terror in the PRC's online campaign, but also for seemingly legitimate financial services purposes in Gaza (Ibid., 13). According to studies, the use of cryptocurrencies is evidenced by the group's financial distress and the need to operate in greater anonymity (ITIC 2019b, 1).

4) Organizational structure

According to an ITIC report (2011, 2), the PRC is a small organization divided into other smaller groupings. In 2006, three factions were

116 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS formed after the Israelis eliminated two of their leaders. Two of them operate de facto under the patronage of Hamas, and the third faction has become a separate group, Jayish al Islam (Army of Islam), which today is one of the strongest Salafi-Jihadist organizations in Gaza (see below). In recent years, the PRC's organizational structure was highly fragmented, yet the group has a declared narrow leadership circle (Ibid.; Durns 2018).

Besides, the armed wing al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades has its own missile and engineering unit or unit in charge of propaganda called Ji- hadist Information. The PRC also manages several Islamic universities in Gaza through the Student Resistance Bloc (Durns 2018, Qaweim.com 2020c). Thanks to Hamas and the PIJ's good relations, the groups share military material, especially missiles (Aurora 2019).

Figure 22: The banner of the Popular Resistance Committees (Source: Azani et al. 2020, 7) 5) The role of violence

Violence plays a vital role in the activities of the PRC and al-Nasr Bri- gades. As with most Islamist groups in Gaza, violence is a means to achieve strategic goals. In terms of a form of violence and tactics, the

117 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS group is heavily associated with the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), road bombs, mortars, and other explosive weapons (Durns 2018). It is the operations in which IEDs were used that belong to the most notably PRC actions, as was the case, for example, in 2018 on the Gaza-Israel border (Eldar 2018). However, it is no secret that the group owns missiles of its production and firearms, including submachine guns and machine guns. The PRC's characteristic modus operandi is naturally bombing attacks and firearms attacks (Durns 2018). Since Operation Lead Lead, there has been a clear trend in the PRC and Hamas to use the indirect route through the Sinai to infiltrate Israel and commit attacks there (ITIC 2011, 2).

6) The relationships between ANSAs and state authorities

As indicated earlier, the PRC is hostile to the Palestinian Authority as a de jure state authority and does not recognize its administration of Pal- estine due to negotiations with Israel and secular politics. Opposition to the PA is also reflected in social issues - for example, in December 2020, the PRC called on its website to lift government sanctions from Ramallah, release their prisoners and restore salaries to the families of slain martyrs (Qaweim.com 2020b).

On the other hand, it maintains good relations with the Hamas government through cooperation in planning and conducting attacks. At the beginning of the establishment, the PRC cooperated with them on operations with which Hamas did not want to engage (ICG 2011, 8). However, these relations have not been entirely friendly over the years, for example, tensions in 2013, when the PRC issued a statement criticizing Ha- mas's arrests of some of their mujahideen. On the other hand, Hamas has criticized the PRC for firing unauthorized missiles toward Israel (Barnett

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2013a, cf. AFPC 2020, 4). A separate chapter is devoted to a more detailed analysis of relations with Hamas.

Figure 23: PRC's promotional material for Eid al-Fitr (Festival of breaking the fast) (Source: Qaweim.com 2020)

7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

Like the PIJ, the PRC rather maintains only security functions for its constituents inside Gaza. However, this does not mean that the PRC does not fulfill non-military functions. The PRC's educational activities through its own student organization Student Resistance Bloc, which administers religious schools in Gaza, have already been mentioned (Durns 2018, Qaweim.com 2020c). It is also clear from Qaweim.com (Ibid.) That the PRC is also involved in charitable activities or celebrations of Islamic holidays. The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee's activities, which seek to promote Islam and non-violent resistance to Israel through "marches, strikes, demonstrations, direct actions and legal campaigns" in the West Bank, cannot be neglected. PSCC activities also serve to raise funds from foreign countries (NGO-monitor 2020).

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4.4.4 Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam)

Figure 24: Emblem of Jaysh al-Islam (Source: Jihad Intel 2020)

Jaysh al-Islam ("Army of Islam" or officially "The Army of Islam Group in Jerusalem") is another Gazan organization based on radical Islamist ideologies. The group was founded between 2005-200620 and is strongly associated with the Dugmush clan in Gaza, whose leader Mumtaz Dugmush is considered the founder (AFPC 2020, 5). With up to a thousand members, the clan controlled the Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City until Ha- mas took control of it. Mumtaz Dugmush (aka Abu Muhammad al-Ansari) is a former member of Fatah, the PRC, or the PA security apparatus, allegedly radicalized during the Second Intifada (Zibun 2009, cf. Brenner 2017, 84). Many Jaysh al-Islam (JAI) members have de facto seceded from other radical organizations, notably the PRC, and have begun to defend global jihad and engage with al-Qaeda (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 16). In the beginning, the group worked closely with al-Qassam Brigades, for

20 The year of establishment varies according to the author.

120 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS example, often digging tunnels on the Gaza-Israel border, including the one used during the famous abduction operation of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006. However, after this incident, there was great tension between the two groups (Brenner 2017, 84). One of the current leaders is Khattab al-Maqdisi, a prominent jihadist known from the Afghan and Iraqi battlefields (Brenner 2017, 86). Today, JAI is based in the Tzabra district of central Gaza. So far, it has been declared a terrorist organization by the United States and the UAE (U.S. Department of State 2011).

1) Motivation and purpose

According to an ICG report (2011, 9), Jaysh al-Islam was initially more of a clan criminal organization that "just wanted money." The move to a radical version of Islam came when JAI leaders were criticizing Hamas's moderate approach, its involvement in politics, or the oppression of Mus- lims in Gaza. Since then, it has become clear that the JAI will differ from traditional Islamist organizations in adopting its global jihadist goals. To this end, it began to establish contacts with other extreme organizations led by al-Qaeda and began to identify with the ideas of various radicals, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or Anwar al-Awlaki. It deems itself a fundamentalist and genuine Islamist alternative (Milton-Edwards 2014, 11). The JAI sought financial assistance directly from al-Qaeda or asked for approval to support even other organizations financially. In May 2011, a few days after Osama bin Laden's assassination, JAI gave a eulo- gizing speech to the former al-Qaeda leader (Roggio 2011). However, since 2015, it has shifted its allegiance to the Islamic State and claims to be an integral part of ISIS-Sinai Province (U.S. Department of State 2018a, cf. ECFR 2020e). However, according to the movement's leader, the JAI has not yet been declared an official branch of al-Qaeda or the

121 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Islamic State, nor is it part of it from the perspective of other radical groups (al-Tamini 2019a).

Besides, the JAI publicly advocates attacks on non-believers, Christians, Jews, and rejectionists or even rejects Shiism's spread across societies. The group describes itself as a Palestinian Salafi jihadist organization whose goal is a religious war with Israel and the establishment of an Is- lamic caliphate in the Gaza Strip (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 16). By forming a splinter group associated with Salafi jihadism, the JAI has gradually moved away from Hamas both ideologically and operationally (Brenner 2017, 84). Dugmush's group sought to question and challenge the political hegemony of Hamas within Gaza and, through a mix of religious and clan policies and violent ideology, to gain internal legitimacy. In response to BBC's British journalist Alan Johnston's kidnapping in March 2007, Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades led an aggressive armed campaign against JAI members resulting in the group's size reduction and operational downturn (Berti 2011, 76).

Figure 25: An online magazine of the Army of Islam group called Nida al-Masra (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2018) 2) Strength and scope

It is currently estimated that the group has a few hundred members (AFPC 2020, 5). In 2007, it was believed that it could have up to 15,000

122 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS members, including supporters of the Dughmush clan and their allies (Blanche 2007). However, there could be only 200 to 300 active members belonging to the group's hard core (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 17).

In addition to Gaza, the JAI maintains its presence in Sinai, where it cooperates with Egyptian jihadist organizations (TIMEP 2014). This relationship is so strong that the JAI provides training facilities in Gaza to other extremist groups and then sends them to the battlefields in Yemen, Syria, and other locations where they support local insurgent groups. It is in Syria that an armed group with the same name operates. In the opposite guard, there are signals that the movement is complemented by foreign fighters from Afghanistan and Iraq, who have heard calls from the group's leadership to join it (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 17, cf. Brenner 2017, 84). With some other militant groups, it actively participates in joint attacks against Israel, such as the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (Barnett 2012a). All the above facts speak of the convergence of the JAI with other terrorist groups.

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

According to several sources (U.S. Department of State 2019), the primary means of financing Jaysh al-Islam are proceeding from criminal activities inside Gaza, including the smuggling of weapons and illegal goods across the Egyptian border. The group also announced a financial campaign in its videos in 2017 and called on Muslims to contribute to their fighters' equipment (SITE Intelligence Group 2017). The other financial resources of the JAI Group are unknown, or no information has been found about them.

4) Organizational structure

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As mentioned above, JAI does not have an integrated organizational structure and rather represents a loosened network with estimated membership in the low hundreds. It promises dozens of individuals, the majority of whom are young people under the age of thirty. According to TRAC (2020c), the JAI consists of more than 50 brigades commanded by Zahran Alloush, son of Saudi-based religious scholar sheikh Abdullah Mohammed Alloush. The exact organizational structure details are unknown, yet the fact remains that the narrow circle of command consists of close people Mumtaze Dughmush and his vast clan. He remains the JAI group's current leader, along with others such as the already mentioned jihadist "veteran" al-Maqdisi (e.g., Brenner 2017, 84).

5) The role of violence

As part of the advocated global approach to jihad, the JAI acts primarily against Western goals. The group also targets internal targets in Gaza, such as local non-Islamic businesses and Christian communities, especially after initial tensions with Hamas and partial reunification (Berti 2011, 76). The abductions of foreign persons, especially journalists, NGO workers, or activists, have become the most renowned actions of the JAI Group, thanks to which it has also gained international attention. Just weeks after the Israeli soldier's kidnapping, another successful abduction of two American journalists from Fox News and a British journalist from the BBC followed. In exchange for their extradition, the JAI demanded the release of several Muslim prisoners from US prisons or the release of Palestinian-Jordanian clerics Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini, who has been linked to involvement in the 9/11 attacks (Klein 2007, cf. Macintyre 2007, cf. Stockmarr 2011, 34). In 2008, the group also planned to assassinate former British Prime Minister

124 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Tony Blair, aiming to visit Israel (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 16). Overall, violence plays a vital role in the JAI's strategic objectives, as in the previously presented groups. It shows the encouragement to Muslims to conduct lone-wolf attacks against Israel in many videos from the JAI placed on communication channels (al-Tamimi 2019a).

Figure 26: Jaysh al-Islam fighters in a screenshot from the propaganda video (Source: al-Tamimi 2019a) 6) The relationships between ANSA and state authorities

Jaysh al-Islam is, of course, hostile to the Palestinian Authority, which it considers corrupt and apostate. On the contrary, ties with Hamas are quite complicated due to the above. In short, the relationship with Hamas is currently strained, but at the same time, it is believed that Mumtaz Dughmush has some agreement with Hamas's command. In any case, the JAI considers Hamas members to be unbelievers because of their rule under human-made laws (al-Tamimi 2019a). On the one hand, Hamas is taking a crackdown on the JAI by arresting several of its members. On the other hand, Hamas allows JAI to exist and cooperating with other Salafi jihadist elements in Gaza and is nearly grateful for their offensive actions against Israel - but not to the extent that there would be a threat of total war with Israel (Brenner 2017, 87). Mutual relations are analyzed in more depth in a separate part of the work.

125 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

7)The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

JAI holds in no small extent exclusively military functions. An exception is religious and educational activities that seek to attract society in Gaza. The group tries to improve its reputation through social networks, where, for example, shares videos of JAI members helping with community service or charity work. Recently, the group seems to have intensified its activity on social media, where it consistently posts videos show- ing the training of fighters and Islamic sermons. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the group described the disease as "the creation of God Almighty" and published a document to interpret Islamic law relat- ing to this disease. In general, the movement communicates through its media organization Al-Noor Media Foundation or through its magazine Al-Misra, the first issue of which was published in February 2018 (Truz- man 2020).

4.4.5 Jaysh al-Ummah (Army of the Nation)

Figure 27: Emblem of the Jaysh al-Ummah (Source: Twitter 2020)

126 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Jaysh al-Ummah21 (full name "Jaysh al-Ummah al-Salafi fi Bayt al- Maqdis" - "The Salafi Army of the Nation in Jerusalem," abbreviated "Army of Nation" or "Army of Faithful") is another radical Salafist group that is active in the Gaza region. The group was formed in Khan Younis in 2008, since when it was responsible for several missile attacks on Is- rael, especially during the wars of 2012 and 2014 (ECFR 2020f, cf. TRAC 2020d). However, some sources (ITIC 2019c, 6; AFPC 2020, 6) state that the group has existed since 2005 and 2006, respectively. Al-Tamimi (2019b) mentions that in 2012 the group merged with the Salafi organization called Salafi Youth Coalition - Palestine, and based on that, a new organization was created with a new vision and organizational framework. From the beginning, it adopted extremist ideology linked to al- Qaeda and opposed the Hamas movement for not implementing Sharia law (ECFR 2020f). Jaysh al-Ummah (JAU) became known when it announced in a video in 2008 its intention to assassinate then-US President George W. Bush, who was about to visit Iraq. The leader of the organization is Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi (TRAC 2020).

1) Motivation and purpose The origin and origins of Jaysh al-Ummah are obscured and unknown due to lack of data. An interview with one group member shows that the organization first operated in secret cells composed of mujahideen who carried out malicious actions against Israel (al-Tamimi 2019b). Ideolog- ically, the Jaysh al-Ummah group was born out of extreme anti-Zionism, in which all Jews are considered occupiers who must be expelled and de-

21 The coalition of armed rebel forces operating in the Syrian civil war had the same name.

127 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS stroyed. They call themselves warriors sent by Allah and Prophet Mo- hammad. In addition to jihad against Israel, the JAU seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Gaza (ITIC 2019c, 6). Although the group has never admitted to al-Qaeda, since there is only an ideological bond, it fully identifies with its ideologies. In official statements, he considers al-Qaeda fighters to be his brothers and Osama bin Laden to be his ideological leader until his death (AFPC 2020, 6). Based on the received beliefs, members of the JAU are sympathizers to both the Islamic State, although indirectly rather than directly. According to them, Salafi jihadism ideas were abducted by the Islamic State, as these Islamist trends can be traced much earlier in the Palestinian enclave (al-Tamimi 2019b).

Another motivation of the JAU is to oppose Hamas and its armistice with Israel. Although in this respect, it is not as radical as other Salafi jihadist groups. As al-Tamimi (2019b) points out, the JAU still considers Hamas to be a Muslim movement that only needs to change its leadership. Therefore, the JAU does not accuse Hamas of takfirism like other organizations (Ibid.). However, this did not prevent the many skirmishes between the JAU and Hamas in Gaza. These often culminated in the arrest of JAU members who were about to carry out terrorist operations during the armistice with Israel. On the contrary, the JAU even criticized the Egyptian authorities for releasing a Hamas member from prison. At present, the situation seems calmer as Hamas allows dawah-related activities by other Islamist groups in Gaza, where the JAU appears to be under the strict supervision of Hamas (Zelin 2013; AFPC 2020, 6; ITIC 2019c, 6).

Another significant ideological feature of the JAU is the criticism of Iran's growing influence in the Gaza Strip. The organization strongly condemns

128 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS the funding of its proxy PIJ and also encourages attacks on Iranian interests anywhere in the world (SITE Intelligence Group 2013; TRAC 2020d).

The group has publicly supported several other jihadist factions as parts of a defended global jihad, such as in Mali (2013) and Libya (2018), or has expressed support for oppressed Sunni Salafists in Iran. It also called on Egyptian Muslims to waging jihad against el-Sisi's government. An- other example is the publication of the condolences after the killing of Emir Hakeemullah Mehsud of the Taliban movement (AFPC 2020, 6, cf. TRAC 2020d).

Figure 28: Flag of the Jaysh al-Ummah (Source: ITIC 2019c, 6)

2) Strength and scope The scope of Jaysh al-Ummah's membership is currently kept secret. However, the group is expected to be comparable to Jaysh al-Islam and has a few hundred supporters. In 2010, the group's leader said that there are about 200 active members, but all the sympathizers can be as many as "thousands" in Gaza and the West Bank and inside Israel (ICG 2011, 15).

According to an AFPC report (2020, 6), the JAU is limited to operational activities in Gaza, from where it fires rockets into Israel. It thus lacks the

129 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ability to attack directly in Israel or the West Bank, even if attacks by dis- patched operatives on these territories are registered. The question is the strength of the operation in Sinai, where it is probably also active to a limited extent. There are no signs of any JAU fighter traveling to Syria or another battlefield (al-Tamimi 2019b). However, in the past, several foreign militants have strengthened the JAU in the fight against Israel (Cunningham 2010).

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

It is not clear from the data analysis what is the primary source of funding for the JAU. Through its communication media, the group regularly calls on its supporters to support them financially. A widespread phenomenon is a demand for financial support through cryptocurrencies, which was first detected in 2017. In 2019, the JAU launched an "arm a warrior" campaign to purchase weapons and equipment for fighters (the organization estimates the average cost per fighter at 2 000 $). Through its Al-Ray media channel, the group then provided the virtual wallet number of the bitcoin account to which the amount could be sent, along with a Twitter/Telegram account, as seen in two of the examples below. The popularity and widespread promotion of bitcoin campaigns attest to a convenient way of raising money without the supervision of the bank- ing system and law enforcement agencies (ICT 2020, 21; ITIC 2020, 1).

