JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

The Security of the Americas

Autumn00

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL ...we must find a better balance between independence and joint- ness. This is bound to be a painful process. Self-sufficiency is a kind of cultural imperative....But we simply cannot afford to configure each service’s combat forces for sustained, independent operations. The key word these days is jointness. And...jointness means depending on one another. —Merrill A. McPeak JFQ AWord fromthe

MV–22 Osprey on deck of USS Essex.

Chairman U.S. (Jaime D. Hernandez)

espite the unparalleled strength of the instances when nations failed to understand that Armed Forces, we should not become successful methods and technologies applied in complacent. Maintaining the status one conflict may be inadequate in the next. Vic- Dquo will not serve national interests. torious powers benefitted from dramatic innova- The evolving security environment of today, re- tions. Such changes, often regarded as a revolu- plete with new challenges and new opportunities, tion in military affairs (RMA), have occurred demands a capable and flexible military. Our throughout history. New technologies and their great strength is service core competencies. We applications can alter the balance of power as the must expand on them to provide seamless inter- champion of a new RMA assumes a position of operability in joint operations—our first joint dominance. Successful warfare in the Middle Ages core competency. was represented by knights in armor. To over- come them, English yeomen introduced the long- Looking Back bow—a revolution in its day—to defeat the close- In developing a transformation strategy, we in superiority of French arms in the 12th century. can learn from the past, particularly from those (continued on page 4)

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 1 ■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman ■ FORUM by Henry H. Shelton 43 The Security of the Americas 8 From the Field and Fleet: 46 Effective Engagement: The Letters to the Editor Case of Ecuador JFQ by John R. Groves, Jr. 10 1999–2000 JFQ Essay Contest on Military Innovation 51 Human Rights and Military Conduct: A Progress Report 11 Interdependent Maneuver for by George R. Vickers the 21st Century by Antulio J. Echevarria II 58 The Legislative Role in Argentine Defense Reform 20 Nanotechnology in a New Era by Pablo Carlos Martinez of Strategic Competition by Shannon L. Callahan 64 U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security 27 Transformation Trinity— by Ivelaw L. Griffith Vision, Culture, Assessment by Bruce H. McClintock

32 Airpower in the Pacific: A Case Study in Innovation by Thomas E. Griffith, Jr.

38 Rethinking -Marine Corps Roles in by Brian J. Dunn

PHOTO CREDITS

The cover of this issue features two light armored recon- 70 Mexico’s Search for a New naissance vehicles during combined armed exercise (U.S. Marine Corps). The front inside cover captures [from top] Military Identity SH–60F taking off from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower for by Craig A. Deare search and rescue mission (U.S. Navy/Josh Treadwell); Marine small craft during Unitas 40 (2d Marine Divi- sion/Tyler J. Mielke); C–141 approaching Cherry Point 75 Battling Storms: Interagency (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Jerry Morrison); and train- ing for Desert Spring, . The table of contents Response to Hurricane Mitch shows USS Robert G. Bradley leaving Guantanamo Bay by Melinda Hofstetter (U.S. Navy/Danny Hernandez) and Royal Marine in Sierra Leone (CinC Fleet). The back inside cover depicts KC–10A heading into sunset (305th Communications Squadron/John Sidoriak). The back cover presents a panorama from the [clockwise from top]: F–16 with AIM–9 missiles (U.S. /Perry Heimer), Marines firing M–198 at start of ground (DOD/J.R. Ruark), Tomahawk being launched from USS Missouri (U.S. Navy/Brad Dillon), and M1A1 (U.S. Navy/D.W. Holmes).

2 JFQ / Autumn 2000 AUTUMN 2000 / NUMBER 26

■ OUT OF JOINT 100 Meets 81 The Paradox of Joint Culture by Gordon D. Issler by David T. Fautua ■ ■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 87 Organizing British Joint 105 Joseph Lawton Collins Rapid Reaction Forces ■ by Richard M. Connaughton THE JOINT WORLD 106 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, and History

■ OFF THE SHELF 107 Invitation to the Revolution: A Book Review by François L. J. Heisbourg

108 Winning the Good War: A Book Review by Cole C. Kingseed

109 Changing the Guard in Latin America: A Review Essay by Frederick M. Nunn

95 The Coast Guard and by Bruce B. Stubbs

Joint Force Quarterly

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano LTC James Jay Carafano, USA Director Director of Publications Executive Editor Institute for National Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S. Government Printing Office Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 112 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 January 2001

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 3 ■ Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher In general, RMAs reach fruition over a period of years as new technologies or approaches evolve ADVISORY COMMITTEE into final form. One revolution replaces another. VADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN ■ National Defense University In a fast-paced world filled with many innova- Chairman tions, we must anticipate and take advantage of BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman unfolding advances more quickly. An example from the early illus- Col Darrell A. Browning, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and trates this point. French doctrine, manpower, and Brig Gen Richard B. Bundy, USAF ■ The Joint Staff matériel appeared to be the best on the continent VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN ■ Naval War College after I. To guard against another inva- sion, constructed a series of defensive for- ■ MG Reginal G. Clemmons, USA National War College tifications along the German frontier known as A. Denis Clift ■ Joint College the . Unfortunately, this static de- fense was better suited to the threat in 1914 than VADM Scott A. Fry, USN ■ The Joint Staff the assault of 1940. The German concept of com- BG David H. Huntoon, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College bined arms warfare known as made such MG Robert R. Ivany, USA ■ U.S. Army War College efforts irrelevant. The lesson is that combining revolutionary technology and its application can Brig Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College defeat the established tools of war. The key to Maj Gen David F. MacGehee, Jr., USAF ■ Air War College success is understanding core competencies and MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces building a coherent approach to change and ex- tending skills to a new force. We must be vigilant ■ Col John T. Sheridan, USAF Air Command and Staff College to ensure that America leads future RMAs—in Col John H. Turner, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College terms of doctrine, organization, and technol- ogy—and does not instead fall victim to one. Looking through the eyes of military leaders EDITORIAL BOARD of a century ago, would we have anticipated the Stephen J. Flanagan ■ National Defense University advent of the , plane, , and radio— Chairman systems that transformed the nature of war? Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University Would we have embraced new technologies to

Col John M. Calvert, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College Col Stephen D. Chiabotti, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College America has done better than Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University most other nations in exploiting COL David M. Cole, USA ■ U.S. Army War College technological breakthroughs COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S.

Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University meet emerging threats? Or would we have used ■ Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces the technology of the age to breed stronger COL Timothy S. Heinemann, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College horses, build better observation balloons, or forge a more deadly bayonet? It is natural for a domi- CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN ■ Naval War College nant nation to perfect that proved suc- COL Paul Herbert, USA ■ National War College cessful in the last conflict. Less powerful nations, Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College eager to assert themselves, are often more open to new ideas to shift the balance of power in their Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation favor. Thus we ignore change at our peril. William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College If we lack the courage to change and allow

John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago success to blind us to new possibilities, we can be- come like Ferdinand Foch who halted the Ger- LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute mans on the Marne in 1914. As commandant of James H. Toner ■ Air War College the French war college in 1911, this future mar- shal revealed an astonishing view of the poten- LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University tiality of aviation by stating, “Airplanes are inter- LtCol James I. Van Zummeren, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College esting toys but of no military value.” America has done better than most other na- tions in exploiting technological breakthroughs. A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Its record over the past century is filled with

4 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Shelton

USS West Virginia and USS Tennessee, December 7, 1941. DOD

many successes in making heroic sacrifices to fur- overran an American-led force in the Philippines. ther the causes of freedom, democracy, and rule With an extraordinary demonstration of national of law. It played the decisive part in two world will and industrial power, the built and led the United Nations in preventing a mighty land, sea, and air forces to secure victory communist takeover of South Korea. And its sus- in Europe and the Pacific. In 1945, however, we tained role in Vietnam permitted the growth of dismantled our military just as we did democracy across Southeast Asia. America kept following . faith with its principles during a long But only five years after Japan surrendered, and averted a nuclear holocaust. Moreover, the the Nation found itself in a desperate situation. United States led coalitions to thwart the forces of Post-war demobilization and defense cuts stretched Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic. Al- the Armed Forces. U.S. troops in Korea were ill though blessed with economic abundance and trained and unprepared for an from the geographical isolation from foreign threats, the North. Ultimately recovering from near disaster Nation has accepted global responsibilities to and at a cost of over 36,000 lives, America and its build a more secure world. But our triumphs have allies preserved South Korean independence. come at a high price and sometimes after an ini- We must defend national interests whenever tial disaster. and wherever challenges arise. Given success in the This was the case when the Navy suffered an Persian Gulf and Kosovo, some may believe that ignominious defeat at Pearl Harbor and Japan America can remain secure by making only minor improvements in warfighting. The world will not stand still. Unpreparedness exposes us to many threats—some of a new and asymmetric nature.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 5 ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

effects on civil infrastructure as well as military capabilities. It is crucial to protect the security of vital information networks. To confront emerging threats, we are not looking for a fair fight or to be just good enough. Minimum force is not sufficient. We must do bet- ter because maintaining the status quo inevitably risks higher casualties or calls into question our willingness to assist an ally in trouble. The United States has the technological edge, economic power, political system, and cre- ativity to move beyond mere sufficiency. We have an obligation to build and maintain forces to pro- vide overwhelming advantages across the range of military operations to counter any enemy. Pos- sessing overwhelming superiority means that most threats will not materialize because would- be aggressors are deterred. Those who do con- front us must be defeated quickly because rapid termination of a conflict saves lives on both sides. To gain the benefit of full spectrum domi- Signal Company (Christina Ann Horne)

th nance, we must modernize, experiment, improve, 55 innovate, and reshape the Armed Forces to retain M270 at forward clear superiority—regardless of the means any po- operating base in tential enemy may choose. Harnessing our tech- Kcirre, Albania. Unmasking the Future nological edge and organizational expertise can Just as the situation changed for France in keep the U.S. military far ahead of competitors. the interwar period, the security environment is The result will be a capabilities-based force that in a state of flux at present. Indeed it has dramati- synchronizes our strengths to create power that cally changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. will not only deter but also defeat any assault. The is gone and the threat of a nu- Technology alone cannot provide a capabili- clear war has been reduced. The comparatively ties-based force to meet security requirements. We stable bipolarity of mutual deterrence has given must be innovative in organization and training way to a less certain world. as well as in developing new systems. Today many states as well as nonstate groups Transformation will involve combining unrivaled seek asymmetric ways to use technology to service core competencies with joint warfighting negate our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. lessons learned in the recent past. Every triumph We must be concerned and setback has indicated that the keys to success about threats such as are not only technological but functional. For the st the services have adapted to the Osama bin Laden 21 century, we must consider a new joint core competency that transcends service boundaries to new threats while undergoing organization that com- bine great wealth, anti- ensure effective joint warfighting. significant reductions in force Americanism, and reli- The services have adapted to new threats gious fervor. Terrorists while undergoing significant reductions in force. are not bound by con- For example, budget constraints since 1989 have ventional norms of behavior and international cut active Army divisions from 18 to 10, Navy treaties and are often difficult to deter. America ships from 566 to 315, and Air Force fighter must be prepared to defeat this growing threat. wings from 36 to 20. Although the Armed Forces Moreover, we must be concerned over the remain the strongest and most capable in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. world, they rank well behind , China, and They are being sought by the weak, who cannot even North Korea in numbers of personnel. To pose a direct threat and thus opt for asymmetric counter its reduced force size, America needs to methods. Some nuclear, chemical, and biological ensure that its men and women in uniform are weapons can actually be built in basements yet better trained and equipped than ever before. produce devastating effects. Despite the steady pace of military commit- In addition to conventional threats, current ments and reductions in defense budgets since dangers include cyber attacks against information systems. Such strikes can visit disproportionate

6 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Shelton the Cold War we are making great strides. Trans- been chartered to conduct joint experimentation forming an organization as large and successful and develop joint capabilities by identifying tech- as the U.S. military is a major undertaking. nological innovations, creating doctrine to incor- Machiavelli, who witnessed changes brought porate advances, and implementing leading-edge about by the Renaissance, said, “There is nothing concepts to employ that technology. more difficult to undertake, or more perilous to At a time when everyone has access to com- conduct, than to introduce a new order of mercial technology, the military advantage often things.” But the transformation is an important goes to nations that can capture the available challenge that has to be vigorously addressed by technology, incorporate it in weapon systems, the entire defense establishment. and get it fielded first. We cannot afford to fail in that competition. In the Vanguard Finally, the Armed Forces must be trans- To lead a transformation, a military needs a formed with all deliberate speed. Now is the time clear vision of future warfighting, the courage to to prepare—not only for the dangers of the past— implement that vision, and the will to impose it but for new threats that lurk ahead. America can on the military landscape. The vision for the joint no longer depend on the protection of distance; force was laid out in 1996 with the publication of global travel and new technologies make it easier Joint Vision 2010. It established a common lan- to target our homeland. And information tech- guage for the services to develop and integrate nology has created new vulnerabilities while at their unique competencies into a synergistic the same time increasing the productivity and ca- whole. It also established targets for experimenta- pabilities of the Nation. tion by the commands and services. Thinking and acting as a joint force will become We are entering the 21st century from a posi- even more important in the years ahead as we re- tion of strength and prosperity. JV 2020 has spond to the broad new set of security challenges. pointed us in a new and exciting direction. We Joint Vision 2020 builds upon the concep- have instituted measures to ensure the appropri- tual template contained in Joint Vision 2010. It is ate mix of forces and capabilities for the future. a guide for experimentation that will help plan- By combining what has been learned about seam- ners identify and understand the right answers. less joint interoperability with the imperative to It describes in broad terms those capabilities maintain service competencies, we will be able to that will be needed to succeed across the full lead the next revolution in military affairs. I am range of operations. confident that by working together we will suc- Simultaneously applied, dominant maneu- cessfully transform America’s military. ver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection lead to full spectrum HENRY H. SHELTON dominance. This transformation will be affected Chairman by the impact of the information revolution on of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the conduct of military operations and by contin- ued reliance on our proven capacity for concep- tual and technological innovation. New concepts lead to change in doctrine, organization, and ed- ucation that is perhaps more important than technological change, which has been relied upon in the past to stay ahead of potential ene- mies. Without change in operational and organi- zational concepts, we simply apply new technolo- gies to old methods. America is moving along the path toward a transformed military and a dramatically different way of warfighting. We don’t expect overnight changes. There are pitfalls in attempting to trans- form a large organization too quickly or without adequate planning. Thus Joint Vision 2020 seeks to implement new concepts in an orderly and controlled way. To ensure that transformation does not be- come only a catch phrase, we are taking steps to implement new ideas to propel the military to- ward success. U.S. Joint Forces Command has

