The Social Fitness of Insurgencies: the Organizational Payoff for Legitimated Power

The Social Fitness of Insurgencies: The Organizational Payoff for Legitimated Power

By Christopher P. Dallas-Feeney

B.S. in Business Administration, March 1977, Pennsylvania State University M.A. in Security Studies, May 2006, Georgetown University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 19, 2013

Dissertation directed by Nathan J. Brown Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University certifies that Christopher P. Dallas-Feeney has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of March 19, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

The Social Fitness of Insurgencies: the Organizational Payoff for Legitimated Power

Christopher P. Dallas-Feeney

Dissertation Research Committee:

Nathan J. Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

James Lebovic, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Holger Schmidt, Professorial Lecturer in the School of International Service, American University, Committee Member

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Dedication

I wish to dedicate this Dissertation to

my beloved father and mother, James A. and Margaret M. Feeney,

to my beloved and unconditionally loving wife, Susan,

and to my precious children, Juliette and Christopher.

Thank you for your love and patience. I could not have done this without you.

Dad, I wish you were here to celebrate with us but I am blessed to know you

your spirit is with us every day.

Acknowledgements

Many great scholars and friends have helped me in this demanding but so gratifying ‘journey of the mind.’ Thank you to all of my patient and thoughtful

Professors at George Washington University. Marty Finnemore, Susan Sell, and

Harvey Feigenbaum were not only outstanding professors of political science but also kind and enthusiastic supporters along the trail. Thanks to Deepa Ollapally for your willingness to support this old dog’s application to GWU. Erik Voeten, you helped me understand legitimation as a limit on power. Thank you to all of the kind and thoughtful scholars that set the foundation for me at Georgetown. Dan Byman, you are an incredible talent and a remarkably patient teacher. Your enduring support at the beginning and throughout this journey is remarkable. Thank you to

Bob Lieber and George Shambaugh for your counsel and scholarship. Thank you to the many kind scholars who never met me but cared enough to take my calls and share their expertise, especially John Horgan.

I want to especially thank my Committee. Fred, thank you for your willingness to provide your expertise to a stranger. Steve, thank you for your continual willingness to teach and counsel an old dog who wants to serve the war fighter. Jim, thank you for your willingness to patiently share your deep insights about international security as well as your pithy sense of humor. Holger, thank you for your expertise on civil war and ethnic conflict, your insights about rigor in social

science research, and your friendship. Finally, Nathan, thank you for your leadership, your commitment to great scholarship but most importantly driving me

(even now) to do outstanding scholarship. Your gentle but thoughtful and persistent guidance have built a stronger intellectual foundation in me.

Thanks to all of you for teaching an old dog new tricks.

Abstract of Dissertation

The Social Fitness of Insurgencies: The Organizational Payoff for Legitimated Power

An organization that seeks to transform persons, places or things needs resilience to achieve its goals. In their effort to transform their societies, political organizations compete “not just for resources and customers (followers), but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness”

(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Weber believed that ‘turning raw power into legitimate authority was the central dilemma of politics’ (Ikenberry 2001:17).

Political organizations that are transformation-seeking and also strategically use violence as part of their transformation missions – defined as insurgencies in this research - are arguably the most resource-intensive forms of non-state political organizations (Ashforth & Gibbs 1991; Weinstein 2007).

There is wide variation, however, in the resilience of these organizations

(Byman 2007 and 2006, Hoffman 2002). This dissertation will investigate the specific payoff to three insurgent organizations1 for their ‘social deposits’ to legitimate their power sufficiently prior to the shocks. The specific organizational payoff to be studied is the impact on the organization’s resilience. Goodwin &

Skocpal (1989) noted that the lifeblood of any insurgent organization “is the ongoing provision of such collective and selective goods (e.g., security, social aid),

1 Sinn Fein/Provisional IRA, Hamas and Hezbollah.

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not ideological conversion in the abstract, that has played the principal role in solidifying social support for guerilla armies.” This research will challenge that position in the sense that the provision of material payoffs is likely necessary but far from sufficient to produce organizational resilience.

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Table of Contents Dedication...... iv Acknowledgements...... v Table of Figures...... xv Table of Tables ...... xvii Chapter 1 – Theory and Approach ...... 1 Introduction ...... 1 Central Research Question and Primary Argument ...... 3 Critique of the Current Literature ...... 6 Social Movement Literature ...... 7 Organizational Power and Legitimacy Literature...... 8 Collective Action Literature...... 9 Organizational Theory Literature ...... 9 Culture and Identity Politics Literature ...... 10 The Civil War and Ethnic Violence Literature ...... 11 Key Concepts Used in the Research...... 13 Insurgency ...... 14 Legitimacy and Legitimated Power...... 15 Forms of Social Control...... 16 Legitimacy and the Link to Resilience...... 18 Gaining Empirical Traction on Legitimacy...... 20 Organizational Strength...... 25 Resilience and Shocks...... 25 Social Deposits ...... 27 Locating Social Deposits...... 30 Alternative Explanations of Resilience for Insurgencies...... 37 The ‘Conditions of Supply’ School...... 38 The ‘Levels of Demand’ School...... 44 Compelling Followers to Follow – Violence and Selective Incentives ...... 47 Other Considerations...... 51 Information Management...... 52 Professionalizing the Insurgency ...... 54 Case Approach ...... 56 Primary Hypotheses to Test ...... 58 Case Selection ...... 59 Theoretical Considerations...... 59 Practical Considerations...... 61 Cases Selected ...... 62

Final Case Selection Logic...... 64 Chapter 2 - Measurement Framework ...... 66 Locate the Anchor Point...... 66 Select Two Shock Events...... 67 Test for Organizational Resilience ...... 69 Tests of the State of Legitimation ...... 71 Audiences for Legitimating the Organization’s Power...... 72 Vision, Mission and Values ...... 74 Methods of Operations Lever...... 76 Outcomes Lever...... 81 Within-Case and Cross-Case Analysis...... 82 Chapter 3 – The Case of Sinn Fein and Provisional IRA ...... 84 Background and Introduction to the Case ...... 84 Events to Study...... 88 Specific Shocks to be Studied in the SF/PIRA Case...... 89 International and Regional Context for Events ...... 95 Loughghall, Eksund, Enniskillen & Gibraltar – 1987/1988 ...... 99 Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of SF/PIRA: 1986 - 1990...... 99 Political Strength ...... 99 Military Strength...... 102 Economic Strength...... 105 Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 1986 to 1990 ...... 108 Assessment of SF/PIRA’ State of Legitimation at the time of 1987/1988 Shock Sequence ...... 108 Methods Tests...... 108 Absence of Violent Coercion...... 109 Level of Autonomy from Sponsors...... 112 Level of Public Accountability...... 115 Level of Professionalism...... 120 Outcomes Tests...... 125 Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes ...... 125 Nature of Outcomes...... 128 Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (Cheap Talk) ...... 130 SF/PIRA’ Super Priorities ...... 130 Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’...... 131 McCartney Murder/National Bank Robbery - 2004/2005 ...... 132 Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of SF/PIRA – 2003 - 2007 ...... 132 Political Strength ...... 132 Military Strength...... 134 Economic Strength...... 135 Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2003 to 2007 ...... 136 Assessment of SF/PIRA’ State of Legitimation at the 2004/2005 Shock Sequence ...... 137 Methods Tests...... 137 Absence of Violent Coercion...... 137 Level of Autonomy from Sponsors...... 139 Level of Public Accountability...... 141 Level of Professionalism...... 145

Outcomes Tests...... 148 Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes ...... 148 Nature of Outcomes...... 152 Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (Cheap Talk) ...... 154 Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’...... 155 Summary Evaluation of Findings from SF/PIRA Case ...... 158 Change in Organizational Strength – Summary Assessment...... 158 States of Legitimation – Summary of Results...... 160 Plausibility of Primary Hypothesis ...... 161 Evaluation of Alternative Hypotheses – SF/PIRA ...... 162 Chapter 4 – The Case of Hamas ...... 170 Background and Introduction to the Case ...... 170 Events to Study...... 176 Specific Shocks to be Studied in the Hamas Case ...... 176 International and Regional Context for Events ...... 182 Hamas 2006 Electoral Victory...... 182 Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of Hamas: 2004 - 2007 ...... 182 Political Strength ...... 183 Military Strength...... 186 Economic Strength...... 192 Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2004 to 2007 ...... 196 Assessment of Hamas’ State of Legitimation at the time of 2006 Electoral Victory ...... 196 Methods Tests...... 197 Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV)...... 197 Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA)...... 200 Level of Public Accountability (LPA) ...... 204 Level of Professionalism (LPro)...... 209 Outcomes Tests...... 214 Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes ...... 215 Nature of Outcomes...... 218 Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (VMV – Cheap Talk) ...... 220 Hamas’ Super Priorities...... 220 Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’...... 222 2009 War With Israel...... 223 Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of Hamas: 2007 - 2010 ...... 223 Political Strength ...... 223 Military Strength...... 228 Economic Strength...... 231 Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2007 to 2010 ...... 235 Assessment of Hamas’ State of Legitimation at the 2009 War...... 236 Methods Tests...... 236 Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV)...... 236 Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA)...... 239 Level of Public Accountability (LPA) ...... 241 Level of Professionalism (LPro)...... 243 Outcomes Tests...... 247 Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes ...... 248

Nature of Outcomes...... 249 Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (Cheap Talk) ...... 251 Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’...... 251 Summary Evaluation of Findings from Hamas Case ...... 256 Change in Organizational Strength – Summary Assessment...... 256 States of Legitimation – Summary of Results...... 258 Assessment of the Primary Hypothesis ...... 258 Evaluation of Alternative Hypotheses - Hamas...... 260 Chapter 5 – The Case of Hezbollah...... 266 Background and Introduction to the Case ...... 266 Events to Study...... 272 Values Challenge – Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 ...... 273 Performance Challenge – War with Israel in 2006...... 276 International and Regional Context for Events...... 279 Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon – May 2000 ...... 281 Assessment of the Change in Organizational Strength of Hezbollah – 1998 to 2002 ...... 281 Political Strength ...... 282 Military Strength...... 291 Economic Strength...... 296 Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 1998 to 2002 ...... 298 Assessment of Hezbollah’s State of Legitimation in May 2000...... 299 Methods Tests...... 300 Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV)...... 300 Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA)...... 303 Level of Public Accountability (LPA) ...... 307 Level of Professionalism (LPro)...... 311 Outcomes Tests...... 318 Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes ...... 318 Nature of Outcomes...... 320 Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (Cheap Talk) ...... 321 Hezbollah’s Super Priorities ...... 322 Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’...... 322 War with Israel – July 2006...... 324 Assessment of the Change in Organizational Strength of Hezbollah – 2004 to 2008 ...... 324 Political Strength ...... 324 Military Strength...... 330 Economic Strength...... 334 Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2004 to 2008 ...... 337 Assessment of Hezbollah’s State of Legitimation in July 2006 ...... 337 Methods Tests...... 337 Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV)...... 338 Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA)...... 341 Level of Public Accountability (LPA) ...... 344 Level of Professionalism (LPro)...... 346 Outcomes Tests...... 350 Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes ...... 350

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Nature of Outcomes...... 352 Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (Cheap Talk) ...... 355 Hezbollah’s Super Priorities ...... 355 Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’...... 355 Summary Evaluation of Findings from Hezbollah Case...... 357 Change in Organizational Strength – Summary Assessment...... 357 States of Legitimation – Summary of Results...... 359 Evaluation of Alternative Hypotheses - Hezbollah ...... 361 Chapter 6 - Comparative Assessment of the Selected Cases ...... 368 Overall Inferences from Research...... 368 Low ‘Bar’ for Legitimation to Produce Resilience...... 369 Not All Organizational Resilience is Alike...... 371 Differing Legitimation Structures and Persistence...... 373 Impact of Shock Type on Legitimation Dynamics and Resilience...... 374 Specific Inferences ...... 375 Organizational Resilience ...... 375 Primacy of Political Resilience...... 376 Economic and Military Resilience ...... 377 The Dynamics of Legitimated Power and the Production of Organizational Resilience...... 379 Level of Public Accountability (LPA) ...... 380 Level of Cheap Talk (LCT)...... 383 Level of Professionalism (LPro)...... 383 Outcomes ...... 384 Tolerance for Dependent Relationships and Criminal Enterprise (LOA) ...... 387 Tolerance for Coercive Violence (AOV) ...... 389 Strategic Considerations and Future Research Paths...... 391 Overall Considerations and Research Paths...... 391 Considerations and Research Paths Regarding Resilience ...... 394 Considerations and Research Paths Regarding Factors of Legitimation ...... 396 Chapter 7 – Summary Perspectives...... 399 To Legitimate or Not to Legitimate? ...... 399 Competitors - Their Resilience and Legitimation...... 400 Strategic Choices...... 402 Payoffs for Legitimating Power – Competitor Comparison ...... 404 Legitimation for Whom? ...... 404 What Matters to Followers and Sympathizers ...... 405 What Matters To Sponsors...... 407 What Matters to Alliance Partners ...... 409 Potential Crosscutting Interests...... 410 Plausibility of Alternative Hypothesis and Implications for Future Research...... 413 Impact on Future Research Designs - Alternative Hypotheses...... 414 Preliminary Conclusions about the Overall Explanatory Power of Social Fitness Theory...... 415 Strengths ...... 415 Limits ...... 416 Potential Policy Implications of This Research...... 418 Bibliography...... 420

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Appendices ...... 464 Appendix A: Sinn Fein/PIRA Case – Various Election Results...... 464 Appendix B – Sinn Fein/PIRA Case – Analysis of Combatant Casualties...... 468 Appendix C: Hezbollah Operations: 2004 - 2008...... 470

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Table of Figures

Figure 1 - Beetham's Conception of the Stages of Legitimation ...... 24

Figure 2 - Macro Goals and Action Levers...... 30 Figure 3 - Pool of Candidate Cases...... 62

Figure 4 - Selected Cases...... 63 Figure 5 - Case Evaluation Process...... 66

Figure 6 - Scheme for Framing a Shock...... 68 Figure 7 - Political Strength Evidence Considerations ...... 70

Figure 8 - Military Strength Evidence Considerations...... 70

Figure 9 - Economic Strength Evidence Considerations...... 70 Figure 10 - Scope of Audiences for Legitimation ...... 73

Figure 11 - Methods of Operations Tests...... 76 Figure 12 - Absence of Violence Test...... 77

Figure 13 - Level of Autonomy Tests...... 78 Figure 14 - Level of Public Accountability Test ...... 79

Figure 15 - Level of Professionalism Test ...... 80

Figure 16 - Outcomes Tests...... 81 Figure 17 - International and Regional Context: SF PIRA ...... 96

Figure 18 - SF PIRA Change in Organizational Strength - All Shocks ...... 158 Figure 19 - SF PIRA Legitimation Structures - All Shocks...... 162

Figure 20 - International & Regional Context - Hamas...... 182 Figure 21 - Hamas: Change in Organizational Strength (All Shocks) ...... 257

Figure 22 - Hamas: Legitimation Structures (All Shocks)...... 259

Figure 23 - International and Regional Context - Hezbollah...... 280 Figure 24 - Hezbollah Change in Organizational Strength (All Shocks)...... 358

Figure 25 - Hezbollah Legitimation Structures (All Shocks)...... 361

Figure 26 – Overall Inferences from Research...... 369 Figure 27 - Specific Inferences: Resilience...... 376

Figure 28 - Findings: Indicators of Legitimation...... 379 Figure 29 - Overall Implications & Future Research Pathways...... 392

Figure 30 - Implications and Future Research Pathways: Resilience...... 395 Figure 31 - Implications for Future Research: Indicators of Legitimation ...... 396

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Table of Tables

Table 1 - SF PIRA Political Strength Evidence: 1986-1990...... 99

Table 2 - SF PIRA Military Strength Evidence: 1986 - 1990...... 102 Table 3 - SF PIRA Economic Strength Evidence: 1986 - 1990...... 105

Table 4 - SF PIRA AOV Test Results (Shock 1) ...... 109

Table 5 - SF PIRA LOA Test Results (Shock 1)...... 112 Table 6 – SF PIRA LPA Test Results (Shock 1) ...... 115

Table 7 - SF PIRA LPro Test Results (Shock 1)...... 120 Table 8 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 1) ...... 126

Table 9 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 1)...... 128 Table 10 - SF PIRA Political Strength Evidence 2003-2007...... 132

Table 11 - SF PIRA Military Strength Evidence 2003-2007 ...... 134

Table 12 - SF PIRA Economic Strength Evidence 2003-2007...... 135 Table 13 - SF PIRA AOV Test Results (Shock 2)...... 137

Table 14 - SF PIRA LOA Test Results (Shock 2)...... 139 Table 15 - SF PIRA LPA Test Results (Shock 2) ...... 141

Table 16 - SF PIRA LPro Test Results (Shock 2)...... 145 Table 17 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 2)...... 148

Table 18 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 2)...... 152

Table 19 - Hamas Political Strength Evidence: 2004 - 2007...... 183 Table 20 - Hamas Military Strength Evidence: 2003-2007 ...... 186

Table 21 - Hamas Economic Strength: 2003-2007...... 192 Table 22 - Hamas AOV Test Results (Shock 1)...... 197

Table 23 - Hamas LOA Test Results (Shock 1) ...... 200 Table 24 - Hamas LPA Test Results (Shock 1)...... 205

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Table 25 - Hamas LPro Test Results (Shock 1) ...... 209

Table 26 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 1)...... 215 Table 27 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 1) ...... 218

Table 28 - Hamas Political Strength Evidence: 2007-2010...... 223 Table 29 - Hamas Military Strength Evidence: 2007-2010 ...... 228

Table 30 - Hamas Economic Strength Evidence: 2007-2010...... 231 Table 31 - Hamas AOV Test Results (Shock 2)...... 236

Table 32 - Hamas LOA Test Results (Shock 2) ...... 239

Table 33 - Hamas LPA Test Results (Shock 2)...... 241 Table 34 - Hamas LPro Test Results (Shock 2) ...... 243

Table 35 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 2)...... 248 Table 36 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 2) ...... 249

Table 37 - Hezbollah Political Strength Evidence: 1998-2002 ...... 282 Table 38 - Hezbollah Military Strength Evidence: 1998-2002...... 291

Table 39 - Hezbollah Economic Strength Evidence: 1998-2002...... 296

Table 40 - Hezbollah AOV Test Results (Shock 1) ...... 300 Table 41 - Hezbollah LOA Test Results (Shock 1)...... 303

Table 42 - Hezbollah LPA Test Results (Shock 1)...... 307 Table 43 - Hezbollah LPro Test Results (Shock 1)...... 311

Table 44 - Hezbollah Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 1) ...... 318 Table 45 - Hezbollah Outcomes Tests Results (Nature) (Shock 1) ...... 320

Table 46 - Hezbollah Political Strength Evidence: 2004-2008 ...... 324

Table 47 - Hezbollah Military Strength Evidence: 2004-2008...... 330 Table 48 - Hezbollah Economic Strength Evidence: 2004-2008...... 334

Table 49 - Hezbollah AOV Test Results (Shock 2) ...... 338 Table 50 - Hezbollah LOA Test Results (Shock 2)...... 341

Table 51 - Hezbollah LPA Test Results (Shock 2)...... 344

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Table 52 - Hezbollah LPro Test Results (Shock 2)...... 346

Table 53 - Hezbollah Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 2) ...... 350 Table 54 - Hezbollah Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 2) ...... 352

Table 55 - Competitors: Their Resilience and Legitimation...... 400 Table 56 - Summary of Relative Strength of Alternative Hypotheses...... 414

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Chapter 1 – Theory and Approach

Introduction An organization that seeks to transform persons, places or things needs resilience to achieve its goals. To transform is not to reform but to revolutionize – to seek out the cleavages in the society that enable the movement to drive its political agenda (Huntington 1968). Transformations can be disruptive even if the outcome of that disruption remains inconclusive for decades. Organizations that seek to transform need to be resilient to be able to have any real hope of succeeding in their mission and, specifically, to overcome the counter-revolutionary forces that will repeatedly rise up against them.

In their effort to transform their societies, political organizations compete

“not just for resources and customers (followers), but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio and Powell

1991). The resilience of a political organization is produced by its ability to legitimate its power to an increasingly greater proportion of the society2 that it seeks to transform to be aligned with its goals as well as the sponsors3 that it needs for economic, political and military support. The legitimation of its power

2 Immediate followers, sympathizers and potential alliance partners are the immediate focus of legitimation efforts within this notion of society. Rivals and state opponents are also the subject of legitimation efforts but only indirectly. 3 Sponsors are most likely to be states, other non-state actors and/or wealthy individuals domestically or in the diaspora.

constitutes a self-imposed limit on the organization’s power in exchange with followers, sympathizers and sponsors and alliance partners for their inputs to the organization’s greater resilience (Beetham 1991, Hurd 2007, Voeten 2005).

Resilience enables the organization to recover its organizational strength in a timely and efficient manner once it has been degraded by a major shock. Weber believed that ‘turning raw power into legitimate authority was the central dilemma of politics’.4

Political organizations that are transformation-seeking and also strategically use violence5 as part of their transformation missions – defined as insurgencies6 in this research - are arguably the most resource-intensive forms of non-state political organizations (Ashforth & Gibbs 1991; Weinstein 2007). Furthermore, given their choice of violent means, many of these groups are often subject to overwhelming repressive force by the state and its allies in order to exterminate or severely degrade the organization. Relative to other non-state political organizations, these insurgent7 organizations (transformative, dissident and strategically violent) are arguably in the greatest need of resilience to succeed in their mission.

4 As quoted in Ikenberry’s After Victory (2001:17). 5 Violence can be in the form of terrorism, guerilla warfare and/or insurgency. See below for a more specific discussion about the nature and tactical role of violence as it is used in this research. 6 See below for a more detailed definition of the use of the term ‘insurgency’ in this research. 7 See below for a discussion of the use of the term ‘insurgency’ in this research.

Since the end of World War II, over 850 different non-state political groups globally have used violence in the hope of achieving some political goal8 that they thought was worthy of the use of violent means. Not all strategically choose to legitimate their power. Not all are able to legitimate their power. There is wide variation, however, in the resilience of these organizations. Most disappear from the political landscape within months of their inception (Byman 2007 and 2006,

Hoffman 2002).

Central Research Question and Primary Argument This research is designed to address the following fundamental question about the nature of organizations:

• Why are some organizations more resilient than others?

As discussed below and in more detail later in this chapter, this very broad question will be more narrowly scoped to certain insurgencies in order to operationalize this initial iteration of the research. The underlying question for this research, however, has implications for and relevance to a variety of complex organizations at all stages of their life cycle.

The primary argument that this research seeks to make is that organizations need to legitimate their power (i.e., be socially fit) in order to produce greater resilience. The primary alternative approaches to producing organizational resilience that are based on coercion or fragile contracts of mutual self-interest are

8 START website: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/ last accessed May 5, 2009.

inadequate to explain variations in the resilience of complex organizations.

Legitimated power is a form of authority that more efficiently enables the organization to control its supporters since the followers and sponsors commitment is based on their belief that they ought to follow or sponsor the organization versus that they are coerced to do so or it is for purely instrumental reasons based on short-term self interest. When power is legitimated, followers are willing to defer certain payoffs and are more motivated to act on behalf of the movement without coercion. Following on from that basic premise, to legitimate their power, organizations need to make the right social deposits at the right time in order to bind their followers and sponsors to them so that they can recover from shocks in a timely and efficient manner. The social deposits act to deepen the social roots of the organization and enhance or establish a dense social network that can be used to build trust within the organization and between its network of followers, sympathizers and sponsors.

The trust that is built is based on three key groups of strategies that the organization uses to legitimate its power: 1.) the authenticity, coherence and relative importance of what the organization says about its vision, mission and values; 2.) the way the organization operates to achieve the vision, mission and values; and, 3.) the nature and type of outcomes that the organizations delivers to its followers and sponsors.

This research program will investigate the specific payoff to the organization for the ‘social deposits’9 to legitimate its power sufficiently prior to the shocks. The specific organizational payoff to be studied is the impact on the organization’s resilience – its ability to, and the means by which, it is able to restore all or part of its “pre-shock” organizational strength in a timely10 and efficient fashion. The external shocks that are most relevant to this research are those that would create reasonable doubt about the organization’s ability to deliver on the collective goods or selective incentives that Skocpal and Goodwin (1989) noted was the lifeblood of any insurgent organization. Skocpal noted that “ it is the ongoing provision of such collective and selective goods (e.g., security, social aid), not ideological conversion in the abstract, that has played the principal role in solidifying social support for guerilla armies” (Goodwin & Skocpal 1989).

This research will challenge this position in the sense that coercion or the provision of selective incentives is likely necessary but not sufficient to solidify organizational strength in its fullest sense11 and especially to recover organizational strength post-shock in a timely manner. As I will argue, due to stresses at various times in an organization’s life cycle (e.g., during growth or maturity when the group is prominent enough to be subject to harsh repression) organizations may be unable to provide historical levels of material goods yet followers and sponsors do not

9 See discussion below for definition of social deposits as used in this research. 10 Timeliness is tied to a two-year time horizon. This timeframe is simply a ‘stake in the ground’ for purposes of this initial research effort. Subsequent efforts will assess the sensitivity to shorter or longer time frames. 11 See the later discussion of the components of organizational strength and how they are operationalized for purposes of this research.

defect and in some cases may even increase the levels of key components of organizational strength. Is this due to additional selective payments or coercion made at, or soon after, the time of the shock? Or is this due to some other social deposits that were made sufficiently prior to the shock and which can be relied upon to bind the followers and sponsors to the organization during and following on from an organizational shock?

Building on a diverse set of theoretical and historical literature, this research argues that the organization whose power is legitimated through a series of social deposits over an extended period of time will be more resilient than those who do not make the relevant social deposits in a timely manner. In a very specific sense, if there are no social deposits, then there is less legitimacy and, therefore, less resilience. Deeply embedding the organization into the local society is critical to the ability of insurgencies to survive the perilous and numerous challenges that they often confront and to efficiently exercise the command of its constituents. In basic terms, when subject to major shocks, the insurgency that built its ‘house on a foundation of stone’ (i.e., legitimated its power through important social deposits made over time) will be able to recover its organizational strength quicker and more efficiently post-shock than those who built their ‘house on a foundation of sand’ (i.e., didn’t make the deposits at all or did not do so in a timely enough manner).

Critique of the Current Literature

Scholars have contributed to and built upon a diverse set of active research programs to gain insight to the phenomena of insurgencies and conflict studies in general. This research effort is situated at the intersection of six major research programs: a.) The Social Movement literature; b.) Organizational power and legitimacy literature; c.) The Collective Action research program; d.) Organizational

Theory literature from economists and sociologists; e.) The Civil War and Ethnic

Violence literature12; and, f.) Culture and Identity politics literature. While the lines have sometimes blurred between these programs at times they have all contributed in different ways to the theoretical understanding of organizational persistence and change, collective action dynamics, insurgency, rebellion and the logic of political violence in general.

Social Movement Literature The social movement literature (McAdam 1986, McAdam, McCarthy & Zald

1996, Gamson 1975, Tarrow 1998, 2005; TIlly, McAdam and Tarrow 2003; Snow,

Benford et al 1986) was leveraged by a variety of scholars to explain recruitment logic for various types of movements involved in contentious politics. Some scholars investigated its relevance specifically to Islamic groups and the political process used by Islamic groups in general to maneuver in the repressive or violent environments in which they operated (Bayat, Wiktorowicz). The Social Movement literature will be helpful in my research for understanding the role of political

12 For convenience I have also included a related body of literature, sometimes referred to as insurgency/counterinsurgency literature, under this caption. I have included writers such as Nagel, Galula, Taber, Hammes and Kilcullen in this category.

opportunity structures at inception of a movement and some of the logic for framing the rebellion for the masses. It will only partially help me explain (e.g., resource dependency aspects of the research program), however, the resilience of an insurgency for two major reasons: 1.) the organization is not the primary unit of analysis in most of the literature; and, 2.) it does not theorize the role of legitimacy or like-kind social phenomena that could explain organizational persistence or change.

Organizational Power and Legitimacy Literature The literature on the legitimation of organizational power and its impact on organizational change will provide a major theoretical backbone for this research effort (Beetham 1991, Suchman 1995, Hurd 2007, Dowling & Pfeffer 1975, Voeten

2005, Ellsbach & Sutton 1992, Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, Levi 2010, Pfeffer and

Salancik 1978, Clark 2007, Zelditch 1991). The insights from this body of literature that I will draw on include: the nature of legitimacy; empirically testing for its presence or absence; how power is limited vis a vis legitimation and how that ties to the theories of rational choice; and, legitimacy as a resource to be used by the leadership of the organization versus a social fact that acts as a constraint on organizational behavior. The literature that I have reviewed in this arena tends to focus on either individual firms in the context of business enterprises or international bodies such as the UN. The role of legitimated power and how it does or does not impact organizations – in particular, insurgencies - under stress or post shock has, to my knowledge, not been addressed empirically in the literature.

Collective Action Literature The collective action literature (Olson 1965, Lichbach 1998; Hardin 1982;

Coase 1937) is built on an economic view of the individual’s rational choice to participate in costly collective social action. This rich research program is rooted in individual rational choice theoretic models and, as noted widely in the literature, does not address the deeply embedded social sources of the preferences that potentially underlie the group decision-making models that are critical to my research. I hope to leverage the insights from this research program about the motivations for costly collective action, however, by combining them with the insights from those in sociology and organizational theory about the impact of deep social structures on collective choice making (see below).

Organizational Theory Literature There is a broad, rich and diverse body of literature that deals with the theory of organizations (North 1990, Coase 1937, Williamson 1985, Moe 1985,

Pierson 2000, Finnemore 1996; Finnemore & Barnett 1999; Granovetter 1985,

2005, 2007; Powell 2007; March & Olsen 1989; DiMaggio & Powell 1991, Meyer and

Rowan 1977, Jepperson 1991). The literature covers the basic questions of why organizations exist including the role of transaction costs as the basis for economic organization, the impact of social embeddedness on economic life, the role of norms to explain organizational change, the nature of organizational boundaries including the import of network structures in organizational dynamics, and the new institutionalism which incorporates the insights from sociology into the explanation for organizational change and reproduction. This literature also probes for the limits of the reach of rational organizational design. I will use the insights from this

research program regarding the role of economics and social forces as the basis for reducing transaction costs within and between complex organizations (e.g., the trust that is inherent in legitimated power), the causal force of rules, norms, myth and ceremony that are diffused via the culture in which the organization is deeply embedded, and the limits of the organization’s instrumental behavior on organization design and change. I will also draw on related scholars who study the impact of complexity in society and path dependency on organizational design and change (Jervis 1997, Jervis 1976, Axelrod 1997; Epstein 2006, Putnam 1993, Tetlock

2005) since I am specifically trying to assess the relevance and impact on the organization who seeks to facilitate its resilience at a later time when unforeseen shocks occur.

Culture and Identity Politics Literature Closely related to the organizational theorists are those scholars who study social capital, the nature of culture and its role in shaping - or being shaped by - the identity (and therefore, preferences) of individuals, groups, organizations and larger social entities (Putnam 1993, Lin 2001, Levi 1996, Weber 2002, Archer 1995, 1996,

Abdelal 2006, Sidanius et al 1991, Ross 1997, Tarrow 1996, Berman 1997, 2003,

Swidler 1986, Fearon and Wendt 2002, Fearon 2007, Reus-Smit 1999). Much of the scholarship here has been focused on the definition of these phenomena and how to gain both theoretical as well as empirical grasps of the causal power of these historically elusive phenomena. The conundrum of the causal roles of structure versus agency of the individual actor is often at the center of this research agenda. I plan to use this literature to help me understand how to unpack the causal power

regarding collective action of the social structures in which individuals operate (e.g., cultures, societies, institutions, confessions, clans, organizations) versus the agency of the individual actors involved (and the incentive structures that are related). In particular, Archer’s morphogenetic approach to the study of society will be helpful methodologically since this approach emphasizes ‘analytic dualism’ with respect to the study of social life and the role of structure versus agency.

The Civil War and Ethnic Violence Literature Students of civil war and ethnic conflict focus on why rebellion happens, its duration and why some forms can be so bloody and intractable. The traditional form of the research (Gurr 1970, Weinstein 2007, Berdal & Malone 2000; Goodwin and Skocpal

1989, Gates 2002, Collier & Hoeffler 2000; Sambanis 2006; Tilly 1985, Fearon &

Laitin 2000, 2003; Fearon 2004, 2007, Wood 2010, Byman 2006, 2008, Kilcullen

2009; Jones & Libicki 2008; Kalyvas 2003, 2006, 2008; Stern 2003; Cragin and Daly

2004, Weinstein 2007, di Figuueirdo & Weingast 1999; Snyder and Ballentine

1996). Most of this generation of the civil war literature focuses on the primacy of utilitarian arguments (coercive violence and/or selective incentives) or the conditions of supply (the ‘insurgency theory’) as the explanation for the onset/duration/termination of the conflict as well as the durability of the rebel organizations. As such it focuses on the broad social forces at work (demand

conditions or supply conditions) and less on the particular organizations per se13 or on individual choice theoretic cases such as ‘why followers follow’.

An emergent body of quantitative research on civil war, however, challenges many of these ‘utilitarian vs. ideational’ approaches to the study of civil war

(Cederman et al 2009, 2010; Wucherpfennig et al 2012). “Rather than continuing to debate whether or not ethnic diversity or polarization breeds conflict, quantitative researchers might want to try identifying those ethnic constellations of power that are particularly war prone” (Cederman et al 2010:114). This literature explores the impact of ethnopolitical configurations of power and the actions of the state on the motivations for rebels to rebel (a more nuanced set of insights on the longstanding grievance argument). This literature offers useful insights to the role of the state and the complex and interrelated nature of utilitarian arguments and ideational arguments with respect to the durability of rebel groups. Based on this research project, ethnicity does matter in the onset and duration of civil war conflict

(Cederman et al 2009, 2010, Wucherpfennig et al 2012). This new school of thought regarding the role of ethnicity in civil war challenges most of the prior explanations for the causes of onset and duration of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 2004;

Kalyvas 2006; Posen 1993). This scholarship incorporates the agency – and legitimacy - of the state and the non-state actors in its explanations. These scholars

13 The notable exception to this is Weinstein 2007. His work, however, tends to limit the impact of deep social structures to their role at the inception of the movement versus throughout its life or especially in the aftermath of external shocks. This contravenes the ontological, epistemological and analytical approach argued for by Archer in her social realist model (Archer 1995). See especially Chapter 7 in Weinstein on Resilience.

argue that “exclusionary policies enacted by the state are likely to influence the salience of ethnonationalist grievances. More specifically, exclusionary politics not only reveal state preferences that impact heavily on the ability and willingness of incumbent governments to accept settlements, but also lead members of ethnic groups that are systematically excluded from state power to develop stronger group solidarity and to become more cost tolerant. Such rebel organizations are therefore more likely to fight longer conflicts” (Wucherpfennig 2012: 111). The different configurations of power, ethnic cleavages and the relationships between the actors matter when trying to assess the relevance of ethnicity to civil war onset and duration. The state-induced policies of exclusion that delegitimate them in the eyes of the excluded groups (based on categorical differences with the ruling powers; i.e., ethnicity) induce the conflicts and contribute to their intractability. The excluded group wants to capture the state in order to address its material and ideational needs.

Key Concepts Used in the Research There are five key concepts that I will be using in this research that warrant a more detailed explanation at this stage:

• Insurgency

• Legitimacy and Legitimated Power

• Organizational Strength

• Resilience and Shocks

• Social Deposits

Each are defined for use in the research below. A more detailed discussion of how I have operationalized these concepts for use in this research is presented in

Chapter 2.

Insurgency14

As used in this research, insurgencies are non-state political actors who seek to transform their society politically in some significant manner15 and who also use violence strategically to achieve that political end. They may or may not choose to mobilize the masses to be an insurgency. For purposes of this research they may choose to remain a clandestine movement, apart from the people, that places little reliance on mass support. That is a strategic choice whose relative effectiveness will be evaluated in future iterations of this research project16.

The type of political violence that is included in this notion of insurgency is terrorism, guerilla war and formal military campaigns to defeat an enemy or defend against enemy actions via more organized military maneuvers. The nature of the violence is protracted and is conducted by politically partisan fighters who have a vested interest in the achievement of the political goals in play. The insurgency may

14 The definition of the term insurgency is fluid and has been used to describe violent political groups of a variety of political persuasions, different military methods and different philosophies about the importance of mass mobilization (Taber 1965, Mao Tse Tung 1961, Guevara 2007). 15 Examples include: eviction or destruction of a foreign occupier, establishment of a particular political philosophy (e.g., Islamic state, communism, nationalism), separation from the state, unification of the two states, and overthrow of the existing government. 16 Chapter 7 of this manuscript includes a summary of the future pathways for this research project.

or may not have legal or covert political parties in place that are used to politically mobilize the masses through propaganda, recruitment and international sponsorship. In all cases, the insurgency is designed to “weaken the existing government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area”.This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country” (Byman

2006). My use of the term insurgency also includes resistance organizations that do not position themselves as a usurper of the incumbent government but claim to exist to resist the military or political influence and incursions of foreign nations

(e.g., Hezbollah or Hamas vs. Israel and the United States).

Legitimacy and Legitimated Power

Legitimacy and the related processes of legitimation and delegitimation rose in importance in the post-Westphalian/post-divine-right monarch era as societies grappled with the underlying justification for who should govern and how those authorities should govern (Clark 2006; Zelditch 2001). Beetham (1991) talks of the distinct angle of pursuit that a social scientist takes to legitimacy and how it is different from the primarily legal or philosophical angles of pursuit: “A social scientific analysis of legitimacy is concerned with the effect it has on the character of a given relationship, and on the behavior of those involved in it. It is the importance

of legitimacy – its character and degree – to explaining people’s behavior that concerns the social scientist.”

Forms of Social Control Legitimacy is relevant to the political scientist since it is seen as one of three basic forms of social control17 (Hurd 2007; Zelditch 1991; Beetham 1991; Suchman

1995) and; therefore, a critical link to all forms of power – both interactive forms

(i.e., power to) and constitutive (i.e., power over) forms (Barnett and Duvall 2006).

At one end of the spectrum of social control is the logic of coercion. Social systems that rely heavily on coercion should evidence enormous resources dedicated to enforcement and surveillance (e.g., the Republican Guard and the Basij in modern Iran).

In the middle is the mechanism of selective incentives based on the self- interest of the individual actor. These social systems are characterized by the fundamental ‘consent to a contract’ that is modeled on the concept of a system of social exchanges that are based on specific, or immediate, reciprocity (Hurd 2007,

Keohane 1986). Self-interest explains the instrumental logic of the egoistic actor who is self-regarding – “what is in it for me – now – if I cooperate?” As Hurd

(2007:39) notes: “…a social system that relies primarily on self-interest will necessarily be thin and held together tenuously, and be apt to change drastically in

17 Wendt speaks to three different cultures of a society – Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian – that are a variation on this scheme (Wendt 1999).

response to the shifts in the structure of payoffs.” Interests are sources of motivation for an actor but can be significantly broader and time-phased than the concept of self-interest suggests. Hurd (2007) emphasizes rightly that there is no need to separate the premise of rational choice from the constructivist dimensions of legitimacy (Fearon & Wendt 2002). As Wendt (1999: 238-240) points out there is an important theoretical and practical significance to the difference between interest and self-interest. All actors have interests since interest is about motivation.

The distinction between interest and self-interest is important to the manner in which legitimacy is to be understood and the overall focus of this research.

At the other end of the spectrum of social control is legitimacy. Legitimacy is a form of relational logic by which the subordinate actor chooses to obey a dominant actor absent coercion or immediate payoffs for one’s self interest. In this research, Legitimacy is a source of an actor’s interests in the context of a social exchange where a common interest exists or is plausibly able to be developed. “A legitimate rule or institution [or organization] is one that has been internalized by the actor’s own sense of its interests and its identity (Hurd 2007:41).” When power is legitimated it acts as a constraint on the power of the dominant social actor and facilitates a “thick” trust-based social exchange between dominant and subordinate.

For purposes of this research I will use the following definition for the independent variable of legitimated (organizational) power:

“Power that provides the grounds for obedience on the part of the subordinate to it, because of the normative force that derives from rules, from the justificatory principles underlying those rules and from actors expressing consent.” (Beetham 1991: 101)… “Legitimacy is the generalized perception or assumption that actions of an

entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574)

This definition (particularly the Suchman component) brings in the role of history, the impact on the organization of the structural forces of society and its culture, the normative nature of the phenomenon and the agency of the organization. Another important aspect that this definition implies is that legitimacy once internalized by the actor has the power to change interests.

Although Legitimacy is an inherently normative concept as applied in this research, it is crucial to the operation of large-scale social mobilization whether for good purposes or bad (Hurd 2007:34). In contrast to the ‘conflict school of

Legitimacy’ such as Marx, Gramsci and Habermas (Zelditch 2001), I am using the independent variable of legitimacy as a subjective concept in this research – it is in the ‘eyes of the beholder’ (Hurd 2007; Sidanius et al 1991).

Legitimacy and the Link to Resilience Suchman (1995) makes an important distinction in his review of the legitimacy literature when he speaks to the purpose for which organizations seek to employ legitimacy. If an organization simply seeks to be undisturbed by other actors in its environment then that is a very different case than an organization that seeks broad-based active support to achieve its strategic, transformative goals. All things being equal, revisionist organizations are inherently more resource-intensive than organizations that aim to maintain the status quo. Applying the metaphor of

Schweller’s ‘animal farm’, insurgencies are more like wolves, foxes or jackals than the doves, owls or hawks (Schweller 1998). They are revisionist (whether limited or unlimited aims) in their interests. The legitimacy that insurgencies seek necessarily

has to be a more potent form since it will be relied on to overcome the ‘rebel’s dilemma’; i.e., the significant mobilization challenges that any violent and revisionist collective action entails (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1995). Insurgencies need to build and then take advantage of a potent form of legitimacy so they can multiply the effects of their generally limited material power vis a vis the social power that inheres to a legitimated organization.

Suchman (1995:574-575) points to Talcott Parsons when he notes that

“legitimacy leads to persistence because audiences are most likely to supply resources to organizations that appear desirable, proper or appropriate…legitimate organizations become almost self-replicating, requiring little on-going investment in collective mobilization. In essence, legitimacy flips the valence on the collective action problem18. Collaboration in support of institutionalized activities is built into the structure of everyday life.” Collier (2000 in Berdal and Malone) points out that the grievance form of the civil war argument is so implausible and unsupportable empirically because of the collective action problem19. He notes that few rebels conduct rebellion in a quixotic manner. He notes that it is only “social capital” that can help an organization overcome the triple threat of the collective action problem: the free rider, coordination (scale) and time-consistency (deferred payoffs). As I will discuss below in regards to alternative explanations for the resilience of

18 Emphasis is mine and is not in original. This is, of course, a reference to the work of Mancur Olson (1965) on the collective action problem. See also Jepperson (1991). 19 The Civil War literature is rife with economic arguments about the causes of civil war, its conduct and its duration. See a separate unpublished manuscript by C. P. Dallas-Feeney (2007) for a summary of that literature and its relevance to the recruitment for the insurgent organizations.

insurgencies, there are other rich bodies of literature that argue alternative logics that are less social and more economic in nature (e.g., warlordism).

Gaining Empirical Traction on Legitimacy Legitimacy is a nuanced and contested social phenomenon (Suchman 1995;

Clark 2006) that can take different forms even within the life cycle of one organization let alone a system of organizations in a society over decades or centuries. As an early student of organizational change and persistence wrote: “An input called ‘legitimacy’ is popular in sociological circles but highly resistant to empirical specification (Terreberry 1968).” Time has not healed this methodological gap. Legitimacy has been under study for over 2500 years (Zelditch 2001) and many theories of legitimacy have been put forward which has likely diluted the tractability of this otherwise important social phenomenon20. The analysis of social variables in general present challenges for the researcher (Berger & Luckman 1966), but legitimacy warrants an especially careful, contingent and patient research process to uncover its presence and its causal powers, if any (Hurd 2007, Suchman 1995,

Beetham 1991, Wendt 1992).

The study of the nature of and causal effects of legitimated power is complex and empirically understood in only a limited manner. While analysts may wish to untangle the social phenomenon of legitimacy from other more utilitarian explanations for social behavior, that approach maybe as impractical as it is uninteresting. In her study of the changing beliefs about state interventions,

20 See also Abdelal et al (2006) for a similar discussion of the complications with the related phenomenon of identity.

Finnermore (2004:16) states “…we as analysts, need to rethink the relationship between utility and legitimacy in political analysis. The vast majority of political science arguments about state (or political actor) behavior are utilitarian or functional in basic form…Perceptions of utility (of intervention) are tightly bound up with perceptions of their legitimacy. Separating the two or treating them as competing explanations is not only difficult but probably misguided, since it misses the potentially more interesting question of how the two are intertwined and interdependent.”

As you will see in this research, I will attempt to systematically look inside the structure of legitimation – the indicators and to what extent they individually or jointly contruct legitimated power. I will also attempt to evaluate the causal power of legitimated power as it relates to organizational resilience. The complexity and nuances of power legitimation warrant a patient and careful analysis to extract credible claims about its causal power and the conditions under which they operate.

I am mindful of this insight from Dostoyevsky:21 “Don’t let us forget that the causes of human actions are usually immeasurably more complex and varied than our subsequent explanations of them.” In practice you will see that legitimacy can change over time – an organization can have it and then lose it and get it again. The levels of legitimation needed for the establishment of legitimated power is likely more intensive and time consuming than its maintenance (Suchamn 1995). The organization might be established in a power regime that is more coercive or based

21 From his novel, The Idiot.

on self-interest and grow and mature under a power regime that is dominated more by the phenomenon of legitimacy (Hurd 2007). In the design of this research, legitimated power is still situated in the context of a social exchange between ruler and ruled. For the ruler’s limits on its power, the ruled will give its followership.

Legitimation is subjective and varies by audience. Sponsors have different interests relative to core followers and then again relative to alliance partners.

Interests matter in the understanding of legitimation but they matter in a collective sense – legitimated power as used in this research is about a collective’s perception of legitimacy versus an accumulation of individual perceptions. The causal power of legitimated power is also influenced by the actions of the state and the organization’s rivals. Context and history do matter even if it is not always clear the timing and nature of the effect of the state and rivals. For example, harsh indiscriminate violence by the state against the civilian population may enhance or diminish the perception of legitimation of an organization by a given audience – and in the case of followers, especially if it can protect that audience from the indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006, Wood 2010). The utilitarian and ideational elements of actor’s motivations are entangled and interdependent. What is interesting and important is how they interact and what are the most relevant indicators of legitimated power and the conditions under which those claims are stronger. The levers of power legitimation have historically been underspecified and, therefore, analysts have a limited understanding which individual indicators let alone the interactions of those indicators legitimate power and under what conditions do those indicator(s) operate.

In many respects, the old argument of ‘utilitarian explanations are necessary but not sufficient’ is not an appropriate way to set up the challenge in this research.

As Cederman et al (2009: 324) noted in their analysis of the impact of ethnicity on the causes and duration of civil war: “… ethnic politics simultaneously concerns material interests, such as access to government controlled jobs, services, and contracts; idealist motives, such as the recognition of one’s ethnic heritage by the state; and genuine political goals, such as access to state power. Because political domination by ethnic others also affects one’s economic, legal, and symbolic standing, it is pointless to try to disentangle these intertwined and mutually reinforcing motives” (Cederman et al 2009:324).

This research is designed to assess the relevance of a set of indicators of legitimated power on the production of organizational resilience for mature insurgencies in three different contexts that vary over time. All of the indicators of legitimated power involve components of material interests (e.g., outcomes, absence of violence, cheap talk). But the indicators are also infused with ideational components as well (e.g., political identity and public goods as outcomes, not just the absence of violence but also the absence of the capacity and willingness to threaten indiscriminate violence), and test to understand the structure of legitimation that is needed by the organization to recover its organizational strength when shocked and how that structure changes over time (though only for mature organizations in this iteration of the research).

Beetham (1991) has outlined a theory of how legitimation of power progresses from a beginning to an end stage (see table below for the factors and stages).

Factor Beginning Stage End Stage

Regulation of Power Conventional Legal Relations Source of Authority Traditional Popular (Masses)

Access to Means & Ascriptive Meritocratic Positions of Power

Determination of Paternalist Consultative Subordinate Interests

Mode of Consent Expressive Contractual

Figure 1 - Beetham's Conception of the Stages of Legitimation

At the heart of Beetham’s conceptual framework is the need to specify both the authoritative source of the rules as well as the justifiable content of the rules.

The framework is sound and reasonable but it suffers from a few basic problems: 1.) it is built from a mindset of Western democracy that may or may not be relevant to the societies that I will study in this research; 2.) it is built with a teleological bias in that democratic forms of government are the natural end state for systems of governance; and 3.) it does not enable the researcher, empirically, to gain traction on the state of legitimation in a more objective manner. To that end, I have conceived of a variation on this model to overcome these basic problems in

Beetham’s conception (see Chapter 2).

Organizational Strength I define organizational strength as consisting of the following three elements:

Political Strength, Military Strength, and Economic Strength. I discuss each of these elements in more detail in chapter 2 and unpack the subcomponents of each element that will be used to focus the empirical investigation to determine the presence of absence of resilience of the organization following the shock that is being evaluated.

Future designs will address the relevance of the different components of organization strength over a broader and more diverse set of cases (e.g., stage of lifecycle). In particular, political strength appears to be the most sensitive to changes in the legitimation structure for the cases in this iteration of the research and may be primus inter pares in the resilience footprint – especially when the rebel groups are either well endowed by foreign patrons or via legal/illegal operations.

Resilience and Shocks Resilience is the speed and efficiency (i.e., level of resources expended) of the organization to be able to restore all or a significant portion of its pre-shock organizational strength. Therefore, for purposes of this proposal, resilience is an organizational trait that focuses on its ability to adapt to and recover from external shocks as measured by the time to restore all or a significant portion of its pre-shock strength. This research design uses the two years prior to the shock and two years following the shock to assess the recovery of organizational strength. This is a ‘stake in the ground’ for this iteration of the research. Future iterations will test the sensitivity of the assessment of recovery to shorter and longer periods pre and post

shock. The insurgency’s resilience is the primary dependent variable in this research.

Resilience is an organizational property that is needed throughout the lifecycle of the entity. Even those violent, transformation-seeking organizations that are able to emerge from the vulnerable start-up phase of their life cycle (Miller &

Friesen 1984; Drazin & Kazanjian 1990) are subject to a variety of external shocks that may challenge the very purpose of the organization or its ability to perform the mission it has set out to accomplish (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990). Followers might defect. The movement could splinter. Sponsors might withdraw sanctuary and political or economic support. Rivals could exploit their relative weakness and compound the adverse effects of the initial shock. Pending victory could expose a group’s inability to transition from armed struggle to governor (Weinstein 2007).

An important element of the discussion about resilience is the concept of a shock. Shocks are the triggering events that could potentially degrade an organization’s resilience. It is important to frame them properly at the outset to ensure that consistency in comparison across the cases and to generate initial hypotheses about the impact of the type of shock on the resilience of an organization. I have constructed a framework to locate the salient aspects of shocks for selecting events within and across the cases and around which I will be measuring organizational resilience. For purposes of this research, shocks have three major dimensions: 1.) Time; 2.) Nature; and 3.) Type. See chapter 2 for more detailed discussion how this scheme has been operationalized for this research.

Social Deposits Social deposits represent those voluntary, prior actions by the organization that are intended to facilitate the development of trust22 in the organization – the binding of a specific constituency to the organization - in the event of a major shock to that organization; i.e., a major performance or values challenge that follows on from a shock (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990). Social deposits represent costly23 binding commitments by the organization and operate as a form of diffuse reciprocity

(Keohane 1986) in a social exchange between the organization and the constituency with whom it seeks to legitimate itself. Social deposits can come in the form of what the organization says about itself, the tangible and intangible social goods it delivers and/or how it goes about delivering on its promises to its greater circle of followers and supporters. To be a social deposit, these actions by the organization, and any related physical capital (i.e., goods or services) that they have employed, would need to be made well in advance (likely years versus months) of any particular shock that

22 The use of the term ‘Trust’ in this context is debatable. Trust may be a more optimistic assessment than is realistic for social deposits. In reality, the outcome produced by the social deposits is a form of permission given to the ruler by the ruled to govern on their behalf. Trust implies that the ruled are no longer concerned about the abuse of power by the ruler and this may or may not be the case. In its base form, social deposits – when structured in a meaningful way – motivate the ruled to permit the ruler to govern; i.e., it motivates the ruled to volunteer her consent to be ruled or represented by the organization. 23 Costliness can be measured in terms of physical or intangible resources. For example, reputation is an intangible asset that, based on the society in which the organization operates, can be put at risk as a form of a social deposit. In this research, I understand cost to be accounted for to the extent that real and intangible assets are put at risk to demonstrate the binding nature of the organization’s commitment.

the analyst is assessing.24 Social deposits are made by the organization with no expectation of immediate payback but are geared to create a durable trust by: a.) alleviating major fears of an important constituency (or multiple constituencies) about the organization exploiting that constituency; b.) building a shared view on the basis of differentiation between the dominant party and the subordinate party; and/or, c.) building a shared view on the common interests that unite the dominant and the subordinate (Beetham 1991). The social deposit may, or may not, be made in an attempt to hedge a specific concern by a given constituency. In short, the social deposit could be made simply in the general interest of building a general trust in the mission, operations and outcomes of that organization; a downpayment to be drawn on in the future (i.e., goodwill).

When dealing with the case of an insurgency that seeks to legitimate itself to selected audiences, the imbalance of power between the insurgency and the followers demand that the dominant party legitimate its power (Beetham 1991) by addressing the followers’ fears of exploitation by the insurgency, locating the basis for differentiation between the organization and its classes25 of followers and the basis for common interest across its various classes of followers. How does the

24 For purposes of this research, in general, actions that the organization takes during a shock (e.g., goodwill gestures to recompense aggrieved parties) are not considered social deposits for purposes of assessing their relevance to the resilience of the organization. These actions could be considered as social deposits for a future shock.

25 Classes of followers refers to the varying degrees of commitment that a given subgroup of followers provides to the movement. The greater commitment comes from the core group (active and unconditional) and the lesser commitment comes from sympathizers (passive and conditional).

follower outside of the immediate and hard-line circle of support know that the insurgency is not simply a tyrant-in-waiting that will exploit the followers once they assume power? In this sense, an insurgency’s attempts to legitimate its power is a form of limiting its power to demonstrate its intentions more clearly and in a binding fashion to the constituencies it seeks to govern.

To the extent that the web of social deposits made by the organization (see below) is effective in mitigating26 these major fears of the primary constituencies, the organization will have legitimated27 itself as a political actor to that constituency. Taken together as a total program of action by the organization, the web of social deposits represents the implementation of an organization’s legitimation strategy – its structure of legitimation for that point in time. In this sense, legitimacy is a strategic asset to be manipulated by the organization’s leaders but this asset is also subject to the social structure within which it is enacted by the leadership (Suchman 1995, Hurd 2007; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). One key aspect of the social structure is the context of international events – or more significantly, series of events - within which the organization and its host state is situated. For example, absent Iran’s desire for regional prominence and desire to spread the

Islamic revolution, would Hezbollah have had the resources to achieve its political goals? As hypothesized in this research, the specific scale, scope and nature of a

26 Mitigation implies not only that the fear is not only addressed in some form (i.e., Mission, Vision & Values and/or Methods of Operations and/or Outputs) but also that the response to the fear is sustained over time. The ‘thinness or thickness’ of the response by the organization is, thus, a function of both extent of the response (scope) and the duration of the response (sustained over time). 27 As noted, this research is also intended to reveal which indicators of legitimacy and in what configuration are meaningful to the legitimation process.

particular organization’s social deposits program (i.e., its legitimation structure which is subject to change over time due to actions of the organization and actions of rivals and the state) is the primary mechanism of action for it to legitimate its power over the longer term. To the extent a suitable28 legitimation structure is in place at the time of a shock, it is hypothesized, facilitates resilience in selected organizations that are subject to certain types of shocks.

Locating Social Deposits Social deposits consist of actions at the intersections of the axis of ‘Macro

Goals’ and the ‘Action Levers’ as noted in the matrix below:

Figure 2 - Macro Goals and Action Levers

28 What is ‘suitable’ is an empirical question and highly nuanced. What is suitable for one group in a particular situation could vary for another group and it could vary for the same group over time. The notion of a ‘rising standard’ for legitimation even for a given organization is discussed more fully in chapters 6 and 7 (see especially the discussion for the Level of Public Accountability indicator). See also chapter 3, the case of Sinn Fein/PIRA for a relevant case where this rising standard is clearly observed.

Macro Goals and Action Levers

For analytical purposes, the ‘Macro Goals’ consist of the intent by the organization to legitimate itself via social deposits that demonstrate its conformity to the norms, values and beliefs of the targeted society and/or to legitimate itself via social deposits that seek to change society’s norms, values and beliefs (i.e., its culture) about itself (Pfeffer and Dowling 1975, Pfeffer & Salancik1978). While changing society’s culture is a significantly greater challenge than demonstrating conformity for an organization that seeks to legitimate itself, the analyst needs to understand the nature of and success/failure of an organization’s attempts to change society. In particular, this research will seek to understand, within the context of its overall transformation agenda, the compromises that the organization makes to its strategies of legitimation when that society fails to respond - or responds negatively - to the organization’s attempts at transformation of its culture.

Hezbollah staked a claim in its 1985 Open Letter that it sought to establish an

Islamic government to govern all of Lebanon (Norton 1987). Lebanese society rejected this proposition (Sankari 2005, Palmer-Harik 2004) and Hezbollah did not

compel the Lebanese to submit to Islamic rule. Importantly, Hezbollah focused more of its attention on moving beyond confessionalism and reiterating its belief that

Islam cannot be imposed on anyone – even its most ardent followers. As will be outlined later in the Hezbollah case, all of these actions were in alignment with

Hezbollah’s overall transformation agenda. In this research, these actions constitute a social deposit in the form of its public accountability.

The culture of any particular society is always subject to interpretation, morphogenesis, and is subject to change over time even if only slow moving change

(Ross 1997; Archer 1995; Swidler 1986). The cultural attributes that the analyst needs to focus on, therefore, should be framed at the macro level (e.g., in the case of

Lebanon one would expect to see meta-values of ‘commitment to Lebanese sovereignty’, ‘commitment to religious and political pluralism’ as characteristics of the national culture and ‘resistance to Israel’ as part of a major sub-culture). Within either of these macro goals, the organization can make social deposits that reflect its missions, vision and values (what it says it believes and its purpose as an organization), its methods of operations (how it goes about its business), and, specific outputs that are tangible or intangible. Tangible outputs include physical goods or services such as security, educational services, and healthcare that the organization produces for the constituency to whom it seeks to legitimate itself. The intangible outputs include more complex social phenomena such as political identities (Abdelal et al 2006).

Mission Vision and Values Lever

The Mission, Vision and Values of the organization can be demonstrated in a variety of discursive forms including the leverage of symbols by the organization to send a specific message, frame a specific organizational identity and/or induce the audience to expect a certain outcome (Hurd 2007, O’Neill 1999). This research will unpack the most significant attempts by the organization to shape the Mission,

Vision, Values narrative via its use of symbols and other discourse with the masses it seeks to whom it seeks to legitimate itself. Organizations use of legitimizing myths

(Hurd 2007, Wedeen 1999) could be authentic attempts to fortify the followers in general or in times of duress (Voss 1996) but there is the risk to the follower that they are essentially ‘glorified marketing’. This is the ‘cheap talk’ risk to the follower that is on par with exploitative marketing efforts in commercial enterprises or the self-serving propaganda efforts of political organizations (Ellsbach & Sutton 1992;

Aldrich & Fiol 1994; Meyer & Rowan 1991; Mish & Scammon 2010). Opportunistic political organizations that do not require the long term commitment of the masses or can count on a lack of information transparency when dealing with the masses, can and have manipulated this layer of actions to ‘talk a good game’ but not follow it up with costlier actions that deliver on the promises made at this level (Snyder &

Ballantine 1996, Bob 2005). In contrast, organizations that depend on the trust and support of the masses for the conduct of their political or commercial activity need to ensure that the social deposits they make at the ‘Mission, Vision & Values’ layer align with the ‘Outputs’ and ‘Methods of Operation’ layers of their web of social deposits over time. This discursive layer of social deposits acts as a constraint on the

other layers – the organization needs to ‘walk its talk’ or else risk weakening or destroying the power of its discursive layer of actions.

Methods of Operation Lever

Consistent with the ‘legitimation via fair process’29, 30 school of thought (Hurd

2007, Barnett & Finnemore 1999; Zelditch 2001), the ‘Methods of Operations’ lever of action reveals the manner in which the organization goes about its business. Since it is not always possible for followers to assess fairness in outcomes in a timely manner, the ‘fairness in process’ component potentially provides a more timely input to the followers to assess the degree to which the organization is moving towards mitigating its greatest fears of exploitation by the organization. There are four primary foci for social deposits to build legitimacy with regard to the methods of operations that will be evaluated in this research. Some are positive in nature (i.e., presence) and some are negative (i.e., absence): 1.) absence of the use of violence to coerce followers/constituents to gain their commitment to the organization’s political/ideological agenda or to persuade them to be loyal to the organization31 32;

29 The ‘fairness in outcomes’ and the ‘fairness in process’ schools are both forms of moral legitimacy per Suchman (1995). Moral legitimacy is based on the positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activities. This is not based on a simple self-interest model but one whereby obedience to the organization is the “right thing to do”. While followers may expect favorable outcomes they operate in a mode of diffuse reciprocity with respect to their expectations. Payoffs can come in the form of general welfare and with no particular timetable for payment. 30 The obedience to the group is based on the follower’s favorable evaluation of the fairness of the techniques and procedures used by the organization. This is a variation on the Weberian notion of the rational/legal form of legitimacy. 31 This is designed to test for the presence or absence of the style of the tyrannical and totalitarian leader-state model used in Hussein’s Iraq and Al-Assad’s Syria (Per

2.) level of autonomy (scope and extent of dependence on sponsors); 3.) level of public accountability (focus on the answerability to the public and an institutional web to enforce accountability from a variety of perspectives); 4.) level of professionalism (efficiency, fairness and innovativeness in leadership, administration and operations).

Outputs Lever

The ‘Outputs’ lever of action consists of the specific social goods that the organization delivers of both a tangible and intangible nature. This component of the social deposits framework builds on the ‘fairness in outcomes’ perspective33 on

Norton/Muslih 1991, “The use of violence by a government against its citizens is usually a symptom of the absence of legitimacy.”). This test is clearly problematic since many governments that have come to be seen as legitimate started out by using illegitimate means of wresting power from rivals within the state (or were the incumbent government) as described in Hurd 2007, Chapter 3. The test needs to account for the scope, timing and nature of the violence used. Is it used to gain power in the defeat of rivals or the state and then discontinued and not required to maintain power? Is it needed to maintain power to repress rivals whereby the constitutional means to compete for power is bypassed? If yes, to the second instance then I would code the that coercive violence has been used and then evaluate then code that legitimation factor as null. At this point in my research, all of these tests are weighted equally. That may warrant reconsideration in subsequent iterations of this research program.

32 As noted in Kalyvas (2006:165-172) the absence of violence may be unrelated to the presence of coercive force. In areas that insurgents control the absence of violence might be the result of a highly effective threat of coercive violence or the self-interest of the civilians to seek protection from the state’s use of indiscriminate violence. This alternative explanation for interpretation of the absence of violence will be addressed empirically for each case. 33 The obedience to the group is intertwined with the utility that comes from the perception that the group provides generally more than less favorable outcomes to the follower. The outcomes seem fair and equitable to the followers. This does not

the sources of legitimacy (Hurd 2007; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore

2004; Zelditch 2001). In the case of an insurgency it could include wages, physical goods such as security, social services (e.g., health and welfare, education, reconstruction, financial assistance), and financial assistance. It is important to note, however, that the ‘Outputs’ category could also include less tangible social goods as well. A political identity34 that is used to frame, inspire or coordinate mass action35 is an example of an intangible output (e.g., the Resistance Culture in Lebanon inspired by Hezbollah – Crooke 2009). These are empirically more problematic for the analyst but they potentially represent substantive deliverables in the eyes of

account for structural injustices that favor a status quo to the disadvantage of some. This is a variation on the Weberian notion of the rational/legal form of legitimacy.

34 Abdelal et al (2006) provides a useful synthesis of scholars’ efforts to define Identity as a variable by developing a simple analytic framework. They have defined Collective identity along two axes: content and contestation. The content consists of four non-mutually exclusive elements: 1.) constitutive norms – the formal and informal rules that define group membership; 2.) social purposes – the goals that are shared by members of the group; 3.) relational comparisons – defining the group by what it is not; and, 4.) cognitive models – overall worldviews. Contestation levels reveal the level of ‘fluidity and the contextual nature of social identities.’ Contestation will allow the analyst to unpack the degree of agreement within the group (the organization and the society that is rendering its views on the legitimacy of the group) regarding the content of the Identity. It is this construction of Identity that I use as the basis for this part of the discussion. 34 See also the earlier discussion regarding the support for Hezbollah during US and western pressure to disarm them in the wake of the 9/11 event. 35 Identities by themselves do not explain behavior but, nonetheless, are a critical component of this puzzle (Wendt 1999: 231). Identity is a function of repeated interaction (i.e., iterative games with a long shadow of the future with diffuse reciprocity) between actors and is, therefore, contingent on social activity. “Identities refer to who or what actors are…interests refer to what actors want. Identities belong to the belief side (context) so of the intentional equation (i.e., desire + belief = action) while interests belong to the desire side (motivations). They play complementary explanatory roles, and so rather than define them as rivals, we should explore how they work in tandem” (Wendt 1999: 231; Wendt & Fearon 2001).

some of the followers and might provide explanatory power for how different followers see the payoff for support of the particular organization.

See the discussion of the States of Legitimation in chapter 2 for a more specific discussion how the concept of social deposits will be operationalized as test of the organization’s state of legitimation.

Alternative Explanations of Resilience for Insurgencies Scholars who study the resilience of insurgencies have historically located the source of that resilience within one of three basic sets of logic: 1.) The

Conditions of ‘Supply’ – structural arguments that revolve around a fertile environment for insurgencies to flourish (sometimes known as ‘the Insurgency

Theory’ school); 2.) The ‘Levels of Demand’ – or Exclusion from Access to State

Power (along categorical36 lines) – current thinking about the role of grievances that builds on a more nuanced set of arguments how the state’s exclusion of a group from power builds resilience for the rebel group; 3.) Compelling Followers to

Follow: Violence and Selective Incentives - utilitarian arguments involving coercive violence and selective incentives that explain the resilience of insurgencies. While few of the scholars see the cause as lying solely in one camp versus another, these three schools of thought comprehend the primary alternative explanations that I will evaluate based on the empirical evidence included in the three cases.

