The Failure of Salafi-Jihadi Insurgent Movements in the Levant

september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9

From the LJ to the TTP The Failure of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist plots in the Levant, it does not Today, the LJ is still involved in terrorist appear responsible or interested in the attacks in Pakistan. Little is known Insurgent Movements in few Islamist insurgent movements that about the group’s current activities, and the Levant have arisen in the region.5 it is not completely clear how the two factions of the LJ—the Basra group and By Bilal Y. Saab This article assesses why the Levant the Qari Hayye group—have evolved. has been a less attractive place for Both factions likely still exist, although it is remarkable that the Levant, a global Salafi-jihadis and a more different leaders are in charge. The sub-region plagued by internal and challenging environment for them to Basra group, for example, is now part external crisis conditions that are mobilize and conduct operations. It of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and generally conducive to terrorism and attributes these failures to the existence contributes to its jihadist operations. LJ political violence, has been free from of well-established mainstream Islamic operatives probably help facilitate the any insurgent1 Islamist group with movements in the Levant that see the TTP’s terrorist acts in Punjab Province, verifiable material ties to al-Qaìda’s violent and extreme Salafi-jihadis where the LT/SSP has an established central leadership.2 The two ambitious as a threat to their interests; the base.22 attempts by Arab Salafi-jihadis to create distinct historical and socio-political insurgent forces in the Levant occurred circumstances in the Levant that make it In fact, a similar paradigm is now in Lebanon in May-September 2007 less hospitable to Salafi-jihadi ideology; occurring with the TTP. The Pakistani when Fatah al-Islam3 violently emerged the relative success of the region’s government blames the TTP for nearly in the northern part of the country, and security and intelligence services to every terrorist attack in Pakistan, some on August 15, 2009 in Gaza when Jund prevent the Salafi-jihadi threat from of which likely had little to do with the Ansar Allah4 declared war on Hamas. inflating; the subduing effect of Iran’s organization. Yet just like the LJ, it is These two attempts sought to radically dominant influence in the Levant; and easy to scapegoat the TTP rather than change the existing socio-political finally the lack of material support from reveal the true extent of jihadist violence orders in Lebanon and Gaza through the al-Qaìda’s central leadership to Salafi- in Pakistan and the many groups and use of religiously-inspired insurgent jihadi insurgent groups in the region. actors involved. violence. Both attempts failed, however. Although al-Qaìda has been tied to Al-Qaìda’s Lack of Allies in the Levant Arif Jamal is a visiting scholar at New York Other than Jund al-Sham6 and Fatah al- University and author of Shadow War: Islam (and the now crushed Jund Ansar The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. 1 The emphasis on the word “insurgent” is deliber- Allah), al-Qaìda does not have allies ate and used to differentiate from the word “terrorist.” in the Levant that could effectively While there are a number of analytical and practical dif- help project its influence and ideology ferences between an insurgent group (or insurgencies) into the region and to serve its various and a terrorist group (or cell), this article only focuses on strategic objectives.7 four: one, insurgent groups enjoy a certain level of support from a segment of society, whereas terrorist groups Jund al-Sham’s lack of organizational usually work alone and do not need indigenous sup- coherence, discipline, and fighting port; two, insurgent groups are usually bigger and bet- capabilities make it an unreliable partner ter armed than terrorist groups; three, insurgent groups for al-Qaìda in the Levant.8 Far from work overtly, whereas terrorist groups operate most effectively in a clandestine fashion; four, insurgent groups 5 No hard evidence on direct material ties between these find it essential to seize territory for the realization of two groups and al-Qaìda’s central leadership has ever their revolutionary objectives, while terrorist groups emerged, even though they appear to share the same generally do not. ideological agenda. 