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JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

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JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment S E C R E T // NOFORN I 12O30O6O3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTFGTMO-CG 3 June2005 MEMORANDUMFOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lstAvenue, Miami,FL33172. SUBJECT:Update Recommendation to Releaseor Transferto the Controlof AnotherCountry (TR) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9IR-000555DP(S) JTF GTMODetainee Assessment 1. (FOUO)Personal Information: o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: Abdul Majid Muhammed o Aliases and Current/TrueName: Abdul Majid Muhammed: Jafar Mnzai o Place of Birth: Zahedan.Iran (IR) o Date of Birth: I January1979 o Citizenship: Iran o IntemmentSerial Number (ISN): US9IR-000555DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineehas been diagnosed with severeAnti-social Personality Disorder.His long-termprognosis is poorwith expectedcontinued frequent use of psychiatric servicesfor poor impulsecontrol and maladaptive behavior pattem. 3. (S//NF)JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMO recommendsdetainee be Releasedor Transferred to the Controlof AnotherCountry $R). b. (S//NF)Summary: JTFGTMO previouslyassessed detainee as Release or Transferto the Controlof AnotherCountry (TR) on 27 September2002. For this updaterecommendation, detainee is assessedas not beingaffiliated with Al-Qaidaor the Taliban. Detaineewas involved in the saleand trafficking of drugs. Detaineepossesses CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20300603 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O30O6O3 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 203O0603 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Releaseor Transfer to the Control of Another Country (TR) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9IR-000555DP(S) knowledge of drug trade routes in the region of Afghanistan (AF) and Iran (IR), including familiarity with the transport of poppy and hashishacross the border from Afghanistan to Iran. Detaineehas knowledge of drug production facilities operatedby Aiduk Khan. Though theseillicit operationscould provide revenueand support to Al-Qaida or the Taliban, detaineedenies any knowledgeof this or any other associationwith Al-Qaida or the Taliban. It is assessedthat detaineeis a LOW risk, as he is unlikely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwise noted, the following paragraphsare basedsolely on the detainee'sstatements. a. (S) Prior History: For threeto four monthsafter Ramadanin 1997, detaineeworked as a clerk at Mohamadi'sFlowers, a retail flower shopin Iran. Although a retail florist shop,it alsowas a cover for illegal drug salesof opium, hashish,and heroin. From 1998to 2000, detaineedelivered opium and hashishfor Aiduk Khan, a major Iranian drug trafficker. b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Detaineeowed Aiduk Khan a large debt. To pay his debt, detaineetraveled to Afghanistan in early February 2002looking for construction work as part of the rebuilding effort after the war. As collateral for his debt, Aiduk Khan held detainee'stwo younger brothers. Kahn statedhe would kill them if detaineedid not repay the debt within one year. Detaineetraveled by bus from Teybad,IR, to Eslam Qal'eh, IR, where Iranian border guardsescorted him through the border of Afghanistan. A week earlier, he used a letter issuedby the Islamic Party of Afghanistan office in Shur Gaz, IR, to crossthe border. Detaineehad paid $2,000for the travel letter. c. (S) Training and Activities: Detaineereceived no training and spentthree days traveling to Kabul, AF, looking for work. d. (S) Gapture lnformation: On detainee'sthird day of travel to Kabul, AF, he stopped to washhis clothesat a river in the vicinity of Ghazni,AF. On 13 February2003, an Afghan soldierapproached detainee and accusedhim of being an Al-Qaida member. The soldier captureddetainee in Qalad,AF. Detaineehad 11,000Iranian Rials, 300,000Afghanis and a notebookin his possessionwhen captured.He possessedno other items and was not carrying a weapon. Subsequently,Afghan forces tumed the detaineeover to US forces on 18 February 2002 andthe detaineewas held at Kandahar detention facility until his transfer to JTF GTMO. e. (S)Transferred to JTF GTMO: 2May2002 .) L S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O30O6O3 S E C RE T // NOFORN / I 203OO6O3 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Releaseor Transfer to the Control of Another Country (TR) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9IR-000555DP(S) f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide informationon the following: . Drug trade operationsacross the Afghan-Iranian border o The organization and operation of a large heroirVhashishproduction ring operating acrossthe Afghan-Iranian border o The transportationof poppy and hashishfrom Afghanistan to Iran . Drug production facilities run by Aiduk Khan 5. (S//NF)Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessedthe detainee poses a LOWrisk, as he is unlikelyto posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies. b. (S) Reasonsfor Releaseor Transferto AnotherCountry: . (S) Detaineewas an opium dealerworking for Iranian drug trafficker Aiduk Khan and claimedto haveno knowledgeof Taliban and Al-Qaida activities. (S) Detaineeclaimed he did not know why US forces were in Afghanistan. He had no interest in fighting and only wanted to find work. (S) Detaineedenied knowledge of extremist groups in Iran and statedthat because Iran is mostly Shi'ite, Iran would not tolerateany Al-Qaida in the country becauseAl- Qaidais predominantlySunni. (S) Although the detaineeis cooperativehis veracity is questionable. o (S) Detaineechanged his story on at least three separatedebriefings. He statedhe lied about selling drugs and he really desertedthe Iranian anny. Detaineeclaimed he was trained as a SCUBA diver, paratrooper,in mountain climbing techniques,and was a member of the Revolutionary GuardsMarines. Detaineeclaimed he was a soldier for four to five months, serving in Abu Musa, a small island in the Persian Gulf. It is assessedthat theseclaims are deceptive. Detaineehas a poor masteryof details and claimed that no weights or buoyancy compensatorswere used for his SCUBA training. (Analyst Note: Detainee'sclaims arenot believable.) o (S) US9IR-000676DP(ISN 676) held a conversationwith the detaineeand claimed that during this conversationthe detaineehad confessedthat he had lied to his debriefers. ISN 676 claimed detaineestated that his real name was Jafar Mrczai and that he enteredAfghanistan from Majhat, IR. Detained statedhe worked for the Iranian governmenttaking pictures for the Besig, a military block of the Iranian Army that supportsthe Iranian Republican Guard. (Analyst Note: This claim is similar to other attemptsby detaineeto changehis story. On the inside cover of the notebook 3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20300603 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20300603 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Releaseor Transfer to the Control of Another Country (TR) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9IR-000555DP (S) capturedwith detainee,it reads"In memory of Mr. JafarMtr'zai." Detaineemay have been attempting to take on the identity of a deceasedfriend.) c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee'sbehavior is extremelymaladaptive. Detaineehad severalself-harm incidents and often exhibits extreme emotion. He threatened to harm himself on severaloccasions as an attempt to gain attention. 6. (S/NF) DetaineeIntelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTFGTMO determinedthis detaineeis of LOW intelligencevalue. (S) Detaineemay be valuablewithin JTF GTMO as an informationsource due to his cooperativenature, but is assessedas not possessingany knowledgeof key information or associationsrelating to theTaliban or Al-Qaida.Detainee's knowledge is limitedto illegal drugoperations between Iran andAfghanistan. b. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Illegal drugoperations between Iran andAfghanistan o Informationabout Aiduk Khan,Iranian drug trafficker o Possiblefunding relationship between drug traffrckers and Al-Qaida/Taliban 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatant status was reassessed on 10December 2004, andhe remainsan enemycombatant. J,s- /,2"^ JAY W. HOOD \L-Brigadier .. General,USA Commandins 4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20300603.
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