36 The primary category is ethnicity for the works I have reviewed for this research.

The ‘Conditions of Supply’ School This school is built around three basic premises that in part or jointly lead to the resilience of the insurgency:

1.) Foreign Aid a. Sanctuary in foreign base camps and b. Financial support for rebels 2.) Weak State – limited policing capacity and an indiscriminate counter insurgency policy that compels the civilian population to join or sympathize with the rebels a. Political instability at center of government b. Loss of foreign patrons for the government 3.) Ability to Hide a. Terrain – rural and distant from power center; this provides sanctuary and geographic impediments to the state and other enemies ability to assault the group b. Rebels with superior local knowledge/affinity with population (vs. government) i. The rebels know how to lever their social or ascriptive assets to gain information and support c. Large population i. To be able to blend in with the masses in the spirit of Mao’s “the guerilla must move among the people as a fish swims in the sea”

Collectively, these three components have been referred to as the ‘Theory of

Insurgency’ (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The Foreign Aid component ‘focuses on the role of role of international patrons (e.g., post-revolutionary Iran, Libya, Iraq during Saddam’s era) who support insurgents (clients) in foreign countries for strategic reasons of that state (Byman

2005; Byman et al 2003, Cragin & Daly 2004, Tanter 1999, US Dept of State 2006).

For example, this logic has produced numerous accounts37 of the role of Syria and

Iran in the comprehensive support (i.e., financial, military, political, territorial and

37 See Palmer-Harik (2004), Jaber (1997), Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), Norton (1987, 2007) and Takeyh (2009) offer foundational accounts.

logistical) for Hezbollah and Hamas as proxies for those states’ conflicts with Israel.

Far better for them to use the private army of Hezbollah and Hamas to bleed Israel and compel it to either ‘land for peace’ in the case of Syria or to simply weaken a mortal foe in the case of Iran. The sponsors resources are critical especially to those insurgencies that do not have the benefit of access to or control over natural resource endowments or other ‘lootable resources’ to fuel the insurgency. Via infusions of much-needed but scarce capital of all kinds, state sponsors enable an insurgency to accelerate through its most vulnerable period as it moves out of the start up stage to the growth stage. The sponsors’ contributions of financial capital could help support vital social services that provide incentives for followers to follow when the state cannot, or will not, support the targeted followers of the insurgency. The political capital that the sponsor provides extends the goodwill of the sponsoring state to the non-state insurgency. One typical path for extending the goodwill is for the state sponsor to lever its political power in the forum of international organizations and its influence with others states to change opinion about a narrative that is harmful to their client (e.g., limits on the flow of funds through international banking networks if designated a Foreign Terrorist)38 with respect to regional and/or international support. The military aid that the sponsors provide enables the insurgency to professionalize its military capabilities to improve the efficiency of its military operations and to upgrade its armory to combat the likely superior military assets of its enemies. The role of the Iranian

38 The case of Hezbollah and the recent Bulgarian bombing incident is illustrative: http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Bulgaria-EU-could-still-act-against-Hezbollah- over-Burgas-307907 (last accessed March 28, 2013).

Revolutionary Guards in the original training of Hezbollah is well documented. The continued role of Iran in the supply of advanced missile technology to Hezbollah and

Hamas had a significant effect on the outcome of the 2006 war with Israel (Harel &

Issacharoff 2008, Takeyh 2009, IICC 2008, Biddle & Friedman 2008). Another key asset related to state sponsors is their provision of territory for sanctuary to mobilize and organize the insurgency for its military and political operations. Syria acts as a safe transit for weapons into Lebanon for use by Hezbollah. Libya had served as a safe haven for the training of forces of the PIRA in the 1970s and 1980s as well as an arms supplier. Afghanistan under Taliban rule served as a safe haven for Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the 1990s to the current time. Pakistan vis a vis the

ISI has provided sanctuary for a variety of groups including Lashkar e Taiba.39 While some of these examples may better be described as the fall out from failed states

(see discussion below about state capacity), the strategic choices of more powerful states to support patrons that are insurgencies is well established in modern political history.

The second component in the ‘Conditions of Supply’ school builds on the beliefs about state capacity and regime type. Weak or failed states40 (Rotberg 2002,

Gannon 2004) do not have a monopoly on the use of force and are unable to thwart the birth and growth of insurgencies when they are most vulnerable (at or near birth). The institutions of government either do not exist in any viable form or are

39 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?_r=1 last accessed December 21, 2010. 40 One index of failed states can be found at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates (last accessed December 21, 2010).

so corrupted as to be useless in the task of governing. The state is more like a

Hobbesian world than Lockean or Kantian world. Kalyvas (2003, 2006, 2008) builds on the Hobbesian notion with his research into the microfoundations of violence in civil and ethnic wars. Kalyvas presents an argument that the intensity and bloodiness of conflict builds on an alliance of equals between the center (i.e., the main narrative of the conflict) and the periphery where the killing and violence can be essentially ‘feuds on a grander scale.’ The incipient anarchic state of a failed or failing state presents the opportunities to settle old scores and the bloodshed reaches unexpectedly high levels. The ‘lawlessness of warlordism’ narrative that some use to describe the political violence within Afghanistan, Chechnya or Bosnia are good illustrations of this phenomenon.

The corollary to this second thread includes beliefs about regime type and its inherent inability to counter insurgencies (and thus be an indirect but key source of their resilience). Democratic regimes that are built on popular sovereignty are less able to prosecute the kind of counterinsurgency war that is needed to counter nascent insurgencies or to eradicate the stronger insurgencies; that is, democratic states do not perform well in ‘small, dirty wars’ (Merom 2003, Gelpi & Feaver et al

2005, 2009; Lebovic 2010). This school believes that the liberal norms and values of democratic states hamstring their superior repressive powers. These scholars also argue that these states do not have the will to execute the kinds of ‘near genocidal’ forms of warfare that authoritarian states are likelier to conduct since the rulers in democratic societies are subject to the complex will of the people and that popular will is informed by a liberal concept of society. In this view, the state does not have

the ‘stomach’ (i.e., the political will) for the kinds of violence that is needed to exterminate insurgencies. In The failure of Israel to eradicate Hezbollah, the failure of the US to eradicate the insurgents in South Vietnam41 and the failure of the

French to eradicate the GIA in Algeria are all examples of democratic states that didn’t have the political will to fight the kinds of wars that are needed to defeat insurgencies.

The third thread of this school of thought involves beliefs about the group’s ability to conceal itself and how it affects the resilience of the insurgency. In this view, the nature of the terrain makes a major difference in the tendency for insurgency to occur let alone thrive (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Galula 1964). The basic notion advanced in this view is that the distance of the group’s main base from the center of state power matters. In addition, the ability for insurgents to easily conceal themselves until they are ready to engage in guerilla or other political violence operations provides the insurgency with a major advantage over those groups who operate in open, flat territory. In this view, the success of groups such as

Lashkar e Taiba and the Taliban have more to do with the plentiful supply of mountainous and rugged terrain than grievances per se. Scholars of civil war

(Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier 2000, Keen 2000, Berdal & Malone, eds. 2000) argued that the presence of compelling grievances over-determined the occurrence and duration of ethnic, civil or insurgent forms of conflict. Their analysis revealed

41 As noted by Lebovic (2010), the Viet Cong were eliminated as an effective fighting force following the Tet offensive. The war, however, continued largely on the power of the North Vietnamese regular army forces and their sponsors.

several factors on the supply side (e.g., oil, demographics) but the presence of suitable terrain in which to operate (i.e., that which facilitated cover and concealment to blunt the imbalance of power relative to their foes) surfaced as a major variable to explain the occurrence and duration of these forms of conflict.

Another aspect of the ‘Ability to Hide’ component of this school of thought focuses on the ability of the group to take advantage of any social or natural affinities (social networks, co-ethnicity, ideology) with the local population. This argument says that the ability to attract and retain followers is a function of strong social ties nurtured in the context of the cultural and group dynamics of a transcendent set of values such as Irish Republicanism or political Islam and a strong pre-existing organization (perhaps even non-violent in nature).42

Another related facet of the ‘Ability to Hide’ component speaks to the organizational philosophies and structures that these groups adopt. To improve the potential to perform at a high level under difficult circumstances, the leadership of the organization will build it around strong, embedded social networks (Crenshaw

2001b; Sageman 2004; Putnam 1994; Saad-Ghorayeb 2001). The successful organizations have been able to more efficiently gather information, organize and sustain themselves even under harsh government repression due to their networked and decentralized operating nature (Stern 2003; Sageman 2004).

42 The case of Hezbollah is instructive. The generally non-violent group, Amal, was the root organization for Hezbollah. Amal was formed by Musa al Sadr in the 1960’s. Hezbollah was derived as a splinter of Amal in 1982 and was violent almost from its inception (Norton 1986).

The ‘Levels of Demand’ School In this school of thought, the primary drivers of birth, growth and resilience of an insurgency are located in the overall level of ‘demand’ for the insurgent’s

‘services’. If the need is sufficiently great to attract (and maintain) agents to meet that societal need, the marketplace will provide the issue entrepreneurs a la the

‘gale of creative destruction43’ to innovate and to serve that need.

Historically, the root of this school of thought is the deprived actor research program (Gurr 1970), the collective action research program (Olson 1965, Lichbach

1998) and the social movement theory research program (McCarthy & Zald 1977;

McAdam et al 1996; Bayat 2005; Wiktorowicz 2003; Tilly 2003, 2006). The resilience of insurgencies according to this school of thought is tied closely to the depth of the grievance that is felt by the actors (or potential recruits), political openings to voice their dissent, the ability of the elite to frame a compelling call to action and the ability to mobilize the resources to selectively incent the needed followers to effect the political changes needed. The greater the collective sense of grievance, combined with the resources and political openings to exploit, the more resilient would the insurgency become.

Ethnic hatreds and all of its cultural variants (e.g., global jihad and clashes of civilizations) have occupied a particularly visible part of the ‘grievance school’

(mostly in the insurgency and counter insurgency literature) as the source of the

43 I realize that Schumpeter was a Marxist and would twist in his grave if he knew that I associated his famous phrase with a capitalist free market concept.

persistence and global spread of insurgencies (Stern 2003; Roy 2004, Huntington

1993, Habeck 2006; Pape 2005; Crenshaw 2001; Cronin 2004, Mueller 2000). These scholars argue44 that the resilience of insurgencies is fueled by ethnic hatred and its cultural variants, particularly irreconcilable differences in primary cultural attributes such as religion (i.e., Islam versus Christianity, Judaism or simply secularism).

For purposes of evaluating this type of alternative claim to the nature of resilience of insurgencies45, however, I will use the new paradigm of the grievance argument that is typified by work by Cederman et al 2009, 2010 and Wucherpfennig et al 2012. This quantitative research project focuses on the impact of the exclusion of a group from state power based on a categorical marker – the marker used is ethnicity in combination with the opportunity presented by the illegitimacy of the state46. These scholars have ‘brought the state and ethnicity’ back in from the cold as it relates to the resilience of insurgencies. They define “…define ethnicity as a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture” (Cederman 2009:325). They note that “ethnicity is not

44 Note that the argument about resilience is often an indirect one since the arguments tend to be about ‘why followers follow’ the elites of the global jihad versus the ability of an organization to recover efficiently and quickly following a major shock. 45 See chapters 3 through 5 for the assessment of the strength of the alternative explanations for each case under review. In chapter 6 I will also assess the overall record of the alternative explanations relative to the hypothesis put forward in this research. 46 The ‘illegitimacy’ of the state is revealed by the population’s perception that it is unwilling to compromise and allow for power sharing with the excluded group based on the categorical basis of exclusion.

an aim in itself, but the organizational means through which individuals struggle to gain access to state power” (Cederman et al 2009:335). They point out how the grievance dynamic influences the resilience of the rebel groups. “The past policies of ethnic exclusion also operate to the benefit of rebel organizations fighting the government, since members of politically excluded ethnic groups harbor grievances that increase collective group solidarity and render individual fighters more cost tolerant. This, in turn, facilitates the durability of rebel organizations”

(Wucherpfennig et al 2012:80). “Our analysis builds on two mechanisms that contribute to retaining fighters: (1) greater cost tolerance and commitment and (2) increased group solidarity (Wucherpfennig et al 2012:89).“Due to greater cost tolerance, claims about uncertain future benefits resonate particularly well in the presence of grievances” (Wucherpfennig 2012: 90). “We argue that the socioeconomic and ethnopolitical context of potential recruits itself shapes individual and collective motivations to fight” (Wucherpfennig 2012: 90). “Members of excluded ethnic groups are more likely to continue fighting, which allows rebel organizations to endure, than are recruits who have not suffered from exclusion”

(Wucherpfennig 2012: 91). Access to and sharing in state power in some meaningful way (e.g., legislative bloc that is significant; participation or control of the executive branch) would, according to this body of thinking, diminish the demand for the insurgency. But the nature of exclusionary politics retards the ability of the state and the excluded group to settle. “Exclusionary politics not only reveal state preferences that impact heavily on the ability and willingness of incumbent governments to accept settlements, but also lead members of ethnic groups that are

systematically excluded from state power to develop stronger group solidarity and to become more cost tolerant. Such rebel organizations are therefore more likely to fight longer conflicts” (Wucherpfennig 2012: 111).

Compelling Followers to Follow – Violence and Selective Incentives ‘Compelling the Followers to Follow’ scholarship consists of the utilitarian arguments that involve the use of coercive force and selective incentives as the means to produce resilience in insurgent organizations. Essentially this thinking unpacks the causal mechanisms of the ‘carrot and the stick’ strategies that leaders of the insurgency can use to compel the followers to follow. Kalyvas (2006, 2008) and

Wood (2010) see these two strategies as interrelated and treat them as such in their explorations of the onset, duration and termination of civil wars. These scholars believe that the use of coercive violence (indiscriminate or selective) and/or selective incentives best explain the duration of civil war when combined with the actions of the state (e.g., employs indiscriminate violence and unable to protect the population from the rebels) and the capacity of the rebel organization (i.e., resource rich or resource poor and able or unable to protect the population from indiscriminate state violence). Kalyvas (2008) brings together the notions of violence and social order. He states that “violence is employed by those who want to upend an existing order and by those who want to sustain it…Likewise, much of what we identify as order is simply violence in disguise. Political institutions are often erected on violent foundations, and maintained through implicit and explicit threats of bloodshed should obedience be withheld” (Kalyvas 2008). Where some see peaceful order, Kalyvas sees an iron fist only thinly disguised. Coercion is clearly

distinct from selective incentives but as Kalyvas and Wood point out, operate from the basic utilitarian motives of fear or greed.

“Coercion refers to a relation of asymmetrical physical power among agents where this asymmetry is applied to the changing behavior of the weaker agent. The operative mechanism is fear or simple compulsion; fear produces acquiescence. An actor who obeys a rule because of coercion is motivated by the fear of punishment from a stronger power. The rule itself is irrelevant except as a signal of kinds of behavior that will or will not incur the penalty. If a social system relies primarily on coercion to motivate compliance with its rules, we would expect to see enormous resources devoted to enforcement and surveillance and low levels of compliance when the enforcing agent is not looking (or considerably weakened)” (Hurd

2007:35). ”….Coercion is a relatively “primitive” form of social control, because it is inefficient from the standpoint of the central power. It does not generally provoke voluntary compliance” (Hurd 2007:36).

These scholars are skeptical about the ‘productivity’ of coercive violence as a primary strategy for compelling followers to follow and, generally, incorporate the actions of the state – the strategic context – when attempting to assess the value or predict the use of coercive violence. “Violence can effectively destroy power but can never create it. In the longer term, violence is counterproductive because it breeds resentment and creates incentives for civilians to collaborate with incumbents

(Kalyvas, 2006: 153–157 as quoted in Wood 2010). Whether insurgent violence succeeds in eliciting civilian support or driving them away is contingent on the government’s response” (Wood 2010:604). Kalyvas (2006) sees, therefore, a natural

progression from a rebel group’s use of indiscriminate violence to one of a selective nature to eliminate informants and defectors and, thus, deter others in the population areas that they control from doing so.

In contrast to the agency-based perspective used by Kalyvas and Wood,

Weinstein’s (2006) notion of how endowments (social and economic) at the inception of an insurgency predetermine the nature of the followers who are attracted to the organization and therefore the payoff model that they are willing to accept. Weinstein (2006) notes that if the insurgent organization is blessed with significant economic resources at its inception (i.e., lootable resources) it will tend to attract ‘consumer’ type followers who care relatively less about the ideas that are the basis for the movement and more about opportunity for self-gain. In contrast, if the social endowments are greater at the inception then the movement will attract

‘investor’ type followers who are prepared to serve the political agenda of the movement and yet are willing to defer payoffs for that service both in kind (material payoffs not as important as the political/cultural/identity goals) and timeframe

(this generation or next). Weinstein goes on to note that even if an insurgent organization is born with leaders who are geared towards a social set of goals, the presence of large economic endowments will attract the consumer type followers who will ultimately reshape the direction of the movement towards opportunism. In

Weinstein’s view, the pull of the economic agenda will always trump the social agenda and it has strong path dependencies from an organizational standpoint.

While relatively less costly to implement, scholars in this school of thought see ideological motivations as subordinated by potential followers to more basic

needs for survival and sustenance under the conditions of civil war. “Ideological appeals are among the cheapest (and most common) strategies available to rebel elites. Yet such strategies frequently fail to mobilize broad support because civilians are often apolitical and motivated primarily by immediate survival and security concerns” (Wood 2010: 603; Migdal, 1974). Some of the potential followers may be motivated by loot or wages but as rational actors they first add up the cost of commitment to the cause. If that cost seems high then they will want progressively more resource-intensive services to entice them to more actively support the insurgency. “Wages and loot may attract some ‘greedy’ supporters, but they are unlikely to motivate peasant support if participation carries a high likelihood of severe punishment by the government” (Wood 2010:603). To the extent that the insurgency is able to provide basic services on the order of a viable state these scholars believe that this is the foundation for ensuring the resilience of the insurgency. “Order (e.g., policing, justice systems, commerce), security, and basic services are more likely to resonate with this population. As a result, services that mimic those provided by the state become important incentives for peasant mobilization. They encourage civilian cooperation and help bring civilians under the control of the insurgents, thus limiting the ability and desire to collaborate with government forces and expanding the insurgents’ human resource base” (Wood

2010:603). The big “if” in this theoretical construction is the capacity of the rebel group to be able to deliver the desired services on a scale and with the skill needed.

Stronger groups are more likely able to deliver on this value proposition than weaker groups. This, of course, echoes the theories of the resource mobilization

branch of social movement theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977). “The provision of incentives sufficient to induce support requires significant capabilities. Establishing safe zones or otherwise defending territory is indicative of rebel strength and the capacity to protect supporters from government reprisals (Mason, 1996: 74).

Nominal territorial control is often a necessary condition for providing other incentives as well” (Wood 2010:603).

One other aspect of Wood’s research regarding the use of violence is the correlation between those groups who were supported by external patrons and groups that were prone to using violence. “Rebels that receive significant material resources from abroad (particularly in the form of weapons and troops) face no such problem of dependence (on the local population). Rather, foreign-backed rebels can target civilians for violence without fear of undercutting their ability to acquire resources” (Woods 2010: 612).

Other Considerations There are two other bodies of literature that are relevant to the explanation of the resilience of an insurgency but are not to be thought of as explanations in the manner of the three arguments noted above: Information Management and

Professionalizing the Insurgency. They are ‘agency-of-elites’ oriented in their focus. I include these two additional views since they have added to my thinking about the indicators of power legitimation as well as provide useful but nuanced extensions to the three basic alternative explanations.

Information Management

Information management consists of what, how and when the leadership communicates internally and externally. The leadership’s skillful use of symbols, myths and the ‘good marketing’ to get a key message properly placed and reinforced with the target audience (Bob 2005, Wedeen 1999, O’Neill 1999) is a key tool in the management kit of the successful insurgent leader (Galula 1964). High performing groups know how to manipulate information to demonize their foes as the oppressor and to fortify the membership (and future recruits) in hard times through mythmaking (Voss in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Followers need to have more than fear of repression to motivate them. Building on the case of Milosevic in

Serbia and the Rwandan case, they identify the critical need for the alleged enemy of the elites to act or threaten to act in a menacing way such that the violence-inciting discourse of the elite is plausible. In effect, unless there is a plausible logic to do so, the masses aren’t dull-witted and without agency such that they would be ready to take the leader at face value and pay a heavy price to fight for them – especially a leader that is bent on resurrecting their claim to power. In order to influence the masses the leader requires a particular interaction with the opponent that is beyond their direct control. This is a helpful sharpening of the ‘fear’ mechanism that has historically been less effective in explaining enough cases of the logic of followership. “Ethnic conflict is a social dilemma. Each citizen acting alone cannot affect the outcome. Fear of extreme consequences beyond their control drive the citizens to support violence to avoid being the victim. The choice faced by pivotal constituencies is not between war and peace. The problem is that a third alternative

is worse than war: violent victimization (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999: 266).”

The presence of the security dilemma alone is inadequate to explain the presence or absence of civil war and the ability of a manipulative elite to foment support in the masses (Weingast 1999: 265). The earlier generations of thinking regarding the fear of victimization by the Other was based on a insufficiently theorized perspective on simple information asymmetry line of thinking regarding civil war (Snyder and

Ballantine 1996).

The information campaign can also be used to strengthen recruiting by making the group attractive to join due to their exclusivity47 - exclusive clubs that only admit their own kind which results in more that want to join than there are slots available.48 Given the high premium on operational secrecy and the need for units to operate in a more independent fashion, this exclusivity and trust-building process is critical. The process of recruitment then is really more akin to screening many applicants for few slots. The fit test will be, at first, less focused on ideology and more on trust built on basic social affinity (Sageman 2004). Religion and culture are necessary conditions but not sufficient.

47 Until very recently, in contrast to civil war rebel groups, most insurgencies generally need far fewer actual fighters. Hezbollah, for example, is reported to have generally no more than 1500 to 5000 shooters. This allows for a far more stringent admission process given the general supply of available talent to these movements in the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia. The insurgency that has flourished in Iraq, however, has included some insurgent groups that, according to various press reports, have grown to as large as 60,000 fighters – e.g., the Mahdi Army led by Muqtada al Sadr. The Mahdi army case places Islamic insurgencies on par with the rebel armies that are the standard focus of the civil war literature. 48 Author interview with Professor John Horgan, Fall 2007.

Finally, in relation to the information aspects of leadership, one of the major foundation stones of the Identity argument in political science, is that there is causal power in the macro-level discourse used by the leaders (i.e., what constitutes the vision and goals of the group). What they say and how they say it matters and antagonistic social identities can be created because of it. Based on a selected set of constructivist literature, Fearon & Laitin (2000) set out to test the notion that social identity can be caused to change by a process that is driven either by broad structural forces or a discursive logic by elites or the agency of elites (i.e., elite manipulation theories). The structural forces arguments (e.g, Stern’s 2003 globalization argument) are viewed as, at best, necessary but not sufficient conditions for conflict. But they go on to say that the discursive logic argument cannot be ruled out and that it is plausible that it has a significant causal impact on the social construction of identity – both pacific and antagonistic identities such as pan-Islamic radical movements (Fearon & Laitin 2000:874). The causal impact is both at the content of the identity (e.g., what it means to be a true Muslim and when killing for Allah is acceptable) and the membership boundaries (i.e., who is in and who is out; who to kill and who to spare). Because the social construction of identity is a function of humans these identities are mutable and do change over time – certainly more quickly than social scientists had imagined in the past.

Professionalizing the Insurgency Reading the classic texts on guerilla warfare by Mao (2000) and Che Guevara

(2007) you will see major sections dedicated to the management of the guerilla organization. These guerilla leaders are clear that success depends on an efficient

and effective organization to underpin the compelling messages of change that they used to rally the faithful to their causes. These ideas play prominently in virtually all of the three primary alternative explanations. Modern scholars who study guerilla warfare and insurgency support the need for efficiency in operations (e.g., losses in combat, resources consumed to conduct any given operation) and effectiveness in reaching beyond the core followers to aggregate all the needed resources to successfully prosecute the goals of the insurgency. For purposes of this research, I have labeled this body of thinking the professionalization of the insurgency.

Building on the premise of resource mobilization theory, some scholars argue that the ability of elites to construct professional organizations to efficiently and effectively prosecute a particular political agenda is what is most important to the resilience of insurgencies. McCarthy and Zald (1977:1215) note ". . . that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group…For some purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations.” McCarthy and Zald argue that the leadership’s ability to perform the following five functions well is the best explanation for the success of the movement: 1.) resource aggregation (money and labor); 2.) coherent organization structure (specialization of labor, networks to manage clandestine operations and clear roles and responsibilities); 3.) management of the involvement of the resources/constituents outside the immediate social collective that the insurgency represents (e.g., sponsors and

powerful sympathizers); 4.) expertise in ‘supply chain’ management (the movement of resources into and out of the organization); 5.) expertise in performance management (i.e., costs as well as rewards). While you can argue the choice of words the intent of the above-listed five areas is to locate the explanation for the resilience and ultimate success of the social movement on the professionalization of the management and operation of the organization. This logic fits very neatly into the neoclassical theory of the efficient firm and the related scholarship about organizational birth, growth, maturity and decline (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975).

Case Approach I propose to conduct a set of structured, focused comparisons (George &

Bennett 2005: 67-72) of three in-depth cases to gain deeper theoretical insight to the mechanisms of action that link social deposits to legitimated power and organizational resilience for a selected type of mass social movement49. I will focus on two major events in the life of the organization so that I can evaluate the change in the resilience footprint and in the configuration of the legitimation structure for that movement over time and by type of shock. Given that this research is designed to test both the explanatory power of legitimated power and which indicators – jointly or separately – provide the most explanatory power, the cases in this iteration of the research need to provide me with insights to which indicators of legitimation are most relevant while also providing me sufficient variation around

49 That is, resilient mass social movements that want to transform their societies and are willing to use instrumentally the insurgent form of violence to achieve their goals.

the resilience footprint. In a very specific sense, I am seeking to understand whether this specification of power legitimation (the six indicators outlined in chapter 2) is relevant to the change in the resilience footprint (also specified in chapter 2). I am also stipulating a fairly restrictive domain constraint in this iteration of the research: only mature insurgencies. This will limit my claims to only one stage of any organization’s life cycle and eliminate a large body of potential cases since most insurgencies fail much earlier than the 15-year life I have imposed on case candidates. Future iterations of the research will relax this constraint and allow for greater variation around the DV. This research needs to also establish some sense for the suitability of the indicators of power legitimation that are specified in chapter 2.

As with all research projects that are based on a limited set of case studies, I will only be in a position to provide ‘contingent generalizations’ (George & Bennett

2005; Collier & Mahoney 1996). Respecting Sartori, I want to hedge against

‘conceptual stretching’ at this point. As a result, I will be moving ‘down the ladder of generality’ to the arena of middle range theory (Goertz 2009). Coherent and robust explanations of the general theory of legitimacy and social power have already been achieved (Beetham 1991, Hurd 2007, Suchman 1995, Zelditch 2001). I want to progress the understanding of how variations in an organization’s legitimacy and the related strategies of legitimation better explain organizational resilience for relatively mature insurgencies. I seek to understand how (if at all) the organization

builds and/or maintains its legitimacy through social deposits;50 the nature, timing and extent of social deposits that are needed; and, finally, under what conditions those social deposits produce organizational resilience.

Primary Hypotheses to Test H0: The legitimation of the insurgency’s power is the sufficient condition to produce resilience – the insurgencies who have made greater ‘social deposits’ over time produce a more robust power legitimation structure which provides the sufficient condition to produce resilience for the insurgency.

H1: Favorable conditions of supply are sufficient to explain the resilience of insurgencies: If an insurgency has appropriate conditions of supply (concealment, foreign aid, weak state) that will be sufficient to produce resilience for the insurgency.

H2: The strategic context (i.e., state actions) and the application of coercive violence and selective incentives are sufficient to explain the resilience of the insurgency- the repressive actions of the state and the insurgency’s ability and willingness to selectively incent or coerce followers as needed provides the sufficient conditions to produce resilience.

50 As discussed later, I have constructed a set of ex ante tests to determine the level of legitimation that is present at the time of the shock.

condition (e.g., ethnicity) AND opportunity (i.e., that the state is unredeemable) are the sufficient conditions that will enable them to produce resilience. This is based on its followers’ greater cost tolerance, commitment increased group solidarity as well as their perceived unwillingness of the state to compromise regarding credible access to power.

Case Selection In this section, I outline the larger pool of candidate cases that I considered, the final three cases that I selected and the case selection logic I used to narrow the cases to the three selected. I begin this section with a brief discussion of the theoretical and practical considerations that formed the foundation of the cases I used in this research.

Theoretical Considerations As noted in the hypotheses above, with this dissertation I seek to make theoretical claims about the role of legitimated power as it relates to the resilience of relatively more mature insurgencies across a variety of factors including time

(within-case variation and across case variation), geographic settings; and, political, social and economic environments. I expect to focus only on mass movements that are relatively more mature, seek to achieve transformative goals and are willing to use the insurgent form of violence instrumentally to achieve those goals. The primary alternative explanations, as noted above, are also important considerations in the case selection. As a result, I have included cases of mature insurgencies that

tend to exhibit – or, at least, have the capability to do so51 - those types of coercive or pay-for-resilience behaviors, have grievances that could be related to exclusions from power based on ethnopolitical configurations of power in the state, and reflect favorable conditions of supply. This will enable me to test the relative merits of the base hypothesis (H0) against the competing alternatives.

The chosen cases also needed to provide me a means to test the relevance of the six indicators of power legitimation that I have built into the ex ante tests

(chapter 2). They also need to enable me to test the impact of shock type on the production of resilience - both a values challenge and a performance challenge to evaluate. I wanted to understand if the legitimation strategies needed to be different to account for the different types of shocks. I also wanted to understand if the legitimation strategies needed to be different to account for shocks that were abrupt versus cumulative in nature. The case set needed to provide coverage of the two basic shock types.

Given my goals for theoretical claims and the need to reduce the effects of selection bias when choosing cases, I have controlled for selected effects including: region of world, key beliefs of movement, funding strategies52, regime type and type

51 For example, punishment beatings to enforce submission to the group’s authority or the use of looted resources to incent their followers or elites to ensure resilience in times of crisis or shock to the organization. 52 Collier (1999) and Weinstein (2007) use the notion of ‘Lootable’ resources principally to describe natural resources such as diamonds or oil that are can be diverted by force for use to fund the insurgency. I expand its use in this research to include financial resources that can be stolen from banks of other places of business and redeployed for funding military operations of the movement.

of payoffs. See below for the complete set of considerations used to profile candidate cases and the logic for final case selection.

Practical Considerations There is inevitably a set of practical considerations that all researchers need to account for when selecting cases for use in research. I planned to use only secondary sources for this research. The availability of sufficient relevant publicly available secondary sources about the case was, therefore, the first among a variety of factors that affected my choices of cases. Another major practical constraint has been the quantity of cases that I have assessed given the need to delve in depth into two significant events per case. The in-depth assessment is necessary given the highly interpretive nature of the analysis and the need to triangulate multiple sources to assess changes in organizational strength and the level of legitimation. I have relied exclusively on secondary sources given the nature of the investigation and the considerable limitations in access to these groups due to their secret (or defunct) nature of these organizations53. The available sources have been suitable for purposes analyzing the states of legitimation and the levels of organizational resilience for each of the cases I have chosen.

While I believe that there is no inherent reason for legitimated power to operate in only mature insurgencies, in my dissertation I only seek to make claims about the theoretical importance of legitimated power for insurgencies that have

53 In consultation with my committee, we also concluded that the political representatives were unlikely to share more in depth perspective than the public record already included (in the form of speeches, analyst reports, journalistic reports in the media or other historical sources).

endured over 15 years and have at least entered the latter stages of their growth stage. In future research, I will investigate the operation of legitimated power in different parts of the organizational lifecycle.

Cases Selected Below is the set of 8 original candidates for selection as cases for my dissertation.

National Sinn Fein/ Lord's Liberation Front Tamil Tigers Canddidate Insurgencies\ Hezbollah Hamas Provisional IRA PLO Taliban Resistance Army (Viet Cong) (LTTE) Case Selection Criteria (Variation in:…) Voluntary and Voluntary and Voluntary and Voluntary Primary Recruitment Forced Forced Forced and Forced Strategies for Fighting Force Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Conscription Conscription Conscription Conscription Violence Used Against the Followers? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (desisted as part of Good Have Used the insurgent form Friday Yes (desisted as of violence at one time in Agreement part of Oslo their organizational life Yes Yes 1998) Accords 1993) Yes Yes Yes Yes Geography Middle East Middle East EU Middle East Central Asia Africa Southeast Asia South Asia Islamic Western Republic/ Presidential Presidential Presidential Regime Type Consociational Trusteeship democracy Trusteeship Emirate Republic Republic Republic Overthrow of Resistance to Resistance to Overthrow of South Vietnam Establish a Israel and Israel/ incumbent gov govt; establish separate Western Establish of Afghanistan communist state for Powers (US, Palestinian Nationalism/unif Independent (establish Overthrow of government; Tamils in Stated Goals of the UK)/eliminate State/ ication; Evict Palestinian Islamic Ugandan unify north and existing Sri Insurgency Israel eliminate Israel British occupiers State Republic) Government south Lanka Islam (Sunni)/ Nationalism/Co Islam (Shia)/ Nationalism/ Nationalism Nationalism Islam (Sunni)/ Syncretic/ mmunism/ Important Belief Systems Anticolonialism anticolonilsm /anticolonialism /anticolonialism anticolonialism religious anticolonialsm Nationalism Governing now or at any time at national level? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (deposed) No Yes No Importance of Support of the Masses High High High High High High High High Criminal Operations are Primary Source of Funds for Operations No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Provide extensive social services outside existing government Yes Yes No No Unknown No No No >20 Years > 30 years Age (as of 2012); active (inactive in (defeated in unless specified otherwise >30 years >25 years >40 years > 40 years >15 years > 20 years 1976) 2009)

Figure 3 - Pool of Candidate Cases

Given the case selection logic outlined above, I have chosen the following three candidates for use in my dissertation:

• Hezbollah • Hamas

• Sinn Fein/Provisional IRA

Selected Cases

Sinn Fein/ Canddidate Insurgencies\ Hezbollah Hamas Provisional IRA Case Selection Criteria (Variation in:…)

Primary Recruitment Strategies for Fighting Force Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Violence Used Against the Followers? Yes Yes Yes Yes (desisted as part of Good Have Used the insurgent form Friday of violence at one time in Agreement their organizational life Yes Yes 1998) Geography Middle East Middle East EU

Western Regime Type Consociational Trusteeship democracy

Resistance to Resistance to Israel and Israel/ Western Establish Powers (US, Palestinian Nationalism/unif Stated Goals of the UK)/eliminate State/ ication; Evict Insurgency Israel eliminate Israel British occupiers Islam (Sunni)/ Islam (Shia)/ Nationalism/ Nationalism Important Belief Systems Anticolonialism anticolonilsm /anticolonialism Governing now or at any time at national level? Yes Yes Yes Importance of Support of the Masses High High High Criminal Operations are Primary Source of Funds for Operations No No Yes Provide extensive social services outside existing government Yes Yes No

Age (as of 2012); active unless specified otherwise >30 years >25 years >40 years Figure 4 - Selected Cases

Final Case Selection Logic Each of these three cases fit the basic profile of the groups I seek as the object of this research – resilient mass movements that want to transform their societies and that are willing to use violence instrumentally to achieve their political goals.

They are mature political/military organizations that have been in existence for at least 25 years as of 2012. They have publicly claimed transformative goals and have employed violence54 instrumentally against rivals (insurgency as defined earlier), the state or foreign occupiers55 at some time in their organizational lives in order to achieve their political goals. Each of these three organizations relied on the support of the masses and have also evolved to more selective recruiting of their core and reserve military forces (versus forced or mass conscription) as they have matured.

They have used violence against their followers at some point to coerce their followers to submit to their authority. Each of these groups also featured a strong narrative about a transcendent belief system (e.g., Islam, nationalism) that they used to attract and unify their followers (not just fighters) in spite of other cleavages that might have fragmented the target of the movement’s legitimation efforts (e.g., clan/family affiliation, political strategies, role of violence). In all cases, it is arguable that they would be coded as ethnic groups who, at one time, have been excluded from power due at least in part to their ethnicity (Hezbollah as Shia, Hamas as

Palestinian Muslims, SF/PIRA as Catholics).

54 Violence has come in the form of terrorism, guerilla warfare and/or insurgency. The campaign of violence is typically not built around a daily military operations tempo but used strategically to achieve the goals of the movement. 55 Foreign occupiers as seen through the eyes of the movement’s leadership.

These three cases provide me with variation around geography, regime type, stated goals, primary funding strategies (state sponsors vs. criminal operations) and material payoffs of the movement (e.g., security vs. security and social services).

These last two variations allow me to better understand two particularly important conditions of power legitimation that I seek to understand in this research. First, to what extent is the power legitimation of the movement affected by its primary funding sources? Second, in the absence of extensive extra-governmental social services, to what extent and under what conditions does criminal operations affect the legitimation of power?

The selection of the Sinn Fein/PIRA case will also allow me to understand the impact on power legitimation of the abandonment of the military capability of the movement (as part of a negotiated peace process). In contrast, as of the end of 2012

Hamas and Hezbollah remain as active political and military organizations.

This case set limits my theoretical reach into the impact of recruitment strategies (forced or mass conscription vs. voluntary) on power legitimation and any claims about the impact of geography beyond the Middle East and the EU. I do not consider these limits critical at this stage of the research.

One domain constraint that is significant and will be rectified in the next iteration of this research is the limitation to only mature insurgencies. This constraint will limit the strength of my claims to a much smaller collection of insurgencies and to those in a later stage of the life cycle.

65 Chapter 2 - Measurement Framework

Once the cases are selected, the approach to testing the hypotheses in this research consists of five basic steps: a.) locate the anchor point of the organization; b.) select the two shock events; c.) test for organizational resilience; d.) test for the state of legitimation at the time of each shock; e.) assess the plausibility of the null vs. the alternative hypothesis. These steps are captured in the diagram below.

Figure 5 - Case Evaluation Process

Locate the Anchor Point To achieve the goal of understanding the shocks for relatively more mature insurgencies I will locate an event/series of events in the organization’s lifecycle

(versus the simple passing of time) that demonstrates its viability as an insurgency that is a ‘going concern’. I will first locate the stage of the insurgency – which I will

refer to as the ‘Anchor Point’- based on the various organizational characteristics that scholars have used to locate organizations in a life cycle (Miller & Friesen 1984;

Drazin & Kazanjian 1990). In addition, to confirm further the location of the Anchor

Point for these cases, I will identify different forms of the achievement of important stated goals (e.g., capture of territory, eviction of a foreign power, organizational size, political success in competitive elections, battlefield successes) that would aid in demonstrating the viability of the insurgency as a going concern. The two shocks I will evaluate will follow in time after the Anchor Point. The timing and nature of any social deposits would be analyzed for up to 5 years prior to the Anchor Point.

Select Two Shock Events I will then select two external shocks for each of the organizations under study. The shocks selected for each case will be of such a severity that one could logically doubt the organization’s ability to perform as needed or expected or give rise to fundamental doubts about the basic need for the insurgency to exist. The shocks will be separated in time (at least 2 years apart) to be able to better isolate the organizational effects of a given shock. As noted earlier, there are three components to the shock event that I use to frame a shock event: time, nature and type. Each is discussed below.

With regards to time, shocks to an organization can occur in two basic time frames: abrupt events that create a crisis for the organization in a very compact time frame (days or weeks); and, a slower form of cumulative stressors (months or years) that may or may not evoke a response from the organization to redress the change in their environment (Hwang & Lichtenthal 1999). I will test both types of

shocks in this research to determine if there are differential effects by the time dimension of the shock.

With regards to the nature of the shock I am adopting the scheme used by

Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and isolating the nature of the challenge that the shock represents to the organization into two categories: Performance-oriented challenges that are based on the belief that the organization has failed to achieve its goals and/or its mission; and, Values-oriented challenges that are based on the belief that the organization’s very mission is at issue regardless of how well it is positioned to achieve its goals. Both types will be tested in each case to determine if there is a differential impact by the nature of the shock.

The third and final component of the framework to select and analyze the shock is its type. I will draw on Weinstein’s (2006) scheme for his research on the organization of rebellion: 1.) major loss on the battlefield; 2.) loss of a major sponsor’s financial or political support; 3.) pending victory; and, 4.) repressive action by the state (or a foreign occupier).

See table below for a graphic depiction of the scheme that I will use for framing a shock to be analyzed for each of the organizations to be studied. I will discuss the details of the events selected for each case in the subsequent chapters.

Figure 6 - Scheme for Framing a Shock

Test for Organizational Resilience The next step in the process is to evaluate the organizational strength within two years prior to and following the shock and test for organizational resilience.

Primary and secondary evidence will be reviewed to assist in the evaluation of the subcomponents for each of the four elements of organizational strength: Political,

Military, and Economic. Based on the outcome of that research a comparative evaluation will be conducted to discern whether there is reasonable evidence to conclude that the organizational strength of the organization has been degraded or remained relatively constant or has increased. To the extent that the organizational strength has remained the same or increased when compared to the levels prior to the shock then the organization will be coded as demonstrating resilience for that particular shock event.

The subcomponents of Political Strength that I will consider pre and post shock include:

Figure 7 - Political Strength Evidence Considerations

Subcomponent+ Evidence+to+Consider+ Popular(Support( • Compe..ve(elec.on(results( • Polls( • Civil(disobedience((e.g.,(rallies,(strikes)(( Geographic(&( • Support(over(a(geographic(range((within(state(and( Demographic(Scope( beyond)( of(Inﬂuence( • Support(across(major(poli.cal(cleavages((e.g.,(race/ ethnicity,(creed,(educa.on,(income)( Alliances(( • Nature(and(extent(of(alliances((i.e.,(with(whom,(logic/ payoﬀ)( • Durability(of(rela.onship((

The subcomponents of Military Strength that I will consider pre and post shock include:

Figure 8 - Military Strength Evidence Considerations

Subcomponent+ Examples+of+Evidence+to+Consider+ Nature'and'Extent'of' • Level'of'opera0ons'(frequency,'volume,'lethality)' Opera0ons' • Type'of'opera0ons'(e.g.,'terror,'guerilla,'conven0onal)' • Targe0ng' • Range'of'opera0ons'(domes0c'and'foreign)'' Nature'and'Extent'of' • Scope'of'arsenal'used' Military'Capabili0es' • Extent'of'arsenal'available' • Military'command'and'control'

The subcomponents of Economic Strength that I will consider pre and post shock include:

Figure 9 - Economic Strength Evidence Considerations

Subcomponent+ Evidence+to+Consider+ Scope&&&Extent&of& • Scope&and&extent&of&funding&from&sponsors&(all&forms)& Contribu2ons&from& • Consistency&of&funding& Major&Sponsors& Scope&and&Extent&of& • Level&of&funding&from&charitable&networks&(“retail”)& Contribu2ons&from& • Level&and&nature&of&funding&from&wealthy&donors&(e.g.,& Other&sources& Diaspora)& Ability&to&Generate& • Level&of&selfLgenerated&income&from&business& Income&from& investments&or&business&interests&(e.g.,&banking,&social& Commercial&& services)& Opera2ons& • Level&of&selfLgenerated&income&from&criminal& opera2ons&

Upon determination of the demonstration of resilience or lack of resilience, I will then assess the state of legitimation of the organization at the time of the shock event. This process is outlined in the following section.

Tests of the State of Legitimation In order to gain empirical traction on the state of legitimation of the organization, the analyst needs to locate their social investments across time and target audience. To be sure that the analyst ‘knows it when he or she sees it’ this process needs to be guided by a specific set of ex ante tests for the presence or absence of legitimation of the organization. For purposes of this research the tests are structured into three groups that correspond to the three social action levers discussed in the prior chapter: 1.) Vision, Mission and Values; 2.) Methods of

Operations; and 3.) Outputs.

As noted previously, this research will also test for the suitability of the six indicators of power legitimation as well as the levels that should be observed when

power is legitimated. It is highly likely that, though theoretically sound, some of the indicators of legitimation of power are less relevant and/or are only needed in lower levels. There are likely interaction effects between and among different indicators as well. The results of this iteration of the research will provide me with greater insight to the relevance of an indicator, the level needed to produce resilience, the changing standard for levels of an indicator over time and any interaction effects. This iteration will only allow me to judge the legitimation structure that is appropriate to legitimate a mature insurgency. There are likely differences in levels of legitimation necessary to originate legitimacy versus maintain achieved levels or to recover lost levels (Suchman 1995). Future iterations will address these nuances of power legitimation. Finally, in this iteration of the research I have also allocated equal importance to each of the indicators of power legitimation which may or may not be empirically supported. The outcome of this research will provide me with the first insights to the reasonableness of this assumption.

Before I outline the specifics of these tests I will briefly discuss the foci for the organization’s power legitimation efforts.

Audiences for Legitimating the Organization’s Power There are at least six different audiences that the organization could focus on in the execution of its legitimation effort. The figure below depicts these six graphically:

Figure 10 - Scope of Audiences for Legitimation

For purposes of this research I will concentrate on the organization’s efforts to legitimate its power to Followers, Sympathizers, Alliance Partners and

Sponsors/Donors. The international community and rivals are important audiences but I have excluded them from the scope of this work to be able to concentrate on the audiences for whom the organization will directly draw its political, economic and military power. Through their actions rivals (within which I include the

State)_may ease the legitimation process for an organization (e.g., Fatah’s reputation for corruption and its impact on Hamas’ political opportunities; Israel’s harsh repression of Lebanon and Gaza) and I will note these contrasts but not evaluate

legitimation strategies through the lens of the rival/organization dynamic. I will also not consider the utility of the organization’s legitimation strategies through the eyes of the international community though I will account for system and region level events that could impact the organization’s dynamics. In most instances, I have collapsed the Follower and Sympathizer into one audience when considering the impact of legitimation strategies. In this research sponsors tend be state sponsors such as Iran or Libya. Donors are generally wealthy persons in either the Diaspora or domestically.

As part of this research I will explain the impact on the organization’s legitimation structure that results from its attempts to legitimate itself to multiple audiences with differing goals or needs. Given the varying goals and interests of the different audiences, an organization could become conflicted and confounded in the design and execution of a power legitimation strategy. For example, Sponsor or

Donors may not be as sensitive to the organization’s use of coercive violence as the

Followers and Sympathizers would be. In contrast, the Alliance Partners may be more sensitive to an organization’s level of autonomy with respect to its sponsors.

These cross-cutting interests could dilute an organization’s attempts to legitimate itself to a complex configuration of audiences and thereby compromise its resilience

(if legitimation of power has a causal impact on resilience).

Vision, Mission and Values

‘Cheap Talk’ Test – how well does the discourse at the Vision, Mission and

Values (VMV) level align with (and remain aligned with) the Methods of Operation

and Outcomes levels? Organizations that depend on the trust and support of the masses for the conduct of their political or commercial activity need to ensure that the social investments they make at the ‘Mission, Vision & Values’ layer align with the ‘Outputs’ and ‘Methods of Operation’ layers of their web of social investments over time. This discursive layer of social investments acts as a constraint on the other layers – the organization needs to ‘walk its talk’ or else risk weakening or destroying the power of its discursive layer of actions.

This research will focus on the primary elements (i.e., the ‘super priorities’) at the VMV level and evaluate conformity. An example of a super priority would be

Hezbollah’s commitment to the eviction of all imperialist powers from Lebanon according to UNSCR 425. Another example would be Sinn Fein/Provisional IRA’s commitment to the unification of all 32 counties of Ireland and the eviction of the

British security forces from Ireland.

Where a component of the VMV level was resisted by the broader society in which the organization operated, did the organization modify that VMV component to conform to the broader societal view? Or did it persist in its attempt to impose that norm? If non-alignment is caused by the concession of a VMV component and that concession acts to build trust in an important constituency, then that will not be treated as a failure of the ‘cheap talk’ test for purposes of this research.

Methods of Operations Lever

Methods of Operations (MO) Tests - the ‘fairness in process’ component potentially provides a more timely input to the followers/others to assess the degree to which the organization is moving towards mitigating its greatest fears of exploitation by the organization. There are four MO tests as outlined below.

Figure 11 - Methods of Operations Tests

Absence of Violent Coercion Test – Modern legitimated insurgencies cannot use violence against citizens or constituents to gain their commitment to your political/ideological agenda or to persuade them to be loyal to the regime as in the leader-state model used in Hussein’s Iraq and Al-Assad’s Syria (Per Norton/Muslih

1991, “The use of violence by a government against its citizens is usually a symptom of the absence of legitimacy.”). A summary of the specific ex ante test is as follows:

Figure 12 - Absence of Violence Test

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Level of Autonomy from Sponsors Test – Especially for those who are not hard- core members of the organization, the belief that the organization is autonomous from its primary sponsors (state, elites or otherwise) and, more positively, loyal to the state they represent is an important component of legitimation of power.

Cooptation due to resource dependency is a fundamental challenge to any modern insurgency and particularly those that do not have access to ‘lootable’ resources.

Figure 13 - Level of Autonomy Tests

Level of Public Accountability Test - Modern legitimated insurgencies make themselves answerable to broader segments of society for their actions and their

overall policies – and there are institutional means to call them to account. This limits the potential for the appearance and the fact of abuse of entrusted power for private gain (i.e., corruption).

Legitimated modern insurgencies are built on the premise that the organization is not a ‘vanguard’ per se in the sense of the traditional Communist models. They depend on continuous engagement and consultation with their ‘rings of supporters’ from hard-core founding members to more loosely federated sympathizers. The insurgency cannot afford to lose the ‘street’ by a lack of responsiveness to the needs and perceptions of the masses. Responsiveness does not imply an ‘order-taker’ model whereby the organization divines the collective needs and then seeks to deliver on them. While this may be true in some (perhaps most) cases, the organization will also need to often transform society and then to manage the change process to enable the masses to embrace the transformational aspect of the political agenda.

To ensure the followers that the interests of the collective is first in the minds of the leaders of the organization, the organization needs to demonstrate the primacy of the collective cause by avoiding the appearance or the fact of the use of conflict as a means to personal gain. Be like Che Guevara or Fidel Castro vs. Charles Taylor

(National Patriotic Front of Liberia) or Joseph Kony (Lord’s Resistance Army).

Figure 14 - Level of Public Accountability Test

Level of Professionalism Test – While delivery on outcomes (see below) may require a long-term to complete (i.e., fairness in outcomes), the followers can gain a sense for the legitimacy of an insurgent organization based on their level of professionalism which is reflected in the efficiency, innovativeness (i.e., are they rational) and fairness (are they aligned with our norms and values – or at least norms and values we would want in our political leaders) of the way in which they conduct the political and military affairs of the organization. The level of the efficiency, fairness and innovativeness in the leadership, administration and operations is built on the notion of a Weberian of a rational and legal bureaucratic operation.

Figure 15 - Level of Professionalism Test

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Outcomes Lever

Outcomes Tests (OT) - This set of tests builds on the ‘fairness in outcomes’ perspective56 on the sources of legitimacy for the modern insurgency. Outcomes can come in two basic forms: tangible and intangible. Tangible outcomes include security, social services and political achievements. Intangible outcomes include honor, pride, status, hope or other political and social identity related dimensions.

For purposes of this research, OT will include two basic tests:

Figure 16 - Outcomes Tests

56 The obedience to the group is intertwined with the utility that comes from the perception that the group provides generally more than less favorable outcomes to the follower. The outcomes seem fair and equitable to the followers. This does not account for structural injustices that favor a status quo to the disadvantage of some. This is a variation on the Weberian notion of the rational/legal form of legitimacy.

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Fairness in Outcomes Test - Modern legitimated insurgencies deliver more public goods than private goods (i.e., goods that can be enjoyed only by a selected subset of society). They are focused on the welfare of the state and commit themselves to the collective good of the state regardless of the level of support it receives from certain sectors of the state.

Nature of Outcomes Test – Modern legitimated insurgencies provide more than tangible outcomes (e.g., security, social services). They build the sense of political identity of the masses – pride, honor, integrity and a sense of meaning and purpose are enabled as a result of the tangible outcomes provided by the group.

This is designed to separate the warlords and gangsters from the nation builders that seek to build a nation on the principles of accepted norms of social justice.

Within-Case and Cross-Case Analysis Once the organization’s resilience has been determined for any given shock and the tests for the state of legitimation have been performed, I will then evaluate the merits of the null versus the alternative hypothesis within the case by matching the patterns of the legitimation structures and resilience footprints for each shock

event. I will attempt to trace the process how the legitimation strategies did or did not produce the resilience footprint to determine whether the alternative hypothesis is a plausible explanation. In general, if the organization demonstrates even qualified resilience and the organization is in a state of legitimation other than absence, then the alternative hypothesis cannot be ruled out. It follows that the larger the ‘resilience footprint’ and the higher the states of legitimation for each of the factors evaluated, the more plausible is the alternative hypothesis. Once the three cases and total of six events are fully analyzed within case, a further assessment of the conditions across case under which the null versus the alternative hypothesis will be completed. I expect this qualitative, small n research to generate new and more nuanced hypotheses about the conditional logic of the role of legitimated power in the resilience of insurgencies.

Chapter 3 – The Case of Sinn Fein and Provisional IRA

Background and Introduction to the Case

The political party, Sinn Fein, and some form of its military counterpart, the

Irish Republican Army57 (IRA), have been in existence in Ireland since the Easter

Rising in 1916. This case will focus on the version of the IRA that was born in

January 1970 and is known as the Provisional IRA58 (PIRA) and its political partner, the Provisional Sinn Fein (hereafter referred to as Sinn Fein). “Although apparently distinct physical entities, Provisional Sinn Fein and the PIRA can be considered in many ways symbiotic movements, many core members holding positions in both organizations” (Horgan 1997:1). For purposes of this research I view Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA as one and the same organization.

Sinn Fein (SF) and the PIRA formed as a splinter from the extant IRA (later to be known as the Official IRA) in 1970 due to various differences in philosophy including the use of armed force and the role of electoral politics as strategies to evict the British from Ireland and to establish a sovereign Irish nation based on the

1916 Proclamation59. SF and the PIRA launched an armed struggle against the

57 I include the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in this grouping. The IRB was the military arm active during the Easter Rising in 1916 and the military predecessor to the IRA. The IRB was established on March 17, 1858 (Curtis 1994:62). 58 The leadership team that guided the PIRA is sometimes known as the ‘69ers’ since they effectively coalesced around the street violence in Derry and Belfast that erupted in 1969 and marks the beginning of the ‘troubles’. The formal splinter of the PIRA from the Official IRA did not occur until January 1970. 59 See Vision, Mission and Values discussion later in this document for more details.

British security forces and the loyalist/unionist paramilitaries in 1970 generally known as the Troubles. The PIRA declared a ceasefire in 1994, signed a peace agreement in 1998 and formally declared and an end to its armed resistance to the

British government in July 2005. Over 3600 persons were killed during the 35 years of the Troubles - over half were civilians. “By 1998 one in seven of the population of

Northern Ireland reported being a victim of the violence. One in five had a family member killed or injured” (English 2003:379).

Given the extended duration of the Troubles, the nature of the fighting changed from one marked by more open insurrection focused primarily on

Northern Ireland (1969 to 1975) to a lower intensity guerilla war that featured small unit terrorist actions perpetrated by more highly trained volunteers not only in Northern Ireland but also Great Britain and on the European continent (1976 until the ‘Good Friday’60 Agreement was signed in 1998). A significant portion of the killings by the PIRA (approximately 41%) occurred during the period 1972-1976

(English 2003:380). Recognizing that it could not openly confront the superior might of the British military in open and continuous combat, the PIRA adopted the

‘long war’ strategy in the late 1970s – they would attempt to slowly bleed the British security forces and thereby compel them to abandon their ‘colony’ in Northern

Ireland. The PIRA sought to bleed the British army by killing its forces, high profile civilian targets such as Lord Mountbatten, bringing terror to the UK via London bombing campaigns and also bleeding it treasury. For every pound sterling raised

60 Also known formally as the Belfast Agreement. It was signed on April 10, 1998, which was also Good Friday on the Christian calendar that year.

(or its like-kind equivalent in contributed resources) by the PIRA/SF, the British had to spend 130 pounds Sterling to counteract the potential effects of that investment

(Hannigan 1985).

The notion of Britain as a colonial master to be evicted dominated the military strategy of the PIRA and the political strategy of SF from its inception. Only during the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement would there be any recognition by SF/PIRA that Britain’s interests in Northern Ireland were not solely guided by imperialist or colonial ideology. SF and the PIRA both strongly believed that only armed resistance to the British occupation in Northern Ireland would compel them to leave or to negotiate a peace that was suitable for the nationalist community in Ireland. Sinn Fein and the PIRA channeled the thinking of anti- colonial thinkers such as Franz Fanon (English 2003) and placed armed struggle at the center of its identity as a political movement. It viewed itself as part of an international group of anti-colonial/anti-imperial movements that included the PLO,

ETA and the ANC. In 1986, Adams noted that “violence is what gives the IRA its importance” (Bishop & Maile 1987:358). John Hume, who led the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) and was Sinn Fein’s primary nationalist party rival61, challenged the SF/PIRA in 1988 on the continued use of violence in the cause of nationalism: “Is the method more sacred than the cause” (Smith 1995:193).

Sinn Fein hedged its military-only strategy by beginning to compete for

61 In 1998 Hume won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to bring peace to Northern Ireland. He shared it with David Trimble, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party at the time. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1998/ (last accessed November 14, 2012).

election in the Republic of Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the House of

Commons in Great Britain in the early 1980s. Prior to 1986 Sinn Fein operated under the abstentionist policy that was in place since the end of the Irish Civil War in 1923. The abstentionist policy was repealed in 1986 after a contentious debate within the ranks of SF and the PIRA.

While committing to the electoral process, the SF/PIRA leadership was careful not to create any doubts about its commitment to armed struggle62 and preached a narrative of the ‘armalite and ballot box’63 (Hannigan 1985; Maillot

2005; Maloney 2002; Bell 1997). The two competing strategies of ‘killing and talking’ would be the pathway that the movement would stay on from 1982 until the

Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The ‘talking’ part of the strategy was bolstered by

Sinn Fein’s commitment in 1988/1989 to a pan-nationalist alliance that included political parties in Northern Ireland as well as the Republic of Ireland.

Following the Good Friday Agreement (GFA, April 1998), the implementation of the ‘peace process’ would dominate the politics of Northern Ireland until the establishment of a devolved government that was built around the power sharing constructs outlined in the GFA. Sinn Fein would grow to dominate the face of the

SF/PIRA organization as the PIRA slowly decommissioned and finally ceased its

62 One of the primary reasons for the Provisional IRA to form by splintering from the Official IRA in 1970 was the perception that the IRA leadership at the time was abandoning the armed struggle. The PIRA and SF leadership did not want to be seen as withdrawing unilaterally from the armed struggle. 63 See this video for a view of a senior SF leader (Danny Morrison) in 2011 regarding the ultimate utility of the ‘armalite and ballot box’ strategy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XFr0T8Etes (last accessed November 10, 2012)

military campaign in July 2005.

Events to Study For purposes of analyzing the level of explanatory power of legitimated power with regards to the production of SF/PIRA resilience, I explore two relatively short periods that include multiple shock events. In contrast to the other cases, I used a series of smaller shocks over a brief period for this case (i.e., the cumulative stress form of shock). Given the nature of the low intensity guerilla campaign that typified the PIRA operations between 1976 and 1997 and the dominant role of the slow-moving peace process that ensued, I concluded that this was a more appropriate approach for this case in contrast to the two other cases. This also allows me to explore any differential impact of shock type on the legitimation/resilience dynamic.

The performance challenge that will be studied occurred between May 1987 and March 1988. This shock sequence includes a set of four events that include setbacks on the battlefield and sponsorship losses. Specifically, the events are: the

Loughgall incident (May 1987), the capture of the Eksund (November 1997), the

Enniskillen Bombing (November 1987) and the Gibraltar incident (March 1988).

This was during the period of the Troubles where the PIRA was the dominant partner and, after the period 1972 to 1977, this was arguably the most violent and bloody period of the entire conflict in Northern Ireland.

The values challenge shock that will be studied for the SF/PIRA case will be reviewed occurs over the period December 2004 to January 2005. The context for

this part of the analysis was a very different one than the first shock sequence in

1987/1988 when the PIRA was the dominant partner in the movement.

“The peace process and the IRA ceasefires propelled Sinn Fein into the limelight, affording its leaders coverage on the airwaves and a degree of credibility that they had been denied for years. From its inception and especially since the Downing Street Declaration of December 199364, the peace process has been, arguably, one of the most important news stories coming out of Ireland, and considering the role that Sinn Fein played in it, it has greatly contributed to casting the party in a different light. Progressively, Sinn Fein started to replace the IRA in headline stories covering the Republican Movement, a new status which the party seemed keen to retain. With a blend of activism and conciliation, Sinn Fein leaders opted for respectability, while at the same time cultivating the their working class roots and claiming a historical legacy, one which pulled together revolutionary politics and armed struggle. In the process, they fashioned an image that captured this new-found confidence, and were keen to come across as serious, trustworthy and professional politicians” (Maillot 2005:73).

This shock sequence which includes the brutal murder by the PIRA of an innocent Catholic citizen, Robert McCartney (January 2005), and the robbery of the

Northern Bank of an estimated $US 42 million allegedly by the PIRA (December

2004) needs to be viewed through the lens of the new-found image of Sinn Fein and the PIRA that flowed from the peace process.

Specific Shocks to be Studied in the SF/PIRA Case The Performance Challenge

Shocks that raised fundamental doubts about PIRA’s ability to conduct the Guerilla

War – May 1987 to March 1988: The ten months ending in March 1988 were very debilitating for the PIRA and SF. A series of operational losses seriously degraded the ability of the PIRA to conduct the type of guerilla war it believed could truly

64 http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=8734 (last accessed November 12, 2012).

compel the British to leave Northern Ireland (i.e., the so-called ‘Tet Offensive’ as outlined by several scholars including Smith 1995; Maloney 2002; Bell 1997).

Further, a series of mistakes in the execution of its bombing operations triggered public outrage against SF and the PIRA. The operational losses demonstrated clearly that the PIRA had largely lost the element of surprise due to very effective and longstanding British intelligence penetration of its organization. The insensitivity or inability to limit collateral damage in its operations was no longer acceptable to their followers let alone the general public.

Performance Shock 1: On May 8, 1987, the PIRA planned and executed an attack on an RUC station in Loughgall, Northern Ireland.

“An Irish Republican Army gang had already destroyed two Royal Ulster Constabulary police stations when intelligence was received that they were planning an attack on a third - the police station at Loughgall, in County Armagh. A predecessor of the British Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) operating in Northern Ireland, 14 Intelligence Company, closely followed their preparations. When they arrived at the station on the evening of 8 May with a 200lb bomb in a digger, the station was empty apart from one SAS officer - but 24 others were in hiding outside. As the bomb was detonated, the SAS opened fire. Eight IRA men and one passer-by died. It was the IRA's biggest loss of life in a single incident.”65 Performance Shock 2: On November 1, 1987, a shipment of 150 tons of weapons from Libya enroute to the PIRA forces in the Republic of Ireland was intercepted

65 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13287133 (last accessed November 12, 1988).

and seized by the French government66. Libya ceased all material support to the

PIRA as a result of this event.

“…As the Eksund left Libya, it was being monitored by MI6 and the French intelligence services and tracked by a Royal Navy hunter–killer submarine. When the crew saw a spotter plane overhead as the vessel was five miles off Roscoff, Hopkins messaged Murphy: "Pender to Halliday. The unloading of cargo date plus 17." This was the prearranged code stating that the Eksund and its cargo were about to be scuttled. Two tons of Semtex, 1,000 Romanian made AK–47s, 1,000 mortars, 600 Soviet F1 grenades, 120 RPG–7s, 20 SAM–7s, 10 DShKs, 2,000 electric detonators, 4,700 fuses and more than a million rounds of ammunition were found in the hold of the Eksund. Hopkins and four IRA men were arrested, convicted and jailed.”67

Performance Shock 3: On November 8, 1987 – Remembrance Day – 11 civilians were killed and 63 injured when an IRA bomb exploded. The alleged target was meant to kill UDR soldiers marching to the monument but instead the blast killed or injured mostly pensioners and other innocent bystanders.

“The Irish Republican Army rarely second guesses itself about the violent attacks that have claimed hundreds of lives in Northern Ireland in the last 17 years. But after one of its bombs killed 11 people at a memorial service for veterans in Enniskillen last Sunday, the outlawed organization issued its second apology in five years.”68 ‘The national and international outrage (at the bombing) was such that the Republican Movement was rocked to its foundation” (O’Brien 1993:142).

66 http://www.csmonitor.com/1987/1109/oship.html (last accessed November 12,2012) 67 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/8425593/Libyan- arms-helped-the-IRA-to-wage-war.html (last accessed November 12, 2012) 68 http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/15/weekinreview/the-world-terrorism- with-latest-bomb-ira-injures-its-own-cause.html (last accessed November 12, 2012)

Performance Shock 4: On March 6, 1988, three unarmed PIRA operatives were killed by the SAS on Gibraltar. The three were intending to plant a 500 pound bomb and kill British soldiers in an upcoming changing of the guard ceremony near the British governor’s mansion on Gibraltar. The British and Spanish intelligence agencies compromised the PIRA early in the lifecycle of this operation - the three were tracked for weeks prior to the intended bombing and killed before they could plant the bomb.

“The terrorists' target was the band and guard of the 1st Battalion Royal Anglican Regiment, which arrived in Gibraltar recently after a tour of duty in Northern Ireland. Army intelligence officers have been expecting an IRA attack on a military target for some months after a series of setbacks for the Provisionals. Reports say 20 members of the IRA have been killed in the past 15 months.”69

These significant events during the 10 months ending March 8, 1988 expose a PIRA that had been operationally compromised either due to counter intelligence or to weak command and control of the field units. Sinn Fein suffered politically and militarily but held on to the core faithful in the movement (except in the local council elections in Fermanagh).

The Values Challenge

Shocks that raised fundamental doubts about the ability of Sinn Fein to govern –

December 2004 – January 2005: Over 6 years after the Good Friday Agreement had been settled, two events occurred that created grave doubt about the status of the peace agreement, Sinn Fein’s ability to govern and the potential for a return to

69http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/7/newsid_2516000/2 516155.stm (last accessed November 13, 2012)

violence by the PIRA. Sinn Fein and the PIRA had largely avoided (or managed to blunt) adverse political damage with respect to the PIRA’s criminal behavior until this point. But the ruthlessness, sophistication and massive scale of the robbery as well as the brutality of McCartney’s murder and subsequent mishandling of the incident by the SF/PIRA leadership70, created a strong sense in the region and internationally that Sinn Fein was not competent to serve in government71 and that the PIRA had lost all semblance of a political resistance movement and had become just another illegal crime syndicate.