130 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Figure 29, 30: The banners of Jaysh al-Ummah posted within the bitcoin campaign. The second depicts the leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri (Source: alraia.wordpress.com 2019; alraia.wordpress.com 2018)

4) Organizational structure The JAU is thought to have a loose network of cells operating throughout Gaza, but further details are unknown. The group's headquarters are probably located in Khan Yunis and Rafah, where the group is most active. One of the important men besides JAU leader Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi is his deputy Abu al-Hayja (Cohen and Levitt 2010, 14).

5) The role of violence

131 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The main forms of violence in Jaysh al-Ummah's activities are armed as- saults, missile attacks, detonating explosives, and firing shells. The organization is often referred to as a group with terrorist fighting methods, although it does not officially appear on the list of terrorist organizations in any country (TRAC 2020d). Compared to other militant movements, JAU is not famous for specific violent actions. Its members have repeatedly attacked pro-Western targets in Gaza, such as coffee shops. The group publicly praised the notable car-ramming attack of a lone wolf in Jerusalem in 2017, in which four Israeli soldiers were killed (ITIC 2019c, 6-7). Violence is, thus, a fundamental pillar for the strategic functioning of the group.

6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

As with previous extreme groups, the JAU has a critical relationship with the Palestinian Authority and its representatives. The relationship with the Hamas government is marked by many disagreements and open disputes that have culminated several times in the arrest of JAU members (including its leader) or the confiscation of missiles and other military equipment. On the other hand, there is a degree of tolerance and leniency from the ruling Hamas. According to interviews with one of the members of the JAU, both actors are working to resolve and calm each other's disagreements, as they submit to the same religious laws (al-Tamimi 2019b).

7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies Jaysh al-Ummah provides his supporters with ideological support or security guarantees. The movement provides both functions mainly through the media wing of al-Ray, which actively publishes its initiatives

132 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS and statements on jihadist forums and websites (Barone 2020). It also publishes videos there with detailed instructions for making rockets (Barnett 2013b). However, as far as potential social functions are concerned, the group is absent, or no signs about it have been found. By no means, given its scale, does it provide an alternative form of government as more vigorous Islamist movements.

4.4.6 Harakat as-Sabirin Nasran li-Filastin (Sabireen Movement)

Figure 31: The flag of the Sabireen Movement (Source: YouTube.com 2020) Harakat as-Sabirin Nasran li-Filastin (The Movement of the Patient Ones for the Liberation of Palestine, abbreviated Sabireen Movement, Harakat al-Sabireen or as-Sabirin, also abbreviated HESN)22 is one of the newer militant Islamist groups in the Gaza Strip. This organization appeared in the coastal enclave in 2014 and was initially one of the strongest local extremist factions (AFPC 2020, 7). It is a split group from several other

22 The exact translation of the group's name is "those who hold on patiently for the triumph of Palestine" (Melamed 2016).

133 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS radical organizations, especially former members of the PIJ. The unique- ness is that the group is based on Shiite ideology and represents the only known Shiite organization in the otherwise exclusively Sunni territory. Quite logically, it is supported by Iran and acts as an Iranian proxy. The group's leader is Hisham Salem, aka Abu Mohammad, a PIJ defector from a prominent family in Gaza. After leaving this group, he converted to Shi- ite Islam and founded a new movement (Melamed 2016, cf. TRAC 2020e). The military branch of HESN is The Great Prophet's Brigades. In 2018, the HESN was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially- Designated Global Terrorist Group by the United States and was sanc- tioned for planning and conducting armed attacks vis-à-vis Israel (US De- partment of State, 2018b, cf. ECFR 2020g).

1) Motivation and purpose

The Sabireen movement was officially formed spontaneously in May 201423 after Nizar Issa's funeral, a Palestinian who lost his life after an explosion at a training camp in Jabalya in northern Gaza. Leader Hisham Salem declared him the movement's first martyr. (TRAC 2020g). Some analyzes (Melamed 2016) suggest that the group's formation is the result of disputes between the PIJ and Iran, due to which some members of the PIJ left to establish a new movement. However, this is still not supported by facts. Ideologically, it is not vastly different from other Salafi jihadist groups.

Nonetheless, it tends towards Shiite Islamism - it promotes "the Sharia obligation of jihad in the path of God" until Palestine is liberated from the

23 Some sources (Abbas 2018) suggest that the movement originally began to take shape as early as 2010. According to Shalom (2018), contacts between members of this group and Iran were already known in 2012.

134 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Zionist enemy, which must be eliminated through violence (JVL 2020b; Melamed 2016). The movement was heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and identified as part of the Camp of the Armed Resistance - al-Muqawama, a global network seeking an alternative world order in the spirit of radical Islam. The group also vigorously pursues the anti- American agenda. Related to this is the full affiliation of HESN with the Iranian Shiite regime and the takeover of its aggressive approach to Saudi Arabia, which, of course, provokes anger among Sunni Palestini- ans. The big promotion of Shiite Islam and the support of the Shiite population within Gaza is another ideological element that sets it apart from other radical groups (Abbas 2018; Melamed 2016).

On the other hand, according to Abbas (2018), the group itself does not consider itself strictly a Shiite organization, as it also recruits Sunni Mus- lims as part of the "principles of jihadi action." In public speaking, the Hisham Salem movement leader makes sure to avoid converting to Shi- ism and at the same time not to refute it. In one of the public interviews, Salem also refuted its direct connection to Tehran or Hezbollah and admitted only links to Iranian charities (Alquds.co.uk 2015).

Proximity to Iran can also be seen in cooperation with Hezbollah, Iran's main proxy in the Middle East, which has identical ideological and strategic goals. Hezbollah probably inspired HESN in the creation of the emblem and flag, which is dominated by the extended arm and rifle as well as the globe. The organization also publicly defends Iran's engagement in Yemen and Syria and has called on the Palestinians to support Assad's regime. HESN also criticizes Israeli airstrikes in Syria and has repeatedly expressed its condolences over the killings of Hezbollah members (Jihad Intel 2020c).

135 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

2) Strength and scope

Estimates speak of a total of a few hundred members associated with the Sabireen Movement. Conservative estimates range from 200 to 800 active members - Durns (2016) and Melamed (2016) list about 400 active militants. However, according to Shoham (2018), the movement can have up to 3,000 fighters. The exact numbers of militants from The Great Prophet's Brigades are unknown. The membership of the group is not limited to the territory of the Gaza Strip. There is evidence that Palestin- ians from refugee camps in Syria, such as Yarmuk in Damascus, are join- ing the Sabireen Movement. These militants are then trained and armed by Hezbollah and participate in violent actions in the Golan Heights (Mel- amed 2016).

However, this movement's overall influence within the Gaza Strip remains minimal due to hostile relations with other Salafi jihadist groups and weak support from Palestinian society.

Figure 32: Emblem of The Great Prophet’s Brigades, military wing of Sabireen Move- ment (Source: YouTube.com 2020)

136 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

According to several sources (Yarri 2015a, cf. Melamed 2016, cf. Abbas 2018, cf. Iran Focus 2018, cf. TRAC 2020e), the Sabireen Movement is connected and directly funded by the Iranian regime. HESN militants re- ceive about one million budget dollars a month (Melamed 2016) or about 10-12 million dollars a year (Iran Focus 2018, cf. AFPC 2020, cf. JVL 2020b). Each member of the movement then earns between $ 250 and $ 750 depending on rank (Melamed 2016). Iranian support also lies in the shipment of weapons and military equipment, including advanced ones such as Fajr and Grad rockets, mortars, and related technologies (Sho- ham 2018). This material is smuggled through tunnels into Gaza. Iran, in cooperation with the Palestinian Operations Department of Hezbollah Group, also provides publicity. It should be noted that these facts are based more on estimates (Yarri 2015a).

4) Organizational structure

HESN has a hierarchical structure, which consists of a political/civil and military branch. The organization is headed by Secretary-General Hisham Salem, the most senior executive person (Melamed 2016). He was one of the most wanted terrorists in Israel during the Second Inti- fada. He also ran several charities, such as al-Baqiyat al-Salihat, some of which were abolished by Hamas to promote Shiism (Yarri 2015b).

Salem's superior is allegedly Shurah, the supreme commanding secret council, which also oversees PIJ activities. The military's Supreme Leader of the movement is Abdulrahman Al-Ajouri, a former high-ranking member of the PIJ. The group's headquarters probably also consists of several regional leaders. One of them was Ahmed Al-Sirahi, the Regional Military

137 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Commander of Central Gaza, who was eliminated by Israel (Melamed 2016).

Figure 33: Excerpt from The Great Prophet’s Brigades video demonstrating the strength of the Sabireen Movement military wing (Source: YouTube.com 2017) 5) The role of violence

As with other armed actors in Gaza, violence, or at least the threat of the use of violence, is a vital tool for the Sabireen Movement to achieve its goals. The most common modus operandi in violent attacks is firing missiles at Israel, although somewhat sporadic, or using an explosive device aimed at the IDF (JVL 2020b). The group was the most belligerent in the period around 2015, when, according to a U.S. report. The Department of State (2018) planned and carried out several terrorist attacks, including firing several rockets in September 2015 and the detonation of explosives on an Israeli military patrol in December 2015.

HESN is primarily involved in violent acts in central and northern Gaza. It also seeks to infiltrate the West Bank, where the movement admitted several of its killed members who fell in armed conflict during the 2015- 2016 wave of violence (Abbas 2018; Shalom 2018). Palestinian security forces also arrested five HESN operatives during this period, who were

138 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS allegedly led by Iran to carry out terrorist acts (Toameh 2016, cf. Rumley 2018).

6) The relationship between ANSAs and state authorities

Despite adopting a different Islam branch, the Sabireen Movement advocates the same hostile attitude towards the de jure government in Ramal- lah as other Islamist groups in the Gaza Strip. Relations with the ruling Hamas and al-Qassam Brigades are ambiguous. Hamas generally considers HESN to be a movement that goes against the Palestinian people's interests and ideology. As a result, the Hamas leadership officially banned HESN activities in Gaza in 2015 (24.ae 2015, cf. Shafei 2016). The main reason is the organization's potential growing strength thanks to substantial financial and military support from Iran (Nazarov 2020). As part of this campaign, the Hamas leadership ordered the arrest and in- terrogation of several group members, including leader Salem, who was in early 2019 in 17-day detention. In response to the firing of several missiles by HESN members, the largest Hamas arrest operation to date was carried out in March 2019, during which more than 70 of their members were detained, and all military material was confiscated (Baroud 2019).

On the other hand, it is fair to say that Hamas tolerates the limited presence of the HESN in Gaza as such - as long as the HESN does not provoke a conflict with Israel. It is aware that the movement is weakening the PIJ, Hamas's main rival, by taking away its members. The Hamas leadership is also afraid to take more decisive action against HESN due to Iranian patronage, which could lead to a potential deterioration of already strained relations (Yarri 2015b, cf. Shafei 2016, cf. Shoham 2018).

139 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Figure 34: One of the posts on the official Twitter account of the Sabireen Movement calling for the liberation of Palestine (Source: Twitter 2018) 7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

The Sabireen Movement is primarily a military organization - the main activity of the movement remains the recruitment of new members into its armed wing, including those who are part of other militias in Gaza (Yarri 2015b). Besides, however, the movement performs several functions for its members or constituencies. As already mentioned, the movement was originally a charity called al-Baqiyat al-Salihat, which had been chaired by Salem since 2004 (Abbas 2018). In particular, activities include promoting Shiite Islam across Palestinian society through various social and charitable associations, which are mostly funded by money from Iran (e.g., through the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee). HESN operates camps in which it provides essential commodities and household supplies. Furthermore, there are educational activities or celebrations of Shiite holidays and rituals (e.g., Day of Ashura), including the distribution of guidebooks called "Hussein" for Palestinian pilgrims heading to Mecca (Yarri 2015b; Melamed 2016). The group is very active on many social

140 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS networks, especially in inciting attacks on Israel and celebrating the martyrs killed in the attacks (IFMAT 2019).

The result of the mentioned propagation of Shiism is debatable. As Ba- roud (2019) points out, HESN was not nearly accepted by the public in Gaza because its opposition to Israel has an only military and religious dimension, not a national one (Abbas 2018).

4.4.7 Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem

Figure 35: The flag of the Mujahideen Shura Council, the same one used by ISIS (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (also known as the Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen, or merely the Mujahideen Shura Council) is another of the relatively new radical extremist groups emerging in the Gaza Strip. The group was formed by the merger of several armed factions in Gaza in June 2012, including formerly influential radical groups Ansar al-Sunnah and the Tawhid, Jihad Group in Jerusalem (Tawhid al-Jihad), and allegedly now dormant Jund Ansar Allah (Barnett 2012b; TRAC 2020f). The announcement of the group's founding was

141 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS presented in a video initially from the Sinai Peninsula, depicting the seven rebels (al-Tamimi 2013).

According to several sources (AFPC 2020, 7, cf. TRAC 2020f), the Mujahi- deen Shura Council (MSC) is an umbrella organization that today brings together several smaller jihadist groups. The founder and leader of this network was Hisham al-Saedni (aka Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi), who had previously fought for al-Qaeda in Iraq and was also the leader of the Tawhid al-Jihad. In October 2012, just a few months after the MSC formation, he was killed in an Israeli raid, along with Ashraf al Sabah, former leader of Ansar al-Sunnah (Akram 2012; Barnett and Roggio 2012). The current leader is probably Abu al-Muhtasib al-Maqdisi, named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the United States in 2015 (U.S. Depart- ment of State 2015). The group is at least ideologically linked to al-Qaeda and also to the Islamic State. The MSC has been declared a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and the UAE due to countless attacks on Israel (U.S. Department of State 2014).

1) Motivation and purpose

As outlined above, the motivation for the emergence of the movement was probably the unification of the existing fragmented resistance movements and jihadist efforts against Israel. In a video in which the leader of the movement announced the group's formation, they immediately committed themselves to implement Islamic Sharia law and the restoration of Ummah in Gaza, not only in Palestine but also around the world. In another statement, the group admitted the goal of fighting the Jews until Palestine was returned to Islamic law, and a rightly-guided Caliphate was established (Barnett 2012c; TRAC 2020f). The MSC generally espouses Salafi jihadism and its global concept advocated by al-Qaeda. The al-

142 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Qaeda support group carried out several terrorist attacks against Israel, the first in June 2012, which the group itself described as "a gift to our brothers in al-Qaeda and Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri" and revenge for the killing of Osama bin Laden (Roggio 2012). The MSC has also shown this support in releasing several condolence videos after killing some al Qaeda leaders or prominent jihadists (Barnett 2014). In February 2014, the MSC declared support for the Islamic State for the first time and continued to do so by publishing several videos in which it presented several statements reiterating its support for ISIS. Nevertheless, the MSC has never sworn allegiance to this terrorist organization (TRAC 2020f). The MSC also publicly supports jihadist activities in the Sinai Peninsula or Syria (APFC 2020, 7).

Figure 36: Title image of one of the MSC propaganda videos entitled "Journey of Mar- tyrdom" (Source: Barnett 2013) 2) Strength and scope

The current strength of the Mujahideen Shura Council is difficult to as- certain. According to AFPC (2020, 7), the exact size of the group is unknown. The U.S. Department of State (2019) report states that the group has several hundred fighters at its disposal. The small number of reports

143 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS about the group, as well as the public statements themselves in recent months, indicate that the Hamas authorities diminish the operational capabilities of the MSC.

MSC operates primarily in the Gaza Strip, especially around the Egyptian and Israeli borders. The group also works closely with Egyptian extremist insurgents in the north of the Sinai Peninsula, including the al-Qaeda and ISIS provincial divisions in Sinai, and is involved in operations in the territory. Since 2015, the MSC, in cooperation with ISIS, has had the ambition to send foreign fighters to Syria, but their number is unknown (Jos- celyn 2016). The presence of MSC is also detected in the West Bank, where its local militants operate covertly. For example, the group volunteered to attack Yatta, south of Hebron, in which three radicals from a local MSC group were eliminated by the IDF (Shitrit and Jaraba 2014).

3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

Not much information is known about the primary source of funding for the MSC Group. However, there is evidence that the group has repeatedly called on Muslims in Gaza and elsewhere to provide financial support. To this end, the MSC announced in 2016-2018 a fund-raising campaign called "Equip Us" on social media such as Twitter, Telegram, YouTube, and Facebook, where it posted several videos in which MSC members for reading verses from the Qur'an justify the need for financial assistance (Solomon 2016). Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center (ITMC), a prominent pro- Islamic State jihadist media unit tied to the MSC, which has disseminated countless videos for this purpose, has taken care of these challenges to arm the Palestinian jihadists. The vast majority are financial support in the form of bitcoins. These financial campaigns are remarkably similar to those of other Salafi jihadist groups in Gaza, which explains that

144 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS groups such as the MSC have a very tight financial budget (SITE Intelli- gence Group 2016).