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 7 ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

“unblinking eye on the future” to exercise foresight struggle against monopolarism, draft doctrine also Letters... as political leaders discounted military moderniza- identified the United States and NATO as the oppo- tion absent any apparent strategic threat. nent. There is continuing tension between that To the Editor—In his article, “Nuclear Prolifer- The last decade has been difficult for the larger but remote threat and imminent dangers that ation on the Indian Subcontinent,” Kenneth Totty Russian military as Chechnya demonstrated. Still, the Ministry of Defense and General Staff face (JFQ, Spring 00) offers some insightful comments. RMA has remained a major theme of within and beyond Russian borders. But progress in But sadly he perpetuates a myth promulgated by and thought. It has competed for attention in the adapting to RMA is apparent. Moscow radically supporters of Pakistan in claiming that: “Islamabad radical transformation of domestic politics, national transformed force structure, eliminating branches favors conducting a plebiscite administered by the economy, and a new security environment. Eco- and consolidating forces. It reduced the number of United Nations that was originally provided for in a nomic decline has made military procurement trou- military districts. Moreover, there is a debate on the resolution passed during the late 1940s, and that blesome, but interest in RMA has not lagged. As in role of the General Staff in defense decisionmaking. New Delhi agreed to but never honored.” However China, the Persian served as a catalyst for A new military-industrial complex is emerging, and this is far from the truth. The ruler of Kashmir, an intensive debate about technological change by foreign military sales sustain research and develop- Maharajah Hari Singh, on learning that Pakistani- transforming the military art and recasting organi- ment, delaying procurement but ensuring modern- backed forces were invading his state, made an ap- zation and force structure. There is no shortage of ization. Russia also moved from a model of mass peal to India for help. But New Delhi indicated that capable thinkers to examine RMA and adapt the industrial warfare and the premise of conventional it would only intervene if Kashmir was considered force to its requirements. superiority to the realm of limited conventional ca- part of its national territory. Finding industrial warfare and nuclear conflict pabilities and a declaratory policy of first use. The When Pakistanis got within shooting range unlikely, Russian theorists began to look at the military mounted its first large-scale exercise in a of the capital, Srinagar, the Maharajah agreed to problem of local armed conflicts and regional wars. decade in 1999, which featured the first use of nu- Indian conditions for assistance. Indian troops inter- Like their Chinese counterparts, they saw Desert clear weapons in a local war that assumed external vened and drove the invaders back, though not en- Storm as a manifestation of RMA in practice but (Western) intervention, weak advanced conventional tirely out of the state. Later the congress of Kashmir warned that the genuine implications of this trans- weapons systems, and the requirement to prevent approved the accession to India. To avoid further formation were incomplete. General Makhmut or counter [de-escalate] such a threat. There is a bloodshed, India agreed with Pakistan to send the Gareev addressed the technological, political, and current debate in the military on nonstrategic nu- dispute to the United Nations. economic trends that would shape conflict over the clear weapons in response to deep-strike precision The U.N. response declared that to reach any next 15 years in If War Comes Tomorrow: The Con- attack. Analysts study foreign military combat de- decision on Kashmir, the state must return to nor- tours of Future Armed Conflicts. He refused to iden- velopments, especially those involving NATO and malcy, which required that Pakistani troops would tify any particular weapon as defining the current U.S. forces. withdraw, Pakistani nationals and tribal groups not RMA and stressed the strategic environment, which The revolution in military affairs knows no resident in Kashmir would leave, Indian troops will promote an “indirect approach” to warfare. nationality and doesn’t favor any particular power. would depart only after a complete of Other works have addressed specific aspects of Its definition depends on individual state percep- nonresidents although some would stay to maintain RMA. V.D. Ryabchuk led specialists from the Frunze tions of the international security system, the de- law and order, and a plebiscite would only be raised Military Academy in a systems approach to the evo- gree and imminence of threats, and interests that it once the above requirements were met. lution of military art under the impact of the current promotes and defends. It exists because of acceler- I would expect this to set the record straight. revolution. They presented military systemology as ating scientific-technical change, which the military —Rahul T. Pandit a new and distinct way of applying a theory of com- has dealt with ever since the . University of Iowa plex systems to tactics and operational art. Vladimir Hawkins should be commended for his research on Slipchenko wrote of sixth generation warfare where the direction of RMA in China, particularly his as- To the Editor—In “The People’s Liberation precision, automated control systems, radio-elec- sessment of its long-term implications for regional Army Looks to the Future,” which appeared in your tronic combat, and information operations replaced security. Getting it right may depend very much on recent forum on transformation (JFQ, Summer 00), deterrence with a paradigm of “no-contact war- internal and external factors that condition national Charles Hawkins provides an interesting view of fare.” Russian theorists have developed a distinct responses to a revolution. The and threat Chinese military modernization and its relationship approach to information conflict and operations. may prove more important in defining RMA in any to the revolution in military affairs (RMA). However, Up to the end of the Yeltsin administration, state than technological determinism. It may prove he makes one claim that is open to challenge: one key obstacle stood in the way of a coherent re- useful to promote comparative studies of national “With the exception of the United States, China has sponse to RMA: identification of the probable main responses to RMA. analyzed the implications of RMA more than any opponent. After the NATO campaign against Serbia, —Jacob W. Kipp other nation.” Hawkins continues by noting the So- pronouncements by the Ministry of Defense left Foreign Military Studies Office viet origins of the term RMA and its application in no doubt that the United States and NATO had as- Fort Leavenworth the 1980s to the transformation of conventional sumed that capital role. Couched in terms of a warfare as associated with precision fires and strikes, the advent of automated control systems, and the transformation of radio-electronic combat. The reader is left with an impression that once the Soviet empire collapsed, interest in RMA waned in WELCOMES Russia. This is incorrect. Interest increased while your letters and comments. the country fell into a deep and protracted crisis. FAX your correspondenceJFQ to (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219 or Those connected to the General Staff urged an send it on the Internet to [email protected]

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Issue 20 (Autumn/Winter 98–99): Articles on joint experimentation, future campaigning, interagency operations, close air support at Kasserine Pass, airpower and the Army-Navy maneuvers of 1925. Issue 21 (Spring 99): JFQ Forum on NATO at fifty (Washington summit), plus joint fires and service competencies, William Owens on jointness, special operations, non-lethal weapons. Issue 22 (Summer 99): Essays on military innovation and contributions by Colin Gray on strategy, airpower in the interwar years, joint doctrine and the Kosovo campaign, air support and in Malaya. Issue 23 (Autumn/Winter 99–00): Focus on space, joint theater air and missile defense, technology and transformation, Vietnam, unified commands. Issue 24 (Spring 00): JFQ Forum on the Greater , plus interagency operations, theater engagement, rethinking two war strategies, joint educa- tion, military advisors. Issue 25 (Summer 00): JFQ Forum on transformation—an international perspec- tive, and joint experimentation, Williamson Murray on innovation during the interwar years, morality and the air war in Kosovo, complete text of Joint Vision 2020.