Value Shock 1: On December 20, 2004, the Northern Bank branch in Belfast was robbed of $US 42 million – the largest bank robbery in UK or Irish history at the time. Due to the sophistication of the operation, the ruthlessness of the treatment of hostages and the criminal history of the PIRA regarding bank robberies, the PIRA was implicated almost immediately as the perpetrator.72 The Independent

Monitoring Commission’s report in February 2005 (IMC 2005) laid blame squarely on the PIRA and held Sinn Fein responsible for not doing all in its power to deter the

PIRA from criminal activity and for violating the trust of the peace process73.

70 After PIRA attempts to intimidate the witnesses, the leadership of the PIRA offered to shoot the alleged killers. 71 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4163331.stm (last accessed November 15, 2012). 72 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/dec/22/ukcrime.northernireland (last accessed on November 12, 2012) 73 “Parties to the Good Friday Agreement affirmed their total and absolute commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means of resolving differences on political issues and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose” (IMC 2005:6).

“The impact of the Northern Bank raid on the political process is "deeply damaging", Paul Murphy has said. The Northern Ireland secretary said the chief constable, who blamed the IRA for the raid, "did not rush to judgment". He challenged the IRA and Sinn Fein to state their positions and responses on the £26.5m bank robbery.”74

Tony Blair (PM Great Britain) and Bertie Ahern (Prime Minister of Republic of Ireland) put heavy pressure on Sinn Fein and the PIRA to disavow all forms of criminality and to function as a purely democratic political party or else they would be excluded from the government in Northern Ireland and the Republic. They emphasized that “progress can be made only if we get a clear position, which means a road that brings us to the end of criminality, decommissioning and paramilitarism.” (O’Donnell 2007:178-179)

Value Shock 2: On January 30, 2005, the brutal murder of a Catholic civilian,

Robert McCartney, by PIRA members in what appeared to be a simple bar brawl and the subsequent attempts by the PIRA to intimidate the witnesses created a local75, regional and international76 77firestorm of controversy for Sinn Fein and the PIRA.

“Robert McCartney's death was not the result of a violent confrontation between loyalists and nationalists on one of Belfast's most troubled fault lines. The popular 33-year-old was killed during a savage bar brawl and residents blame the local IRA. The past week has seen an unprecedented turning point in local attitudes towards the IRA. More than 600 people gathered for a candlelight street vigil in defiance of Mr. McCartney's killers. Residents in the Short Strand, which has suffered decades of sectarian violence, would once not have challenged the standing of the IRA, seen as defenders of the community. But some said the vigil was a sign of the growing unease at the criminal activities of what one person called a "Goodfellas" gang of IRA "peacetime" paramilitaries. People complained of IRA punishment beatings, racketeering, intimidation and sexual violence over recent years. In an area with its own republican murals, once unthinkable graffiti appeared on one wall last week:

74 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4163331.stm (last accessed November 15, 2012). 75 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/28/northernireland.northernireland (last accessed on November 12, 2012). 76 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4359491.stm (last accessed on November 12, 2012). 77 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4352035.stm last accessed on November 12, 2012).

PIRA [Provisional IRA] scum out.”78

International and Regional Context for Events The two shock sequences selected occurred in the context of a variety of major regional and international events that potentially influenced the flow of the legitimation dynamics of SF/PIRA. The case analysis will account for these major events to the extent they play into the legitimation dynamics of the organization.

78 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/09/northernireland.angeliquechrisafis (last accessed on November 12, 2012).

Country of Country of Event Date - Start Date - End Origin Event Type War between Great Britain and Disputed Argentina - Falklands Territories of the (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ Great Falkland Islands War -South uk-17444526) Apr-82 Jun-82 Britain/Argentina (Malvinas) America US hostilities with Libya (Libyan sponsored terrorism US (assistance Counter- continues beyond these dates; from Great terrorism e.g.,Lockerbie) Mar-86 Apr-86 Britain) Libya Initiative First Intifada in Palestinian Political Territories (PLO and others) Change - that culminates in the Oslo Palestinian Palestinian Model Accords in 1993. Dec-87 Dec-93 Territories Territories Movements ETA history of ceasefires and Political peace negotiations. Ultimately Change - desist from all violence in Model 2011. Jan-88 Mar-06 Spain Spain Movements Political Unrest in Fall of the Berlin Wall Nov-89 Nov-89 East Germany East Germany Region War to expel Iraq from Kuwait War - Middle (UN sponsored coalition) Jan-90 Feb-90 Iraq/Kuwait Iraq/Kuwait East African National Congress 'unbanned' allowing for the eventual formation of a democratic government. ANC Political wins 62.5 % of vote and Change - assumes power of SA Model government. Feb-90 Apr-94 South Africa South Africa Movements Political Unrest in German Reunification Oct-90 Oct-90 Germany Germany Region Change in Global Polarity (Pax Americana - New World Dissolution of the USSR Dec-91 Cuurent USSR USSR Order) Second Intifada in Palestinian Palestinian Palestinian War - Middle Territories Sep-00 2005 Territories/Israel Territories East Al Qaeda attacks on US Sep-01 Non-State Actor US Current (or some Counter- US launches its Global War on variation US/UK and terrorism Terror Oct-01 thereof) coalition (non UN) Global Initiative

US/UK and Afghanistan/Pakis War - South US led war in Afghanistan Oct-01 Current coalition (non UN) tan Asia

US/UK and War - Middle Second Iraq War Mar-03 Dec-11 coalition (non UN) Iraq East Figure 17 - International and Regional Context: SF PIRA

“In the late 1980s/early 1990s the tide of history was moving away from revolutionary movements as a means to challenge the established order" (Bean &

Hayes 2009:127). In addition to the peace agreements by the PLO (1992- 1993), the

ANC (1991 – 1994) and ETA (various ceasefires), some scholars (Bean and Hayes

2009; Maillot 2005) contend that as the promise of communism faded with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR and the reunification of

Germany, the SF and the PIRA were influenced to move more aggressively towards a peaceful settlement (the exogenous factors argument). Other scholars (e.g., Murray

& Tonge 2005: 266) leaned more towards endogenous factors to explain the events that led to end of the armed campaign and a more fully democratic environment in

Northern Ireland. These scholars cite the overwhelming commitment as of 2001 by both SDLP supporters (90%) and Sinn Fein supporters (72%) for decommissioning and the peace process. But even well before the peace process got underway,

Maloney (2002) and Bell (1997) both point to the Falklands war in 1982 as an important factor in SF/PIRA thinking regarding the merit of armed struggle. They argue that the PIRA and SF had to conclude that if Britain was prepared to expend its military resources on the defense of a set of distant islands, it would surely be prepared for a long, bloody fight for Northern Ireland. SF needed an electoral strategy and a peace strategy. Armed struggle would be useful as a means to improve their bargaining position when the time was right.79

The catastrophe of 9/11 triggered the global counter-terror campaign then known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The US spearheaded this effort which included wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and numerous operations to disrupt, capture

79 See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, 1966

and kill alleged enemies of the state that were complicit in the 9/11 events. The impact of 9/11 undoubtedly raised the ‘bar’ for power legitimation as it related to the US audience. The tolerance for violence as a means to gain political rights had been in decline and 9/11 emphatically ended that tolerance in the US. The PIRA was de-listed in 1995 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization80 but came under duress as a result of the Columbia incident in 2001 (discussed below). The US as a whole was a major benefactor to the Irish pan-nationalist cause – The US government was a major contributor to the International Fund for Ireland81 (Maillot 2003:139), US businesses were a major source of job creation through foreign direct investment, and US individual citizens were a major source of charitable contributions to Sinn

Fein via the Friends of Sinn Fein. The PIRA and SF knew it could hardly afford a falling out with the US government and its US supporters regardless of what the SF and PIRA leadership felt about what they believed to be the bellicose foreign policies of the Bush Administration. It surely influenced the movement’s strategic commitments to a fully democratic process to reconcile the political differences with

Great Britain and the loyalist communities in Northern Ireland.

80 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last accessed November 12, 2012). The PIRA was listed as an FTO after the breakdown in the ceasefire in 1996 but de-listed again in 1997. Note that two splinters from the PIRA were listed as FTOs: the Real IRA in 2001 and the Continuity IRA in 2004. 81 The IFI was established in 1986 by the British and Irish governments to facilitate dialogue between nationalist and loyalist communities.

Loughghall, Eksund, Enniskillen & Gibraltar – 1987/1988

Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of SF/PIRA: 1986 - 1990 As noted earlier, for purposes of this research, organizational strength consists of three basic components: 1.) political strength, 2.) military strength, and,

3.) economic strength. I will discuss each component in turn and assess the nature and extent of how it has changed from 1986 through 1990. This time bracket allows me to observe organizational strength change two years prior to and after the shock period under study. The theoretical logic for choosing these types of actions to measure as evidence to test for changes in the level of organizational is explained more fully in an earlier chapter.

Political Strength The primary observations regarding the change in SF/PIRA’s political strength during the period 1986 to 1990 are included in the following table:

Table 1 - SF PIRA Political Strength Evidence: 1986-1990

Major Category Observations

Popular Support . The Provisional Sinn Fein’s electoral success in all legislative bodies in which they competed for election (NI Assembly, Westminster and the Dail) remained relatively flat during the period 1986 to 199082 . Political appeal of the party during this period was limited to about 10% of the electorate in Northern Ireland and

82 (http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ (last accessed November 12, 2012). See also, Maloney 2002, Bell 1997.

83 (http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ (last accessed November 12, 2012). See also, Maloney 2002, Bell 1997

between 1 and 2% in the Republic.83

. During this time period, Sinn Fein’s primary support base was limited to the Catholic ghettoes of Northern Ireland (Maillot 2005:4-5; Patterson 1997:228). . Sinn Fein did not take a Marxist, class- based approach to its rebellion and direct its efforts to all of the poor regardless of creed – it was about the

Catholic poor in the North. Its limited appeal in the South was due to the fact it was viewed as a one-issue party (unification via armed struggle) and was a latecomer to understanding that Geographic/Demographic the majority of citizens in the Republic Scope of Influence accepted their government as legitimate (Maillot 2005; Maloney 2002; Bell 1997, Patterson 1997). . Sinn Fein and the PIRA had, until the late 1980s, viewed the government of the Republic of Ireland as illegitimate in that it was a descendant of the de Velara government from 1926 who had accepted the partition of Ireland (Maloney 2002, Bell 1997, Patterson 1997). This view also limited their appeal in the Republic at that time.

. The most notable alliance that Sinn Fein built during this period is the linkage with the SDLP and a broader cross- section of pressure groups and nationalist political parties that ultimately produced a broader nationalist front across all of Ireland. Alliances This began to take shape in 1988/1989 (Maloney 2002; Maillot 2005; English 2003; Beans and Hayes 2009).

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. Sinn Fein had to build this alliance since it had been politically isolated as a result of the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985. The cost to Sinn Fein of building this alliance was to moderate the party’s political position (i.e., the far left wing of the nationalist community) by eschewing its more radical ‘marxist esperanto’ (Smith 1995:191).

Conclusions

Sinn Fein’s emergence as a political force in the broader nationalist community in Northern Ireland and the Republic stalled during this period.

Perceived as a one-issue-party by most outside its most ardent supporters, they could not muster greater than 10% in general elections in the North and a paltry 1% to 2% in the Republic. A vote for Sinn Fein was largely seen as a vote for continued violence regardless of SF’s rhetoric to the contrary. Most in the north and virtually all in the South were tired of the death and misery of the Troubles and saw little return for the struggles of the prior 20 years. The PIRA was the dominant face of the movement to the public and SF’s political rhetoric was not persuasive enough to carry their message beyond their core followers. Politically and militarily, SF/PIRA was stagnating and at increasing risk of irrelevance unless it steered a political course beyond what it had been doing for the last 10 years.

Recognizing the political dilemma and the reality that the ‘long war’ strategy was taking too long for most of the Irish nationalists, the SF leadership pushed the proposition of a broader nationalist alliance with the SDLP and other factions in the

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nationalist community in Northern Ireland and the Republic. This was a largely a secret process at this time – at least with regards to the Hume/Adams dialogue and their back channel work with the leaders of the Republic of Ireland and the UK. The macro changes in global politics, the reality of a stalemate in the military arena (and realistically, perhaps a losing hand), SF/PIRA stepped up its attempts to ally with more pacific groups to signal their intentions to move beyond the political and military stalemate that characterized this period in the Troubles.

SF/PIRA was able to recover and improve upon its political strength in this period largely due to its ability to mobilize the broad nationalist coalition to begin negotiations with the UK for peace.

Military Strength The primary observations regarding the change in SF/PIRA’s military strength during the period 1986 to 1990 are included in the following table:

Table 2 - SF PIRA Military Strength Evidence: 1986 - 1990

Major Category Observations

Nature and Extent of . From 1986 though 1990, the number of Military Operations incidents that the PIRA was involved in more than doubled in annual volume – from a low of an estimated 50 operations in 1986 to a high of 120 operations per year in 1990. The lethality of the PIRA operations also climbed from 61 in 1986 to 104 in 1988 then declining to 81 in 1990. This was the height of the PIRA’s ‘Tet offensive’ that was designed to shake the resolve of the British security forces (Maloney 2002; Maillot 2005; Bell 1997;

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Smith 1995; O’Brien 1993).84 . As detailed in the GTD database85 the PIRA’s operations activity peaked in 1991 and declined to almost negligible levels upon signing the ceasefire agreement in August 1994 until the PIRA disarmed and ended its armed struggle in 2005. This period under review was the ‘high water mark’ of the guerilla war against Britain (Maloney 2002; Maillot 2005; Bell 1997; Smith 1995; O’Brien 1993).

Nature and Extent of . Between 1986 and 1990, the PIRA arsenal Military Capabilities was stocked with at least 80 tons of arms suitable for the low intensity guerilla war that they were waging. These weapons were generally suitable for light infantry operations with the most useful weapons in the arsenal being the AK-47 assault rifle and the explosive material semtex. The sophistication of the weapons was never to the level of the promised ‘secret weapon’ - e.g., MANPADs that could reliably shoot down helicopters (O’Brien 1993, Maloney 2002, Bell 1997). . The order of battle of the PIRA at this time remained steady and included at least five primary brigades in the North that were the main assault forces. With General HQ personnel, there were approximately 300 active service personnel with another 750 part time volunteers that were on call for service in the Northern Command. There were an additional 5 to 10 brigades in the South. These were primarily used for the weapons quartermaster function

84 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&casualties_ty pe=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=417 (last accessed on November 12, 2012).

85 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&casualties_ty pe=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=417 (last accessed on November 12, 2012).

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(including weapons caches), the management of safe houses and also to manage bombing and assassination operations in the UK and on the Continent (O’Brien 1993: 154-176).

Conclusions

The cumulative stress of the shocks in 1987 to 1988 appeared to have only a nominal effect on the military effectiveness of the PIRA. The PIRA had built up enough military strength over the years that the stress of the cumulative shocks did not noticeably degrade their military effectiveness. Their operating tempo peaked at all-time highs even if the lethality of their attacks was slightly declining. They projected force across Northern Ireland, the Republic, the UK and in Europe. The

Eksund loss was, in fact, a serious blow to the movement’s ambitions to launch a

‘Tet offensive’ class campaign against British security forces86. But the PIRA had not operated on that level since 1972 and had long since eschewed the high intensity direct confrontation with the British security forces. They were relatively easily able to continue the guerilla campaign that they had been conducting – it appeared to be business as usual to the unknowing public. At the time only the leadership of the

86 The notion of a ‘Tet offensive’ campaign is a strange desire for the PIRA given their established overall strategy of a long war with Britain that essentially accepts low intensity warfare as the approach most likely to succeed. There were clearly elements in the PIRA Army Council who still believed that the British resolve would collapse with one major military stroke – or that the ability of the PIRA to pull off such a campaign would demonstrate the willingness of the rebels to fight on indefinitely and this compel the British to look for a way out of Northern Ireland ala the US in South Vietnam. This is, at best, a confused strategic perspective.

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PIRA knew that the British and their allies had foiled their grand plans with the capture of the Eksund and their increasingly effective counterintelligence efforts.

In this respect, it is not remarkable that the PIRA was able to recover its pre- shock military strength in a relatively prompt fashion. It is noteworthy that these shocks made it very clear to the SF/PIRA leadership that the military dimension of the conflict had reached a stalemate. Not only the resolve of the British could be called into question but also the resolve of the Republican leadership to continue the tactical use of armed struggle as the primary means of negotiating for the rights of the nationalist and republican community in Northern Ireland.

Economic Strength The primary observations regarding the change in SF/PIRA’s military strength during the period 1986 to 1990 are included in the following table:

Table 3 - SF PIRA Economic Strength Evidence: 1986 - 1990

Major Category Observations

Scope and Extent of . During this period the PIRA and Sinn Fein Contributions from drew nominal financial support and State Sponsors significant material support from Libya. Almost 300 tons of weapons were supplied by Libya between 1984 and 1987 and represented the principal source of arms for the movement during this time period. Libya provided financial support but very limited in nature (less than $10 million from the early 1970s to 1987 – Maloney 2002; O’Brien 1993). . With the capture of the Eksund in November of 1987 the support from Libya ceased. The PIRA had lost a major shipment of weapons (an estimated 130 tons of material) for its ‘Tet Offensive’ as well as a major contributor of weapons

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(Maloney 2002; Bell 1997; O’Brien 1993).

Scope and Extent of . In 1981, the US-based NORAID was Contributions from effectively shut down as a major source Other Sources of weapons and was reduced to a nominal financial contributor87. . The Friends of Sinn Fein were also active in fund raising in the US. Combined with NORAID, contributions from the Friends of Sinn Fein amounted to an estimated $250,000 a year during this time period (Horgan 1999 & 2003; Maillot 2005).88 . NORAID claims to have raised US$3 Million between 1972 and 1984 or an estimated US$250,000 per year to that date89 Ability to Generate . SF/PIRA drew most of its financial Income from support from income from operations of Commercial legitimately-run businesses in Northern Operations Ireland (e.g., ‘black taxis’, construction (Criminal or otherwise) firms and pubs) as well as from various criminal operations in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and other parts of the world. Armed robbery, however, was the single most important source of ‘outward’ funding to meet the estimated US$7.5 million in operating expenses of Sinn Fein as well as the PIRA (Horgan & Taylor 1999:12). . The SF/PIRA financial picture between 1985 and 1990 shows the movement generating surpluses that peaked at US$3 million in 1988 but declined to an estimated breakeven run rate in 1990 (Horgan & Taylor 1999:9).

87 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/wilson95.htm#chap9 (last accessed November 9, 2012) and see also http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/weapons.html (last accessed November 9, 2012) 88 http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552676 (last accessed November 12, 2012) 89 http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552676 (last accessed November 12, 2012).

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SF/PIRA is a very resourceful group on a variety of levels but especially with respect to its financial affairs. As Horgan noted, at this time, their primary source of funding was armed robbery but they were also surprisingly very skilled at running a host of commercial businesses – legal and illegal. SF/PIRA exploited all of the typical funding sources including charitable foundations, but it built the core of the movement’s economic engine on its legal and illegal commercial operations. The

PIRA’s ability to prosecute its political agenda had as much to do with its economic savvy as it did with its political and military abilities and policies. This is especially intriguing since the movement did not depend on state sponsors for financing the movement, although Libya was a primary supplier for weapons (albeit antiquated and of limited use beyond the semtex and the Armalites). Without the heavy burden of financing large, complex social programs on the order of Hezbollah and Hamas,

SF/PIRA could run its operations on a much smaller budget than either of those movements. SF/PIRA represents a movement that could be highly effective yet not be beholden to a foreign power to bankroll its operations – in that respect, a bit of an old fashioned revolutionary when compared to the likes of the movements born in the 1980s and of the Islamic militant variety. The relative financial independence of the movement largely insulated it from the typical dilemma for insurgencies including the unexpected strategic recalculations of state sponsors and the distractions that come with tending to that sponsor’s directives in exchange for resources.

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Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 1986 to 1990

During the period 1986 through 1990, Sinn Fein and PIRA demonstrated organizational resilience even though there was a marginal weakening in their financial strength. Their relative financial independence through their legal and criminal operations and, to a lesser extent, their steady flow of charitable donations acted as hedges against the loss of a major arms sponsor (Libya). Militarily the movement was unfazed by the shock sequence and politically it improved on the margin with the establishment of the pan-nationalist alliance notwithstanding its overall stagnation in popular elections.

Assessment of SF/PIRA’ State of Legitimation at the time of 1987/1988 Shock Sequence As noted previously, in light of the assessment of the organization’s demonstrated resilience following the 1987/1988-shock sequence, the next step is to determine which of the primary hypotheses has the least amount of evidence against it. There are three basic areas to cover: the Methods of Operations tests, the

Outcomes tests and the Cheap Talk test.

Methods Tests These tests are built around four factors that reveal the way the organization goes about its duties and how that demonstrates its willingness to legitimate its power in some meaningful way. The theoretical logic for choosing these types of methods, outputs and public claims to measure as evidence of the state of legitimation is explained more fully in chapter 2. The summary graphic is reproduced below for convenience:

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Absence of Violent Coercion The key observations I made when performing the Absence of Violent

Coercion test are included in the following table. A brief discussion of these findings follows.

Table 4 - SF PIRA AOV Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Frequency & Extent of . Punishment beatings by the PIRA Coercive Violence – against Catholics in Northern Ireland Loyalty and were widespread and persistent. There Performance were 1228 punishment shootings (described as ‘extremely numerous’ by English 2003:275) between 1973 and 1997 and 755 beatings between 1982 and 1997. . Offenses that warranted a punishment by the PIRA included petty crime, joyriding or simply defiance of the authority of the IRA. In part this was to reduce the risk of drug dealers or petty criminals from becoming informers given the predilection of the RUC to recruit informers in this manner. The violence against its own constituents was also, in part, an attempt to maintain its control: “Intra-communal vendettas

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and power struggles played their part in these gruesome IRA policing methods” (English 2003:275).

Nature and Extent of . Established in the late 1970s, the Internal Security Internal Security Unit – or ISU, Organization sometimes known as the ‘nutting squad’ since bullets were known as nuts - arranged the arrests, interrogations and, if needed, the execution of all informants. The estimated 10 to 20 persons dedicated to this function investigated every failed operation to determine to determine if the operation had been compromised by an informant (Maloney 2002:155). . “After 1977 the number of deaths of alleged informers rose steeply…as many as 70% of all informers caught by the IRA during the entire Troubles were killed after that date” (Maloney 2002:155). . Estimates of the number of informants murdered by the PIRA are difficult to corroborate but no less than 100 persons were likely murdered by the ISU as punishment for informing on the movement’s operations. Informers under the protection of the PSNI still live in fear of retaliation by PIRA hit men.90

Use of Unlawful . By 1988 almost 2900 persons had been Violence to Maintain killed in the Northern Ireland Troubles Power and approximately half of them were civilians.91 . The PIRA was responsible for approximately 55% of these deaths. I have made the assumption that the proportion of the deaths related to the classes of perpetrators was not

90 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/sep/09/uk.northernireland (last accessed November 9, 2012). 91 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html (last accessed November 9, 2012)

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materially different between 1988 and 1999 when these statistics were completed). Also note, that these statistics slightly overstate the role of the PIRA since this proportion is for all Republican paramilitary forces in operation in Northern Ireland.92 . After almost 20 years “the IRA could not murder with competence and could not take care to protect the innocent” (Bell 1997:591).

Conclusions

The PIRA was a violent and ruthless organization in regards to internal discipline. It was late to form an internal security unit in the late 1970s but it operated with ruthless determination from thence forward. It had a big job to do with regards to informers since the British had very effectively penetrated the movement by this time. It is arguable that the highly effective counterintelligence effort against the PIRA made the movement so paranoid about informants that the excessive violence against its own people was a natural result.

The PIRA conducted a steady campaign of beatings and shootings epitomized by the ‘kneecapping’ of alleged violators of its internal rules and prohibitions. The

PIRA essentially policed the neighborhoods and towns it controlled and meted out justice as it saw fit against those that they perceived as criminals, informers or simply disobeying the PIRA rules.

92 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html (last accessed November 9, 2012)

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Although the internal security unit was not relatively large, all active service unit personnel and the extended network of volunteers were available to carry out the vigilante justice of the PIRA. They did so routinely and methodically.

The relative disregard for collateral damage from PIRA operations complicated Sinn Fein’s political agenda but was inevitable given the clandestine nature of the PIRA and the increasingly more loose linkage between the political arm and the military arm. As is typical of most sub-state wars, more civilians than combatants die or are injured. In that regard the PIRA is not remarkable. What made this apparent disregard for civilian casualties seem more like unlawful coercive violence was the fact that the British had dramatically improved its record with regard to collateral damage. By this time period, they became much more proficient in killing the PIRA active service personnel and avoiding the killing or injuring of otherwise innocent civilians. The PIRA suffered by comparison and did adapt its operational safeguards accordingly and in a timely manner.

Based on these observations I concluded that SF/PIRA operated with an absence of legitimation with regards to this methods test (absence of violent coercion).

Level of Autonomy from Sponsors The key factors I considered when evaluating the SF/PIRA level of autonomy from sponsors are included in the table below. A brief discussion of the primary findings follows.

Table 5 - SF PIRA LOA Test Results (Shock 1)

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Major Category Observations

Scope, Level and . Libya was the major supplier of arms to Persistence of the PIRA until 1987 after which it ceased Support support. (Maloney 2002; Bell 1997; O’Brien 1993) . The Republic of Ireland provided the PIRA its primary sanctuary even after the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985 made it easier to apprehend IRA operatives in the Republic for crimes committed in Northern Ireland (Maloney 2002; Bell 1997; Maillot 2005). This was not an official policy of the Republic. Rather it was lax border governance at the time and a sympathetic set of Republicans in the border counties that made this sanctuary possible. . The border county of Munster had over 200 safe houses alone at this time (Horgan 1997:1). The Republic offered a secure and safe haven for the PIRA to conceal weapons caches, provide safe haven for ASU members to evade British security forces and to mobilize for military operations in Northern Ireland.

Strategic vs. . Libya’s interest in supporting the IRA was Ideological to serve its national interests in that the Motivation of IRA could harm its enemy, Great Britain, Sponsor(s) both physically and financially. I discovered no evidence that the PIRA performed killings or violent operations on behalf of Libya as payment in kind for Libya’s weapons contributions (Maloney 2002; O’Brien 1993; Maillot 2005; Smith 1995).

Diversity of . NORAID had largely been disabled as a Sponsorship source of weapons in the early 1980s. A modest level of contributions (estimated to be about US$250,000 annually at that time) was sourced from the diaspora via

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the charitable foundations of the Friends of Sinn Fein and NORAID.93 . The primary source of income for operations, for Sinn Fein and the PIRA, however, was from its legal and criminal operations with armed robbery being the primary source of fund during this period (Horgan 1999 and 2003). . Libya was the only state sponsor of note to SF/PIRA up to and at this time.

Conclusions

SF/PIRA had been operating relatively autonomously for most of its political life. As noted, it was an accomplished operator of a variety of legal and illegal businesses and was a proficient and prolific bank robber. The Republic provided a suitable unofficial sanctuary for PIRA operatives on the run and plenty of safe arms caches as well as clandestine ports of entry for weapons shipments from suppliers.

Libya was an ‘occasional’ strategic partner that provided only nominal financial support but did provide, in tonnage if not quality, substantial weapons support up to this point in time. The Libyans produced a flimsy narrative to the international community about its obligation to support anti-colonial rebellions and but supported the PIRA primarily because it could inflict pain on the British who were bitter enemies of Libya at this time. The PIRA and the Libyans were strange partners given the thin ideological affinity for each other but the Republicans were happy to

93 . http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552676 (last accessed November 12, 2012).

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take their weapons that were given with little obligations to repay the favor except to kill and terrorize the British.

Sinn Fein and the PIRA did all of the right things to build out its charitable foundations network but more for public relations purposes in the US and the

Republic. The relatively nominal funds gathered were useful for political and propaganda campaigns. The greatest value was not the funds gathered so much as the ability to message the politically useful Irish American support base as well as the Republican faithful in the Republic of Ireland.

Based on this analysis I conclude that SF/PIRA’ is in a confused state of legitimation at the time of the 1987/1988 shock sequence with respect to the Level of Autonomy tests.

Level of Public Accountability With regards to the scope, persistence and level of answerability to the public, I used the following observations in order to assess the state of legitimation.

Table 6 – SF PIRA LPA Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. Sinn Fein candidates began standing for elections in 1982 as members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. This is the devolved legislature of Northern Ireland which, at the time, operated under the direction of the Northern Ireland executive and the Parliament of GB/NI. . The five Sinn Fein Members of the Local Assembly (MLAs) did not take their seats in the Assembly in 1982. Sinn Fein also began competing for election in 1982 the Level of Answerability Republic of Ireland in both legislative

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to the Public bodies (Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann). In 1983 Sinn Fein began competing for office in the British Parliament. In 1984 Sinn Fein also began competing for election in the European Parliament. The policy of abstentionism remained in effect until late 1986 for seats won by Sinn Fein in the NI Assembly and the Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann. This policy remains in effect currently for Sinn Fein regarding its seats won in the Parliament of Great Britain. . During the 1980s SF had geared itself to engage the people in a more direct manner through its broader-based political outreach programs and active local government service, especially now that the PIRA became and even more secret army and more detached from the people (O’Brien 1993:154-176). . In November 1986, after a contentious and extensive debate within the ranks of Sinn Fein and the PIRA, the policy of abstentionism was repealed. Sinn Fein would now take the seats in the legislative bodies of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the two legislative bodies of the Republic of Ireland (Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann) (Mailloit 2005, Maloney 2002, McAllister 2004). . In the mid 1980s the movement leaders moved aggressively into action on jobs, housing, healthcare, and establishing drug free zones (Maillot 2005; Maloney 2002; Bell 1997) . Sinn Fein members and the PIRA volunteers earned very modest salaries (between an estimated STG 10 to 20 per week, if at all) for their service to their followers (Horgan and Taylor 1999 and 2003).

. While there were notable exceptions to a consistent adherence to the rule of law (e.g., Diplock courts, internment, “Shoot to Kill” policy), Northern Ireland exhibited a

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strong set of institutions to enforce public accountability for organizations such as Sinn Fein and the PIRA (as well as the Level of Enforcement of British security forces and the loyalist Public Accountability paramilitaries). . The biases of the law enforcement community at the time, especially the Royal Ulster Constabulary, were well documented (Maloney 2002; Bell 1997; O’Brien 1993; Taylor 1997) and weakened the fairness of the enforcement of public accountability to some degree at this time. . A diverse and robust media had long been established and provided a productive environment for a public discussion of the actions of all actors in the Troubles (Smith 1995:188-189). . No CPI scores were available for Northern Ireland in 1987/1988.

Discussion

Following on from the political success of the hunger strikes in 1981, Sinn

Fein made a strategic decision to compete for election. It progressively competed at the local, national and EU levels. It made a firm commitment to extend its fight beyond simple military means. Sinn Fein knew it needed to move beyond the traditional position of the IRA as a vanguard and submit itself – to some extent – to the will of the people it sought to serve. Sinn Fein progressively geared itself to engage the people in a more direct manner through its broader-based political outreach programs and active local government service, especially now that the

PIRA became and even more secret army and more detached from the people

(O’Brien 1993:154-176). The PIRA needed to withdraw almost completely from

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public life to protect its members and to have any hope of conducting military operations that were not compromised by informants. Sinn Fein emerged in the late

1980s as the public face of the movement and the means to engage Republican followers and sympathizers. To be effective in this changed role, Sinn Fein had to repeal abstentionism, compete for election and responsibly represent the broad slate of its constituents needs – not simply the achievement of ultimate goal of reunification by making Northern Ireland ungovernable. Sinn Fein was no longer simply a ‘cheer leader’ for the PIRA. It was the political wing of the movement whose leadership increasingly shaped the course and speed of the struggle for the

Republican movement.

As part of its electoral strategy Sinn Fein knew it needed to be seen and understood by a broader portion of the Irish community (north and south) as a more complete political party – specifically, it needed to go beyond the one issue -

‘Brits out!’/unification - as well as the one strategy - armed struggle. To appeal to a broader set of constituents in the north and the south, in the mid 1980s the movement leaders moved aggressively into action on jobs, housing, healthcare, and establishing drug free zones. They were able to use the political process now that they took their seats in local government but they also used other forms of non-

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violent civic activism94 (non-violent protests including marches, and public rallies) to give voice to the material needs of their constituents.

The leadership was careful not to be seen as exploiting their political power for personal gain (Horgan and Taylor 1999 and 2003; Maloney 2002). Rank and file volunteers were just as likely to live off of the gifts of food and clothing from the supporters of the movement given the difficulty of either life on the run or the demands of active duty or political service. Free-lance robberies for personal gain were forbidden and severely punished (including the death sentence for egregious violations)95.

Though only clear in hindsight, Sinn Fein began to emerge from the PIRA’s shadow and rebrand the Republicans as governors-in-waiting. It would take another

20 years for the process to be completed but they began the process with this aggressive move into competitive elections and extending its scope of service to include the immediate social and economic needs of its constituents.

Based on this assessment of its level of public accountability, I conclude that

SF/PIRA’ state of legitimation as of the 1987/1988 shock sequence was between emergent and legitimated. The movement had made dramatic shifts to improve its level of public accountability in an environment that was conducive to enforcement

94 Sinn Fein believed less in being the people’s power than enabling the people to organize themselves to focus their power on the political process (Maillot 2005: 24- 25). 95 The PIRA, while a different ethos than the Officials, strongly disapproved of appearing to be, or actually be, abusing the sacred trust that they viewed had been given to them by the people vis a vis the Second Dail in 1921-1922 (Maloney 2002; Bell 1997).

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of that accountability. The PIRA persisted, however, with the armed struggle even when dissenting voices were beginning to be heard from loyal active duty IRA as well as the broader nationalist community. The war was 20 years on and the achievement of the goals of that war seemed no closer.

Level of Professionalism I have used the following observations as the basis for evaluating the organization’s state of legitimation with respect to the level of professionalism:

Table 7 - SF PIRA LPro Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Efficiency and Technical Competence – Military Operations . Between 1969 and 2000, the PIRA was able to kill British security forces and loyalist forces at the rate of better than 3 to 1 versus PIRA combatant losses. The PIRA efficiency however, declined significantly over the course of the ‘long war’ that was instituted in the late 1970s. All statistics cited in this section are included in the Appendix B (SF/PIRA) – Analysis of Combatant Casualties unless otherwise noted. . The quality of the counter-intelligence operations mounted against the PIRA blunted much of this advantage and the PIRA units suffered significant relative losses in the crucial 1987- 1988 period (Taylor 1997, Bell 1997, Efficiency, Maloney 2002; Appendix B, SF/PIRA – Analysis Innovation and of Combatant Casualties). . A detailed analysis of the lethality of the PIRA Coherence operations over time reveals that the hoped-for efficiencies were achieved. The PIRA deaths per incident were 0.25 for the period 1971-1975, 0.08 for the periods 1981-1985 and again 1986 to 1990 and 0.05 for the period 1991-1995. . The lethality of PIRA operations, however, declined as a result of the PIRA ‘force protection’ schemes and counter-intelligence practices of the British security forces. The PIRA killed 0.86

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Loyalist or British security forces for each incident in the 1971 to 1975 period, 0.51 from 1981-1985, 0.38 from 1986 to 1990 and 0.13 from 1991 to 1995. . By 1988, almost 65% of the 2888 deaths were non-combatants. The PIRA was responsible for over half of these deaths.96 . Alonso (2003) suggests that the PIRA was irrational due to its fanaticism and it prolonged the death and dying long after it was obvious that the war had been stalemated and that a political solution was the only way to achieve any progress. This fanaticism contributed, in Alonso’s view, to the high level of non- combatant fatalities.

Efficiency and Technical Competence – Administrative Operations . In the early 1980s the PIRA and SF evolved their organizational model. They established the Northern Command that relocated the seat of operations for the war to the Belfast and Derry based leaders, tightened the distribution of arms via a strengthened Northern Command quartermaster function and progressively built up a sophisticated financial and administrative management capability for the movement overall (Hannigan 1985; Horgan 1997, Horgan and Taylor 1999 and 2003). . During the 1980s the SF/PIRA leadership created a ‘plausible deniability’ about the PIRA membership of the secret army council as well as kept the identity of those members secret (Maloney 2002; Hannigan 1985; O’Brien 1993).

Level of Tactical Innovation

. To optimize field operations and mitigate counter-intelligence risks, in the late 1970s to early 1980s the PIRA leadership replaced the battalion style structure of active service

96 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html (last accessed on November 8, 2012)

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personnel with the cell structure. An Active Service Unit (ASU) cell consisted of 4 active service personnel and a brigade equaled 4 ASUs. Typically operations consisted of only one ASU to limit the damage of intelligence leaks or the capture of volunteers. . The Internal Security Unit was established in the late 1970s to evaluate all failed operations to determine if informants had compromised the mission. . The relative sophistication of the bomb-makers (e.g., timing devices) and artillery manufacturing (e.g., mobile mortar platforms with remote control devices) marked the technical innovation and advancement of the PIRA at this time (O’Brien 1993:154-176).

Coherence of the Organization . Following its split with the Official IRA in 1970, the SF/PIRA leadership based in the north was able to maintain a high level of coherence despite two major challenges to the organization. . In 1986 the controversial decision by SF/PIRA to repeal abstentionism produced a splinter group – the Republican Sinn Fein and Continuity IRA– at the time it was a minor splinter politically and militarily (Maloney 2002; Maillot 2005; Bell 1997). See Horgan (2013) for an updated perspective. . In 1984 and 1985, the SF leadership avoided splintering based on a major challenge to the Army Council’s decision (Ivor Bell challenge) to divert a larger proportion of financial support to Sinn Fein at the expense of the armed struggle (Maloney 2002; Maillot 2005; Bell 1997).

. To improve the overall organizational performance, the movement drew on atypical (e.g., women) and outside (e.g., technocrat) sources of talent. Women “were brigade commanders and held other notable roles” Fairness in during the mid 1980s (Maloney 2003:375ff). Public . An internal think tank was organized in the mid

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Administration 1980s that drew on the talents of persons outside the typical pool of PIRA talent – technocrats that were more experienced in political strategy and policy making (Horgan and Taylor 1997, 1999, 2003; Maloney 2002; Maillot 2005). . The financial specialists that were brought into the General HQ operations in this era were also indicative of the technocratic approach that the SF leadership was adopting at this time (Horgan and Taylor 1999).

Discussion

SF/PIRA demonstrated a high level of professionalism in both its military and administrative operations during this period. They evolved their political and military organizations to fight the ‘long war’ and to serve the more immediate needs of their followers and sympathizers. They reached outside the normal circles to add leadership and technical talent to run the increasingly more complex political, administrative and financial operations of the movement. As Horgan and Taylor

(1999:2) note: “ the terrorist is now more likely to conform to the image of a middle-ranking clerk than a gun-toting hoodlum.”

Though perpetually outgunned they innovated their methods and their military technologies to maintain the element of surprise, the ‘balance of terror’97

97 Originally used by Albert Wohlstetter in reference to relative advantage in nuclear arsenals, I am using it here as the relative advantage in military operations by the PIRA to create a sense of dread in the general population about the capacity of the PIRA to kill and injure innocents or military targets. See http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html (last accessed January 10, 2013).

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and carefully husband their scarce military personnel. During this period, the PIRA also began to innovate the ways in which they could ‘sicken the British’ by choosing targets that disrupted critical or highly symbolic commercial operations (e.g.,

Harrods and the Baltic Exchange).

The need for ‘plausible deniability’ about the linkage between Sinn Fein and the PIRA, however, created its fair share of political problems for Sinn Fein. The

PIRA were beginning to appear to the public operationally inefficient and militarily undisciplined (O’Brien 1993:154-176). Adams and the SF leadership knew they needed the PIRA for bargaining leverage but managing the tension between the political and military dimensions of the movement – with only limited ability to synchronize their strategies – put great pressure on the leaders to produce results for their followers and sympathizers and yet remain credible to the broader nationalist alliance.

In many ways, by this time, Adams et al increasingly understood that they would never be able to force the British to abandon Northern Ireland by military power alone. The loss of the Eksund dashed any real chance to implement a military surge in the late 1980s or early 1990s (aka, the Tet offensive). The savvy of the organization to pivot to peace negotiations in the late 1980s (however nascent) while still sustaining bargaining influence via the tactical use of armed struggle, was the clearest exhibition of its high level of professionalism. SF/PIRA was in the beginning stages of moving beyond the ‘all or nothing’ legacy of the PIRA. It was becoming more political than military – at least at the most senior levels of

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leadership in Sinn Fein. The leadership of the PIRA and the rank and file were another matter and that would require diplomatic skills and time to move those parts of the organization to a ‘post-Troubles’ footing without collapsing the

Republican movement.

Favorability and fairness in outcomes is designed to unpack the degree of public versus private goods that are produced by the organization. The nature of outcomes is to unpack the degree to which the organization reconstructs and enhances the political identity of the followers and/or the society as a whole. Please see chapter 2 for a complete discussion of the theoretical underpinnings for this aspect of the evaluation framework.

Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes

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The observations regarding tangible outcomes produced by SF/PIRA are summarized in the table below:

Table 8 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. Defense/Security for Catholics: In the early 1970s, the PIRA played the role of ‘Defender’ in the Northern Ireland ghettos (sections of Belfast and Derry) against the attacks by loyalist paramilitaries (e.g., the Shankill Butchers98) and brutality by the British security forces. The Tangible Outcomes PIRA essentially policed the towns Produced and neighborhoods that it controlled. The disputed but persistent accusations that the PIRA was a sectarian killer (Alonso 2003, Hayes and McAllister 1995; English 2003) complicated SF/PIRA’s ability to parlay the defender role into a broader public good. . Political voice for broader social needs – Sinn Fein’s electoral strategy required a more active role in the welfare of the basic material and cultural needs of their constituents – equal access to housing, healthcare, jobs, cultural rights (e.g., language). Sinn Fein acted as the mobilizer, the organizer, and; when elected, the local government representative to work the political process on their behalf. These services were almost exclusively for the benefit of the estimated 10 to 12% of the Northern Irish population that voted for Sinn Fein during this

98 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12858930 (last accessed November 12, 2012).

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period. . Armed resistance to British rule – The armed resistance to British rule in Northern Ireland was intended to, in the minds of the movement, rid Ireland of British colonial rule once and for all. Realizing by this time (1988) that the armed struggle would not likely ever cause the British to leave Northern Ireland, the leadership of the movement used the armed struggle instrumentally to position itself for a better negotiating position should peace talks evolve (Adams 1986 and 1997). This outcome, however, was closer to a public good in that it served a larger community in Northern Ireland – the nationalist movement or essentially all non- unionist parties/constituents. . Facilitate the establishment of a broad nationalist coalition – Sinn Fein joined forces with the SDLP and the other nationalist pressure groups and parties in the North and the Republic to form a coherent nationalist bloc. This work began in the late 1980s. This unity initiative bolstered the bargaining position of

99 Sinn Fein viewed the SDLP as appeasers of British and unionist aggression. As scholars have noted (Maillot 2005, English 2003, Murray and Tonge 2005), this rapprochement to the broader nationalist community clearly served Sinn Fein’s political interests as well. As detailed in a variety of accounts of the Good Friday Agreement, most scholars agree that secret discussions to set the stage for a more robust peace negotiation between various intermediaries (e.g., Catholic clergy close to Sinn Fein, RofI Prime Ministers and their aides, NI Home Secretaries) were taking place as early as 1986 (Maloney 2002, Bean 2009, English 2003, Bell 1997). Sinn Fein publishes “A Scenario for Peace” In May 1987 (Taylor 1997:350). “While flawed this document is viewed as the first real communication to those outside the republican 'family' about their views on peace and where the movement stood.” (Taylor 1997:352) 100 Any noticeable change in the actions of the PIRA was at least three years in the future.

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the nationalists in that the British had a more complete negotiating partner should peace negotiations become possible.99 While not a selfless move on Sinn Fein’s part, this alliance compelled Sinn Fein to become noticeably more pragmatic in its communications and its actions as a political party.100

Nature of Outcomes Various scholars have argued that the SF/PIRA have provided more than tangible outcomes to its constituents and the nationalist coalition in Northern

Ireland and the Republic (English 2003; Feeney 2003). The observations regarding the intangible nature of the outcomes produced by SF/PIRA’s in this period are summarized in the table below:

Table 9 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Intangible Nature of . Realistic Chance to Compete for Equal Outcomes Civil Rights - ‘given the irreformable and illegitimate nature of the northern Irish statelet’ the movement had provided hope to the minority of poor Catholics in the north that – with the PIRA in the vanguard – that they would be able to compete more effectively for their equal rights101. The SF/PIRA enabled all nationalists to compete for their political right to national self-determination that,

101 They would be able to reclaim their status as political and cultural equals in society, a status that was taken from them as a result of the partition of the country in 1921 (English 2003:339-342).

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in theory, would lead to the unification of the 32 counties.102

Discussion and Conclusion

In spite of all of the above listed outcomes, in 1988 the Troubles were almost

20 years old with little hope in sight for the faithful that the ultimate goal – an independent and unified social democratic state of Ireland – was close. Even for the outcomes noted, most were private goods for a select portion of Northern Irish society – the supporters of the Republican movement. The most significant tangible outcome with respect to the legitimation of its power, was Sinn Fein’s move to mobilize a pan-nationalist alliance including erstwhile foes like Hume’s SDLP. For most of its existence to this point, SF/PIRA had been essentially a militarily oriented political actor. They were shooting and bombing their way to the negotiating table based on their belief that the government of the ‘statelet’ of the six counties was

‘irreformable’. Sinn Fein’s decision to forge a nationalist alliance is a major shift in its political strategy and a significant step towards legitimating its power as an organization. Though only in its earliest stages at this time, this rapprochement with

102 Other scholars (Alonso 2005, Maloney 2002, Bell 1997) dispute this notion that, at this time, there was a true building of an identity of equality outside a fanatical rump of northern Irish Catholic society. The PIRA’s violence against their own people, their unnecessary prolongation of the armed struggle (in the view of some), and the broad extent of their criminal activities, diluted any real chance of building an identity of equality and honor.

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the middle class, pacific SDLP demonstrated clearly that Sinn Fein knew it could not

‘go it alone’.

Based on these observations I conclude that SF/PIRA is, at best, in a confused state of legitimation with respect to Outcomes.

Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (Cheap Talk) The final set of states of legitimation tests focus on how well the organization’s discourse at the Vision, Mission and Values (VMV) level aligns with

(and remains aligned with) the Methods of Operation and Outcomes levels. This is test for the level of ‘cheap talk’ by the organization.

SF/PIRA’ Super Priorities “The PIRA and Sinn Fein are an overtly nationalist movement seeking the removal of British rule from Northern Ireland, and specifically, as stated in the PIRA

Constitution it aims:

• To guard and honour and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the

Republic of Ireland.

• To support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic based on the

1916 Proclamation103.

• To support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful government in sole

and absolute control of the Republic.

These are the PIRA's long-term objectives. Its more proximal objective, however, is a

103 Democratic Socialist model based upon the 1916 proclamation - (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proclamation_of_the_Irish_Republic#The_text_of_the _Easter_Proclamation)

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simple policy of 'Brits out', i.e. withdrawal of the British military presence in

Northern Ireland” (Horgan 1997:1-2).

Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’ SF/PIRA were true to their vision, mission and values in this time period.

They steadfastly – some would say, to a fault – persisted in their mission to evict the

British from Northern Ireland and Irish affairs using all the political and military capabilities that they had available to them. In an attempt to heighten the ‘pain of their occupation of Ireland’, the PIRA changed their targeting strategy to focus primarily on British soldiers, British politicians and British property from the mid

1980s to the end of this period.104 105They did not waver on their political commitment to the unification of Ireland and the sovereignty of the Irish nation. In the 1980s they evolved their electoral strategy and engaged their constituents on a broader slate of social issues. They made the important move to join and facilitate the broader nationalist coalition in Ireland that enabled the nationalists to present a unified front to the British and the Republic in the pursuit of their goals.

As a result, I conclude that SF/PIRA is in a legitimated state at this time with respect to the ‘Cheap Talk’ test.

104 This targeting strategy largely remained in place until the ceasefire in 1994. The Canary Wharf bombing in 1996 was a continuation of this strategy; i.e., ‘bleed’ the British and weaken their resolve. Primary targets also included those who directly supported the British military (e.g., construction workers). 105 See also Appendix B in this chapter – Analysis of Combatant Casualties.

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McCartney Murder/National Bank Robbery - 2004/2005

Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of SF/PIRA – 2003 - 2007 As noted earlier, organizational strength consists of three basic components:

1.) political strength, 2.) military strength, and, 3.) economic strength. I will discuss each component in turn and present observations within approximately 2 years prior to and subsequent to the events being studied. In this case, the period under study for this event begins in January 2003 and ends December 2007.

Political Strength The observations I used to form my assessment of the changes in SF/PIRA’s political strength during this period are summarized in the table below:

Table 10 - SF PIRA Political Strength Evidence 2003-2007

Major Category Observations

. Sinn Fein had more than doubled its share of the vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections as well as the parliamentary elections in Great Britain between 1993 and 2007.106 Between the 2003 and 2007 elections, Sinn Fein picked up a few more seats in Popular Support the Assembly and by 2007 controlled over 25% of the seats. Adams had lost his seat in the Westminster Parliament in 1992 but by 2005 there were 5 MPs from Sinn Fein in the House of Commons of the British Parliament. . The Republic of Ireland was a struggle for Sinn Fein until the 2002 election where it gained 3% of the vote (5 seats) and finally came ‘in from the cold’ in Southern politics. It would see its performance stagnate in the 2007

106 http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ (last accessed November 12, 2012); See also Appendix A – Election Results - of this chapter.

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election with a reduction in the first preference votes to 2.4 % and a loss of 1 seat to 4 seats overall. . Sinn Fein’s growth in the late 1990s and early part of the new millennium was ‘irresistible’ and ‘more powerful than any IRA campaign’ (Bean & Hayes 2009:127). The ‘rolling peace process’ had given SF a stage to showcase its abilities far beyond the stature that a relatively small party would ordinarily enjoy (Frampton 2009:155; O’Donnell 2007: 168). . Sinn Fein boasted of being the ‘All Ireland Party’ following its success in the 2002 elections in the Republic. During this period, however, SF was still unable to reach far outside its natural base. . Due to the extreme positions it took on Geographic/Demographic economic policy and the dilemma of the Scope of Influence criminal behavior of the PIRA, it was hard for the party at this time to attract the middle class vote in either the Republic or Northern Ireland. They proudly featured themselves the party of ‘people with no property’ (Maillot 2005:4-5) but this was not the narrative for gaining traction beyond its working class, Catholic and Republican core. . With its broad-based equality program (Maillot 2005; Murray & Tonge 2005) it staked its position as more progressive on the issues of women’s rights, women in the labor force, abortion, racism and homosexuality. It framed its platform around the values of the increasingly secular society that it sought to represent. . The party also adopted an increasingly “less-socialist” economic platform along with its secular social agenda (Murray & Tonge 2005:251-253). . The nationalist alliance started in the

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late 1980s holds in place but Sinn Fein dominates that bloc . Sinn Fein would experience two rejections and one acceptance in its Alliances bids for alliances in the 2003 to 2007 time frame. Fianna Fail declines the prospect of an alliance following the 2002 elections – the Party leader (Bertie Ahern) casts aspersions on Sinn Fein as ‘slightly constitutional’ (O’Donnell 2007:163). The SDLP also declines Sinn Fein’s overtures for an alliance during this time. . The Democratic Ulster Party (DUP) led by Dr. Ian Paisley (Sinn Fein’s mortal foe) accepts the premise of sharing power in the Northern Ireland Assembly in the run up to the 2003 elections (Murray &Tonge 2005:256). The power sharing agreement would collapse in December 2004.

Military Strength

The observations I used to form my assessment of the changes in SF/PIRA’s military strength during this period are summarized in the table below:

Table 11 - SF PIRA Military Strength Evidence 2003-2007

Major Category Observations

. In the period 2003 to 2007 the All categories PIRA had ceased all military operations. . They retained an arsenal but were in the process of decommissioning all weapons as part of the Good Friday Agreement. . By the time of the shocks in 2004/2005 they had not completely decommissioned but would do so by September 2005

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as confirmed by the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC 2006). "The PIRA…isolated and marginalized, has been run down, whatever the claims to the contrary by the anti-Agreement Unionists" (Murray & Tonge 2005:256)

Economic Strength

The observations I used to form my assessment of the changes in SF/PIRA’s economic strength during this period are summarized in the table below:

Table 12 - SF PIRA Economic Strength Evidence 2003-2007

Major Category Observations

. SF/PIRA had no major state sponsors that provide them with weapons or other financial resources. All categories . The major external sponsor of Sinn Fein/PIRA was the US via the charitable organizations, Friends of Sinn Fein and NORAID. Funding averaged US$700,000 per year during 2003 to 2007107. . Sinn Fein’s financial strength was stable to strong in this period with the exception of a brief hiatus due to US sanctions on fund-raising for Sinn Fein due to the McCartney murder and the Northern bank robbery.

107 http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/jerome-reilly-sinn-fein-war- chest-swells-as-global-ties-pay-big-dividends-3038814.html (last accessed November 16, 2012).

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Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2003 to 2007

During the period 2003 to 2007, based on my analysis, I conclude that the change in SF/PIRA’ organizational strength was mixed. The political strength of the movement grew overall. Sinn Fein continued to make headway in Northern Ireland and Westminster but stumbled in the elections in the Republic. The South was still suspicious of Sinn Fein as a non-democratic actor especially in light of the shocks of

2004/2005. Sinn Fein needed to back off of its more extreme economic positions as well as consistently conduct itself as a wholly constitutional party. Sinn Fein grappled with its identity as just one among many voices competing for state resources during this time. The edginess of the unification agenda was muted and gradually replaced with a more innocuous ‘equality’ agenda that was designed to broaden the appeal of the party. Sinn Fein was struggling to locate its radical footing as it transitioned completely out of the ‘armalite and ballot box’ mode that dominated the party for so many years. To restore its political strength post shock,

Sinn Fein needed to make several major concessions (e.g., full decommissioning of the PIRA, shut down of the PIRA, policing). Its constituents wanted these changes and if Sinn Fein was to lead them they needed to accede to these concessions.

The military strength became non-existent based on the strategic decision of the movement to cease all military operations and decommission. The economic strength was flat which is relatively unremarkable given the discontinuation of military operations and the associated resources to fuel that effort. By this time,

Sinn Fein was flush with donations from its charitable foundations as well as

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international support organizations. Economic recovery from these shocks in this case is a low bar.

I conclude that the organization showed qualified resilience as a result of these shocks.

Assessment of SF/PIRA’ State of Legitimation at the 2004/2005 Shock Sequence There are three basic areas to cover: the Methods of Operations tests, the

Outcomes tests and the Cheap Talk test. See an earlier chapter for the theoretical foundation for these tests and a more detailed explanation of the approach to these tests.

Methods Tests There are four factors that will be evaluated as part of the methods tests

• Absence of Violent Coercion

• Level of Autonomy

• Level of Public Accountability

• Level of Professionalism

Absence of Violent Coercion I used the following observations to shape my assessment:

Table 13 - SF PIRA AOV Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Punishment Beatings/Vigilantism . As late as 2004, the PIRA still operated as ‘judge, jury and executioner’ in the neighborhoods that the PSNI (Police Service of Northern Ireland) did not or could not effectively operate.

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. According to the PSNI statistics108, Frequency and Extent casualties as a result of paramilitary style of Coercive Violence – attacks by Republican groups had been Loyalty/Performance trending downward since the a peak of 175 incidents in 1996 to 130 incidents in 2004. While considerably less than loyalist levels of violence and moving in a positive direction, it was clear that the PIRA had not given up its old ways of controlling dissident followers or informers or simply those they judged common criminals that lived in their areas of control. . The programs of violence appeared to be well organized and effective. In 2002, the Superintendant of the PSNI noted that “paramilitaries still firmly believe they have the right to police their own areas and it is their way of continuing to exert control” (Maillot 2005:42).

Softer Tone on Drug Dealers . One area of the vigilantism that typified the PIRA at this time that did improve was the way that the PIRA and SF addressed the drug problems in Irish society. . In the mid 1990s, SF and the PIRA allegedly used a community action group known as the Concerned Parents Against Drugs to assault and/or kill drug dealers. Their policy became significantly more benevolent in the run up to the 2002 elections as they were attempting to dispel their image as ‘slightly constitutional’ (Maillot 2005:93-94). Nature & Extent of . The internal security unit that was Internal Security established in the late 1970s was still in Organization operation at this time. . Its focus due to the ceasefire, however, was more closely associated with the vigilante operations of the PIRA (power maintenance vs. defeating informants that could compromise military operations) Use of Unlawful . The PIRA was still well armed at this time

108 http://www.psni.police.uk/ps_attacks_cy.pdf (last accessed November 12, 2012)

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Violence to Maintain and was prepared to use that arsenal to Power police areas that under its control in Northern Ireland and to conduct illegal activities as it saw fit (IMC 2005:5-6 and PSNI statistics). . The persistence of armed robbery and related legal activities during this time, demonstrates the PIRA’s willingness to defy the rule of law in order to sustain its operations (IMC 2005; Maillot 2005). . The levels of Republican violence would decline significantly in 2006 and beyond but as these shocks hit, there was little confidence that they would do so.

Conclusions

Based on these observations, I conclude that the SF/PIRA state of legitimation with respect the Absence of Violence method test is still, at best, between absent and confused.

Level of Autonomy from Sponsors I used the following observations to shape my assessment:

Table 14 - SF PIRA LOA Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Scope, Level and . There were no foreign state sponsors such Persistence of Support as Libya that supported the PIRA, nor had from State Sponsors there been since the late 1980s.

Strategic vs. Ideological . The financial support from the US was due Motivation for primarily to ideological alignment with Sponsor(s) the US Irish Diaspora versus any security

109 See this PBS review for a different take on the relationship between the PIRA and SF and the US Irish community:

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interests109. . As of January 2005, SF and the PIRA were dependent on charitable contributions of an estimated US$700,000 per year during 2003 to 2007110 from the Friends of Sinn Diversity of Fein and NORAID, legal businesses in NI, Sponsorship the Republic and the US, criminal activities. . Legal and illegal sources accounted for an estimated $7 million per year per Horgan and Taylor as of 2003. There is no indication that the level of these operations were curtailed in subsequent years (IMC 2005). . SF also received an unspecified level of distributions from the international organization, International Fund for Ireland111 that was established to facilitate dialogue between the nationalist and loyalist communities112. . The PIRA continued its criminal operations including armed robbery which was used to sustain the organization while the final decisions were made regarding decommissioning and ceasing all military operations.

Conclusions

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/reports/america.html (last accessed November 12, 2012). 110 http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/jerome-reilly-sinn-fein-war- chest-swells-as-global-ties-pay-big-dividends-3038814.html (last accessed November 16, 2012). 111 The fund raised annually pledges of approximately US $25 million during this period. Sinn Fein was a major party in the inter-group dialogue and is expected to have received millions in financial support from this source. See Annual Reports on website. http://www.internationalfundforireland.com (last accessed November 15, 2012). 112 Based on my review of the website, distributions were on a project basis and did not flow directly to the movement.

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Based on these observations, I concluded that SF/PIRA had a confused state of legitimation with regards to its level of autonomy. This is due primarily to the significant level of domestic and international illegal activity that it conducted to fund its operations including training of other outlawed paramilitary groups and illegal weapons procurement (e.g., the Columbia Three incident113). While there were no lootable natural resources (e.g., diamond mines or oil), the PIRA (with Sinn

Fein’s benign neglect making them complicit) looted the banks in order to fund their operations. As one journalist noted, Northern Ireland was so rife with former terrorists who had turned to organized crime during the period 1998 to 2005 that it was like ‘Sicily without the sun.’114

Level of Public Accountability I used the following observations to shape my assessment:

Table 15 - SF PIRA LPA Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

The Peace Process115 and Sinn Fein’s Commitment to Democratic Politics

. As part of the Good Friday Agreement Sinn Fein committed itself to a fully democratic means to contest its political agenda

113 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/colombia-3-refuse-to- leave-cell-to-face-ira-arms-trial-609683.html (last accessed November 12, 2012). 114 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/19/international/europe/19ireland.html (last accessed on November 15, 2012). 115 The timeline of the peace process from the first talks between Gerry Adams and John Hume in 1988 to the May 2007 when the devolved government that was seated in Stormont was littered with false starts, setbacks and enough small breakthroughs that seemed just enough to keep the process going. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4072261.stm (last accessed on November 12, 2012).

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(Maillot 2005; Maloney 2002; Bean and Hayes 2009; O’Donnell 2007). . Sinn Fein became increasingly involved in conventional politics beginning in the late Level of Answerability 1990s – active in the community to the Public addressing basic issues of health care, housing, jobs, equal employment opportunities (Murray and Tonge 2005) and pushing an ‘equality’ agenda (Maillot 2005:101-128) that encompassed race, religion, sexual preference and gender. . The PIRA maintained the ceasefire and generally avoided extra-legal interference even when sectarian violence/disruptions broke out in the ‘interface areas’ of Belfast (e.g., the Holy Cross school incident in 2001).116 . Sinn Fein continued to contest and compete for public office locall, nationally and internationally and did so with increasing success. See Appendix A (Election Results).

Failure to Contain the PIRA

. Sinn Fein would be held accountable by the public as well as the British and its international supporters for not deterring the PIRA from vigilantism and its criminal enterprise – the public wanted the violence to end; specifically the crime from idle paramilitaries (IMC 2005; Hayes and McAllister 2005). . As noted above (i.e., the Absence of Violence Test) the crime and vigilantism by the PIRA intensified since the Good

116 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/04/qanda.schools (last accessed November 15, 2012). 117 In 2002, in the wake of the discovery of an alleged PIRA spying ring active in Stormont, Tony Blair chastises Sinn Fein for ‘being half in and half out’ of the democratic process: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal- view/3614151/Blairs-plan-to-turn-terrorists-into-democrats-has-failed.html (last accessed November 15, 2012).

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Friday Agreement was put in place in April 1998. Following the high point of the Good Friday Agreement, the lengthy process of decommissioning would play out over the next seven years (see below).117

Decommissioning . In a poll taken in 2001, the large majority of nationalists wanted the PIRA to decommission its arsenal – 90% of SDLP supporters and 72% of Sinn Fein supporters (Hayes and McAllister 2005:610; Murray and Tonge 2005:266). . The PIRA would not fully decommission its arsenal until September 2005. The apparent foot-dragging of the PIRA with regards to decommissioning was seen as a disingenuous negotiating tactic by even its sympathizers. . A first installment in decommissioning was largely due to an effort to limit damage control from the Columbia Three incident (Maillot 2005; O’Donnell 2007; Bean and Hayes 2009). . The failure to more promptly decommission its weapons led most to believe that the PIRA – and Sinn Fein by association – were not truly committed to the peace process and, therefore, not suitable to govern.

. The dense network of domestic, national and international institutions provided a rigorous environment for enforcement of the public accountability of SF/PIRA. . The media, the international monitoring commission, special arbiters (e.g., George Mitchell), prominent government leaders Level of Enforcement (Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the of Public Republic, President of the USA, political Accountability leaders in all parties in Northern Ireland) all combined to provide a bright light on the compliance/non-compliance of SF/PIRA with the spirit and letter of the

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Good Friday Agreement. They had little room to hide or dissemble. . The CPI score for the UK was 8.6 in 2005 and for the Republic of Ireland was 7.4 118 which is consistent with their scores for the prior four years. . There are no separate scores for Northern Ireland in that it is a part of the UK. . The UK and the Republic enjoy a relatively strong environment for the enforcement of the rule of law due the strength of its media institutions, the norms of these countries and the dense network of national and international institutions that are democratically focused.

Conclusions

Based on these observations I conclude that SF/PIRA is between a confused and emergent state of legitimation as it relates to the test of the level of public accountability. Whatever their intentions regarding bargaining with the British, Sinn

Fein risked political alienation from the pan nationalist bloc (by this point it included the US) as a result of its unwillingness or inability to compel the PIRA to more expeditiously (yet properly) put its arms beyond use. Sinn Fein did not act in a manner that suggested it was accountable to the people in regards to this important and contentious issue. A further drag on its legitimation was due to Sinn

Fein’s inability or unwillingness to curb the PIRA’s unlawful actions reveals an organization that is not wholly committed to its accountability to the public.

118 http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (last accessed November 15, 2012)

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Level of Professionalism I used the following observations to shape my assessment:

Table 16 - SF PIRA LPro Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Coherence of the Organization

. The Sinn Fein leadership managed to bring the movement largely intact through the contentious debate regarding the ceasefire, the Good Friday Efficiency, Agreement and ultimately to the start of Innovation and the decommissioning process. There Coherence were two notable splinters – the Real IRA (RIRA) in 1998 and the Continuity IRA (the military wing of the Republican Sinn Fein that was established in 1986). These were relatively small splinters but lethal actors nonetheless.119 . In spite of the limited disruption from the minor splinters, the coherence of the organization as a whole was unstable through this period. Sinn Fein had ascended to prominence as a political party but the PIRA’s criminal and vigilantism revealed the limited control that SF had over its military wing.120

Efficiency and Innovation of Operations

119 The RIRA was responsible for a horrific bombing in Omagh in 1998 that the Provisionals immediately disavowed as ‘the politics of the past’. Both the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA were listed as Foreign Terrorist organizations by the State Department in 2001 and 2004, respectively. See Horgan (2013) for an updated perspective on the impact of the dissident violent republican movements including the RIRA and the CIRA. 120 Scholars argue that a clandestine organization such as the PIRA is inherently difficult to align tactically with its political wing (Bell 1990, 1997). An alternative explanation for Sinn Fein’s failure to rein in Sinn Fein is that it could not risk the appearance of being a distinct and separate organization from the PIRA and, therefore, truly exercised limited influence over the tactics of the PIRA at that time.

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. Sinn Fein made wise use of third party experts, it minimized its costs by reducing its centralized infrastructure and created national organizations to ensure that common issues were contested nationally. . In the early stages of the peace process (early 1990s), Sinn Fein reached outside its inner ranks to attract policy making talent that could help it shape more thoughtful and compelling policies for peace, economic well-being and governance (Frampton 2009:141). This ‘kitchen cabinet’ of technocrats/policy experts took on an increasingly more significant role as the party moved beyond the formulation of the Good Friday Agreement and needed more compelling positions on what Sinn Fein meant by a social democratic economic platform, equality, drug policy taxation and other complex policy issues. . As Horgan and Taylor (1999 and 2003) note, the SF/PIRA financial organization also took on outside experts in order to become a highly sophisticated operation that was able to mitigate the risks of fraud and corruption internally as well as maximize the returns on investment of the movement’s financial capital deployed in various legal and illegal business operations. . Sinn Fein also made conscious efforts to limit its central infrastructure and devolve as much responsibility to the local activists where possible (Maillot 2005: 88-89). This was as much for efficiency of the party operations as it was for a more philosophical belief that it would help maintain the ‘radical edge’. Sinn Fein also established a national campaigns office in the late

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1990s to ensure that local issues that had national significance were mobilized and contested efficiently and effectively (e.g., employment discrimination, racial and gender equality; public transportation access).