Figure 37: One of the MSC contributions on social networks soliciting bitcoin donation (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2015a) Kromě užívání kryptoměny Joscelyn (2016) uvádí jako další možný způsob funding MSC získávání finančních prostředků od Islámského státu, alespoň kolem roku 2016. Důležitou roli v tomto ohledu hrál Hu- sayn Juaythini, v té době deputy head of MSC. Ten fungoval jako získával finance pravděpodobně od Bagdádího nebo jeho podřízených, kteří požadovali rozšíření globální sítě ISIS do Gazy (Ibid.).

4) Organizational structure

Details of the organizational structure of the MSC are not traceable from open sources. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the group is rather a network of more actors than a single cohesive organization. The group is led by the group's permanent leadership and apparently with more leaders in charge than just Abu al-Muhtasib al-Maqdisi, including several representatives (Ibid.). It is safe to say that MSC also has a unit responsible for media and propaganda communication.

5) The role of violence

145 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The MSC uses violence in its advocacy and Salafi jihadist ideology. Since its inception, the organization has been involved and taken responsibility for countless armed operations in Gaza. The main violence methods are missile, bomb, and shooting attacks (U.S. Department of State 2014). The group often collaborated with Jaysh al-Islam on the shelling of Israel. During the attack in June 2012, MSC members killed an Israeli civilian border on the Egyptian-Israel border. It also took part in the 2012 No- vember conflict against the Jewish state with several other radical factions. Violence by the MSC peaked during 2013, especially in April and August this year, when large numbers of rockets were fired at cities in southern Israel, including the famous tourist city of Eilat (AFPC 2020, 7). One of them was deliberately conducted when then-US President Barack Obama was visiting Israel, whom he labeled the new leader of the "Cru- saders" on MSC social networks (Joscelyn 2013). In November 2013, three MSC members in Yatta in the West Bank, who were preparing an attack on Israelis, were neutralized by the IDF (Shitrit and Jaraba 2014). However, since 2014, the number of violent activities has fallen sharply, indicating that no attack has been attributed to the MSC since that year (based on GTD 2019).

Figure 38: Screenshot from an MSC propaganda video calling for attacks on Israel (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2013)

146 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

The Mujahideen Shura Council considers both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas to be opponents, although not, of course, on the same level as Israel. The reason is negotiations and efforts to create peace with Israel, which the MSC considers unacceptable. Like the Salafi jihadist movement, the MSC seeks to disrupt Hamas' position of power. However, the MSC is a threat to Hamas on a political and ideological level rather than a military one (al-Tamimi 2013). For the first time, Hamas cracked down on the MSC in a campaign against all Salafi jihadist entities in Gaza in July 2013, arresting several of its members, including its leader (Barnett 2013b). Over the years, the MSC has continued to criticize Hamas in its social media videos, demanding the release of several of its members (al- Tamimi 2013).

7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

The MSC does not appear to have wider support within Palestinian society, so it does not aspire to provide non-purely military functions. The group tries to communicate with its supporters through the already mentioned ITMC propaganda unit. In communication materials, organizations often emphasize the teachings of pure Islam and jihadist ideology, including its practical implementation, such as calling for attacks in the West Bank and Israel. Some contributions included, for example, videos with instructions on how to make explosives or what types of targets to choose for a terrorist attack (SITE Intelligence Group 2013; MEMRI 2016). At present, however, the MSC is inactive on social networks, as evidenced by reports from the SITE Intelligence Group, which, according to available data, recorded the last activities in 2014.

147 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

4.4.8 Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (Islamic State in Gaza)

Figure 39: One of the emblems used by the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) The Sheikh Omar Hadid Bait al-Maqdis Brigade or the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade24 (known as the Islamic State of Gaza, or Ahfad al-Sahaba) is another example of emerging Islamist militant group in the Gaza Strip. The organization allegedly formed from a separate division of the former Egyptian pro-al-Qaeda faction Ansar Bait al-Maqdis at the end of May 2015, which took part in the Sinai insurgency but based in Gaza. Some members of the Army of Islam and even defectors from Hamas also joined it (Beamount 2015). The MSC, considered to be the largest ally of the Gaza Brigade, is also involved in the unification of radical Salafists (al-Ghoul 2014b).

24 The name is derived from Omar Hadid, one of the key figures in the early years of the Iraqi insurgency, who died in the battles of Fallujah in December 2004 (al-Tamimi 2015a; Moubayed 2019).

148 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Some sources (Bar'el 2014) say that the group of the same name appeared in 2014 in the West Bank, from where it penetrated Syria. Accord- ing to other data (Levy 2014), a new pro-ISIS jihadist network appeared in Gaza as early as 2014 but has probably not yet been formed. The exact date of formation of the group thus remains unknown. The fact is that as early as May 2015, the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (SOHB) launched a rocket attack on the southern Israeli city of Ashdod (TRAC 2020g). How- ever, the radical organization's actual existence was not mentioned until June 2015, when a violent raid led by Hamas killed its leader, Yunis Hun- nar, a former member of the al-Qassam Brigades (Yashar 2015). The current commander is unknown. The SOHB openly subscribes to the Islamic State's jihadist ideology and has declared itself its local affiliate group. As the group reports to ISIS, it has been declared a terrorist organization by all states that do so with ISIS (al-Tamimi 2015a).

1) Motivation and purpose

As indicated above, the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade's formation is closely linked to the development of jihadist rebel groups in the Sinai Peninsula. The motivation for the emergence of a new radical organization seems to have been the strengthening of the Salafi jihadist scene in Gaza and creating an offshoot that swears allegiance to the Islamic State, as Ansar Bait al-Maqdis did, which became ISIL-Sinai Province. The affiliation with ISIS was confirmed in videos from May 2015, where puppet warriors sing two Islamic State nasheeds (al-Tamimi 2015a, cf. TRAC 2020g). There- fore, since its inception, the SOHB has adopted objectives typical of ISIS, with particular emphasis on establishing an Islamic emirate with the introduction of Sharia law in Gaza and the fight against infidels and apos-

149 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS tates, which they consider both Palestinian Authority and Hamas members (Zack 2019). As Batrawi (2016) points out, the group tends to a religious struggle (more precisely, a pan-Islamic one) - in which it also defends attacks on the Jewish state and demands control of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in the name of global jihadist ideology (Ibid.). As stated by Beauchamp (2015), "it is all about God, Umma, and the caliphate." Another typical sign is the strong opposition to Hamas and its rule, which resulted in intense hate fights that continue to this day. The SOHB accuses Hamas of cooperating with Israel and harsh treatment against other Salafi jihadists, including killings and arrests (al-Tamimi 2019).

2) Strength and scope

The exact number of SOHB members is challenging to determine due to the group's degree of clandestine activity. In 2015, the SOHB membership base's size was estimated at two hundred fighters (Beamount 2015). However, the total number of supporters in Gaza is estimated to be much higher. Moore (2014) came up with an estimate of at least 2,000 such supporters; however, it was during the "Golden Age" of ISIS. According to another source (Aawsat.com 2015), SOHB is an organized and professional organization with access to quality military equipment, including Russian-made missiles, which until then had only been owned by Hamas or PIJ.

In terms of the scope of SOHB's operations, the group is primarily present and based in Gaza. He also works closely with the Egyptian jihadist network, especially the Wilayat Sinai of ISIL. In addition to military cooperation, the two organizations are involved in large-scale smuggling of illegal goods along the Egyptian-Gazan border. The Egyptian army had to

150 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS dig a deep trench to prevent smuggling (Yusri 2015). The group also has supporters in the West Bank but is not established to the same extent as in the Gaza Strip. As with other radical movements, it operates there in secret cells and sent operatives who plan and carry out violent attacks. It has already been shown that several ISIS supporters are capable of this, which raises some doubts, especially in the period 2014-2015 (e.g., Bar'el 2014).

Figure 40: Excerpt from the SOHB video in which he reports responsibility for a missile attack in Israel (Source: Twitter 2015) 3) The ways in which they obtain funding or access to resources

It can be assumed with great certainty that the method of financing the SOHB is very similar to the previous research group's funding - the Mu- jahideen Shura Council. In this regard, both groups cooperate in creating fund-raising campaigns in which they motivate their supporters to financial support in the form of cryptocurrencies (SITE Intelligence Group 2015). It is therefore difficult to determine to what extent these online incentives are only the work of SOHB. Other forms of raising funds are not known.

151 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

4) Organizational structure

There is currently no data on the detailed organizational structure. After swearing allegiance to ISIS, the SOHB identifies itself as part of a global jihadist network. The group currently appears to have a decentralized structure with a circle of close commanders but currently has an unclear leader. After the death of leader Yunis Hunnar, who founded the Brigade, it seems that his successor has not yet been announced. The sources refer to the current ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. In 2015, the group's spokesman was Abu al-Ayna al-Ansari (Zack 2015).

5) The role of violence

Violent activities are again the cornerstone of the organization's functioning. According to the GTD (2019) and TRAC (2020g) databases, missile attacks are among the most common violent tactical methods, followed by explosives. In terms of time, the SOHB was the most active in 2015, when several missile attacks were committed. Initially, however, the individual armed actions were considered more amateurish, as many fired missiles did not reach the intended target or ended up outside, mostly in the Negev desert. Over time, however, these operations became more sophisticated and intensified (Moubayed 2019).

As already mentioned, the group made itself known from the very beginning of its appearance in Gaza when they signed up to fire two rockets at the city of Ashdod (Cohen et al. 2015). During the same period, a bomb attack inside Gaza followed, killing a member of Hamas (Levi 2015). In June 2015, leaflets in occupied East Jerusalem, threatening to kill Arab Christians living in the West Bank, were dispersed by the group (Schwartz 2015). In October 2017, the group allegedly was behind the assassination attempt on Tawfik Abu Naim, the commander of internal

152 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS security in Gaza. Another assassination was to be attributed to the group in March 2018, when Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah was targeted (Moubayed 2019). More recently, the SOHB is suspected of an attack by a suicide bomber in August 2019 who killed three Hamas police officers in Gaza (BBC 2019).

Figure 41: SOHB's extract from social media defending the missile attack of September 2015 (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2015b) 6) The relationship between ANSA and state authorities

As already mentioned, the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade is very hostile to the PA and Hamas. The relationship between the SOHB and Hamas is specific due to the high concentration of former Hamas members in the SOHB. These defectors often ran to the SOHB due to dissatisfaction with the government in Gaza, system corruption, or a departure from the obligation to wage war with Israel (Moubayed 2019). On the contrary, the pro-ISIS group promised its members to continue what they believe Ha- mas has failed (Abdelaty 2015, cf. Levi 2015). In one of the first videos, the SOHB demanded that Hamas stop inciting society or the media to a fratricidal war, release all its fighters, and return its confiscated weapons (al-Tamimi 2015a).

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A significant milestone in mutual relations was the sharp move away from Hamas right after it became clear that a SOHB was forming in Gaza. It included extensive indiscriminate arrests of several people, which provoked strong opposition from other Salafi jihadist organizations (Reed 2015). Another important event leading to the deterioration of relations was the expansion of ISIS in Syria and the takeover of ISIS Yarmouk Camp in Syria in April 2015, where many pro-Hamas fanctions were active (Perring 2015).

7) The functions of ANSA fulfill for members and supporting constituencies

Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade does not currently replace the alternative government of Hamas. The essence of the functioning of the organization, therefore, lies more on an ideological level. The SOHB can be seen as an organization that has provided other, similarly radical Palestinians a platform in which they can realize their ideological beliefs and vent their frustrations stemming from the various reasons mentioned above (e.g., Moubayed 2019).

Since 2015, the group has been highly active on media channels, where it has published statements on the attacks on Israel or Hamas, general support for the Islamic State, and the already mentioned call for participation in the financial campaign. However, the level of publicity by SOBH on these platforms has declined in recent years (based on SITE Intelli- gence Group 2020).

4.4.9 Other Groups In addition to the Islamist organizations analyzed above, other radical Islamism actors operate in Gaza, but their size and strength are far

154 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS smaller than in the groups already studied. These groups' low importance is reflected in the difficult availability of resources and thus pre- cludes a more thorough analysis of them.

Of these extremist groups, the most prominent in recent years has been The Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem (also known as Ja- maat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis or just Ansar Al-Dalwa al-Islamia), which shares many similarities with the Mujahideen Shura Council and the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade. It is another Salafi jihadist movement based on the ideology of the Islamic State. It was founded in 2014, and the following year it swore allegiance to ISIS – but the group was not recognized as the official pro-ISIS network in Gaza. Since 2015, he has been responsible for several rocket attacks on Israel and has also been behind many escalating incidents in Gaza against Hamas along with the MSC or SOHB (Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016, 162; Marteu 2018, 104). In 2014, the organization claimed responsibility for the murders of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank (SITE Intelligence Group 2014). In 2015, the group threatened Hamas with a three-day ultimatum and attacks to release their members from prison (Paraszczuk 2015). Ac- cording to the TRAC database (2020h), The Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem is also referred to as the Islamic State of Sinai, indicating a close connection with the Sinai jihadists from whom the organization was originally formed - similar to the SOHB of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis. The group is not as organized as other, stronger groups in Gaza, so it is more reminiscent of just "a tiny underground group among several pro- IS entities" (al-Tamimi 2015b).

155 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

According to Marteu (2018, 104), Gaza's radical arena also includes other generally unknown groups. One of them is the Saraya Yehia Ay- yash Brigades, an al-Qaeda affiliate organization named after the leading bombmaker of Hamas (nicknamed the "Engineer"). This group is a formal part of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades operating in Lebanon. In 2014-2015, the group launched several rockets towards Israel (Solomon 2014, cf. Marteu 2018, 104). Other missile strikes came in 2018 (SITE Intelligence Group 2018). Another lesser-known group is Ajnad Bayt al- Maqdis, who volunteered to fire rockets at Israel in 2016. The movement is reportedly ideologically neutral compared to other actors. A similarly unexplored organization is Jund al-Sham fi Bayt al-Maqdis, which has been acting instead exclusively on social networks since 2014. He is said to have close ties to al Qaeda (Marteu 2018, 104). According to research by Irgens (2018, 39), another lesser-known group is Masada al-Mujahi- deen, which is also involved in the sporadic shelling of Israel - the last of which was recorded in 2016. The group has been active since 2008 and is sharply opposed to Hamas, especially since 2012 when Hamas leader Tawhid al-Jihad Group (predecessor of MSC) was killed by Hamas (TRAC 2020i).

As mentioned during the analysis, some other groups have appeared in Gaza in the past, notably, the Salafi jihadists, whose current state is generally unknown. Because no information about them has appeared in recent years (e.g., on the SITE Intelligence Group website, MEMRI, etc.), it can be estimated that the groups are in decline or have merged with other organizations. These groups include Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of the Supporters' of Allah), Jaljalat (Rolling Thunder), Sayf al-Haqq (Swords of Truth), or Jaish al Mu'minun (Army of Believers). In recent

156 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

years, several organizations called Ansar al-Sharia have also been ap- pearing in the Gaza Strip to engage in propaganda activities for ISIS (al- Tamimi 2015b).

4.5 Summary and Comparison of Groups' Characteristics

This section aims to analyze the features of Palestinian radical Islamist groups examined above and compare them between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Overall, the analysis showed many different features in the observed aspects of individual actors, but also fundamental similarities. For better clarity and subsequent comparison, the author summarizes individual groups' characteristics in the following tables.

4.5.1 Summary In the West Bank, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades movements were analyzed. Hamas' activities in the West Bank are not included due to the non-application of the analytical framework.

Strength Relation Motivation Islamist Organizational and Funding Violence to state Functions and purpose ideology structure scope authority The Pan- A few establishment Hierarchical Critical Islamism, hundred Rejection Religious, of a global Various (decentralized and radical across (officially) educational Islamic in the WB) hostile Salafism the WB caliphate Table 3: Fundamental characteristics of Hizb-ut-Tahrir

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Motivation Strength Relation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority A few Armed Alleged hundred resistance Not funding Primary across Decentralized Military against specific from means Ambiguous the WB Israel Iran and GS Table 4: Fundamental characteristics of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades

In the same vein, the following are tables of radical Islamist groups' basic characteristics in the Gaza Strip.