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Autumn 2000 / JFQ 9 ■ 1999–2000 JFQ Essay Contest on Military Innovation

ilitary innovation is the razor’s edge of strategic competition. In times of danger, states will turn to the in- novators, seeking new ways to extend the reach of national power. The acme of inventive skill is laying the Mgroundwork for strategic advantage before it becomes a matter of national priority. For the United States, contemporary challenges to this task are well Contest Judges known—unclear threats, absence of a peer competitor, Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.), is the director for constrained budgets, an established infrastructure gov- joint history in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of erned by time-honored traditions and operational prac- Staff and member of the JFQ Advisory Committee. tices, a full agenda of global issues and Alvin H. Bernstein is a research professor at the National Defense responsibilities competing for resources University, the founding editor-in-chief of JFQ, and coeditor of The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. and attention—and the most signifi- James R. Blaker is an analyst at Science Applications International cant obstacle of all, knowing how to Corporation and former visiting fellow in the Institute for National innovate. At its root, the current debate Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. over military innovation grapples with Colonel David M. Cole, USA, is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the fundamentals of building sound Staff Chair at the U.S. Army War College and member of the JFQ public policies—setting priorities, se- Editorial Board. lecting the right leaders, crafting a vision, and establish- Colonel Robert A. Doughty, USA, is the head of the Department of ing a framework for implementing change. To add to this History at the U.S. Military Academy and author of World War II: debate, Joint Force Quarterly has sponsored essay contests Total Warfare Around the Globe. on the revolution in military affairs and military innova- Captain D. Scott Ensminger, USN, is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces tion since 1994. This issue includes the work of the win- and formerly taught at the Naval War College. ners of the 1999–2000 JFQ Essay Contest on Military In- Captain Chester E. Helms, USN, is head of the Operational Concepts novation and three essays by other entrants selected by Division in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval the editors. War College and member of the JFQ Editorial Board. In different ways, each essay addresses the require- Mark Jacobson is a professor in the School for Advanced ments for turning innovation into the kind of transfor- Warfighting at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and mation that cuts a new strategic edge. The articles address member of the JFQ Editorial Board. new concepts, radical technologies, rethinking institu- Martin C. Libicki is an analyst at RAND and coauthor of Mind the tional practices, the place of transformational leadership, Gap: Promoting a Revolution in Military Affairs. and restructuring roles and missions. Together, they sug- Thomas L. McNaugher is the deputy director of the Arroyo Center at RAND and member of the JFQ Editorial Board. gest that true military innovation requires a complex re- Lieutenant Colonel David E. Snodgrass, USAF, is a speechwriter for sponse that touches every aspect of an organization and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and frequent contributor all the capabilities of the United States to project power to military periodicals. by land, sea, and air. These contributions offer new voices Colonel Jerre W. Wilson, USA, is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of to the debate on how to best master the daunting task of Staff Chair at the Marine Corps War College and formerly held a providing the best force for the future. JFQ fellowship at the Brookings Institution. JFQ

10 C–17 taking off during Large Package.

Interdependent Air Mobility Wing (Kenn Mann) th

Maneuver 305 for the 21st Century By AUTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II

irtually all intelligence and opera- likely to be flooded with an admixture of techno- tional estimates suggest that war in logically sophisticated and relatively crude preci- the 21st century will require interde- sion and area-fire weapons (including weapons of V pendence among land, sea, and aero- mass destruction) linked by communication sys- space systems. The services report that precision tems from state-of-the-art to the relatively primi- weapons will so expand the range and capabilities tive. At the same time, a dynamic strategic envi- of systems that the tactical deadly zone, once a ronment will add missions and responsibilities. few hundred meters, could extend beyond 200 Thus service interdependence will be necessary at kilometers by 2020. Operational exclusion zones, the low and high ends of the conflict spectrum. designed to deny access to land, sea, and aero- Although Joint Vision 2020 calls for the space forces, might reach 2,000 kilometers. Each is Armed Forces to become fully joint, it provides no operational concept for moving in that direction. Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is director of national The desired endstate, full spectrum dominance, security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War requires becoming better than everyone else at College and is the author of After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers doing everything. A worthwhile aim, it does not Before the Great War. offer the common ground for developing a shared

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 11 ■ INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER

conceptual model of future operations. Even more range of military operations through the applica- disconcerting, two concepts that allegedly support tion of information, deception, engagement, mo- full spectrum dominance—dominant maneuver bility, and countermobility capabilities. and precision engagement—stem from competi- On the other hand, precision engagement is tive rather than complimentary traditions. Unless the ability to locate, surveil, discern, and track reconciled, no move toward interdependence will objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the occur. This article examines the definitional and correct systems; generate desired effects; assess re- historical tensions underlying dominant maneu- sults; and reengage with decisive speed and over- ver and precision engagement and suggests a way whelming operational tempo throughout the full of harmonizing them under a new operational range of military operations. concept, interdependent maneuver. Each concept, according to JV 2020, uses “de- cisive speed and overwhelming operational Conflicting Definitions tempo” and is to be applied across the “full range Documentation such as JV 2020 and Joint of military operations.” But to gain dominant ma- Pub 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, does not pro- neuver one must also carry out all the activities— vide a unifying concept. As presented in JV 2020, “scaling and massing force or forces and the ef- its four concepts—dominant maneuver, precision fects of fires”—contained in the definition of engagement, focused logistics, and full dimen- precision engagement. In fact, on closer inspec- sional protection, and their endstate, full spec- tion, engagement seems to be integral to maneu- trum dominance—are little more than tautologies. ver rather than a separate concept. Indeed, in Dominant maneuver amounts to the capacity to most cases precision engagement will not occur conduct maneuver that dominates, precision en- without some movement of joint forces or assets, gagement equates to the ability to engage with whether it be repositioning intelligence gathering precision, and so forth. Presumably these tautolo- satellites or launching F–16s. Similarly, dominant gies are marks on the wall toward which each maneuver will likely require some form of engage- service (as well as the many partners involved in ment, whether surveillance and tracking hostile defense research and development) should focus. However, since they are self-referential, tautologi- cal concepts tend to be- the lack of a unifying concept is come ends in them- Minuteman III, selves. In other words, Force Development a result of the failure of JV 2020 efforts to improve pre- Evaluation Program. to reconcile dominant maneuver cision engagement tend to take place in isola- and precision engagement tion from similar en- deavors in developing other concepts and could proceed beyond the point at which they contribute most meaningfully to full spectrum dominance. In a world of limited resources, efforts to perfect one capability could undermine the individual and collective effective- ness of others. Thus working toward ideal capabil- ities introduces pitfalls that might run counter to the development of a unifying operational con- cept. A vision document must at some point pres- ent desired capabilities that might come together to achieve battlefield success. Moreover, the lack of a unifying operational concept is a result of the failure of JV 2020 to rec- oncile tensions between dominant maneuver and precision engagement. For example, dominant maneuver means having positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming opera- tional tempo. Widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces—capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the ef- fects of fire—will secure advantage across the U.S. Air Force (AmandaU.S. Air Force M. Edwards)