. In 2002 to 2004 two senior Sinn Fein leaders assumed roles in the executive Fairness in Public branch of the Northern Ireland Administration Assembly. Martin McGuiness took on the role of Minister of Education and Barbre De Brun took on the role of Minister of Health. . Both appeared to fare well in their roles in that they dispensed their duties in a professional and independent manner during this period (Maillot 2005: 50-52; Murray & Tonge 2005:246; O’Donnell 2007). . The equality agenda that Sinn Fein championed was also reflected in the increasing role for women, minorities and (to a much more limited extent) persons of color in the administration of Sinn Fein’s affairs (Maillot 2005). . Sinn Fein representatives labored to demonstrate their credentials to serve all of their constituents regardless of their political sympathies, creed or other potential point of difference with the party. The example of the Alex Masky, the first Sinn Fein party member to become Lord Mayor of Belfast (2003- 2004), is illustrative.121

Conclusions

121 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2076528.stm (last accessed January 11, 2013).

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Based on these observations I conclude that SF/PIRA’s state of legitimation with respect to its level of professionalism is emergent. It demonstrated fairness in its role in the executive, fairness in the service to all constituents while in elected office, efficiency in its operations and coherence amidst difficult organizational transitions.

Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes

The major observations that I use to develop my view on the state of legitimation of SF/PIRA with respect to favorability and fairness of outcomes are summarized in the table below:

Table 17 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Reformation of the Police in Northern Ireland . Sinn Fein pressed hard for reformation of the institution of policing in Northern Ireland and negotiated the formation of the Independent Commission on Policing in NI as part of the Good Fairness & Favorability Friday Agreement. - Tangible Outcomes . This commission identified over Produced 175 changes to the existing police force and led to the dismantling of the RUC (the Royal Ulster Constabulary) and

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the formation of the Police Service of NI (PSNI). . The nationalist claims of the systemic biases in the RUC would be validated in a 2003 British inquiry.122 While a major breakthrough for nationalists, this created a furor in the loyalist community given the high price that the RUC paid in lives lost during the troubles (over 9% of those killed were from the RUC) and its identification with the institution as an effective enforcer of civil order (Maillot 2005:67-68).

Supporting the Pathway to Devolution . Devolution was a public good and, given the significance that the leaders of Great Britain and the US placed on Sinn Fein’s inclusion in that devolved government, the movement’s commitment to making that happen is a public good. . As indicated in findings from the Northern Ireland Life and Times surveys123, by 2003 there was an increasing preference for a devolved government in Northern Ireland from a broad cross section of society124 not just Catholic Republicans.

122 The Stevens Inquiry that focused on collusion between security forces in NI and loyalist paramilitaries: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/northern_ireland/03/stephens_inquiry/ht ml/ (last accessed November 16, 2012). 123 http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2003/Political_Attitudes/VIEWNI.html (last accessed November 16, 2012). 124 http://www.devolution.ac.uk/Final%20Conf/Devolution%20in%20Northern%20Ir eland%20rw.pdf

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. Sinn Fein’s commitment was rightly called into question between 1998 and 2005125, but the fair and balanced performance of its two members as executives in the government (O’Donnell 2007) in 2002 to 2003 (McGuininess and de Brun) reflected a real commitment to the power-sharing form of the devolved government that Northern Irish society sought in the wake of the Troubles. Even the staunch anti-Republican DUP leader, Ian Paisley, said ‘yes’ to SF as a coalition partner in 2003 (Murray & Tonge 2005:266).

Mitigate Greatest Risks of Splintering the Movement . Adams and the SF leadership’s skillful management126 of the peace process within the movement mitigated the high risk of the dissolution of the movement (Maloney 2002; O’Donnell 2007; Maillot 2005). . A fragmented republican movement would have dramatically reduced the chances for a meaningful peace

125 See the discussion in this chapter regarding Sinn Fein’s complicity in the reckless and criminal behavior of the PIRA. Sinn Fein’s rivals in the Republic of Ireland criticized SF as being ‘slightly constitutional’ – that is, they argued that SF would act in an extra-legal manner when it suited its purposes (O’Donnell 2007:163). 126 Several scholars have noted the duplicity that the leadership needed to use to maneuver the rank and file to agree to the ceasefire in 1994 (Maloney 2002, Bell 1997, Maillot 2005, Alonso 2003). 127 Arguably the disastrous bombing in Omagh in 1998 by the Real IRA was indicative of the type of violence that could have occurred if the movement fractured under the strain of the peace process negotiations. The counter action from the Loyalists (i.e., Ballymoney attack) is also indicative of the tit-for-tat style that would likely have been reintroduced. 128 http://www.psni.police.uk/ps_attacks_cy.pdf (last accessed November 16, 2012).

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agreement in the near or mid term.127

Demilitarization vs. Decommissioning . Sinn Fein argued for the demilitarization of Northern Ireland vs. simply the decommissioning of only PIRA weapons (Maillot 2005:42). . Between 1998 and 2004 the loyalist groups were responsible for about 57% of the paramilitary style shootings and 66% of the paramilitary style assaults.128 . British troops still remained in Northern Ireland as of January 2005 but had been reduced threefold to approximately 5000 at that time. . The loyalist paramilitaries full decommissioning would not come until 2009. The decommissioning of the PIRA splinters would also not come until 2009/2010.

Equality Agenda . Sinn Fein sought to reproduce the unification platform around its equality agenda. . Acting on its belief that it is the party of the ‘people with no property’, Sinn Fein pushed its ‘equality for all’ agenda in the 2001 through 2005 (Maillot 2005: 101-128). . Down to the local level it pushed an agenda of equality regardless of race, creed, gender or sexual preference. In 2004, it pushed ‘rights for all’ in the areas of education, child-care and employment (Maillot 2005:121; Murray & Tonge 2005:246).

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Nature of Outcomes I will use the following two observations to assess the state of legitimation of SF/PIRA with respect to the nature of the outcomes as of the shocks in

2004/2005:

Table 18 - SF PIRA Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

An Ireland of Equals

. “ For the Republican mainstream…the IRA served its purpose in removing the sectarian essence from the Northern state helping Nature of Outcomes - nationalists to become part of Intangible Outcomes an Ireland of equals, even if Produced that Ireland remained partitioned” (Murray & Tonge 2005:266). . In contrast to some scholars that contended that Sinn Fein had moved to a ‘post Republican’ footing (Murray & Tonge 2005; Bean & Hayes 2009) this did not mean that the Republican and nationalist identity had been discarded. . A review of the survey results of the Northern Ireland Life and Attitudes surveys between 1998 and 2004 shows how little changed in people’s perceptions were of their political identities – if you saw yourself as a nationalist or unionist in 1998 you were

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likely to see yourself that way in 2004.129 . The correlation between religious identity and preference for unification has diminished since the 1980s but the Republican ideals of unification and sovereignty still were in place at this time. The strategies had changed. The goals had not.

Peacemaker and Civic Republican

. Nationalists believe that their parties have helped considerably to bring peace to Northern Ireland.130 . Sinn Fein eschewed a ‘truth commission’ but was ready to account publicly for the loss of innocents due to its paramilitary operations during the Troubles (Maillot 2005:162-166). . SF was uneven in the post conflict resolution efforts eschewing the relevance of a truth commission and less than fully cooperative on the fate of the ‘disappeared.’131 . Sinn Fein has moved away

129 http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/results/polatt.html#identity (last accessed November 16, 2012). 130 http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/1999/Political_Attitudes/PTYHPEAC.html (last accessed November 16, 2012). For that matter, so does John ‘Mad Dog’ Adair of the Ulster Freedom Fighters. See http://www.thescottishsun.co.uk/scotsol/homepage/scotlandfeatures/3795319/.h tml (last accessed November 30, 2012). 131 An inspection of the Sinn Fein website currently reveals that the movement still prominently displays its contempt for the past actions of the British forces in the murder of innocents in the nationalist community during the Troubles. See http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/16514 for the collusion dossier. Last accessed November 16, 2012.

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from ‘ethnic Republicanism’ “towards a more civic Republicanism, which acknowledges the plurality of identities in Northern Ireland and recognizes an independent existence for Unionists beyond British ‘colonial masters’” (Murray & Tonge 2005:263).

Conclusions

Based on these observations I conclude that the SF/PIRA state of legitimation with respect to this outcomes test is emergent. The SF/PIRA had helped sustain and refine a political identity that transcended the value of the material goods that the movement produced for its followers. It was not fully legitimated in that the PIRA was still active and perceived as a criminal organization and that its political traction in the South was still only emerging. SF is clearly committed to the peace process and the devolved government. While unfinished and, at times, inconsistent in execution, the nature of the major outcomes produced by Sinn Fein/PIRA are focused on an agenda that is predominantly for the greater public good.

(and remains aligned with) the Methods of Operation and Outcomes levels. This is a test for the level of ‘cheap talk’ by the organization. This is especially relevant in an

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era of significantly improved communications capabilities for insurgencies that are otherwise less sophisticated.

See the earlier discussion of Sinn Fein/PIRA’s super priorities. The long-term objectives did not change nor did their short term objective to ensure that Britain would cease its presence in Northern Ireland and its role in Northern Irish politics.

Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’ While the long-term goals of Sinn Fein/PIRA did not change by the late 1990s and early 2000s, their strategies of achieving them did. The Good Friday Agreement committed the movement to only fully democratic, constitutional and non-violent methods to achieve their political goals. Sinn Fein accepted the democratic principle of consent in that the Northern Irish community would need to judge whether it wished to be free from British rule and unified with the 26 counties of the Republic.

It acceded to the condition that the Republic changes its constitution to relinquish its claim to the 6 counties of the North. During the peace process, Sinn Fein had to withstand charges from ultra-Republicans that it had given up on the goals of unification and sovereignty that so many faithful volunteers over time had fought and died for (Murray and Tonge 2005; Bean 2007; Bean and Hayes 2009; Maloney

2002).

All-Ireland Political Presence – Sinn Fein is the only all-Ireland party with constituencies in the North and in the South (see earlier discussion of political strength). As of 2005 it had not assumed leadership roles in either government but it is at least preliminarily positioned to pursue its 32 county unification agenda

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given the scope of the party’s political presence (Murray & Tonge 2005:266-267).

Sinn Fein has not backed off of its political identity of a unified and sovereign

Ireland. Sinn Fein has successfully positioned itself as more than ‘just another nationalist party’ in Northern Ireland (e.g., the SDLP) or ‘just another nationalist party’ in the Republic (e.g., Fianna Fail).

Non-violence and Equality Agenda – As noted above, Sinn Fein pushed hard for equality in multiple dimensions. It sought to place the subject of equality on par with unification and place it as the engine of what would drive to a sustainable union of all of Ireland (vs. a reverse subjugation). In many ways this was a much more nuanced approach to the issue of recognizing the heterogeneity of Irish society and how to accommodate those differences in a devolved democratic political system. In some ways, Sinn Fein seemed to be saying ‘we are decommissioning but we are not backing off our political objectives…we will out birth you and ultimately win the prize of re-unification’ (Maillot 2005:47).

Socialist Economic Program – radical wing – Sinn Fein’s economic proposals are often far left of the ruling party and especially that in the Republic. SF generally stood outside the traditional political system and was 'a coalition of the dispossessed'. SF focused on addressing solutions to the illegal drug issue, Dublin’s housing crisis, refuse charges and the wealth and income inequities that resulted from the economic gains and losses from the Celtic Tiger.132 The party pushed

132 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/06/how-ireland-became-the- celtic-tiger (last accessed November 30, 2012)

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economic policies that were opposite from Fine Gael and Fianna Fail - it opposed privatization and generous tax incentives for FDI.133 It decried corruption in government (e.g., the Moriarity and Flood tribunals). SF sought to take the mantle of the principled opposition. It sought to be the leader of what became loosely known as the anti-establishment bloc (Frampton 2009:135-139).

Conclusions

Based on these observations, I conclude that Sinn Fein/PIRA is at the legitimated state with respect to its Mission, Vision and Values. There were leaks in that position and especially with the tolerance of the criminal behavior of the PIRA.

Within light of its deft maneuvers to pivot from ‘militarism to constitutionalism and to participation from insurrection’ between 1994 and 2004, SF/PIRA was able to

‘walk its talk’.

133 SF argued that foreign investors were feckless and used as examples Apple and Fruit of the Loom who had built plants and then abruptly vacated them which triggered major job losses and lost tax revenue. It opposed Shell’s plans to build a pipeline from Corrib oil field.

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Summary Evaluation of Findings from SF/PIRA Case At this point, I will summarize the results of the analysis of change in organizational strength for both cases as well the states of legitimation ranking for both cases. I will then do a comparative evaluation of the primary hypothesis versus the three alternative hypotheses. I will also provide some preliminary observations regarding these findings but reserve a fuller assessment when I combine the findings from all cases in a later chapter.

Change in Organizational Strength – Summary Assessment

Figure 18 - SF PIRA Change in Organizational Strength - All Shocks

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In both shock sequences SF/PIRA came back politically stronger. Though they were hurt economically in the first shock, they had evolved their military strategy to the ‘long war’ and had built up a substantial arsenal prior to these shocks. Their criminal enterprises were robust and there were ample targets in the

North and South to loot (which impacts their legitimation status).

Two very significant points should be made about the political and military factors in the 2004/2005 shock sequence. To not only recover but improve on the pre-shock political strength, Sinn Fein needed to finally deliver on its commitments to operate solely within constitutional and legal constraints of the land – compel the

PIRA to cease the war, cease its extra-legal punishment beatings and to fully decommission its arsenal per the Independent Monitoring Commission. Sinn Fein went further and finally (March 2007) acceded to the jurisdiction and legitimacy of the PSNI. All of these were promised in the spirit, if not the terms, of the Good Friday

Agreement. With regards to the Military strength, it ceased to exist as the PIRA declared an end to the armed struggle. In the context of this particular case, the ability to increase the organization’s political power while ceasing military operations, is a consistent finding. When compared to the other cases in this study, it is a very surprising finding – by becoming militarily weaker, the organization could increase its political strength. Clearly the political environment within which they operated was conducive to this change, but the limited extent of splintering of the PIRA itself, let alone between the PIRA and Sinn Fein, demonstrates a remarkably high level of organizational resilience.

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States of Legitimation – Summary of Results

As indicated in the table below, SF/PIRA’ overall state of legitimation exhibits a fairly significantly different pattern in the 2004/2005 case. SF/PIRA consistently operated as a highly professional but coercive champion of the nationalist/Republican cause. They did not tolerate dissidence within their ranks and were swift to punish those they saw as traitors or reckless. They were first class criminals and businessmen. They would rob, steal and racketeer when needed to keep the SF/PIRA treasury flush. But they were devoted to a level of public accountability – and could deftly handle the political challenges of that accountability – better than some long-established political parties in Ireland. They didn’t always deliver the outcomes that were for the greater good of the public – versus their followers – but they did what they said they were going to do and their core followers true to them both politically and militarily (e.g., safe houses, intelligence). In the second shock sequence, Sinn Fein and the PIRA ultimately deliver a broader slate of public goods that suggest their sincerity to the peace process and a more enlightened and nuanced view of what Republicanism is to be about in the future of Ireland.

These results suggest that what matters more to those for whom an organization seeks to legitimate its power, is the level of public accountability and the level of cheap talk. Outcomes can be for the private use of your followers if they represent a significant minority of the overall affected population (in this case, the

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nationalist bloc was substantial). The audience for your efforts would appear to tolerate relatively high levels of coercive and criminal behavior if you are seen to be using these tactics for internal security and returning those ill-gotten gains for use in the cause. These results suggest that the audience of the legitimation strategies

(the nationalist bloc) believed enough of this to continue to support the movement.

Plausibility of Primary Hypothesis While there are enough of the legitimation factors that are at least emergent to help explain the resilience demonstrated in this case, the factors of legitimation are clearly not all equally weighted in the minds of the audience to whom the organization seeks to legitimate its power and that different factors matter differently depending on the context of the shock. The context of the shock matters significantly about how to grade out a particular factor of legitimation. For example, the bar had clearly risen on the expectations of Sinn Fein/PIRA’s to be compliant with the spirit and the letter of the constitution in the 2004/2005 shock sequence.

The affected nationalist audience (including sponsors in the US) was outraged at the extra-legal murder and subsequent attempted cover-up of an apparently innocent civilian (and a Catholic) and the brazen robbery of the Northern Bank branch. Times had changed substantially since the late 1980s and the standards for legitimation changed with it. If Sinn Fein was going to be a credible governor then they needed to live up to that higher standard. Post shock concessions on the part of SF/PIRA made a huge difference in the ability of Sinn Fein to recover politically and economically.

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Figure 19 - SF PIRA Legitimation Structures - All Shocks Evaluation of Alternative Hypotheses – SF/PIRA

The ‘ability to hide’ factors were present for SF/PIRA to a large extent throughout the life of the Troubles. The PIRA had bases of operation and safe houses in the rural parts of Northern Ireland as well as the Republic of Ireland. Sinn Fein was very well connected to its constituents and it ‘moved among the people easily.

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The population of Northern Ireland was large but to some extent the ascriptive traits of the Catholic Republican active service members (e.g., accents) could and was used to identify them in the public. Through leverage of its social networks it was able to extract useful information about both targets and defectors and informants (to some extent). The military wing became progressively more reclusive following the emergence of Sinn Fein in the early 1980s and the increase in the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency. As I note in the case, however, I see SF and the PIRA as one organization and Sinn Fein increased its engagement and interaction with its followers significantly since the mid 1980s.

The weak state factors were more problematic. It is true that the government of Northern Ireland was dissolved and the state was essentially run by the UK from

Westminster between 1974 and 2007. In that sense there is a weak state but the powerful and unrelenting presence of the British government and its security forces

(UK and Northern Ireland based) effectively established a strong state in terms of security and counterinsurgency. Northern Ireland was and is a part of the UK. The economic and social services of the state, while formerly administered from London, remained in place and largely uninterrupted. The effective state (the UK) had the power and ability to ‘outbid’ the SF/PIRA for followers.

The PIRA was essentially self-funded for most of its organizational life. Libya was a feckless and unreliable patron. Its legal and illegal operations were the lifeblood of its financial independence. It generally did not prey on its own (e.g.,

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security rents) to any large extent. The importance of foreign aid was very limited in the explanation of the PIRA’s resilience.

Based on these factors, I conclude that this alternative explanation presents a relatively weak challenge in the case of the SF/PIRA case.

The actions of the state security forces to counter the insurgency were at first

(until the mid 1980s) more indiscriminate (greater level of killings by the RUC and the British security forces) but gave way to more selective violence in the late 1980s

(e.g., Loughghall and Gibraltar) until the end of its operations in 2007. The Loyalist paramilitaries, however, which were largely viewed as in collaboration with the RUC continued its widespread indiscriminate violence campaigns throughout the

Troubles and beyond the establishment of a power sharing government. Thus, the strategic context was consistent

The PIRA was a relatively strong organization that was able to gather ample funds and resources to both drive its operations and to offer selective incentives although not on the scale of a parallel government. The PIRA/SF were in position to

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provide selective incentives such as security, wages and political representation but little else in the way of attractive selective incentives. Though world class armed robbers, there was a strict internal discipline that the gains from these operations were to be plowed back into Sinn Fein for its political operations and the PIRA for its military operations. There were rare cases of siphoning off assets for personal use or to entice followers to follow. The wages for an active IRA combatant were nominal (less than 20 pounds sterling a week). The active service unit members generally relied on gifts from followers or sympathizers (such as clothing). They had safe zones and could provide protection to their followers but subscribed to a relatively strong conviction that they could not be drawn into sectarian conflict with the Loyalist paramilitaries. They wanted to bleed the British in order to convince them to leave. This resulted in a sense that the PIRA was unable to provide consistent protection for their followers.

The internal security apparatus of the PIRA was relatively small and primarily was used to address defectors and informants. There was no history of incidents of genocidal or other mass violence to coerce the population to do its bidding. Of the 1696 persons killed by the PIRA134 during the Troubles 338 were

Catholics. Approximately half of those were informants or defectors killed by the internal security arm. 1006 Catholics were killed by Loyalist, RUC or British security forces. At least half of that number were defectors or informants while the remainder are for causes unknown which could include selective violence to coerce

134http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/past/troubles/troubles_stats.html# statusperpetrator (last accessed March 28, 2013)

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parts of the Republican population. There were at least 45000 persons injured as a result of the Troubles and at least half of those were attributed to the PIRA. The

PIRA was a relatively violent organization and essentially policed its own safe areas to keep order and deter defection. The PIRA did not need resources from the general population since it had transformed itself to primarily a guerilla organization after

1976 and never had more than 1500 active service unit members at any one time.

The PIRA was an exclusive organization and becoming a member required extensive vetting. There was no need for forced conscription. Sinn Fein, of course, depended heavily on volunteers to care for its constituents and to facilitate social activism. The primary value to any use of violence or selective incentives would have been to deter the recruitment of informants, to limit defections from the military wing and to gather information from the population. If that was the purpose, the PIRA were woefully poor at it. The PIRA was so thoroughly penetrated by informants and spies that it needed to change to a cell structure in the late 1970s. This did not prevent the leaks and intelligence penetration that disabled many operations in the 1980s and

1990s (e.g., Loughghall and Gibraltar). It was more likely that the killing and maiming of Catholic citizens that are not explained by closing security gaps, were explained by either incompetence or keeping social order (e.g., punishment for drug dealing, rape or other crimes) according to the rules of the PIRA (versus preventing defection per se).

The SF/PIRA organization was strong as noted but they were up against a stronger state apparatus. The government could – and did – outbid them for the loyalty of the people. SF did not reach much beyond 10% of the Northern Irish

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voting public and 2% of the Republic’s voters until 1994 (the year of the ceasefire).

Selective incentives, if any beyond those noted, were largely to maintain a small base. Perhaps sufficient to continue the long war and in that it is supportive of this alternative explanation. But its impact was limited and the costs to the support base were quite high in that economic opportunities were as scarce in 1994 as they were in 1970.

This alternative explanation presents a moderate to weak challenge to the primary hypothesis for this case.

H3: Favorable conditions of demand AND opportunity are sufficient to explain the resilience of insurgencies – the insurgency whose chief grievance is based on exclusion from power by the actions of the state that is based on a categorical condition (e.g., ethnicity) AND opportunity (i.e., that the state is unredeemable) are the sufficient conditions that will enable them to produce resilience. This is based on its followers’ greater cost tolerance, commitment increased group solidarity as well as their perceived unwillingness of the state to compromise regarding credible access to power.

Although arguable, the SF/PIRA Republican movement was an ethnic group in that it was largely perceived as a Catholic movement since its inception and through the majority of the Troubles. The Catholic minority represented by various civil rights and political parties were largely excluded from state power over most of its history – and often via harsh countermeasures from the UK government - in

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what was generally perceived as an unredeemable state that actively resisted the devolution of any significant power to the Catholic groups. The SF/PIRA portrayed the UK’s desire to repress the PIRA as evidence of its illegitimate colonial interests in the North that stemmed from its own security interests and a desire to blatantly

‘strip mine’ its colony for homeland benefit. Until 1998, the constitution of the

Republic of Ireland stipulated that the vote on the reunification of the six colonies with the Republic was to be decided by a vote of all Irish including the population of the Republic. This fact terrified the Northern Irish governors given the predominantly Catholic population of the Republic would presumably vote for reunification in line with the PIRA and other violent or peaceful republican movements in the North. The solidarity of the Republican community was strong throughout its organizational life. Its active service units and its followers were very cost tolerant in that they were willing to endure great hardships over an extended period of time.

Until the prospects for peace became credible in 1998, the insurgency dragged on with only limited prospects of ceasing. Up until this time the PIRA was openly committed to fighting the ‘Long War’ and had the arsenal, willpower and support to do so. The Good Friday agreement began to weaken, significantly, the

Republican base’s commitment to violent resistance as the means to achieve its political objectives. Reunification was not a condition for the ceasefire nor peace but was not any closer than it was in 1970 when the PIRA was born. What was in sight for the alliance led by Sinn Fein was a power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland and a realistic chance to capture the state on behalf of its co-ethnics. The UK and the

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leaders of the Northern Ireland Loyalist political parties appeared less uncompromising and more amenable to a power sharing arrangement.

This alternative explanation presents a strong challenge to the primary hypothesis of this research.

169 Chapter 4 – The Case of Hamas

Background and Introduction to the Case Hamas has been in existence since 1987.135 The name Hamas is derived from the Arabic word for zeal and the acronym translates as the ‘Islamic Resistance

Movement’. Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine that was established in the Palestinian territories in 1935. “It is neither Al Qaeda nor the

Taliban. It owes something to Hezbollah and much to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is

Islamist but nationalist; Sunni, yet supported by Shia regional power; democratic, yet opaque; populist, yet cruel (Milton-Edwards 2010: vi).” The seat of Hamas’ political power is the Gaza Strip. It has followers in the West Bank but Fatah controls the West Bank militarily and limits the degrees of freedom Hamas sympathizers to express their support (Erlanger 2009b).

Hamas has had a longstanding commitment – and did its predecessor organization, the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine – to provide social welfare as a tangible means to educate and prepare society in the way of Islam. Hamas had many years of practice to get good at mobilizing for and delivering social services - they could call on many volunteers to assist in the delivery of needed services. They built the requisite social roots over at least three decades (Hroub 2000) and socialized

135 Scholars of Hamas generally recognize the birth of Hamas as December 1987 even though their covenant was not published until June 1988. The outbreak of the first intifada was in December 1987 and Hamas is generally recognized as having been active in that effort since its inception. Hamas was formed from the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine. The latter was formed in 1935 in the then British Mandate of Palestine.

society that this was a good thing to do regardless of their religious persuasion. In light of the profoundly corrupt Palestinian Authority (PA), it was hard for Hamas not to look good relatively speaking in regards to their commitment to social services

(Byman 2011:178).

Hamas relied heavily on state sponsors for its financial viability. It took what was offered from the patrons such as Saudi Arabia and Syria but also managed to attract different state sponsors when needed including Iran. As a primary provider of basic social services (e.g., healthcare; education), as well as a major fighting and police force, the movement needed substantial amounts of resources to maintain its regular operations.

Hamas used violence instrumentally to advance its political agenda in the

Palestinian Territories. The suicide bombing campaigns that followed on from the

Oslo Accords and during the second intifada were gruesome evidence of its firm belief in the coercive power of violence. Dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as well as the destruction of Israel, Hamas is believed to have killed more than five hundred people in more than 350 separate terrorist attacks since 1993136. Hamas has predictably provoked the harshest response from

Israel and its allies as well as its rivals. The organization has endured multiple organizational shocks over the last 25 years: hot and cold wars (i.e., the blockade and targeted assassinations) with Israel; bloody internal battles with the rival Fatah

136 CFR Hamas Backgrounder (August 2009); http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/

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and dissident Salafist factions; and, a major political victory in 2006 that shocked the world as well as Hamas.

Israel’s countermeasures during the second intifada decimated Hamas militarily. Senior leadership of the movement was also degraded especially with the assassinations of Yassin and Rantisi in 2004. Hamas was subsequently able, however, to attract significant new recruits137, add sophistication and depth to its arsenal and enhance its troops’ combat readiness. It also was able to replenish its depleted leadership with reasonably competent leaders such as Haniyeh, Zahar and

Mishal. This was an organization that understood and adapted to the fact that its leaders were subject to assassination and would need to deepen its ranks of leadership candidates. It was also an organization that also knew it needed to evolve beyond a ‘guerilla-like’ combat capability that was best equipped to conduct terror operations to one that could enforce law and order in a modern state, protect its borders as well as fight for an independent Palestinian state – a very tall order given the state of the Hamas fighting force in 2004.

Arafat’s death in 2004 created a leadership challenge for Fatah and a political opening for Hamas. Abbas did not have the moral authority of Arafat (ICG Middle

East Briefing, 23 2004:3ff) and the failure of Fatah to deliver any substantive progress on peace negotiations further strengthened Hamas’ political hand. The

137 See ICG Report #73 and 85. Hamas had relaxed its more stringent recruitment policies following its political victory in January 2006 and the quality of recruits declined. They instituted an internal review and ultimately purged the less-qualified recruits by 2009.

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Cairo Talks of March 2005 were hosted by Egypt in an attempt to unite the PLO and

Hamas under the banner of the PA. Hamas made pledges of unity (Tamimi

2007:211-217) but the political significance is that they were asked at all to join with the PLO – the regional powers understood the growing significance of Hamas.

As discussed in more detail below (first shock event), Hamas stood for elections at the municipal level in 2004 and 2005 and, for the first time at the national level, in 2006. After its stunning victory in the 2006 national elections,

Hamas turned its attention to the business of governing. One of its earliest initiatives was to push forward with a national unity government with Fatah. It claimed it would separate the party of Hamas from the government of the Palestinian

Territories. Hamas was also now in the unusual position of being the one to enforce domestic security and to enforce restraint of violent operations against Israel.138

Gunning (2008) and Lybarger (2007) both point to the heterogeneous nature of

Hamas which demands a more pliant governing style to mitigate the risks of civil unrest or simply defections from the ranks139. Neither are they monolithically secular or religious which, of course, aligns with their nature as mass movements that are designed to comprehend a more complex array of their societies. Hamas could ill afford, nor was it inclined to be, ideological purists since the support of a broad constituency is vital to the accomplishment of its political goals (Brown 2009,

2012, 2012b, 2012c; Gunning 2008; Lybarger 2007).

138 http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_aqsa.html (last accessed August 20, 2012) 139 See comments above and below in the states of legitimation tests (absence of violence) regarding Hamas’ use of violence to enforce followership/reduce defections.

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Following the electoral success in 2006, the vigorous resistance by Israel, the

US and EU to Hamas’ 2006 election victory substantively altered the economic capacity for Hamas to govern (Brown 2006; Brown 2008b). International funding that should have flowed to the PA (at this time Hamas held the majority position) was diverted to the West Bank administrators under Fatah control. Israel stiffened its constraints on all crossings into and out of Gaza.

In June 2007 Hamas clashed with Fatah security personnel located in the

Gaza with the intent to oust any remaining presence of Fatah security in the Gaza.

Hamas burned a significant amount of its political capital with most Palestinians regardless of whether they perceived Fatah as complicit in the clash or that it was due to the provocation of the conspiring Western powers (Rose 2008). Any real hope for the Fatah and Hamas unity initiatives were deferred indefinitely – some feared permanently. Hamas was subject to an even broader and more systematic campaign by Fatah, Israel and western powers to undermine the ability of Hamas to govern Gaza (Brown 2008b, 2009b). Specifically, Israel commenced its siege of Gaza and reduced Gaza to a prison state (Brown 2008). What were fragile democratic institutions in January 2006, never took root in the ‘prison state’ of Gaza. Mishal notes that the payoff for a democratically elected Hamas party seemed to offer very little at the international level (Rabbani 2008). Mishal seemed to be saying ‘Why bother with all the pain and suffering of ‘politicization’ (Brown 2012b) when the rewards seem to be so limited?’

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Following the clash with Fatah and the ensuing harsh repression of its enemies in Gaza, Hamas’ veneer of piety and selfless service to Allah seemed to be fading.

“On the one hand, the violent takeover of the Gaza Strip helped strengthen the more hawkish groups in Hamas’s leadership. On the other hand, many in Hamas realize the devastating blow that the coup dealt to Palestinian unity and to the ability of the Islamist group to gain regional and international acceptance. The Islamist leadership inside and outside Gaza recognizes that for Hamas to have any hope of improving its dismal performance in the Gaza Strip, of restoring some presence in the West Bank and of having any chance of real integration into the Palestinian political system, it must seek a new public mandate.” (Shikaki 2009) But as Brown points out: “…defeating Hamas has not worked nor will the organization simply wither away. The decline in Hamas’s public standing is quite real, but there is no easy way to use fleeting opinion polls to toss Hamas out of power” (Brown 2009). Hamas made enough mistakes in its first two years as governor of Gaza that its political strength predictably deteriorated. While Hamas reduced crime and general lawlessness in Gaza and wisely avoided any forced imposition of Islamic law, more importantly, the movement failed to rule in a competent manner immediately following its shocking electoral victory. Specifically, its failure to materially improve the economic state of the Gazans140 and its choice to use violence against fellow Palestinians to seize control of Gaza seriously politically damaged the movement. The failure to unite the Palestinians – in a national unity

140 As noted, there is no debate that the comprehensive blockade imposed by Israel following the June 2007 clash between Fatah and Hamas had a material impact on the economic potential for Gazans.

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government or otherwise – is the most significant political failing of the organization in this time period.

Events to Study For purposes of analyzing the explanatory power of legitimated power with regards to Hamas’ resilience, two key events will be explored in detail. The values challenge shock that will be studied for the Hamas case will be the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. The performance challenge that will be studied will be the war between Hamas141 and the IDF that concluded in January 2009. These cases represent substantial abrupt shocks to

Hamas in that they put the continuity of the organization in doubt at least for a period of time either during the crisis or subsequent to the crisis.

Specific Shocks to be Studied in the Hamas Case 2006 Parliamentary Elections: For the first time in Hamas’ history, in January

2006 they participated in the national elections for the Palestinian Legislative

Council. Though subject to intensive internal debate, their prior objections to participation in the 1996 national elections based on their rejection of the Oslo

Accords, were no longer relevant (Rabbani 2008; Tamimi 2007; Brown 2012). To participate they also apparently overcame what would seems to be a major ideological hurdle for Islamist movements – subjecting the divine will to popular vote (Brown 2012c; Milton-Edwards; Hroub 2000). Hamas became more

141 Hamas was joined in the war against the IDF in 2009 by various members of the other Islamist resistance groups active in the Gaza during this time including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Popular Resistance Committees.

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politicized142 (Brown 2012) in order to capitalize on the political openings created by the death of Arafat, the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza and their revered leadership during the second intifada (ICG Middle East Briefing 23). The national election campaign enabled Hamas to feature the elimination of government corruption and the resolution of the security dilemma (both lawlessness domestically and the occupation by Israel) as the foundation of its Change and

Reform platform – instead of mistakenly pushing for an agenda of Islamization of society upon which only 25% of the electorate was focused (Gunning 2008:151).

Hamas effectively signaled the electorate that it was listening to the people and committing itself through the political process to be answerable to them. Time would tell if this was cheap talk but they were willing to make binding promises to the people as election season heated up in late 2004.

Brown (2012c: 196-201) notes “the surging popularity of Hamas made it easy at first for (Hamas’) leaders to be democrats.” Though weakened militarily

Hamas became stronger politically as a result of its bold and costly actions during the second intifada (Byman 2011:177; ICG Middle East Reports #21 AND 49). But as

Brown (2012c) also points out, the general strategy of Islamist parties in the Arab world has been “participation, not domination”. Given the popular belief in western societies that Islamic movements were anti-democratic (i.e., “one man, one vote, one

142 Brown (2012:6) uses the term ‘politicized’ to describe an organization’s “decision to dedicate resources to elections, to move to form structures that resemble electoral parties, the effort to craft platforms and appeal to new constituencies, the development of new appeals and programs, the attempt to comply with onerous and restrictive laws, and the almost inevitable emergence of new leadership groups grounded in parliaments.”

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time”)143, the general entry strategy of many Islamist movements has been more about stretching the boundaries of political participation versus winning outright.

Hamas appears to have had, at a minimum, a very pragmatic and basic logic driving its interests seeking election and, by doing so, making themselves directly accountable to the people; i.e., to contrast itself with the PA and avoid the appearance that the movement’s actions are motivated by fear of, or compliance with, Israel’s demands or wishes. Hamas is not the Palestinian Islamic Jihad – a clandestine armed group that does not seek nor need the support of the masses to succeed in its narrower mission. Hamas is a nationalist social movement that depends on the support of the masses to enact its vision, mission and values. It has to appeal to more than its most ardent followers to build the legitimacy that drives its resilience. It needed to at least attempt to maintain a consistent and relatively transparent rapport with the masses versus just with its most loyal followers. The debate within Hamas was more about whether the elections after the second intifada were to be free and clear of the stain of Oslo. This was a much more pragmatic political question vs. an ideological one, notwithstanding the sniping from the Salafist groups in the Gaza Strip and from Al Qaeda spokespersons outside the region (ICG 2011 – Middle East Report # 104; Mendelsohn 2009).

Even with all the political momentum it had, Hamas didn’t expect that it would win a majority in the 2006 election. For that matter, it wasn’t even sure until the later stages of the campaign whether it would even try to win (Brown 2012c,

143 There are a variety of sources on this but see Zakaria 2003 and Lewis 2003.

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Tamimi 2007). Polls prior to the election suggested that a weakened Fatah would maintain its majority in the Parliament.144 But Hamas won and won big. They gathered in 74 of a possible 132 seats on the Change and Reform ticket.145 Hamas shocked itself and the world (Rabbani 2008; Pina 2006).146

Hamas’ victory created a dilemma for Hamas as an Islamic resistance movement. It had to deal with the basic challenge from traditionalists/salafists inside and outside the movement (Mendelsohn 2009; ICG 2011) that the movement could not sustain its vision, mission and values as a resistance movement and still hope to govern in even a semi-authoritarian manner. Wouldn’t it have been better to win a sizeable minority of seats and provide a counter-balance to the more seasoned

Fatah party in a national unity government? What did Hamas know about running a country? What did Hamas know about being a political party for that matter (Brown

2012c; Gunning 2008)? Even its “big brother”, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of

Egypt, cautioned them against dominating the elections. The MB of Egypt told them they weren’t ready to rule and it could ruin the movement.

2009 War With Israel: As yet another six-month ceasefire came to a close in

December 2009, skirmishes between the IDF and Hamas and the factions active in

Gaza degraded into a tit-for-tat exchange of rockets, mortars and air assaults (Cohen

144 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p18epressrelease.html 145 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html 146 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/30/international/middleeast/30diplo.html?pa gewanted=all

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and White 2009; Cordesman 2009; ICG Middle East Briefing N°26). Hamas nor the

IDF would back down from the fight. Quickly, Gazans would feel the punishing impact of the IDF military retaliation. “When overlapping, unilateral ceasefires came into effect on 18 January 2009, some 1,430 Gazans had been killed, over 5,300 wounded and in excess of 90,000 were homeless (ICG Middle East Report N°85).”

Gazans paid a severe price to be affiliated with Hamas. In contrast, Israel suffered modest casualties - 13 killed, 4 IDF soldiers from friendly fire -147 due in large part to its strategy to avoid the kind of house-to-house fighting for which Hamas had hoped to entrap the IDF (Byman 2011; Cohen and White 2009; Cordesman 2009).

The IDF spared its troops at the expense of the Palestinians (Amnesty International

2009; ICG Middle East Report 85) but Hamas’ military wing (i.e., the Izz al Din

Qassam Brigades) did not perform well on the battlefield (Cohen & White 2009;

Cordesman 2009; Byman 2011). Byman (2010) lays out the extent of Hamas’ failure to perform in the 2009 war:

“Perhaps most damaging to Hamas was its failure to emerge from the 2008-9 Gaza war with the aura of victory that Hezbollah enjoyed after its 2006 war with Israel. Hamas' military strategy was poor, as was its implementation. The Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar had warned soon before the war, "Just let them try to invade Gaza. Gaza will be their new Lebanon," but Hamas found itself completely outmatched by the IDF and Israel's intelligence services. No Hamas terrorist cells attacked Israel from the West Bank or within Israel proper, and Israel did not lose one tank or one helicopter or suffer one kidnapping. Hamas' rocket attacks tapered off as the conflict ended rather than growing in intensity, as Hezbollah's had in 2006, which allowed Hezbollah to claim it was unbowed when the guns went silent.”(Byman 2010)

147 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/world/middleeast/18mideast.html?pagew anted=all

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For all of its training and enhanced military equipment, Hamas was overwhelmed in short order. Hamas did not fare well militarily (Cohen and White

2009; Byman 2011; Cordesman 2009) but the organization survived the fight albeit at a high cost. Though Hamas tried to sell that it was a great victory, it quietly understood that it had failed militarily and would need to revamp its strategies, tactics and personnel if they were to produce any significantly different results in future conflicts with Israel. Nothing of substance changed for the better in Gaza as a result of the war in Israel in 2009. “With large parts of Gaza destroyed, Israel suffering comparatively minor losses and the crossings still shut, Hamas’s claims

(about victory) have lost some credibility and its agenda some of its luster” (ICG

Middle East Report #85:6).

Even though the crossings into Gaza remained blockaded and many Gazans were dead or wounded, Hamas’ ability to survive the 2009 ‘small’ war gave them material to build a suitable ‘victory’ narrative for their political use domestically and with donors.148 They had the thin propaganda advantage that goes with the underdog by ‘living to fight another day’.

148 And as Cohen and White (2009) point out, Hamas took full advantage of spinning all aspects of their ‘victory’. Though there was little tangible evidence of any victory (e.g., the blockades remained in place let alone the loss of life and property destruction in Palestine), Hamas built a narrative to support Hamas as the leader of the resistance to Israel’s occupation.

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International and Regional Context for Events The two events selected occurred in the context of a variety of major regional and international events that potentially influenced the flow of the legitimation dynamics of Hamas. The case analysis will account for these major events to the extent they play into the legitimation dynamics of the organization.

Country of Country of Event Date - Start Date - End Origin Event Type Palestinian Palestinian Leadership Death of Yasir Arafat Nov-04 Nov-04 Territories Territories Change War in US/EU War in Iraq Mar-03 Dec-11 US/EU Iraq Region Political Unrest in Cedar Revolution in Lebanon Feb-05 Jun-05 Lebanon Lebanon Region Political Libya, Egypt, Unrest in Arab Spring Dec-10 Current Tunisia Syria Region War in Civil War in Syria Mar-11 Current Syria Syria Region Egyptian Revolution - fall of Leadership Hosni Mubarak Jan-11 Current Egypt Egypt Change War in Israeli war with Hezbollah Jul-06 Aug-06 Lebanon Lebanon Region Political UN Sanctions on Iran - Unrest in Nuclear Weapons Issue Jan-06 Current Iran Iran Region

Conflict between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared Refugee War in Camp in northern Lebanon. Apr-07 May-07 Lebanon Lebanon Region Figure 20 - International & Regional Context - Hamas

Hamas 2006 Electoral Victory Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of Hamas: 2004 - 2007 As noted earlier, for purposes of this research, organizational strength consists of three basic components: 1.) political strength, 2.) military strength, and,

3.) economic strength. I will discuss each component in turn and assess the nature and extent of how it has changed from 2004 through 2007. This time bracket allows me to observe change two years prior to and after the 2006 elections.

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Political Strength There following observations form the basis for my assessment of the change in the political strength of the movement for this time period:

Table 19 - Hamas Political Strength Evidence: 2004 - 2007

Major Category Observations

. As the second intifada wound down in 2004 and the temporary ceasefire took hold in mid 2005, Hamas’ political strength was on the rise (Gunning 2008:220-240; Hroub 2004). . Since 2000 Hamas had drawn even Popular Support in the polls with Fatah and had made strong gains in the municipal elections. “Hamas had emerged to the point where it could at least be a spoiler in the decision making process of the PA post-Arafat” (ICG Middle East Briefing 23:4). . Along with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad149 (PIJ), Hamas had garnered approximately 40% of the public’s support in polls in 2004 (Lybarger 2007:74). . Abbas understood the emerging power of Hamas. Instead of attempting to dismantle Hamas as demanded by Israel and US, Abbas instead offered Hamas a seat in the government (ICG Middle East

149 The PIJ and Hamas are both ideologically aligned in that they build their world- view on the basis of an interpretation of Sunni Islam that is rooted in the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Abu Amr1994; Hroub 2000; Milton-Edwards 2010). They are different and distinct entities, however, and were conflated in this reference due to the researcher’s interest in the popularity of notable Islamic groups.

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Briefing 23). . Most Palestinians150 viewed Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza in August 2005 as further evidence that Hamas – and its ability to hurt Israel through sustained campaigns of violence – was the leverage that was needed to get concessions from Israel151. . Byman (2011) and Hroub (2004) both note that, ironically, the more the Israelis degraded Hamas through targeted assassinations and other countermeasures, the stronger Hamas became politically. It appears that the willingness and ability of Hamas to remain steadfast in its mission to resist Israel during the second intifada endeared the movement to the Palestinian community. . Coupled with Fatah’s decision to eschew violence and yet not extract meaningful concessions from Israel, Hamas’ defiance was welcomed by the Palestinian people as the path to peace, honor and a homeland (Hroub 2010). . As further evidence of Hamas’ increasing political strength, on behalf of a delegation of rising younger leaders in Fatah, Marwan Barghouti152 reached out to Hamas in 2005 (from an Israeli prison) to seek an alliance with the

150 There are dissenting opinions on how the withdrawal translated politically. See CFR hamas Backgrounder (August 2009); http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ (last accessed August 15, 2012) 151 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p17a.html (last accessed August 15, 2012) 152 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13628771 (last accessed January 12, 2013). 153 See various polls produced during this period by PSR at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/index.html (last accessed August 15, 2012).

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movement (Gunning 2008). . A review of PSR Polls153 following the 2006 elections shows a weakening in political support that then nose-dived after the 2007 clash with Fatah. . As a result of the clash with Fatah in June 2007, Hamas burned a significant amount of its political capital with most Palestinians regardless of whether they perceived Fatah as complicit in the clash or that it was due to the provocation of the conspiring Western powers (Rose 2008). A Palestinian woman commented: “Our servants of Allah are as obsessed with power as are our selfless nationalists…Fatah and Hamas? Two behinds in one pair of drawers!”(ICG 2007; Middle East Report #68: 8-9). Geographic/Demographic . Based on the results of the 2006 Scope of Influence elections and polls in the region154, Hamas had established a strong political presence in the West Bank as well as Gaza. It had political reach across the entirety of the Palestinian Territories in spite of its austere Islamic social agenda. . Following the clash with Fatah in spring 2007, Hamas supporters in the West Bank were forced “underground or into hibernation…Hamas is disliked by many Palestinians, but most still regard it as a legitimate political actor rather than as an organization to be suppressed” (Brown 2009b). Alliances . No political alliances of significance noted during this time period.

154 See various polls produced during this period by PSR at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/index.html (last accessed August 15, 2012).

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Conclusion

Coming into the 2006 elections, Hamas’ was politically strong. Two years on its political reputation was tattered. Hamas was not ready to rule in 2006. They likely should have taken the advice of its Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood colleagues and be satisfied with a strong opposition role and then learn how to rule. They made poor decisions politically to confront Fatah and further divide the Palestinian nation. They seemed confused about how to deal with their role as governor and resistance movement and ended up blurring the lines between the party and the state – just like Fatah did to their detriment.

As a result of this assessment I conclude that Hamas’ political strength weakened considerably over the course of the period 2004 to 2007.

Military Strength

I made the following observations as the basis for change in the military strength during the period 2004 to 2007.

Table 20 - Hamas Military Strength Evidence: 2003-2007

Major Category Observations

. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) identifies Hamas as complicit in 33 separate incidents of violent activity

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against Israel from the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2007155 156. . The operations against Israel during the 2004 to 2007 period represented a precipitous decline from the tempo at the height of the second intifada as well as the suicide bombing campaigns in Nature and Extent of the mid 1990s. Military Operations . Since Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel in March 2005 (that lasted until June 2006), there had been only 4 relatively minor incidents with nominal casualties. Even after the abduction of Gilad Shalit in June 2006157 and the termination of the extant ceasefire, there were only nine (9) other incidents, again with no fatalities and relatively nominal level of injury and property damage. . Overall Israeli losses exceeded 1000 killed during the second intifada158 (Almog 2004)159, which is greater than the Israeli losses in the 1967 war. . Hamas’ lethality declined precipitously over the course of the second intifada with the number of fatalities per operation declining to .11 in 2005 from a peak of 5.4 in 2002 (Byman 2006). . Byman specifically alludes to the talent drain as a likely cause for the decline in

155 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type =b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2004&end_yearonly=2007&dtp2=all&success =yes&perpetrator=399&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#results-table (last accessed January 12, 2013). 156 Note that the listing from GTD needs to be adjusted for the many attacks against Fatah in the Gaza Strip in the spring of 2007 to arrive at the operations targeting Israel. 157 http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/timeline-1-940-days-from- gilad-shalit-s-abduction-to-his-release-1.389452 (last accessed January 13, 2013) 158 http://www.jmcc.org/fastfactspag.aspx?tname=88 (last accessed January 12, 2013) 159 http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-death-toll-in-intifada- higher-than-last-two-wars-1.132555; (last accessed August 20, 2012)

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efficacy of Hamas’ military operations between 2000 and 2005. That is likely given the level and efficacy of the targeted assassination campaign, but the IDF had also evolved its defenses (Almog 2004) that included a redesigned barrier wall between Gaza and Israel. . Between the electoral victory in January 2006 and the end of 2007, Hamas had been expending most of its military energies on policing up Gaza internally by reducing crime and lawlessness in the Strip and evicting the Fatah security forces from Gaza (ICG Middle East Report #62 and 68, Byman 2011) versus engaging Israel militarily. Hamas had shown little appetite for up- tempo or larger scale military operations once the second intifada had come to a close.

. The combined forces of the Palestinian resistance with Hamas leading the way had hurt the Israelis during the second intifada but it was at a great cost for all Gazans160 but in particular for Hamas as a fighting force. For Hamas as the ‘tip of the spear’ of the intifada, the cost in personnel was the greatest of all the groups engaged. . As a fighting organization Hamas had Nature and Extent of been battered badly during the second Military Capabilities intifada losing over 460161 of its core personnel. The IDF campaign to degrade Hamas and Fatah during the period September 2000 to March 2005 (Gunning 2008, Byman 2006 and 2011) while decried as immoral was effective.

160 There were 3334 Palestinians killed between the start of the second intifada and September 2004. 82% were civilians: http://electronicintifada.net/content/four- years-intifada-statistical-overview/395 (Last accessed January 12, 2013). 161 http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-death-toll-in-intifada- higher-than-last-two-wars-1.132555 (last accessed August 20, 2012)

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Given the relatively small size of Hamas and the Qassam Brigades in particular (between 1000 and 2000 at this time), this is a significant degradation of Hamas’ combat and leadership capacity162. . As part of this systematic effort to degrade the overall size and extremist mix of Hamas, the IDF also successfully targeted key political leaders, assassinating both Sheik Yasin and Abdel Rantisi in 2004 killing within the span of a few weeks each other. "On the ground, there is no question that Hamas has been seriously weakened by the decimation of its ranks through assassination and arrest” (Byman 2006). . In 2005, the group even declared that it would unilaterally accept a "period of calm" because of the losses it was suffering among its senior cadre. Hamas opted for a ceasefire from March 2005

162 Hamas and Fatah were joined in the second intifada by other resistance groups that were active in the Gaza strip including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Brigades and the Popular Resistance Committees. 163 Many public servants on the PA payroll had not been paid consistently, or at all, since the 2006 electoral victory. Brown (2006) notes:”With tens of thousands of security personnel, many of them loyal to Fatah, stripped of their salaries but not their weapons, Palestine might earn the dubious distinction of having experienced its first coup d’état before establishing an état.” This may have had more than a little something to do with the less than honorable performance of the PA security forces in their clash with Hamas in 2007.

164 “Since 2006 Hamas has fired 122mm Grad rockets, copies made in Iran, and Eastern-bloc versions modified to expand their range and lethality, into Israel. The rockets were believed to have been smuggled into the Gaza Strip via tunnels from Egypt. Some of the rockets were of a Chinese Grad variant. Hamas sources said they were pleased by the performance of the Chinese variants of the BM-21 Grad rocket, which demonstrated a far greater range and blast impact than Palestinian-made rockets, as well as Russian-origin Grads or Katyushas.” See also: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism- +Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Terror+in+Gaza- +Two+months+since+the+Hamas+takeover+16-Aug-2007.htm (last accessed August 20, 2012).

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to June 2006 largely due to its weakened condition militarily as well as the debilitating attacks on its political leadership. “Before his death, Rantisi conceded that the killings had made things harder for his organization. Hamas never retaliated for his death” (Byman 2006). . Since the election in 2006 and through 2007 Hamas was struggling to keep all of the active militant groups in line, especially the Al Aqsa Matryrs Brigade who continued to launch rockets even though Hamas was demanding restraint. Hamas had the ability to evict a relatively powerful for (PA security forces loyal to Fatah) but struggled to control the other militants with respect to harassment of Israel. . Fatah had significantly greater security forces estimated at 40,000 men in 2004 but were routed by Hamas forces in a matter of weeks in June 2007. While an unsavory example of violence against one’s own people, Hamas demonstrated that it had regained some measure of combat ability albeit against a foe that was perhaps less than willing to die for the cause at that moment163 (Berman 2009:43). . By 2007 the tunnel networks inside Gaza had been expanded not only in the capacity to smuggle weapons, move combatants into positions for kidnapping or terror operations but also as a source of revenue for the fledging Hamas government (ICG Middle East Report #73; IICC 2008). . Hamas was also able to make substantial upgrades to its rocket systems between 2006 and 2008 – arguably its most important strategic weapon following suicide bombers - which now included longer-range missiles from its sponsor Iran (IICC

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2008).164 . By 2007 Hamas was still essentially a combination of approximately six light infantry brigades and mortar and rocket artillery units. Training with Hezbollah and the IRGC (Quds Force) had begun in the Bekaa Valley (and occasionally in Iran) to conduct company or brigade size operations as well as to operate more sophisticated weapons systems (e.g., surface to air and antitank weapons) but this was still in the early stages at this point (Yoram and White 2009; ICG Middle East Report # 73; IICC 2008). . Hamas seems to have been more focused on taking care of its business against its rival, Fatah, than focusing on equipping itself for war with Israel. “Hamas and Fatah arm themselves post Mecca since they were wary of each others intentions re the power grab for the security apparatus. Fatah officials asserted the military wing was significantly augmenting itself with outside (mainly Iranian) help, putting it in a position to control Gaza" (ICG Middle East Report #68:7).

Conclusion

In summary, the military strength of Hamas changed positively between

2004 to the end of 2007. At the end of this period, Hamas was still a relatively unsophisticated military organization - certainly not on the level of Hezbollah whom it sought to model itself after (especially in light of the apparently successful outcome of the July 2006 war with the IDF). But Hamas had been devastated militarily at the conclusion of the second intifada and, by comparison, it was

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stronger by the end of the period under measurement. The military strength trend was positive and they were also attempting to move up in capability from, at best, a guerilla organization that mixed terror and small unit operations to a more formal military operation. Because their operations tempo had declined so significantly over the evaluation period, even while their military capabilities were in the early stages of recovery, I conclude that they had recovered their pre-election military strength by the end of 2007. This is a tenuous conclusion given that their tempo of operations against Israel had declined so significantly. They, at best, had built up capability but it remained unproven as of the end of 2007 with respect to its most lethal foe. Their ability to forcibly evict Fatah, however, is something that would have been unthinkable in 2004 or 2005.

Economic Strength The observations I will use to gauge the change in the economic component of organizational strength for this period are summarized in the table below:

Table 21 - Hamas Economic Strength: 2003-2007

Major Category Observations

. At the outset of this period, the major sponsors include the state of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria (ICG Middle East Report #21). Scope and Extent . Key state sponsors such as Iran165 and of Contributions Syria had provided up to $15 million a from State month and military equipment (e.g. Sponsors Grad rockets) during this period to fund its military build up (Byman 2011:191). Saudi Arabia (private

165 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_08_079_2.pdf (last accessed January 23, 2013)

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citizens) had also been major donor to Hamas but invested at levels below Iran. . As the impact of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)166 and the regional war in Iraq expanded in 2004 and later, Hamas took pains to distinguish itself from groups such as Al Qaeda in order to preserve some of its more vulnerable financial sources (e.g, charitable foundations, Saudi Arabia). . As the Hussein regime in Iraq fell in 2004 and the GWOT pressures interdicted Saudi sources by 2005167,

166 The use of the term GWOT was discontinued in 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html (last accessed January 12, 2013). 167 GlobalSecurity.org notes, however, that Saudi Arabia still is active in funding Hamas. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-funds.htm (last accessed August 21, 2012). 168 An interview with Mahmoud Zahar in June 2007 suggests otherwise. In this interview in Der Spiegel, he suggests that Hamas was able to attract donations from other Arab states “because they have a very good image among Arab states.” For example, Egypt was supposedly willing to provide $5 million a month. See http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-hamas-co-founder- mahmoud-zahar-we-will-try-to-form-an-islamic-society-a-490160.html (last accessed August 20,2012).

169 “Israel used its control over the border crossings – and much of the Gazan economy, power, and water – to launch a political and economic war against Hamas that began in July 2007. It did so after nearly a half-decade of broader Israeli- Palestinian struggles that had already sharply isolated Gaza and crippled its economy. As some senior Israeli officers and officials stated in briefings at the time, the result was to place Gaza under a ―state of siege or make it a ―prison. The decline in Gaza‘s already weakened economy as led the World Bank to warn of the collapse of the Gazan economy in December 2007. In practice, some 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza became hostages to the power struggle between Israel and Hamas” (Cordesman 2009:7) 170 http://www.spiegel.de/international/palestinian-authority-in-financial-crisis- hamas-calls-eu-aid-freeze-wrong-and-unjust-a-410889.html (last accessed August 20, 2012).

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major gaps appear in Hamas’ financial supply. At this point, though controversial inside Hamas, Iran emerges as a primary state sponsor along with Qatar (Levitt 2008). “Hamas Politburo Chairman Khalid Mashal said, ‘we receive funds from one [government] source, Iran. Arabs [states] pay nothing to help the people168. Funds from donor states are paid for political purposes and not to help the Palestinian people.’ . PA officials alleged that since the takeover [June 2007], Iran and other Gulf states (e.g., Qatar) have contributed between $150 million and $200 million to the Hamas government” (ICG Middle East Report #73: 18-19, Levitt 2008; IICC 2008). . The Israeli blockade and the cutoff of international funding for NGOs in Gaza169 had radically degraded the ability of Hamas to function as a government, these funds enabled it to conduct basic operations in Gaza – social services, police, government, municipal services – as long as it avoided any major conflicts with Israel. . Hamas itself feared dependency on few large donors at this time (ICG Middle East Report #49:13). . The EU had rallied with the US and Israel and cut off funding to the PA (i.e., Hamas as governor) shortly after their election in January 2006.170

. The inflows generated from charitable foundations continued to be strong, if not stronger, during the Scope and Extent period under review (2004 to 2007). of Contributions Levitt (2005 and 2008) points to a from Other robust network of foundations that Sources operated inside the Palestinian territories and amongst the Diaspora

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that channeled substantial sums ($25 to $30 million annually) for the purposes of the social work that was critical to Hamas’ political strength. . While there were routine accusations that these foundations were fronts for funding military operations (Levitt 2005, 2008), no final resolutions regarding these charges were made during this time. As a result, the foundations operated unchecked. Ability to Generate . A major new source of revenue was Income from triggered by the organization’s ability Commercial to gain control of the taxing authority Operations over the tunnels and goods smuggled (Criminal or into Gaza through the tunnels (Byman otherwise) 2010 and Levitt 2008). . While relatively new and undeveloped at this stage, Hamas’ ability to tax smuggled goods such as cigarettes began to add significantly to its treasury for political, military or social purposes. . Funds from criminal operations (e.g., illegal drugs, contraband cigarettes) amounted to approximately US$5 million annually.

Conclusions

Iran in cooperation with Syria and Hezbollah were able to provide substantial contributions in kind of military equipment and financing to the movement following their electoral victory in 2006. The revenues from the tunnel operations was another major improvement in the financial welfare of the state that was able to tapped by the Party due to the blurred lines between the two entities.

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Based on my observations regarding Hamas’ financial strength during the period 2004 to 2007, it appears that they have become considerably stronger even as the Gaza Strip descended into an economic hell due to the blockade and cutoff of the NGO funding from Western powers.

Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2004 to 2007

Hamas demonstrated qualified organizational resilience during this time period based on its ability to rebuild and enhance its military capabilities in a reasonable timeframe as well as sustain and then extend its economic strength.

Hamas was politically weakened during this period but also strengthened the movement militarily and economically. While there were a variety of external factors that potentially distort the reasons for the change in the political strength of

Hamas (in particular, the campaign by Western powers and Israel to actively undermine Hamas as a political organization), Hamas made enough mistakes as a governor to contribute directly to its weakened political state.

Assessment of Hamas’ State of Legitimation at the time of 2006 Electoral Victory As noted previously, in light of the assessment of the organization’s demonstrated resilience following the 2006 elections, we need to determine which of the primary hypotheses has the least amount of evidence against it. There are three basic areas to cover: the Methods of Operations tests, the Outcomes tests and the Cheap Talk test.

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Methods Tests As noted in chapter 2 these tests are built around four factors that reveal the degree to which the organization’s power is legitimated in the way the organization goes about its duties. A summary graphic is below:

Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV) The table below includes the observations I use to assess the state of legitimation with regards to this test during the period under review:

Table 22 - Hamas AOV Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. Especially after the first intifada, Hamas was inclined to use violence against Palestinians who were perceived as collaborators with Israel (Robinson Frequency & Extent of 1997). Coercive Violence – . “Unlike Fatah, which is properly believed Loyalty and to have carried out numerous internal Performance assassinations…and has seen a sharp increase in internal violence since the death of Arafat, Hamas has not, as far as

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is known, resorted to internal violence to discipline members or settle internal disputes…Hamas and Qassam squads have killed a significant number of suspected collaborators within Hamas’ own ranks, particularly during the first intifada, and political rivalries or moral differences probably played a part in some of these. However, compared to other factions, Hamas is typically considered by informed observers to have been more meticulous in its investigation…and less prone to killing suspected collaborators for other reasons than intelligence cooperation.” (Gunning 2008:129) . The formation of the armed wing of Hamas (Qassam brigades) in 1991 Nature and Extent of established a 1000 to 2000 person Internal Security organization of loyal troops to both deal Organization with internal enemies and to fight the fight against Israel (Mishal and Sela 2000). . Unlike the relatively nominal force of the Qassam Brigades, the PA fielded an estimated 60,000-man internal security force to enforce law and order. In comparison, Hamas would not/could not devote that amount of resources to internal policing given its resistance mission and the social service needs to which the movement had committed. . Hamas faced a significant challenge from Fatah to disarm prior to the 2006 elections as part of the PA’s promise to Use of Unlawful its donors (Byman 2011:79-112). Violence to Maintain . Hamas resisted in a generally non- Power violent manner any attempts by the PA (effectively Fatah) to disarm it and in, so doing, demonstrated its discipline in the face of a potential opportunity for the use of force. . Hamas clearly understood its inferior position militarily relative to the PA at that time but, via the Cairo Talks in 2005

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(Tamimi), legitimated the role of violence in resisting the occupation and, thereby, avoided a confrontation with the PA over the monopoly on the use of force.171 . The use of violence to deter collaboration was supported wholeheartedly by the Palestinian electorate and, as a result, was viewed as an appropriate use of force by a ruling party in the Palestinian Territories (Gunning 2008) Conclusion

Prior to the 2006 electoral victory, Hamas appears to have been careful to limit the use of violence outside of the specific needs to eliminate collaboration with the enemy. While this may be a case of ‘who is the tallest midget’, Hamas seems to be relatively more circumspect than Fatah in how it deals with internal policing. Its use of violence to address internal dissension leading up to the 2006 election appears to be very limited. Its available resources (i.e., the Qassam Brigades) to do so are limited if not by design then by the reality of having to maintain a reasonable deterrent force against Israel. Hamas did not have the burden of managing the monopoly of the use of force that the Palestinian Authority (PA) did at this time. It could choose to focus its resources entirely on the resistance mission that naturally extended to the policing of internal security problems within its own ranks.

171 With Abbas only newly elected as President in the wake of Arafat’s death in November 2004, Hamas was in a advantageous position politically to press its views on the legitimation of the use of violent resistance to thwart the occupation. It also exploited its popularity following the second intifada.

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Based on these observations, I conclude that the state of legitimation with regards to the AOV test is emergent.

Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA) The table below includes the observations I will use to assess the state of legitimation as of the 2006 shock with regards to the LOA test:

Table 23 - Hamas LOA Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. Saudi Arabia contributed $135 million172 to Hamas for the 16 months ending May 2002 (Napoleoni 2003: 71). Iraq and Syria were donors of Scope, Level and financial and military assistance to Persistence of Hamas but were limited contributors Support (Napoleoni 2003). . Until the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2004, Saddam Hussein had pledged $25,000 to the families of all suicide bombers in the Palestinian Territories. . Syria provided sanctuary at this time for certain leaders of Hamas (e.g., Khalid Meshal) who needed protection from Israel’s targeted assassination programs173 as well as the freedom of movement for fund raising.174 . Iran facilitated the combat training of Hamas by Hezbollah and the Iranian Quds force (Byman 2005; 2006; 2011; IICC 2008). . Key state sponsors such as Iran had

172 This is a substantial sum if Napoleani’s estimate of Hamas’ operating budget is correct - $70 million annually at the time (Napoleoni 2003:71). 173 Mishal, of course, was almost assassinated in 1997 by Israeli intelligence agents when Hamas’ international offices were located in Amman (McGeough 2009). 174 Hamas leaders would ultimately leave Syria in opposition to the Assad regime’s repressive measures against its citizens. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-17192278 (last accessed January 13, 2013).

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provided from $20 to $30 million 175annually during the intifada and prior (Napoleani 2003:71). By the end of the second intifada Iran provided a broad scope of resources to Hamas: financial assistance, weapons176 and (at this time limited) combat training support via the Iran’s Quds force and Hezbollah177 (IICC 2008). . Iran and Syria both attempted to legitimate Hamas to its regional peers as a resistance movement; i.e., it was appropriate to use violence to end the Israeli occupation and oppression of the Palestinian Territories. . Levitt (2005) notes that while Hamas “jealously protects its operational independence”, when Rantisi and Yasin were assassinated in 2004 and Iraq and Saudi Arabia ceased contributions178, that the weakened Hamas leadership relented and permitted Iran to fill the funding gap created by the loss of Iraq and Saudi Arabia as state sponsors. . Iran provides financial assistance,

175 https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5167 (last accessed January 27, 2013). 176 Illustrative of the weapons shipments from Iran to Hamas are the Karine-A incident in 2002. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2002/Seizing%20of%20 the%20Palestinian%20weapons%20ship%20Karine%20A%20- (last accessed January12, 2013). 177 https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5167 (last accessed January 23, 2013). 178 With the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq funding for Hamas ceased. Due to counterterrorism operations by the Saudi government, financing from Saudi donors was interdicted in 2004. It is unclear if that funding has resumed as of summer 2012. 179 Illustrative of the weapons shipments from Iran to Hamas are the Karine-A incident in 2002. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2002/Seizing%20of%20 the%20Palestinian%20weapons%20ship%20Karine%20A%20- (last accessed January12, 2013).