Motivation Relation Islamist Strength Organizational and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology and scope structure purpose authority Tens of Critical Armed National All- thousands and resistance Islamism, Primary embracing in GS, low Various Hierarchical hostile against jihadism means alternative hundred (towards Israel (local) government in WB PA) Table 5: Fundamental characteristics of Hamas

Motivation Organizatio Relation Islamist Strength and Funding nal Violence to state Functions ideology and scope purpose structure authority Radical Armed Salafism, A few Strategic resistance Primarily Primary Military, jihadism thousand Hierarchical ally against from Iran means social (local), in GS (Hamas) Israel takfirism Table 6: Fundamental characteristics of Palestinian Islamic Jihad

158 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Motivation Strength Relation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority Radical Armed Salafism, Several Primarily Strategic resistance Primary Military, jihadism hundred from Fragmented ally against means social (local), in GS Iran (Hamas) Israel takfirism Table 7: Fundamental characteristics of Popular Resistance Committees

Motivation Strength Relation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority Jihadism Critical A few Religious (global), and hundred Criminal Primary Military, war against Salafist Decentralized hostile in GS and activities means religious Israel jihadism, (towards Sinai takfirism Hamas) Table 8: Fundamental characteristics of Jaysh al-Islam

Motivation Strength Relation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority Critical Jihadism Probably Religious A few and (global), fund- Primary Military, war against hundred Decentralized hostile Salafist raising means religious Israel in GS (towards jihadism campaigns Hamas) Table 9: Fundamental characteristics of Jaysh al-Ummah

Strength Relation Motivation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority Jihadism Religious (global), A few Primarily war Primary Ambiguous Military, Salafist hundred from Hierarchical against means (towards religious jihadism in GS Iran Israel Hamas) (Shiite) Table 10: Fundamental characteristics of Sabireen Movement

159 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Motivation Strength Relation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority Jihadism Critical A few Religious (global), and hundred Primary Military, war against Salafist Not clear Decentralized hostile in GS means religious Israel jihadism (towards and Sinai takfirism Hamas) Table 11: Fundamental characteristics of Mujahideen Shura Council

Motivation Strength Relation Islamist Organizational and and Funding Violence to state Functions ideology structure purpose scope authority Jihadism Critical A few Religious (global), and hundred Not Primary Military, war against Salafist Decentralized hostile in GS and clear means religious Israel jihadism (towards Sinai takfirism Hamas) Table 12: Fundamental characteristics of Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade

4.5.2 Comparison As the analysis of the historical and current state of radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories has already been outlined, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip represent entirely different environments in which an in- comparable number of organized actors of the radical Islamist scene operate. It significantly affected the character of the groups examined above.

The difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip already lies in the nature of these groups' activities. While radical groups in the West Bank operate undercover, they take the form of rather loosened and decentralized networks (except for Hizb-ut-Tahrir to some extent) and do not reach the military strength (a few hundred members and sympathizers), ample space is left in the Gaza Strip for Islamist actors as long as they do not threaten the ruling Hamas. Furthermore, state authorities'

160 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS attitude towards radical Islamist groups in the two Palestinian territories is similar and different in some respects. It should be added that the ruling actors are intervening for different reasons – while the PA and Israel for purely security reasons, Hamas more for political (power), as it perceives radical Islamists as a threat to its supremacy, and to some extent for ideological reasons, as Salafi jihadists question his "moderate" Islamism.

In the West Bank, state authorities intervene against all radical entities. On the contrary, the Gaza Strip is particular in that Hamas intervenes only against the most extreme Islamist organizations and at the same time, cooperates with other important Islamist groups (PIJ, PRC), per- ceiving them as strategic allies thanks to their same primary motivation to wage armed resistance to Israel (see the next chapter on relations). Nevertheless, as follows from an interview with Dr. Barak (2021), Hamas allows the limited presence of even the most extreme groups with al- Qaeda or ISIS jihadist ideology, which non-violently spread these beliefs within Gaza (primarily through social networks). However, their military capabilities are kept to a minimum. Hamas's stance against al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups differs significantly in the West Bank, where it lacks a position of power, and to some extent, endorses their activities, as they mostly attack Israeli targets.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning the relationship of the examined Islamist groups to state authorities. While in the West Bank, the relationship of all radical Islamist groups to the ruling actors is hostile (except for the contentious relationship of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades), in

161 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS the Gaza Strip, the situation is by far the most ambiguous due to the fragmentation of the Islamist scene - one side of the warring parties is cooperating with Hamas, and the other is trying to overthrow it (see below).

Although the actors of the radical scene in Gaza and the West Bank have similar motivations and purposes, they differ in how they are fulfilled. All groups seek to destroy Israel and liberate Palestine and subsequently establish an Islamic state (except Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades) - but the difference is the supremacy of these sub-goals depending on Islamist ideology.

Ideologically, the Gaza Strip groups differ considerably in that various variants of Islamist currents intermingle here, while in the West Bank, only radical Islam, driven by purely nationalist struggles against Israel, is detectable. An exception is the Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement, which seeks to establish a unified Muslim state in a global sense. Given its ideological and practical differences, however, this movement deviates significantly from all Palestinian radical groups.

In the Gaza Strip, groups adopt Islamist versions that range from general radical Islamism (Salafism) to the most extreme currents of Salafi jihadism and Takfirism, just as ISIS adopts. In the case of established movements in Gaza (Hamas, PIJ, partly PRC), but also in the case of the secular Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in the West Bank, their primary motivation is armed resistance to Israel from prevailing nationalist motives, which are secondarily supported by Islamic beliefs and efforts to establish an Islamic State in Palestine (excluding the AAMB). In contrast, for extreme Salafi jihadists (Jaysh al-Islam, Jaysh al-Ummah, Sabireen Move- ment, Mujahideen Shura Council, and Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade), the primary motivation and goal is a religious war against Israel and non-

162 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS believers in the global conception and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate without a Palestinian narrative nationalist. On the other hand, it should be noted that the dividing line between the two concepts is difficult to distinguish for some groups.

When it comes to funding radical Islamist organizations, both areas show similarities in financial resources diversity. In both areas, these actors are supported by public and private donations, criminal activities (Salafi jihadists), and a popular means of noticeably fund-raising campaigns through cryptocurrencies. However, a different aspect is the level of financial involvement of foreign states, which is much more intense in the Gaza Strip, where financial assistance ranges from smuggling of goods (including military) to investments in infrastructure.

The two Palestinian regions agree on groups' approach to violence (again, except for HuT). All studied groups perceive violence as necessary to fulfill their strategic goals. Violence is then directed primarily at the Jewish entity, but besides, some groups, as has already been pointed out, use violent means against state authorities. On the contrary, what differs between the two areas is the modus operandi and forms of violence. In the Gaza Strip, the vast majority of attacks on Israel are rocket and mortar shells and bombings; in the West Bank, stabbing and shooting attacks, use of bombs, and improvised explosive devices are the primary forms of violence.

Finally, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not differ much in the functions that individual radical movements perform for their members and constituencies. In both cases, military functions are a crucial function. Due to the suppression of Islamist activities in the West Bank, more Gaza

163 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS groups are also profiling themselves in social activities. Apart from Ha- mas, it is, to some extent, the PIJ and the PRC who provide social services. The same is true for groups that base their functions on Islamist ideological identities and educational (religious) activities.

4.6 The Behavioral Dynamics and Relations between the Groups

Another part of the analysis examines the interrelationships between the above-studied radical Islamist groups, separately in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the following text, the author will use Idler's analytical framework (2012), which distinguishes four basic attributes to analyze the relationships between ANSAs.

4.6.1 West Bank The analysis of the dynamics of behavior among radical Islamist groups in the West Bank is austere due to the small number of extremist organizations with militant features. The following text primarily analyzes the relationship between the Palestinian branch of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and the West Bank branch of Hamas.

1) Drivers of decision-making

Within the driver of decision-making, Idler's framework distinguishes four other essential elements, which are gradually examined.

The degree of trust between groups

This attribute correlates with the stability and durability of individual relationships. The previous part's analysis has already shown that all three examined actors occupy specific positions, which differ from each

164 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS other in the whole. When analyzing the dynamics of behavior in Hizb-ut- Tahrir, its level of trust is low vis-à-vis all other movements due to having pretensions to global Islamic outreach, in which there is room for only one ruling organization (see Høigilt, 2014: 510). Criticism of Hamas and other Palestinian movements is also evident in many HuT media statements (e.g., khilafah.com, 2011). Another reason is the considerable ideological and practical differences that have been made in comparing the characteristics of groups in the West Bank. A low level of trust also exists from the opposite side. Hamas criticizes HuT for its narrowly defined and weak ideology and "for its weak spirit of resistance" (Høigilt, 2014: 517).

There is a relatively high level of trust between Hamas and the AAMB, which have carried out several terrorist attacks in the West Bank together in the past, but also around the Gaza Strip (see, for example, the UNHCR report, 2015). Although Hamas has a hostile relationship with the Fatah political division (the Palestinian Authority), Hamas is known for cooperating with Fatah's militant offshoots that have separated from the political branch of Fatah and continue to armed resistance. Evidence of this is the presence of the AAMB at the last large-scale military exercise in Gaza in December 2020 (ITIC, 2021a).

The local context

In the West Bank context, historical ties play a role, mostly in Hamas's relations with the AAMB, which cooperated in the violent actions against Israel during the Second Intifada, thanks to which there is still a high degree of trust between them to this day. The other influence of the local context probably cannot be identified, given that all the examined actors were formed several years ago (in the case of HuT even almost 70 years ago), so their interests have not changed much over the years. Only the

165 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS political participation of Hamas in 2006 can be taken into account, which has deepened the hostile relations between Hamas and HuT.

The role the state forces and other external actors

As in the previous case, the interventions of state forces (PA), and therefore Israel, impacted the strengthening of relations between Hamas and the AAMB. On the contrary, the PA's harsh approach to HuT did not affect bringing the movement closer to other organizations. The role of external actors in the West Bank is not much reflected in mutual relations. The only issue is Iran's influence on Hamas and the AAMB, which is difficult to measure.

The organizational structure of the ANSAs

The organizational structure does not have such a major influence on forming agreements between groups in the West Bank, as stated in his study Idler (2012). The proof is the cooperation between hierarchical Hamas and the decentralized AAMB network.

2) Insights on violence

According to Idler (2012: 79), one of the effects of mutual interactions is a certain level of violence. In the case of radical Islamist groups in the West Bank, this is only very limited, as they have no room to interact with each other due to security controls from the PA and Israel. From them comes violent interventions to limit their influence, not with each other. Given the above, there is only tension without physical violence, especially between Hamas and HuT, or between AAMB and HuT. The inter- esting thing is the negligible presence of HuT in the Gaza Strip, whose activities Hamas tolerates and does not crack down on them as hard as

166 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS against Salafi jihadists (Salah, 2015). However, the Gaza Strip is not the subject of analysis in this case.

3) Variation in repercussions on local communities

The presence of violence against the local community is tangible from all the mentioned actors (in the case of HuT at least incitement) only against Israeli settlers and soldiers in the West Bank. In recent years, all groups have been linked to attacks by their operatives against the Jewish community. Of course, the attacks' shared goals and the cooperation in car- rying them out affect the rapprochement between Hamas and the AAMB. Sporadic violence against Palestinians is perpetrated by HuT, which "punishes" society for failing to adhere to strict Islamic principles. An example is the beating of young people for drinking alcohol or young women who are not dressed modestly enough (Koren, 2020). The popularity of HuT and AAMB is generally very low since Palestinian society in the West Bank and Hamas can rely on a higher level of trust, which has risen markedly in recent years (Altmann, 2018).

4) Group-specific characteristics

Of the specific features between the examined groups, it is necessary to emphasize the ideological and practical differences (see previous analysis) between HuT and Hamas, together with the AAMB, which essentially preclude any cooperation.

Determination of Categories of Groups' Relations

The research aims to categorize the relations between individual radical Islamist groups according to the categories of the so-called agreements of ANSAs (Idler, 2012: 71-79).

167 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The studied dynamics of behavior between Hamas and Hizb-ut-Tahrir branches in the West Bank means that the two movements have no agreements. The only interaction between them is, in essence, mutual non-violent criticism due to the different leadership of Islamism and social reform. There is only a violent struggle for non-existent agreements within Idler's categories, but this does not apply to Hamas-HuT relations. Thus, no category from Idler's concept suits mutual relations. In the same sense, it is possible to identify relationships between HuT and AAMB with almost no interaction with each other.

Relations between Hamas and al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades can probably be described as a strategic alliance, given the high level of trust evident from long-term cooperation in violent attacks on Israel. Another proof is the military cooperation in the Gaza Strip. However, the author is aware of the lack of data, making it difficult to determine the relationship accu- rately.

4.6.2 Gaza Strip In this part, attention is focused on analyzing relations between the examined actors in the Gaza Strip. As part of the presentation of the groups' characteristics, their relationship to Hamas, as the ruling entity in the Gaza Strip, has already been analyzed, but the dynamics of behavior, among others, require a more detailed analysis. As is clear from the research carried out so far, the interrelationships between organizations, especially in the Gaza Strip, are confusing and not entirely understanda- ble. The author will again use the analytical framework according to Idler (2012).

1) Drivers of decision-making

168 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The first indicator is the drivers of decision-making, which are broken down into four other aspects.

The degree of trust between groups

The analysis already shows that trust between the various groups in the Gaza Strip is built on the proclaimed goals and ways of achieving them. For all actors, the primary goal is to destroy the Jewish state and the liberation of Palestine, but from other Islamist motives. In Gaza's case, this trust is largely linked to the groups' attitudes towards the ruling Hamas movement, which, through its actions (internal to Gaza entities and external to Israel or the PA), shapes relations between other Islamist groups. Since its involvement in the political process since 2006, Hamas' behavior has led to its former members' leavings, who, with the help of many disgruntled radicalized Palestinians, have formed new Salafi jihadist elements in Gaza.

As mentioned several times, relatively stable relationships are detectable in established groups and the three strongest factions - Hamas, PIJ, and PRC. Although the PIJ and the PRC have repeatedly criticized Hamas for political participation and the weak leadership of the armed resistance against Israel, and Hamas has cracked down on some of their members, both movements have a long-standing military agreement with Hamas. In this case, they have little choice, as the military and material superiority of Hamas simply forced them to cooperate. A great rapprochement between the groups has been observed since 2018, when the so-called return marches took place and the establishment of the joint operations room, a platform strengthening military cooperation between the leading militant organizations in Gaza (ITIC, 2021a), was announced. As a result, the last joint military exercise, the first of its kind,

169 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS took place at the end of December 2020, called "Strong Pillar," the mas- siveness of which surprised many intelligence portals. Up to 12 military wings (including several Fatah splinter groups) took part in this military drill, including the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, the al-Quds Brigades, and the Salah al-Din Battalions (Ibid.).

Figure 42: The logo of the joint operations room of the Palestinian resistance movements (Source: ITIC, 2021a) As analyzed in the previous section, trust between the three actors has declined several times, especially after the PIJ or PRC fired rockets even during an agreed peace with Israel, which always provoked a harsh re- action from Hamas. The deterioration of relations between Iran and Ha- mas, which affected Hamas's behavior towards the PIJ and the PRC, also played a significant role. Even so, the fight against the common enemy remains the link between all organizations, which is proving to be a crucial factor in the long run. The only problematic player in this shamrock is the PRC's military wing, the al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades, becoming much closer to global jihad. However, as mentioned above, the Bri- gades also took part in the last major exercise, together with Hamas and the PIJ, which shows their cooperation with Gaza's main militant factions.

170 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In terms of other actors in the radical Islamist arena in Gaza, it is clear that there is a high level of trust between Salafi jihadist factions - Jaysh al-Islam, Jaysh al-Umma, Mujahideen Shura Council, and Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (excluding the Sabireen Movement), namely despite their fragmentation. On the contrary, they have a low level of trust in more traditional actors in Gaza, or rather no one at all. Their loose network and their limited military capabilities compared to Hamas predispose them to maintain long-term agreements with each other. Of course, the problem remains to determine the specific trust between the individual Salafi jihadist factions, which is due to the lack of resources on which the work is based. However, it can almost certainly be concluded that this rate is high due to the above-mentioned common strategic objectives and cooperation on violent attacks. It is usually tricky to identify who the real perpetrator is due to the close interconnectedness of the Salafi jihadist elements in Gaza.

A separate chapter is representative of Shiite Islamism - Sabireen Move- ment (HESN). Hamas and Sunni Salafi jihadist groups, who see Shiites as apostates from true Islam, are, of course, vehemently opposed. From Ha- mas, there is some form of tolerance due to the potential deterioration of relations with Iran, which HESN supports. HESN thus maintains stable and lasting agreements only with the PIJ and the PRC, which are also under Iran's de facto patronage. Evidence of the close relationship is docu- mented by the fact that many members of HESN are former officials from both named organizations.

The local context

The local context in the Gaza Strip case corresponds to the premise from the Idler study (2012) - that is, those actors who have strong historical

171 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ties maintain good relations. On the contrary, for those who have recent interests and have emerged recently, short-term agreements prevail. In Gaza's context, the older and experienced movements that have been involved in the Palestinian armed resistance since the first intifada (1987- 1993) - Hamas and the PIJ, which was formed several earlier, maintain historically unchanging relations tendency side by side. In the same sense, the PRC, fighting Israel since the beginning of the second intifada (2000-2005), can be added. On the contrary, the groups that appeared later - except for Jaysh al-Islam - all cooperated after the end of the second intifada and were not accepted between established and older movements (except the Sabireen Movement). Moreover, the inconsistency of Salafi jihadists greatly complicates the precise determination of relations between them.

The role the state forces and other external actors

The first part of this feature's analysis may seem problematic given that Hamas is a non-state actor in the Gaza Strip, which also represents a legitimate state force. In essence, it confirms the above, i.e., that some groups in the Gaza Strip have united (concluded agreements with each other) to face Hamas. It can be transferred to the regional level in the same meaning, where most radical Islamist organizations have joined forces to carry out armed resistance to Israel.

