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How JIHADISTS USE INTERNET DISCUSSION FORUMS Mohammed Ali Musawi Quilliam Is the World’S First Counter-Extremism Think Tank

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HOW JIHADISTS USE INTERNET DISCUSSION FORUMS MOHAMMED ALI MUSAWI Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank. Located in London, our founders are former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist organizations. Quilliam aims to generate new thinking through informed and inclusive discussion to counter the Islamist ideology behind terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures. Our strategic communications work involves research projects, training seminars, public events, specialist roundtables and media campaigns to empower civil society to work towards improved national cohesion, Muslim integration through respect for scriptural diversity, and encouragement of political pluralism. For further information contact: Quilliam Email: [email protected] Tel: +44 (0)207 182 7280 www.quilliamfoundation.org Cheering for Osama: How Jihadists use Internet Discussion Forums Quilliam, August 2010 © Quilliam 2010 - All rights reserved ISBN number: 978-1-906603-13-7 Disclaimer: The views of individuals and organizations used in this report do not necessarily reflect those of Quilliam. Cheering for Osama Contents Contents Introduction 4 Methodology 6 Chapter One - Overview of Jihadist Forums 7 Standard Jihadist discussion forums 8 Types of forums used by Jihadists 12 Al-Qaeda affiliated 12 Iraqi insurgency 14 Salafist 15 Palestinian insurgency 15 Others 15 Spotlight: Medād al-Sūyūf forum 16 Chapter Two - Cyber Proselytizing and Recruitment 18 On Jihadist websites 18 On non-Jihadist websites 20 Chapter Three - Key Jihadist Beliefs 26 The Saved Sect 29 ṭāghūt 34 al-walā’ wal barā’ 41 Chapter Four - Conversational Trends 48 Defense of global Jihadist ideology and its violence 48 Exposition of the internal enemies of Islam and Muslims 56 Criticism of anti-Jihadist Salafists 56 Criticism of the Shī‘a 59 Exposition of ‘deviant’ and heretical sects who ‘worship manmade laws’ 65 Conclusions 69 Recommendations 72 Glossary 75 Appendix 77 Introduction Cheering for Osama Introduction As is now well known, the Internet, an essential part of modern life for most people, is also an essential tool for modern Islamist groups worldwide. During the last decade Islamist groups, both terroristic and ostensibly non-violent groups, have established a strong Arabic-language web presence. This allows them to directly reach both committed supporters and potential recruits around the world. Al-Qaeda and other Jihadist terrorist organizations are no exceptions. However, whereas other Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Jamaat-e-Islami have largely sought to communicate through official websites, al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups today largely communicate not through dedicated websites but instead through a range of online discussion forums. These Arabic-language forums are now widely recognised as essential hubs for the propaganda, radicalisation and recruitment efforts of al-Qaeda and its supporters. Bearing in mind the threat that such extremist web forums clearly pose – namely that some of those who visit them will come away more supportive of al-Qaeda and its ideology – Quilliam has produced the following report. Its key aims are: • To show how Jihadist movements use web forums to consolidate their existing followers and to recruit new ones • To illustrate how Jihadists, and their online supporters, use theology and ideology to justify their violent actions • To suggest how western governments can better challenge the worldview and ideology propagated on these forums This report – which focuses exclusively on Arabic-language websites – should be understood in the context of three important trends in the Arab world: rapidly rising Internet usage,1 high levels of youth unemployment,2 and the continuing lack of real political change and sufficient peaceable outlets for legitimate political dissent. These factors together create a situation in which Jihadist websites which offer radical, utopian solutions to complex socio-economic and political challenges can easily appeal to young people who are bored, frustrated and lack basic opportunities to live full and productive lives. The potential consequences of al-Qaeda’s ideology being adopted by large numbers of young people in the Arab world do not need to be spelt out. Unlike other reports on online extremism which have tended to focus on the structural, technical or social aspects of extremist websites, this report has chosen to focus more explicitly on their 1 International Telecommunication Union, ‘Information Society Statistical Profiles 2009 Arab States’, 2009. http:// www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/ind/D-IND-RPM.AR-2009-R1-PDF-E.pdf. 2 See, for