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weapons179 and (at this time limited) combat training support via the Quds force and Hezbollah. Strategic vs. . The state sponsors each had different Ideological strategic reasons to support Hamas. Motivation for Iran, Syria and Iraq viewed Hamas as a Sponsor(s) suitable proxy to inflict harm on Israel. Hamas acted as a private army for these sponsors with respect to their strategic desire to weaken Israel politically and militarily (Byman 2005). But the strategic goals of all parties were aligned. Saudi Arabia (state level) provided support to burnish its image as a patron of the Palestinian cause and a major political power in the Gulf. . The Islamic ideological affinity with the major state sponsors is plausible only with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The link with Iran is tenuous given the Sunni/Shia religious divide that separated these organizations.180 . There seems to be little evidence that any of the major sponsors were able to influence the course and speed of Hamas’ basic operations that had been in place since its birth in 1987 (Byman 2005). . Those state sponsors (e.g., Iran and Syria) who may have been inclined to divert Hamas resources for terror operations abroad were not able (nor seemingly inclined) to persuade Hamas to conduct missions outside of its normal area of focus (Gunning 2008:195-196). Hamas was not a mercenary for its state sponsors. . Hamas’ primary sources of funding

180 It is true that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 did inspire Sunni movements in the Palestinian Territories including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Abu-Amr 1994) but it is unclear that this was a primary motivation for the financial and operational support by Iran. Hamas was in need and took help when offered if the provider was careful to limit its demands on the movement.

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include state sponsors (e.g., Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq), charitable Diversity of Sources foundations, modest commercial operations181 and criminal activities (Levitt 2006). . For the bulk of the period leading up to the 2006 elections, Hamas had a relatively diversified set of funding sources that lowered the co-optation risks of state level sponsors (Byman et al 2003). This dynamic did change following the second intifada (2004) when Iran assumed the primary sponsor role. . The funding from charitable foundations domestically and internationally constituted the bulk of all the funds needed to run the Hamas social services annually (an estimated $30 million annually) during this period (Levitt 2005 and 2008; Napoleoni 2003:70-73). . Hamas gains modest revenue from commercial activities cattle farms as well as sewing and weaving centers.182

Discussion and Conclusions

In contrast to the rampant corruption that stained the PLO’s financial management of donors’ funds, Hamas had been institutionally committed to be both transparent and independent in its dealings with any donor. But the movement had

181 According the Global Terrorism Database, Hamas gains modest revenue from commercial activities cattle farms as well as sewing and weaving centers. http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_prof ile.asp?id=49 (last accessed August 8, 2012). 182 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=2&search=hamas&count =100&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=country&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results- table (last accessed August 8, 2012).

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become highly dependent on Iran by the time of the 2006 election and, at that time, had few major alternative sources of funding available. Though no signs of cooptation were present as of the 2006 election, Hamas had become unduly reliant on

Iran for military and financial support and knew it internally. Hamas had been relatively consistently engaged militarily with Israel and was neither willing nor able to be conducting extra military/clandestine operations on behalf of its sponsors. Iran (Shia) and Syria’s (Alawite) brand of Islam is inconsistent with the more traditional Sunni form that Hamas practices. Syria and Iran are also well- known practitioners of realpolitik. They are looking for proxies to do their bidding as part of strategic gambits (Byman 2005). Syria is just as inclined to support its donee’s rivals as the group it is funding – especially if they are Islamic in nature

(Byman 2005). The private Saudi sponsors also provide economic support for Al

Qaeda and its affiliates with whom Hamas is ideologically at odds (Mendelsohn

2009; ICG 2011 - Middle East Report #104) and are well aware of the implications of being tarred with the ‘Al Qaeda’ brush. While Hamas is happy to take these sponsors’ monies they are generally not aligned with these parties ideologically except in the sense that Israel is a common foe.

Based on this analysis I conclude that Hamas’ is in a confused state of legitimation at the time of the 2006 elections with respect to the Level of Autonomy tests.

Level of Public Accountability (LPA) The table below includes the observations I will use to assess the state of legitimation as of the 2006 shock with regards to the LPA test:

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Table 24 - Hamas LPA Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. Hamas’ leadership behaves more like the authoritarian or semi- authoritarian vanguard of a mass movement that led a number of secular movements in that they operated more along the lines the democratic centralism of Leninism (Brown 2012b). 183 Level of . Brown (2012b:83) notes that “for Answerability to movements following the the Public Brotherhood model (i.e. Hamas), neither vision of personal improvement nor the dedication to building an organization of righteous Muslims leads them to cut themselves off from the broader society.” . Hamas changed its stance from refusing to stand for local and national elections in 1996 due to its fundamental rejection of the Oslo Accords and all that flowed from that process to competing for elections at the local and national level from 2004 to 2006.184 . Hamas won a majority of seats in the national elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council of January 2006 – 74 out of 132 (Pina 2006:10). . “Between 2004 and 2006 Palestinians voted in multiple municipal elections (for the first time

183 As noted below, Hamas systematically monitored the ‘Palestinian street’ (popular opinion). This action is not mutually exclusive with the democratic centralism model. Hamas leadership may have listened to what the street was saying but, as the vanguard, it alone decided what actions to take on behalf of the masses. 184 Gunning (2008:143 ff) notes that Hamas or its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine, stood for elections at the University level and in trade unions since the 1950s.

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since 1976) to fill 900 local council seats that are attached to the Palestinian Ministry of Government Affairs. Hamas managed to out- mobilize Fatah at the local municipal level by harnessing its tradition of delivering social services to Palestinians” (Pina 2006:9). . Until the campaigning season of late 2004/2005 commenced, there were only occasional attempts to justify its actions before or after controversial actions were taken (Gunning 2008:155-157).185 As the municipal elections took place between December 2004 and December 2005, Hamas performed very well by “grassroots consultations and heeding public opinion.” This same political operating style also played well for Hamas as it competed for seats in the national legislature in 2006 (2008:146ff). . In the wake of the second intifada, Hamas demonstrated a commitment to be aligned with the Palestinian street; i.e., to systematically monitor, evaluate and incorporate what the masses were saying to the movement regarding the strategies it used to achieve its overall vision, mission and values (ICG Middle East Report #21 - Dealing with Hamas). . “Palestinian public opinion clearly plays a key role in Hamas’ calculations and acts in two ways: first, because Hamas will never act

185 For example, Mishal and Sela (2000:76-77) note Hamas’ crude attempt to justify its use of suicide bombers in 1995. In addition, the commitment to ceasefires, especially unilateral decisions by Hamas, warranted explanations to the masses. Hamas was particularly focused on avoiding the appearance of submitting to the will of Israel in keeping with its view of Israel as illegitimate and an oppressor. Any decision that involved the appearance of submission to Israel, therefore, warranted an explanation to the people.

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against the Palestinian street; and secondly, because the PA’s ability to act without being viewed as Israeli collaborators is directly linked to popular perceptions…Unlike most radical Palestinian groups, secular or Islamist, it is sensitive to public opinion, skillful at reading popular moods and acting in ways that are basically congruent – or at least not inconsistent – with them.” (ICG Middle East Report #21 - Dealing with Hamas) . Until late 2004, Hamas had to operate largely as a clandestine organization to minimize the degradation from IDF attacks and the oppression from PA security forces Level of in the Gaza Strip. Especially since the Enforcement of height of the second Intifada (c. Public 2002) when Israel was Accountability systematically targeting and assassinating its leaders, Hamas needed to maintain its secrecy. . In spite of the long history of elections in the Territories (Gunning 2008), the institutions of democracy were fragile and unstable at best at this time. . Discussions of a civil society that uses a public sphere to contest alternative identities for the Palestinian Territories are plausible (Lynch 1999) in that, analysts and scholars routinely refer to the existence of ‘an Arab Street’ in Gaza and the West Bank. But what is not clear is the enforcement impact of this public sphere. While in some societies (e.g., Jordan per Lynch 1999) the public sphere acts as a force for change, the existence of such a social entity with that power was very questionable in Gaza and the West Bank prior to the 2006

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elections. . CPI scores from Transparency International ranked the Territories in the bottom third of countries surveyed with CPI scores of 2.5 or 2.6.186 . Even though the PA held the majority in the legislature and controlled the executive and the judiciary, at this time Israel maintained a ‘vote’ in who stood for election and would disrupt or disable the campaigning of candidates that it did not perceive to be in its best interests (e.g., imprisonment or restrictions on access to campaigning in Jerusalem or West Bank cities). . There were a variety of public polling organizations187 that operated in the Palestinian Territories but numerous scholars point out the difficulty of gauging the integrity of respondents due to their fears of adverse repercussions. Many scholars pointed out the big disconnect between the pre-election estimates of voter choice vs. the actual outcomes in the 2006 elections.

Conclusion

Based on this assessment of its level of public accountability, I conclude that

Hamas’ state of legitimation as of the 2006 election was ‘confused’. Though Hamas made important strides in the run up to the election regarding public accountability,

186 http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (last accessed August 8, 2012). 187 For example, PSR (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research) and The Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy Research, run by pollster Khalil Shikaki.

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it was hard to distinguish political maneuvering from genuine commitment to conditions and level of public accountability that merit a higher ranking. The environment for public accountability is structurally weak. The relative absence of any real enforcement mechanism also weakens the organization’s ability to code this factor at a more advanced state of legitimation.

Level of Professionalism (LPro) The graphics below depicts the ex ante tests for the level of professionalism component of the states of legitimation tests. There are two empirical elements to focus relevant observations: 1.) efficiency, innovativeness and coherence of the organization; and, 2.) fairness in the administration of public services.

Table 25 - Hamas LPro Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Observations

Category

Efficiency and Technical Competence – Military Operations

. Hamas is a lethal military force188 killing or injuring thousands of Israelis since its inception. They conducted numerous deadly suicide bombing operations in the mid 1990s as well as rocket attacks on Israeli cities within reach of their rocket arsenal. . They conducted 19 attacks in 2001 and peaked at 204 in 2004 (Byman 2006) and reduced operations dramatically between the end of the second intifada and the elections in 2006 (see Military Strength discussion above).

188 The military wing is known as the Al Qassam Brigades.

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Efficiency, . Between the start of the second intifada in Innovation 2000 and the temporary ceasefire in June and 2005, however, the organization’s lethality plummeted from a peak of 5.4 deaths per Coherence attack to 0.11 per attack (Byman 2006). . In addition to the drop in lethality of Hamas military operations, Byman and others have noted that Hamas -and the Palestinians in general - were paying a high price in terms of killed or wounded by the IDF. Palestinians were dying at the rate of 4:1 versus the Israelis (Gunning 2008: 208-219) during the second intifada. This was the same ‘exchange rate’ that they had been dying since the birth of Hamas. . Hamas and its military wing were incurring losses during the second intifada at such a rate that their military efficacy was being radically reduced and their organizational survival was in question. They were being ground down by the IDF and had a limited source of talent to draw upon to sustain the efficiency of its operations (Byman 2006, 2011; ICG Middle East Report #23 and #49).

Efficiency and Technical Competence – Administrative Operations

189 http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=87 190 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamass-tactics- lessons-from-recent-attacks 191 This is no small feat given the variety of major organizational decisions it has had to make from rejecting the Oslo Accords, refusing to stand for election in 1996, participating and leading the second intifada in 2000, the ceasefires in 2003 and 2005; and, finally, standing for elections at the national level in 2006. This last decision could have been fatal to the organization given the ideological dilemma that elections present, the complexity of standing for elections in a semi-authoritarian political system (Brown 2012), as well as the operational risks that assuming public office would present to a resistance organization. Hamas had to deal with the classic problem of resistance movements that enter politics: "entering institutional politics was a slippery slope that would ultimately lead to abandonment of armed struggle, as well as to the loss of important constituencies to more radical groups" (ICG Middle East Report N°49:6).

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. In the final year of this period (2005), Hamas does actually govern at the municipal level and receives generally strong endorsement as an efficient and effective governor (ICG Middle East Report #49:11; Gunning 2008). . Hamas is recognized as an efficient administrator (Hroub 2000:236-239; ICG 2003 Middle East Report #13) and a trusted administrator (Hroub 2004:33). . They are at least as efficient as the international NGOs (e.g., UNRWA) some of whom have been operating in the Palestinian Territories since 1950189 (ICG Middle East Report #13). . “Hamas in particular has, since its inception, invested heavily in charitable work and considers this central to its identity and purpose. Islamic social welfare organizations, directly or indirectly, provide emergency cash assistance, food and medical care as well as educational and psychological services, to perhaps one out of six. By most accounts, such institutions are more efficient than the secular or official counterparts, delivering aid without distinction as to religious belief or political affiliation. Certainly, they are perceived as such by the Palestinian public” (ICG Middle East Report #13).

Level of Tactical Innovation

. There is limited evidence that Hamas was substantially altering its way of conducting the resistance in the period prior to the 2006 election. . Two areas of innovation, however, are worth noting. 1.) To minimize the impact of the IDF’s targeted assassination programs from decapitating the organization, Hamas devolved more operational responsibility and “allowed local operatives more initiative” (Byman

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2006); 2.) In addition to the innovations regarding command and control, Hamas also apparently tried to incorporate chemical weapons into its suicide bombing schemes but ultimately failed in the implementation190.

Coherence of the Organization . Rumors of pending splinters in Hamas due to disagreements about political or military strategies have been common since the decision not to compete for election in 1996. . As Brown (2012b) and Byman (2006, 2011) point out, however, Hamas’ democratic centralism allows for a robust and wide-ranging debate but demands conformity once a decision has been reached. Hamas has maintained remarkable organizational coherence since its inception until the 2006 election.191 . To mitigate the impact of rivals and enemies actions to degrade it, Hamas’ multilayered organization structure acts as a shock absorber for the organization when it is harassed or degraded by the IDF or its rivals: “Hamas’s capacity for quick adjustment is undoubtedly due to its functioning structure at various levels— religious preaching, charitable work, political activities, and of course military operations—which provides the movement with a multilayered network difficult to dismantle. These layers support each other, immediately filling the gaps created by assassinations, arrests, or clampdowns."(Hroub 2004:33) . There appears to be no/limited evidence of any major incidents of uncontrolled rogue operators in this period. This is inconclusive, however, since Hamas did not have the responsibility for assuring law and order in the Palestinian Territories nor the military operations of

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all parties operating in the Gaza and the West Bank during this period (the PA was responsible and could be criticized for not controlling the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades as well as Hamas/Qassam).

. Hamas is recognized as a trusted administrator (Hroub 2004:33; ICG 2003 Middle East Report #13). . While respecting the power of the clans and families prior to the elections, Hamas began to move beyond the patron/client model that typified Fatah in the past. In its ardent attempts to be the ‘un-Fatah’, Hamas built its social services operations on a rational needs-based model that any Fairness in self-respecting NGO would recognize as Public fair and balanced (ICG Middle East Report Administration 71). . Hamas built policies of social services and military significance that fit the demands of the times and the people (Tamimi, Hroub 2000 and 2010) as a “faithful and effective” operator (Tamimi 2007:220- 221). . See also above reference to ICG Middle East Report quote regarding the perception of Hamas’ social services as “…delivering aid without distinction as to religious belief or political affiliation.” . While I cannot detect any evidence that the leadership positions have been opened to a worthy candidate that is female, the typical member of the vanguard is trained in engineering, medicine or financial matters (Lybarger, Gunning 2008). Hamas seems to have gone the technocrat route to supply talent for certain roles. This contrasts with other notable Islamic organizations that restrict senior leadership positions to that that are trained in Islamic jurisprudence (e.g., Hezbollah, Al Qaeda). . Leaders need to be, however, a full

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member of the Brotherhood that requires a relatively lengthy indoctrination period (at least one year but likely longer to establish a platform for candidacy for senior leadership). “Swearing an oath of allegiance to the Brotherhood is a prerequisite to a position of authority within Hamas, not all of whose members have been invited to do so…anyone can say he is Hamas. What is meaningful is to say you are Ikhwan [Brotherhood]” (ICG Middle East Report #104).

Conclusion: Level of Professionalism

Based on the analysis of Hamas’ level of professionalism at the time of the

2006 elections, I conclude that the organization has an emergent state of legitimation with respect to this element of the framework. There are some notable elements (e.g., decline in lethality and the gaps in Hamas’ engagement with the masses regarding military policies) that weaken this rating but, on balance, Hamas is an organization that invested heavily by 2006 to demonstrate its bona fides as a credible professional organization.

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Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes The tangible outcomes produced by Hamas are summarized in the table below:

Table 26 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Resistance to Israel

. Led the organized resistance effort that disrupted the Oslo Accords in the 1990s.192, 193

192 This is only a productive outcome for those who saw the Oslo Accords as a ‘sell out’ to the Israelis and the West for little in return. This is contested in much of the scholarship on the Accords but it appeared to burnish Hamas’ credentials as a seeker of the Palestinian homeland that it espoused in its Charter. 193 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key _documents/1682727.stm (last accessed August 14, 2012)

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. Led the second intifada and – though debatable - led to the IDF withdrawal Tangible Outcomes in August 2005 from Gaza and the Produced collapse of the Oslo Accords. . Fatah had largely eschewed violence as a political lever following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and yet negotiations with Israel had not produced the desired outcomes by the time of elections in 1996, let alone by the national elections in January 2006. Hamas and other smaller factions194 carried the fight to the Israelis given these groups’ belief (and the broad public sentiment) that Israel would negotiate fairly only if compelled to do so (Gunning 2008:203-205). The great cost of that fight to all ranks in Hamas provided many with the evidence of its commitment to the cause of an independent Palestine along at least the 1967 borders195.

Major Provider of Social Services

. As discussed above, Hamas consistently delivered a broad slate of social services (e.g., healthcare, housing construction and education) in a

194 One of those smaller factions was the Al Aqsa Brigades who were a Fatah-funded and Fatah-related group but who dissented from the non-violent policy of Fatah (Milton-Edwards 2010; Napoleoni 2003, Alexander 2002; Byman 2005; ). 195 Many scholars have noted the pragmatism in Hamas’ position on the basis for a peaceful settlement with Israel. While the 1988 charter calls for a complete return to the 1948 borders, Brown (2012), Hroub (2000, 2004), Tamimi (2007) and others have noted Hamas’ willingness to accept a state along the 1967 lines.

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fair and equitable manner. . From late 2004 to the elections in 2006, Hamas governed at the municipal level and performed well enough for this to be cited as an important reason for their ultimately successful bid to upset Fatah in the Parliamentary elections in 2006 (Gunning 2008; ICG Middle East Report #49).

Discussion

The exit of the IDF from Gaza, the resistance effort in general, and the municipal government roles are public goods whose benefits are shared by all196 in the Palestinian Territories. The transparent and equitable manner in which most view Hamas’ administration of social services leads me to conclude that Hamas primarily acted in the public good in the delivery of its social services (versus a private good for only pious Muslims)197. The glaring exception to the outcomes that a legitimated actor would have produced is the failure of Hamas (in concert with

Fatah) to make much progress on the unification front. The unity talks in Cairo in

196 The impact of the municipal government roles are clearly limited to those jurisdictions in which its elected officials operated. From the sources noted, it appears, however that Hamas served fairly and openly in accordance with the laws and customs of the Territories. 197 In virtually all sources I have used that relate to the Hamas social service program prior to the 2006 elections, I have seen no specific references to concern about corruption or otherwise inappropriate management of these services. This is consistent with even a purely instrumentalist view of Hamas in that the organization was vying for a significant minority, if not a majority, in the national elections in 2006.

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March 2005 appeared to be more of the same low-impact efforts that preceded it in the early 1990s198.

Nature of Outcomes Hamas has delivered more than tangible outcomes to the Palestinian people it seeks to lead and govern. Followers and rivals alike had often noted, however, that the tangible outcomes that are discussed above were only part of the Hamas value proposition (as of January 2006). The following table summarizes the major observations that I use to assess the nature of outcomes produced by Hamas as of the 2006 elections.

Table 27 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. The intangible outcome that was central to Hamas’ discourse was the formation a political identity199 of resistance to the occupation, of steadfast commitment to the realization of an independent state of Palestine in a just manner.

198 Brown (2012 and 2012c) points to the long trail of unfulfilled pledges for unification of the factions. In an interview in 2004, (Rabbani 2008), Khalid Mishal cites “the need to repair the inter-Palestinian rift as our greatest priority.” 199 Abdelal et al (2006) have provided a useful synthesis of the scholarship to define Identity as a variable by developing a simple analytic framework. They have defined Collective identity along two axes: content and contestation. The content consists of four non-mutually exclusive elements: 1.) constitutive norms – the formal and informal rules that define group membership; 2.) social purposes – the goals that are shared by members of the group; 3.) relational comparisons – defining the group by what it is not; and, 4.) cognitive models – overall worldviews. Contestation levels reveal the level of ‘fluidity and the contextual nature of social identities.’ Contestation will allow the analyst to unpack the degree of agreement within the group (the organization and the society that is rendering its views on the legitimacy of the group) regarding the content of the Identity. It is this construction of Identity that I use as the basis for this part of the discussion.

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Intangible . Hamas as an organization gave Nature of voice to a fundamental set of Outcomes beliefs in the Palestinian people as a whole. It was not about an Islamic vision of society or the destruction of Israel based on ideological grounds. It was a positive vision of what the Palestinian sought and how they would accomplish that major goal of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. . “Destroying Hamas as an organization is not impossible, but destroying Hamas as a manifestation of the Palestinian will to resist is. Hamas rose with the decline of the PLO as it compromised Palestinian rights and lost its will to resist. If Hamas follows the same path, a new “resistance” organization will emerge. In all cases and stages, the “new rising” movement(s) will succeed because they adhere to the logic of resisting the occupation, the same logic that was abandoned by the falling movements.” (Hroub 2004:36)

Conclusions

Hamas represents the will of a notable majority of the Palestinian society, if need be, to resist Israel with violence. Hamas provided a defiant and dignified alternative identity to Palestinians who saw the negotiations-based model of Fatah plus the Quartet as futile and debasing to the Palestinian people. Based on these observations, I conclude that Hamas has an emergent state of legitimation with regards to the test of its Outcomes.

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Vision, Mission & Values Alignment Tests (VMV – Cheap Talk) The final set of states of legitimation tests focus on how well the organization’s discourse at the Vision, Mission and Values (VMV) level aligns with

(and remains aligned with) the Methods of Operation and Outcomes levels. This is essentially a test for the level of ‘cheap talk’ by the organization. This discursive layer of social deposits acts as a constraint on the other layers – the organization needs to ‘walk its talk’ or else risk weakening if not destroying the power of its discursive layer of actions.

Hamas’ Super Priorities Based on scholars who have studied Hamas closely, it seems unlikely that one would find the organization’s most important priorities by doing textual analysis of their official proclamations. Brown (2006) notes that “the movement, used to operating in opposition and led by a diverse and geographically dispersed group, has grown accustomed to hammering out vague statements that hint at many things but commit to very little.”200

Recognizing that Hamas can be vague in its public statements and has evolved its thinking on core issues (e.g., conditions for settlement with Israel on the state of Palestine, role of democratic elections domestically, the role of Islam in the governance of society), the organization has consistently maintained its focus on two super-priorities since its origin and more recently on one other. These can be

200 For example, in their original 1988 charter, Hamas stipulated that the only acceptable borders for the state of Palestine were the 1948 borders. “Hamas has shown surprising pliability on the goals of the movement – (for example) Yassin accepted a two state solution along with the 1967 borders” (ICG Middle East Report #18:20).

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derived based on its actions in society and the military arena. First, Hamas is a nationalist movement inspired by Islam. It seeks an independent Palestinian state that comprehends the Gaza and the West Bank. Unlike its predecessor movement,

Hamas is a nationalist organization. It is zeroed in on the plight of the Palestinians not the greater Muslim community. In regards to the notion of an Islamic state,

Gunning (2008:60ff) notes that Hamas has more recently conceded that Islam must be “willed by the people, and can only come about if a clear majority support its establishment.”201 The notion of an independent Palestinian state is not negotiable but the boundaries (1948 vs. 1967) and the basis for the rules of society are negotiable (Islam vs. a secular model).

Second, Hamas is committed to sustaining steadfast resistance to the occupation (and later, to its non-violent variant, the siege/blockade) by Israel and will use violence as needed against both military as well as civilians in Israel to compel the Israelis to conduct fair and even-handed negotiations for the establishment of the Palestinian state. It seeks these goals on behalf of all

Palestinians currently in the Territories and the refugees from the 1948 war who live outside the Territories.

201 For this analysis I do not need to be certain that Hamas will remain true to this pledge – it is clear than this is contestable. I only need to see that they have stated their willingness to not impose Islam. In the analysis post 2006 elections we will have the opportunity to observe Hamas’ compliance with this pledge.

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Third, Hamas seeks intra-Palestinian unity; Hamas wants to avoid civil war or the factionalism that would weaken the Palestinian cause in the presence of a superior enemy such as Israel (Rabbani 2008).

Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’ Hamas has maintained its focus and commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and has paid a high price in loss of life and organizational degradation to do so. By January 2006 it had become recognized as the face of the resistance in Palestine. It had mounted a very credible challenge to the PLO’s claim of sole authority to represent the Palestinian people in all negotiations with Israel regarding peace and the establishment of the Palestinian state.

The glaring weakness in Hamas’ ability to ‘walk the talk’ is with regards to factionalism inside the Palestinian community. Hamas gave, at best, lip service to unification. No real movement has occurred since the dialogue in the early 1990s regarding progress towards joining the PLO. With the death of Arafat and its ability to take ownership of the “success” of the second intifada and the withdrawal of

Israel from Gaza in 2005, Hamas continued to move slowly on substantive progress towards unity with Fatah.

Based on these observations, I conclude that Hamas is emergent with respect to its Vision, Mission and Values. Even with all of the vagueness that pervades

Hamas’ public statements, it has stood fast as the main force of the resistance to

Israel in the fight for an independent Palestinian homeland that most Palestinians

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would consider just. It had, however, failed to deliver on its pledge for Palestinian unity.

2009 War With Israel

Assessment of Change in Organizational Strength of Hamas: 2007 - 2010 As noted earlier, organizational strength consists of three basic components:

1.) political strength, 2.) military strength, and, 3.) economic strength. I will discuss each component in turn and present observations within 2 years prior to and subsequent to the event being studied. In this case, the period under study for this event begins in January 2007 and ends in December 2010.

Table 28 - Hamas Political Strength Evidence: 2007-2010

Major Category Observations

. Public opinion polls from 2007 to 2010 (PSR polls202 #26 through #38) revealed a general trend downwards in popular support for Hamas and Haniyeh during this period. . Brown (2009) notes that: “The decline in Hamas’s public standing is quite real, but there is no easy way to use fleeting opinion polls to toss

202 http://www.pcpsr.org (last accessed January 15, 2013).

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Hamas out of power.” Popular Support . The weakening support for Hamas showed up prior to the Spring 2007 clash with Fatah but was significantly adversely affected by that event- and lingers in the poll results throughout this period even though Khalid Mishal claims Hamas had recouped its lost support by 2008 (Rabbani 2008:77). . The failure of Hamas and Fatah to reconcile – or even hold a new round of presidential and legislative elections (Brown 2009c) – appears to have promoted a creeping pessimism regarding not only the peace process (Annapolis in 2007 and other proposals including the Saudis and Egyptians) but also armed confrontation203. . Hamas’s public support204 does stabilize during this period between 30% and 36%205 of the population but it appears that has less to do with the positive acts of the Hamas government (e.g., establishing and enforcing law

203 But there always seems to be at least 25% of the polled population that saw armed conflict as a viable means to the end of an independent Palestinian state. At times this group grew to 40% polled (PSR #34) and was not exclusive to Hamas supporters. 204 The polls are not consistent in their use of comparable language over time. At times they use ‘popularity’ and others they use ‘support for Abbas/Haniyeh/Barghouti’ as a proxy for which group pulls more popular support. In addition, they ask the respondent to indicate which party would you vote for if an election was held today. 205 There is a spike in Hamas’ support in the PSR Poll #31 that was taken in March 2009. Presumably this is attributable to the bounce from the recent war with Israel. This uptick in support declines during 2009 as outlined in the ensuing polls.

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and order; not imposing Islamic mores) than the continued incompetence of the PA and perhaps apathy on the part of the public. . The overall political strength of either party was adversely affected by what also appeared to be a creeping pessimism about a re-unification between the West Bank and Gaza ever coming to pass: “ With two parliaments, two presidents and two governments, each declaring its own legitimacy while denying it to the other, the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip might become complete and permanent” (Shikaki 2009).

. There were no significant changes in Hamas’ scope of geographic influence during Geographic/Demographic this period. They remained Scope of Influence contained by Israel and Fatah as governors of the Gaza ‘prison’ while Fatah controlled the West Bank. Byman (2010) notes, however, that “It (Hamas) poses a strong and growing political threat to the more moderate Palestinian Authority, which is led by President Mahmoud Abbas and his technocratic prime minister, Salam Fayyad, and which governs the West Bank and used to run Gaza, too.” . Hamas’ apparent willingness to not impose an Islamic social model206, sustained Hamas’

206 Hamas's attempts at Islamization of Gazan society was uneven and tentative. All the usual disclaimers were being used by Hamas (i.e., compelling no one to accept

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political support beyond those who ranked development of personal piety as the most important goal of the state (well under 20% of the polled population).

. In the run up to the 2006 elections Hamas had demonstrated a savvy ability Alliances to build alliances at the individual or group level in order to compete and win in important political districts (Gunning 2008; Brown 2012b). . As elected officials in Gaza (post 2006 elections) it has shown little or no signs of building alliances for the purpose of advancing broader Palestinian statehood goals (ICG Middle East Report #104). . Most in the Fatah leadership in 2009 saw Hamas as a ‘coup d’etat’ movement and not a partner in productive political negotiations to bring about the Palestinian state (Shikaki 2009). The polarization between the movements continued unabated. The chances for a national unity government also did not

Islam) but there are enough reported incidents of intense social or physical pressure to abide by the more conservative rules of Sharia. This is clearly not the Taliban but it is not Hezbollah either. Hamas’ willingness to tolerate the repression of Gazans by more conservative groups (the jihadis) is still unclear (See also ICG Middle East Report N°73 – 19 March 2008). See also ICG Middle East Report #104 regarding Hamas’ bloody confrontation with a radical Jihadi group (Jund Ansar Allah) as evidence that it will use force to keep its monopoly on the use of force in Gaza (versus its motivation to be more ecumenical regarding the role of Islam in society).

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appreciably improve in later years (Brown 2012c).

Conclusions

Hamas’ overall political power has appeared to change for the worse in this time period. Its popular support had waxed and waned but, over the period, had declined due in large part to its poor record as a governor, its bloody clash with

Fatah in 2007, and its failure to even begin to unify all of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza. Its scope of influence remained largely limited to the Gaza.

Hamas seemed to revert to its ‘spoiler’ status that it was infamous for while it resisted the implementation of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s. The movement seemed to be less interested in alliances than consolidating its political and military power in Gaza during this period. It was falling into the same ‘Party State’ trap that ruined the PLO (Brown 2009c). Elections and a national unity government seem to be further away than ever by the end of 2010. Hamas tried to claim a victory in the

2009 war (a la Hezbollah in 2006) but few seemed to believe the rhetoric – or at least the impact of the ‘victory’ faded quickly.

Politically, by the end of this period Hamas was strong enough to remain a credible alternative to Fatah207 but that proved of little value in regards to its broader political goals. The contrast between the political strength that Hamas

207 Notwithstanding some analyst’s belief that Fatah was on the rise in 2009 (Shikaki 2009).

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enjoyed immediately following the second intifada and the close of 2010 is remarkable. Hamas had fallen on political hard times.

Military Strength

There are two basic elements of military strength that I will focus on to assess the change in the military strength of the organization under study: a.) nature and extent of military operations; and, b.) nature and extent of military capabilities.

Table 29 - Hamas Military Strength Evidence: 2007-2010

Major Category Observations

. Based on a review of the Global Terrorism Database for the period under review208, Hamas’ operations pattern with regards to attacks on Israel changed dramatically from prior periods. There were 49 incidents of terror attributed to Nature and Extent Hamas for the period under review of Military but only 10 involved Israel. Hamas Operations was devoting its military operational capacity to the consolidation of its power in Gaza. . Hamas all but ceased attacks on Israel following the war in 2009 (Jacob 2011). . The very limited operations against Israel during this period triggered challenges from the Jihadi splinter groups that accused Hamas of abandoning Jihad (ICG Middle East Report # 104).

208 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2007&end_yea ronly=2010&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_ day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=399&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&c asualties_max= (last accessed November 1, 2012)

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. Hamas and its allies in the war with Israel in 2008/2009 (i.e., PIJ, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Popular Resistance Committee) were defeated soundly. The toll on the Palestinians was substantial (over 1000 deaths, extensive property damage and 90,000 homeless) while the Israeli losses were nominal (between 10 and 15 deaths). These loss ratios were worse than those suffered in the second intifada.

. During the period under review Hamas continued the major effort it had started following the second intifada to rebuild its combat forces, equip it with more sophisticated weapons and upgrade its combat Nature and Extent skills to a level on par with Hezbollah of Military (Levitt 2009, Jacob 2011). Capabilities . With the eviction of the Palestinian Authority security forces in June 2007, it had assumed all of the police duties in Gaza. . Hamas trained with Hezbollah and the IRGC (Quds) force and became proficient in the use of more advanced weaponry including antitank guns and surface to air missiles. . Israel grew concerned in 2008 with the increasing capabilities of Hamas: “Hamas is building a Palestinian military organization in Gaza unprecedented in the occupied territories both in size, training, arming, commando conditions and fight efficiency” (ICG Middle East Report #73:8). . Cordesman (2009) notes that the military wing’s regular forces (Qassam Brigades) grew from 1000 +

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prior to the 2006 elections to 6000 to 10000 men209 just before the 2009 war with Israel. . During this period, Hamas was evolving from a group that primarily used terror and guerilla tactics to a more organized military organization that could maneuver on a battlefield and compete with a highly sophisticated enemy (Cohen and White 2009). It was preparing for its first major conflict with the IDF and without Fatah. . After its sound defeat in the 2008/2009 war, Hamas would reload and renew its troops within one year of the war such that the IDF leadership grew concerned about the range and lethality of its rocket arsenal (ICG Middle East Report #104) and the fighting capabilities of their enhanced military organization. . Even in the wake of their poor performance in the 2009 war, Brown (2009c) and Byman (2010) see Hamas as strengthened from the siege militarily and economically. . Even IDF leaders seem concerned about the resilience of Hamas militarily (following the war): “We defeated them militarily, but only until the next round” (ICG Middle East Report #85:26).

Conclusions

209 There are conflicting reports about the actual size the Qassam Brigades. Cohen and White (2009) indicate that the Qassam Brigades had only 2000 ‘real combat troops’ when the war began but they were augmented by 15000 to 16000 other combatants (those willing to fight but less formally trained).

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Based on this assessment I conclude that Hamas’ military strength during this period remained essentially unchanged. Its terror operations were significantly more limited in this time frame which could be explained as a change in strategy militarily as well as politically.210 While it performed very poorly in the 2009 war, it sought to promptly acquire an even more sophisticated arsenal of longer-range rockets and enhance its military combat capabilities. It has strengthened its hold on the Gaza such that a ‘counter coup’ from Fatah is unlikely to succeed (nor perhaps even be tried). The deterrent power of its military relative to Israel at the time was very limited but its monopoly on power in the Gaza appeared to be complete by the end of 2010. Challenges to its force monopoly by radical Jihadis and warlord clan chiefs were not tolerated. Through better policing and a rejuvenated court system,

Hamas had restored law and order. Hamas military strength was restored to pre- shock status but not improved.

Economic Strength

The observations I use to gauge the change in economic strength during this period are summarized in the table below:

Table 30 - Hamas Economic Strength Evidence: 2007-2010

Major Category Observations

. Iran, Qatar and Syria remained the primary state sponsors of the movement.

210 Hezbollah demonstrated a similar change in its operational model as it migrated from a terrorist organization to a guerilla organization to a more formalized military organization. See that case in another chapter in this dissertation.

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. Iran is the lead investor of this Scope and Extent of syndicate in respect to financial Contributions from support as well as military training State Sponsors and weapons. . The Qataris increased in importance during this period. They were an important sponsor to help to close the funding gap that was created when the Saudi sponsors were effectively shut down in 2004 by pressure from Western and Saudi state powers (as part of the post 9/11 Global War on Terrorism): “…as Saudi support for Hamas decreased, Qatari financial support increased dramatically. When the US and the European Union limited their funding to Gaza, The Emirate replaced much of the funds.”211 . Syria continued to provide limited logistical support for weapons transit and a safe haven for Hamas’ external operations (led by Mishal) and a safe venue for the continued military training of Hamas (by Hezbollah and the Quds force). Qatar appears to have been limited to financial support only. . While it appears that Iran is still financing Hamas212 213, Mishal began to look beyond its traditional sources for support later in the period under review: “Hamas is also beginning to look beyond pariahs such as Iran for backing. Khaled Mashaal, the group's so-called external leader, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Damascus in May. And together with Turkish President Abdullah Gül, they called for including Hamas in peace

211 http://www.algemeiner.com/2012/02/22/qatar-rises-as-diplomatic- heavyweight/ (last accessed on August 21, 2012) 212 http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/694/iran-renews-efforts-to-supply- weaponry-to-bruised (Last accessed January 23, 2013). 213 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/04/content_10758854.htm (last accessed January 23, 2013).

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talks” (Byman 2010). By the conclusion of this period, I have seen no evidence that these discussions have translated into tangible state support from either Turkey or Russia. Scope and Extent of . A significant adverse event financially Contributions from was the shutdown of the Holy Land Other Sources Foundation – source of substantial charitable funds from Diaspora for Hamas214 (Levitt 2009; Napoleoni 2003). Ability to Generate . “Hamas has also found a way to benefit Income from economically from the blockade by Commercial taxing the tunnel trade, even creating a Operations ‘tunnels authority’. Yezid Sayigh of (Criminal or King's College London has estimated otherwise) that Hamas earned up to $200 million from tunnel taxes in 2009. The tunnels215 also employ over 40,000 people, creating an important business constituency for Hamas” (Byman 2010). . “Since seizing the Gaza Strip in 2007 from forces loyal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah movement, Hamas has run several investment projects in former Israeli settlements in the enclave. They include farms, greenhouses, entertainment facilities and restaurants in areas Israel withdrew from in 2005.”216 . While these commercial enterprises

214 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/us/25charity.html?ref=shukriabubaker (last accessed August 21, 2012) 215 The Rafah tunnel trade — and the considerable amount of revenue (estimates range as high as $20 million per month) that the Gaza Hamas wing derives from it”215 are an important source of revenue for Hamas.http://www.salon.com/2012/02/27/smugglers_tunnels_are_hamas_lifebloo d/ (last accessed August 21, 2012) 216 http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/iran-cuts-hamas-funding-for- failing-to-show-support-for-assad- 1.379845?trailingPath=2.169%2C2.216%2C2.295%2C (last accessed August 21, 2012)

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amounted to only a modest proportion of their total revenue, Hamas took the initiative to spread the risk of concentrating its support in a few large state sponsors217. . The tunnels218 also employ over 40,000 people, creating an important business constituency for Hamas” (Byman 2010). . Hamas was very effective in administering the movement of goods and funds into/out of Gaza for the benefit of the nation’s treasury: “[W]hat goes in and out of Gaza (in terms of commodities and even currency notes) can be monitored, licensed, controlled, and taxed by Hamas and the Gaza Palestinian Authority” (Brown 2009b). . There are a some reports that Hamas is trafficking in illegal drugs as a source of revenue for the movement.219 The scale, scope and veracity of these claims are difficult to determine at this point.

Conclusions

217 This concern is apparently well-placed. In 2012 a rift appeared to develop between Hamas and Iran with regards to Hamas’ support of the Assad regime. “Tehran has withdrawn its patronage of Hamas over the Palestinian group's refusal to support the Syrian regime against a year-long uprising. According to a Gazan academic who specialises in Islamic movements, this has included the termination of financial support worth $23m (£14.5m) a month.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/06/hamas-no-military-aid-for-iran (last accessed August 21, 2012). 218 The Rafah tunnel trade — and the considerable amount of revenue (estimates range as high as $20 million per month) that the Gaza Hamas wing derives from it”218 are an important source of revenue for Hamas.http://www.salon.com/2012/02/27/smugglers_tunnels_are_hamas_lifebloo d/ (last accessed August 21, 2012) 219 http://cnsnews.com/node/67377 (last accessed August 21, 2012)

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Hamas was able to recover its economic strength during this period and to a limited degree improve on its pre-shock economic strength. As Brown (2009b) noted, while the Gaza was an economic basket case as a country, ‘Hamas was hiring.’

They were taking steps to diversify their sources of revenue and also to extract the legal rents that are due the state so it could conduct its affairs at the social level – from police, to military, to education and health care. Hamas did not solve that colossal problem but it had made great strides in keeping the resistance movement fed and the state functioning even at a base level.

Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2007 to 2010

During the period 2007 to 2010, based on my analysis, I conclude that the change in Hamas’ political strength was unfavorable – it was politically weaker at the end of the period. The change in Hamas’ military strength was favorable. Hamas had at least recovered its pre-shock strength and was possibly becoming stronger.

The change in Hamas’ economic strength was favorable. It had recovered its pre- shock strength and was possibly even stronger than prior to the 2009 war.

As I noted in the summary of the change in organizational strength around the 2006 elections, Hamas has demonstrated resilience militarily and economically but not politically.

I will now evaluate the state of legitimation of Hamas at the time of the war with Israel that concluded in January 2009.

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Assessment of Hamas’ State of Legitimation at the 2009 War Once the determination is made that the organization has demonstrated resilience, we need to assess the state of legitimation of Hamas at the time of this shock. There are three basic areas to cover: the Methods of Operations tests, the

Outcomes tests and the Cheap Talk test.

Methods Tests See earlier in this chapter for a summary that explains the four factors that will be evaluated as part of the methods tests.

Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV) The observations that I used to assess the state of legitimation with respect to the AOV test are summarized in the table below.

Table 31 - Hamas AOV Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Frequency & Extent . The confidence of Gazans that they of Coercive can safely criticize the government of Violence – Hamas declined from 52% in Loyalty & September 2007 to 19% December Performance 2010 – and had moved downward noticeably just prior to the 2009 war (PSR poll # 38220). . During this period Hamas reduced violent crime – it may have been heavy-handed but it brought order to Gaza (ICG Middle East Briefing #30 – 2011b; ICG Middle East Reports #68 and 73; Brown 2012c).

. “ After it (Hamas) took over the Gaza

220 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38e.html (last accessed August 22, 2012)

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Strip in 2007, Hamas revamped the police and security forces, cutting Nature & Extent of them from 50,000 members (on Internal Security paper, at least) under Fatah to Organization smaller, more efficient forces of just over 10,000, which then cracked down on crime and gangs. No longer did groups openly carry weapons or steal with impunity. People paid their taxes and electric bills, and in return the authorities picked up garbage and put criminals in jail” (Byman 2010).

Use of Unlawful . Hamas’ militia221 fought a bloody and Violence to vicious battle with Fatah security Maintain Power forces in Gaza in Spring 2007. Hamas was then the law enforcement arm of the government222 but most accounts of that event suggest that Hamas’ senior leadership lost control of the fighting units and it became a series of revenge killings as much as checking the military forces of a long time rival or establishing the monopoly of force in Gaza by the ‘legitimate’ PA security forces223 (ICG Middle East Report # 68 and 73, Byman 2011:181). . Hamas's attempts at Islamization of Gazan society were uneven and tentative. Hamas is suspected,

221 Brown (2009b) notes that it was actually Hamas’ militia that fought the battle with the Fatah security forces vs. the legitimate PA security services. Another example that Brown uses to denote the failure of Hamas to separate the movement from the State – for which it had consistently criticized Fatah. 222 Brown (2009c, 2012b, 2012c) notes that Hamas operated more as a party-state not unlike the model used by Fatah during its period of control. As a result, it is hard for the analyst to clearly separate what actions are the states and what are the movements. I view them as inseparable at this time in the life of the movement. 223 The various unity summits between Fatah and Hamas that preceded the clash in 2007 always cited the need to address the security organization question. Fatah maintained an independent force at the time in Gaza under the direction Muhammad Dahlan and had little inclination to yield control to Hamas in Gaza. Rose (2008) suggests that Dahlan and the PA security forces were to be used as part of a plan by Israel and the western powers to rout the military forces of Hamas.

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however, of being willing to tolerate the repression of Gazans by more conservative groups - the jihadis (ICG Middle East Report N°73 – 19 March 2008). . Hamas’ used violence to suppress the radical Jihadi group, Jund Ansar Allah,224 to maintain its monopoly on the use of force in Gaza (versus its motivation to be more ecumenical regarding the role of Islam in society) (ICG Middle East Report #104). . Hamas preferred the use of force to compel or deter rivals. Rivals included Fatah, Salafi splinter groups225 or local war lords/clan chiefs (Byman 2010; ICG Middle East Report #104)

Conclusions

Based on these observations, I conclude that the State of Legitimation with regards to the Absence of Violence test at the time of the 2009 war is ‘Confused.’

This is a regression from the ‘emergent’ ranking that I assigned to Hamas at the time of the 2006 elections. This would appear to be consistent with the confusion that pervaded Hamas’ first years in power as it tried to separate (unsuccessfully) the

224 See this link for a discussion of the clash with Jund Ansar Allah. This happened after the 2009 war but the article also cites the nature of the groups operating in Gaza at that time. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/08/hamas_and_al_qaeda_l.php (last accessed August 22. 2012) 225 Though the Salafi movements were, at best, emergent in Gaza in January 2009 they represented a ‘noisy’ ideological challenger to Hamas. Inspired by the radical interpretations of Islam by Al Qaeda, they consistently criticized Hamas as disloyal to the resistance and apostate to Islam.

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movement from the state and transform itself from primarily a fighting organization to a governing organization and yet bring order to a relatively lawless Gazan society and establish its monopoly on the use of force. Hamas was in the strange place of having to enforce compliance with limits on rocket fire by other groups and still not appear to be a tool of Israel. This was surely a complicated situation for them to navigate politically and operationally.

Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA) The observations that I used to assess the state of legitimation with respect to the LOA test are summarized in the table below.

Table 32 - Hamas LOA Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Scope, Level and . Hamas was highly dependent on three Persistence of primary sponsors as of the Support commencement of the war with Israel for a broad scope of the support factors – Iran, Syria and Qatar. . Iran was the lead sponsor in that they provided political, military and economic support. Syria offered political support, logistical support and sanctuary to senior Hamas Leaders. Qatar was primarily a financial backer with limited political support at the time.

Strategic vs. . Iranian and Syrian support for Hamas, Ideological who it viewed as a member of the so- Motivation of called ‘axis of resistance’ to Israel and Sponsor(s) western powers, was stepped up in

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this time largely due its own strategic interests226. . I found no evidence that Hamas repaid its sponsors’ support with terror operations outside Israel on their behalf. This is consistent with the ‘full plate’ that Hamas had simply consolidating its power in the Gaza and preparing for war with Israel.

. At the time of the 2008/2009 war, Hamas had not significantly widened the sources of its sponsorship since the last shock. Iran, Syria and Qatar227 Diversity of played a central role in 2006 and still Sponsorship did in 2009. . Hamas had historically had a very strong charitable contribution network. While it still was robust at the time of the war, as noted above, a major source (the Holy Land Foundation) had been shut down by the US that disrupted a significant flow of funds from the Palestinian Diaspora. . The overtures to Turkey and Russia were in the making but not in effect by the time the war had begun. See Economic Strength discussions above.

Conclusions

226 See Byman 2005 for a more detailed assessment of the strategic logic of Syria and Iran with regards to support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This logic intensified for Iran as it came under increasing pressure to cease its nuclear program. Syria sought Iran’s support in light of its increasing isolation even within the Arab League. The so-called ‘axis of resistance’ was led by Iran and Syria. See also: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57488169/iran-were-in-axis-of- resistance-with-syria/ (last accessed August 21, 2012). 227 As noted in the economic strength discussion, Qatar increased its role between 2006 and 2009.

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Based on my assessment of the factors included in the level of autonomy legitimation test, I conclude that Hamas was in a ‘confused’ state. While Hamas is ideologically quite a distance from all of its major sponsors it was concentrated in a short list of sponsors, in particular, Iran. The tunnel revenues were a significant upgrade since 2006, but these were available to the movement due to the blurring of

Party and State boundaries versus independent sponsor support for Hamas and its mission.

Level of Public Accountability (LPA) The observations that I used to assess the state of legitimation with respect to the LPA test are summarized in the table below.

Table 33 - Hamas LPA Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Level of . “By all accounts, Hamas’s seizure of Answerability to power in June 2007 was followed by the Public improved public security, but that security is provided by a one-party state, its militias, and local warlords and gangs rather than the regular and accountable structures of democratic governance” (Brown 2008). . By 2007 the public opinion polls were signaling that the Gazans had tired of the grinding conflict with Israel and now sought stepped up negotiations for peace – either along the lines of the Annapolis plan or the Saudi initiative (PSR Poll #22 and #26). Hamas ignored this sentiment or concluded it could not credibly pursue this path at the time given the split with Fatah.

. Hamas maintained its grip on power but given the deterioration of

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democratic institutions in Gaza (Brown 2009b, 2012c), it is hard to tell Level of if that was based on the will given the Enforcement of erosion of democratic institutions. Public . The new party-state of Hamas was Accountability taking root in Gaza where the party- state of Fatah had once ruled: “… it is on the organizational level that Hamas has changed more clearly—its leaders have taken a series of steps that it always claimed to seek to avoid, unmistakably building a governing apparatus in Gaza that elides the distinction between party and government. In an unambiguous fashion, Hamas has come to take on some features that characterized Fatah in the 1990s; in this regard, Hamas’s current leaders seem to have become in part the people the movement’s founders warned them against” (Brown 2009b). . There were little signs of an independent media that could take the government to task for not living up to its promises. “[There were] significant restrictions on the media by Hamas [even] while launching its own broadcast units to load the airwaves with its view of the world” (ICG Middle East Report #73:11).

Conclusions

Extra-legal measures were used to silence dissidents. The use of violence had changed from curtailing collaborators with Israel to silencing the opposition. The courts were not in operation. Democratic institutions eroded. Hamas had blurred the lines between the Party and the State. Hamas campaigned prior to the 2006 elections as the ‘un-Fatah’ and they reverted to ‘new-Fatah’ under the duress of

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international sanctions. Based on these observations, I conclude that Hamas operated in a ‘confused’ state of legitimation at this time with respect to the Level of

Public Accountability tests.

Level of Professionalism (LPro) There are two empirical categories to focus relevant observations regarding the LPro test: 1.) efficiency, innovativeness and coherence of the organization; and,

2.) fairness in the administration of public services.

Table 34 - Hamas LPro Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Administrative Operations

. Hamas was very effective in administering the movement of goods and funds into/out of Gaza for the benefit of the nation’s treasury: Efficiency, “[W]hat goes in and out of Gaza (in Innovation and terms of commodities and even Coherence currency notes) can be monitored, licensed, controlled, and taxed by Hamas and the Gaza Palestinian Authority” (Brown 2009b). . As an administrator of domestic government services, Hamas proved able and efficient. Hamas needed about 25% of the labor that Fatah needed to run the government (ICG Middle East Report #73:14). . Hamas ran the government with a leadership team that was diffused across Gaza, the West Bank, Israeli prisons and in exile (ICG Middle East Report #73:24). . Hamas took administrative control of the tunnels and implemented an efficient process to collect taxes to fund basic government services including security, trash collection and

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health care. It was by no means perfect but it was impressive in that it was established reasonably promptly in an environment that had been neglected for years by Israel and the PA (Byman 2010). . Hamas was unable to make significant headway on many other government services including education, economic stimulus and a viable judiciary228.

Military Operations

. Hamas’ performance in the war in 2009 would suggest that it was caught relatively unaware regarding the timing of the attack and the scale and scope of the attack (Cohen and White 2009; ICG; Byman 2010). Its external intelligence capability was less than effective, if functional at all. . Hamas improved its operational planning to reduce the loss of life since the end of the second intifada by reducing the tempo, scale and scope of military operations against Israel as well as the quality of its planning for the civil war with Fatah security (ICG Middle East Report #68:13).229

Coherence

. “Hamas as a movement is still far more coherent than Fatah. Neither movement is free of divisions and

228 Hamas did stand up a crude judicial system to bridge the loss of judges following the June 2007 eviction of Fatah security from Gaza. It was not stable in the multi- confessional Gazan society in that it was based on Islamic law/muftis (civil issues), run by Hamas at the executive and legislative level and there was no functioning criminal court. They ultimately stood up a functioning judiciary in February 2008 but it would be a few more years before it was fully operational (ICG Middle East Report 73:12-13). See also Brown (2012c). 229 The catastrophic losses in the 2008/2009 war would prove that this readiness effort was not effective.

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rivalries, but Hamas is more able to make decisions and far more able to have internal dissidents accept their loss. And Hamas has even shown some ability to operate in accordance with its internally-established procedures even as it remains under siege and partly underground—last year, for instance, the movement was able to carry out internal elections of the kind that Fatah steadily postponed until it was jolted by its 2006 repudiation. And Hamas, for all its recent hints of interesting diplomacy, continues to insist that it will never recognize Israel” (Brown 2009b). . There were small splinters from Hamas but they were in the junior ranks and limited in scale. Those disaffected from Hamas largely flowed to the Salafi Jihadi groups230 (ICG Middle East Report #104).

. “[Hamas] Officials have used this [government] system to carefully to construct a fiscally sound administration in the midst of terrible economic devastation and international boycott. When he attended the graduation ceremony of Fairness in Public the Islamic University, Gaza PA Prime Administration Minister Ismail Haniyya was able to announce that all those who completed degrees in law and Sharia would have jobs waiting for them in the government. Gaza may be in a state of advanced economic decay, but Hamas is hiring” (Brown 2009b).

230 The Jihadi groups were principally led by Al Qaeda inspired persons that had not been Hamas members previously. The Hamas defectors were largely in the junior ranks (ICG Middle East Report #104). Abbas unsuccessfully attempted to smear Hamas as an Al Qaeda sympathizer but Hamas parried that move with its own public relations campaign to disassociate itself from Al Qaeda and its offshoots (Mendelsohn 2009 and 2009b; Byman 2010).

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. In early 2007 some worried that Hamas had abandoned its even- handed approach now that it had won the election: “Before the elections Hamas made a point of distributing social welfare equitably, sometimes even seeming to prefer those who were identified with rival movements in order to win their favour. Today the situation is different. It is a time of consolidation, meaning they reward loyalists and punish opponents. They are sufficiently organised at the local level to know who voted for and against them, who prays in the mosque and who doesn't” (ICG Middle East Report 62:8). . With respect to its overall management of the government affairs, by the end of 2008, Brown (2009b) notes that “Hamas has managed the political economy of the Gaza Strip to solidify its hold on power, its members have not yet been implicated in the extent of personal graft and venality that characterized Fatah during the Oslo years.” Hamas maintained its reputation as an honest dealer that it brought to the 2006 elections. . Hamas security forces had been guilty of heavy-handedness in dealing with the enforcement of compliance with Islamic customs and also extralegal measures to repress dissidents. “The shock of victory confounded the normally longer and more deliberate process of making a Muslim Brother… Before it took four or five years to become a Muslim Brother, sometimes more. The minimum today [2007/2008] is seven to eight months. Hamas security officials lamented having traded quality for size. Now it is recognized that this was a huge

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mistake” (ICG Middle East Report #104). Hamas conducted an internal review to weed out the recruits that were unqualified to serve as police officers (ICG Middle East Report #104). While Hamas demonstrated that it was willing to change its ways and ‘clean house’, it was a closed affair and conducted privately without public discourse.

Conclusions

Based on my assessment of the two components of the Level of

Professionalism state of legitimation tests, I conclude that Hamas was operating at an ‘emergent’ state of legitimation with respect to this element as the 2009 war commenced between Hamas and Israel.

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Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes The following table summarizes my primary observations regarding the fairness and favorability of outcomes produced by Hamas by this time.

Table 35 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Tangible Outcomes . Under great duress from domestic Produced and international sources Hamas maintained the resistance to Israel that it had assumed leadership of during the second intifada (Brown 2008b; Rose 2008; ICG reports #62, 68, 73 and 85). . Hamas brought order to society yet did not impose Sharia law (but did not institute a suitable compromise legal solution by this time as noted by Brown 2009, 2009b, 2009c; Milton-Edwards 2010; Byman 2010). . Hamas protected the right to resist Israel with violence as an option for

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all who chose to resist Israel while still maintaining its monopoly on the use of force in the Gaza Strip. . Hamas set up a viable bureaucracy to administer the government services. . Social services provided by the Party continued at a level and pace with prior years.

Nature of Outcomes The following table summarizes my primary observations regarding the nature of outcomes produced by Hamas by this time.

Table 36 - Hamas Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

. It would be hard to argue that in Intangible Nature of January 2009 the Palestinian people Outcomes believed that three years of Hamas rule (plus its social deposits from the years prior) had instilled in them a stronger sense of a nobler Palestinian and a greater urgency to forcibly resist the occupation.

Discussion and Conclusions

Since the elections in 2006 Hamas maintained its contributions of public goods in the tangible sense: resistance, social services and, following the election, governing. Hamas had maintained its commitment to the resistance to Israel and its supporters in the West. It maintained its commitment to a just society based on

Islam in contrast to the widespread perception of the corruption and perfidy of

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Fatah. The traditional ideals of Hamas were still being socialized at the time of the shock of the 2008/2009 war.

The conditions were not ripe, however, for reforming Palestinian society even with an electoral majority from the 2006 elections: “The reform agenda is threatened by crime and violence. It is unclear how much any government can accomplish in an environment where the distinctions among security forces, party militias, guerilla bands, terrorist cells, and protection rackets have already become extremely difficult to draw” (Brown 2006). Political reform is tough to achieve even under the best of circumstances (Huntington 1966:344-362). Hamas’ rule began under difficult circumstances but they were also complicit in compounding their difficulties. Perhaps Hamas was tuned to the politics of the Gaza better than most231 but as of January 2009 they appeared not only to not have delivered on the greatest promise it made since its inception and framed in its Change and Reform platform – independent Palestinian statehood with honor232 – but, in fact, shoved those prospects hard in the opposite direction. "If they (Islamic movements) look at

Hamas, it's as a negative model of what happens if you win elections too quickly and

231 Byman (2010) noted “moderate Palestinian officials would find it impossible to gain popular support for negotiations while Palestinian civilians were dying at the hands of Israelis. So even when its attacks do no damage, Hamas walks away triumphant, whereas both Israeli and Palestinian moderates are discredited.” 232 The ‘honor’ tag is intended to differentiate it from the ‘end the occupation at all costs’ platform that they blamed Fatah for promoting (i.e., appeasing the Israeli occupiers). Hamas has a variety of descriptors it uses to frame its platform but it is less than what they wrote in the 1988 charter and closer to the popularly understood two-state solution.

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face unfavorable international conditions" (Brown 2012c). Hamas was not ready to rule, let alone rule in the rugged conditions of the Gaza at that time.

(and remains aligned with) the Methods of Operation and Outcomes levels. This is essentially a test for the level of ‘cheap talk’ by the organization. This is especially relevant in an era of significantly improved communications capabilities for insurgencies that are otherwise less sophisticated. Earlier in this chapter, I outlined the super priorities of the movement. Those are to be used as the basis for testing the level of cheap talk as of the 2009 shock.

Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’ Hamas had always been the social movement that appealed to the Palestinian identity in a nobler way – appealing to the people to move beyond simple self- interest and take up jihad at the personal and community level. They combined

Lockean notions of a social contract but they sought to institute a deft blend of

‘revealed law’ and ‘legislated law’ to organize society and make Palestine a great, safe, independent and prosperous nation (Gunning 2008:55-94). Hamas was both the party of the people (democratic) and of God (corruption-proof). In contrast to

Fatah, who would say similar things but then exploit the system for personal gain,

Hamas actually ‘walked the talk’. Hamas was historically known to be steadfast and unshakeable in their commitment to gaining the full Palestinian national goals. They were willing to face down their critics and enemies with the conviction that they

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were only doing the bidding of the people and of God (the dual contract per Gunning

2008). Hamas was, in their theory, a government by the people and for the people under God – it was not exactly Jeffersonian democracy but the social contract that was underneath their philosophy borrowed more heavily from western philosophers like John Locke (Gunning 2008: 55-94). There was a clear commitment to representative government that would check any abuse of power both at the personal level (Islamic piety) and the structural level (democratic institutions of the people). Hamas was designed to be fair and balanced and an able and efficient administrator – they worked for the people and acted as a faithful trustee of the resources they had for the benefit of the people. They did not exploit power for personal advantage. They were committed to Islam, the resistance and to governing in a just manner (Brown 2010:177-180).

But as Brown points out, there are inherent tensions in these three pathways.

Hamas struggled, especially after the clash with Fatah in June 2007, to live up to the spirit of these pathways. It is apparently easier to ‘walk the talk’ when not having to govern and deliver the basic goods of the state and, as noted, operating under harsh international and regional conditions.

The ideal of the Palestinian state that Hamas sought to create – and how to govern that state - came under harsh pressure in June 2007. Hamas was ultimately unable to reconcile the three main pathways prior to January 2009 as the shock of war came. Hamas dramatically reduced the tempo of its resistance operations and

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established unilateral ceasefires233 when it couldn’t establish joint ones and focused on consolidation of its power domestically. Hamas failed to mature (in fact, let decay) the basic institutions of democracy. Following the June 2007 conflict with

Fatah, Hamas governed in an increasingly autocratic manner as it bolstered its party-state. The Islamization of Gaza was put on the back burner to mitigate the risk of civil unrest and perhaps distract attention from the dismal living conditions in

Gaza. They failed to walk the talk and would now be accountable to the people when the shock of War came in December 2008/January 2009.

Though it promised to be the un-Fatah, Hamas became the party-state that could not distinguish the state from the party. Senior leaders in Hamas held senior posts in the PA. The promise of a national unity government failed once again – and in a bloody civil war with Fatah. The West Bank and Gaza are now divided not only just by Israel but also by two separate and entrenched parties with separate leadership and governing structures. While not solely responsible by any means,

Hamas had managed to reverse the direction of Palestinian statehood. It returned to its old spoiler role (Gunning 2008) but now spoiling future prospects for

Palestinians on a grander scale. At the time of the War, as the blockade was strangling Gaza and turning it into a large Israeli prison, the prospects for relief from national elections were not in sight. And if the polls were near being reflective,

233 Until, as discussed, they inexplicably terminated the ceasefire with Israel in December 2008. The argument that Hamas makes is that the blockades had become intolerable and they believed that they could signal that they would bargain hard with the Israelis but ending the ceasefire - a miscalculation at best and hubris at worst.

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Hamas would have lost its majority (PSR #30). But the Palestinian people could not even vote on who they wanted to lead them out of the mess that resulted from the disastrous first few years of Hamas’ rule. For Hamas, that was a relief since they had precious little to show for themselves in terms of the most meaningful outcomes that the Palestinian people sought (Brown 2009b, 2009c; ICG Middle East Reports #

73, 85, 104).

The un-Fatah turned out to be not much different than the original Fatah in that it slipped easily into its party-state structure, failed to build/sustain democratic institutions and came no closer (and likely moved backwards) to the ultimate goal of a fully liberated Palestine - all of that plus the failure to lift the Palestinian hopes for better days ahead. The Palestinian identity234 suffered a significant setback along with the physical Palestine in Gaza.

Based on these observations, I conclude that Hamas was performing poorly on the cheap talk test at the time of the 2009 war. I coded the organization in a

234 Abdelal et al (2006) have provided the field a useful synthesis of the academy’s efforts to define Identity as a variable by developing a simple analytic framework. They have defined Collective identity along two axes: content and contestation. The content consists of four non-mutually exclusive elements: 1.) constitutive norms – the formal and informal rules that define group membership; 2.) social purposes – the goals that are shared by members of the group; 3.) relational comparisons – defining the group by what it is not; and, 4.) cognitive models – overall worldviews. Contestation levels reveal the level of ‘fluidity and the contextual nature of social identities.’ Contestation will allow the analyst to unpack the degree of agreement within the group (the organization and the society that is rendering its views on the legitimacy of the group) regarding the content of the Identity. It is this construction of Identity that I use as the basis for this part of the discussion.

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confused state of legitimation. At the macro level, the level that the masses would understand, they were not living up to their promises.

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Summary Evaluation of Findings from Hamas Case At this point, I will summarize the results of the analysis of change in organizational strength for both cases as well the states of legitimation ranking for both cases. I will offer some preliminary observations regarding these findings but reserve a fuller assessment when I combine the findings from all cases in a later chapter.

Change in Organizational Strength – Summary Assessment

As indicated in the table below Hamas’ political strength changed unfavorably following both shocks. In contrast, the military strength and the economic strength exceeded the pre-shock strength within two years of the 2006 electoral victory and recovered to pre-shock strength within two years of the 2009

War. In both cases, I coded the organization as demonstrating resilience but in a qualified manner.

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Figure 21 - Hamas: Change in Organizational Strength (All Shocks)

The qualifications, of course, revolve around the extended period of weakness in their political strength even while the military and economic strength recovered or exceeded pre-shock strength in a timely manner. Further analysis in subsequent years would be needed to determine if the weakness in political strength was a significant factor for Hamas’ organizational resilience. At this point, the prior analysis demonstrates that Hamas was undeniably a functioning organization in the aftermath of both shocks even though both events presented credible threats to their viability. What these particular results suggest is that

Hamas could maintain resilience militarily and economically even though it was in a weakened political position.

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States of Legitimation – Summary of Results

As indicated in the table below, Hamas’ overall state of legitimation deteriorated between the two events. As noted below, Hamas became a more willing user of violence against fellow Palestinians to ensure its control over its rivals and to assure its monopoly on the use of force. Perhaps more disturbing for the followers and believers in Hamas is the deterioration in the Outcomes and Level of

Cheap Talk (faithfulness to the Vision , Mission and Values) aspects of organizational legitimation. Based on my analysis Hamas’ legitimation had deteriorated considerably between the two events and now largely rested in the ‘confused’ state.

Hamas started out with a lot of promise and went backwards in its first three years in office.

These results correlate with the weakness in organizational strength but are contrary to what the military and economic strength indicators are suggesting.

Subject to a full comparative view, I would have expected Hamas to have fared poorly in at least one of the material elements of its strength assessment (military or economic) and consequently not demonstrated resilience at least after the 2009

War. As noted, a fuller assessment of these results will be forthcoming in a separate chapter that will incorporate the results of all of the cases.

Assessment of the Primary Hypothesis Hamas was coded resilient for both events even though its political strength did not recover in a timely manner after both shocks. I coded Hamas as in an

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‘emergent’ state of legitimation in 2006 and that correlates well with the coding of the organization as resilient in 2006 and supports the primary hypothesis. Based on this analysis Hamas had made sufficient social deposits prior to the 2006 elections and the political opportunity structure was right for Hamas to contest elections in

2006 (versus 1996). That coding supports the primary hypothesis of this dissertation. What is inconsistent with the primary hypothesis of this dissertation is the resilience of the organization following the 2009 War. With what I believe to be a significant deterioration in the state of Hamas’ legitimation between 2006 and

2009 I would not have expected Hamas to demonstrate resilience (i.e., two of the three strength factors show favorably). I would have expected at least two of the three strength factors to show unfavorable trends. Tyrants and autocrats who have a monopoly on the use of force and control of the state’s resources and treasury perform in like-kind manner. They don’t need the assent of the people to rule. They just need enough force to coerce them, or appeal to the self-interest of enough of the warlords, to stay in power. Hamas was able to secure continued funding for its resistance movement.