External influences play a crucial role in decision-making between Gaza actors, as already shown in the analysis of characteristics. In particular, the influence of Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) meant the formation of the PIJ + PRC, the most important Iranian proxies in Gaza, to which the Sabireen Movement can be added. To some extent,

172 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS it is safe to include Hamas in this category (see separate chapter). A con- certed effort to repay Iran was demonstrated on the first anniversary of the death of former IRGC General Qasem Soleimani in January 2021, when both Hamas and PIJ leaders gave commemorating speeches and commemorated the event, including the placement of Soleimani posters across Gaza (ITIC, 2021b). It was the Iranian involvement in Gaza that formed the Salafi jihadist opposition and strengthened relations between them, especially in the case of Jaysh al-Ummah. In a similar sense, it is possible to mention Western states' influence (through politicians, humanitarian workers, journalists), which seeks to keep to a minimum, especially the most radical currents within the global concept of jihad.

Figure 43: Billboards in Gaza depicting Qassem Soleimani and the epitaph "the martyr of Jerusalem" (Source: ITIC, 2021b)

The organizational structure of the ANSAs

The organizational structure and its influence on the decision-making and dynamics of radical groups in Gaza correspond to the Idler (2012) assumption - hierarchical organizations such as Hamas and PIJ prefer longer-term alliances, while decentralized groups tend to have short- term agreements. An exception is the PRC, which is more like a decen-

173 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS tralized group. Most Salafi jihadist movements (except the Jaysh al-Um- mah and the Sabireen Movement - but still represent a relatively loose network) have a decentralized structure due to their fragmentation between multiple cells and their covert action.

2) Insights on violence

One of the effects of the interaction between radical Islamist groups in Gaza is physical violence. Violence most often arises between Hamas and other actors due to Hamas's strict security control over the Palestinian enclave, which addresses any attempts challenging its dominant position with stern action. From the opposite point of view, groups inspired by al- Qaeda or ISIS are challenging Hamas's own resistance credentials with threats of violence and, to a lesser extent, attacks on some of its members, as was in August 2019, when two suicide bombers killed three Ha- mas police (TOI 2019c). It should not be forgotten that even between Ha- mas and the strongest militant groups, there has also been something of a "tense calm" in the past, despite the mutual maintenance of long-term agreements. Violence between individual Salafi jihadist groups is absent, as they have identical goals and are not considered competitors but allies. It contradicts Idler's hypothesis that there is a higher probability of violence among shorter-term agreements.

3) Variation in repercussions on local communities

The third attribute is the impact of mutual interactions on the local population, thanks to which it is possible to determine the length of mutual agreements between organizations in the Gaza Strip. In its context, however, it is tough to determine the impact on local communities of actors other than Hamas. It has almost complete control over Gaza's security

174 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS situation (it performs security functions for its members and constituencies) and does not allow violence against the people of Gaza, and if so, it punishes the perpetrators severely. The only actors clearly involved in the violence against the local population is the Salafi jihadist bloc, which has injured or killed civilians in several attacks primarily aimed at Hamas (e.g., Donnison, 2012). That is illustrated by the low support (distrust) of Gazan society for the jihadist ideology adopted by al-Qaeda or ISIS (see above). Thus, the situation in Gaza is very specific in that violence against the civilian population is committed almost exclusively by a state actor (Israel). However, it is still clear that actors who have shorter-term agreements and are decentralized (Salafi jihadists) are more inclined to violence.

4) Group-specific characteristics

Of the specific characteristics of individual groups in Gaza, the unequiv- ocally different adaptation of the extreme level of Islamist ideologies influences the most. On the one hand, some movements defend Islamist beliefs together with the local nationalist narrative (Hamas, PIJ, partly PRC). On the other hand, organizations with a worldwide jihad concept, where nationalist motives do not play such a crucial role, consider other moderate Islamist groups as apostates for compromising Islamic principles. It also implies another important feature, which is the conduct of an offensive jihad against Israel by all means, which has resulted in the creation of competitive tendencies in Gaza and joint agreements between actors against Hamas.

Determination of Categories of Groups' Relations

This part of the analysis aims to define the type of relationships between the studied radical Islamist groups, again according to Idler's study. It

175 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS distinguishes up to seven different categories according to their durability and stability (trust).

The interrelationships between the established Palestinian Islamist movements Hamas, the PIJ, and the PRC can undoubtedly be categorized as strategic alliances given the long-term agreements presented above. Coinciding with the very definition of this category, Hamas, the PIJ, and the PRC have military cooperation agreements (despite occasional disagreements), in which they share intelligence and business, where Hamas has, of course, the greatest power. All these movements have a common external enemy (Israel) and, to some extent, an internal one (Salafi jihadist organizations). Both Hamas and the PIJ have a high degree of in- stitutionalization. In the case of the PRC, this is debatable given the fragmented structure in recent years. A feature of this category is the high degree of trust and durability, which is evident in the relatively constant relations between Hamas, the PIJ, and the PRC, which have lasted for dec- ades. However, the author believes that the level of trust between them is not so high that it would be possible to describe the relationship as pacific coexistence. Of course, within these joint alliances, shorter-term agreements can also occur, viewed as subcontract relationships, concerning military cooperation, such as trade services, lending of military equipment, etc.

The relationship of all these groups towards Jaysh al-Islam, Jaysh al-Um- mah, Mujahideen Shura Council, Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, and others is typical for violent combat given the above. Hamas, like the PIJ and the PRC, is hostile to these groups, which question their position in Gaza, which is, of course, accompanied by mistrust and conflicting interests.

176 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

However, it is true that, especially around the second intifada, some jihadist groups collaborated with the al-Qassam Brigades on several violent actions (Gilad Shalit kidnapping) or the construction of underground tunnels. These rather one-off events are characteristic of subcontract relationships.

As already mentioned, the Sabireen Movement (HESN) has a specific position, having ties with the PIJ and the PRC, thanks to joint Iranian support. Relations between these actors are approaching pacific coexistence, given that the Sabireen Movement operates independently of the PIJ and the PRC, and the level of trust between them is very high due to the Iranian link. The same applies to the relationship between the PIJ and the PRC. On the contrary, Hamas's relationship with the HESN is comparable to that of the Salafi jihadists - i.e., violent combat, although it is not as intense as against them, but instead in the form of a threat of violence.

The conceptualization of relations between the most extreme groups in Gaza is very difficult to determine due to the fragmentation of the Salafi jihadist scene and the uncertainty of who supports whom. The analysis shows a high level of trust between these actors, which is justified by the joint cooperation in the attacks against Israel. However, as Barak (2021) points out, slight tensions arise among groups that identify with al-Qaeda ideology and that adopt the ISIS ideology. According to him, al-Qaeda's ideology is far more entrenched in Gaza, and there is intolerance of ISIS (on an ideological level). An example is the prominent Salafi jihadist Nail bin Ghazi, who is spreading anti-ISIS propaganda in Gaza.

When it comes to determining their relationship, on the one hand, due to the decentralized structure or mistrust of society, Salafi jihadists should

177 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS prefer shorter-term agreements. Given that the presence of violence between them is almost absent, which favors longer-term agreements, the author is more inclined to strategic alliances as a category of mutual relations. Even though, individual organizations often disappear or merge with another, which documents the mentioned lack of data on these groups.

4.6.3 Comparison Like the previous analysis of radical Islamist groups' characteristics, the analysis examining their interrelationships and dynamics of behavior comes with visible differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The difference in the mutual relations between the examined actors is largely related to the results from the first part of the analysis when a minimal number of established organizations in the West Bank determine the main distinctions between the two Palestinian territories.

The smaller number of actors in the radical Islamist theater of Judea and Samaria naturally results in the most significant difference in the extent of interactions between groups. While there are interactions between several groups in the Gaza Strip and there is no complete picture of who supports whom, in the West Bank, the opposite is true - there is minimal interaction, mainly due to the strict security oversight of the PA and Is- rael. The result is, therefore, almost impossible to determine the stability and durability of mutual relations.

On the contrary, in what the features of behavioral dynamics are similar to those in the West Bank and Gaza, is the role of Islamist ideology, respectively the level of extremity and practical application in the strategic goals of the actors. The differences in the Islamist creed have de facto

178 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS created dividing or converging lines in the relations of the various radical Islamist movements, which accordingly interact in the areas under study - in Gaza, opposition has arisen in several groups identifying with al-Qada and ISIS against a more political and nationalist current. Islamism represented by Hamas and in the West Bank, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement is similarly separated from other actors, and Hamas and al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades cooperate with each other.

The influence of external actors on the form of relations between groups seems to be different in both territories. Like a different Islamist ideology, Iran's involvement in particular plays an important role in shaping relations in Gaza. On the contrary, in the West Bank, the influence of foreign states on the behavior of groups is not evident.

Another distinction lies in the levels of violence between organizations. Far more explosive relations with the presence of physical violence can be registered in Gaza than in the West Bank, where these features are relatively minimal. It, of course, is again related to the different number of established actors. In the same vein, it is possible to analyze the factor of repercussions on local Palestinian communities, which are low in both areas, and relations are not formalized fundamentally (in the Strip, they only strengthen relations between Salafi jihadists).

Regarding the categories of examined relations between groups, in both cases (West Bank, Gaza Strip), the author most often identified relations in the form of a strategic alliance. This fact is justified mainly due to the wage of a long-lasting war (jihad) against the same enemy - Israel and the long-term action of the actors. It does not apply to all Salafi jihadists whose presence is volatile. Even so, strategic alliances as a category of relationships prevail given the same strategic goals. The outright violent

179 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS struggle between radical groups occurs only in the Gaza Strip, where ir- reconcilable positions persist between the ruling Hamas and Salafi jihadism followers. The other types of relations (agreements) mentioned by Idler (2012) in his study are not to be found in the case of the Pales- tinian territories. The only exception is sporadic subcontract relationships, especially between Hamas and other groups they use for one-off military or trade services (e.g., cooperation in arms supplies and smuggling), which may occur within the framework of the mentioned strategic alliances.

Finally, the analysis also documents that, despite its weak presence in the West Bank, Hamas is pursuing the same behavior pattern (albeit in mod- erately moderate ways) as in Gaza. It maintains strategic cooperation with those radical movements (AAMBs) that reach certain military strength, and at the same time, they do not accept the most extreme versions of Islamic radicalism. On the other hand, Hamas's attitude toward al-Qaeda and ISIS supporters in the West Bank (only to individuals, not groups because they are not based here) is largely pragmatic since it endorses their activities given that they carry out attacks against Israel.

4.7 Summary of the Analysis

The last part of the analysis summarizes the current reality of the phenomenon of radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories. The current development of extreme Islamist tendencies in these territories is strongly influenced by historical events from the first intifada (1987- 1993) to the 2007 split between Fatah and Hamas, which marked the de

180 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS facto political separation between West Bank and Gaza Strip. The subsequent completely different political and socio-economic course in both areas shapes the current form of radical Islamism.

Despite the much smaller size of the Gaza Strip, the area today represents a pocket of various extremist Islamic elements compared to the much larger area of the West Bank, where radical Islamism in the form of more extensive and long-term organized activity is not present. As analyzed, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with their security and intelligence forces, have made it almost impossible for a radical Islamist movement to establish itself in the West Bank. Besides, another reason is the low level of support for the violent flow of Islamism among most young Pal- estinians in the West Bank, who now live in relatively peaceful times and are in a good socio-economic situation as opposed to their older family members in times of highest violence (Barak, 2021).

Nevertheless, radical Islamist groups can be found in the West Bank. In addition to the limited capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Ji- had, which are primarily present in the Gaza Strip, it is Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Hamas still appears to be the strongest Islamist faction in the West Bank, operating militarily through its dormant cells and still enjoying constant political support from prominent Palestinian family clans. It is also necessary to mention the strong potential of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Although the HuT officially proclaims the nonviolent leadership of jihad, it is a potential threat to greater radicalization among Palestinians, given the radical views of its leadership and sympathizers and growing popularity. Moreover, the movement may move to violent means in the future (Barak, 2021).

181 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The current reality of the radical Islamist scene in the Gaza Strip is far more complicated to summarize. The lack of relevant data and the dy- namically changing situation in recent years have made it difficult to determine which extremist groups other than the traditional Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and, to some extent, the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza are present today. The analysis showed that the main challengers of the ruling Hamas are the fragmented Salafi jihadist bloc, represented in recent years by the Jaysh al-Islam, the Jaysh al-Um- mah, the Sabireen Movement, the Mujahideen Shura Council, and the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade. However, after a detailed analysis, it is not one hundred percent to declare these groups to be the current actors of the Salafi jihadist spectrum. If only the data for the past months are considered, it can be concluded that groups such as the Mujahideen Shura Council and the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade are inactive today and seem to have merged with other factions.

The author consulted the analysis results with Mr. Al-Tamimi, a Middle East expert who confirmed that the main groups besides Hamas, the PIJ, and the PRC are currently active only Jaysh al-Islam and Jaysh al-Ummah (also, the Salafi jihadist wing of the PRC Liwa al-Tawheed). Also, Dr. Barak admitted that there had been no recent data on most of the groups in the jihadist spectrum. The clarity of the situation is complicated because these organizations often consist of defectors al-Qassem Brigades or former members of other groups. The analysis has also shown that in recent years some other, little-known actors have been operating in Gaza, for whom it is not possible to prove whether they are active or have disappeared.

182 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Looking at future developments, we cannot expect revolutionary changes, but rather the continuation of current trends. The further development of not only radical Islamism in the West Bank depends to a large extent on the outcome of the legislative and presidential elections, which take place in 2021 for the first time in 15 years. A potential change in the presidency of the Palestinian Authority may, as Barak (2021) points out, lead to a new wave of violence that can be exploited and intensified by the radical Islamist scene. Gaza's situation must be seen in the light of a geostrategic context, where it will depend primarily on Is- rael, whether it is willing to change the long-term status quo. It is also necessary to consider external actors' influence, such as Iran, Turkey, Qa- tar, or Saudi Arabia, who continue to pursue their strategic interests in Gaza. In addition, the security situation and the development of Islamist tendencies in Gaza are further complicated by the neighboring conflict in the Sinai Peninsula.

The research analyzed the current development of radical Palestinian Is- lamism through radical Islamist groups that operate on its territory with a certain militancy level. However, to capture radical Islamism as a whole, it is necessary to analyze the overall context and atmosphere of this phenomenon. Radical Islam in Palestine is driven by many other actors than just radical military groups. It is mainly Islamic organizations with educational activities, radical clerics and scholars, but also families and tribes in Palestine that identify with radical ideology. Examples include Salafist organizations such as the Ibn Baz Islamic Society in Gaza, which, through its dawah activities, oppose Hamas and Iranian influence, or prominent Salafist jihadists Nail bin Ghazi or Abu Attiya al-Libi, spreaders of al-Qaeda propaganda in the Gaza Strip (Barak, 2021). All of

183 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS these actors are making a significant contribution to the potential radicalization of Palestinians and the development of extremist Islamist tendencies in both Palestinian territories.

184 CONCLUSION

5 Conclusion

The research in this diploma thesis analyzed the phenomenon of Pales- tinian Islamic radicalism and its main actors active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The research's main ambition was to compare the two areas in the selected analytical frameworks, which were the characteristics of radical Islamist groups and their dynamics of behavior and mutual relations.

The first goal of the work was to present the main radical Islamist movements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and based on the analytical concept, create their profiles. The answer to the research question "Who are the key actors of the radical Islamist arena in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and what are their characteristics based on the concept of armed non-state actors?" is summarized in the tables in subchapter 4.5 .1 devoted to summarizing the characteristics of the groups.

Within this objective, the ambition was to determine the individual radical Islamist ideologies that the examined actors adopt. These ideologies were discussed for each group under the first attribute (motivation and purpose) and are also summarized in the tables above. The author notes that their purpose is not entirely clear, given that they intersect with each other.

The overall goal was to compare the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and find out the answer to the secondary research question "What are the main similarities and differences between radical Islamist groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?". In sum, the research found that groups in the West Bank differ significantly from those in the Gaza Strip

185 CONCLUSION in their established quantity, nature and organization of actions, achieving strategic goals, extent of Islamist ideologies, modus operandi and forms of violence, relations to state authorities, and the attitude of state authorities towards them. On the contrary, the author identified similarities in motivation and purpose, diversity of funding, stance on violence, and similar functions that they fulfill for their members and constituencies. The following table provides a clear summary.

Similarities Differences

Motivation and purpose The established quantity

The nature and organization The diversity of funding of actions The stance on violence (except Achieving strategic goals Hizb-ut-Tahrir) The functions they fulfill for The extent of Islamist their members and ideologies constituencies The modus operandi and

forms of violence The relations to state

authorities The attitude of state authorities towards radical groups

Table 13: Summary of the main similarities and differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in group characteristics

The second objective of the research was to examine the dynamics of behavior and the interrelationships between radical Islamist groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and categorize them based on a chosen analytical framework. The answer to the second research question "What are the relations between the individual Islamist groups in the

186 CONCLUSION

West Bank and Gaza Strip? How can they be categorized?" is discussed clearly in a separate subchapter 4.6.3, including the categories of relationships between groups.

The additional goal was again to compare the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and answer the secondary research question "What are the resemblances and differences on radical Islamist groups' relationships between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?". To sum up, the differences between the two territories lie in the general range of interactions, the level of violence between groups, or the influence of external actors on the formation of relations. However, the work also detected similarities in the form of the influence of Islamist ideology on the formation of relations and strategic alliances as the predominant category of mutual relations. The conclusions are summarized again in the following table.