2 Very few comprehensive studies have been written on 6 Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islamic al-Qaìda’s presence and influence in the Levant. For a extremist entities, all or none of which may be connected. commendable paper on the subject, see Hassan Mneim- These entities mostly operate in Lebanon, Syria and Jor- neh, The Jihadist International: Al-Qaìda’s Advance in the dan, and their goals include the establishment of an Is- Levant (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti- lamic caliphate throughout the Levant. tute, April 8, 2009). 7 For instance, without the Taliban in Pakistan and 3 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group that Afghanistan or the Salafist Group for Preaching and is inspired by al-Qaìda’s ideology. Its members are Combat in Algeria, al-Qaìda would have found it ex- mostly Arabs from various Middle Eastern countries. It tremely difficult, if not impossible, to expand and oper- emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp ate in South Asia or the Maghreb. More examples where in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but al-Qaìda relied on local support to expand its influence include the establishment of an Islamic state in northern and pursue its goals in various regions around the world Lebanon. include al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Qaìda in Iraq, and the 4 Jund Ansar Allah was founded in southern Gaza in Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. November 2008 as an armed Sunni Islamist group with 8 There are three groups—Hizb al-Tahrir, Jaysh al-Is- 22 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Net- strong Salafi-jihadi credentials. Its goals include the es- lam, and Jaysh al-Umma—in the Palestinian Territories work,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). tablishment of an Islamic state in Gaza. that claim to be inspired by al-Qaìda’s ideology, but they

14 september 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 9 being an al-Qaìda “franchise” in the enter Ain al-Hilwah.11 In Syria, Jund al- the Salafist groups in the north, who Levant, Jund al-Sham is a title claimed Sham has been accused of perpetrating can be regarded as ideologically closer by several Sunni Islamic extremist a number of terrorist operations in the to al-Qaìda than other Islamic groups, entities, all or none of which may be country and of facilitating the stream have no ties to al-Qaìda and are largely connected. More like a movement, of Islamic fighters that reportedly non-militant and involved in preaching Jund al-Sham, whose alleged link to make their way to Iraq through Syrian activities. These Islamic entities and the late al-Qaìda in Iraq (AQI) leader territory.12 others such as the Lebanese Shià group Abu Musàb al-Zarqawi stems from Hizb Allah have made it more difficult reports that he had arranged training Fatah al-Islam’s crushing defeat for al-Qaìda to mobilize and create a for the group’s fighters at al-Qaìda and ultimate transformation from a solid base in Lebanon. camps in Afghanistan, has a presence centralized insurgent group to a loose in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps network of underground terrorist cells In Syria, the Syrian Muslim after the Nahr al-Bared battle with the Brotherhood, the biggest and most “Al-Qaìda’s ideology does Lebanese army in the summer of 2007 important Sunni Islamist group in the makes it an unreliable partner for al- country that is opposed to al-Qaìda’s not have a strong popular Qaìda. extremism, is seen by many Syrians following or support base as a safety valve against al-Qaìda’s Meanwhile, Usama bin Ladin and attempts to establish an insurgent in most of the Levant.” Ayman al-Zawahiri could not relish the presence in their country.15 In Jordan, news of the birth of Jund Ansar Allah the Salafists and Jabhat al-Amal Islami in Rafah in the Gaza Strip. As soon as (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood) are the group’s leader Shaykh Abdel Latif peaceful and denounce al-Qaìda. In the and in Syria (possibly in Jordan too).9 Moussa publicly declared an Islamic Levant, Islamic politics, like all politics, Jund al-Sham members have been emirate in Gaza, Hamas forces, who are local and are rarely connected to the described by terrorism analysts and have been officially in charge of the global Salafi-jihadi movement. Arab counterterrorism officials as Strip since the June 2007 coup against jihadist freelancers who are only tied the