One possible explanation for the surprising resilience of Hamas at this time involves Israel’s views of Hamas as the best option among several poor ones to lead the Gaza government. The IDF remained concerned about increases in Hamas’ military strength but Israel seemed more concerned that if it degraded Hamas

Figure 22 - Hamas: Legitimation Structures (All Shocks) completely it could create political openings for more radical groups in Gaza. Radical

Islamist groups were only barely emergent at this point in Gaza (ICG Middle East

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Report #104) but were not an attractive alternative to Hamas. The cost of running

Gaza if they were to remove Hamas from power would be equally unattractive and this reality appeared to act as a more effective deterrent than Hamas’ military capabilities: “If the IDF were to remove Hamas from power, however, it would have to stay for months to dismantle Hamas' infrastructure there: the hospitals, mosques, and social services that Hamas has been putting in place for decades. And it would not be cheap, since Israel would have to bear the financial burden of deploying thousands of troops to Gaza” (Byman 2010).

Evaluation of Alternative Hypotheses - Hamas

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The ‘ability to hide’ factors are partially met in this case. Hamas has a close affinity with portions of its followers (especially the pious Muslims but they only constitute a minority of its core followers). Hamas has strong social networks to leverage and does so competently. These networks are not monolithic by any stretch and Hamas’ ardent form of Islam can be problematic for its followers. It has had to subordinate those aspects of its identity to its nationalist credentials. It does has a relatively large population to move amongst but that has not provided it with much of a shield against its enemies. Gaza is known as the world’s largest prison.

Any operations against its enemy has become increasingly problematic – the Wall limits its access to Israel and the internal security in Israel is dramatically improved since Hamas’ birth. Its base of operations in Gaza does provide it with a safe haven from Israel and from its chief internal rival, Fatah. The overall geography of Gaza offers little in the way of natural impediments to operations by the IDF as evidenced by the successful targeted assassination program and its military operations in

2008/2009.

Hamas has benefited from a series of foreign patrons that have provided it weapons, training and funds for the provision of social services. But that collection of patrons is unstable and Hamas has had to continuously develop alternative

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external patrons as well as additional sources of funds to conduct military operations and to build its resources for use in providing state-like services.

The state in the Palestinian Territories is weak. The patrons of the state (the

Palestinian Authority as constituted by Fatah and elites in the West Bank), however, are strong and committed to the isolation and defeat of Hamas (Israel and related western powers including the USA).

Based on these observations, this hypothesis presents a weak challenge to the primary hypothesis.

The use of selective and indiscriminate violence by actions by Israel against

Hamas creates incentives for the population to seek the protection of Hamas. Hamas does have safe havens in Gaza but those are largely overwhelmed by the superior firepower of Israel. The targeted assassination programs that began in earnest in the mid 1990s and were stepped up during the second intifada decimated the leadership ranks of Hamas. The wholesale destruction of major parts of Gaza in the

2008/2009 war demonstrated Hamas’ general inability to protect its followers from its primary enemy, Israel. In contrast, Hamas’ ability to evict Fatah’s security forces in 2007 and to repress its lesser Muslim rivals in Gaza, demonstrates its limited

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ability to protect its followers. The Israeli threat overshadows its ability to maintain control relative to the internal competition.

Hamas uses selective violence via its internal security forces which expanded as a result of the 2006 elections. Due to resource limitations this internal unit has is still only 1/6 the size of the internal security forces that Fatah had when in power.

There is ample record of Hamas’ inclination to use selective violence to suppress rivals, eliminate informants and deter defectors. There is no history of genocidal or mass violence nor is there evidence to suggest that Hamas uses civilians as human shields in combat (Amnesty International 2009).

Hamas came to power as the ‘anti-Fatah’ in that it sought to demonstrate its bona fides as a fair and incorruptible governor. It does provide services that parallel a state and to some extent did this before it came to power. The tax revenues and donations from international organizations are unavailable to Hamas as the elected party and the formal Palestinian Authority. Through its patrons and alternative sources of funds (legal and illegal) the group attempts to provide sustenance for all the people of Gaza. The threat from Israel and the level of poverty and economic misery in Gaza suggests that the selective incentives are quite limited and an independent observer would be hard pressed to believe that this slate of incentives would be persuasive to mitigate defection.

As a result of these observations, this alternative hypothesis presents a weak to moderate challenge to the primary hypothesis.

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Hamas is comprised of Palestinians who seek the independent state of Israel but whose nationalist aspirations are situated in Islam and a stated commitment to annihilate Israel. They are not an ethnic group in the context of the aspiration for access to state power – Fatah are fellow Palestinian Arabs though largely secular.

While there are likely differences in dialect and possible physical features between

West Bank Arabs and Gazan Arabs, they would likely be insufficient to be justified as different ethnically. They are different ideologically but not ethnically.

Hamas has been excluded from access to power in the state but only after the

2006 election. Israel and the US failed to recognize Hamas as the legitimate

Palestinian Authority and all international funds still flow to Fatah. Hamas is running the state apparatus in Gaza based on the modest internal revenues it can generate from taxes and illegal businesses as well as external patrons. Prior to the

2006 elections, Hamas had eschewed elections and did not seek office nor control of the state apparatus. The conditions, therefore, for this hypothesis to apply were not

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even present until 2006 and it is a stretch to classify their grievance as exclusion based on ethnicity. They simply didn’t want to compete for control of the state until they thought the time was right (following the second intifada) and they believed that the political system was worth competing for.

Another important aspect of this alternative explanation is that rebel groups that are operating in the context of civil war last up to over two times as long (on average) than those who are not engaged in that context (Cederman 2009, 2010;

Wucherpfennig 2012). Hamas is operating in the context of an ideological conflict which should a reduced level of of motivation.

Based on these observations I conclude that this alternative explanation presents a weak challenge to the primary hypothesis.

265 Chapter 5 – The Case of Hezbollah

Background and Introduction to the Case Hezbollah emerged from anonymity during the summer of 1982 in the wake of the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon within the prior four years. Lebanon was at war with itself since 1975 and had split into several armed factions vying for control of the country. Hezbollah was formed from a splinter of Amal235, the

Lebanese Dawa party, the Association of Muslim Ulema and the Association of

Muslim Students (Byman 2007:32, Ranstorp 1997:31-35; Palmer-Harik 2004:34 –

39; Norton 1999:23-24). Following Israel’s swift defeat of Syrian and Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon in the summer of 1982, Iran inserted an estimated 1500

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps troops (IRGC) into Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley with the cooperation of Syria. They trained the Hezbollah fighters (estimated at no more than 500 full time forces at the time) in the political ideology of Islam and the fighting methods of the elite forces of the IRGC. They were groomed to conduct terror and guerilla operations against western forces in the region and the IDF and

SLA forces in the south.

In its very early years, Hezbollah was a confused and strange mix of leaders who often had conflicting views about how an Islamic movement should and could transform not only Lebanon but the region as well (Norton 1987 and 2007; Saad-

235 At the time Amal was the most powerful Shia movement in Lebanon. It was formed in 1974 by the prominent Shia leader, Musa al Sadr, to defend the Shia’s interests in the looming civil war and from the predatory actions of the PLO in the part of southern Lebanon then known as Fatahland (Ajami 1986; Norton 1987).

Ghorayeb 2002; Palmer-Harik 2004; Byman 2007). One of its founding members and a future Secretary General, Shayk Subhi Tufayli, described these first few years as the ‘scuffle of camels’ (Hamzeh 2004:24).

In 1985 Hezbollah articulated its political agenda in its Open Letter (Norton

1987). They proclaimed that they were dedicated to evicting all foreign occupiers, annihilating Israel and forming an Islamic state in Lebanon based on the Shia model that was established in Iran in 1979. While Hezbollah is generally viewed as patriotic to Lebanon236, virtually incorruptible and willing to suffer enormous personal loss to fight for their political goals, its dependence on Iran and Syria for military, political and economic support raised doubts about their ultimate purpose.

Iran and Syria combined have contributed handsomely to movement in order to build its political and military power for use against mutual foes. Iran bankrolled

Hezbollah with an estimated $50 to $100 million in annual support for the development of Hezbollah’s military, political and social services operations (Byman

2005; Ranstorp 1997; Levitt 2005; Napoleoni 2003). Hezbollah leadership acknowledged that the Iranian support accelerated the development of their movement by 50 years (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002:14). Syria provided military and political support and collaborated with Iran to ensure safe transit of weapons into

Lebanon for use by Hezbollah as it conducted its terror campaigns in the 1980s

236 Beyond the dependency on Iran for substantial financial support, the group’s ideological submission – and at times, strategic policy decisions - to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor via the guardianship of the jurisconsultant (velyat al faqih) has caused concern in many Lebanese about the group’s autonomy and fealty to Lebanon.

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against the US and Western Powers (e.g., France) in Lebanon237, guerrilla wars against the IDF and SLA in the 1990s and the building of its deterrent military forces to oppose Israel in the 2000s.238 Today, 30 years later, Hezbollah is recognized as a highly effective military organization239 240(Biddle & Friedman 2008; Byman 2005;

2007) and the single most powerful political organization in Lebanon.241 242

As part of its mission to bring social justice to Lebanon – and relieve the suffering of the ‘dispossessed - Hezbollah built a robust social welfare network in large part to close the large gaps in public services that the weak national government could not deliver. The Shi’a movement that they were founded on was the catalyst for the transformation of Lebanese politics that gave a powerful voice to the dispossessed (essentially the Shi’a in the 1960’s) and set the stage for Lebanon

237 Hezbollah also fought a series of battles with the armed forces of Amal between 1989 and 1990. Syria and Iran intervened to stop the intra-Shia warfare. 238 “Hezbollah’s self-declared mission to sustain a ‘balance of terror’ had evolved since the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 in an attempt to find new directions fro the party that would preserve missionary zeal for its own militants” (Reenders 2006:42).

239 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-550000.html (last accessed January 22, 2013). 240 One IDF officer noted “Hezbollah are a mini-Israeli army. They can do everything as well as we can.” (Byman 2005:111). 241 ICG Middle East Report No. 39, “Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria”, p. 18 (12 April 2005). See also a more current discussion of Hezbollah’s political and military status: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/opinion/28noe.html?ref=hezbollah (last accessed February 4, 2011). 242 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/world/middleeast/26lebanon.html?scp=1 &sq=Ousted%20Lebanese%20Leader%20Swallows%20Rivals%E2%80%99%20Bi tter%20Pill&st=cse (last accessed February 4, 2011)

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to move beyond the dysfunctional patronage system that pervaded their political system prior to this period.243 Hezbollah’s social services organizations rival or exceed the abilities of the Lebanese government as it relates to important social services (e.g., education, medical care and financial aid and trash collection)

(Palmer-Harik 2004, Deeb 2006a; Hamzeh 2004; Flanigan and Abdel-Samad 2009).

Much of the funding from Iran is channeled through charitable organizations to deliver these important social services. Hezbollah uses these NGOs to serve mostly the needy Shia but, in times of great crisis, they are open to all in need. They see it as part of the greater jihad to transform each member of Lebanese society.

Hezbollah first competed for election nationally in 1992 and has competed nationally and locally in each election thereafter. Since 1992 they have increasingly formed alliances with some unlikely partners to broaden their appeal as well as deepen their hold on the primary right to represent the Shia confession in Lebanon.

This is exemplified more recently by the formation of the March 8th alliance in 2006 with the Free Patriotic Movement, the party of the Christian leader, Michel Aoun.

Taking the deeper plunge into the complex politics of Lebanon, Hezbollah finally took seats in the cabinet in 2005. Since the early 1990s Hezbollah positioned itself as a supporter of major Arab causes and, in particular, the Palestinian cause for self- determination that came to be known as the ‘Jerusalem liberation’ culture (Hamzeh

243 See Norton, Augustus Richard, Amal and the Shi’a, University of Texas Press, 1987; Ajami, Fouad, The Vanished Imam – Musa al Sadr and the Shi’a of Lebanon, I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd., 1986 and Picard, Elizabeth, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, Holmes & Meier, 1996

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2004:39).244 That pan-Islamic (or at least regional view) has deepened over the years but not to the point that they have taken up arms on behalf of any of the

Palestinian resistance movements.

Hezbollah can be defiant and brutish in the political arena when it sees the need but it can also be a subtle and savvy political operator. As an example of their savvy side, and in clear contrast to the extremist views of the Al Qaeda or the

Taliban-based movements, Hezbollah takes a more pluralistic approach to living among Muslims and non-Muslims. In their interpretation of Islam it is not necessary to coerce anyone to be a Muslim and it is acceptable to engage in government of a country that is not Islamic. A core concept of Hezbollah is that oppression is what is wrong with the world – regardless of religion. “The only religious obligation upon the Party is that it actively pursues justice, regardless of whether or not this culminates in the creation of an Islamic state” (Saad-Ghorayab 2001:37). As an example of their defiant and brutish side, Hezbollah did the unthinkable in May

2008 and turned its weapons on fellow Lebanese (ICG Middle East Briefing 23, May

2008). They sensed a threat by their political rivals to disarm the movement245 and consolidate the monopoly on the use of force in the country’s military, the Lebanese

Armed Forces. While politically costly in the short term, they played political

244 Hezbollah’s focus on messaging and acting on social justice issues and the liberation of the dispossessed has often been linked to the work of Franz Fanon (e.g., The Wretched of the Earth, 1963) and Catholic liberation theology in general. 245 A change that Hezbollah admits must come but that they have forestalled either through political maneuvering or bullying (as in 2008).

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hardball and not only survived but ultimately came out stronger politically in the long run246.

The view on Hezbollah varies significantly in the international community, which has a direct impact on Hezbollah’s political, economic and military strength.

The U.S. government’s 247 sees the group as a terrorist organization that is virulently anti-American and that has joined forces with Syria and Iran to destabilize the region and threaten Israel directly or indirectly through support for radical Islamic

Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Hezbollah is infamous in the

U.S. for the 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed over 280 Marines, the bombing of the US and French embassies in Lebanon as well as the hostage crises of the late 1980’s. The U.S. has consistently taken the position that Hezbollah should suffer the same fate as groups such as Al Qaeda as part of its global war on terror in the post 9/11 world. The UN Security Council has issued

UNSCR 1559 in 2004, which demanded the disarmament of Hezbollah and the dismantling of any military apparatus that the group may operate directly or indirectly.

246 Their role in the toppling of the Saad Harirri-led government in Lebanon in 2011, has only burnished their image as the most powerful – and feared - single political actor in Lebanon. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/12/lebanon-reels- hezbollah-topples-government (last accessed January 22, 2013). 247 See various sources including the recent reports on Patterns of Global Terrorism issued by the State Department and related websites such as Middle East Media Resarch Institute (MEMRI) on Lebanese Hezbollah (http://www.memri.org/subject/en/88.htm)

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The U.S. (and Israel), however, has generally been alone in this more harsh view of Hezbollah. Most of the EU powers - particularly France - as well as the majority of Arab nations248 believe that Hezbollah is a legitimate national resistance movement and that it is vital to the security of Lebanon.249 France has argued consistently that Hezbollah is not a terrorist organization and that, in any event, it is a matter for the Lebanese to sort out – not meddling foreign powers and especially not ‘crusading’ Americans.

Events to Study The first shock to be used in this case is the May 23, 2000 withdrawal of the

IDF from the portions of southern Lebanon it had occupied with its SLA allies since

1982. This ‘divine victory’ (Noe 2007) was a values challenge to Hezbollah. With

Israel’s withdrawal and the collapse of the SLA there was a very real question about why Hezbollah needed to exist – at least its military wing (ICG Middle East Briefing

July 2003). While Israeli leaders had been signaling that they wanted to withdraw from Lebanon in 1999, I have classified this as abrupt in timing since the withdrawal was unilateral after Israel failed to negotiate terms with Lebanon.

The second shock to be used in this case is the Summer 2006 war between

Hezbollah and Israel. Triggered by the ambush and kidnapping of IDF troops on July

12, 2006, Israel launched an air campaign on July 13th and ultimately followed with

248 A notable exception is Saudi Arabia, which has generally been in favor of disarmament of Hezbollah if for no better reason than to weaken a political foe of its Sunni clients in Lebanon. 249 As will be explored in this chapter, the stability and depth of that belief varies over time for a variety of reasons.

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land forces that invaded southern Lebanon. The UN brokered a ceasefire on August

14th. I have classified this as a performance challenge since they were tested in a form of combat that was closer to conventional warfare than they had ever demonstrated in the past (Biddle & Friedman 2008). This more conventional format

(and the longer range/more lethal rocket arsenal) was an important component of

Hezbollah’s deterrence strategy with respect to Israel.

These shocks credibly put the continuity of the organization in doubt at least for a period of time either during the crisis (the 2006 War, battlefield losses250) or subsequent to the crisis (the IDF Withdrawal in 2000, pending victory).

Values Challenge – Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 Between 1978 and 2000, Israeli military actions are estimated to have cost the lives of 20,000 Lebanese civilians. Between 1982 and 2000 Israel lost 889 soldiers in Lebanon (Blanford 1999; Norton 2000). Militarily superior democracies such as Israel generally have had difficulty unleashing their full fury against their weaker enemies (Merom 2003) due to concerns about the killing of innocents euphemistically known as ‘collateral damage’.251 Israel held little back, however, in

Operations Accountability (1993) and Grapes of Wrath (1996) and it triggered the

250 For purposes of this research, the significance is not who won or who lost the 2006 war (both sides claimed victory though the general sense is that Hezbollah won by not losing – a typical claim in asymmetric warfare). The significance is that Hezbollah expended significant resources in lives and material relative to its supply and provoked the IDF to wreak massive damages to Lebanese state in property and human loss of life. 251 See also the current controversy in the US regarding collateral damage in the use of drones for targeted assassinations in counterterrorism operations. For example, see http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/counterterrorism/drone- strikes/counting-drone-strike-deaths (last accessed January 25, 2013).

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effect that Merom speaks of when the ‘war gets dirty’ (Merom 2003:23). The domestic polity in Israel was horrified at the carnage and increasingly raised political pressure252 to end the conflict (especially when the carnage of the bombing of the UN facility in Cana was made public). In Lebanon the commitment to resistance only stiffened (Norton 2000).

A senior IDF officer is quoted in 1999:

“Show me a single case in history in which an army managed to occupy territory over time and defeat a guerilla organization that benefitted from a massive support and political backing from the local population. Even if unilateral withdrawal is interpreted as weakness that does not mean it ought to be ruled out. There are plenty of nations that have already done it: the Americans folded in Vietnam and the Russians ran as fast as they could from Afghanistan. We can also get out. I don’t think there is one sane Frenchman who is now sorry about withdrawing from Algeria. The truth is that there isn’t a whole lot the IDF can do against Hezbollah” (Hamzeh 2004:94).

After failing to negotiate terms for withdrawal, Ehud Barak, then Prime

Minister of Israel, makes the decision to unilaterally withdraw the IDF on May 23,

2000 and leave the SLA to fend for itself253. Supreme Leader of Hezbollah since

1992, Hassan Sayyed Nasrallah, publicly claimed a victory on behalf of all Lebanese

(Noe 2007) on May 26, 2000 and was inclusive of all groups who fought from all confessions – he framed it as a Lebanese victory and an example for the Palestinians to follow254. Nasrallah was trotting out his bona fides as a ‘post-confessional’

252 http://www.meforum.org/70/israels-security-zone-in-lebanon-a-tragedy (last accessed January 25, 2013). 253 http://www.meforum.org/49/did-israel-betray-its-lebanese-allies (last accessed January 25, 2013) 254 In the summer of 2000, the second Palestinian intifada (i.e., rebellion) began in the Palestinian territories and a truce was signed in November 2006 between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.

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Lebanese leader but it suited the occasion and he seized the opportunity. He was feeling heady since this was arguably the first time an Arab army of any kind was able to compel Israel to yield territory that it occupied by force.

Israel’s withdrawal, however, presented a major challenge to the organization: were they now a ‘rebel without a cause’ (ICG Middle East Briefing July

2003). Since inception they had been fighting and dying to rid Lebanon of Israel and other Western powers including the US and France. Yes, they had been competing for election and ran a large social service enterprise in Lebanon, but the heartbeat of

Hezbollah was its defiant armed resistance to Israel. Hezbollah knew it could very quickly become irrelevant if it disarmed and became just another voice in the crowded and corrupt political arena of Lebanese politics. The one-time dominant

Shia party, Amal, virtually disappeared as a political force in Lebanon when it laid down its arms in 1991. The leaders of Amal fell into the same corrupt, sectarian client-patron model of politics that had dominated Lebanon for decades. Hezbollah did not want to suffer that fate. It knew that it would not be long before the pressure to disarm would come from its political rivals inside Lebanon as well as the international community. In 1999 Israeli political leaders openly suggested that withdrawal would be the surest way to defeat Hezbollah since it would deprive the armed wing its raison d’être (Norton 1991). Hezbollah rightly suspected that

Lebanon’s political leadership would now likely put its full focus on rebuilding the state’s institutions including a stronger and more diverse Lebanese Armed Forces that would retake the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The people of Lebanon needed to rebuild their country and create a vibrant economy. The unchecked

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military power of an increasingly unnecessary Islamic movement would not last long in the renewing Lebanon. Hezbollah’s organization-defining role as the armed resistance would first decline in relevance and then likely be taken by the LAF. The

Hezbollah was duty-bound as part of a 1991 settlement with its rivals to not resist by force the transition of its military capability to the state when it best serves the state - not necessarily when Hezbollah is ready to make that transition (Norton

1991). Given all of the changes brought on by the withdrawal, the need for

Hezbollah as a military organization was called into question.

Performance Challenge – War with Israel in 2006 The war with Israel in the summer of 2006 came so swiftly and furiously that even the Secretary General of Hezbollah was surprised.

"We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude," Hassan Nasrallah, the cleric who leads Hizbullah, told Lebanon's New TV channel. "You ask me, if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not."255

Hezbollah had been building an impressive military arsenal, defense infrastructure in the south and combat capabilities since the IDF withdrawal.

Hezbollah had hoped, at least to some extent, these assets would deter Israel from invading Lebanon again. Hezbollah triggered the war with what it thought was

‘within the rules of the game’ at the time – capturing IDF troops to as barter for future prisoner exchanges (Kuperman 2006).

“The 2006 Lebanon Campaign opened when Hezbollah ambushed an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers on July 12. The Israeli Air

255 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/28/syria.israel (last accessed January 25, 2013).

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Force (IAF) quickly retaliated against targets in Lebanon. Before dawn on July 13, the IAF executed Operation SPECIFIC GRAVITY, destroying more than 50 of Hezbollah’s long-range rocket launchers in a pre-planned, 34-minute strike. Other early targets included Hezbollah observation posts along the border, Hezbollah compounds in the Dahyia section of Beirut, and roads and bridges that Israel believed might be used to exfiltrate the abducted soldiers. Over the course of the campaign, the IAF flew roughly 5,000 strike missions, primarily directed at the Dahyia, the Beqaa Valley near the Syrian border, and the region south of the Litani River” (Biddle & Friedman 2008:29- 30).

The IDF escalated from the air campaign to include progressively larger ground forces during the course of the war. At the height of the war (late July/early

August) the fighting was at close quarters with firefights lasting several hours and sometimes days. Hezbollah was performing tactically more like a conventional force would versus a guerilla organization (Biddle & Friedman 2008; Exum 2006; Byman

2007). While Israel would be roundly criticized for its conduct of the war (e.g.,

Winograd Commission), Hezbollah conducted itself tactically with surprising conventional military skill until the ceasefire was brokered by the UN on August

14th.

“Despite losing many of its long-range launchers early in the war, Hezbollah began what would become a steady stream of rocket fire into Israel. In total, Hezbollah fired an estimated 4,000 rockets, the vast majority of which were 122 mm Katyushas stationed within 20 kilometers of the Israeli border. Hezbollah launched 100 or more rockets on 22 of 34 days in the campaign, including 220 on the final day of the war. About 900 of these rockets landed in urban areas, causing 53 civilian deaths” (Biddle & Friedman 2008:31).

The war was very costly to Hezbollah and to Lebanon. During the course of the 34 day war Hezbollah is estimated to have lost 650 to 750 fighters which is

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about half of its estimated standing force256. The IDF lost 119 to combat fatalities

(Biddle & Friedman 2008:33). Civilian deaths in Lebanon numbered 1191 and there were 90,000 Lebanese displaced due to the war. Property damage in Lebanon was estimated at over $20 billion.257

Following the war it became clear that one of the goals of Israel was to so severely degrade Hezbollah that it would be difficult for the movement to recover its military and political power at least for several years if at all. There were a variety of accounts that the US government, Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah’s political opponents in Lebanon (i.e., the March 14th alliance with Saad Harriri as prime minister at the time) were complicit in delaying the brokering of a ceasefire in hopes that Hezbollah would be destroyed as a result of the war (Harel & Issacharoff 2008; Exum 2006). In spite of the cost of the war to Hezbollah258 and to Lebanon, Nasrallah defiantly claimed victory following the war. In that Hezbollah fighters had killed 119 IDF troops, were still firing rockets at Israel on the last day of the war and Israel achieved none of its pre-war objectives259, he had a plausible claim and would promptly go to work to parlay it into Hezbollah’s political advantage.

256 Hezbollah’s ranks swelled to at least 10,000 fighters. Amal, SSNP and Palestinian militias provided troops to fight under Hezbollah command. 257 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.3.2. pdf (last accessed January 25, 2013). 258 http://www.meforum.org/2054/nasrallahs-defeat-in-the-2006-war#_ftnref18 (last accessed January 24, 2013). 259 It is arguable that the IDF did seriously degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities but that would take time (and future combat) to reveal if true or not. The war of words between Hezbollah and Israel regarding ‘who won’ would rage for some time.

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International and Regional Context for Events The two events selected occurred in the context of a variety of major regional and international events that possibly influenced the structure of legitimation of

Hezbollah. The events that I have highlighted relative to the IDF Withdrawal Event in 2000 are outlined below. They include wars in the region, the launch of the GWOT and major leadership changes of Hezbollah’s two primary sponsoring states. I have included the US war in Iraq in this slate even though it began almost 3 years after the IDF withdrawal since the rumors of war and UN activity prior to the war were commonplace in the 2002 time window. The US war in Iraq spans both events since the US policies and actions are major part of Hezbollah’s resistance and refusal political platform. The case analysis will account for these major events to the extent they play into the legitimation dynamics of the organization.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-2006-lebanon-war-a-short-history (last accessed January 24, 2013).

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Figure 23 - International and Regional Context - Hezbollah

On the heels of the 9/11 catastrophe in the US, President Bush mobilized a global effort to declare war on terror (then known as GWOT). The UN Security

Council passed a Resolution that obligated the entire UN community to do all in its power to shut down terrorist organizations in its jurisdiction – not just military or police action but also to interdict financial flows that might be related to suspicious organizations or persons. Lebanon and Hezbollah were early targets.

“The first tangible step came soon later, when US President George Bush announced a list of individuals and organizations to be targeted – which included some Lebanese names…On Sept. 28, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1373, and followed it up a month later with the practical mechanisms necessary for its implementation. This coincided with new FATF (Financial Action Task Force) guidelines…Resolution 1373 was no ordinary resolution; it was passed under Article 7 of the UN Charter, making its implementation obligatory on all 189 UN member states. The resolution demands that all states prohibit all terrorist activity, sequester funds belonging to those accused of terrorism, and freeze the assets of all those committing,

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trying to commit, taking part in, and facilitating acts of terrorism.” (Daily Star, November 10, 2001; Joseph Samaha)

Hezbollah was an early target especially after it rebuffed attempts by the US government to ply the organization with a set of incentives260 (e.g., financial aid, political recognition by the US) to cease its military operations towards Israel and to cooperate with US intelligence to undermine various terrorist operations it may be aware of (Noe 2007:256-262; Daily Star, November 17, 2001).

Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon – May 2000

Assessment of the Change in Organizational Strength of Hezbollah – 1998 to 2002 As noted in chapter 2 organizational strength consists of three basic components: 1.) political strength, 2.) military strength, 3.) economic strength. We will discuss each component in turn and present observations within 2 years prior to and subsequent to the event being studied.

260 In the interview with Al-Rai Al-Am, Nasrallah said the original offer made by the US following the Sept. 11 attacks contained three demands: to distinguish between acts of terrorism and what is legitimate according to the tenets of Islam; that Hizbullah renounces its support for the Palestinian intifada, severs ties with Syria, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and withdraw from the Arab-Israeli conflict; to provide intelligence on extremist Islamist groups possibly involved in the Sept. 11 attacks with which Hizbullah may have had contacts. In return, the US would “forgive” Hizbullah for its alleged involvement in the 1983 suicide bombings of the US embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut, which collectively claimed the lives of more than 300 people. “Of course we rejected all these offers because we believe it's a political bomb aimed at finishing off Hizbullah,” Nasrallah said. (Daily Star, November 17, 2001)

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Political Strength There are three basic elements of political strength that I will focus on to assess the relative political strength of the organization under study: a.) popular support, b.) geographic/demographic scope of influence, c.) alliances. The table below summarizes the observations I will use to assess the change in political strength for this period.

Table 37 - Hezbollah Political Strength Evidence: 1998-2002

Major Category Observations

1998 municipal elections in Lebanon261

. Hezbollah had to submit to competing for 3 of 24 seats on the list262 led by Rafik Harriri in Beirut – a compromise that Popular Support frustrated Hezbollah leadership but one that they compromised and acceded to nonetheless. . Hezbollah dominated the 1998 municipal elections in the

261 These elections are useful for gauging political support of the movement at this time for a variety of reasons including it was the first time Islamic groups of any kind participated at the local level and given the autonomy of the local municipalities in the Lebanese political environment these elections represent a test of the group’s ability to convert their works of social justice at the local level (e.g., sanitary water projects, health care, construction/reconstruction) into tangible political power (Hamzeh 2000). 262 There are numerous sources that describe the political process used in Lebanon for municipal and national elections. Palmer-Harik 2004, chapter 7 (pp 95-110) is a reasonable primer on the machinations needed by any political aspirant to secure the endorsements of local clan chiefs that is needed to assemble a credible and winning list for election. As noted by Palmer-Harik (1993, 2004) and Kramer (1998), the clan structures – especially in the more rural areas in the south and in the north in the Bekaa - were still deeply entrenched in the late 1990’s in Lebanon, played a major role in the political process (vs. ideological conformity to the asceticism that lay at the core of Hezbollah’s political philosophy).

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southern suburbs of Beirut (their traditional stronghold) and shut out Amal, its closest rival for Shia community domination in Lebanon. . In the pivotal municipal elections in the South263, Hezbollah would take only 122 seats (Palmer-Harik 2004:107) to Amal’s 231 in that election. Hamzeh (2000) notes, however, “Hezbollah proved that it is now a potent threat to Amal in its stronghold.”

263 This region had traditionally been an Amal stronghold given its role in the protection of the Shia from the PLO banditry of the 1970s and early 1980’s and its more limited role in resistance to Israel and the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) following the IDF invasion in 1982. In addition, the South consists of a significantly more varied collection of beliefs about the need for and compliance with the asceticism of a group such as Hezbollah. See Cambanis (2010:70 to 76) for a useful discussion about the different social customs in a city such as Tyre versus Nabatiyah, both larger cities in the South. Hezbollah has shown a willingness to trade off its desire for compliance with its ascetic Islamic conduct against its need for political control. They are ‘pragmatically ideological’ politicians. 264 http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_prof ile.asp?id=3561 (last accessed February 4, 2011). 265 As captured in ICG Middle East Report No. 39: An oft-cited example is that of Habib Sadeq, a left-wing Shiite politician. Sadeq ran on a list against Hizbollah and Amal in the 2000 parliamentary elections. He and his allies garnered over a third of Shiite votes in south Lebanon. See http://www.libanvote.com "It's a myth that Hizbollah and Amal control all the Shiites. They never received more than 60 per cent of the Shiite vote. Many Shiite leaders and prominent activists either joined or are close to the opposition, like Habib Sadeq, Hassan Amin [a writer] and the As'ad family". Crisis Group interview with leader of the Democratic Left Movement, Beirut, 1 March 2005. See ICG Middle East Report 39, pg. 17.

266 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last accessed January 16, 2013). 267 Hezbollah’s estranged spiritual mentor who had often been critical of Hezbollah (Sankari 2005). 268 This figure is drawn from Hamzeh 2004 and likely reflects membership numbers in the 2003 period. As a result, the 200,000 number is likely inflated for late 2002 but suitable as an order of magnitude in terms of growth.

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. Hezbollah’s ability to dominate the Bekaa Valley (which should have been a stronghold for the organization) was limited by suspicions in the Sunni community that its presence would degrade the region’s tourism business and the lingering effects of its dispute with Tufayli (Alagha 2006:288) and his group, Ansar Allah264, that had split off from Hezbollah in 1997.

National Elections, Fall 2000 . The 2000 national elections demonstrated that Hezbollah had increased its political strength in the South at the expense of Amal though it still required a variety of composite lists (with clan chiefs of the more powerful families) to do so. . The Party (and its partners) increased the number of seats in Lebanese Parliament from 10 to 12 as a result of this election (Azani 2009:227). . The combined forces of Amal and Hezbollah did not account for more than 60% of the total Shii vote.265 . Nasrallah successfully defers the question of disarming Hezbollah until future years based on claims that the threat from Israel is still near and present and that Hezbollah is a legitimate resistance organization given the limits of the Lebanese Armed Forces (Azani 2009).

Post 9/11/01 Events

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. A cross-section of Lebanese political leadership were staunchly opposed to compliance with the FATF266 (Financial Action Task Force) requirements to freeze Hezbollah (and Nasrallah’s) financial assets and labeling the organization a terrorist organization – effectively black listing the group and de- legitimizing it as a political actor in Lebanon and the region. Nasrallah was vocal in his opposition, which was to be expected (Noe 2007: 256- 263). . “The major impediments to compliance are political…Beirut is not prepared even to contemplate naming Hizbullah as a terrorist organization. This position, moreover, is supported by the majority of Lebanese as we all as by many Arab countries. A confrontation with the US is therefore inevitable, if the Americans insist on widening the scope of their war on terror to include Hizbullah.” (Daily Star, November 10, 2001; Joseph Samaha) . “Meanwhile, Industry Minister George Frem said that the country's attitude toward Hizbullah was clear. In an interview with the LBCI TV station on Thursday, the minister said that the government, despite its friendship with Washington, “supports the resistance. “ “ (Daily Star, November 17, 2001)

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. Shiite cleric Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah267 on Wednesday described Washington's latest repudiation of Hizbullah as “state-sponsored terrorism,” and called for an Arab response “consisting of more than just words.” In a statement, the cleric said that “everyone knows that the United States has granted itself an open mandate to launch a war on anyone and any state within the framework of combating international terrorism.” He lashed out at the US administration for “assuming the responsibility of waving the stick at any state group engaged in liberation activity.” (Daily Star, November 8. 2001) . The view of Hezbollah’s political power from Israel: “From the outset, Hezbollah grounded itself in the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, which provided thousands of recruits and a mass constituency. For many Shi'ites in Lebanon, Hezbollah was and still is a legitimate force for social and political change. And it is true that Hezbollah today is something more than a quasi- military formation. Even were it to lay down its arms, it would continue to exist as a political and social movement.” (Zisser 2002) . The size of the organization had grown considerably from approximately 15,000 members pre withdrawal to

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almost 200,000 at the end of this period.268

1998 municipal elections in Lebanon . Where Sunnis and Christians tended to be the majority population, Hezbollah had little ability to upset that balance of power. They were largely in a pitched battle with the Shia dominated portions of the country or, as in Beirut, a rider of coattails of the Geographic/Demographic stronger confessional Scope of Influence group/political bosses (Hamzeh 2000; Palmer-Harik 2004). . “By providing social services, Hezbollah…[was] able to bypass the politics of patronage and to overcome this particular feature of Lebanese politics. As a result they boosted the size of their constituency and were able to perform well in local [1998 municipal] elections” (Hamzeh 2000:741). . The geographic scope of influence of the party, as evidenced by its successes and failures in the 1998 elections, depicts a surprising set of cross-cutting trends. In the hotly contested South, Hezbollah won in certain towns that were historically Amal strongholds (e.g., Nabatiyeh) but lost in towns that were home to prominent Hezbollah leaders (e.g., Kfarfila that is home to Qassem). . “[T]he geographical change of this duality indicates that the size of Hezbollah’s electorate

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has expanded from Nabatiyyeh down to some coastal villages. On the other hand, the party’s popularity shrank in frontline towns and villages, which were once considered Hezbollah’s main strongholds. This new geographical distribution demonstrates that Hezbollah was surprisingly unaware of the local realities in the south. The party, which possesses the most sophisticated military capability in fighting the Israeli occupation, had misjudged the needs of the people. Other than their need for social welfare services, the people wanted more freedom over their daily activities. Such freedom was better understood by Berri than Hezbollah, who backed lists of families in these frontline villages at the expense of Amal. As a result of this new political geographic map, one is tempted to hypothesize that the farther the people from the battle zone, the higher the popularity of Hezbollah (southern suburbs, Hermel district); the closer to the battle zone, the lower the party’s popularity (e.g., Jaba’, Ain Qana, Kafra, Yater, Shakra).” (Hamzeh 2000:754) . The followers of Hezbollah cut across all major socioeconomic classes within the Lebanese Shia community (Palmer-Harik 1996).

National Elections, Fall 2000 . Hezbollah’s political geographic footprint was still generally limited to the South,

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Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut.

Post 9/11/01 Events . French Foreign Minister Hugo Vedrine was “against pressuring Syria and Lebanon to take measures against groups that Washington (emphasis mine) says are engaged in terror.” (Daily Star, November 17, 2001).

1998 municipal elections in Lebanon . Political alliances tended to be Alliances limited to the types of alliances that were more opportunistic269 in order to build an electable list of candidates in the municipal elections (Hamzeh 2000, Palmer-Harik 2004). . Hezbollah was savvy in that they knew when to compromise and include Communists and social democrats on their lists when it served their interests (Palmer-Harik 2004).

National Elections, Fall 2000 . At the behest of Iran270, Hezbollah and Amal join forces

269 Beyond those opportunistic, one-off alliances, Hezbollah tended to focus on a broader series of messaging and symbolic acts to demonstrate solidarity – mostly ideologically – across confessional lines with the Christian community and also within the broader Islamic community of Sunnis and Shia. This did not result in tangible political alliances in this period but reveals its political and ideological instincts with respect to broadening the overall credibility of the organization beyond its more parochial and violent roots. 270 Iran was concerned about intra-Shia rivalry and imposed on Hezbollah to be collaborative with Amal to minimize the ability of foreign powers to divide the bloc of voters in the Shia confession (Hamzeh 2004:116). In contrast, a weakened Syria

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and campaign with combined lists.

Conclusions

Hezbollah’s political strength prior to the IDF withdrawal in May 2000 was limited but clearly on the rise relative to the mid and early 1990s. They had not consolidated their power outside Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut, their alliances were opportunistic in nature and hardly enduring at that point. Following the IDF withdrawal Hezbollah was a politically stronger organization. Hezbollah demonstrated the ability to generate national and international traction as a bona fide political movement based on its resistance to Israel. It had not, however, demonstrated any new abilities to build alliances outside of the opportunistic ones needed to produce a winning list in elections.

The international political pressure from 9/11 demonstrated that its appeal politically within Lebanon crossed sectarian lines and became stronger within the

Shia confession – conditioned on its sharp focus on resistance to Israel. While there are certainly alternative explanations for the support of erstwhile political opponents of Hezbollah (including fear of renewed civil war), the willingness by the majority of Lebanese to defend Hezbollah as a bona fide resistance organization in the face of significant international pressure demonstrated its increased political power beyond its natural constituency. Hezbollah’s relatively merciful treatment of

was seen as pitting Amal and the dismissed Tufayli as counterweights to Hezbollah’s rising power (ICG Report: Old Game, New Rules – 18 Nov. 2002).

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the SLA forces that were captured following the IDF withdrawal, likely led some non-supporters to see them as a de facto LAF that was needed to at least provide some level of deterrence to Israel’s forces.

Military Strength

There are two basic elements of military strength that I will focus on to assess the change in military strength of Hezbollah during the two years prior to and following the shock: a.) nature and extent of military operations; and, b.) nature and extent of military capabilities. The table below summarizes the major observations I will use to assess the change in military strength for the period 1998 to 2002.

Table 38 - Hezbollah Military Strength Evidence: 1998-2002

Major Category Observations

Nature and Extent . Prior to the IDF withdrawal of Military Hezbollah’s targeting choices Operations changed to include the state of Israel mostly through rocket attacks on civilians in northern Israel. Typical guerilla operations became more prominent as Hezbollah’s area of operations became more secure (Hamzeh 2004: 86-88). Attacks on IDF and SLA forces, via improvised explosive devices (IEDs), were the most common operation during this period.271 The use of the suicide terror tactic declined considerably

271 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack& casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1998&end_yearonly=2002&dt p2=all&perpetrator=407&count=100 (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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(less than 10% of the levels used in the pre-Ta’if period) as the IDF retreated to its security zone in the south.272 . Hamzeh (2004:90) notes that Hezbollah dramatically ramped up its military activity in 1999. It became the “year of the resistance par excellence.” . According to Hamzeh (2004:90-91) Hezbollah carried out over 1500 military operations against the IDF and the SLA in 1999 alone and was by far the single most active resistance group (63% of all operations identified). The 1528 military operations conducted in 1999 represent 25% of all military operations against the SLA and the IDF for Hezbollah since 1985. Hezbollah sensed the time was right to intensify the attack on the SLA and the IDF given Ehud Barak’s stated intentions in early 1999 to withdraw from Lebanon in coming year.273 . In the two-year period following the IDF withdrawal, the operational tempo of Hezbollah dramatically

272 Even Pape (2005) only codes three suicide operations in this period – all the targets were military convoys in the south. The suspect moral character of these operations also became harder to explain to the adherents given Israel’s retreat and foreign power withdrawal. 273 During his campaign to be elected prime minister in the spring of 1999, Ehud Barak vowed to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon by July 2000 (The Jerusalem Post, 3 March 1999). Barak vowed to “get the boys out of Lebanon within a year of being elected Prime Minister” (The Jerusalem Post, 4 March 1999) as cited in ICG report: Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israeli-Lebanon Border, 18 November 2002:6).

274 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=target& casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2000&start_month=6&start_day=1 &end_year=2002&end_month=5&end_day=30&dtp2=all&perpetrator=407 (last accessed January 15, 2013).

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changed. In contrast to the furious military combat activity in 1999 that was designed to accelerate the Israeli/SLA withdrawal, the activity level dropped to seven (7) recorded incidents (Hamzeh 2004, GTD database274). The Shebaa Farms became the primary focal point for active combat operations and they were significantly more limited in scope and mission.

. Many analysts would describe Hezbollah during this period as predominantly a guerilla force (Byman 2005, 2007; Kuperman 2006, Hamzeh 2004). That is, they leveraged their ‘local support, a secure geographic base, distributed Nature and Extent military organizational structures of Military and mobility’ to engage the enemy on Capabilities terms most favorable to Hezbollah. . Two years prior to the IDF withdrawal, Hezbollah had approximately 15000 members including 1000 to 5000 armed combatants (Hamzeh 1997, 2004). Hamzeh 2004 also notes that the combination of fighters and security forces in Hezbollah climbed from 8,000 in 1998 to approximately 20,000 by the end of this period. . The arsenal of Hezbollah in the late 1990s primarily consisted of small arms complemented by Katyusha rockets, IEDs and short-range artillery (Hamzeh 2004:91; Norton 2000). Hezbollah had limited ability to strike deep into Israel and therefore had only limited deterrence capability at this time. Hezbollah had, at best, an ability to offer limited harassing fire against IDF and SLA positions in Lebanon and very limited ability to threaten

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Israeli territory directly at this time. . Hezbollah had significantly improved its intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities that thwarted the IDF and SLA’s ability to penetrate the organization as well as facilitate Hezbollah’s attacks on the IDF and SLA prior to withdrawal (Byman 2007). . Following the withdrawal, Hezbollah was changing its military footing from a guerilla-oriented footing with persistent harassment of fixed enemy positions in the South to a deterrence-oriented footing (ICG Middle East Report, No. 7 – pp. 15- 16; ICG - Old Games, New Rules: 18 Nov 2002) that was designed to intimidate Israel from even attempting another invasion. . Hezbollah became an active military trainer and conduit for military supplies to the Palestinian forces engaged with the uprising in Gaza (Byman 2005, ICG Middle East Report No. 7, Zisser 2002). . Following the withdrawal, Hezbollah had undertaken a major build out of its defensive positions in the South along with a significant upgrade in its firepower that introduced the ability to strike deeper into Israel from protected positions in the South of Lebanon as well as considerable improvement in its anti-tank capabilities for its infantry (Biddle and Freeman 2008, Exum 2006, Deeb 2006b, Zisser 2002). . “Hezbollah has also succeeded in militarizing its territorial base. Because Israel did not wish to give Hezbollah an excuse to strike northern Israel, it has stood with folded arms while Hezbollah has built an extensive military presence along

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the border. This presence includes reconnaissance and surveillance positions, supported by Hezbollah troops deployed throughout southern Lebanon. Even more disturbing from Israel's point of view is a powerful arsenal that reportedly includes some10,000 Katyushas and Iranian- made rockets (al-Fajr) with ranges up to 70 kilometers, covering Israel as far south as Hadera (between Haifa and Tel Aviv). Hezbollah has thus turned southern Lebanon into a kind of "Hezbollahland"—successor to the "Fatahland" that the Palestine Liberation Organization ruled until 1982 but geographically much larger. This is an area completely under Hezbollah's control that serves as its home base and from which it could ignite all-out war in the region” (Zisser 2002).

Conclusions

Prior to the IDF withdrawal, Hezbollah had made major improvements in its effectiveness and efficiency since its inception in 1982 but it still operated as a harassing force. It sought to attrite the IDF and SLA forces and provide a delaying force against the IDF and SLA. Hezbollah did not offer much in the way of deterrence given its limited arsenal but its dogged persistence and growing political support enabled it to provide sufficient resistance over the long term against its enemies.

Within the two years following the IDF withdrawal the military strength of

Hezbollah grew substantially even as its operational activity slowed dramatically. It was on a clear pathway to become to becoming a more credible deterrent force. It

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had made major improvements in its defensive positions, its tactical and strategic firepower, and its military communications and intelligence. Hezbollah was free to begin the build out of what would later be revealed to be an impressive defensive fieldworks and the knowledge to conduct limited maneuvers of infantry in that region.

Economic Strength There are three basic elements that I will focus on to gauge the change in economic strength of the organization: a.) scope and extent of contributions from major sponsors; and, b.) scope and extent of contributions from other sources; c.) ability to generate income from commercial operations (criminal or otherwise).

Table 39 - Hezbollah Economic Strength Evidence: 1998-2002

Major Category Observations

. In almost all accounts of the financial condition of Hezbollah, the financial sponsorship of Iran plays a prominent role. Reports of Iran’s annual contributions to Hezbollah vary from Scope and Extent tens of millions (Palmer-Harik 2004) of Contributions to a $100 million or more (Byman from State 2005, 2007; Hamzeh 2004; Levitt Sponsors 2005). The annual levels vary due to the strategic interests of the sponsors but these robust support levels appeared to persist through the period under review. . Nasrallah has publicly acknowledged that Iran’s support has accelerated the development of Hezbollah by 50 years. . Syria is also consistently identified as a major sponsor of Hezbollah but largely as a collaborator with Iran to safely transit arms and other military or social service supplies so as to

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minimize the ability of the IDF or UNIFIL to interdict resupply of Hezbollah. The nature of Syria’s financial support is difficult to discern and most analysts have generally concluded that is nominal at best (Norton 2000; Jaber 1997; Saad- Ghorayeb 2001; Palmer-Harik 2004; Byman 2005). . The mechanism of collection and disbursement for the support from Iran came through the charitable contributions network of Iran and also in Lebanon (Wright 2010, Takeyh 2009, Byman 2005). Scope and Extent . Based on the vibrant flow of public of Contributions services through Hezbollah to the from Other needy Shia during the late 1990s the Sources level of funding from Iran and other donors was as robust as ever. Hamzeh (2000, 2004), Palmer-Harik and Saad- Ghorayeb (2001) explain that the levels of social services were operating at all time highs in the history of the movement at that time. . There were other sources of income for Hezbollah at the time including charitable contributions from the members, wealthy sympathizers both inside Lebanon and the diasporas and to a far lesser extent, fees from services provided for education, health care and other social services (Hamzeh 2000, 2004; Azani 2009; Deeb 2006a). . Volunteer labor is also a key source of contribution in-kind (Deeb 2006a) to drive the social services. Paid staff in these NGOs can range anywhere from 1 in 10 to 2 in 10 (Deeb 2006a).275 Hezbollah believes that ‘faith moves mountains’ and that is pays politically

275 See also http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/03/sb-augustus-no- 1173896326

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in the long run. Ability to Generate . Hezbollah had accumulated enough Income from capital by this time to invest in Commercial supermarkets (cooperative), real Operations estate, Islamic banking and other (Criminal or business ventures (Jaber 1997:150- otherwise) 153). Not clear from Jaber what was the financial payoff from those ventures but this is evidence of a productive funding diversification scheme by the movement. . While far from conclusive, it appeared that Hezbollah was involved in the criminal activities in the US and South America to raise millions of dollars from the sale of illegal cigarettes and possible narcotics (Levitt 2005).276

Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 1998 to 2002

Hezbollah’s strength arguably grew noticeably when comparing the pre and post IDF withdrawal periods.

Growth in political strength was significant in that the internal and regional support for Hezbollah demonstrated solidarity at least around the resistance to

Israel. Its internal political power edged up in the south relative to Amal but it was still without any major alliance partners beyond the clan deals they made to build winning lists. Political strength had been restored and improved upon during this period.

276 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp- dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A26122-2002Jun21¬Found=; http://articles.cnn.com/2001-11-07/world/inv.terror.south_1_paraguayan-assad- ahmad-barakat-ciudad-del-este?_s=PM:WORLD.

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Military strength was the factor that was enhanced dramatically when comparing the pre and post withdrawal period. In one sense it is to be expected given the free hand that Israel gave them as a result of the withdrawal and the desire to remain disengaged from the morass of Lebanon. Their sponsors saw an opportunity to outfit the able and competent Hezbollah with sufficient firepower

(and train them in its use) to ensure that they had a proxy army in place to deter or harass Israel if needed.

Economic strength was at least as sound as it was in the pre-IDF withdrawal period. As noted, the estimates of financial flows (in cash or in kind) were not reported to be much higher in the post-withdrawal period, but clearly the uses of funds had grown considerably at least in the military arena.

Based on this assessment, I conclude that Hezbollah demonstrated resilience following the shock of the IDF withdrawal in May 2000. I will now assess states of legitimation of Hezbollah as it experienced the IDF withdrawal in May 2000.

Assessment of Hezbollah’s State of Legitimation in May 2000 As noted previously, once the determination is made that the organization has demonstrated resilience, we need to determine which of the above-mentioned hypotheses has the least amount of evidence against it. There are three basic areas to cover: the Methods of Operations tests, the Outcomes tests and the Cheap Talk

Test.

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Methods Tests These tests are built around four factors that reveal the degree of legitimation of its power based on how the organization goes about its duties. A summary graphic is below:

Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV) The table below summarizes the major observations I use to assess the state of legitimation with regards to the AOV test.

Table 40 - Hezbollah AOV Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Frequency & Extent . There is no evidence from the sources of Coercive I have used of the systematic use of Violence – force by Hezbollah against its Loyalty and followers to coerce them to be loyal or Performance perform their duties as required for their resistance or social service missions. 277

277 I am suspicious of the virtual absence of discussion about the use of coercive violence. In contrast to Northern Ireland (see case on Sinn Fein/PIRA) where there are sufficient public institutions to expose vigilantism, that is not the case in Lebanon. The norms of the Hezbollah community are powerful (Deeb 2006a) but,

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. Hezbollah’s relatively merciful treatment of the SLA forces that were captured following the IDF withdrawal demonstrated at least political savvy if not a noble restraint of power.

Nature and Extent . A security organization was in place of Internal Security at May 2000 (ICG Middle East Briefing Organization July 2003) but the size could not have been greater than the 1500 full time fighters that were estimated to be Hezbollah’s order of battle at that time (Norton 2000). While there were additional fighters that were part time (estimated to be no more than 5000 per Norton 2000), these fighters would not constitute a functioning internal security unit. . The security forces at the time represented about 3 per 1000 for the 1 million Shiites in Lebanon at the time and far less than 2 per 1000278 if one includes the total Lebanese population in 2000. This force would be severely limited in its ability to coerce followers through force even if it wanted to given the limits of its size. Though empirically elusive, it is more likely that this group was used for intelligence and counterintelligence against its primary enemies (Israel and its allies), to limit penetration by given the broad cross section of Shiite society that follows or sympathizes with Hezbollah, not all followers operate consistently and completely in accordance with those norms. I would expect the need for coercion outside of the situation of the punishment of informants. We should, however, have seen or heard of more incidents of coercive violence if they were happening in a systematic manner. 278 Quinlivan (1999) lays out useful ratios to interpret the size of security forces that are appropriate versus relatively more threatening. He points out that in reasonably well-ordered societies (e.g., the US) there are approximately 2 police personnel for every 1000 persons in the population. In more difficult circumstances (e.g., Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles) he notes that that ratio rose to 20 police personnel per 1000 population.

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Israeli agents and its allies and also to provide internal discipline should there be any rogue actors. . In the wake of the Taif Accord279 that unofficially280 ended the Lebanese Use of Unlawful civil war, Hezbollah was deemed the Violence to only militia to bear arms given its Maintain Power commitment to resistance to Israel and its pledge to never use those arms against other Lebanese. Hezbollah avoided the appearance and fact of using unlawful violence to maintain its power by focusing its military capacity on the harassment and punishment of Israel and the SLA. In the view of most Lebanese the continued Israeli occupation validated their resistance by force.

Conclusions

There is no evidence of even isolated threats to use violence against other

Lebanese in order to maintain its power (specifically with regard to the debate about disarming Hezbollah). As a result of the debate about the adoption of Taif

Accord in the earlier part of the 1990s, the Lebanese government281 acknowledged the legitimate role of Hezbollah as a resistance organization (Norton 1991, 2000).

While that consensus would break down in late 2004 – and remains a debate into

279 http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html (last accessed January 16, 2013) 280 Clashes between rival militias continued into 1990 including a bloody battle between Amal and Hezbollah (Norton 1991). 281 It is difficult to ignore the overwhelming influence of Syria and Iran on any Lebanese governmental decision. It would fair to state that the decision to allow Hezbollah to retain its arms was more a function of the decisions made by Syria and Iran at this time.

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2013 – in May 2000, there was no debate about the need for Hezbollah as an armed party to resist Israel and its allies attempts to occupy Lebanon.

Based on these observations, I conclude that the State of Legitimation with regards to AOV is ‘emergent’ at this time.

Level of Autonomy from Sponsors (LOA) The table below summarized the major observations I use to assess the state of legitimation of Hezbollah with respect to its level of autonomy from sponsors as of May 2000 when the IDF withdrew from Lebanon:

Table 41 - Hezbollah LOA Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. Hezbollah was highly dependent on both of its primary sponsors as of May 2000 for a broad scope of the support factors - Iran for financial, military and political support; Syria for military and political support. Scope, Level and . Though there is conflicting Persistence of evidence282, the financial flows Support reportedly declined from Iran during this period due to the change in leadership283 in Iran and the change in its strategic interests (Byman 2005, Hamzeh 2000). . It was unclear that Iran wanted to continue to be seen aiding a group that was branded as a terrorist group

282 See earlier discussion of change in economic strength of Hezbollah. 283 Khatami was elected in 1997 and ruled until 2005. http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.04_siddiqi.html (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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by the US (in 1999) and some western powers (and Saudi Arabia) as Iran sought full membership and favorable trading and diplomatic status in the international community (Wright 2010, Takeyh 2009). . Syria was cooling in its ardor for Hezbollah given the potential for a peace deal with Israel284. It was in the process of attempting to negotiate its own land-for-peace deal with Israel though it ultimately collapsed in late 1999. It was not clear that an Islamist armed group fit into the long-term plans of Syria.

. Each of the major state sponsors had their own strategic interests for supporting Hezbollah that were subject to change given leadership changes in those countries or other external events outside the control of either Hezbollah or the state (Byman Strategic vs. 2005). Ideological . Hezbollah had the closest ideological Motivation of affinity with Iran given its shared Sponsor(s) Shia brand of Islam and its support of the Wiliyat al Faqih doctrine regarding Iran’s Grand Ayatollah (Norton 1987, 1990, 1991, 2000; Jaber 1997; Palmer-Harik 2004; Saad Ghorayeb 2001). Many of Hezbollah’s founders and leaders trained in the Shii religious universities of Iraq and

284 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/14/lebanese- government-collapse-us-policy. “Eleven years ago, a peace agreement between Syria and Israel – that would have led to the disarmament of Hezbollah given the 30,000 Syrian troops in the country – fell apart because, as Israel's top negotiator on Lebanon and Syria, Maj General Uri Sagi, subsequently explained, President Bill Clinton "lied" to the dying Syrian president, Hafez Assad, about having a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in his pocket (including up to the north-eastern shoreline of Lake Tiberius), and Israeli premier Ehud Barak got electoral "cold feet" about giving back the last 100m or so of territory.”

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Iran. . Iran also clearly had strategic interests as well with regards to Hezbollah but these were always framed in the context of the ideological connection of Shia philosophy and the Khomeini’s more activist model of clerical leadership (Sankari 2005; Norton 1987, 2007; Ajami 1986). Their relationship was surely not simply about ideological affinity (Ranstorp 1997; Takeyh 2009; Wright 2010). Israel was Iran’s mortal enemy and any friend in that fight was a useful friend to have. Iran could effectively open up two fronts against Israel with its Hezbollah friends in Lebanon. In addition, Iran could use Hezbollah as its agent to influence the course and conduct of the Palestinian conflict. . Since its inception in 1982, a variety of evidence is present to demonstrate that Hezbollah (or its agents such as the Islamic Jihad) conducted operations against non- traditional enemies of the organization for the potential benefit of its sponsors. 285 While Ranstorp (1997) lays out the strategic logic of the non-combatant oriented kidnapping campaign that lasted for 10 years ending in 1992, it nonetheless is plausible that these acts were performed at the behest of the sponsor and demonstrates limited autonomy (Norton 2000, 2007; Byman 2005) . Syria was demonstrably more instrumental in its relationship with Hezbollah than Iran. Syria was more

285 For example, the attack on the Israeli embassy in 1992, the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires in 1994 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6085768.stm) and the kidnapping campaign that I speak to in the commentary above.

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than prepared to use force against Hezbollah if it had to during this period (Rabil 2007; Byman 2005; Ranstorp 1997). . Hezbollah operated a variety of charities that attracted donations Diversity of from its disapora and, as noted Sponsorship above, were also the conduits for Iranian contributions slated for social service projects in Lebanon. . Hezbollah was highly concentrated in its sponsorship support in that Iran and Syria were its primary sponsors at this time – and had been for some time. . Hezbollah used international criminal enterprises to fund its military and terror operations (Napoleoni 2003:176; Junger 2002; Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 2002). Estimates of dollar volumes vary widely - $50 million proceeds from the 2000 software piracy incident alone (Napoleoni 2003). 286

Conclusions

As a result of these observations, I conclude that as of May 2000, Hezbollah was somewhere between a ‘confused’ state of legitimation and an ‘emergent’ state with respect to its level of autonomy. The scope, persistence and level of support were significant to Hezbollah’s operations time and Hezbollah was exploiting most

286 See this reference for a current look at the criminal enterprises of Hezbollah. It appears that Hezbollah was only in the nascent stages of its international criminal efforts at this point: http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi= 8357&sr=HLEAD(Murky+global+trail+of+Hezbollah+cash)+and+date+is+December +15%2C+2011 (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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of the support factors from arguably both of its main sponsors. There was sufficient evidence of major campaigns of violence on behalf of its sponsors287 but that practice was in decline by time of withdrawal. There was credible evidence of criminal activities (Levitt 2005; Napoleoni 2003) as sources of income. The security interests of both major sponsors were clearly plausible but less so in Iran’s case – i.e., it clearly preferred to have an ally on the border of Israel that it could leverage but Iran realizes it would need nuclear deterrents to realistically deter Israel. Syria was interested in using Hezbollah as a deterrent in the case of an Israeli invasion of

Syria and also a chip in its negotiations to reclaim its land. These were all more realistic propositions in its strategic security gambit than those of Iran. Ideological affinity with Iran was constant and plausible presence from the inception of the movement. That was clearly a different matter with respect to Syria whereby the strategic calculus was what bonded the two unusual allies.

Level of Public Accountability (LPA) The table below summarizes the primary observations that I will use to assess the state of legitimation of Hezbollah with respect to the LPA test as of May

2000.

Table 42 - Hezbollah LPA Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

. The 1992 national elections were a major point of contention within the

287 http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/7986 D1536C0FFD5FCA256FCD001BE859?OpenDocument (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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movement that ultimately led to the dismissal of Tufayli and the elevation Level of of Mussawi and, after his Answerability to assassination, then Nasrallah. This the Public decision appeared to some to be a radical change in direction for Hezbollah – an ‘about face’ (Palmer- Harik 2004). . In 1992 Hezbollah would compete for elections in a national government that only seven years prior they had excoriated in their Open Letter as a ‘rotten sectarian system’288 and unworthy of being cooperated with – and anyone who did so was, by definition, no longer a legitimate form of opposition. By most accounts this appeared to have warranted a significant turnabout in Hezbollah’s fundamental philosophy – its ‘intellectual structure’ (Saad- Ghorayeb 2001).289 . Hezbollah went on to participate in the municipal elections in 1998 as discussed in the Political Strength comments above and the national elections in September 2000. They maintained some faint semblance of distance – and, in their mind, dignity - from the government by not serving in the cabinet as of May 2000. . Ideologically, Hezbollah believes that only the highly trained religious leaders who themselves are worthy of emulation can divine the will of God such that they would be able to set

288 See text of Hezbollah’s 1985 Open Letter in Amal and the Shi’a, by Richard Augustus Norton, University of Texas Press, 1987; especially references on pp. 175- 176: “Why do We Confront the Current Regime” and “Our Position Towards Opposition”. 289 Saad-Ghorayeb substitutes ‘intellectual structure’ for ideology since she believes that ideology warrants a view on a political, social and economic level. She believed that Hezbollah’s views did not include an economic dimension and, were therefore, not to be considered an ideology in the strictest sense of the term.

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strategic direction. In practice, however, Hezbollah is quick to test the opinion of the people through its well-developed social infrastructure. It appears to be quite interested in the opinion on the street if not before their planned policy takes effect, then afterwards in order to manage reputational damage control (Deeb 2006a; Norton 1987, 1990, 1991, 1999, 2000, 2007; Ajami 1986; Byman 2006, 2008). . There is a robust media in Lebanon that facilitates the open debate of important public issues (e.g., Level of disarmament of Hezbollah, resistance Enforcement of to Israel, freedom from meddling Public foreign powers) as well as Accountability international institutions that are active in the Lebanese arena (e.g., UNIFIL, UNSC, Human Rights Watch, ICG, Amnesty International). . Lebanon is regarded as a fundamentally corrupt environment and, as a result, unlikely to be able to provide the robust enforcement mechanisms for public accountability.290

Conclusions

Hezbollah’s rationale for competing in these elections reveals that they were willing to trade off the disruption to the core membership and the ‘dirtiness’ of

290 Transparency International did not have an affiliate in Lebanon until 2003. This is the first year that the surveys were completed and ranked Lebanon at 3.0. All states with scores below 5.0 are believed to corrupt per TI. It is not likely that the conditions present in 2000 were materially different than those in 2003 and likely to have been worse. http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2003 (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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playing the political game in Lebanon in order to demonstrate a willingness to operate inside the Lebanese system in order to achieve their social justice and political goals. The willingness to participate in competitive elections since 1992 demonstrated a tangible commitment by Hezbollah to hold itself accountable to the people of Lebanon – or at least the constituents whose favor it sought. Hezbollah is a savvy political operator but they do so in order to maintain their mission of resistance and social justice that they logically believe would be compromised in foreign-power penetrated politics of modern Lebanon.

Given the weakness of the central government and the interpenetration of foreign powers, the enforcement of accountability for non-state actors such as

Hezbollah depend largely on the public sphere (Lynch 1999) and the power of international institutions. That is not a fair contest. The public sphere consists of civil society organizations, international institutions, the local and regional media and related bodies to monitor ‘cheating’ on the part of political actors in the

Lebanese environment. If viable, the public sphere operates as a clearinghouse for exchanging different views but not necessarily as a suitable enforcement mechanism. At this time, Lebanon was regarded as a fundamentally divided and corrupt state and, as a result, unable and unwilling to provide the enforcement mechanisms for public accountability.

Based on these observations, I conclude that Hezbollah operates between a

‘confused’ and an ‘emergent’ state of legitimation with respect to LPA. The weak enforcement environment could allow Hezbollah to escape consequences for failing

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to be publicly accountable. While it would appear in this period that Hezbollah is answerable to the public, it does so at its own pleasure and with limited ability of other institutions locally or globally to hold it accountable for its failures in fact or appearance for public accountability. Combined with its closed organizational structure and rigid hierarchy that left a major power unchecked.

Level of Professionalism (LPro) The graphic below depicts the ex ante tests for the level of professionalism component of the states of legitimation tests. There are two empirical elements to focus relevant observations: 1.) efficiency, innovativeness and coherence of the organization; and, 2.) fairness in the administration of public services.

Table 43 - Hezbollah LPro Test Results (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Efficiency and Technical Competence – Military

. Hezbollah’s overhauled operating tactics (e.g., more local autonomy, improved logistics and specialized weapons and explosives skills) substantially reduced its casualties and increased its effectiveness against IDF and SLA forces. Hezbollah’s conversion from a predominantly terrorist operation to a guerilla operation by the end of this period enabled it to fight its enemies Efficiency, more effectively and efficiently Innovation and (Byman 2005:110-112; Norton Coherence 2000). . The relative combat operations loss ratios declined from the peak of 5:1 prior to 1990 in favor of the IDF and SLA to approximately 2:1 or less by this time (Byman 2005:30; Norton

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2000; Hamzeh 2004: 94). . To limit the collateral damage to civilians on both sides in this increasingly bloody war, in 1996 Hezbollah and the IDF agreed to abide by a ‘set of rules’ to limit the conduct of military operations (Norton 1999, Kuperman 2006). . The use of suicide bombers (i.e., martyrdom operations) against relatively hardened military targets by Hezbollah (or its sanctioned shadow organization, Islamic Jihad) represented a major innovation in tactics in the Middle Eastern theater in the 1980s (Pape 2005). Hezbollah was quite utilitarian about the use of martyrdom operations – if the payoff was sizeable enough, it was justified given the presence of foreign oppressors (Sankiri 2005:207-209; Saad-Ghorayeb 2001:95-102). The use of these types of operations declined significantly by the latter part of the 1990s. The use of IEDs became the more prevalent means to harass and kill IDF personnel.