Similarities Differences

The influence of Islamist The range of interactions ideology on the formation of relations Strategic alliances as the The level of violence predominant category of between groups mutual relations The influence of external actors on the formation of relations

Table 14: Summary of the main similarities and differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in group relations

As can be seen from the above conclusions, the research came with several key findings that show that radical Islamism is highly diverse in the Palestinian territories and that its current reality in the West Bank and

187 CONCLUSION

Gaza Strip differs significantly in several different factors, chiefly in the number of active radical Islamist elements, in their character, and dynamics of interactions between them.

This work's main merit is originally designed research, which provides up-to-date data on the complex security problem of the Middle East region. The thesis offers a comprehensive overview of the main radical Is- lamist organizations active in the Palestinian territories, the current form of which was absent in the current professional literature. The author aimed to clarify the information and provide an objective analysis that will help at least to some extent to unravel the complex Israeli-Pal- estinian conflict and the topic of radical Islam, which is often biased and distorted in Western countries. The research's value lies in the considerable contribution to the Czech professional environment, where the researched topic is poorly discussed. The analytical outputs also contribute to foreign research on radical Islamism or the debate on the Israeli-Pal- estinian conflict.

As mentioned in the analytical part summary, the phenomenon of Pales- tinian Islamic radicalism for its overall capture needs to be analyzed in its entirety, including other essential actors than just organized extremist movements. The analytical outputs of this work can thus be developed in the future and can serve as a basis for further, comprehensive research.

188 LIST OF TABLES

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Professional and Intelligence Databases

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ECFR - European Council on Foreign Relations. 2020c. “Hamas.” Ecfr.org. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/hamas/

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ECFR – European Council on Foreign Relations. 2020g. “Harakat al-Sabi- reen.“ Ecfr.org. https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_poli- tics/harakat_al_sabireen/

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ICT – International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2020. “Cyber Report July-September 2019.“ ict.org.il, May 20, 2020. http://www.ict.org.il/images/Cyber%20report%2032.%20JulySeptember%202019.pdf

Isseroff, Ami. 2008. “Popular Resistance Committees.“ Encyclopedia of the Middle East, November 4, 2004. http://www.mideastweb.org/Mid- dle-East-Encyclopedia/popular_resistance_committees.htm

ITIC – Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2011. “The Popu- lar Resistance Committees: Portrait of the Terrorist Organization Re- sponsible for the Series of Combined Terrorist Attacks North of Eilat, Is- rael's Southernmost City.“ Terrorism-info.org.il, August 23, 2011. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_11_182_2.pdf

ITIC - Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2019b. “Examina- tion of the List of Fatalities in the ‘Return Marches’ Reveals That Most of Them Are Operatives of Terrorist Organizations.” Terrorism-info.org.il, January 21, 2019. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/examination- list-fatalities-re-turn-marches-reveals-operatives-terrorist-organizations-half-affiliated-hamas

ITIC – Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2019c. “Funding Terrorism: campaign of a jihadi organization operating in the Gaza Strip to raise funds in Bitcoin.“ Terrorism-info.org.il, May 19, 2019. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2019/02/E_025_19.pdf

ITIC – The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2019a. “Pales- tinian Violence and Terrorism Against Israel, 2018: Data, Nature and Trends.“ Terrorism-info.org.il, February 18, 2019. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/palestinian-violence-terrorism-israel-2018-data-nature-trends-2/

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ITIC - The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2020. “Funding Terrorism: The al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafi Army of the Nation in Jerusa- lem, which operates in the Gaza Strip, recently renewed its Bitcoin fundraising campaign.“ Terrorism-info.org.il, May 13, 2020. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2020/05/E_116_20.pdf

ITIC - The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2021a. “The first military exercise was held under the command of the joint operations room of all the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip. Its objective was to send messages of unity and improved military capabilities.“ terrorism-info.org.il, January 7, 2021. https://www.terrorism- info.org.il/en/the-first-military-exercise-was-held-under-the- command-of-the-joint-operations-room-of-all-the-terrorist-organizations-operating-in-the-gaza-strip-its-objective-was-to-send-messages-of- unity-and-impr/

ITIC - The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2021b. “Spot- light on Iran (December 27, 2020 - January 10, 2021).“ terrorism- info.org.il, January 10, 2021. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spo- tlight-on-iran-december-27-2020-january-10-2021/

Jihad Intel. 2020a. “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades :: Jihad Intel.“ Jihad Identi- fiers Database. https://jihadintel.meforum.org/group/72/al-aqsa-martyrs-brigades

Jihad Intel. 2020b. “Jihad Intel :: Liwa al-Tawheed.“ Jihad Identifiers Da- tabase. https://jihadintel.meforum.org/group/174/liwa-al-tawheed

Jihad Intel. 2020c. “Harakat al-Sabireen :: Jihad Intel.“ Jihad Identifiers Database. https://jihadintel.meforum.org/group/192/harakat-al-sabireen

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MEMRI - Middle East Media Research Institute. 2016. “Videos By ISIS Supporters In Gaza Teach Viewers To Create Improvised Explosive De- vices And Ricin Poison At Home.“ memri.org, May 18, 2016. https://www.memri.org/jttm/videos-isis-supporters-gaza-teach-viewers-create-improvised-explosive-devices-and-ricin-poison

MEMRI - Middle East Media Research Institute. 2017. “Militants of Fa- tah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades Demonstrate Skills during Course Grad- uation, Simulate Capture of Israeli Soldier.“ Memri.org, February 5, 2017. https://www.memri.org/tv/militants-fatahs-al-aqsa-martyrs-brigades- demonstrate-skills-during-course-graduation-simulate

MEMRI - Middle East Media Research Institute. 2018. “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Establish 'Yasser Arafat' Military Base In Gaza, Announces: No One Will Take the Weapons Of Resistance From Us, Fatah Is True To The Path Of Armed Struggle.“ Memri.org, February 8, 2018. https://www.memri.org/reports/%20al-aqsa-brigades-establish- %27yasser%20arafat%27-base-in-gaza

RedCrow Intelligence. 2016. “Salaﬁsts in Palestine and Israel.“ RedCrow Blog, July 31, 2016. http://blog.redcrow.co/node/62

SITE Intelligence Group. 2013. “MSC in Jerusalem Promotes Jihad in West Bank, Eulogizes Slain Fighters.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, December 1, 2013. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/msc-in-jerusalem- promotes-jihad-in-west-bank-eulogizes-slain-fighters.html

SITE Intelligence Group. 2013. “Palestinian Faction Urges Help to Sunnis in Ahvaz, Iran, in Audio.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, January 17, 2013. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/palestinian-faction-urges- help-to-sunnis-in-ahvaz-iran-in-audio.html

209 LIST OF TABLES

SITE Intelligence Group. 2014. “Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusa- lem” Claims Murder of Three Teens in West Bank.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, June 30, 2014. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Ji- hadist-News/supporters-of-the-islamic-state-in-jerusalem-claims-murder-of-three-teens-in-west-bank.html

SITE Intelligence Group. 2015. “Fighter Calls in Video to Contribute to Fundraising Campaign for Gaza-based Jihadis.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, August 21, 2015. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/fighter- calls-in-video-to-contribute-to-fundraising-campaign-for-gaza-based-jihadis.html

SITE Intelligence Group. 2016. “Telegram Channel Solicits Bitcoin Dona- tions for Jihadi Groups in Palestine.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, July 6, 2016. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Chatter/telegram-channel-solicits-bitcoin-donations-for-jihadi-groups-in-palestine.html

SITE Intelligence Group. 2017. “Gaza-Based Jaish al-Islam Launches Fi- nancial Campaign to Equip Fighters.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, June 12, 2017. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/gaza-based-jaish-al- islam-launches-financial-campaign-to-equip-fighters.html

SITE Intelligence Group. 2018. “Yahya Ayyash Battalion Claims May 30 Rocket Strikes in Southern Israel in 1st Operation in Nearly 3 Years.“ ent.siteintelgroup.com, June 21, 2018. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/yahya-ayyash-battalion-claims-may-30-rocket- strikes-in-southern-israel-in-1st-operation-in-nearly-3-years.html

SITE Intelligence Group. 2020. “Palestinian Territorries – search.” https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_customproper- ties&view=search&task=tag&tagId=144&Itemid=570&limit- start=60&limit=20

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TRAC - Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020b. “Hamas.” Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/hamas

TRAC - Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020c. “Army of Is- lam.“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/army-islam

TRAC - Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020d. “Jaish al Um- mah (JAU)/Army of the Nation – Gaza.“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jaish-al-ummah-jauarmy- nation-gaza

TRAC – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020e. “The Move- ment of the Patient Ones for the Liberation of Palestine (HESN).“ Track- ingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/movement-patient-ones-liberation-palestine-hesn

TRAC – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020f. “Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen (MSM).“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/majlis-shura-al-mujahedeen-msm

TRAC – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020g. “Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade.“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/sheikh-omar-hadid-brigade

TRAC – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020h. “Islamic State Sinai (IS, ISS, ISISS) -- Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al- Maqdis (‘The Group of Helpers/Supporters of the Islamic State in Bayt al-Maqdis’).“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-sinai-iss-isiss-jamaat-ansar-al-dawla-al-islamiya-fi-bayt-al-maqdis-%E2%80%98-group-help

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TRAC – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020i. “Masada al Mujahideen.“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/masada-al-mujahideen

TRAC -Terrorism Research & Analysis Consurtium. 2020a. “al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB).“ Trackingterrorism.org. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-aqsa-martyrs-brigade-aamb

Zelin, Aaron. 2013. “Al Rayyah Foundation for Media Presents New Pic- tures from Jaysh al ummah the Arrival of Goodness.“ Jihadology.net, Oc- tober 13, 2013. https://jihadology.net/2013/10/13/al-rayyah-foundation-for-media-presents-new-pictures-from-jaysh-al-ummah-the- arrival-of-goodness-3/

212 LIST OF TABLES

Documents of State Authorities

IDF. 2020. “Hamas' Military Wing.“ IDF.il. https://www.idf.il/en/minisi- tes/hamas/hamas/hamas-military-wing/

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. “Popular Resistance Commit- tees.“ mfa.gov.il. https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/popular_resistance_committees-aug_2011.aspx

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2020. “Wave of terror 2015-2020. 2021.“ Mfa.gov.il, January 10, 2021. https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/wave-of-terror-october-2015.aspx

U.S. Department of State. 2011. “Designation of Army of Islam.“ U.S. De- partment of State, May 19, 2011. https://2009- 2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163838.htm

U.S. Department of State. 2014. “Terrorist Designation of the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC).“ State.gov, August 19, 2014. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230728.htm

U.S. Department of State. 2015. “Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224.“ federalregister.gov, January 21, 2015. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/01/21/2015-00908/in-the-matter-of-the-designation-of- abdallah-al-ashqar-also-known-as-abdallah-al-ashqar-also-known

U.S. Department of State. 2018. “State Department Terrorist Designa- tions of Ismail Haniyeh, Harakat al-Sabireen, Liwa al-Thawra, and Hara- kat Sawa’d Misr (HASM).“ State.gov, January 31, 2018. https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-ismail-haniyeh-harakat-al-sabireen-liwa-al-thawra-and-harakat-sawad- misr-hasm/

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U.S. Department of State. 2019. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019.“ State.gov. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/

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Documents and Communication Material of Organizations

Alqassam.ps. 2020. “Video: Martyrs Ezz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades.” https://alqassam.ps/arabic/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%8 8 (in Arabic)

Dabiq. 2015. https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/the-islamic- state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-522.pdf (see Mandelbaum and Schweitzer 2016).

Fund.alqassam.ps. 2019. Ezzedeen Al Qassam Brigades website. https://fund.alqassam.net/

Hamas Covenant. 1988. “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Move- ment.” Avalon Project, Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp

Hamas.ps. 2017. “Document of General Principles & Policies.” Hamas, May 1, 2017. http://hamas.ps/en/post/678/a-document-of-general- principles-and-policies

Hamas.ps. 2020. “About Hamas.” https://hamas.ps/en/page/5/About- Hamas

Hizb-ut-tahrir.info. 2009. “Al-Quds cannot be liberated by resorting to protests and sit-in… it can only be restored by mobilizing armed forces to eliminate the Jewish entity!“ Hizb-ut-tahrir.info, October 6, 2009. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/791

Hizb-ut-tahrir.info. 2017. Press Release. “Al-Quds (Jerusalem) is not the Capital of the Jewish entitybut its Tomb!“ Media Office of Hizb ut Tahrir Wilayah Turkey, August 12, 2017.

215 LIST OF TABLES https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd =&ved=2ahUKEwjh9qjog4fuAhWX3YUKHcL9AG- wQFjAAegQIARAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hizb-ut-tahrir.info%2Fen%2Findex.php%2Fpress-releases%2Fturkey%2Fdown- load%2F5767_cfb80457e73cb842615fe8a3421054bf.html&usg=AOv- Vaw0zVsyk0wcjJnpk1VeoNnlL

Hizb-ut-tahrir.info. 2021a. “Hizb ut Tahrir.“ hizb-ut-tahrir.info. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/multimedia/item/7980- hizb-ut-tahrir

Hizb-ut-tahrir.info. 2021b. “Hizb ut Tahrir – Palestine.” Hizb-ut-tahrir.org. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/leaflet/palestine.html

ICG - International Crisis Group. 2004. Dealing With Hamas. Middle East Report no. 21.

ICG – International Crisis Group. 2011. “Radical Islam in Gaza.“ Middle East Report no. 104. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/104-radical-islam-in-gaza.pdf

Khilafah.com. 2011. “Hizb ut-Tahrir gives sincere advice to Hamas in relation to the political…“ mykhilafah.com, May 15, 2011. https://mykhilafah.com/hizb-ut-tahrir-gives-sincere-advice-to-hamas-in-relation-to- the-political/

Nedal.net, 2021b. “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades - Al-Amoudi Brigade.” http://nedal.net/ (in Arabic)

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Nedal.net, 2021c. “Playlists | Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.” http://nedal.net/video/playlists (in Arabic)

Nedal.net. 2021a. “Martyrs | Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.” http://nedal.net/martyrs (in Arabic)

OCHA and UNSO. 2001. “Food and Cash Assistance Programmes, October 2000-August 2001: A Brief Overview.” Jerusalem: OCHA.

Pal-tahrir.info. 2015. “Press release: Hizb ut-Tahrir did not and will not be affiliated with any group or base, and it will only raise the banner of the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace.“ Pal-tahrir.info, April 13, 2015. http://www.pal-tahrir.info/hizbuttahrir-at- world/7985-2015-04-13-11-26-29.htm (in Arabic)

PCPSR. 2015. “Poll No. 54, January 15.” Ramallah: PCPSR.

PCPSR. 2020. “Public Opinion Poll No. 78.“ https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/829

Qaweim.com. 2020a. “The most prominent statement was made by Brother Abu Khaled, one of the military commanders in the Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades - the Resistance Committees.” September 30, 2020. أبرز-ما-صرح-به-األخ-أبو-خالد-أحد-القادة-/https://qaweim.com/post/61661 العسكريين-في-ألوية-الناصر-صالح

Qaweim.com. 2020b. “The Resistance Committees condemns the continuation of the Palestinian Authority’s policy of discrimination and impos- ing sanctions against its employees in the Gaza Strip.“ December 4, 2020. لجان-المقاومة-تدين-استمرار-السلطة-برام-هللا- /https://qaweim.com/post/61851 في-سياسة-التمييز-وفرض-العق

Qaweim.com. 2020c. “Resistance Committees.” https://qaweim.com

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Saraya.ps. 2020a. “The Al-Quds Brigades - Statements.” https://saraya.ps/statements/

Saraya.ps. 2020b. “The Al-Quds Brigades - The common-room-we an- nounce-with the help of God-Almighty-about-launch-maneuvers-corner- الغرفة-المشتركة-نعلن-بعون-هللا-/severe.” https://saraya.ps/statement/2174 تعالى-عن-انطالق-مناورات-الركن-الشديد

Saraya.ps. 2020c. “The Al-Quds Brigades - Martyrs.” واحة-الخالدين/https://saraya.ps/martyrs

UNHCR. 2015. “Palestine: Treatment of family members of known collab- orators with Israel by Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas; treatment by society (2005-January 2015).“ refworld.org, November 16, 2015. https://www.refworld.org/docid/56499e0e4.html

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Thesis or dissertation

Dunning, Tristan. 2013. “Reinterpreting Resistance: Hamas’ Polysemic Conceptions of Jihad and the Search for Popular Legitimacy.” PhD thesis, University of Queensland, Brisbane.