12 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Echevarria

USS Tarawa operating off Aden. U.S. Navy (David Miller)

or neutralizing cruise missile sites, to per- With emphasis on both physical and psychologi- mit enough movement for positional advantage. cal dislocation, Blitzkrieg represented the epitome Differently put, it is as if JV 2020 defined the of 20th century maneuver theory. terms separately to mollify service interests rather A significant contribution to that theory than to isolate their virtues as concepts. Domi- came in the 1980s and 1990s as American mili- nant maneuver and precision engagement are in- tary writers engaged in a debate over the merits of terdependent—parts of the same activity. firepower versus maneuver. This exchange re- Dominant maneuver and precision engage- sulted in a redefinition of the concept of maneu- ment are defined independently because they ver as the “use of to gain a have evolved from two conflicting traditions. The positional advantage.” Maneuver was thus di- origins of dominant maneuver are rooted in theo- vided into two mutually supporting elements— ries identified with the military canon of the 20th fire and movement, which could be employed se- century, so-called Blitzkrieg doctrine. In contrast, quentially or simultaneously. Fire is subsumed concepts underpinning precision engagement under maneuver. Yet for all its innovation, this emerged from ideas which influenced strategic new definition was applied better on the theory as developed following World than on the operational or strategic levels because War I. coordinating fire and movement over great dis- Loosely associated with the work of Basil tances remained difficult, chiefly because of the Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, and Heinz Guderian, limitations of communication technology. Blitzkrieg (lightning-war) centered on using air The applicability of Blitzkrieg was not limited , fires, and armored at- to land operations. Both land- and seapower tacks to penetrate defensive zones, disrupt com- evolved in similar ways and shared enduring mand and control, and sever lines of communica- principles. and Julian tion and supply. At best the psychological shock Corbett, prominent naval thinkers, relied upon would cause a defender’s resistance to collapse landpower concepts such as central position, suddenly. At worst it would force an enemy to strategic lines of communications, and concentra- fight in encircled pockets, against overwhelming tion of force to gain . Early odds, and with rapidly diminishing supplies. Japanese victories in the Pacific—the fall of Malaya and Singapore in two and a half months, Burma and the Philippines in three and a half

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 13 ■ INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER

C–17 landing at North Field, South Carolina. Combat Camera Squadron (JeffreyCombat Camera Squadron Allen) st 1

months, and the Dutch East Indies in two and a surface attacks to strike directly and perhaps inces- half months—validated the ideas espoused by santly until an enemy capitulated or its capability Mahan and Corbett while confirming that to resist was destroyed. Blitzkrieg would work in theaters in which naval With the appearance of larger aircraft and pre- (including amphibious) operations replaced ar- cision munitions at the end of the 20th century, a mored pincer movements. The essential ingredi- new generation of airpower theorists—notably ent in rapid maneuver was not the armored vehi- John Warden—argued that the technology for cles but pinpoint application and timing of achieving strategic collapse of an enemy was just all-arms attack, followed by rapid exploitation be- over the horizon. Rather than using massively dev- fore an enemy could recover. Accordingly, recent astating , planners could employ studies have concluded that the principles of ma- long-range precision munitions for surgical strikes, neuver warfare on land apply equally at sea. greatly limiting collateral damage. As the range Ideas associated with the- and variety of precision munitions grew, theorists ory emerged concurrent with, but independent of, began to embrace the possibility of executing par- Blitzkrieg doctrine. They were inspired by events allel attacks—numerous simultaneous strikes during World War I such as the bombing of Lon- against critical infrastructure nodes. These attacks don. Six months of air raids in 1915 caused 1,750 would inflict damage on strategic assets that would casualties and created a panic among the British render an enemy incapable of either reacting or re- population. Although the air arms of the day covering, thereby forcing strategic paralysis and could not create or sustain the tempo to induce psychological collapse. the enemy to , in Italy, The principles underlying dominant maneu- Hugh Trenchard in Britain, and in ver and precision engagement share a common the United States believed that airpower, which theme—attacking an enemy psychological center was evolving rapidly, had revolutionized warfare. of gravity. However, the fundamental difference is Accordingly, they argued that it was the best way that the former finds movement as essential to ef- to strike an enemy psychological center of gravity. fect an attack while the latter considers physical By means of strategic bombing, air forces could destruction as key. Both employ tempo, although circumvent the tactical and operational carnage of for dominant maneuver tempo pertains to the pace of physical movement in relationship to that of an enemy. Precision engagement, on the other hand, uses tempo in terms of the rate at

14 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Echevarria

M–1 on range in Korea, Foal Eagle ’00. Combat Camera Squadron (WayneCombat Camera Squadron Clark) st 1

which destruction is inflicted on critical strategic Blitzkrieg Revisited assets. Both concepts also make use of lethality. Practical applications of the conceptual fore- But dominant maneuver uses lethality as a means runners of dominant maneuver and precision en- to facilitate movement while precision engage- gagement have a mixed record. Blitzkrieg doctrine ment employs movement to inflict lethality. was validated by German attacks on Poland, Another difference is the level on which the which fell in one month, Denmark and Norway, concepts apply. Dominant maneuver is found to which succumbed in two months, and France and the Low Countries, which were overrun in one practical applications of the conceptual forerunners and a half months. But for various reasons, not of dominant maneuver and precision engagement the least of which was better training and equip- ment, Germany’s enemies grew less susceptible to have a mixed record the psychological shock of Blitzkrieg as the war progressed. Campaigns between 1941–45, such as be the most applicable on the tactical and opera- those conducted in Russia, North Africa, and Italy, tional levels because of logistic and deployability became protracted as , , and air forces limitations. Precision engagement is often con- adjusted to a new style of war. Victory had to be sidered in terms of strategic applicability because won, more often than not, through costly and de- of the great distances that munitions and deliv- liberate annihilation. On the Russo-German front, ery systems can cover and because their expense for example, where fighting was particularly bit- makes them undesirable when used against tacti- ter, encircled forces held out for extended periods, cal targets. depriving Blitzkrieg of its chief advantage, light- The intellectual tradition behind each con- ning-like decisions. While the conflict remained cept has led to institutional conflict, not only one of movement on all fronts, logistical require- with regard to budgets but to the roles of air as- ments and adaptive opponents limited the ex- sets in campaigns and whether they should be ploiting of tactical victories for operational effect. controlled by a single service. This conflict can- From 1945 to 1995 the concept of Blitzkrieg not be wholly solved with a unifying operational changed more in form than substance. The object concept, but that is a place to start. remained integrating ground, naval, and airpower into decisive strikes to break enemy will to fight

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 15 ■ INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER

results fell short of expectations. Strikes against and industrial sites did not ensure victory. Rather than surrendering en masse, be- came inured to massive devastation. Their will to resist was arguably strengthened rather than di- minished. The bombing of Hamburg in 1943, for example, caused 90,000 casualties in a four- month period, the bombing of Dresden in 1945 killed 80,000 in three months, and the most dev- astating of the Tokyo raids led to 125,000 victims during May 1945. Even with tremendous de- struction, long-range bombing technologies did not generate sufficient tempo or lethality to compel surrender. For a time it appeared that Douhet and his disciples had mistakenly convinced themselves that air arms alone could achieve decisive effects. Then the United States dropped atomic on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing some 220,000 casualties in three days. Technology seemed to fi- nally catch up with theory. From the standpoint of more conventional munitions, however, the events of World War II had neither proved nor dis- proved the case for strategic bombing. From 1945 to 1980 intercontinental ballistic missiles not only expanded traditional strategic distances to global proportions but gave Douhet a renewed relevance. For a while, the capability to deliver long-range weapons of mass destruction against cities and industrial centers, whether dropped from B–52s or launched from sub- marines or missile silos, appeared to render con- ventional forces obsolete. Strategic attack became synonymous with nuclear attack, and strategic theory was focused on concepts such as nuclear deterrence, flexible response, and mutual assured destruction. Fortunately, the practical application of strategic nuclear attack is untested. Meanwhile, the advent of precision-guided munitions meant