Efficiency and Technical Competence – Administrative

. The well-developed organizational structure of Hezbollah (Hamzeh 2004, 1997; Palmer-Harik 2004; Byman 2005) facilitates the division of duties amongst the organization and channels the available combination of paid and volunteer labor in an effective manner. Trash is picked up. Health care is delivered at a high quality for a low price. Wells are dug and potable water flows. . Hezbollah was efficient in the use of their resources to deliver on many operational needs: a.) increasing its

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scope of social services; b.) broadening its sources of income from charitable sources and commercial operations to reduce their financial dependence on its primary sponsors; c.) smart investments in multiple sectors to reduce their financial dependence on its primary sponsors (Palmer-Harik 2004; Saad-Ghorayeb 2001; Norton 1999, 2007: Jaber 1997). . The launch of the al-Manar TV station in 1991 demonstrated Hezbollah’s savvy and awareness of the role of marketing in its resistance operations. Hezbollah, with seed capital from Iran, created what would become a significant enabler of its ability to manipulate symbols of Islam and Hezbollah’s virtue, sacrifice and commitment through its ‘myth-management’ apparatus (Jorisch 2004).

Coherence . The organization was formed from a combination of several groups between 1982 and 1985. A previous Secretary General, Sheik Subhi Tufayli split from the group in 1992 (formally dismissed in 1998) to form Ansar Allah. . In contrast to Yassir Arafat’s PLO and its closest Shia rival (Amal), Hezbollah is generally recognized as a high integrity organization in the conduct of its operations (Reenders 2006; Deeb 2006a, Norton 1987, Fairness in Public 2007; Saad-Ghorayeb 2001; Palmer- Administration Harik 2004; Hamzeh 2004; Picard 1997). . “Syrian control over Lebanon is rooted in the pervasive corruption that infects Lebanese politics at all levels, and Hezbollah has been the

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most vocal critic of this corruption. Moreover, the readily observable asceticism of its leaders and efficiency of its social-welfare network contrast sharply with the pervasive corruption and ineptitude that has infected the Second Republic. Even Hezbollah's soccer team, Al-Ahd, has managed to maintain an impeccable image in a country where the sport is not associated with good sportsmanship. Astonishingly, during the 1997 season, the team did not receive a single red or yellow penalty card. Hezbollah's stance on corruption is particularly resonant among Lebanese Shi'ites because the Amal movement arose in the 1970s primarily to challenge the corrupt patronage networks of the traditional feudal lords (zu'ama) who reigned supreme within the community. After the death of the movement's founder, Musa al-Sadr, however, Amal soon adopted the same practices as the zu'ama it sought to supplant. In the post-Ta'if era, Berri has rivaled Rafiq Hariri as the most skilled and corrupt of Lebanon's neo- zu'ama, and the Council of the South, a government institution controlled by Berri, is perhaps more ridden with patronage than any agency that existed in the First Republic. As a result, many among the Shi'ite professional middle class - once the core base of Amal's support – have deserted the group and now support Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, whose austerity and dedication to the fight against Israel (his own son was sent into battle and died) contrast sharply with Berri's corruption and cowardice (during the civil war he fled Lebanon and spent the better part of a year in Damascus

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because he feared for his life). “ (Gambill & Adelnour 2002) . Hezbollah is a closed organizational structure in that its senior leadership is largely291 open only to recognized Shii clerics. Women and secular leaders are represented on select committees within the hierarchy of Hezbollah (e.g., the Hezbollah Political Council) but there is a clear ascriptive set of criteria – e.g., male, Shia, religiously credentialed – that is necessary to attain the most senior leadership positions (Hamzeh 2004; Palmer-Harik 2004; Jaber 1997; Saad-Ghorayeb 2001; Norton 1987, 1999). . In an attempt to accommodate the growing community of sympathizers of Hezbollah that wanted to actively participate in the resistance mission, Hezbollah formed the Lebanese Resistance Brigades in 1997. Qassem (2005) speaks to the need for the movement to include those who are committed to the resistance mission yet are not committed to the ascetic Islamic lifestyle that core members lead who are pious Shii (Deeb 2006a, Qassem 2005, Saad-Ghorayeb 2001). Qassem (2005:121-123) notes that the Lebanese Resistance Brigades consisted generally of males over 20 years old and represented a multi- sectarian cross section of Lebanese society. . Hezbollah managed the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB) in way that minimized perceptions that they

291 All seven members on the Shura Council at that time were clerics (Hamzeh 2004). The Shura Council is, in my view, the Board of Directors of the organization – the senior policy and strategy body of the organization. Sayyid Nasrallah has been the Secretary General of that body since 1992 and, though a collective body in concept, Nasrallah would appear to be primus inter pares.

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were second class citizens, diluted the core members commitment to Islam and jihad as well as a more universal set of claims regarding Islam; Hezbollah was careful to avoid the impression that the LRB personnel were more expendable by putting them unduly in harm’s way292. It was a non-trivial management effort to incorporate these volunteers into what was generally a fairly rigorous organization to join. . Beyond the Lebanese Resistance Brigades and Al-Manar there is limited evidence that Hezbollah recruited heavily outside their immediate social networks at this time to acquire technocratic skills that may not have been available to them otherwise.

Conclusions

Hezbollah was learning how to fight a militarily superior foe on more favorable terms. It was innovating in order to survive but also to harm the enemy in new ways. It had become significantly more efficient administratively and militarily by May 2000. It maintained a high level of organizational coherence for a movement that began as a collection of small, disparate groups.

292 When the Lebanese Resistance Brigades were formed, Qassem (2005) notes that these groups were carefully husbanded to minimize their exposure to more dangerous operations even though some in that group sought dangerous missions to demonstrate their commitment and value to the resistance. This approach is in sharp contrast to the deployment of the Basij by Iran during the Iran/Iraq war as ‘cannon fodder’ in the human wave attacks against Iraqi positions (Wright 2010).

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Hezbollah has enjoyed a reputation for integrity, fairness and being the metaphorical ‘Mr. Clean’ in a corruption-ridden Lebanese political environment.

Hezbollah is clearly utilitarian in its willingness to compromise to gain political advantage (e.g., building composite lists with clan chiefs in the south) but that flexibility represents its clear understanding of the fragmentation of power and cultural heterogeneity that characterizes Lebanese political life. Hezbollah has had to back off of its early claim to seek an Islamic state in Lebanon because it was fundamentally not viable in the political and social structure of Lebanon.

The principles on which Hezbollah delivered its services in this era are based on its broader social justice mission – to address the dispossessed and oppressed equally and with primary regard to need as dictated by Islamic law and theology

(Deeb 2006a, Saad-Ghorayeb 2001). It focuses the scope, timing and extent of its social services via engagement with planning committees at the municipal level in districts that arguably are the neediest. The reality is that the vast majority of their social services were focused on the traditional strongholds of the Shia – the south, the southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley. The Sunni, Christian and Druze groups largely served their own to the extent those programs were needed and in operation.

The patronage-based model is virtually absent from the discourse about

Hezbollah’s operations. The fairness principles are based on a social justice model that transcends religious boundaries. Based on these observations, I conclude that

Hezbollah operates in an ‘emergent’ state of legitimation with regards to LPro.

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Outcomes Tests These tests are built around two factors that reveal the nature of the outcomes and the fairness/favorability of those outcomes that the organization delivers to its followers and the society in which it operates. It reveals the degree to which power is legitimated based on the nature and extent of the outcomes produced by the group. A summary graphic is below:

Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes The following table includes the primary observations I will use to assess the state of legitimation of Hezbollah as of May 2000 with respect its Outcomes produced.

Table 44 - Hezbollah Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Tangible Outcomes . The resistance effort since 1982 that

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Produced arguably led to the IDF withdrawal in May 2000 from southern Lebanon. The withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon and the collapse of the SLA are public goods whose benefits are shared by all in Lebanon.293 . The extensive slate of social services noted in previous sections of this chapter. The primary beneficiaries of the social services programs of Hezbollah are the neediest regions within the Shia communities of the south, the southern suburbs and the Bekaa valley. Some services are available to all based on a fee for service (e.g., Health care) and given the quality of care provided this is often the case now that these institutions have reached some degree of operating scale. . Release of Lebanese prisoners from Israeli prisons (all factions but largely Hezbollah operatives given their activity levels). In 1998 sixty five (65) Lebanese prisoners and 40 bodies of Hezbollah fighters (including Nasrallah’s son who was killed in 1997 in combat with the IDF) were exchanged for two IDF soldiers held by Hezbollah.294 This was largely a benefit to the families of the most ardent followers of Hezbollah.

293 Clearly there are Maronite elites who would disagree with this statement in that the SLA and the Israelis were intent on reinforcing the Maronite hegemony in Lebanon. The generally broad cross section of support for Hezbollah in regards to the proposed sanctions on the movement as a result of 9/11 suggests that the majority of Lebanese believed that Hezbollah delivered a public good with regards to the Israeli withdrawal. 294 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2004/1/background%20on% 20israeli%20pows%20and%20mias (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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Nature of Outcomes The following table includes the primary observations that I will use to assess the intangibles outcomes produced by Hezbollah at this time and its impact on the state of legitimation of the movement with respect to Outcomes as of May

2000.

Table 45 - Hezbollah Outcomes Tests Results (Nature) (Shock 1)

Major Category Observations

Intangible Nature . Hezbollah had begun to build in May of Outcomes 2000, a resistance culture (Crooke 2009; Deeb 2006a) that fit with a national and regional sense of pride based on a complex web of identity295 reconstruction that was not always convergent: Arab, Islamic, Lebanese, Shia. Hezbollah’s devotion to the resistance to Israeli occupation (and to a lesser extent its rejection of western values), contrasted sharply with the legacy of the corruption or tyranny of many Arab governments (Hafez 2003) and/or their complicity with western powers in order to maintain their regime. . To a broader base of Lebanese than simply poor and/or pious Shia, Hezbollah represented a viable means

295 Abdelal et al (2006) provides a useful synthesis of scholars’ efforts to define Identity as a variable by developing a simple analytic framework. They have defined Collective identity along two axes: content and contestation. The content consists of four non-mutually exclusive elements: 1.) constitutive norms – the formal and informal rules that define group membership; 2.) social purposes – the goals that are shared by members of the group; 3.) relational comparisons – defining the group by what it is not; and, 4.) cognitive models – overall worldviews. Contestation levels reveal the level of ‘fluidity and the contextual nature of social identities.’ Contestation will allow the analyst to unpack the degree of agreement within the group (the organization and the society that is rendering its views on the legitimacy of the group) regarding the content of the Identity. It is this construction of Identity that I use as the basis for this part of the discussion.

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to redirect positively the course of not only Lebanese political culture (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008; Deeb 2006a) but also Arab political culture (Crooke 2009, Saad-Ghorayeb 2001; Palmer- Harik 1996, Hamzeh 1997). As a result of the impact of the resistance mission – and its tangible result of the unilateral withdrawal of the IDF in 2000 – Hezbollah had enabled a productive reconstruction of not only the Shia Islamic political identity but also the Arab and Lebanese political identity as of May 2000 (Norton 2000; Noe 2007: Nasrallah’s Divine Victory speech in May 2000).296

Based on these observations, I conclude that Hezbollah has reached to between an ‘emergent’ state of legitimation and a ‘legitimated’ state with respect to nature of outcomes.

(and remains aligned with) the Methods of Operation and Outcomes levels. This is essentially a test for the level of ‘cheap talk’ by the organization. This research will focus on the primary elements (i.e., the ‘super priorities’) at the VMV level and evaluate conformity.

296 See also the earlier discussion regarding the support for Hezbollah during US and western pressure to disarm them in the wake of the 9/11 event.

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Hezbollah’s Super Priorities In its 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah specified the following as its primary objectives (i.e., super priorities) for the organization: a.) Israel’s eviction from

Lebanon and ultimately its annihilation; b.) Eviction and elimination of the influence of all Imperialist powers and their allies from Lebanon; c.) Submission of the

Phalangist forces to just rule and trial for their crimes; and, d.) Give all peoples of

Lebanon the freedom to choose their own system of government – openly admitting that they preferred an Islamic system but yielding to the Qu’ranic stipulation that

Islam cannot be imposed on anyone (Norton 1987: 175-176).

Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’ In the case of its objective to eliminate Israel from Lebanon, this was achieved but at great cost to the organization and its allies in the field with the withdrawal of the IDF in May 2000. The threat of future military action was not eliminated at that time but the basic requirement of eviction was completed. The annihilation of Israel was not achieved and, given the strategic and conventional imbalance of power in Israel’s favor with any/all Arab states at that time, it was not reasonable to believe that this objective would be achieved any time soon.

The eviction of imperialist powers requires some interpretation. Hezbollah was certainly referring to the US, France and Israel (and any other Western power who may have had designs on Lebanon) when they crafted this goal. In that sense, they have achieved the goal of evicting those countries military forces from a presence in Lebanon. The presence of UNIFIL or other like-kind forces in Lebanon had done little to limit Hezbollah’s freedom of movement and resupply and, thus,

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the presence of ‘Chapter 6’ class UN forces would translate to constructive accomplishment of that goal. The part of the goal that had not yet been accomplished was the eradication of the influence of western powers in the affairs of the Lebanese state. The US and France have maintained a strong political presence in the state and as of May 2000 continued to do so in support of their patrons (the Sunni and Christian communities as well as other secular groups).

Once the IDF pulled out, there was widespread concern that Hezbollah would systematically slaughter the SLA that remained. Hezbollah largely refrained from any widespread violence towards them and remanded the SLA soldiers and sympathizers to the courts to address their crimes. Hezbollah initially pushed hard for the establishment of an Islamic state but eased its stand in the early 1990s as it considered participation in the Lebanese political process. By May 2000, Hezbollah had generally ceased to speak openly of a vision for an Islamic state in Lebanon (and which Fadlallah publicly noted was not consistent with the consociational form of government that Lebanon was built on).

Beyond the objectives laid out in the Open Letter, Hezbollah has publicly claimed that it seeks to dismantle the sectarian form of politics that has dominated

Lebanese political life since the mid 20th century. In this goal they have been less than successful but continue to seek a non-sectarian form of government. Having said that, however, there is evidence (ICG Middle East Briefing #23: 2003) that they will lever the sectarian scheme when it suits their political goals (especially around elections and when the disarmament debates heat up). In addition, Hezbollah has consistently claimed that it seeks to establish a system of social justice that relieves

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the suffering of the dispossessed and the ‘wretched of the earth’ (Fanon 1963). In that respect, its ability to deliver a broad and high quality of social services demonstrates that they are committed to easing the suffering of the truly needy based on the Islamic rejoinder to supplement your prayers with actions (Deeb

2006a).

Based on these observations, I conclude that there is a relatively low level of

‘cheap talk’ by Hezbollah. They are between emergent and legitimated with respect to this test. They generally deliver on – or remain credibly committed to pursuing - what they set out as their objectives. Hezbollah ‘walks the talk.’

War with Israel – July 2006 Assessment of the Change in Organizational Strength of Hezbollah – 2004 to 2008 As noted in chapter 2 organizational strength consists of three basic components: 1.) political strength, 2.) military strength, 3.) economic strength. We will discuss each component in turn and present observations within 2 years prior to and subsequent to the event being studied.

Table 46 - Hezbollah Political Strength Evidence: 2004-2008

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Major Category Observations

Popular Support . “A growing number of Lebanese politicians said they feared three factors [about Hezbollah in 2004]-- the party's demographic clout, a potent arsenal that includes guns, rockets and a new drone spy plane, and authority to operate largely as an independent government in southern Lebanon – were fueling broader ambitions.297 . In 2004, UNSCR 1559298 calls for the disarming of all militias in Lebanon. The pressure intensified on Hezbollah by its political rivals to disarm. “By capitalizing on Lebanon’s volatile sectarian conundrum and on the government’s built in institutional gridlock, Hezbollah effectively thwarted attempts by the US and France to get the Lebanese themselves to disarm [Hezbollah]” (Reenders 2006:48; ICG Middle East Report #59, Nov 2006). . Hezbollah assumed a role in the executive branch of the government (June 2005), which they had consistently avoided since they first, entered electoral politics in 1992. This was a strategy to block attempts to disarm Hezbollah given the political debate on this issue at that time (Reenders 2006; Norton 2007;

297 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12336-2004Dec19.html (last accessed July 3, 2012). 298 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm (last accessed January 20, 2013).

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Blanford 2012). . “In the 2005 elections, the party won fourteen parliamentary seats, in a voting bloc with other parties that took thirty-five. Also in 2005, for the first time, the party chose to participate in the cabinet, and currently holds the Ministry of Energy” (Deeb 2006b; Ilias 2010). . “In a rally attended by hundreds of thousands in Beirut on 23 September [2006], its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared a ‘strategic, historic and divine victory’ that had left Israel’s image in tatters: ‘We have done away with the invincible army. We have also done away with the invincible state’ “ (ICG Middle East Report #57, Nov 2006:8). . Hezbollah is unsuccessful in its attempts to build a ‘veto-bloc’ in the legislature (Yacoubin 2008). Disrupts government through protests and abstention from Parliament. “At the end of 2006, Shia ministers resigned from the government to protest the attempts by the majority to force through the statutes of the international tribunal. The two movements staged strikes, huge demonstrations and sit-ins to oppose government policies” (Ilias 2010).

299 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7391600.stm (last accessed January 21, 2013). 300 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25637594/ns/world_news- mideast_n_africa/t/lebanon-unity-deal-gives-hezbollah-veto- power/#.UP6xZqXZzhM (last accessed January 22, 2013).

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. “Hezbollah’s military victory [the battle against rivals in May 2008299], however, comes with long-term political costs. As a result of its violent behavior in Beirut, Hezbollah today [Fall 2008] scores very low on the popularity scale in Lebanon. More political actors and parties now genuinely distrust and fear the Shia group and view it as the only remaining obstacle to the process of state rebuilding and democracy consolidation that started after Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in April 2005. Furthermore, the majority of non-Shia Lebanese accused it of doing Iran’s bidding on Lebanese soil and at the expense of Lebanese interests. No one in Lebanon, least of all members of the Sunni community, will soon forget what happened in Beirut” Saab 2008:94). . Almost all Lebanese citizens (93%) are confident in the Lebanese Army’s capacity to provide security and stability in their areas. Almost two-thirds (65%) think the Lebanese government can provide security while only one third (34%) believe Hezbollah could (International Peace Institute, Lebanon Poll, 9/22/2008). . The March 8th alliance (includes Hezbollah) gains the veto power it sought in Lebanese politics as part of the Doha Agreement (ICG Middle East Report #78).300 Geographic/Demographic . Hezbollah sharpened its

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Scope of Influence sectarian support in the Shia community largely in response to the threat of disarmament by rival political parties (Reenders 2006). . As of July 2007, “Hezbollah, whose followers are predominantly Shia, is viewed most favorably in the Palestinian territories, where 76% have a favorable view of the organization. Elsewhere in the Middle East, solid majorities express positive opinions of Hezbollah in Egypt (56%) and Jordan (54%). But the story is very different in Lebanon. Nearly two-thirds of all Lebanese (64%) have an unfavorable view, including a 55% majority who say their opinion of the organization is very unfavorable” (Pew Global Attitudes 2007:61-62; see also Telhami 2007) . “In Lebanon, as of July 2007 views of Hezbollah, as well as Hamas, are deeply divided along religious lines. Fully 85% of Lebanese Shia have a favorable view of Hezbollah while about as many of the country’s Shia and Christians have a negative opinion of the movement” (Pew Global Attitudes 2007: 61-62; see also Telhami 2007). Alliances . “Hizbullah went farther than before in creating electoral alliances [in 2005 elections]. Hizbullah candidates were on the same list as Sa‘d Hariri in Beirut, as Jumblatt in the eastern Aley-Baabda region, and as the Maronite Michel

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Aoun’s candidates in Kesrouan- Jbeil and Zahleh in the north. The alliance building paid off at the polls. The Resistance and Development Bloc, which consisted of Hizbullah, Amal, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, won 35 out of 128 seats. It earned 80% of the votes in South Lebanon when the second round of voting took place, and slightly less than 50% of the seats in the Biqa‘ Valley” (Samii 2008:48). . Forms alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement (predominantly Christian in confession and led by the controversial figure, Michel Aoun) in February 2006. This evolves into a strong alliance over the ensuing two years (ICG Middle East Report #78; Ilias 2010) and forms the backbone of what would become the March 8th alliance that also included the Amal, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and others.

Conclusions

Hezbollah’s political strength two years on from the war was at least as strong as it was prior to the war. And this was true even though Hezbollah behaved badly in the public arena prior to and after the war – the ‘empty chair’ policy with regards to the cabinet and legislature was disruptive; the street protests; and, most significantly, its brutal response in May 2008 to its perceived attempt to disarm the movement. Hezbollah was not playing nice and reverted to form and was

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increasingly perceived as a Shiite militia that would use strong-arm tactics when its

‘back room’ politics didn’t produce the political results it wanted.

Hezbollah’s ability to develop enduring alliances is impressive overall Aoun’s party needed Hezbollah as much as Hezbollah needed them. Lebanon’s central government was still a weak actor and the country seemingly even more divided two years on from the war with Israel.

Military Strength There are two basic elements of military strength that I will focus on to assess the change in military strength of Hezbollah during the two years prior to and following the shock: a.) nature and extent of military operations; and, b.) nature and extent of military capabilities. The table below summarizes the major observations I will use to assess the change in military strength for the period 2004 to 2008.

Table 47 - Hezbollah Military Strength Evidence: 2004-2008

Major Category Observations

Nature and Extent . Between 2000 and 2006 Hezbollah of Military transformed from a resistance force Operations to a deterrence force (Reenders 2006). This strategic shift placed more emphasis on the build up of a suitable arsenal of strategic weapons (advanced missile systems) and training for more conventional warfare should Israel attack Lebanon in the future (Biddle & Friedman 2008; Blanford 2011:301-328). . See Appendix C for record of terrorism/guerilla operations ascribed to Hezbollah. These results also reflect the changed military

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strategy of Hezbollah (deterrence) including the development of a reserve force to address internal security in light of the disarmament pressure following UNSCRs 1559 and 1701. . In May 2008, Hezbollah uses force against internal Lebanese rivals to ensure control over its use of force301 (Saab 2008). Nature and Extent . “Hezbollah has firepower of Military unparalleled by many states.” Capabilities Commander of the IAF Maj. Gen. Ido Nachushtan.302 . "This is by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world," said Brig. Gen. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162 (September 2006).303 . ``The most significant change in terms of Iranian support for Hezbollah [since 2000 and up to the 2006 war] . . . is that Iran has also given Hezbollah much longer-range rockets that can be fired into major cities like Haifa -- targets that are far more valuable and have far more propaganda value than the settlements and bases near the border -- and Hezbollah has begun to use them…It was normally just a few of them [Katyushas], fired into Israel right up at the border, and usually a one-day wonder John Pike , a military specialist at GlobalSecurity.org, an Arlington, Va., think tank, said of previous Hezbollah attacks. ‘The games have just begun. They are widely estimated to have 10,000 of

301 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7391600.stm (last accessed June 10, 2012). 302 http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/10/05/1103 (last accessed June 2, 2011). While this characterization was recorded in 2010, this perception corresponds to the firepower observed during and after the 2006 war. 303 http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-13-israel-army_x.htm (last accessed July 10, 2012).

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these things [Fajr class rockets] and they have only used about 300 of them’ " (Global Security.org 2006).304 . “Hezbollah did some things well [in the 2006 war], such as its use of cover and concealment, its preparation of fighting positions, its fire discipline and mortar marksmanship, and its coordination of direct fire support. But it also fell far short of contemporary Western standards in controlling large-scale maneuver, integrating movement and indirect fire support, combining multiple combat arms, reacting flexibly to changing conditions, and small-arms marksmanship. Hezbollah appears to have attempted a remarkably conventional system of tactics and theater operational art, but there is a difference between trying and achieving, and in 2006 at least, Hezbollah’s reach in some ways exceeded its grasp” (Biddle and Friedman 2008:75). . Three differences stand out with Hizballah: its ability to maneuver tactically against the IDF, the autonomy given to its small units and the initiative taken by the small-unit leaders, and the skill Hizballah displayed with its weapons systems” (Exum 2006:13). Hizballah built out a complex defense in depth in southern Lebanon in expectation of war with Israel (Blanford 2011:329-371) . “The Shi'ite party appears to be preparing for battles on two fronts:

304 http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2006/060718-hezbollah (last accessed July 2, 2012) 305 http://www.haaretz.com/news/syria-gave-advanced-m-600-missiles-to- hezbollah-defense-officials-claim-1.288356 (last accessed January 21, 2013). 306 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1712866,00.html (last accessed January 21, 2013).

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against Israel and against Hizballah's sectarian rivals in Lebanon. Hizballah has begun marshaling a new reservist army of Shi'ite street fighters, which would allow Hizballah's regular combatants to concentrate on confronting Israel rather than becoming embroiled in fighting fellow Lebanese (Blanford 2007). . Based on its after action reviews of the 2006 war with the Quds force, Hezbollah is upgrading its air defense facilities and acquiring missiles of increased range305 that are fitted with guidance systems to enable precision targeting of high value sites in Israel (Blanford 2011:435). . Imad Mugniyah is assassinated in February 2008306. “For the first time in its history, Hezbollah felt it had been penetrated by foreign intelligence services. The secrecy of its organizational structure, which has enabled the group to wage successful combat operations, was jeopardized” (Saab 2008:97).

Conclusions

Hezbollah’s ability to regenerate its military capabilities and its arsenal is impressive. While Iran and Syria are critical to the movement’s military supply chain, the organization has the ability to renew its abilities at a far more rapid pace than Hamas or the PLO of the past. Hezbollah took a severe beating in the 2006 war in terms of battlefield losses to men and material as well as destruction of its political and military infrastructure. It was not able to rebuild the defense works in the south given the presence of UNIFIL forces but it had reloaded its missile arsenal

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with even more powerful versions. Hezbollah had also begun the careful process of building out an even larger fighting force in preparation for yet another war with

Israel while maintaining the necessary cooperation with the LAF.

Economic Strength There are three basic elements that I will focus on to gauge the change in economic strength of the organization for this period: a.) scope and extent of contributions from major sponsors; and, b.) scope and extent of contributions from other sources; c.) ability to generate income from commercial operations (criminal or otherwise).

Table 48 - Hezbollah Economic Strength Evidence: 2004-2008

Major Category Observations

Scope and Extent of Contributions from . Iran and Syria remained the State Sponsors primary state sponsors of Hezbollah. Iran provided political, military and financial support. Syria provided political support (even though constrained by its ouster from Lebanon in 2005 per UNSCR 1559) and military support via its logistical assistance for weapons imports from Iran as well as the transfer of its own missile systems (Blanford 2011; ICG Middle East Reports #39, 48 and 57). . “The Hezbollah arsenal [used in the 2006 war], which also included thousands of missiles and rockets to be fired against northern Israel's towns and villages, was paid for with a war chest kept full by relentless fundraising among Shiites around the world and, in particular, by funds provided by Iran, said the intelligence specialist. The amount

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of Iranian funds reaching Hezbollah was estimated at $25 million a month, but some reports suggested it increased sharply, perhaps doubled, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took over as president in Tehran last year [2005], the specialist said.”307 Scope and Extent of . “Hezbollah's main sources of Contributions from income [in 2004]… are the party's Other Sources investment portfolios and wealthy Shiites.”308 309 . Charitable organizations are the primary means for Iran’s distribution of funds to Hezbollah (Rudner 2010; Blanford 2011; Norton 2007). Hezbollah also has a strong network at the local level to extract contributions in time of need (e.g, war with Israel) for use in reconstruction and payments to widows and orphans (Rudner 2010; ICG Middle East Re Ability to Generate . See comments above regarding the Income from role of wealthy Shiites as fronts for Commercial the commercial operations of Operations Hezbollah. (Criminal or . “International governmental otherwise) sources have noted Hizbullah involvement in human smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, trade in contraband, money-laundering, forging travel documents, and financial fraud. Hizbullah sympathizers and operatives are also reputed to have resorted to hostage-taking, extortion, drug

307 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300719.html (last accessed February 5, 2011). 308 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12336-2004Dec19.html (last accessed February 5, 2011). 309 http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg997.aspx. (last accessed January 21, 2013). See also Blanford (2011:424).

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trafficking, trade in counterfeit goods, import-export scams, and mafia-style shakedowns of local Arab communities. People smuggling, it should be noted, is not only highly profitable criminal activity, but it may also create potential for future recruitment possibilities” (Rudner 2010:706)

Conclusions

Iran and Syria were not about to abandon Hezbollah in that it was a very attractive option to use to deter, or at least, bleed Israel. The leadership of both Syria and Iran moved further from the graces of the international community and saw

Hezbollah as a viable organization to not only hurt Israel but to improve its status in the eyes of certain parts of the Middle East that viewed the ‘axis of resistance’310 as a useful balance against the meddling of foreign powers.

Hezbollah also began to syndicate the risk of being beholden to two state’s whose strategic interests could change and reduce economic and military support.

While Iran has been a staunch ally, it was increasingly being isolated politically and harmed financially by the sanctions program. Hezbollah improved its income from other operations of a criminal or legal nature in order to buffet itself from risk of the loss of a key sponsor.

310 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2012/0809/Iran- convenes-conference-on-Syria-vowing-to-preserve-the-axis-of-resistance (last accessed January 24, 2013)

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Summary of Change in Organizational Strength – 2004 to 2008

Based on these observations, I conclude that Hezbollah regained its pre- shock strength politically, economically and militarily within two years from the shock. The economic and military recovery was primarily a function of its sponsors beliefs that it was still the best organization of its kind (allied non-state actors) to use in its political and military strategy against Israel. The political recovery was more ‘ragged’ in that Hezbollah mixed brute force, threats of force and constitutional politics to achieve its recovery. Not exactly a democratic basis for recovering its strength in the political arena. In the rough politics of Lebanon, however, this passed for acceptable behavior to at least its alliance partners and its political base, the Shia.

Assessment of Hezbollah’s State of Legitimation in July 2006 As noted previously, once the determination is made that the organization has demonstrated resilience, we need to determine which of the above-mentioned hypotheses has the least amount of evidence against it. There are three basic areas to cover: the Methods of Operations tests, the Outcomes tests and the Cheap Talk

Test.

Methods Tests These tests are built around four factors that reveal the degree of legitimation of its power based on how the organization goes about its duties. A summary graphic is below:

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Absence of Violent Coercion (AOV) The table below summarizes the major observations I use to assess the state of legitimation with regards to the AOV test.

Table 49 - Hezbollah AOV Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

. There is little, if any, evidence in the literature that I reviewed of the use of coercive violence against its followers or sympathizers either sporadically or Frequency & Extent systematically. The rigorous admission of Coercive requirements311 and effective internal Violence – security has limited Israeli or Loyalty and informant penetration. Performance . “Self-discipline and obedience are integral characteristics of Hezbollah. Hezbollah ﬁghters are expected to obey all orders promptly and fully when they are given. They are also expected to behave correctly toward each other as well as toward people outside the party, a natural outcome of successfully pursuing the ‘greater

311 http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articledetails.aspx?aid=92 (last accessed January 22, 2013).

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jihad.’ Transgressors face being ﬁned, having pay docked, or spending time in Hezbollah’s own prison in the southern suburbs of Beirut” (Blanford 2011).

. The internal security unit remained largely the same size and composition as it had been since the May 2000 withdrawal of the IDF. Nature and Extent . A clandestine organization known as of Internal Security ‘Party’s Security’ (Amn al-Hizb) has Organization been in existence at least since the IDF withdrawal, “reportedly protects Hizbollah’s leaders, maintains law and order in various Hizbollah strongholds via so-called liaison committees, monitors party officials and even watches over the Consultative Council and Nasrallah himself. According to some observers, it has sweeping authority to restrict party officials’ contacts with the outside world and impose disciplinary action, including removing them from office. Its leaders, unknown to the outside world, are said to include hard-line veterans of the party’s armed resistance operations” (ICG Middle East Briefing “Rebel Without a Cause”, July 2003; pg. 3). The size and extent of this organization is not clear from the sources I reviewed. . “During the preparatory phase [of recruitment into Hezbollah], each recruit is subjected to a rigorous background security check by Hezbollah’s internal security apparatus. Anyone who has lived abroad for a lengthy period of time, for example, will be treated as a potential security risk and face great difﬁculty in joining. The security assessment is constantly updated during the recruit’s subsequent life within Hezbollah.

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Hezbollah has managed to maintain a high level of internal security over the years due to each recruit’s learning self-discipline and developing a sense of security” (Blanford 2011). . Hezbollah used ‘street politics’ (demonstrations, protests and provocative rhetoric312) following UNSCR 1559 and its rivals attempts to move to disarm the movement (ICG Use of Unlawful Middle East Reports # 39, 48, 57; Saab Violence to 2008; Norton 2007). Maintain Power . It also used ‘empty seat’ politics by vacating its cabinet and Parliament seats in protest against the attempts to disarm it (in December 2005 and early 2006) (ICG Middle East Reports # 39, 48, 57; Saab 2008; Norton 2007). . In the midst of the national debate about disarming Hezbollah (beginning in 2005), Na'im Qasem, Hizbollah' deputy secretary general, restates a firm conviction of Hezbollah since the end of the civil war in 1991: “Hizbollah's weapons were never used in the sectarian game, but were only directed against the Israeli enemy [and] will not be used domestically” (ICG Middle East Report #39:33). . I discovered no other incidents of unlawful use of violence occurred as of this time.

312 Though Hezbollah did not use violence prior to this shock, it clearly threatened the use of violence for those that would try to disarm the movement. “On 25 May 2005, commemorating Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon, Nasrallah noted: ‘if anyone, anyone, thinks of disarming the Resistance, we will fight them like the martyrs of Karbala [and] cut off any hand that reaches out to grab our weapons because it is an Israeli hand’. Asked to whom this warning was directed, a Hizbollah official said: ‘With such a statement you scare everybody. Now there is not a single Lebanese who is going to come to us and tell us to disarm. Sometimes you just need to be tough’ “ (ICG Middle East Report #48:18)

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Conclusions

Hezbollah misbehaved with its ‘street politics’ and other types of tactics to achieve its political ends but did not resort vigilantism to coerce followers to conform nor to unlawful violence to maintain power. In some respects, Syria’s agents likely provided support for the murder of political enemies (e.g., Rafik

Harriri) without active involvement by Hezbollah. All of that is largely speculative for purposes of this research. The most important factor is that Hezbollah was a very different actor in this regard than either the PIRA or Hamas. It does not tend to use (though it does occasionally threaten) force coercively against its followers or unlawfully to maintain power (at that time). Its inclination to threaten violence if

‘any hand’ moves to disarm it weakens its reputation as a constitutional actor with regards to the use of coercive or unlawful violence.

With respect to AOV Hezbollah was emergent as of July 2006.

Table 50 - Hezbollah LOA Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Scope, Level and . “Western diplomats and political Persistence of analysts in Beirut estimated that Support Hezbollah received $200 million a year from Iran, which views the party as its bridge to the Arab world. Raad said money from Iran came only

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through private charities to be used for health care, education and the support of war widows.”313 . ‘[Iran] gives Hezbollah an extremely wide array of support, including significant financial help. The figure generally talked about is $100 million a year, but my [Byman] guess is that is probably higher than that. Recently it gave more because after the 2006 war Hezbollah needed more support. Iran has also provided massive training. There is an Iranian military presence in Lebanon and also weapons that were shipped through Syria. Weapons range from machine guns all the way to anti-ship cruise missiles” (Byman 2008).

. In the wake of the Harriri assassination and UNSCR 1559, “Hizbullah responded to the domestic opposition with a March 8 rally in Strategic vs. Beirut that attracted hundreds of Ideological thousands314, making it the largest in Motivation of the country’s history. Nasrallah told Sponsor(s) the crowd that Lebanon and Syria are inextricably bound: ‘No one can get Syria out of Lebanon or out of Lebanon’s mind, heart, and future’ “ (Samii 2008:47). . “Hizbullah is pursuing its own agenda in Lebanon, and this increasingly is at odds with the objectives of Tehran or Damascus. Tellingly, Iran worked with Saudi Arabia to resolve the political crisis initiated by the Hizbullah cabinet walkout in late 2006. It can be argued reasonably

313 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12336-2004Dec19.html (last accessed May 10, 2011). 314 “Hizbullah’s pro-Syrian rallies did not cow the Lebanese opposition, however, and it organized a counter-rally on March 14 in which approximately one million people — including Sunnis, Druze, and Christians — participated” (Samii 2008:47).

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that the walkout reflected Hizbullah’s political ambitions, and it did not serve the short or medium-term interests of either the Iranian or Syrian regimes. As sectarian clashes took place in Lebanon in early 2007, furthermore, Iranian and Syrian officials exchanged visits and discussed the need to avoid Shi‘a- Sunni strife” (Samii 2008:52). . “Hizbullah appears to depend on three primary sources of revenue: (a) Diversity of Military assistance from the Islamic Sponsorship Republic of Iran and from the Syrian Arab Republic; (b) Enforced tax-like levies on local businesses in Hizbullah-dominated areas of Lebanon, and in particular the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon;3 and (c) Revenue generation from sources in among the Lebanese Shi’ite diaspora across Europe, North America, South America, and West Africa” (Rudner 2010:700-701).

Conclusions

Hezbollah was still very reliant on Syria and Iran as of the 2006 war. It could never have built the military capabilities it had as of the war without the active assistance of these two state sponsors. The level of social services was just as important as in the past and demanded a substantial sum of money to operate (not necessarily for labor but for infrastructure). Hezbollah was still very much beholden to their sponsors and was very public about its commitment to both Syria and Iran.

The ideological linkage with Iran was easier for the movement to explain its relationship as more than a tenuous instrumental arrangement. Syria had been and

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continued to be a more difficult relationship to maintain and explain. Hezbollah continued to be dogged by its political opponents with accusations that it was simply a ‘cat’s paw’ for Iran and Syria. This plausible claim reduced its political space to operate when it became openly defiant about a national dialogue to disarm the movement and building a national unity government that was more favorable to its liking.

I conclude that Hezbollah is in a confused state of legitimation with respect to its level of autonomy.

Level of Public Accountability (LPA) The table below summarizes the primary observations that I will use to assess the state of legitimation of Hezbollah with respect to the LPA test as of May

2000.

Table 51 - Hezbollah LPA Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Level of . As part of the March 8th alliance, Answerability to Hezbollah competed for national the Public Parliamentary elections in 2005. The alliance garnered 57 seats in the Parliament. . For the first time, Hezbollah party members took seats in the cabinet of the government (Energy & Water and Labor) (ICG Middle East Reports 39, 48, 59; Saab 2008). . Hezbollah practiced civil disobedience in 2005 and 2006 in the wake of UNSCR 1559 in an attempt to head off rivals attempts to disarm the movement – they did not have veto power in the legislature at that time (ICG Middle East Reports #39, 48; Saab 2008; Norton

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2007). . There is a robust media in Lebanon that facilitates the open debate of important public issues (e.g., disarmament of Level of Hezbollah, resistance to Israel, freedom Enforcement of from meddling foreign powers) as well Public as international institutions that are Accountability active in the Lebanese arena (e.g., UNIFIL, UNSC, Human Rights Watch, ICG, Amnesty International). . The United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission was established in April 2005 to investigate the murder of Rafik Harriri. Murders of anti-Syrian journalists (e.g., Gebran Tuenei and Samir Kassir) and other public figures follow. . Lebanon is regarded by international monitoring agencies as a fundamentally corrupt environment and, as a result, unlikely to be able to provide the robust enforcement mechanisms for public accountability.315

Conclusions

Hezbollah remained active in competitive politics in Lebanon at the local and national levels including taking seats in the cabinet. This was a major change in

Hezbollah’s posture politically in that it now could be held accountable for the execution of policy as a member of the executive branch. They had carefully avoided cabinet participation in the past for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. In spite of this, it is far from clear that they operated in accordance with the spirit and letter of the constitution and the law of the land with respect to political matters. They

315 http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006 (last accessed January 16, 2013).

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were accountable but in an inconsistent and often self-serving manner. Even though

Lebanon is a corrupt and flawed political environment, Hezbollah was no better in regards to the others as it related to its accountability to their constituents – they were when it suited them. They operated more like a benevolent dictator and would use ‘street politics’ or threaten the use of force if the political situation did not suit their needs. Consequently, Hezbollah had a difficult time gaining traction beyond its traditional political constituency.

Hezbollah was in a confused state of legitimation with respect to LPA at this time.

Table 52 - Hezbollah LPro Test Results (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

Administrative Matters: . “Hezbollah is famous in the NGO community for being highly efficient. The source of its efficiency lies in the organization of its NGOs and motivations of its social-service employees. Many of them are volunteers with a strong belief in the morality of their work” (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009:131; Palmer-Harik Efficiency, 2004; Norton 2007; Blanford 2012). Innovation and . “The number of people receiving Coherence services from Hezbollah is not clear.

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Some reports claim that the number of service recipients is more than 200,000, while other estimates claim Hezbollah provides services to about 10 percent of all of Lebanon’s citizens, or about 350,000” (Flanigan & Abdel- Samad 2009:130). . “Hizbullah is known to have built up a robust, multipronged, global money- generating and money-moving system from among its far-flung international support network. Funding is generated by soliciting private donations, by diverting revenues from quasi-legitimate businesses, charities, and religious institutions, by setting up benevolent-sounding “front” organization, like Hizbullah’s so- called Islamic Resistance Support Organization, as well as through criminal activities. Hizbullah allegedly utilizes two front organizations, Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company, to manage its assets and serve as intermediaries between the terrorist entity and the formal banking system” (Rudner 2010:702). . “Hizbullah has become adept at finding surreptitious means of generating and transferring funds to its Lebanese accounts. Their methods include illicit money-laundering through financial systems and informal payment transfer networks, like hawalas , as well as through commodity-based exchanges, most notably diamonds or drugs” (Rudner 2010:702). Military Matters: . “Hezbollah inflicted more Israeli casualties per Arab fighter in 2006 than did any of Israel’s state opponents in the 1956, 1967, 1973, or 1982 Arab-Israeli interstate wars. Hezbollah’s skills in conventional war

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fighting were clearly imperfect in 2006—but they were also well within the observed bounds of other state military actors in the Middle East and elsewhere, and significantly superior to many such states’ (Biddle & Friedman 2008:75-76).316 . “Hezbollah’s combination of methods and proficiency places them well to the right of the classical guerrilla model. While they were less “conventional” than, for example, the U.S. defense of Saudi Arabia in 1990, they were probably not significantly less so than other Arab state militaries in Middle Eastern warfare; in terms of their net proficiency, they may well have been at least as adept at holding ground, for example, as some European militaries in the 20th century world wars (such as 1940 France or 1941 Italy). On balance, Hezbollah’s behavior in 2006 thus places them within a band that includes man state militaries in interstate warfare” (Biddle & Friedman 2008:76). . Hezbollah continued to operate political, military and social organizations with a reputation of Fairness in Public freedom from corruption, a Administration willingness to provide social services to all who needed it or for a nominal fee and resisting abuse of its political office as a form of patronage (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009; Norton 2007; Blanford 2011; Wiegand 2009). . “Hezbollah’s health and social

316 I use these findings from Hezbollah’s performance during the 2006 shock since this reflects the quality of its training and preparation in the period prior to the war in 2006. Hezbollah’s operational tempo had also changed from an active resistance footing to a deterrence footing that revealed less about their operational efficiencies prior to the actual conflict.

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services primarily benefit Lebanon’s Shiite population and typically are not advertised to the Lebanese population at large except following an Israeli attack. At such times, Hezbollah’s services receive a great deal of coverage by the media; then, after some time, the party returns to focusing its services on the Shiite population” (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009:121).

Conclusions

Hezbollah maintained its ‘Mr. Clean reputation combined with a clear sense that they were efficient and innovative in both military and administrative matters.

They were effectively and efficiently running a complex global political, social and military operation – in many respects running a state within a state and doing it well. I discovered no evidence of splinters from the movement between 2000 and

2006. This is non-trivial given the uncertainty that surrounded the movement between 2000 and late 2004. I would have expected a disgruntled set of next generation leaders to at least make some noise in that period. None was detected which reflects either a highly effective information suppression capability or a highly coherent organization.

I concluded that Hezbollah was operating in an emergent state of legitimation and not legitimated primarily because its core followers were the primary beneficiaries.

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Outcomes Tests These tests are built around two factors that reveal the nature of the outcomes as well as the fairness/favorability of those outcomes that the organization delivers to its followers and the society in which it operates. It reveals the degree to which power is legitimated based on the nature and extent of the outcomes produced by the group. A summary graphic is below:

Favorability and Fairness in Outcomes The following table includes the primary observations I will use to assess the state of legitimation of Hezbollah as of July 2006 with respect its Outcomes produced.

Table 53 - Hezbollah Outcomes Test Results (F&F) (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

. “What holds much of Hezbollah’s

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Islamic project together is a notion of development that includes both material modernization Tangible Outcomes (infrastructure, technology, scientific Produced progress) and an Islamic outlook. Unlike the Taliban’s almost medieval system of governance, Hezbollah’s Islamic state embraces a conception of modernity that integrates material and spiritual progress. In this vision, Islam and development go hand in hand, and in fact promote one another” (Saab 2008:96; Crooke 2009; Blanford 2011). . Through its substantial range of social service organizations (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009; ICG Middle East Report #39; Palmer-Harik 2004) Hezbollah provided critical human services to the needy primarily in the Shia community. . Prisoner Exchanges with Israel in 2004 (Norton 2007:116), 2007317 and 2008318. . Militarily, Hezbollah developed substantial military infrastructure in Lebanon prior to 2006 (and in particular, southern Lebanon) as a deterrent to an Israeli ground invasion. Hezbollah fighters trained to be able to conduct more advanced military maneuvers in order to slow any Israeli advance and raise the cost to the IDF of an invasion. . Hezbollah diligently protected its right to bear arms ostensibly while the LAF became stronger and better equipped to deal with a potential Israeli invasion. . In concert with alliance partners,

317 http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-frees-one-of-5-hezbollah-guerillas-two- bodies-of-militants-1.231075 (last accessed January 21, 2013). 318 http://gulfnews.com/news/region/palestinian-territories/nisr-s-release-raises- hopes-of-freedom-for-more-prisoners-1.109962 (last accessed January 21, 2013).

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Hezbollah provided political representation in the Lebanese parliament and legislature as well as led political activism ‘in the streets’ when they deemed necessary. . Provided support for key Arab causes but especially military and political support for the Palestinian statehood and the resistance movements, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Nature of Outcomes The following table includes the primary observations that I will use to assess the intangibles outcomes produced by Hamas at this time and its impact on the state of legitimation of the movement with respect to Outcomes as of July 2006.

Table 54 - Hezbollah Outcomes Test Results (Nature) (Shock 2)

Major Category Observations

. A Resistance Society – Hezbollah has a “long-term strategic perspective and commitment to building a ‘society of resistance’” (Blanford 2011). The Intangible Nature resistance culture is most especially of Outcomes seen in the Shia community more broadly - resistance to Israel, anti- imperialism, politico-cultural Arabism, and Shiite empowerment319. “In Hezbollah’s efforts to address the negative effects of poverty, there is a clear message of resistance. In addition to humanitarian motives, some

319 www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Saad-Ghorayeb_PDF1.pdf (last accessed January 22, 2013).

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Hezbollah staff members believe that the role of the social-service units is to build a ‘resistance society,’ measured by their readiness to face Israel in war” (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad 2009:132- 133; Crooke 2009). . Nationalism joined with an Arab Identity - Nationalism based on the Lebanon as an Arab State (vs. Phoenician) and a commitment to Arab causes such as Palestinian statehood (Deeb 2006a:117). . Hope for a Sovereign Lebanon – Though contestable (given their lack of autonomy with regards to Syria and Iran), Hezbollah presented a credible military and political threat to western powers and Israel to cease interference in Lebanese internal affairs. . Honor and Dignity for the Shia in Lebanon – Though hardly a complete project, Hezbollah has advanced the image of Shia within Lebanon as equal partners and loyal citizens of the state.320

Conclusions

Hezbollah has an impressive record of tangible outcomes and intangible outcomes. It has served as the de facto ministry of defense for Lebanon - a public good all Lebanese enjoy the benefit of - and has absorbed enormous loss of life and

320 In a meeting with Rafik al Harriri in 2000, Nasrallah told him “We [the Shia] don’t possess second [class] citizenship, we were born here, we will die here and we will be buried here. And we may starve here and satisfy our appetite here, so nobody may outbid us on our patriotism or on our right to belong” (Norton 2007:158).

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property to fulfill that role since 1991.321 It maintains substantial social services programs for large portions of the neediest Shia who had long been ignored by the central government of Lebanon. While the social services are arguably a private good for the movements followers, it relieves the central government of the need to address this substantial portion of the population and, in times of great need,

Hezbollah will open its NGOs for all the needy.

Hezbollah carefully cultivates a Lebanese political identity that is Arab vs.

Phoenician, nationalist vs. confessional, socially just vs. corrupt-take-all and virulently anti-Israel/West vs. submissive to Israel and Western. In many respects,

Hezbollah has gone completely against the grain of old Maronite Lebanon and seeks to transform a nation’s identity by serving the poor and violently resisting the vastly more powerful Israel. This is the heavy symbolism that Hezbollah uses while trying to stand up this new identity – and they have been largely successful. The movement has helped create and then leverage this emerging political identity to mobilize a substantial portion of Lebanon, especially now with the alliance with Aoun’s Free

Patriotic Movement in partnership. It has not unified Lebanon but it has given more than hope to the Shia, a previously downtrodden portion of Lebanese society.

With respect to Outcomes, Hezbollah operates in an emergent state of legitimation.

321 I use 1991 versus 1982 as the beginning of this role since the movement was functioning, at least in part, as a sectarian militia given its running battles with Amal until 1991.

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Hezbollah’s Super Priorities322 In its 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah specified the following as its primary objectives (i.e., super priorities) for the organization: a.) Israel’s eviction from

Lebanon and ultimately its annihilation; b.) Eviction and elimination of the influence of all Imperialist powers and their allies from Lebanon; c.) Submission of the

Phalangist forces to just rule and trial for their crimes; and, d.) Give all peoples of

Lebanon the freedom to choose their own system of government – openly admitting that they preferred an Islamic system but yielding to the Qu’ranic stipulation that

Islam cannot be imposed on anyone (Norton 1987:172-173).

Relevant Observations and Assessment Regarding ‘Cheap Talk’ Hezbollah had achieved a major piece of its super priorities in 2000 with the withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon. Its ‘successful defense’ of Lebanon in

2006 reconfirmed that achievement. It did not rest on its laurels and was prepared to face the challenge of another Israeli invasion (even it unwittingly provoked that invasion). The obvious offset to these accomplishments is the massive destruction to

322 I repeat these super priorities here for convenience. These are unchanged from those used in the 2000 shock event.

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Lebanese life and property that resulted from the IAF’s bombing campaign at the outset of the 2006 war. Hezbollah may have been ‘bloodied but unbowed’ at the end but all of Lebanon paid a heavy price for Hezbollah’s unwitting provocation323 of

Israel.

All imperialist powers (in Hezbollah’s mind) had been evicted prior to 2000 and remained so in the period between 2000 and 2006. The trials of the Phalangist forces (the SLA troops) were largely a farce324 but Hezbollah chose to be merciful325 in their treatment of the SLA troops that either surrendered to them or were captured by them following the 2000 withdrawal of the IDF326.

While Hezbollah operates more as a ‘semi-constitutional’ party, it has been very careful not to push the Islamic form of government on Lebanon. Their alliance with non-Islamic political parties has been a consistent feature of their strategy since 2000. The Free Patriotic Movement alliance in 2006 has developed into a strong and lasting arrangement and demonstrates Hezbollah’s willingness to

323 It is ‘unwitting’ as long as you believe Nasrallah’s claim that he would not have agreed to conduct the ambush/kidnapping mission if he knew how Israel would respond. The facts seem to line up that it was a strategic blunder by Hezbollah versus a weak rationalization to deflect blame for the cost of the war to the state. Israel was already on edge given the Hamas operation that captured Gilad Shalit on the Gaza border approximately 3 weeks prior to the Hezbollah incident. 324 http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0007_ldoc0621.htm (last accessed January 24, 2013). 325 It was highly likely that most of the SLA troops who dared to return to their home villages would suffer ‘street justice’ at the hands of the locals. Hezbollah could take the high road on this matter, glean the international and domestic political benefits from that, and still be assured that the Phalangists would be severely punished for their collaboration with the Israelis. 326 ICG Middle East Report N°7 – “Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel- Lebanon Border”, 18 November 2002 Page 17.

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integrate its corruption-free social justice model with other confessional groups.

Where Hezbollah falls short is its deep-seated resistance to disarming and its insistence on strong-arming whomever they need to ensure a veto power in the

Parliament. This still allows for a popularly elected government but one that

Hezbollah can paralyze if it moves in a direction it does not like. That is a government less than democratic even if it is not in a coerced Islamic form.

In this respect, Hezbollah is in an emergent state of legitimation with respect to the level of cheap talk test.

Summary Evaluation of Findings from Hezbollah Case At this point, I will summarize the results of the analysis of change in organizational strength for both shock events as well the states of legitimation ranking for both events. I will offer some preliminary observations regarding these findings but reserve a fuller assessment when I combine the findings from all cases in a Chapter 6.

Change in Organizational Strength – Summary Assessment

Within this case, Hezbollah demonstrated resilience after both shocks. In the

2006 event, it simply restored its pre-shock strength in all categories whereas in the

2000 event, Hezbollah was able to improve its military and economic strength post shock. I believe that the ability to improve on its military and economic strength in

2000 and not do so in 2006 is a function of the weaker position that Hezbollah was in prior to the IDF withdrawal versus a weakening of their sponsors/donors support. That event created a safe harbor for its state sponsors to invest in the

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significant defensive and offensive infrastructure in the south that Hezbollah built between 2000 and 2006 to deter Israel.

The recovery of its political strength – but not enhancement of – after both shocks is an intriguing finding. Possible explanations for this include: a.) its rivals balanced the growing power that came with these two shocks that paid dividends to

Hezbollah; b.) Hezbollah’s natural constituency is no larger than the Shia community and they are tolerated until the LAF can become strong enough to disarm the movement

Figure 24 - Hezbollah Change in Organizational Strength (All Shocks)

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States of Legitimation – Summary of Results Hezbollah had not legitimated itself completely on any of the six factors tested at the time of either shock yet the movement demonstrated resilience in both events albeit with different resilience footprints. Its weakest factors were its coercive violence, level of autonomy and its level of public accountability. It appeared that these factors were of greater importance with followers and sympathizers than with regards to the state sponsors who are the ‘supply chain’ for their financial and military provisioning. In fact, the LOA declined in the second shock event vs. the first as did the AOV. The ‘street politics’ and threats of counterforce against anyone who dared try to disarm the movement (an implication that it would do the unthinkable and risk civil war) degraded its legitimation with respect to LOA and AOV factors – likely important factors in legitimation domestically to followers, sympathizers, alliance partners and rivals - and likely contributed to its simple restoration vs. enhancement of political strength within two years of the war. I would have expected Hezbollah to have surged politically as a result of their ‘bloodied but unbowed’ status at the end of the war in spite of the devastation to Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s strongest factors were its level of professionalism, the outcomes delivered and the level of cheap talk. Hezbollah was an efficient, innovative, coherent organization both administratively and militarily. While the movement can be heavy-handed on certain issues like veto power and disarmament, they strive to avoid the appearance of corruption that they believe would destroy any legitimacy with their followers. Hezbollah is not a cheap talker. It does what it says it is going to

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do. The outcomes produced were high impact in that they produced important material gains for their followers and sponsors and they also produced a desirable political identity for those who valued resistance and social justice in Lebanon.

This legitimation structure was enough for those to whom it is was trying to legitimate itself – its alliance partners, primary followers and sympathizers and state sponsors/donors – to produce a reasonable resilience footprint for the movement as of the shock in 2006.

Based on the results of this case, there is reasonable evidence to conclude that the primary hypothesis is plausible.

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Figure 25 - Hezbollah Legitimation Structures (All Shocks)

Evaluation of Alternative Hypotheses - Hezbollah

With respect to the ‘ability to hide’ component of this argument, for the two events studied, Hezbollah had at least three safe zones that it controlled: Baalbaak, the southern suburbs of Beirut (the Dahiyya), and the southern territory below the

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Litani River that abuts northern Israel. In one case (Dahiyya) it was close to the state’s power. In another, the southern territory, it was close to its main rival, Israel.

Baalbaak was proximal to one of its important external patrons (Syria). Hezbollah was not far from trouble but with regard to the terrain in Baalbaak and southern

Lebanon it offered a variety of opportunities for concealment (Biddle 2006) and the ability to develop secure supply lines or defense works outside the watchful eye of

Israel327. Hezbollah had well-developed social networks. The combination of Shia and Islam as well as the families that had historically dominated the Shia political community, were rich sources of social connection that it developed to combat the historical subjugation of the Shia within Lebanon and galvanize the masses in its fight against Israel (who had occupied Shia-dominated southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000) and it allies. The large population aspect was largely irrelevant in this case since they the group generally did not operate inside the borders of its primary enemy, Israel. While Hezbollah did not need its patrons for sanctuary or fighters328, these patrons were important suppliers for its military and social services campaign.

The central government of Lebanon was weak and riven by sectarian sympathies and foreign allegiances. It was degraded by a long civil war from 1975 until 1991 and by 2006 had not been able to stand independently of Syria or its other foreign patrons. The Lebanese Armed Forces were still weak and in the midst

327 As demonstrated by its ability to contest the IDF in the 2006 war. 328 Iran did supply approximately 1500 IRGC troops in the very early days of Hezbollah for training and manpower. These troops were withdrawn before the civil war ended in 1991.

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of a rebuild after the SLA had been co-opted and then devastated during the IDF occupation and its aftermath between 1982 and 2000.

There were a variety of cross-cutting patrons for the state (e.g., Saudi Arabia, the USA, France) but Hezbollah also had strong external patrons in Syria and Iran.

Hezbollah has publicly claimed that, were it not for Iran’s largesse, it would have taken 50 more years for it to develop as a force in Lebanon and the Middle East. The logistical support from Syria was a significant advantage in enabling Hezbollah to outfit itself for guerilla warfare in the 1990s and major combat operations in 2006.

Based on these observations, this alternative explanation provides a strong challenge to the primary hypothesis.

In this case, the state offered little or no challenge to Hezbollah. It was too weak to offer much resistance and, since 1991, all rival militias had been disarmed.

Only Hezbollah was permitted to retain its arms since it was dubbed a legitimate resistance movement to Israel by the government of Lebanon (in accordance with

Ta’if Accord). Israel and the US, however, offered stiff counterforce to Hezbollah

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since its hostile actions against US, French and Israeli forces in 1983/1984. Israel conducted numerous and harsh counterforce operations in the mid to late 1990s in response to perceived violations of the informal rules of war. This indiscriminate violence killed hundreds of innocents in Lebanon and destroyed tens of millions of dollars of Lebanese property, regardless of affiliation with Hezbollah. Israel executed selective violent operations against Hezbollah as well. They targeted its leaders for assassination and, in the case of Abbas al Musawi in 1992, was successful. The devastation from the 2006 war was orders of magnitude greater in civilian lives lost and property damage than the counterforce operations in the

1990s. The Lebanese, let alone the followers of Hezbollah, paid a high price for their support or, simply, their co-location with Hezbollah. The state did their part in compelling the civilian population to seek Hezbollah’s protection and bolster its ranks.

Hezbollah was a strong organization and had ample resources from its external patrons and its substantial legal and illegal operations to offer selective incentives to its followers as well as fund its political and military operations. They provided nominal wages to both fighters and administrators, provided state-like social services to the needy Shia and also provided security to its followers within its safe zones (at least until Israel unleashed hell in response to actual or perceived provocations by Hezbollah). Similar to Hamas and SF/PIRA they eschewed the trappings of power and lived simple lives in accord with the lifestyles of their primary constituents (the poor and oppressed of their societies).

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While Hezbollah had no history of genocidal or mass violence against civilians, the state was so penetrated by its ally, Syria, that it would be hard to tell if

Syria was intimidating the civilian population on behalf of its client, Hezbollah. In effect, the internal security regime of Lebanon could have been co-opted to do the dirty work of Hezbollah (on behalf of its masters in Syria) to keep it clear of accusations of coercive violence to deter defectors or informants. It is, at best, unclear given the security dynamics of Lebanon. The internal security apparatus of

Hezbollah was relatively modest compared to the resources and personnel it applied to resisting Israel and providing state-like services to the Lebanese population (primarily the Shia-dominated communities).

The political and economic progress of the Shia has improved substantially since the establishment of the Movement of the Dispossessed (and Amal) by Musa al

Sadr in the 1960s. Hezbollah is the effective successor to that movement329 and has established the Shia as a political force where they once were dismissed as politically irrelevant and socially undesirable. The majority of the material goods and services provided by Hezbollah are targeted at the neediest Shia communities in

Lebanon.

Based on these observations this alternative explanation presents a moderate to strong challenge to the primary hypothesis.

329 Amal, of course, is the technical successor to al Sadr’s movement but Nabih Berri and the current Amal are a nominal player in the Hezbollah-led alliance, March 8th.

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As a Shiite Arab-based movement, Hezbollah is clearly an ethnic group that is distinct from its primary political competitors – the Maronite Christians, the Druze and the Sunni Muslims. The Shia are considered heretics to the Sunni, Arabs versus

Phoenicians to the Maronites and, simply, non-Druze to the Druze. Historically they were the political and social outsiders (Ajami 1986). The consociational form of government in Lebanon did not restrict access of the Shia to the state’s power but blunted its fairest distribution of power due, in part, to bogus electoral rules (e.g.,

1943 census). But Hezbollah did not even seek to participate in the government until 1992 and, when it did, it competed successfully and without restriction. It progressively built itself over the ensuing 20 years into one of the most powerful political blocs in Lebanese politics and was able to form a powerful alliance in 2006 to counterbalance its primary political rivals. It had access to the state and it seized control of it even though it represented two levels of outsider in modern Lebanon – pious Muslim and Shia. They were derided as pre-modern and heretical.

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In 2006 Hezbollah agreed to participate in the executive branch of the government and thereby opened itself to criticisms that it was complicit in the corrupt and ineffective government of Lebanon. Hezbollah used its executive powers to gain a veto over the government’s decision-making authority and to oust regimes it considered hostile to its mission (e.g., Saad Harriri government).

Hezbollah had little trouble gaining access to the power of the State – of limited value though it was.

Hezbollah was not excluded from power based on its ethnicity or otherwise.

It should not have enjoyed the extra motivations from its followers to persist as long as it did.

Based on these observations, this alternative explanation presents a weak challenge to the primary hypothesis.

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Chapter 6 - Comparative Assessment of the Selected Cases Overall Inferences from Research There are four major sets of inferences that I draw from this research. This first set discusses my general conclusions regarding the legitimation structure(s) that produce resilience, differences in ‘resilience footprints’ and the influence of shock types. It is summarized in the table below and then discussed in more detail in the following three subsections.

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Class Question Claim-Based-on-Research

What-combination-of-the-six-power-legitimation-factors- The-bar-for-legitimating-the-power-of-the-organizations- and-what-levels-of-those-same-factors-are-needed-to- studied-is-relatively-low.-The-organizational-payoff-for- produce-organizational-resilience-(i.e.,-the-‘legitimation- legitimation-–-resilience-–-appears-to-be-bought-with-just- Overall structure’)?- a-middling-performance-by-the-organization.

Organizational-resilience-can-be-achieved-without-being- Does-an-organization-need-to-be-fully-legitimated-on-any- fully-legitimated-on-any-of-the-factors-used-in-this- or-all-of-the-six-factors-of-legitimation-before-it-can- research-but-progress-on-every-factor-to-some-degree-is- Overall achieve-resilience? needed. Backsliding-on-any-of-the-six-factors-will-weaken-the- movement’s-overall-state-of-power-legitimation-and-have- an-adverse-impact-on-the-production-of-organizational- resilience.-Each-of-the-legitimation-factors-evaluated-were- important-enough-for-these-movements-that-they-needed- to-be-seen-to-be-making-even-partial-or-inconsistent- Does-the-organization-need-to-be-consistent-in-their-state- attempts-to-legitimate-themselves-according-to-these- Overall of-legitimation-of-any-or-all-factors?- standards-of-legitimation.-

There-is-no-oneMsizeMNitsMall-legitimation-structure-that- causes-the-organizational-resilience-for-the-organizations- Is-there-a-uniform-legitimation-structure-that-all- of-the-kind-under-study.-They-each-produced-resilience-to- organizations-need-to-conform-to-in-order-to-produce- some-degree-with-a-different-conNiguration-of- Overall resilience? legitimation-structures.-

Are-all-organization's-'resilience-footprints'-similar?-The- 'resilience-footprint-is-the-combination-of-the-scope- Not-all-organizational-resilience-is-the-same.-Some-are- (political,-military,-economic)-and-extent-(did-recover,- larger-than-others-M-some-organizations-achieve- did-not-recover,-exceeded-pre-shock-strength)-of-changes- resilience-on-all-strength-factors-while-others-show-a- Overall in-organizational-strength-for-a-given-shock. deNicit-in-one-of-the-strength-factors.

Does-the-type-of-shock-(values-challenge-vs.-a- Mass-movements-that-include-professionalized-military- performance-challenge)-matter-with-respect-to-an- organizations-will-respond-to-and-recover-from- organization's-recovery-of-postMshock-organizational- performance-shocks-that-are-combat-related-more- Overall strength? quickly-and-efNiciently-than-values-challenges.- Does-the-timing-of-the-onset-of-the-shock-(abrupt-vs.- The-legitimation-of-power-is-not-inNluenced-by-the-time-in- cumulative-stress)-affect-the-organization's-recovery-of- which-the-shock-occurs-M-abrupt-onset-vs.-cumulative- Overall postMshock-organizational-strength? stress. Figure 26 – Overall Inferences from Research

Low ‘Bar’ for Legitimation to Produce Resilience One of the basic questions that this research is intended to address is: what is the ‘bar’ for power legitimation to produce resilience? That is, what combination of the six power legitimation factors and what levels of those same factors are needed to produce organizational resilience (i.e., the ‘legitimation structure’)? Based on the outcomes of this research the bar for legitimating the power of the organizations studied is relatively low. The organizational payoff for legitimation –

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resilience – appears to be bought with just a middling performance by the organization.