Palestinian Authority, confronted Al-Qaìda’s Ideology: Few Followers in the together by ideology and a desire to the newly-born Salafi-jihadi group and Levant violently defend a radical Islamic order. killed 22 of its members in a day-long Al-Qaìda’s ideology does not have a Many Islamic fighters tied to Jund al- gun and artillery battle.13 Hamas has strong popular following or support Sham in Lebanon merged with Fatah al- repeatedly fought al-Qaìda-inspired base in most of the Levant. This is in Islam during its rise and fall, while the entities in its bid to impose its influence part because of the region’s long history rest went into hiding and took refuge in and role over Palestinian society. of communal (Christian-Muslim and the Palestinian camp of Ain al-Hilwah.10 Sunni-Shià) co-existence and rejection Lebanese press reports indicate that In Lebanon, mainstream Sunni Islamist of takfiriyya (labeling a Muslim an one of the leaders of Jund al-Sham in groups such as Jamaà al-Islamiyya, infidel), which is a basic tenet of al- Lebanon, Shaykh Wissam Tahbish, Harkat al-Tawhid al-Islami, and Jabhat Qaìda’s ideology.16 was arrested on August 19, 2009 by al-Amal Islami do not support al- the Lebanese army as he was trying to Qaìda and its takfiri ideology.14 Even In Syria, while society has lately become more Islamic—as evidenced by 11 “Army Arrests Leading Jund al-Sham Member,” Na- the increased number of veiled women, have no direct ties to the terrorist organization and are harnet.com, August 19, 2009. skyrocketing mosque-construction, a too small and weak to be reliable partners. For more on 12 Al-Qaìda’s Syrian network is thought to have suf- thriving religious literature market, Fatah al-Islam and the story of its rise and fall, see Bilal fered a setback as the United States implemented a coun- significant growth in Islamic charity Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an terinsurgency program in Iraq in 2007 and executed a organizations and rising attendance Ambitious Jihadist Enterprise Went Awry,” The Brook- covert operation in Syria in 2008, which targeted and at informal home Qur’an classes— ings Institution and the Swedish National Defence Col- killed a senior member of al-Qaìda’s facilitation net- increasing religiosity in the country lege, November 28, 2007. For more on al-Qaìda in Leba- work. An estimated 120 foreign fighters a month are has not translated into a rise in takfiri 17 non, please see Bilal Y. Saab, “Al-Qaìda’s Presence and thought to have entered Iraq from Syria at its peak in ideology or Islamic militancy. In Influence in Lebanon,”CTC Sentinel 1:12 (2008). 2007. This number is now estimated to be in the single 9 For more on Jund al-Sham in Syria, see Chris Zambe- digits, but there is concern that the Syrian network is 15 The group, however, is banned by the Syrian regime. lis, “Violence in Syria Points to Radical Islamic Unrest,” being rejuvenated. For more on Islamic fighters mak- The only Islamist party that is able to publicly operate in- Terrorism Focus 3:23 (2006). On Jund al-Sham’s alleged ing their way to Iraq through Syrian territory, see Karen side Syria today is Hizb al-Tahrir, and it is largely moder- presence in Jordan, see Alon Ben-David, “Jordanian In- DeYoung, “Terrorist Traffic Via Syria Again Inching ate and non-violent. dictment Reveals Operations of Jund al Sham’s Terror Up,” Washington Post, May 11, 2009. 16 Another possible reason is the enduring spiritual and Network,” Jane’s Information Group, June 16, 2003. 13 Erin Cunningham, “Growing Threat to Hamas: Ga- cultural influence by the secular colonizing powers—the 10 To learn more about the support Fatah al-Islam re- zans Who Think it has Sold Out,” Christian Science Moni- Ottoman Empire in the past, and more recently France ceived from Jund al-Sham, please consult Bilal Y. Saab tor, August 17, 2009. and the United Kingdom—over the Levant. and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an Ambi- 14 For profiles of these groups, see Bilal Y. Saab and 17 For example, sermons delivered in Syrian mosques tious Jihadist Enterprise Went Awry,” The Brookings Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of have largely been moderate in tone and substance. No Institution and the Swedish National Defence College, Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 frequent use of takfiri language or sign of widespread ad- November 28, 2007. (2007). vocacy for militant Islam has been reported in any Syrian