Communications Squadron (SarahCommunications Squadron E. Shaw) launching a strategic strike without mass casual- d 2 ties associated with weapons of mass destruction. B–52 being refueled, Long-range precision strikes were viewed as the Desert Fox. new warfare, and campaigns in the Persian Gulf, or destroy its military. The Arab-Israeli, Falklands, Bosnia, and Kosovo have been touted as airpower Panama, and Persian Gulf conflicts proved that victories. Although under the right conditions the Blitzkrieg concept was valid even if defensive such weapons can indeed modify enemy behav- technology was becoming deadlier and enemies ior, the extreme of strategic psychological col- did not always collapse instantly. Still the prob- lapse prophesied by Douhet and Warden has lem of moving beyond operational to strategic proven elusive. exploitation remained. Except in a few cases, ma- neuver forces could not maintain an operational The Human Factor—People’s War tempo that was sufficient to turn tactical success Conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghan- into . istan, and Somalia warned that , civil wars, and remained the Achilles heel of Legacy of Strategic Bombing dominant maneuver and precision engagement. Unlike Blitzkrieg, history shows that the con- Neither concept has been particularly successful in cept of strategic bombing outpaced technology. resolving protracted, internecine, or civil wars. Although most evidence before World War II sug- gested that new air arms had enormous potential,

16 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Echevarria

Marine vehicles in UAE, Iron Magic. Marine Expeditionary Unit, Combat Camera (Branden P. O’Brien) Marine Expeditionary Unit, Combat Camera (Branden P. th 13

Such conflicts generally do not involve limited Reconciling New Ways of War aims such as breaking the enemy will to resist, but To merge the concepts found in JV 2020, a nonnegotiable objectives such as political annihi- unifying operational concept is required to com- lation or genocide. The centers of conflict tend to bine the advantages of rapid movement with the remain dispersed. Time benefits the side that wages benefits of precision strike. It also must unite the a protracted war by offering an opportunity to tactical and operational applicability of dominant learn and adapt. The side that seeks a short, deci- maneuver with the strategic reach of precision en- sive war, on the other hand, suffers a decline in gagement. It must make movement and fire inter- as its expectations are frustrated and its dependent—hence interdependent maneuver. emotional endurance wanes. This means applying principles of fire and The basic element in waging protracted war, movement on all levels of war simultaneously, as Mao Tse Tung noted, is not overwhelming elevating a tactical concept to an operational and force, but patience. Indeed, a decisive in strategic one. This leap in conceptual warfare is the traditional sense was to be avoided. Instead of made possible by expected advances of informa- a classic confrontation of force on the battlefield, tion, maneuver, and firepower technologies over Mao called for first creating and consolidating a the next 20 years (the focus of JV 2020). Interde- political base of support among the populace, pendent maneuver assumes that such advances then expanding that base by bold attacks that will blend the tactical, operational, and strategic forced an enemy on the defensive and then a full- levels of war into a single continuum of military scale counteroffensive. This theory proved suc- activity. In any case, these levels have historically cessful in China and was adopted in other agrar- been little more than arbitrary categories used to ian societies, especially in Vietnam and Cuba. enable planners to assign objectives, resources, Because such conflicts are decentralized, with the and responsibilities. Therefore, rather than ac- front nowhere and everywhere, they pose unique cept such distinctions, one may find it more use- challenges to doctrines that attack the enemy ful to see warfare as consisting merely of military psychological center of gravity by more conven- actions—whether hand-to-hand combat or tional means. While U.S. forces consistently strategic bombing—linked in time and space by achieved tactical victories in Vietnam, political constraints kept them from achieving operational and strategic success.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 17 ■ INTERDEPENDENT MANEUVER

USS Pennsylvania. U.S. Navy (Larry Smith)

myriad information systems. It may also be help- non-line-of-sight weapons. They would be de- ful to divide such actions into fire—the ability to ployed in and around key terrain to provide inflict lethality whether by the tip of a bayonet human intelligence, report battle damage assess- or the virulence of a biological agent—and move- ment, augment other special operations forces al- ment—the physical relocation necessary to de- ready in theater, and interdict enemy movements liver lethality. with reach-back fires. Interdependent maneuver thus is built upon The suppressive effects of fires executed the definition of tactical maneuver developed by throughout theater would in turn enable addi- military theorists in the 1980s and 1990s. In tional aerospace, naval, and perhaps heavier terms of application, however, it brings the syn- ground forces to be deployed into combat. Such ergy of fire and movement to the realms of opera- forces would exploit strategic vulnerabilities— tions and strategy, levels on which these compo- extant or created by interdiction fires—in enemy nents have never been applied in tandem. For defensive zones and maneuver to obtain a posi- example, once a decision is made to use force in a tion of advantage. In the meantime suppressive crisis, interdependent maneuver means that inte- attacks would continue throughout, developing grated ground, naval, and aerospace assets would synergy that comes from fire and movement. An begin to move into theater while at the same enemy is thus presented with a constant rain of time laying down suppressive fires throughout. destruction across its entire defensive zone as well Such fires would engage what have traditionally as the threat of inevitable capture or destruction been considered enemy tactical forces as well as by ground maneuver forces via the close fight. operational and strategic reserves and other criti- One further benefit is that interdependent cal strategic assets. The fires would combine maneuver applies more to situations that resemble ground, naval, and aerospace systems employing people’s wars than to traditional maneuver con- lethal and nonlethal weapons to facilitate the in- flicts. If such a war is in the first phase—building a sertion of ground elements. These units would political base—operations would likely entail less initially consist primarily of special operations suppressive fires and a greater number of ground forces equipped with reach-back support and elements to isolate an enemy from indigenous peoples, destroy supply caches, and interdict ef- forts to reestablish a logistic flow. If people’s war is in the second phase—expansion—interdependent