Irgens, Marcus Arctander. 2018. “A narrow dominion? Gaza’s Salafi-Ji- hadis in the fallout of the Arab Spring.“ Master’s thesis, University of Oslo. https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/64350/Irgens-Mas- ter-MES-2018-Spring.pdf

Sunsehaugen, Jarle Opedal. 2011. “Hamas in the West Bank. A study of the political position of the West Bank branch between 1987 and 2007.“ Master`s thesis, University of Bergen. https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3940-hamas-in-the-west-bank.pdf

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News or Magazine Articles

24.ae. 2015. “Hamas dissolves and bans the "Sabreen" movement for its attempt to spread Shiism in Gaza.” 24.ae, July 6, 2015. https://24.ae/ar- aspx.خاص-ل24-حماس-تحظر-وتحل-حركة-الصابرين-في-غزة/ticle/170433

Aawsat.com. 2015. “The "Sheikh Omar Hadid Company" is a new group competing with "Hamas" in Gaza.” Aawsat.com, June 10, 2015. https://aawsat.com/home/article/380386/%C2%AB%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE- %D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1- %D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%C2%BB- %D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9- %D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9- %D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B3- %D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%81%D9%8A- %D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9 (in Arabic)

Abdelaty, Ali. 2015. “WATCH: ISIS Vows to Topple Hamas in Gaza, Uproot 'State of the Jews'.“ Haaretz.com, July 1, 2015. https://www.haaretz.com/watch-isis-vows-to-topple-hamas-in-gaza- 1.5374801

Abu Amer, Ahmad. 2018. “Has Iran’s influence increased in Palestinian arena?” Al-Monitor, October 16, 2018. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/palestinian-islamic-jihad-elections- iran-influence.html

Abu Amer, Khaled. 2018. “Israeli estimates of Hamas’s intention to esca- late the West Bank front .. Why?” Arabi21.com, October 30, 2018.

220 LIST OF TABLES

تقديرات-إسرائيلية-عن-نية-حماس-تصعيد-/https://arabi21.com/story/1133623 (in Arabic) جبهة-الضفة-لماذا

Akram, Fares. 2012. “Israeli Airstrike Kills 2 Militants in Gaza.“ New York Times, October 13, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/world/middleeast/israeli-airstrike-kills-palestinian-militants-in-gaza.html

Akram, Fares. 2013. “In Gaza, Iran Finds an Ally More Agreeable Than Hamas.“ New York Times, July 31, 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/world/middleeast/in-gaza-iran-finds-a-closer- ally-than-hamas.html

Al Jazeera. 2020a. “Hamas urges united ‘resistance’ against West Bank annexation plan.“ Al Jazeera, June 15, 2020. https://www.al- jazeera.com/news/2020/6/15/hamas-urges-united-resistance- against-west-bank-annexation-plan

Al Jazeera. 2020b. “Hamas says ready to resume Palestinian unity talks.“ Al Jazeera, December 14, 2020. https://www.al- jazeera.com/news/2020/12/14/hamas-says-it-is-ready-to-resume-palestinian-unity-talks

Al-Ghoul, Asmaa. 2014b. “Gaza Salafists pledge allegiance to ISIS.“ Al Monitor, February 27, 2014. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/isis-gaza-salafist-jihadist-qaeda-hamas.html

Al-Ghoul, Asmma. 2014a. “Hamas Isolated as Iran Boosts Ties with Is- lamic Jihad, Fatah.” Al-Monitor, February 12, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulseen/originals/2014/02/islamic-jihad-fatah-hamas-iran- palestinians.html

221 LIST OF TABLES

Al-Modon. 2019. “Cities - the authorities are afraid of "Hamas" activity in the West Bank.” Almodon.com, August 11, 2019. Al-Mughrabi, Nidal. 2015. “Hamas says ISIS has no foothold in Gaza Strip.“ Al Arabiya English, May 14, 2015. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/14/Hamas-says- ISIS-has-no-foothold-in-Gaza-Strip

Alquds.co.uk. 2015. “The leader of "Al-Sabreen": We are a resistance faction, and there are no direct relations with Iran. Our slogan is similar to the slogan of "Hezbollah" that took more than its size, and the Arab coalition in Yemen is unjust.” Alquds.co.uk, May 10, 2015. https://www.alquds.co.uk/%EF%BB%BF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6 %D8%AF- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D 9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86- %D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84- %D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85- %D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9/ (in Arabic)

Altmann, Julia. 2018. “Hamas’ popularity spikes among Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza.“ The Jerusalem Post, December 22, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/hamas-popularity-spikes- among-palestinians-in-west-bank-and-gaza-strip-575076

Amad. 2016. “Palestinian Security Sources: The “Patient” Movement Seeks to Stretch from Gaza to the West.” Amad, May 2, 2016. http://www.amad.ps/ar/?Action=Details&ID=109775 (in Arabic)

Asharq Al-Awsat. 2012. “Islamic Jihad Leadership Relocates to Iran,” Aawsat.com, July 22, 2012. https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/theaa- wsat/news-middle-east/islamic-jihad-leadership-relocates-to-iran

222 LIST OF TABLES

Awad, Walid. 2011. “Al-Damiri to Al-Quds Al-Arabi: Hizb Al-Tahrir Has Been Officially Informed by the Authorities That It Is Prohibited from Any Activism as Long as It Does Not Work within the Palestinian Pluralist Political System.” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, January 2, 2011. http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today%5C02qpt92.htm&arc=data%5C2011%5C01%5C01- 02%5C02qpt92.html

Bachner, Michael. 2019. “Iran said increasing Hamas funding to $30m per month, wants intel on Israel.” The Times of Israel, August 5, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-agrees-to-increase-hamas-funding-to-30-million-per-month-report/.

Badour, Huda. 2019. “Hamas quashes armed Shiite movement Sabireen in Gaza.“ Al Monitor, May 24, 2019. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/gaza-hamas-bans-sabireen-movement-shiite-iran.html

Balmer, Crispian and Nidal al-Mughrabi. 2011. “Islamist Jihad Ready for All-Out War with Israel.” Reuters, November 3, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/03/us-palestinians-israel-islamicjihad- idUSTRE7A24RR20111103

Balousha, Hazem. 2013. “Islamic Jihad May Respond If Israel Enters Syria War.” Al-Monitor, September 2, 2013. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/islamic-jihad-syria-us-strike.html

Bar'el, Zvi. 2014. “Has ISIS Infiltrated the West Bank?“ Haaretz.com, June 14, 2014. https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-has-isis-infiltrated-the- west-bank-1.5251822

223 LIST OF TABLES

Barone, Daniele. 2020. “Salafi Army of the Nation in Jerusalem Call for Bitcoin to “Equip a Fighter” in Gaza.“ ITSTIME, May 18, 2020. https://www.itstime.it/w/salafi-army-of-the-nation-in-jerusalem-call- for-bitcoin-to-equip-a-fighter-in-gaza-by-daniele-m-barone/

BBC. 2002. “Israel says al-Qaeda active in Gaza.” BBC, December 5, 2002.

BBC. 2019. “Gaza explosions: 'Suicide bombers' kill three police officers.“ BBC, August 28, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 49491516

Beauchamp, Zack. 2015. “ISIS is threatening Hamas in Gaza. That’s scary news.“ Vox.com, July 2, 2015. https://www.vox.com/2015/7/2/8886317/isis-hamas-gaza

Beaumont, Peter. 2015. “Palestinian Salafists pose dangerous new problem for Hamas.“ The Guardian, June 10, 2015. https://www.theguard- ian.com/world/2015/jun/10/gaza-salafists-problem-hamas-islamic- state-isis

Boxerman, Aaron .2020. “Abbas meets Hamas, Islamic Jihad terror heads, says he won’t engage with US plan.“ The Times of Israel, September 3, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/meeting-with-hamas-and-islamic-jihad-abbas-urges-unity-against-normalization/

Boxerman, Aaron. 2020b. “Israel arrests senior Hamas leader in West Bank.“ The Times of Israel, October 2, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-arrests-senior-hamas-leader-in-west-bank/

Cohen, Gili et al. 2015. “IDF Strikes Gaza After at Least Two Rockets Fired Toward Southern Israel.” Haaretz.com, June 4, 2015. https://www.haaretz.com/idf-strikes-gaza-in-response-to-rocket-fire- 1.5369289

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Cunningham, Erin. 2010. “Jihadists of Gaza take on Hamas for not being Islamic enough.“ The National News, May 17, 2010. https://www.thena- tionalnews.com/world/mena/jihadists-of-gaza-take-on-hamas-for-not- being-islamic-enough-1.519402

Daraghmeh, Mohammed. 2014. “Al-Qaeda group’s ranks in Gaza growing, leader says.“ The Times of Israel, March 9, 2014. https://www.timesofisrael.com/al-qaeda-group-growing-ranks-in- gaza-leader-says/

Donnison, Jon. 2012. “Israel seeks to contain Gaza's Salafi-jihadist threat.“ BBC, October 15, 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-19952325

Eldar, Shlomi. 2018. “Hamas’ Grip on Gaza Weakens.” Al Monitor, Febru- ary 20, 2018. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/israel-idf-gaza-hamas-popular-resistance-committees- war.html

Gedalyahu, Bez. 2011. “Iran Backs Islamic Jihad’s 8,000-Man Army in Gaza.“ Israel National News, November 7, 2011. http://www.israelna- tionalnews.com/News/News.aspx/149498#.TrhgmnF4Vow

Gross, Judah Ari. 2020. “Shin Bet: Hamas recruiting teens to carry out terror attacks, kidnappings.“ The Times of Israel, November 9, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-hamas-recruiting-teens-to- carry-out-terror-attacks-kidnappings/

Haaretz. 2020. “Islamic Jihad.” Haaretz.com. https://www.haaretz.com/misc/tags/TAG-islamic-jihad-1.5599123

Halbfinger, David. 2019. “As Islamic Jihad and Israel Battled, Hamas, in a Twist, Sat on the Sidelines.“ New York Times, November 13, 2019.

225 LIST OF TABLES https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/world/middleeast/gaza-israel-islamic-jihad.html

Hanania, Ray. 2020. “Lawsuit names Qatar’s royal family in killings of 10 Americans in Israel.” Arab News, June 11, 2020. https://www.arab- news.com/node/1688051/middle-east

Harel, Amos. 2009. “Terrorists Who Fought U.S. in Iraq Make Way to Gaza.” Haaretz, August 11, 2009.

Hendrix, Steve et al. 2020. “Gaza militants target Israel with party balloons bearing bombs.” Washington Post, March 8, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/gaza-palestinian-balloon-bombs-israel/2020/03/08/d2069346-54d5-11ea-80ce- 37a8d4266c09_story.html

أجهزة-السلطة-تخشى-/https://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2019/8/11 (in Arabic) عودة-نشاط-خاليا-حماس-في-الضفة

I24 News. 2016. “Iran resumes funding for Palestinian Islamic Jihad: report.” i24 News, May 25, 2016. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/114490-160525-iran-resumes-funding-for-palestinian-islamic-jihad-group-report

I24News. 2020. “Top Palestinian militant killed during clashes with PA security forces.“ I24NEWS.tv, October 31, 2020. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle- east/1604177334-top-palestinian-militant-killed-during-clashes-with- pa-security-forces

Islam Times. 2019. “Al-Quds Brigades Commander Bahaa Abu al-Atta and his Wife were Assassinated.“ Islam Times, November 12, 2019.

226 LIST OF TABLES https://www.islamtimes.org/en/news/826896/al-quds-brigades-commander-bahaa-abu-al-atta-and-his-wife-were-assassinated

Issacharoff, Avi. 2016. “Hamas has replenished its rocket arsenals, Israeli officials say.” The Times of Israel, March 4, 2016. http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-has-replenished-its-rocket-arsenals-israeli-officials- say/

Jabr, Hasan, 2007. “Al-Ayyam Opens File on Salafi Groups in The Gaza Strip.” al-Ayyam, May 17, 2007.

Kajjo, Sirwan and Mehdi Jedinia. 2019. “What Does the Recent Fighting in Gaza Mean for Iran?“ VOA News, November 18, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/what-does-recent- fighting-gaza-mean-iran

Klein, Aaron. 2007. “Claim: Radical al-Qaida sheik to be freed for BBC reporter.“ WND.com, July 5, 2007. https://www.wnd.com/2007/07/42425/

Kredo, Adam. 2020. “Lawsuit Alleges Qatar Secretly Financed Terror At- tacks that Killed Americans.” Washington Free Beacon, June 10, 2020. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/lawsuit-alleges-qatar- secretly-financed-terror-attacks-that-killed-americans/

Kubovich, Yaniv. 2019. “With Israel’s Consent, Qatar Gave Gaza $1 Billion Since 2012.” Haaretz, February 10, 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.pre-mium-with-israel-s-consent-qatar-gave-gaza-1-billion-since-2012-1.6917856

Laub, Karin and Ibrahim Barzak. 2014. “Hamas in Worst Cash Crisis since Seizing Gaza.” Associated Press, March 13, 2014. http://news.ya- hoo.com/hamas-worst-cash-crisis-since-seizing-gaza-181239758.html

227 LIST OF TABLES

Levi, Yaakov. 2015. “ISIS Threatens to Destroy 'Heretical Hamas'.“ Israel National News, May 31, 2015. https://www.israelnational- news.com/News/News.aspx/196079#.VW31IflVhBe

Levitt, Joshua. 2014. “Expert: Hamas Received $2 Billion from Iran; Is- lamic Jihad Gets $150 Million Annually.” Algemeiner, February 11, 2014. http://www.algemeiner.com/2014/02/11/expert-hamas-received-2- billion-from-iran-islamic-jihad-gets-150-million-annually/

Levy, Elior. 2018. “Iran's $100 million aid to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.” Ynet News, August 3, 2018. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5321985,00.html

Macintyre, Donald. 2007. “Tape provides firt evidence that BBC reporter was taken.” The Independent, May 10, 2007.

Malik, Shiv. 2006. “NS Profile – Omar Sharif.“ Newstatesman.com, April 24, 2006. https://www.newstatesman.com/node/164197

Moore, Jack. 2014. “Israel: 'Thousands' of Isis Supporters Rally at Temple Mount in Jerusalem.“ Ibtimes.co.uk, September 4, 2014. https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/israel-thousands-isis-supporters-rally-temple-mount-jerusalem-1464043

Nazarov, Damir. 2020. “The war will have an impact on the course of the Israeli elections: Agel Salah.“ Tehran Times, February 28, 2020. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/445631/The-war-will-have-an- impact-on-the-course-of-the-Israeli-elections

Newton, Creede. 2017. “With Iran’s Rocket Men Who Start Gaza’s Wars.“ The Daily Beast, April 14, 2017. https://www.thedailybeast.com/with- irans-rocket-men-who-start-gazas-wars

228 LIST OF TABLES

Perring, Rebecca. 2015. “ISIS turns on Hamas in Gaza over its crackdown on extremists.“ Express.co.uk, June 1, 2015. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/581559/Islamic-State-Hamas-Gaza-crackdown-48-hour-extremist

Qannan. 2010. “Exclusive: New Gaza Salafist faction numbers 11,000.” Maan, April 18, 2010.

Rasgon, Adam. 2016. “PA Official: Top Suspect in Killing of Two PA Offic- ers Arrested and Beaten to Death,” Jerusalem Post, August 23, 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Top-suspect-in-killing-of- two-PA-officers-arrested-and-beaten-to-death-464841

Reed, John. 2015. “Hamas seeks to stamp out Isis in Gaza.“ Financial Times, June 1, 2015. https://www.ft.com/content/7d6c49d0-0547- 11e5-9627-00144feabdc0

Salah, Hana. 2015. “Hamas struggling with emerging Islamist parties.“ Al Monitor, May 28, 2015. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/hamas-gaza-support-salafist-groups-islamic-state.html

Saleh, Yasmine. 2014. “Exclusive: With Muslim Brotherhood Crushed, Egypt Sets Sights on Hamas.” Reuters, January 14, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-egypt-gaza- idUSBREA0D09D20140114

Schwartz, Sharona. 2015. “A Chilling Message Was Sent to Christians from the 'Islamic State in Palestine.“ TheBlaze.com, June 28, 2015. https://www.theblaze.com/news/2015/06/28/a-chilling-message- was-sent-to-jerusalem-christians-from-the-islamic-state-in-palestine

229 LIST OF TABLES

Sisk, Richard. 1998. “Terror Victim’s Dad Wins $247M Lawsuit Vs. Iran.” New York Daily News, March 12, 1998. http://www.nydailyn- ews.com/archives/news/terror-victim-dad-wins-247m-lawsuit-iran- article-1.789077

Soffer, Ari. 2015. “Report: ISIS Beheads Senior Hamas Member in Syria.“ Israel National News, April 5, 2015. https://www.israelnational- news.com/News/News.aspx/193666#.VW7iX_lVhBd

Solomon, Ariel. 2016. “Gaza-based pro-ISIS group urges Muslims on social media to donate for weapons.“ The Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2016. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/isis-threat/gaza-based-pro-isis- group-urges-muslims-on-social-media-to-donate-for-weapons-457680

Spyer, Jonathan. 2009. “Al-Qaida-Style Islamism Comes to Gaza. Millions of Petrodollars are Flowing in Every Month to Fund Islamist Extremists.” Jerusalem Post, August 20, 2009.

The Sunday Times. 2008. “Al-Qaeda has infiltrated Gaza with help of Ha- mas, says Abbas.” The Sunday Times, February 28, 2008.