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Lebanon, despite years of sectarian and Successful Hard Measures Against al-Qaìda In the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian religious conflict most recently marked Security and intelligence forces in and Israeli security and intelligence by Sunni-Shià tensions in the aftermath the Levant have used hard measures services share the concern of al-Qaìda of the 2003 Iraq War and several internal reasonably well to combat the threat of penetrating the Palestinian Territories, political crises, al-Qaìda’s ideology al-Qaìda-inspired tactics. In Lebanon, and it is possible that they have at times has not found a home. In the summer of these services and the army have cooperated in combating the Salafi- 2007, the Lebanese were shocked by the been able to crush two Salafi-jihadi jihadi threat, although there is no hard images of the Lebanese army fighting insurgencies during the past nine years evidence of this. Fatah al-Islam near Tripoli. Perhaps and break a number of terrorist cells the strongest evidence of the lack of across the country. This is a result of Iran’s Influence over the Levant popularity of al-Qaìda’s ideology within an offensive plan that has been recently Iran’s overall influence in the Levant Lebanese Sunni Muslim society was the coordinated with the Internal Security is significant and dominant in some unwillingness of all Lebanese Sunni Forces (ISF).21 areas such as Lebanon (through Hizb Islamist groups to heed Fatah al-Islam’s Allah) and the Palestinian Territories appeal and calls for help throughout its In Syria, the regime’s notorious (through Hamas and Palestinian Islamic battle with the Lebanese army. Even the intelligence services have been able Jihad). This hampers al-Qaìda’s relatively more radical Asbat al-Ansar, to ensure security and stability in ability to mobilize in that region. the Qarun group, the Arqoub group, the country.22 For now, the Syrian Given the adversarial and often hostile and the Majdal Anjar group remained government has largely relied on brute fairly silent and distanced themselves force to crush any al-Qaìda-linked “The relative decline of from the battle.18 terrorist threat. The regime, however, seems to be investing in a longer al-Qaìda in Iraq following In Jordan, the majority of the civilian term strategy by promoting moderate the success of the U.S. population considers al-Qaìda a Islamic voices through regime-friendly terrorist organization, as opposed to a clerics such as the moderate Grand counterinsurgency effort “legitimate resistance organization,” Mufti Ahmad Badreddine Hassoun and has presumably started a according to a study published by figures such as Mohammed Habash, the the University of Jordan’s Center for director of the Islamic Studies Center decentralization process Strategic Studies.19 The increasingly and grandson-in-law of the long serving for the group.” negative perception of al-Qaìda by mufti of Damascus, Ahmad Kaftaro. Jordanians and other Arab societies alike speaks to one of al-Qaìda’s biggest In Jordan, its Western-trained weaknesses: its use of violence against intelligence services and special operations relationship between Iran and al- innocent civilians in pursuit of its unit (known as the Knights of Truth) are one Qaìda (al-Qaìda considers the Iranian goals. In recent years, there have been of the most disciplined and effective in the regime as “apostate” and Shià Muslims mass demonstrations in Jordan against region. Jordanian security forces foiled in general as rawafidh, or “traitors”), al-Qaìda following terrorist attacks two Salafi-jihadi attacks in 2003, eight the latter actively works on preventing such as the November 9, 2005 Amman in 2004 and 10 in 2005.23 the former from expanding in its hotel bombings. Even Abu Muhammad own sphere of influence.24 This effort al-Maqdisi, a leading Jordanian militant 21 For more on the Lebanese military intelligence ser- usually takes the form of projection of ideologue, censured al-Qaìda for its vices’ efforts at combating al-Qaìda-like entities in Shià values and norms onto the Levant 20 acts of indiscriminate violence. Lebanon, see Saab, “Al-Qaìda’s Presence and Influence (a process that started with the Islamic in Lebanon.” revolution) and financial and technical 22 Several al-Qaìda-style failed terrorist operations have assistance to allies in their fight against been carried out in Syria since the outbreak of the 2003 al-Qaìda. mosques, at least those located in Damascus. Iraq War. The