example, Baṭālat al-shabāb al-‘Arabī al-a‘alā fi al-‘ālam, Al-Jazeera, 21/12/2009. http://www.aljazeera. net/NR/exeres/FC59979D-466E-43E6-ACEB-F53316920CAF.htm, and International Labour Organisation, ‘Global employment Trends – Update’, May 2009. http://www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/ trends/documents/publication/wcms_114102.pdf. Cheering for Osama Introduction content; in other words, to direct attention towards the message rather than the medium. This will not only help policy-makers to more effectively understand the dangers posed by extremist websites, and how to better tackle them, but will also allow a more informed approach to challenging extremism more widely. Terms used The following terms have been extensively used throughout this report and although we do not claim that they are universally accepted, readers should be aware that the following definitions reflect what we mean when we use these terms. Islamism: The belief that Islam is a political ideology. It claims that political sovereignty belongs to God rather than the people. Islamists believe that their reading of sharī’a should be state law, and that it is the religious duty of all Muslims to create and pledge allegiance to an ‘Islamic state’ that reflects these principles. Jihadism: Non-state violence used in the cause of Islamism. Just as Islamism is the politicization of Islam, Jihadism is the modern politicization of jihad. Jihadists take the traditional concept of jihad and use it as a political tool to achieve a political end. Salafism: A revivalist Sunni Muslim trend that believes that Muslims should shed traditional theological edicts and instead derive new religious verdicts directly from the sources. Salafism includes the subsets of Wahhabism, Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism. Wahhabism: A heterodox and obscurantist conservative Sunni revivalist movement, founded by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in the 18th century. It is popular in Saudi Arabia and retains a socially conservative, austere and vacuous interpretation of Islam. Salafi-Jihadism: A current within Salafism which regards violence as the only way to spiritual and political self-fulfillment. Methodology Cheering for Osama Methodology The research for this report involved surveying a large number of Arabic-language websites frequented by Islamist extremists. These included pro-Jihadist discussion forums, as well as more general blogs, websites and online libraries. The research was conducted over a period lasting more than a year, between January 2009 and May 2010. Gradually, the research focused on the discussions posted on around twenty forums on which Jihadist sympathizers were active during this period. The majority of these sites, however, do not have stable web addresses due to being constantly shut down by various national authorities and instead have various, rapidly-changing mirror sites. The following websites and discussion forums were constantly monitored for this report, although not all were quoted from (some have also since been taken offline): 1. Al-Fallūja (unstable address) 2. Shumūkh al-Islām (unstable address) 3. Al-Taḥaddī (unstable address) 4. Al-Shūrā (taken offline) 5. Ma’ārik Islamic network (unstable address) 6. Al-Lūyūth (unstable address) 7. Al-Mūjāhidīn (unstable address) 8. Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn (unstable address) 9. Medād al-Sūyūf (http://www.almedad.com/vb/) 10. Minbar al-Tawḥīd wal Jihād (http://www.tawhed.ws/) 11. Muntadyāt Bayt al-Maqdis al-Jihādīyya (http://www.al-amanh.net/vb/index.php) 12. Al-Būrāq (http://alboraq.info/) 13. Ḥānīn (http://www.hanein.info/vb/forum.php) 14. Fursān al-Ḥaq (http://www.forsanelhaq.com/) 15. Al-Multaqā (http://ikhwan.net/vb/index.php) 16. Shabakat Filasṭīn lil Ḥiwār (http://www.paldf.net/forum/) 17. al-Ḥisba (unstable address) 18. Anā al-Muslim (http://www.muslm.net/vb/) 19. Shabakat al-Difā’ ’An al-Sunna (http://www.dd-sunnah.net/forum/index.php) 20. Aljazeeratalk (http://www.aljazeeratalk.net/forum/) Cheering for Osama Overview of Jihadist forums Chapter One – Overview of Jihadist forums Jihadists began using the Internet almost as soon as it became accessible to the public in the 1990s.3 As with many other terrorist groups and movements seeking to communicate their cause and demands to a local, regional or global audience, the Internet presented obvious opportunities.4 Previously, terrorist groups had relied upon conventional media outlets to report their activities and publicize their grievances and ideology. However, conventional media is not the most efficient tool for a terrorist group’s public messaging, especially if governments intervene to prevent reporting about terrorist groups or if the media presents such groups unsympathetically. In addition to offering an uncensored channel of communication, websites can also be
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