18 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Echevarria

maneuver would be used to preempt its expan- making ground units more strategically agile. sion. Suppressive fires and ground elements would Most of these technologies are already under de- operate in tandem to reduce known enemy con- velopment in DOD or industrial laboratories. JV centrations, effect isolation, and erode indigenous 2020 should promote such technologies through support. The third phase—full scale counteroffen- a coherent, unifying operational concept that il- sive—resembles a conventional conflict. lustrates how such capabilities will contribute to Interdependent maneuver is more than link- military success. ing ground maneuver with the halt-phase con- cept, which claims that airpower alone can deci- The of the 21st cen- sively defeat a large-scale armored attack. First, it tury which is currently underway might finally calls for a fully joint ap- combine fire and movement in a genuinely effec- interdependent maneuver proach from the outset, tive manner. If so, well-timed, precisely-directed generating synergy with surface, subsurface, and supersurface attacks over calls for a fully joint approach, the interaction between extended areas will provide a better means for generating synergy between fire and movement rather achieving political and military objectives even in than placing the burden situations like Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where fire and movement of success on one dimen- force requirements may be subtle and dispersed. To sion, with others absent or realize this potential, we must complete this revo- only in support. Second, halt phase applies to a lution with comparable conceptual and doctrinal limited segment of the threat spectrum; it can’t transformation. At a minimum, a means must be effectively address people’s war, for example. The found to move the Armed Forces from a joint to type of conflict to which the halt-phase concept interdependent approach. As JV 2020 asserts, applies, armored engagements in relatively open “Without intellectual change, there is no real terrain like the Middle East or Korean peninsula, change in doctrine, organizations, or leaders.” In- is becoming rarer. By contrast, interdependent deed, recent debates over which service is the arm maneuver is based on the principle of presenting of decision prove that there is still some way to go. an enemy with a dual threat—destruction by fire Thus we must reconcile tensions between domi- or the close fight. Aerospace power alone is too nant maneuver and precision engagement. Merg- easy to counter. The Armed Forces need a truly ing these competing traditions into a single unify- integrative operational concept to give them ing operational imperative will not only reconcile every possible advantage. them but permit a coherent articulation of how a particular list of desired capabilities would con- Technological Prerequisites tribute to the execution of military actions and Ground forces will surely need to enhance provide a blueprint to focus the efforts of the re- strategic deployability to execute interdependent search and development community. maneuver. The Army and Marine Corps have rec- Adopting independent maneuver is not ognized this fact and established vehicle/system equivalent to emulating the technological opti- requirements to accommodate easier air and mism that captured airpower theorists before with regard to military and commercial World War II. The evolution of technology will transport capabilities. Vehicles/systems projected bring both opportunities and challenges to fu- for the 2020 timeframe will likely feature modu- ture ways of war. Indeed, whatever new tech- lar designs to permit mixing and matching com- nologies may bring, the key to applying military ponents to a single chassis. One example of such force will remain the ability to discriminate be- a maneuver technology, a hybrid, air-cushioned tween the will of an enemy to fight and its vehicle, is currently under investigation and means to do so. JFQ could hover over level terrain or water, enabling it to reach speeds well beyond conventional track or wheeled systems. At the same time, advances in active protection systems, lightweight ceram- ics, titanium, and other metals might afford ground vehicles nearly as much protection as heavy armor. Ground forces are also exploring vertical-take-off-and-landing and short-take-off- and-landing technologies to develop viable self- deployment options. Other initiatives include de- veloping fuel-efficient and hybrid-power technologies to reduce logistic requirements,

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 19 ■ Nanotechnology in a New Era of Strategic Competition By SHANNON L. CALLAHAN

Preparing GBU–16 aboard USS Enterprise. U.S. Navy (Jacob L. Hollingsworth)

ew technologies on the battlefield can In the mid-1990s, Admiral William Owens alter the course of history and precipi- articulated the initial RMA concept as a system of tate the rise or fall of nations. The ad- systems that yields total situational awareness. An Nvent of microelectromechanical sys- overarching systems architecture integrates an tems (MEMS) coincides with what some regard as array of capabilities such as command and con- a revolution in military affairs (RMA), an onset of trol, surveillance, , intelligence, technological innovation that changes the nature and targeting. Under this integrated system, ad- of warfare. These tiny devices could be the revo- vantages of individual platforms and capabilities lution’s enabling technology. are fused into a powerful joint warfighting entity. As Andrew Marshall has predicted “The change Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Shannon L. Callahan, USN, is undergoing will be profound...the new methods of warfare training as an electronics countermeasures officer with EA–6B Fleet will be far more powerful than the old.”1 Replacement Squadron.

20 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Callahan

MEMS is a far-reaching technology with pos- mechanical or electronic device can be shrunk by sible application to two broad military arenas: replacing macroscale parts with MEMS. precision guided munitions (PGMs) and individ- But this technology is more than just minia- ual soldiers. The former represents the stand-off turization of existing systems. It allows for new warfare likely to characterize future major re- functionality since the decrease in size facilitates gional conflicts while the latter represent a coun- the creation of new architectures. Through them tertrend to manpower-intensive, close-in fighting an entire subsystem could be integrated on one likely to characterize military operations other chip. For example, one firm replaced an avionics than war. MEMS answer some criticisms of the component of 1,044 parts for F–22s with an revolution in military affairs—such as prohibitive equivalent MEMS component that had only 36 cost—and expand the impact of the revolution by parts. This characteristic of multiple and mixed bringing its fruits to the level of the warfighter. technology integration in MEMS devices and fab- The developments examined below represent rication technologies may be especially relevant areas of great potential. They are in various stages of development, but their eventual realization is probable and cannot be ignored. Without serious Getting situation consideration of MEMS, the Nation could loose report, Culminating its unchallenged military prominence like other Phase Experiment. states on the brink of RMAs who rested on past accomplishments or early leads. Vision of New Technology Richard Feynman delivered a speech in 1960, “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom,” which envisioned a technological world of the very small, where the units of construction were not blocks or circuits but atoms.2 Nanotechnology, a term coined by Nobuhiko Taniguchi in 1974, is the technology of the ultrasmall: roughly the 1–100 nanometer or billionth of a meter (10-9 me- ters) range. Minia- the field that combines the two turization will ex- microelectromechanical systems is tend to mechanics and electronics. known as MEMS in the United States The field that combines the two microelectromechanical systems is known as MEMS in the United States. The vision statement of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which is spearheading research and de- velopment on MEMS, reads: The field of microelectromechanical systems is a revo- lutionary, enabling technology. It will merge the func- Marine Division (D.R. Storms) d

tions of compute, communicate, and power together 2 with sense, actuate, and control to change completely the way people and interact with the physi- cal world. Using an ever-expanding set of fabrications to the Armed Forces, which relies on a core com- processes and materials, MEMS will provide the ad- petency of integrated global and local surveil- vantages of low power, low mass, low cost, and high lance, communications, and data fusion. functionality to integrated electromechanical systems New High Ground both on the micro as well as the macroscale. MEMS offer several dramatic advantages. The It must be stressed that MEMS are a multidis- first is what makes the technology possible to ciplinary approach to design and fabrication, not begin with: universally accessible fabrication. simply a class of products. Its devices fall into These tiny parts are manufactured using the same three general categories: sensors, actuators, and processes as the integrated circuits of microchips mechanical components such as gears, cogs, and switches. These three categories demonstrate the ubiquity of this emerging potential. Virtually any