Toameh, Abu Khaled. 2016. “Analysis: Iran Infiltrates the West Bank.” Je- rusalem Post, February 9, 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli- Conflict/Analysis-Iran-Infiltrates-the-West-Bank-444352

Toameh, Abu Khaled. 2018. “Islamist group accuses PA of blocking pro- Caliphate rally.“ The Times of Israel, April 22, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/islamist-group-accuses-pa-of-blocking-pro-caliphate-rally/

TOI. 2019a. “Israel arrests several senior Hamas officials in West Bank raids.“ The Times of Israel, December 12, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-arrests-several-senior-hamas-officials-in-west-bank/

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TOI. 2019b. “Islamic Jihad shows off tunnels, rocket workshop on Iran TV.” The Times of Israel, March 1, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/islamic-jihad-shows-off-tunnels-rocket-workshop-on-iran- tv/

TOI. 2019c. “Gaza on high alert after suicide bombings kill Hamas police- men.“ Times of Israel, August 28, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-on-high-alert-after-suicide-bombings-kill-hamas-police- men/

Williams, Daniel. 2009. “Salafism: A New Threat to Hamas.” New York Times, October 27, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/world/middleeast/28iht-letter.html

Yaari, Ehud. 2015a. “Replacing Hamas”; “Middle East: Iran Back Into Gaza.” Amad, October 25, 2015. https://www.amad.ps/ar/post/95441 (in Arabic)

Yashar, Ari. 2015. “Hamas Kills Local ISIS Leader in Gaza Shootout.“ Israel National News, June 2, 2015. https://www.israelnational- news.com/News/News.aspx/196185#.VXlSJvlVhBc

Yusri, Mohamed. 2015. “Egypt army digs trench along Gaza border to prevent smuggling.“ The Daily Star, June 22, 2015. https://www.dai- lystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jun-22/303296-egypt-army- digs-trench-along-gaza-border-to-prevent-smuggling.ashx

Zibun, Kifah, 2009. “The Salafi Groups in Gaza are Close to al-Qa’idah, and Have Split from Factions Including Hamas.” a-Sharq al-Awsat, August 16, 2009.

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Blogs, Reviews, and Another Website Content

Abbas, Hassan. 2018. “Al-Sabireen: an Iran-Backed Palestinian Move- ment in the Style of Hezbollah.“ Raseef22.net, March 14, 2018. https://raseef22.net/article/1071256-al-sabireen-iran-backed-palestinian-movement-style-hezbollah

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2013. “Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin: Between Israel and Hamas.“ Middle East Forum, May 6, 2013. https://www.meforum.org/3500/majlis-shura-al-mujahidin-gaza

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2014. “Muhajireen Battalions in Syria (Part Three).“ Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog, June 23, 2014. https://www.aymennjawad.org/14961/muhajireen-battalions-in- syria-part-three

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2015a. “New Salafi Jihadi Group in Gaza: The Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade.“ aymennjawad.org, June 2, 2015. https://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/06/new-salafi-jihadi-group-in- gaza-the-sheikh-omar

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2015b. “Jihadi Debate over Jamaat Ansar al- Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis.“ aymennjawad.org, January 2, 2015. https://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/jihadi-debate-over-jamaat- ansar-al-dawla-al

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2019a. “Jaysh al-Islam in Gaza: Exclusive In- terview.” aymennjawad.org, January 25, 2019. http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/01/jaysh-al-islam-in-gaza-exclusive-interview

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2019b. “Jaysh al-Ummah in Gaza: Exclusive Interview.“ aymennjawad.org, February 20, 2019. https://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/02/jaysh-al-ummah-in-gaza-exclusive-interview

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Alvi, Hayat. 2020. “Musical Criminology: A Comparative Analysis of Ji- hadist Nasheeds and Narco Corridos.“ Air University, June 9, 2020. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMEAA/Display/Arti- cle/2213615/musical-criminology-a-comparative-analysis-of-jihadist- nasheeds-and-narco-corri/

IFMAT. 2019. “Harakat Al Sabireen.“ Ifmat.org, September 18, 2019. https://www.ifmat.org/09/18/harakat-al-sabireen/#page

Iran Focus. 2018. “U.S. Announces New Sanctions Against Iran Terror Cell.“ Iranfocus.com, February 1, 2018. https://www.iranfocus.com/en/terrorism/32428-u-s-announces-new-sanctions-against- iran-terror-cell/

JVL – Jewish Virtual Library. 2020a. “Palestinian Terror Groups: Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).“ Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/popular-resistance-committees- prc

JVL - Jewish Virtual Library. 2020b. “Palestinian Terror Groups: Harakat al-Sabireen.“ Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/harakat-al-sabireen

Levin, Daniel. 2018. “Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.“ The Iran Primer, July 9, 2018. https://iranpri- mer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/09/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad

Melamed, Avi. 2016. “Intelligence Report: Harakat as-Sabeeren Nasran li-Filastin in the Gaza Strip.“ Avimelamed.com, July 1, 2016. https://www.avimelamed.com/2016/07/01/intelligence-report-harakat-as-sabeeren-nasran-li-filastin-in-the-gaza-strip/

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Moubayed, Sami. 2019. “The Surge of Salafism in Gaza.“ European Eye on Radicalization, November 4, 2019. https://eeradicalization.com/the- surge-of-salafism-in-gaza/

Ngo-monitor.org. 2020. “Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC).“ Ngo-monitor.org, October 18, 2020. https://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/palestinian-popular-struggle-coordination-committee- pscc/

Paraszczuk, Joanna. 2015. “As Tensions Rise, Pro-IS Group In Gaza Com- plains Hamas 'Worse Than Israel'.“ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 5, 2015. https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-group-in-gaza-says-hamas-worse-than-israel/26995991.html

Shafei, Fadi. 2016. “What is Harakat al-Sabireen and why is Hamas trying to block their expansion?“ Marsad Palestine, March 18, 2016. https://www.marsad.ps/en/2016/03/18/what-is-harakat-al-sabireen- and-why-is-hamas-trying-to-block-their-expansion/

Smolar, Piotr. 2015. “ISIS And Corruption Undermine Hamas Rule In Gaza.“ Worldcrunch.com, 16 June 2015. https://worldcrunch.com/the- endless-war/isis-and-corruption-undermine-hamas-rule-in-gaza/hamas-palestinian-authority-reconciliation-isis/c22s19032#.VYhwal- VVhHx

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Videos

ICT - International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2018. “Counter Terrorism Today 13 12 18.“ YouTube.com, December 31, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYK34gc69kg

Personal Communication

Barak, Michael. 2021. Personal online interview.

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2021. Personal consultation via email.

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Sources of figures

Figure 1: Placement of ANSA arrangements according to the degree of trust and durability (Source: Idler 2012, 70) http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view- File/217/html/1454

Figure 2: Picture from one of the protests held by Salafists in Gaza in support of ISIS (Source: al-Tamimi 2014) https://i0.wp.com/www.joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/BqKT3VcCAAA3klH.jpg

Figure 3: Excerpt from a video from The Mujahideen of Gaza in the Is- lamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham, an ISIS group composed of fighters from Gaza (Source: al-Tamimi 2014b) https://i1.wp.com/www.joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/BjhaPf_CEAE2fL_.jpg

Figure 4: The primary logo of the organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021) https://hizb-ut-tahrir.info/

Figure 5: Banner available on the HuT website (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2017) http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/images/Cam- paign/2017/QUDS_Capital_Khilafah/Final_Logo_en_2-01.jpg

Figure 6: Screenshot from The Central Media Office of HuT encouraging the liberation of Jerusalem (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2017)

236 LIST OF TABLES http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/images/Cam- paign/2017/Free_Aqsa/2017_07_Aqsa_Banner_1_EN.jpg

Figure 7: One of the issues of Mukhtarat Magazine, a periodical of HuT (Source: hizb-ut-tahrir.info 2021b) http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/images/Magazine/Mukhtarat/Is- sue_53/Mukhtarat_EN_53_front_cover.PNG

Figure 8: Emblem of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (Source: Aurora 2019) https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5ce16c2ad20994000114b3ca/1559154816405- TH32D1RT37Z94ZTNLWMC/ke17ZwdGBToddI8pDm48kEpVg- ILAPna1wRh-xAJ9fRZw- zPPgdn4jUwVcJE1ZvWQUxwkmyExglNqGp0IvTJZUJFbgE- 7XRK3dMEBRBhUpwEv36x-EUL2-BSQ5feDhwGCbXuJBFqZ- erYzVouT8yOb9TwqchglLQOCYTRn7ZGxI/Al-Aqsa+Martyrs+Bri- gade.jpg?format=1000w

Figure 9: Propaganda banner from the AAMB website (Source: Nedal.net, 2020a) http://nedal.net/uploads/images/2020/08/LpW6r.jpeg

Figure 10: AAMB fighters on a propaganda video (Source: Nedal.net 2020b)

كتائب-االقصى-تجدد-العهد-والوفاء-لدماء-الشهداء-/http://nedal.net/video/596 بمناسبة-عيد-االضحي-المبارك

Figure 11: Emblem of the Hamas movement (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) https://jihadintel.meforum.org/pics/symbols/large/6.jpg

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Figure 12: Emblem of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) https://jihadintel.meforum.org/pics/symbols/large/3.jpg

Figure 13: Banner from al-Qassam Brigades website (Source: CEP 2020b, 8) https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/blog_im- ages/Qassam%20Brigades%20website.png

Figure 14: One of the banners of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Source: alqassam.ps 2020a) https://alqassam.ps/arabic/attachments/special_files/pictures/b7fe15d96cec63bdfa97664abe0f32d7.jpg

Figure 15: Propaganda of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades related to the COVID-19 pandemic (Source: alqassam.ps 2020b) https://alqassam.ps/arabic/attachments/al- bum/pics/2009/thumb_3975ca75b959e88260780410b2ce20ca.jpg

Figure 16: Emblem of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Source: cleanpng.com 2020) https://www.cleanpng.com/png-gaza-islamic-jihad-movement-in-palestine-jerusalem-1420409/

Figure 17: PIJ's promotional material shows "preparation for waging jihad" with pictured former PIJ leaders (Fathi Shaqaqi, Ramadan Shalah) and current leader (Ziyad al-Nakhalah) (Source: Saraya.ps 2020) https://saraya.ps/thumb/1170x450/uploads/images/76fca6512d24b1f22d7026d145f6a2b1.jpg

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Figure 18: Propagational material from the official AQB website (Source: Saraya.ps 2020) https://saraya.ps/thumb/570x230/uploads/images/7e2f421aee6621bb89fd93398024d809.jpg

Figure 19: Emblem of Popular Resistance Committees (Source: Qaweim.com 2020) https://qaweim.com/

Figure 20, 21: Emblem and the flag of al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades (Liwa al-Tawheed), (Source: ECFR 2020; Jihad Intel 2020) https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1_%D8 %B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9% 8A%D9%86-1-1024x0-c-default.jpg

Figure 22: The banner of the Popular Resistance Committees (Source: Azani et al. 2020, 7) https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2488/Identifying_Money_Trans- fers_and_Terror_Finance_Infrastructure#gsc.tab=0

Figure 23: PRC's promotional material for Eid al-Fitr (Festival of Break- ing the Fast) (Source: Qaweim.com 2020) https://qaweim.com/uploads/images/2018/11/40be5e662a5a57a4495693e5d8c0e50c.jpg

Figure 24: Emblem of Jaysh al-Islam (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) https://jihadintel.meforum.org/pics/symbols/large/270.jpg

Figure 25: An online magazine of the Army of Islam group called Nida al- Masra (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2018)

239 LIST OF TABLES https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/images/2018/05/nm2.jpg

Figure 26: Jaysh al-Islam fighters in a screenshot from the propaganda video (Source: al-Tamimi 2019a) http://www.aymennjawad.org/jawad/pics/large/2671.jpg

Figure 27: Emblem of the Jaysh al-Ummah (Source: Twitter 2020) https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_im- ages/469061293769375744/uMBTSTKw_400x400.png

Figure 28: Flag of the Jaysh al-Ummah (Source: ITIC 2019c, 6) https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Flag_of_Li- waa_al-Umma.svg

Figure 29, 30: The banners of Jaysh al-Ummah posted within the bitcoin campaign. The second depicts the leader of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri (Source: alraia.wordpress.com 2019; alraia.wordpress.com 2018) https://alraia.files.wordpress.com/2019/06/24.jpg?w=1024 https://alraia.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/11-1.jpg?w=1024

Figure 31: The flag of the Sabireen Movement (Source: YouTube.com 2020) https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCsPA1XSD0tsHFfXbKY6f_4A

Figure 32: Emblem of The Great Prophet’s Brigades, military wing of Sabireen Movement (Source: YouTube.com 2020) https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDQYjw-96nzRH6CyIQj7S9Q

Figure 33: Excerpt from The Great Prophet’s Brigades video demonstrating the strength of the Sabireen Movement military wing (Source: YouTube.com 2017)

240 LIST OF TABLES https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZLxiyxV1t4&feature=emb_title

Figure 34: One of the posts on the official Twitter account of the Sabireen Movement calling for the liberation of Palestine (Source: Twitter 2018) https://twitter.com/alsabireenpal/status/963032939998138371/photo/1

Figure 35: The flag of the Mujahideen Shura Council, the same one used by ISIS (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) https://jihadintel.meforum.org/pics/symbols/large/35.jpg

Figure 36: Title image of one of the MSC propaganda videos entitled "Journey of Martyrdom" (Source: Barnett 2013) https://www.longwarjournal.org/images/Hithem%20Ziad%20Ibra- him%20Masshal%20ITMC%20Poster%20-%20Jour- ney%20of%20Martyrdom.jpg

Figure 37: One of the MSC contributions on social networks soliciting bitcoin donation (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2015a) https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/images/2015/07/ITMC-Jahizuna.jpg

Figure 38: Screenshot from an MSC propaganda video calling for attacks on Israel (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2013) https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/images/2013/12/mscej121.jpg

Figure 39: One of the emblems used by the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade (Source: Jihad Intel 2020) https://jihadintel.meforum.org/pics/symbols/large/577.jpg

Figure 40: Excerpt from the SOHB video in which he reports responsibility for a missile attack in Israel (Source: Twitter 2015)

241 LIST OF TABLES https://twitter.com/Terror_Monitor/status/613545302356705280/photo/1

Figure 41: SOHB's extract from social media defending the missile attack of September 2015 (Source: SITE Intelligence Group 2015b) https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/images/2015/09/30-BattalionOmar- Rocket/1.jpg

Figure 42: The logo of the joint operations room of the Palestinian resistance movements (Source: ITIC, 2021a) https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2021/01/word-image-1610027226468.jpeg

Figure 43: Billboards in Gaza depicting Qassem Soleimani and the epitaph "the martyr of Jerusalem" (Source: ITIC, 2021b) https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2021/01/word-image-1610276581030.png

242 APPENDIX

Appendix

Comparison of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in basic facts

Source: AFPC – American Foreign Policy Council. 2020. “World Almanac of Is- lamism – Palestinian National Authority, Islamist Activity.” AFPC.org, December 4, 2020. https://almanac.afpc.org/uploads/documents/Palestinain%20Natio- nal%20Authority%202020%20Website_0.pdf

243 APPENDIX

Map of Israel and Palestine Controlled Areas

Source: Centanni, Evan and Koen Adams. 2020. “Israel / Palestine Map: Who Controls What in 2020?“ Political Geography Now, July 1, 2020. https://www.polgeonow.com/2020/07/israel-palestine-control-map-2020- west-bank-areas.html

244 APPENDIX

Interview Details

Introduction of the respondent

Dr. Michael Barak is a Senior Researcher and Project Manager at the In- ternational Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), part of the Interdisci- plinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel. His field of expertise includes Salafi and Sufi movements in the Arab states, religious polemics in modern Islam, history of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Global Jihad (see ICT website - https://www.ict.org.il/Worker.aspx?ID=18#gsc.tab=0).

Aims of the interview

• obtain current data that is not available from open sources • verify the findings obtained from the analysis

The course of the interview

The author conducted a semi-structured interview, in which he had pre- prepared questions and additional questions that he asked during the interview. The author first sent a pre-prepared set of questions to the respondent to get acquainted with them.

The interview took the form of an online meeting on the Zoom platform in January 2021 and lasted about one hour. The interview consisted of 12 pre-prepared questions and several supplementary questions. The author showed questions through a shared screen for better convenience. During the interview, no audio recording was made at the respondent's request, so the author took written notes.

Transcript of the interview

Since the respondent disagreed with the publication of his answers, the following transcript is given only with the questions.

245 APPENDIX

1) How do you perceive the current development of radical Islamism in the Palestinian territories? What are the differences / similarities between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

2) Who are the main actors of the radical scene in the Gaza Strip and what is their position?

3) Which groups have the potential to be a security threat to the government of Hamas, or even Israel? Do you think that the relatively new Salafi jihadist groups are a security challenge for Hamas, or rather an ideological threat?

4) In terms of Islamist ideology, which groups can be considered the most radical? Are they the ones who adopt the ideology of ISIS or al-Qaeda?

5) How much influence does the ongoing insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula have on the development of radical Islamism in Gaza?

6) What are the relations between the various actors of radical Islamism in Gaza?

7) What future development do you predict? Will the current trends of the almost unlimited Hamas government in Gaza continue, or will there be any dramatic changes?

8) Who are the main actors of the radical scene in the West Bank and what is their position?

9) Is it possible to characterize the relations between these actors in any way?

10) What is the reason for the smaller number of actors in the West Bank compared to Gaza? Is it a consequence of tight security maintenance by Israel and the PA?

246 APPENDIX

11) To what extent is the "level" of radical Islamism influenced by external factors, such as the Syrian war, Palestinian refugee camps, foreign fighters of terrorist organizations?

12) What development do you predict in the West Bank in the future? Will the current situation continue, or do you see any indications of changes, such as new emerging actors?

247