most prominent took place in April 2004, 18 For profiles of these groups, please see Saab and Ran- when armed assailants raided an abandoned UN build- storp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Salafist Ji- ing in the residential Mezzeh neighborhood of Damas- hadism.” cus, killing a policeman and a bystander. In July 2005, 19 Alia Shukri Hamzeh, “Majority of Jordanians View a group of terrorists were apprehended after a shooting al-Qaìda as Terrorist Group,” Jordan Times, January 5, on Mount Qassioun, which overlooks the Syrian capital. cial operations unit, August 21, 2009. There have been 2005. Earlier that summer, Syrian authorities announced that recent suspicions by the Jordanian intelligence services 20 Al-Maqdisi’s criticism of AQI’s conduct in Iraq was they had arrested one man and killed another who had that Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami was forming a militant fac- articulated in several articles and in an interview with been planning an attack in Damascus on behalf of Jund tion. The group denies the accusations and insists it is al-Jazira. See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi; al-Sham, an al-Qaìda-affiliated group. In June 2006, only interested in peaceful political activism. munasaha wa munasara: amal wa alam,” Minbar al- Syrian security clashed with al-Qaìda-linked terrorists 24 There is no consensus among terrorism analysts over Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, August 2004. For more details, see who, according to the Syrian Ministry of Information, the nature of the relationship (or lack thereof) between Anouar Boukhars, “The Challenge of Terrorism and were planning to execute terrorist operations in Um- al-Qaìda and Iran. Some argue that the two often coop- Religious Extremism in Jordan,” Strategic Insights 5:4 ayyad Square and other important civilian and military erate for the purpose of defeating common enemies (in (2006); Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Muta- spots in the country. The Syrian police managed to kill this case the United States), while others claim that reli- tion: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” Current Trends in Isla- four militants, wound two and arrest four. gious, political and even strategic considerations prevent mist Ideology 2 (2005). 23 Personal interview, senior member of Jordan’s spe- the two from forming any serious partnerships.

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Al-Qaìda Unclear About the Levant strategically located precisely in Indeed, material links between Salafi- In their statements and writings, al- that region. Any attack here would jihadi cells and al-Qaìda’s central Qaìda’s senior leaders have often damage the Crusaders many times leadership have been reported in called for the destruction of Israel and more than attacks elsewhere.29 Lebanon. For example, in June 2009 the liberation of Jerusalem. Rarely, a cell of four people (one Kuwaiti, one however, have Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, or Abu Musàb al-Zarqawi is also Syrian, one Lebanese, and one Tajik) other senior leaders addressed in detail suspected of having a strategic plan that with verifiable ties to al-Qaìda in the value of the Levant from either an included the Levant. His organization, Afghanistan was apprehended by the operational or strategic perspective.25 for example, perpetrated terrorist Lebanese military intelligence services.33 There are, however, some cases where attacks in Amman in 2005 and sent In July 2007, 10 men allegedly linked to Salafi-jihadi ideologues mentioned the many fighters to Fatah al-Islam in al-Qaìda were arrested and accused of Levant when highlighting al-Qaìda’s Lebanon in an effort to expand in the using a billboard advertising agency as “global strategy.” For example, Levant and destabilize the “apostate” cover to spy on the UN peacekeeping Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, regimes there.30 Finally, an allegedly force and the Lebanese army in allegedly one of al-Qaìda’s “strategic leading jihadist ideologue, known as preparation for an attack.34 brains,” wrote a document entitled “al- “the Spearhead of the Mujahidin,” Qaeda’s Strategy to the Year 2020,” claims that al-Qaìda is already well This worrying trend sheds light on the which indicated that al-Qaìda has a established in the Levant and is focused nature of al-Qaìda’s strategy toward master plan to pursue a long-term jihad on fighting Israel.31 the Levant. Instead of