Comparatively evaluating the results of the states of legitimation tests for each organization and for both events under study (see tables below) shows that these organizations do not need to be outstanding performers with regards to

legitimating their power before they produce resilience. Organizational resilience can be achieved without being fully legitimated on any of the factors used in this research but progress on every factor to some degree is needed.

As I discuss below, there are select legitimation factors that matter more than others in the overall legitimation structure but backsliding on any of the six factors will weaken the movement’s overall state of power legitimation and have an adverse impact on the production of organizational resilience. Each of the

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legitimation factors evaluated were important enough for these movements that they needed to be seen to be making even partial or inconsistent attempts to legitimate themselves according to these standards of legitimation. The populations that are the focus of these organization’s legitimation efforts (which are many and varied – see earlier discussion) were willing to reward them with resilience for a relatively average performance.

Not All Organizational Resilience is Alike While all of the organizations demonstrated at least qualified resilience after each shock, SF/PIRA and Hezbollah recovered a broader scope and greater extent of organizational strength than Hamas; i.e., their ‘resilience footprints’ were different

(see tables below).

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The organization’s resilience footprint is the combination of the scope (i.e., political, military, economic) and extent (i.e., did recover, did not recover, exceeded pre shock strength) of changes in organizational strength for a given shock.

The 'resilience footprint' of Hamas was smaller than either Hezbollah or

SF/PIRA (see tables). Hamas demonstrated resilience but of an inferior quality to

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either Hezbollah or SF/PIRA. This ‘resilience gap’ was due largely to Hamas’ failure to recover its political strength after both shocks.

These findings align with my general conclusions that Hamas, while still standing after these two major shocks, has been considerably less effective in advancing its broader political agenda than either Hezbollah or SF/PIRA during the periods studied. Hamas can reload and retool its military capabilities and resupply its treasury but politically is, and has been, stalemated. Gaza is generally recognized as the ‘largest prison’ on earth and the IDF routinely degrades the military capabilities of Hamas with impunity. The threat of a divided Palestinian state as a permanent solution has become more believable since Hamas won the national elections in 2006.

Differing Legitimation Structures and Persistence Notwithstanding the general inferences noted above, there is no one-size- fits-all legitimation structure that causes the organizational resilience for the organizations of the kind under study. They each produced resilience to some degree with a different configuration of legitimation structures. SF/PIRA was fully legitimated with regards to Cheap Talk but was without any legitimation regarding the use of violence against their own - they brutally coerced their followers

(Absence of Legitimation) to conform to their norms and values. The Islamic movements operated in ‘Confused to Emergent’ states of legitimation on all factors evaluated for each of the events evaluated.

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These results suggest that a given legitimation structure that translates into resilience for the organization is highly contingent in nature. The six factors evaluated in this study all mattered to a greater or lesser extent in the production of resilience. There are likely other factors to be discovered, but the results of this research demonstrate that each of these six factors matter to some extent for organizations of this kind. Context and history for that organization in that society does matter with regard to what configuration of legitimation structures will produce resilience.

Impact of Shock Type330 on Legitimation Dynamics and Resilience Two different types of shocks were studied: Values Challenges and

Performance Challenges. In addition, the shocks studied had two different timing properties: Abrupt Onset and Cumulative Stress. In this research I sought to determine if the translation of legitimated power into resilience was affected by either of these shock characteristics.

The organizations studied responded to their values challenges differently and less competently than they did their performance challenges. From this research I infer that mass movements that include professionalized military organizations will respond to and recover from performance shocks that are combat related more quickly and efficiently than values challenges. Simple counterforce from rivals or state enemies cannot defeat the movement even under conditions of

330 The concepts regarding shock types are discussed in more detail in chapter 1 of this manuscript.

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'dirty war'331. These movements can and will adapt to 'long war' low intensity conflict if needed and use their international political leverage (via its diasporas or its state sponsors/sympathizers) to mitigate the risk of an overwhelming counter force. Values challenges - those that put the very purpose of the organization in question - are much more difficult for the studied organizations to recover from. The response by the organization to the challenge plays a major part in whether they can recover the political component of resilience. Major concessions may be needed for the organization to overcome a values challenge if it hopes to continue to exist and pursue its vision, mission and values.

Whether a shock is abrupt onset or a result of cumulative stress does not make a discernable difference regarding resiliency for the three organizations studied. I infer from this research that the legitimation of power is not influenced by the time in which the shock occurs - abrupt onset vs. cumulative stress.

Specific Inferences

Organizational Resilience In this research I focused on three components of organizational resilience. I was able to draw out a few specific findings and related inferences as summarized in the table below and discussed more fully in the following two subsections.

331 For example, see Merom (2003) and Adams et al (1998).

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An*organization*can*survive*but*not*thrive*if*it*does*not* demonstrate*political*resilience.*An*overdeveloped* military*and*economic*capability*threatens*all*but*your* most*loyal*followers*and*limits*the*advancement*of*your* political*agenda.*Organizational*power*that*is*not* Are*all*components*of*resilience*of*equal*importance*to* balanced*is*threatening*not*only*to*your*rivals*but*also*to* Resilience the*organization?* your*potential*followers.*

To*hedge*the*loss*(even*temporarily)*of*a*state*sponsor's* Binancial*support,*a*diverse*set*of*resource*suppliers*is* critical.*While*charitable*foundations*are*important*in* both*an*economic*and*symbolic*sense,*a*broad*network* Are*there*any*particular*aspects*of*funding*sources*that* of*criminal*and*legal*businesses*are*vital*sources*of* Resilience are*more*important*for*economic*resilience? income*for*these*organizations.*

A*state*sponsor*may*not*be*necessary*to*conduct*effective* Is*it*necessary*to*have*a*state*sponsor*in*order*to*achieve* military*and*political*operations*but*social*services*and* Resilience resilience? military*operations*would*be*limited*in*important*ways.

Figure 27 - Specific Inferences: Resilience

Primacy of Political Resilience An organization can survive but not thrive if it does not demonstrate political resilience. An overdeveloped military and economic capability threatens all but your most loyal followers and limits the advancement of your political agenda.

Organizational power that is not balanced is threatening not only to your rivals but also to your potential followers. Higher levels of public accountability, less cheap talk and improving net margins of public goods will drive improvements in political resilience.

Hamas’s power legitimation structure was notably different from Hezbollah and SF/PIRA in three important ways. First, Hamas was the only organization studied whose state of legitimation with respect to Outcomes degraded over time.

This had little to do with the nature of the Outcomes (i.e., political identity). It had

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everything to do with Hamas’ backsliding on the fairness and favorability of the outcomes it produced. Second, Hamas was rated as a 'cheap talker'. Hamas’ hot and cold civil war with Fatah has degraded the political resilience of the movement in the eyes of all but its most ardent followers. Third, Hezbollah and Sinn Fein both made concerted efforts to build political alliances with rivals in order to compete more effectively for the movement's goals. Hamas has consistently eschewed forming an alliance with their rival/s. The ability to form effective political alliances is a form of public accountability and is critical to power legitimation and political resilience. Furthermore, this research also demonstrates that the failure to form political alliances within a reasonable time after the organization first competes for national public office (or as part of that initial process) will stagnate the political growth of the movement and weaken the organization's ability to govern broadly.

Economic and Military Resilience All of the organizations studied exhibited economic resilience except for one event for SF/PIRA.332 All of the organizations had diverse sources of income, though at various times in their organizational lives, they were highly dependent on a state sponsor for funding daily operations and/or weapons supply. None of the organizations relied on their state sponsors for sanctuary. I infer from this research that diverse sources of funding are necessary for economic resilience. This is especially true after a performance shock (combat operations in this research) that

332 This was the first event studied (1987/1988) which included the loss of Libya as a major arms supplier. Even with the loss of significant state source of military resources, the PIRA was able to nearly recover its economic strength in the two-year period. Within four years the organization had fully recovered economically due to its extensive criminal and legal business operations.

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is resource intensive (and often not of a timing and intensity of the organization’s doing).

In all cases, the organizations dealt with the loss of a major state sponsor. In addition, even when the relationship remained active with their sponsors all of these organizations needed to overcome significant irregularities in the flow of funds and weapons from their state sponsors due to changes in the strategic interests of those sponsors333. I infer from this research that, while charitable foundations are important in both an economic and symbolic sense, a broad network of criminal and legal businesses are vital sources of income for these organizations. These types of financial resources directly contribute to their economic resilience but these sources also require a level of sophistication to manage and organizational legitimacy to even attract the sponsor.

In some cases, these sources of income act as ‘rainy day’ funds for use when the state sponsors contributions vary. In others, they are a replacement for the loss of state sponsorship in its entirety. I infer from these findings that, in certain cases, a state sponsor is not necessary to maintain military and political operations. The organizations that eschew state sponsors (or cannot attract them) would be limited in two very important ways. First, the nature of military operations will be limited in scope and intensity. They will not be able to extend beyond episodic terror operations and a low intensity guerilla campaign given the limits on their access to

333 For example, see Byman (2005) for a discussion of the impact of a sponsor’s strategic interests on their economic and military relationships with their clients.

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advanced weaponry (e.g., MANPADs334) on a larger scale. Second, the organization would not be able to fund and operate social service operations on the scale of the

Islamic groups included in this research. That scale of social service operation is essentially a state-level of support.

The Dynamics of Legitimated Power and the Production of Organizational Resilience

Four of the six factors of legitimation stood out as having a greater impact on the production of organizational resilience. The Level of Public Accountability (LPA), the Level of Cheap Talk (LCT), the Level of Professionalism (LPro) and Outcomes were significantly more important to the production of organizational resilience.

Two of the six legitimation factors had less of an impact on the resilience of the organizations studied: Absence of Violence (AOV) and Level of Autonomy (LOA). A priori I expected all of the six legitimation factors to be roughly equal in importance to the production of resilience. This is an intriguing variation and warrants closer inspection.

Figure 28 - Findings: Indicators of Legitimation

334 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/manpads (last accessed December 15, 2012).

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The*Level*of*Public*Accountability*(LPA),*the*Level*of* Cheap*Talk*(LCT),*the*Level*of*Professionalism*(LPro)* and*Outcomes*were*signiDicantly*more*important*to*the* Legitimation* What*legitimation*factors*matter*relatively*more*in*the* production*of*organizational*resilience*than*the*Absence* Factors production*of*resilience*than*the*others?*Why? of*Violence*(AOV)*and*the*Level*of*Autonomy*(LOA).*

LPA*is*a*very*signiDicant*element*of*an*organization's* power*legitimation*if*for*no*better*reason*than*the* standard*of*legitimation*becomes*more*stringent*once* the*group*demonstrates*even*a*partial*and*inconsistent* attempt*to*demonstrate*its*level*of*public*accountability.* This*is*the*only*legitimation*factor*that*exhibited*that* Are*there*any*factors*whose*standards*of*legitimation* property*in*this*research.*The*group*needs*to*be*viewed* (what*it*takes*to*achieve*a*certain*state),*change*over* as*committed*to*improving*its*public*accountability*even* Legitimation* time?*That*is,*doe*the*standard*become*more*or*less* as*the*expectations*grow*for*what*constitutes* Factors stringent?* legitimation.*

Tangible*public*goods*are*necessary*for*legitimation*of* power*but*delivery*on*the*intangible*(political*identity)* Legitimation* To*legitimate*the*organization*and*produce*resilience,*do* type*of*outcomes*is*the*critical*condition*for*legitimation* Factors they*need*to*go*beyond*tangible*outcomes? of*power*via*outcomes*to*produce*resilience.* Dominant*state*sponsors*do*adversely*affect*the* legitimation*of*power*but*do*not*translate*into*severe* 'resilience*penalties'.*As*long*as*movements*diversify* their*sources*of*funding*(state*sponsors,*charities,* legal/illegal*businesses)*even*a*dominant*state*sponsor* Does*the*presence*of*a*signiDicant*state*sponsor*impact* will*not*lead*followers/sympathizers*to*believe*that*they* Legitimation* the*legitimation*of*power*(LOA)?*Does*it*adversely*affect* are*independent*and*able*to*pursue*the*mission,*vision* Factors the*production*of*resilience? and*values*of*the*movement. LPA*L*At*least*a*confused*level*for*LPA*and*ideally* trending*to*emergent.*LCT*L*At*least*an*emergent*level*of* legitimation*and*ideally*trending*to*legitimated.*LPro*L* For*those*factors*that*are*considered*critical*to*the* At*least*an*emergent*level*of*LPro*to*produce*resilience.* Legitimation* production*of*resilience,*were*there*minimum*levels*of* Outcomes*L*At*least*a*confused*level*and*trending* Factors legitimation*that*need*to*be*achieved? towards*emergent.

Large*and*overt*criminal*operations*are*tolerated*by*the* followers*as*long*as*the*criminal*operations*do*not*prey* on*the*followers*of*the*movement*and*invested*back*into* Legitimation* Do*criminal*operations*produce*a*'resilience*penalty'*for* the*movement*to*serve*the*best*interests*of*the* Factors these*movements?*Why? followers/sympathizers*(the*'robin*hood'*effect).* Followers*and*sympathizers*can*tolerate*coercive* violence*if*you*are*consistent*L*even*consistently*harsh* levels.*Organizations*can*ruthlessly*selfLpolice*its*own* (its*core*followers)*with*little*risk*of*this*deligitimation*of* power*having*an*adverse*effect*on*resilience*as*long*as*it* is*seen*to*be*for*operational*security*(i.e.,*root*out*and* dispose*of*informants)*and*the*overall*increase*in*social* Legitimation* Is*there*a*'resilience*penalty'*for*the*use*of*coercive* order*(according*to*the*norms*of*the*leaders*of*the* Factors violence*against*followers*and*sympathizers? movement).*

Level of Public Accountability (LPA) With regards to the LPA, all struggled to get or keep this factor in at least the

'Emergent' state of legitimation. Two of the three (Hezbollah and SF/PIRA) regressed over time while Hamas remained in a 'Confused' state for both events.

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Over time the ‘audiences’ standards for what constitutes legitimation for the LPA factor changed for all of the organizations and become even more stringent. What was sufficient to legitimate them for the earlier event studied was insufficient for the later event studied.

LPA is a very significant element of an organization's power legitimation if for no better reason than the standard of legitimation becomes more stringent once the group demonstrates even a partial and inconsistent attempt to demonstrate its level of public accountability. This is the only legitimation factor that exhibited that property in this research. The group needs to be viewed as committed to improving its public accountability even as the expectations grow for what constitutes legitimation.

There are two specific aspects of LPA that that reveal the manner in which this factor produces resilience for the organizations included in this research. The first aspect involves the movement’s push to compete for national political office, either legislative or executive. Between the first and second events analyzed for each case, all of the organizations either competed for election nationally for the first time or significantly increased the scope, tempo and scale of the national competitive political component of their strategy to transform their societies.

Engaging the broader public body is a greater challenge especially for movements such as these that are managing the tension between the use of armed struggle with

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competing for election.335 Once the movement commits to compete for elections, and as long as the public is unclear whether the military wing dominates the decision making process of the movement, it will not be able to fully legitimate itself regarding its public accountability. This fact will limit the resilience of the organization. Followers/potential followers learn to expect progressively more from the movement as it matures and delivers on prior promises. Expectations may rationally rise but the increase in the LPA legitimation 'bar' occurs relatively quickly

(within 3 years in one case - Hamas). Based on the cases involved in this research, however, the rising standard for legitimation for LPA would appear to be driven specifically by increased role that public accountability plays in the legitimation of organizations as they intensify the political aspects of their organizational strategy.

Another facet that helps reveal the way LPA acts on resilience is the dampening effect that a dominant military organization has on the movement’s ability to progress its level of public accountability. All of the organizations had active political wing and military wings. The Islamic movements also had a social services arm to deliver the broad slate of social services to the public. Sinn Fein has a community activism unit that leveraged street level activism locally and nationally.

After 12 to 15 years functioning primarily as a military organization, they all competed in national elections and were successful. The decision to compete for office was a divisive one for all of these movements. The political organizations all

335 Though arguable in the case of Hamas, all of these groups were founded on the principle that violence can and should be used instrumentally to deal with an intractable foe.

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struggled, and some still struggle, to overcome the dominance of their military wings in the political discourse. I infer from this research that once the movement commits to compete for elections, and as long as the public is unclear whether the military wing dominates the decision making process of the movement, it will not be able to fully legitimate itself regarding its public accountability. This fact will limit the resilience of the organization.

Level of Cheap Talk (LCT) The level of Cheap Talk is a proxy for trustworthiness. Based on this research if you don’t do what you say you are going to do - and how you say you are going to do it - you will be less resilient. Two of the three organizations (Hezbollah and

SF/PIRA) achieved a legitimated state (or on the cusp) with regards to the level of the Cheap Talk. Both of those organizations had larger 'resilience footprints' than

Hamas (see prior discussion). Cheap talkers will struggle to regain political strength following shocks. This is especially true if you regress over time with respect to the level of cheap talk.

Level of Professionalism (LPro) Each of the groups studied had at least at least an emergent level of professionalism for each of the events. As mature organizations they had developed a robust set of administrative and combat capabilities and were able to consistently attract followers and sponsors.

A more professional organization learns from its mistakes and adapts to turbulence its environment through a superior innovation capability. They prepare for shocks better than others and can absorb typical countermeasures from enemies

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or rivals better than other dues to superior counterintelligence, clandestine cell structures, superior command and control and better-trained combat/guerilla troops. Militarily they produce greater lethality at lower risk to the organization's combatants. Administratively they are a fair and able administrator that uses a rules-based scheme that is able to competently run a slate of charities, legal and illegal businesses and are savvy politicians that are able negotiators with diplomatically savvy state actors. If they use extra-legal measures they know how to cover up the illicit actions. These attributes enable the organization to attract more followers and sponsors as you might expect based on the logic of the efficient firm from neoclassical economic theory.

As a result, I infer that it is necessary for at least an emergent level of LPro to produce resilience. Followers and sponsors need to know that the organization is well run in order to invest their time, money let alone their lives.

Outcomes While all of the organizations delivered tangible and intangible outcomes for the events evaluated, none of the organizations fully achieved their declared super priorities even though all had been active for at least 15 years. Yet they all still achieved at least a qualified level of resilience. The followers and sponsors appeared to believe that the super priorities were either not all equally relevant, ‘nice to have’ or that the organizations were on a reliable path to delivering them.

By embedding themselves in the societies that they served and delivering down payments on the ultimate outcomes desired, these organizations attracted

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followers and sponsors that were willing to defer ultimate payoffs on the super priorities for an indefinite period of time (decades, at a minimum). Their followers and sponsors did expect, however, some tangible and intangible payoffs in much shorter time frames. The two Islamic groups provided a wide slate of social services to those in need - including those who were not followers of the movement – due to the limited state capacity. SF/PIRA did not provide social services in the same sense but offered the services of their community activists and also their elected representatives to those in need. At first it was for Sinn Fein constituents primarily if not exclusively. By the second event analyzed (17 years later) this practice broadened to all of the people of that community who sought their aid. To legitimate the organization, it is necessary to deliver on the basic social needs of its constituents. These are general tangible needs such as housing, employment, health care and education. Where the state is able to provide these services if compelled, the movement does not have to be the actual provider but it needs to at least be a political activist/representative on its behalf.

In the shorter term the followers also needed to see movement on the formation of the desired political identity that shaped the mission, vision and values

– this identity produced hope and a sense of purpose that mattered in the absence of material payoffs and plentiful natural resources. The political identity phenomenon showed up in various forms including language (Gaelic), religious creed (Shia), the

‘resistance culture’ (all), public claims for political rights of a separate state

(Palestine) or a unified (Ireland). The leaders of the movements all used myths and symbols and discursive tools to produce and then reinforce the desired political

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identity. For the followers/potential followers, as long as the progress on the formation of the new political identity was aligned with the organization's transcendent belief system (Islam, nationalism) this proved the movement's commitment to good governance.

At some point in their lives, the organizations studied produced more public goods than private goods. The essence of this test is to provide one more clue to the organization’s competence to govern all of the people versus its natural base. If the movement delivers more public goods it is a clear mark of its commitment to serve the whole society (all Lebanese, all Palestinians, All Irish) versus to simply operate solely for the benefit of one faction among many, or worse as a gangster/warlord.

Hezbollah consistently offered more public goods based largely on its role as the resistance to Israel. Hamas regressed over time largely due to its failure to bridge the divide with Fatah. SF/PIRA progressed to provide more public goods over time as it built alliances and built a broader nationalist coalition across all of Ireland.

Providing progressively more public goods over time is a significant contributor to greater resilience. The movement will attract more followers beyond its natural constituency since this is a demonstration of the organization's commitment to be a governor of all of the people. Those movements that either never deliver a net greater supply of public goods or regress over time, appear to be warlords or gangsters and their political appeal is limited to those that benefit from the private goods.

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Tolerance for Dependent Relationships and Criminal Enterprise (LOA) Two of the three groups were rated 'confused' for both events (Hezbollah was emergent). All groups had, to varying extents, diverse sources of funds: criminal operations, charities, legitimate businesses and - at some time in the life of the organization - state sponsors.

Hamas relied most heavily on support from state sponsors including Iran and

Syria. In contrast to Hezbollah, Hamas was not yet able to develop the more extensive alternative sources of income (including illegal operations) to sustain its social services programs as well as its political and military operations. Neither tried to hide the extent and appreciation they had for their state sponsors. While there are persistent claims that Hamas and Hezbollah (especially) are proxy warriors for

Iran, the public record is conflicting with respect to evidence to support that conclusion. These two groups who rely/have relied on state sponsors appear to be relatively free from the commitment to do the private bidding of their sponsors.

Killing Israelis in Israel and destroying Israeli property seems to be sufficient payback for their primary state sponsors. While controversial outside their political base, the followers and potential followers did not seem to be too concerned about

Hamas and Hezbollah’s dependent financial/resource relationship with their state sponsors. I infer from this research that even when an organization has a dependent financial/economic relationship with a state sponsor, that the followers will not deny its support as long as the organization remains largely focused on the super priorities of the movement.

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I make two primary inferences from this research with regards to the Level of Autonomy. First, If the movement gets distracted on private military missions for the sponsors, or appears to privilege the sponsors’ political objective at the expense of the organization’s home country, then this factor will be a significant influencer in the production/destruction of political resilience.336 Second, subject to the first inference being true, as long as movements’ diversify their sources of funding (state sponsors, charities, legal/illegal businesses) even a dominant state sponsor will not lead followers/sympathizers to believe that they are independent and able to pursue the mission, vision and values of the movement.

Sinn Fein/PIRA presents a different aspect of the Autonomy debate – the impact of gangsterism on the group’s power legitimation dynamic. SF/PIRA lost its major state sponsor relatively early in its organizational life but, in any event, had primarily relied on an extended criminal and legal enterprise to fund its operations.

While SF/PIRA never really could be portrayed as a proxy warrior for its major state sponsor (Libya until 1987), I expected the extensive criminal operations to be an important delegitimating factor (it was) and to damage the movement’s political resilience (it did not, or it was overwhelmed by the other legitimation factors).

I infer from this research (the SF/PIRA case primarily) that large and overt criminal operations are tolerated by the followers as long as the criminal operations do not prey on the followers of the movement and invested back into the movement

336 Of the three groups studies, Hezbollah is the one that is most at risk for this ‘resilience penalty’. Future research will address the impact of Hezbollah’s support for Assad regime in Syria throughout the Syrian civil war.

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to serve the best interests of the followers/sympathizers (the 'robin hood' effect).

While there is little the public can do to be certain that the leadership or members aren’t using funds for personal gain, the leaders of all of these movements lived humbly and among their constituents. Through their actions and discourse they projected the image of being a fellow traveler with the largely economically oppressed constituents that they led. All of the organizations publicly enforced prohibitions against the use of movement funds for personal gain (or committing crimes in the name of the movement but for personal gain). In this respect, all of the organizations were the ‘anti-PLO’.

Tolerance for Coercive Violence (AOV) All organizations studied used violence against their followers to some degree and yet none of these organizations seemed to suffer any ill effects in respect to the legitimation of its power. I infer from this research that the Absence of

Violence (AOV) factor is not a primary driver in the translation of power legitimation to the resilience of this type of violent mass movement. This was a surprising finding considering the prominence of the absence of violence against its people as a hallmark of a legitimate authority in many of the Lockean and Kantian schools of political thought.

The PIRA was rated in the 'absence of legitimation' state in the first event and improved slightly to the cusp of 'confused' in the second event. Hezbollah was rated as emergent for both events. Hamas regressed from 'emergent' to 'confused' between the first and second events. Hamas had the smallest 'resilience footprint' of the three organizations studied. I infer from this finding regarding backsliding -

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even on a relatively lower priority component of power legitimation – that followers and sympathizers can tolerate coercive violence if you are consistent - even consistently brutal like the PIRA. If you demonstrate a higher level of legitimation and then regress, it is relatively more harmful to your political strength.

From these findings I infer that organizations can ruthlessly self-police its own (its core followers) with little risk of this deligitimation of power having an adverse effect on resilience as long as it is seen to be for operational security (i.e., root out and dispose of informants) and the overall increase in social order

(according to the norms of the leaders of the movement).

Another aspect that is important to discuss about the AOV factor in these cases involves the relatively low levels of internal security operatives in these organizations. While the violence against their own was no doubt ruthless and designed to deter others from informing or challenging the rule of the incumbent leadership, none of these organizations studied had large internal security organizations. For most of the time that they were active guerilla movements or formal military forces they did not have the resources to devote much more than a modest manpower complement to internal security and “coup prevention.” These organizations all relied as much on the enforcement of social norms by its followers as well as the use or threat of violence to mitigate the risks of civil unrest, informants or the splintering of the movement. Each of the organizations had to

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contest with splinters from the organization but all did so with minimal bloodshed.337

I infer from this aspect of the research that the relatively small ‘footprint’

(i.e., manpower and other resources) dedicated to internal security was also a factor that aided in dampening the adverse effects of coercive violence on the organizations’ resilience.

Strategic Considerations and Future Research Paths Based on the total package of inferences, I have prepared a set of strategic considerations for the types of organizations studied as well as a preliminary assessment of the important questions that future research needs to address. The strategic considerations can be viewed as essentially management advice for the leadership of these types of organizations based on the results of this research.

Based on the previous discussion about the inferences that I make from this research, I believe that building a set of management recommendations provides a useful way to understand how the results of this research can be practically applied.

The research questions are offered as a means to focus my future research path as well as for those that also pursue this line of inquiry in the future.

Overall Considerations and Research Paths The first package of considerations/research are at the overall level of the research and summarized in the table below.

337 Hamas, of course, was culpable for the violent eviction of the Fatah security forces in Gaza in 2007 that, in fact, was very detrimental to its political resilience as noted above. This was not a splinter per se but violence against a close rival that the broader Palestinian polity preferred to see unified.

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Possible(Strategic(and(Operating(Implications(for(These( Organizations Future(Research(Questions Is(this('low(bar'(inference(true(for( movements(earlier(in(their(life(cycle((0(to( 15(years(of(life)?(To(what(extent(are(the( Mature(mass(movements(should(generally(make(the( military(and(political(accomplishments( investment(in(power(legitimation.(Relatively(low(levels(of( prior(to(maturity(acting(to(reduce(the(need( legitimation(investments(produce(disproportionately( for(power(legitimation(investments(later(in( greater(returns(to(organizational(resilience. the(organization's(life?( Institute(organizational(units(to(ensure(the(group's( overall(progress(in(appearance(and(fact(along(all( dimensions(of(the(legitimation(structure.(Most(of(these( groups(are(aligned(functionally(and(in(operational(silos.( These(units(would(need(to(operate(across(the(natural( boundaries(K(at(least(within(the(main(social,(political(and( What(other(factors(should(be(included(in( military(lines(of(operation.( the(legitimation(structure?(

Manage(the(appearance(and(the(fact(of(backsliding(on(any( of(the(legitimation(factors.(Build(a(narrative(to(support( damage(control(should(backsliding(occur(and(maintain(an( organizational(unit(to(ensure(consistency(in(the(progress( of(the(factors(of(legitimation. Though(there(is(no(oneKsizeKOitsKall(model,(there(are(some( lessons(to(be(learned(from(successful/unsuccessful( What(are(the(most(important(local( groups.(The(movement(is(not(likely(to(be(able(to(directly( conditions(that(restrict(the(transferability(of( transfer(those(learnings(for(use(in(their(own(case(but( lessons(learned(from(movement's(who(have( should(adjust(them(for(the(peculiar(dynamics(of(their( successfully(legitimated(their(power(and( own(environment.( produced(resilience(consistently(over(time? Are(there(speciOic(legitimation(structures( that(produce(bigger(resilence(footprints( than(others?(Do(different(resilience( footprints(enable(more/less(scope(and( quality(of(achievement(of(the(movement's( goals? Identify(the(most(likely(values(challenges(that(the( Are(there(particular(types(of(values( movement(could(confront(and(prepare(contingency(plans( challenges(that(are(easier/harder(to( to(address(the(political,(social(and(military(challenges( accommodate?(Why?(What(social(deposits( that(could(ensue.(Identify(social(deposits(that(could(be( are(the(best(hedge(for(the(movement( made(today(that(would(hedge(the(harshest(effects(of(the( against(the(harshest(effects(of(those(types( most(likely(values(challenges. of(value(challenges?

Does(the(type(of(schock(matter(for( organizations(earlier(in(their(life(cycle? Figure 29 - Overall Implications & Future Research Pathways

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Based on this research, all organizations of the type studied should adopt the strategy to legitimate their power to at least their followers, sympathizers and sponsors. The payoff for even a modest level of legitimation is substantial in terms of organizational resilience. The costs to an organization in terms of reduced organizational resilience and/or scope of political power are too great to ignore the adoption of this organizational strategy. This research does not fully address338 why direct competitors to these organizations did not choose to or did try and could not legitimate their power to the level that these organizations have done. One hypothesis that I will pursue in future research is that the choice to adopt the

‘legitimation of power’ strategy has less to do with ideological reasons but has more to do with the level of organizational sophistication (i.e., level of professionalism).

Some organizations are just not capable of legitimating their power. Many organizations may be willing to legitimate their power but they are not able. The inherent difficulty in dealing with values challenges that this research demonstrates is a useful way to illustrate this point. Mobilizing these complex organizations to make the timely social deposits and investments in talent to plan for or be able to competently respond to the potential values challenges that an organization would encounter is a high order capability with which many sophisticated organizations struggle to accommodate. It is true that some of the organizations that competed with the three studied have had or are enjoying relatively longer lives (e.g.,

Palestinian Islamic Jihad). It is also true that almost all of the competitors to the

338 See final chapter for a brief discussion about this issue and future research considerations.

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groups studied have been dominated politically by the three groups studied. None of the direct competitors to the Hamas339, Hezbollah or SF/PIRA can credibly compete with these groups as alternative providers of political, economic or military340 outcomes for the communities that they represent.

Considerations and Research Paths Regarding Resilience The second package of considerations/research paths are regarding resilience and are summarized in the table below.

339 The notable and debatable exception to this statement is Fatah as it relates to Hamas and the overall Palestinian population. 340 This statement does not apply in the case of SF/PIRA in that they have ceased all military operations as of July 2005.

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Possible(Strategic(and(Operating(Implications(for(These( Organizations Future(Research(Questions Ensure(that(the(drivers(of(political(strength(are(tended(to( as(much/often(as(the(military(and(economic(drivers(of( strength((natural(for(organizations(that(began(in( violence).(Understand(which(components(of(legitimation( most(affect(political(resilience(and(build(organizational( ConFirm(the(drivers(of(political(resilience( mechanisms(to(ensure(their(maintenance(and( based(on(this(reseach((see(below).(Are( development(in(a(manner(consistent(with(the(more( there(others(and,(if(so,(under(what( naturual(attention(to(the(Financial(and(military( conditions(do(they(have(a(measurable( components.( impact(on(political(resilience? Diversify(income(sources(as(early(as(possible.(For( symbolic(reasons(alone(establish(the(global(charity( networks(and(acquire(talent(to(establish(and(run( successful(legal(and(illegal(businesses(domestically(and( globally.(Attract(state(sponsors(but(manage(Financial( resources(as(if(that(type(of(support(could(disappear(at( any(time.(Limit(separate(military(missions(on(behalf(of( the(sponsor(to(mitigate(the(appearance(of(loss(of( autonomy.( Understand(to(what(extent(state( sponsorship(is(vital(to(any(movement(from( a(military(standpoint.(Is(it(needed(just(for( those(movements(who(have(a(social( services(offering?(Can(nonRstate(actors(ever( Evaluate(potential(for(subsisting(primarily(on(legal/illegal( achieve(competitive(parity(with(a(likely( businesses(and(charitable(funds.(Determine(availability(of( state(sponsor(should(that(state(sponsor( the(scale(and(type(of(weapons(available(outside(state( choose(to(use(its(full(capacity(to(prosecute( sponsorship(and(the(limits(that(would(impose(on(the( the(war?(if(not,(why(bother(with(the( movement's(military(strategy. complications(of(a(state(sponsor(at(all? Figure 30 - Implications and Future Research Pathways: Resilience

To be a resilient organization you need to diversify your sources of income and most likely will need to build substantial and sustainable sources of legal and illegal income early in the organization’s life. Larger illegal operations, however, substantially increase the risk of warlordism or gangsterism and could fragment the movement. The management of this tension can be overwhelming for all but the most clear-minded and disciplined political movements that have a well-developed set of norms about the restrictions on the use of looted funds for personal gain. State sponsorship of dissident violent movements has gotten a lot of scholarly attention but there may be less need for state sponsors (at least for financial reasons versus

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sanctuary) than prior research has shown. The freedom to operate without the political or operational restrictions of a large sponsor reduces the mission distractions that come from over-reliance on one/few major donors.

Considerations and Research Paths Regarding Factors of Legitimation The third package of considerations/research paths are regarding the factors of legitimation and are summarized in the table below.

Figure 31 - Implications for Future Research: Indicators of Legitimation

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There is a hierarchy of factors of legitimation that warrant more versus less effort to manage. The Level of Public Accountability is the primary factor and should attract the most management attention especially given its apparent tendency to become more challenging to sustain over time. The level of professionalism is a necessary condition to build power legitimation – inefficient, reckless and stagnant organizations are less credible and less able to execute their visions. While it may seem obvious to achieve a high level of professionalism, there are many ideological and material reasons that slow this process down for these types of organizations.

Their enemies systematically assassinate key members of the movement. Security reasons tend to limit who is even able to join these movements let alone rise in the ranks – loyalty and trustworthiness often trump technical competence.

The security apparatus is vital to maintain internal discipline, defeat internal coups and detect and punish intelligence leaks. But the main military and political mission is a resource-intensive effort and will leave little extra resources for this function. A major effort needs to be made to mobilize the masses to at least passively support the organization by limiting/eliminating the flow of information to the movement’s enemies as well as to identify sources of leaks. Make it the people’s responsibility to be part of operational security.

398 Chapter 7 – Summary Perspectives To Legitimate or Not to Legitimate? The three organizations studied in this research all made conscious strategic choices to become mass movements. Whether they consciously decided to legitimate their power can only be ascertained in the actions that they took over the years. I suspect that there was not a leadership meeting with the agenda item:

”Should we legitimate our power?” But there was a conscious decision to build a broader political base to support the movement for each of these groups.

Hezbollah, Hamas and SF/PIRA all had competitors that aspired to similar goals and sought to build support from the same constituencies be that Shia

Muslims in the different parts of Lebanon, Sunni Muslims in the Palestinian

Territories or Irish Republicans in Derry, Dublin, Belfast or Newry. These groups did not walk in uncontested and build their political base. They emerged from an often crowded field of competitors – or the field became crowded after their early successes – and they needed to compete for the right to represent the people. Some of their competitors decided that they would only be a clandestine military operation and forgo the open political contestation. Others tried but failed to legitimate their power to the people.

At this point I will provide a preliminary analysis of the relative value of the strategy to legitimate versus not legitimate and reflect on the fate of those that tried and failed to compete against Hezbollah, Hamas and Sinn Fein/PIRA.

Competitors - Their Resilience and Legitimation Each of the three organizations studied in this iteration of the research had competitors for the constituencies that they served (see table below).

Table 55 - Competitors: Their Resilience and Legitimation

Organization Selected Direct341 Competitors Studied (Start – End Years) (Total Years) Hezbollah Amal (1974342 – current)

Sinn Fein/ Official IRA343 (1969-1972) Provisional Irish Republican Socialist Party (1974-current); Irish IRA National Liberation Army (1974-1988) Republican Sinn Fein/Continuity IRA (1986 – current) Real IRA (1997 - current) Hamas Palestinian Islamic Jihad (1980344-current); Jaysh al Islam (2006345 – current); Popular Resistance Committees (2000346 – current)

As noted in the table above, all of the competitors exhibit at least durability

(i.e., length of time in operation), if not resilience. Hezbollah’s primary competitor for the Shia community in Lebanon has been in existence for 39 years as of this writing. Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA have faced a host of splinters from the

341 In all cases, there were other groups who competed with the specific organizations noted. I have not done an exhaustive inventory at this stage. But for purposes of discussing the relative merits of the ‘to legitimate or not’ strategy, this collection is sufficient. In all cases, these groups represent the major direct competitors of the groups studied. Direct competitors have comparable objectives and political philosophies. Fatah, for example, is not listed as a direct competitor in this analysis since it was a secular group. 342 Norton (1987); Ajami (1986). 343 Maloney 2002; Horgan 2013 for all dates for competitors to SF/PIRA. 344 Abu-Amr (1994) 345 http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Jaish- al-Islam-Gaza-and-the-West-Bank.html (last accessed January 30, 2013) 346 Byman 2011:121.

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IRA that existed in 1969.347 Hamas has been challenged politically by the PIJ since its birth and since 2000 has faced an increasing array of Islamic competitors – some are Al Qaeda derivatives in that they practice the Salafi form of Islam (ICG Middle

East Report #104). Except in the case of Hezbollah (Amal) none of the competitors was able to mount a successful bid to take political ground from any of the three organizations studied. In all cases, the three organizations studied dominated their direct political competitors politically, militarily and economically during the periods under review. Sinn Fein/PIRA consolidated its power in 1986 in the

Republican community and never looked back. Hamas is an unfinished story but, in most respects, their competitors are under Hamas control both politically and militarily. In Hezbollah’s case, they militarily challenged Amal, the incumbent Shia power from 1988 to 1991 and defeated them. Following Amal’s disarming after the

Lebanese civil war in 1991 and its slide backwards into the corruption of the

Lebanese government, Amal all but disappeared as a political force in the Shia community and Lebanon at large. Amal is now a subordinate partner in the March

8th alliance that Hezbollah and Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement dominate. Amal has been a non-factor in the Shia community politically since Hezbollah decided to enter the political game in 1992.

The implication of this preliminary analysis is that it would appear that the payoff for an organization to legitimate its power is the production of a larger resilience footprint than would otherwise be possible. In addition, this larger

347 Horgan (2013) details the ever-increasing supply of dissident Irish Republican groups that have proliferated following the Good Friday peace agreement in 1998.

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resilience footprint helped the organization achieve critical mass such that it could credibly attempt, if not succeed, in leading the achievement of their transformative goals even while subject to substantial shocks. All of the competitors wanted to achieve at least one of the super priorities of their comparator in three organizations studied. They sought a transformative political agenda. They just didn’t have the same capacity to execute as those organizations that legitimated their power to successively broader constituencies of followers, alliance partners and sponsors/donors.

Strategic Choices In fairness, not all of the competitors noted above made the strategic commitment to legitimate their power to broader constituencies. Some chose the path of being the vanguard party and provoke collective action by their example.

The PIJ are a good example of this strategic choice. They never saw themselves as becoming a mass movement party. “PIJ militants see themselves as people who lay the groundwork for the day when the Islamic Arabic army will be able to destroy

Israel in a military confrontation” (Alexander 2002:29). They have fashioned themselves on the legacy of Izz-al-din-al-Qassam348 whose exploits against the

British in the 1935 sparked the ensuing four year revolution against the British. The

PIJ also saw their military operations in the mid 1980s as the spark for the first intifada (Abu Amr 1994:99-100). They see themselves as ‘fire starters’, not the organization to mobilize and drive the mass movement. In a similar vein, the Real

348 http://www.rohama.org/en/content/87 (last accessed January 30, 2013).

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IRA see themselves as a vanguard movement not unlike the IRA did in the Border

Wars of the late 1950s/early 1960s (Horgan 2013).

In contrast to the PIJ and Real IRA who made the strategic choice not to commit to the effort to legitimate its power, Amal, the Official IRA, the Republican

Sinn Fein/Continuity IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) all tried and failed to legitimate their power to broader constituencies. The Official IRA conducted guerilla operations against the British security forces from 1969 to 1972 and sought broader political and economic support from Republicans in the north and the Republic of Ireland (Bell 1997; Maloney 2002; Coogan 2002) and attempted to legitimate themselves as the rightful bearer of the duty to unite Ireland in alignment with the spirit of the 1916 Easter Rising. They effectively ceased military operations in 1972 and morphed into the non-violent Worker’s Party that subsequently drifted into political anonymity.349 The Marxist-oriented INLA tried to fill the vacuum created from the split between the Official350 IRA and the

Provisionals with a socialist economic agenda as well as unification focused political agenda. They formed their base from Derry vs. the PIRA stronghold of West Belfast.

The INLA and its political wing, the IRSP, had limited political appeal and nominal military impact during their lifetimes. These examples are representative of all of the remaining competitors based on the limited research to date.

349 As usual in the history of the IRA, remnants of the Official IRA splintered and maintained a low intensity campaign against as well as the PIRA until 1975. 350 Prior to the split the Official IRA did not exist. I use it here to clarify the outcome of the split of the IRA in 1969 (formally in January 1970) into the Official and the Provisional IRA.

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Payoffs for Legitimating Power – Competitor Comparison Though not systematically evaluated as part of this research, I would expect the resilience footprints of Hamas, Hezbollah and SF/PIRA to be substantially larger than any of their competitors when assessed for comparable shocks. Based on limited reading to date about these competitor groups as discussed above, I would also expect the legitimation structures of the competitors to show substantively weaker forms (i.e., more factors closer to absence or confused, at least those factors that this research demonstrates have an impact on the production of resilience).

The payoff for the three organizations that legitimated their power compared to their competitors who would not or could not, is their ability to control the political process largely as they see fit. The larger resilience footprint reflects the more robust stores of political, military and economic capital. The superior legitimation structures reflect the superior stores of social capital. They effectively are positioned to lead the various groups that may compete for common constituencies and have common interests in the transformation agenda. The legitimated power has the ability to coerce or incent competitors or simply ignore them with no risk. The leader has the burden of leadership and all that entails political, military and economically, but they are in a position to set the course and speed of the broader insurgency complex. By dominating they attract the greater share of political power, sponsor dollars and military equipment.

Legitimation for Whom? As noted in chapter 1 of this manuscript, an organization’s attempts to legitimate its power could vary depending upon the audience to whom it is

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legitimating itself. Four primary audiences were noted: Followers, Sympathizers,

Sponsors/Donors and Alliance Partners. This research provides preliminary insights to how the legitimation structure could change based on the influences of different audiences and the context of the organization. I will use the abbreviated terms for the six legitimation factors.351

What Matters to Followers and Sympathizers352 Followers and Sympathizers of the three organizations under study had fears that the organization to which they were committed would exploit them once they become powerful enough to do so. Beyond this basic fear they also had great expectations. They expected the organization to be true to its core beliefs (i.e., Islam,

Republicanism). They expected the organization to produce the outcomes related to the common interests of the leader and the follower and reflected in the organization’s super priorities. They expected those outcomes to be produced in a time frame that was meaningful to the Followers and Sympathizers. If it was to be longer then expected then they needed to manage the expectations of the group by making ‘down payments’ on the ultimate outcomes. If the organization needed the

Followers to help then they should know how to make them useful and not compel them to do so – it should be built into the culture of the community for all to share the load. Beyond these basic needs the Followers of these groups expected the

351 AOV: Absence of Violence; LOA: Level of Autonomy: LPA: Level of Public Accountability; LPro: Level of Professionalism; Outcomes as stated; LCT: Level of Cheap Talk. 352 This research did not segment the Followers and Sympathizers such that I could assess the relative importance of different needs by Follower segment. This aspect will be explored in future iterations of this research.

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organization to give them hope for a better future, a political identity that encapsulates the promise for a better day.

To hope to meet these needs the organization needed to be highly professionalized in administrative and military matters (LPro). That professionalism needed a prominent element of fairness in administration and freedom (LPro) from the appearance and fact of corruption (LPA). Exploiting the loyal Followers and Sympathizers through coercive violence or the use of unlawful violence to maintain power will degrade the organization’s legitimacy. Rooting out and executing informants is acceptable. Extracting protection money from loyal followers is not. The organization needs to be clearly seen as making demonstrable progress – and sustaining it – in its accountability to the public (LPA) but especially to the Followers and Sympathizers who may not share the goals but not the ardent commitment to the transcendent philosophy of the group (e.g., Islam or Irish

Republicanism). Competing for elections were a good thing but proof that you are listening to the most important people’s needs (seen in actions and outcomes that are binding) is just as important as competitive elections. They need to be seen at least as emerging regarding cheap talk (LCT). The mix of public versus private goods needs to increasingly move towards more public goods or else you will be perceived as a private militia (Outcomes). The organization has to seen to be wholly committed to producing the political identity that inspires hope for a better day

(Outcomes – Intangible). This identity should be inclusive of as many of the electorate as possible – the more exclusive it is the less likely it will gain traction and produce the legitimation needed for Outcomes.

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What Matters To Sponsors353 Sponsors have to contend with the Principal/Agent dilemma. They want the investment they make in these organizations to pay off as promptly as possible although ideological affinity between parties will lengthen the timeline for delivering results. Sponsors generally like to control their ‘assets’ (Byman et al

2003) and ensure that they deliver on their promises and, perhaps, do some ‘special projects’ for them in the meantime (e.g., Abu Nidal with Sadaam Hussein and

Moammar Qaddaffi). Sponsors place a high value on performance and professionalism in that performance. They are investing in the organization because they believe that it can deliver the outcomes that the state needs – one of which is to bloody and embarrass a common enemy (Israel, the US or the UK in these cases).

They do not want any blowback from their support for the group that could complicate their diplomatic challenges in the international community. They fear loss of control of the group that they are financing and equipping and need to have confidence that the group will not do anything unwise that would compromise the success of the overall goals or leave a trail to the sponsor (if they don’t want that trail).

Syria was an impatient sponsor with tenuous ties to the Islamic groups but strong political and military incentives to support them. Iran was a patient sponsor with ideological affinity with Hezbollah and Hamas and strong political and military

353 I do not speak to donors in detail in this manuscript. They are wealthy individuals whose interests may vary for highly personal reasons. I presume they are self-interested actors that may or may not align with the Followers and Sympathizers discussed above.

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incentives to support them. Libya was a distracted and unreliable sponsor whose strategic commitments to SF/PIRA were less than reliable. Given the high degree of alignment between Hamas and Hezbollah’s resistance goals and the goals of these sponsors, it is not surprising that they generally gave these groups a ‘long leash.’ It was rare, if at all, that these groups were used as proxy terrorists for their sponsors or that they needed to use coercive force to compel them to do their bidding. This slack would not have been possible unless these groups were performing as professionally as they were – they were very good at what they did and that mattered to states that were used to dealing with professional armies to effect the military affairs of the state. The Followers and Sympathizers of Hamas and

Hezbollah and also Hezbollah’s alliance partners were less concerned with the appearance of dependence on Iran and Syria. The movements did enough to dispel the fears that they would be diverted from the immediate mission of resistance to

Israel or dealing with the social challenges in their societies. The fight was taken to

Israel and the relief flowed to the most in need in their societies. Sinn Fein/PIRA’s challenges were different in that state sponsors were gone by 1987 (and Libya’ feckless support was not seen as compromising the PIRA) and even before this presented no appearance of the loss of independence to their followers or alliance partners. The SDLP was not concerned that the PIRA was going to lose focus on the mission at hand due to ‘special services’ for Qaddafi and Libya.

State sponsors logically look for the top performers and ideally they are ideologically of like-mind. Iran had a good fit with Hezbollah ideologically and an acceptable fit with Hamas. Libya was more opportunistic with regards to its support

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for the PIRA and simply wanted to harm Britain. The ideological fit was tenuous at best and it showed in the relatively inferior quality of the military equipment that it provided to the movement.

What Matters to Alliance Partners 354 Alliance partners generally regarded LPA as critical to legitimation and especially so in the SF/PIRA case. SF/PIRA was highly dependent on its partners – especially the SDLP - for progress in the peace talks and its overall legitimation to the broader communities it sought for support. The SDLP was critical to the eventual disarming of the PIRA and the easing of Sinn Fein into a more mainstream political platform. The SDLP’s base was originally more middle class and educated

Irish from Derry. This segment of the electorate was largely out of reach for t Sinn

Fein as long as a vote for Sinn Fein meant a vote for violence. Sinn Fein ultimately grew in its electoral support at the expense of the SDLP but would likely have never gotten to its current scope of influence without them. Sinn Fein had to move considerably in its political philosophy to find common ground with the SDLP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The full commitment to constitutional means to achieve its political goals (LPA) was central to Sinn Fein’s ability to build a broader political base and achieve as much as it did politically.

Hezbollah’s primary alliance partner, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, was, to some extent, riding the coattails of Hezbollah and was less sensitive to the LPA of

354 I will treat only two alliance groups in this discussion: the SDLP with regards to the SF/PIRA and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) with regards to Hezbollah. Hamas had no substantive political alliance partner during the periods that I reviewed.

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the movement. FPM had been ostracized from the other main Christian party and needed a political partner to have any hope of influencing public policy even in the corrupted environment of Lebanon. Hezbollah needed a political partner and Aoun was an unlikely choice given his virulent anti-Syrian history.

Beyond the need for LPA, the Alliance partners looked for all of the things that Followers or Sympathizers would want: professionalism, fairness, outcomes, no cheap talk and freedom from co-optation by a sponsor. They needed to know that their partner was an able and efficient operator and was dedicated to the achievement of their common interests. Excellence in these dimensions of legitimation would mitigate the same basic exploitation fears that Followers and

Sympathizers have.

Potential Crosscutting Interests To what extent did the need for these organizations to legitimate their power to different audiences, confound that process? I will briefly review the crosscutting interests that were active in these cases and provide a preliminary assessment of the impact on the legitimation structures of these organizations.

Control vs. Cooptation

Sponsors want control of the non-state actors that they invest in. The organization and its followers want to avoid being co-opted to do the bidding of a sponsor when it conflicts with their conception of the course and speed of their mission. While this was potentially possible in all of the cases studied (LOA scores were generally coded low), I observed little actual cooptation of these organizations

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by their sponsors. Based on my understanding of all three of these organizations, the mitigation of this dilemma was primarily due to the close alignment between sponsor and organization around their fundamental missions.

Iran and Syria invest in a variety of non-state actors but Hezbollah is clearly one of their safest investments given that their mission is to deter Israel and their high level of competence to do so. Hezbollah’s loyalty to their sponsors is steadfast and shows clearly in their staunch support for Syria even when pressed domestically. Strangely, Syria is the junior partner in the Iran/Syria partnership and the one most likely to defect from Hezbollah.

Hamas is a shakier bet for the Iran/Syria axis but appears to be the best they have in the Palestinian Territories. Fatah has gotten out of the political violence game and Hamas is the leader of a pack of less attractive options. Hamas is a fierce foe and resilient fighting organization but they are not nearly as skilled military or politically as Hezbollah. They are more vulnerable to Israeli counterforce and have to expend relatively more resources to manage the internal rogues (e.g., rebellious clans and/or militant Salafi groups) who can destabilize their government and inadvertently provoke countermeasures by Israel. Iran and Syria need to exercise more control over Hamas than Hezbollah but the organization is fiercely independent and is less likely to comply for philosophical reasons versus fear of looking like a stooge for its sponsors.

Sinn Fein/PIRA never had to deal with the appearance or fact of being co- opted by a sponsor given the secret nature of the dealings with Libya let alone

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Libya’s whimsical support for the group. SF/PIRA had more legitimacy problems with its record as an armed robber – it had to fend off allegations of gangterism most of its existence.

Indifference

In the case of Hezbollah, Iran and Syria showed interest in having the organization compete for election (1992). While it was arguably more to mitigate the appearance of being a rogue militia, it nonetheless pushed Hezbollah into the public arena for good. It is not clear from my investigation that either sponsor cared about more than the appearance of public accountability since that is more costly than a secret army and potentially a means for the organization to break free from dependence on the sponsor. Especially in the early days of Hezbollah’s political competition, Syria meddled in Lebanese politics to limit the extent the organization’s success (as well as a host of other reasons).

While Syria and Iran were likely pleased with Hamas’ success in the 2006 elections, there is reason to believe that they would have preferred a close second versus the majority position. They want Hamas bleeding Israel not spending all of its calories on governing a virtual prison. With Hezbollah in the majority – and not nearly as talented as Hezbollah – they could foresee a troubled road ahead for the movement. While these interests do not necessarily mean that the sponsors do not want Hamas competing for office, it says more about the instrumental way they view it. The needs of the Followers and Sponsors diverge around LPA. The sponsors

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are benignly neglectful while the Followers and Sympathizers want strong and sustained progress.

The indifference also stretches to the use of coercive violence or unlawful use of violence to maintain power. The sponsors care about the goal of bleeding Israel and little to nothing about the organization’s use of violence against its own people.

That is an internal matter. This is another case of benign neglect versus active opposition to the needs of the Followers and Sympathizers.

Conclusions

In these cases I found fewer differences between and among the audiences than I suspect I would find in a broader sample. The very close alignment of key elements of the super-priorities or the weak/absence of a sponsor tended to dilute the full impact of the potential for crosscutting interests. In any case, these groups were exceptional at fending off the internal rancor from rivals or

Followers/Sympathizers with regards to the co-optation risk. I conclude that there was only limited impact on the legitimation structure due to the crosscutting interests of the various audiences.

Plausibility of Alternative Hypothesis and Implications for Future Research The purpose of this research was to assess the viability of the primary hypothesis (i.e., legitimated power is the sufficient condition for resilience of insurgencies relative to three alternative hypotheses. Subject to the limits of the particular cases used in this iteration of the research, this research has

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demonstrated that the primary hypothesis has merit and is a plausible path of inquiry for explaining the resilience of insurgencies.

Each of the alternative hypotheses355 was evaluated for each case (see relevant portions of chapters 3 through 5). The summary of those evaluations are summarized in the table below:

SF/PIRA Hamas Hezbollah H1 - supply conditions weak weak strong

H2 - coercion/incentives weak-moderate weak-moderate mod-strong H3 - exclusion strong weak weak

Table 56 - Summary of Relative Strength of Alternative Hypotheses

As noted above, none of the alternative hypotheses presented a strong challenge to the primary hypothesis for all three cases. There was, however, a strong challenge by H3 (exclusion from power/illegitimacy of state) in the SF PIRA case and a strong challenge by H1 (conditions of supply) in the Hezbollah case. In addition, H2 presented a steady challenge – though uneven in strength - across all three cases. I will discuss possible explanations for these results, the implications for the strength of my claims based on this iteration of research; and, the impact on future research designs in the following section.

Impact on Future Research Designs - Alternative Hypotheses With regards to the overall impact of the challenges from the alternative hypotheses on future research designs, I will expand both the number and variety of

355 See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of the primary and alternative hypotheses.

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cases in general and also include additional events that cover more of the stages of the life cycle of the covered cases. This will likely increase the variation around the dependent variable. In addition, I will include natural competitive pairings of organizations (e.g., Hezbollah and Amal; Hamas and Fatah; the PIRA and the INLA).

Future research will need to also include some sense for the impact of the results produced – the degree of transformation of the society that the organization produces. This also implies that the sampling should include only those organizations that claim that they want to constructively transform a society regardless of whether they seek to legitimate their power or not. Autocrats and democrats and all in between can make claims that they want to transform society.

Who has the more resilient organization (and this most likely to succeed) is the focus of the inquiry.

Preliminary Conclusions about the Overall Explanatory Power of Social Fitness Theory I will briefly discuss my overall sense for the strengths and limits to the

Social Fitness theory as conceived and used in this research.

Strengths The analyst can now gain empirical traction on the otherwise historically vague social phenomenon of legitimated power. There is no need to ‘go inside the head’ of the audience who is the target of the legitimation, since there are sufficient actions or outcomes of these audiences that signal the willingness of those targets

(as a broader community) to obey (or support) the dominant power without the need for coercion or self-interest. Freed from the need to abide by some fictional

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notion of universal legitimacy, the conception of legitimated power in this research is highly contingent on the wants, needs and expectations of the specific audiences of the organization’s legitimation strategy. The six factors of power legitimation used in this iteration are not likely the final conception of all of the critical components for study but they provide an opening into the ‘pathways of interest’ for organizational strategies for power legitimation.

Social Fitness theory has the potential to produce more nuanced insight into the full slate of factors that contribute to an organization’s resilience. Social Fitness theory approach enables a more complete empirical assessment of the correlation between agency of the organization and the resilience of the organization. It provides a more complete set of factors to include in the evaluation of an organization’s resilience beyond merely physical factors and the instrumental choices of state sponsors. It provides a more complete understanding of all the social control function available to an organization; i.e., in addition to coercion and selective payments to self-interested actors, the analyst is now able to include legitimated power to the tool kit to assess its role in social control.

Limits But this instance of the theory is very much focused on the agency of the organization by design. I did not dwell long on the dynamics of how the structural conditions shaped the legitimation dynamics. As noted in the alternative explanations segment in chapter 1, this agency-oriented perspective was not well- represented in the current research regarding resilience (in addition to a bias towards a neo-classical economic mindset to explain leader and follower behavior).

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In addition, the insights into the impact on the different audiences of the legitimation will need much more in-depth analysis in future iterations especially as the tension increases at the various cleavage lines in the social environment in which the group operates; i.e., between Sponsors/Donors and Followers and

Sympathizers; core Followers vs. the outer rings of Followers/Sympathizers;

Diasporas versus Indigenous Followers; Rivals and the International Community (as deconstructed).

The organizations studied in this research lived, fought and competed for election among the primary audiences for whom they were attempting to legitimate their power (i.e., at least with respect to followers, sympathizers and alliance partners). These organizations all had deep social roots in the communities by whom they sought to be legitimated. The results of this research, therefore, do not comfortably account for groups like Al Qaeda who are transformative and a mass movement but who are ‘country-less’ (Roy 2006:58-97). Future iterations of this theory and research need to account for the globally transformative movements and how their legitimation dynamics work in a more diffuse set of Followers and

Sympathizers. Trust building comes from dense and repeated social interactions

(Putnam 1994) and it is less clear to me at this point how Al Qaeda would legitimate its power beyond a close circle of ardent followers (i.e., at least the political portion of the resilience footprint would consistently be relatively smaller than socially rooted nationalist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and SF/PIRA).

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Only one of the organizations in this research had lootable resources (the

PIRA and its armed robbery operations). In future research I want to include groups who have access to natural resources that are lootable to push more forcefully on

Weinstein’s notion that the presence of these resources would pull the organization more towards his ‘consumer’ oriented followership (Weinstein 2007). Groups such as the Taliban (e.g., the Al Haqqani network) are early candidates.

A final consideration to address are those groups that use forced conscription for their fighting units (e.g., the Lord’s Resistance Army). I would expect that legitimation of power for those groups – and more difficult to maintain once it was developed - would be a difficult challenge and that they would likely quickly abandon any serious efforts to do so. I would also expect that the impact of the AOV factor would be much more significant for those groups versus the groups studied in this iteration of the research.

Potential Policy Implications of This Research The results of this research demonstrate that the social phenomenon of legitimated power does have a causal effect on the resilience of insurgencies. These claims are, of course, limited by the constraints of the limited sample selected for this research. Understanding that substantial additional research is needed, I would expect that this iteration of the research would have the most policy relevance to those who craft defense and/or foreign policy to combat or politically oppose organizations such as those studied in this research. The theory and framework used to focus and structure this research could be combined with the more physical capabilities-oriented frameworks that are currently used to gauge an insurgency’s

418

resilience as the strategic basis for political, economic or military countermeasures.

An historic perspective on the changes in the target organization’s legitimation structure as well as correlations with changes in its resilience footprints could be developed within this framework. Building on the findings from this research a set of hypotheses could be formulated and evaluated to assess the efficacy of past countermeasure campaigns. A state that opposes the insurgency can overlay the insurgency’s social fitness scores on the history of its countermeasure campaigns to determine the correlation of outcome of the political, economic and/or military actions. An in-depth understanding of the organization’s legitimation actions and political, economic and military profile are needed.

Once profiled with their social fitness over time, these results can be factored into the assessment of the future role for military, political or economic countermeasures (if any) that would be best to use against this group (or groups similar to it and in comparable contexts) given a particular legitimation structure and resilience footprint. One very specific question that would be triggered is whether military countermeasures would provide any results against groups that are highly rated on the social fitness ‘scale’. Are their roots so deep that nothing short of an all out ‘dirty war’ would be able to unseat them? Should we both with this or adopt a containment strategy that may test our political patience but be more suitable to address this type of opponent?

419

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Appendices

Appendix A: Sinn Fein/PIRA Case – Various Election Results

464

Northern Ireland

Election Body Share of votes Seats Share of seats 1982 Assembly 10.10% 5/78 6.40% 1985 Assembly 11.80% 1989 Assembly 11.20% 1993 Assembly 12.00% 1997 Assembly 17.00% 1998 Assembly 16.70% 18/108 16.70% 2003 Assembly 23.50% 24/108 22.20% 2007 Assembly 26.20% 28/108 25.90% 2011 Assembly 26.90% 29/108 26.80% 1996 Forum 15.50% 17/110 15.50% Election Body Share of votes Seats Share of seats 1983 Westminster 13.40% 1/18 5.50% 1987 Westminster 11.40% 1/18 5.50% 1992 Westminster 10.00% 0/18 0.00% 1997 Westminster 16.10% 2/18 11.10% 2001 Westminster 21.70% 4/18 22.20% 2005 Westminster 24.30% 5/18 27.80% 2010 Westminster 25.50% 5/18 27.80%

Source: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/

465

Share of votes 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% Share of votes Westminster Westminster Westminster Westminster Westminster Westminster Westminster

1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010

Share of votes 30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00% Share of votes 5.00%

0.00% Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly

1982 1985 1989 1993 1997 1998 2003 2007 2011

466

Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann

Share of Share of Election Body seats Seats votes

1982 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 1.00% 0 0.00%

1987 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 1.90% 0 0.00%

1989 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 1.20% 0 0.00%

1992 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 1.60% 0 0.00%

1997 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 2.50% 1 0.60%

2002 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 6.00% 5 3.00%

2007 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 6.90% 4 2.40%

2011 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann 9.90% 14 8.40%

12.00%

10.00%

8.00%

6.00%

4.00%

2.00%

0.00% Series1 Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann Dáil Éireann/Seanad Éireann

1982 1987 1989 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011

467

Appendix B – Sinn Fein/PIRA Case – Analysis of Combatant Casualties

Source: http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/selecttabs.html calculated on November 19, 2012 by C P Dallas-Feeney

Source for incident volumes: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ no data available for 1993 (last accessed November 19, 2012)

Total Incidents Combatant attributed to Lethality per BA RUC UDR total IRA deaths Kill Diff UVF UDA Loy deaths Kill Diff w Loy Kill Ratio Kills by RP IRA incident 1969 1 1 0 1 0 1 #DIV/0! 1 1970 2 2 4 -2 0 -2 -0.50 2 1971 43 11 5 59 16 43 0 43 2.69 59 1972 106 16 24 146 54 92 1 11 12 104 1.93 158 1973 58 13 8 79 30 49 5 10 15 64 2.13 94 1974 45 15 7 67 19 48 3 4 7 55 2.89 74 1975 15 11 6 32 13 19 17 11 28 47 3.62 60 1976 14 24 16 54 15 39 3 7 10 49 3.27 64 1977 15 14 14 43 4 39 2 4 6 45 11.25 49 1978 15 9 7 31 6 25 1 1 26 4.33 32 1979 38 14 10 62 6 56 1 1 57 9.50 63 1980 11 9 9 29 4 25 2 2 27 6.75 31 1981 11 21 13 45 12 33 3 3 36 3.00 48 102 0.47 1982 32 12 7 51 7 44 2 3 5 49 7.00 56 56 1.00 1983 5 19 10 34 2 32 1 1 2 34 17.00 36 134 0.27 1984 9 8 10 27 12 15 1 1 16 1.33 28 118 0.24 1985 2 23 4 29 5 24 1 1 25 5.00 30 53 0.57 1986 4 12 8 24 6 18 1 1 2 20 3.33 26 45 0.58 1987 3 16 8 27 14 13 2 2 4 17 1.21 31 79 0.39 1988 23 6 12 41 14 27 2 2 4 31 2.21 45 134 0.34 1989 24 9 2 35 3 32 2 2 34 11.33 37 124 0.30 1990 10 12 8 30 3 27 1 3 4 31 10.33 34 107 0.32 1991 5 6 8 19 10 9 2 5 7 16 1.60 26 202 0.13 1992 4 3 7 9 -2 3 3 1 0.11 10 184 0.05 1993 6 6 12 4 8 1 2 3 11 2.75 15 1994 1 3 4 2 2 4 3 7 9 4.50 11 147 0.07 1995 1 1 0 1 0 1 #DIV/0! 1 4 0.25 1996 1 1 2 -1 2 2 1 0.50 3 1997 1 4 5 0 5 1 2 3 8 #DIV/0! 8 1998 1 1 0 1 2 2 3 #DIV/0! 3 1999 0 0 0 0 0 #DIV/0! 0 2000 0 0 0 6 4 10 10 #DIV/0! 10 502 300 196 998 276 722 60 87 147 869 3.15 1145

468

Absolute Diff Ratio 160 Avg Kill ratios 1981-1985 6.67 133 Avg Kill ratios 1986-1990 5.69 38 Avg Kill ratios 1991-1995 2.24

The kill ratio uses the total

combatant kills by the PIRA and divides by the PIRA deaths.

era Kills/Incident 1971-1975 0.86 1981-1985 0.51 1986-1990 0.38 1991-1995 0.13

The Kills/incident calculation uses the total combatant kills by the PIRA forces and divides by the total incidents for that period. It is a crude proxy for battlefield lethality of the PIRA. These data suggest a

considerable decline in the lethality of the PIRA operations as the Troubles progressed.

Rate of Rate of Decline IRA Deaths/ Decline since (ivrease) incident 1971-1975 IRA Deaths 1971-1975 132 Incident Vol 1971-1975 516 0.26 IRA Deaths 1981-1985 38 247% Incident Vol 1981-1985 463 0.08 212% IRA Deaths 1986-1990 40 -0.05 Incident Vol 1986-1990 489 0.08 0% IRA Deathsl 1991-1995 25 60% Incident Vol 1991-1995 537 0.05 76%

469

Appendix C: Hezbollah Operations: 2004 - 2008

Source: Global Terrorism Database (START)

470