helping to create campaign of five distinct phases to rid overt insurgent movements in that the umma (global Islamic nation) of all These notable cases notwithstanding, region, al-Qaìda is likely focusing forms of oppression.26 The strategy’s there is no evidence that al-Qaìda’s on embedding terrorist sleeper cells third stage features the Levant where chief leader or his deputy have devoted that are in charge, with the help of al-Qaìda would militarily engage any substantial resources to the Levant. the franchise in Iraq, of planning and the United States in a long war of This leads one to assume that this sub- conducting terrorist operations against attrition.27 region, while important spiritually to al- Western and Israeli targets. Qaìda’s leaders because of Jerusalem, Moreover, the now-detained Abu is not currently as strategically or Bilal Y. Saab is a doctoral student at Musàb al-Suri, who some have labeled operationally critical as other regions the Department of Government and “the architect of the new al-Qaìda” in the Middle East or South Asia. Politics at the University of Maryland after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and a Counterterrorism and Middle East sharply disagreed with Bin Ladin Conclusion consultant for Centra Technology Inc. and attached more significance to the While Levantine societies have had and Oxford Analytica. Previously, he was Levant than the al-Qaìda chief or his success and luck in battling overt Salafi- a Research Analyst at the Saban Center deputy.28 In his lectures, al-Suri placed jihadi insurgencies and preventing them for Middle East Policy at The Brookings enormous emphasis on the strategic from developing in their region, they Institution. This article is inspired by a impact of striking Jewish, American, have had to face challenges in a much speech delivered by the author at the 2009 and Western interests in the heart of more demanding category: combating International Terrorism and Intelligence the Arab world: the Arab Peninsula and the threat of underground terrorist (ITI) conference in Washington, D.C. the Levant. According to one analyst cells, which seem to be proliferating in who has closely studied al-Suri, the Levant. The relative decline of al- Qaìda in Iraq following the success of in his mind, the “new Crusader the U.S. counterinsurgency effort has imperialism” aimed to take presumably started a decentralization control of the oil resources and the process for the group. Many of its holy places, both of which were members have fled Iraq to neighboring countries such as Syria, Jordan and 25 It is worth recalling that during and after the battle Lebanon. In these countries, they have of Nahr al-Bared in Lebanon in the summer of 2007, worked on creating terrorist cells to 32 Ayman al-Zawahiri was severely criticized online by al- attack Western targets and Israel. Qaìda sympathizers for not publicly supporting Fatah al-Islam in its fight against the Lebanese army. Even Bin Ladin did not issue a statement praising Fatah al-Islam 29 Brynjar Lia, “Dissidents in al-Qaida: Abu Mus’ab al and claimed rocket attacks from southern Lebanon by name. Suri’s Critique of bin Ladin and the Salafi Jihadi Current,” against Israel. See Patrick Galey, “Al-Qaeda Claims 26 Stephen Ulph, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategy Until 2020,” Ter- Lecture at Princeton University, December 3, 2007. Rocket Attacks Against Israel,” Daily Star [Beirut], July rorism Focus 2:6 (2005). It is not clear at what stage al- 30 See Saab and Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the 27, 2009; Yaakoz Katz, “Al-Qaeda Suspected in Attack Qaìda considers itself in today. Threat of Salafist Jihadism.” that Killed 5 UN Troops,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. 27 Ibid. 31 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Qaeda Ideologue De- 33 Hassan Oleik, “Al Iddi’a’ ala Mawkoufin min al- 28 For more on al-Suri’s life and influence, see Paul scribes Alleged Spread of Al-Qaeda in the Levant,” Ter- Qaìda Mourtabitin bi Afghanistan,” al-Akhbar, June 30, Cruickshank and Mohanad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab al rorism Monitor 7:7 (2009). 2009. Suri: Architect of the New Al-Qaìda,” Studies in Conflict 32 For example, al-Qaìda cells have attacked UNIFIL 34 “Lebanon: Ad Agency Served as Cover for Terror and Terrorism 30:1 (2007). (more specifically its Spanish contingent in June 2007) Plot, Reports Say,” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2009.