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 21 ■ NANOTECHNOLOGY

and can be made of silicon wafers. Because of the ■ unattended sensors for tracking and surveillance manufacturing technology, 10,000 MEMS can be ■ mass data storage built as easily as one. Correspondingly, ease of fab- ■ analytical instruments rication allows engineers to change the way they ■ biomedical sensors ■ design systems. make produc- optical fiber components and networks ■ wireless communications tion inexpensive. In fact, this massive reduction ■ active conformable surfaces for aircraft. in cost is the main driver for research. For exam- ple, Raytheon Corporation wants to build a sys- The range of uses suggests that MEMS is ap- tem of circuits for radios at 3 percent of the cost of plicable to every aspect of . macroscale systems. This product will shrink a MEMS and PGMs bulky $200,000 system into a radio the size of a credit card for only $2,500. Multiplicity permits Among the many applications of this new augmenting low-end systems with high-end tech- technology is PGM enhancement. In the Persian nologies for greater performance and extended Gulf War these munitions made such an impact life. Many products can be upgraded, or many re- that they became almost synonymous with the dundant systems can be included in the larger ar- revolution in military affairs. Used against what chitecture for improved reliability and lowered war planners considered strategic core targets (C3 maintenance demands. MEMS make advanced assets, leadership facilities, and military support technology affordable in quantity. facilities), they were the weapons of choice. Secondary effects will also reduce cost. Mi- Since then reliance on PGMs has only in- croscale systems require less energy to operate creased. Their accuracy makes them especially at- moving parts. Systems that run on lower power tractive. Collateral damage can be avoided. They produce less heat, lead- permit selection of specific aimpoints for a given with micronavigation ing to fewer mainte- target to achieve desired objectives, perhaps nance problems and a merely disabling enemy assets rather than razing components, many dumb longer service life. an entire site. Accuracy also increases the proba- munitions could be transformed Moreover, smaller sys- bility of a kill, meaning fewer munitions. Stand- tems that weigh less re- off capability, which keeps friendly forces away into PGM-like weapons quire less energy to pro- from well-defended targets, is another advantage. pel. Other advantages Unfortunately the advantages of PGMs have stem from the physical properties of very small not been fully realized in combat. The Persian devices. Many use electrostatic energy for power, Gulf War illustrated their limitations as well as drastically reducing energy requirements. their capabilities. They were not always as accu- In some cases extreme sensitivity to the envi- rate as desired, and their sheer expense restricted ronment acts as a disadvantage, particularly in their numbers. The conflict also revealed that high temperatures. This special packaging chal- simple countermeasures decrease effectiveness. lenge can account for more than 80 percent of The evidence suggests that housed some of the costs. Despite this problem, the demand for its most valuable nuclear assets deep under- and development of this technology is continu- ground. It also frustrated the allies by placing mil- ing at an amazing pace. The Committee on Ad- itary assets near populous areas or sites of reli- vanced Materials and Fabrication Methods for gious or cultural significance or dispersing them MEMS of the National Research Council contends in the desert every few days. Nevertheless, the that the technology makes possible the “imple- low cost, small size, and light weight characteris- mentation of fault-tolerant architectures that are tics of microtechnology make it the ideal enabler modular, rugged, programmable, conventionally for PGM systems, and integrating sensors, com- interfaced, and relatively insensitive to shock, vi- puters, accelerators, and actuators allows the sys- bration, and temperature variations.”3 Even tems to be custom designed for specific muni- though more research is needed in the field of tions. MEMS can make the components both MEMS packaging, solutions will be discovered. smaller and cheaper. A typical missile accelerome- MEMS is achieving a technological critical ter and gyroscope cost $1,000, but an equivalent mass as more and more possible applications microdevice costs $20. emerge, including: With micronavigation components, many dumb munitions—howitzer, mortar, and rocket- ■ inertial measurement units fired—could be retrofitted and transformed into ■ signal processing ■ distributed control of aerodynamic and hydro- PGM-like weapons. Unguided rounds with a cir- dynamic systems cular error probable of 250 meters could in- ■ distributed sensors for condition-based mainte- stantly improve to 64 meters. Smart rounds re- nance and structural monitoring duce the number required to destroy a target by a factor of ten.

22 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Callahan

Launching Tomahawk during Desert Fox.

Conducting surveillance operations with hunter sensor suite. U.S. Navy (Todd Cichonowicz)U.S. Navy (Todd

morale. Cost-imposing strategies fostered by MEMS force an enemy to expend time, effort, and resources on defensive measures instead of offen- sive advancements that would in turn force the United States to develop countermeasures. Sensor and fusing devices are an area in which MEMS could improve PGMs, for instance by eliminating unexploded ordnance that often U.S. Army (Marshall Woods) causes friendly casualties and wastes resources. When a munition fails to detonate, a microac- celerometer could sense its impact with the earth In addition to minimizing cost MEMS pres- and trigger a self-destruct mechanism. MEMS fus- ent several cost-imposing strategies to an enemy. ing/detonation devices offer greater reliability, High volumes of PGMs incentivize costly coun- which results in fewer duds. termeasures. An enemy may invest heavily in anti-air warfare batteries, jamming capabilities, or Taking the Revolution to the Trenches underground facilities—essentially trading offen- Planners emphasize PGMs, stealth aircraft, sive for defensive investments. Moreover, dispers- and other highly touted RMA platforms for use in ing and hiding targets requires sizable manpower, reduces efficiency in operations, and lowers

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 23 ■ NANOTECHNOLOGY

thereby multiplying his lethality through an ability to Marines during Urban ’99. communicate what he sees and knows up to higher headquarters.4 The Land Warrior program realizes the idea of systems architecture, a system of systems. For instance the MWS component alone comprises subsystems such as close-combat optics, night- fighting sights, thermal weapon sights, laser rangefinder/compass/clinometer, camera mod- ules, and combat identification equipment. The overall picture is an armored suit, special , computerized helmet with a monocle display, and computers and electronic components wired throughout every part of the suit, with the abil- ity to communicate remotely with other soldiers and headquarters. But the program hit a snag. The suit weighs 80 pounds and proved too heavy for soldiers to maintain speed and agility in field tests. There

Fleet Image Command, Pacific (Eric Logsdon) were also problems with bulkiness and balance. Congress lost faith in the program and canceled funding. The Land Warrior concept remains valid, but conventional war. But many RMA supporters neg- technical problems thwart its realization. In sev- lect individual soldiers as beneficiaries of the rev- eral areas MEMS research and development has olution through information, communication, already yielded results that could be speedily inte- situational awareness, survivability, and lethality. grated into the Land Warrior or similar battle suit. New technologies are especially critical to Communications. Using MEMS over the next lesser contingencies which are more manpower- few years, Raytheon is expected to produce a mili- intensive and where the value of firepower is di- tary radio receiver that weighs four ounces. It will minished. Soldiers in this environment need better work ten times longer than current models and re- communications and intelligence—or situational quire less maintenance. The receiver is part of a awareness. Effective is also larger effort to shrink a four-channel radio, now vital, especially because complex operations typi- weighing 10 pounds, to the size of a credit card. cally involve small detached units. Overwhelming Navigation. The MEMS inertial navigation sys- force, which can compensate for command and tem/global positioning system (INS/GPS) device control weakness, will be unavailable. Moreover, that guides PGMs could also guide . It such operations are increasingly joint and multilat- could run on microwatts at a cost of $50 per unit. eral, placing greater strains and greater import on It could aid in locating friendly assets, interrogate command and control. from afar, and transmit its coordinates in re- But these technical needs clash with compet- sponse, greatly enhancing command and control. ing requirements for speed, agility, stealth, and Information display. The monocle visual dis- mobility. Individual soldiers carry everything play in the Land Warrior helmet shows maps, themselves, constraining weight and size. Taking data, position, manuals, and orders from head- technology to the individual level also demands quarters. Microtechnology makes possible a high- more devices, limiting spending per unit. In light resolution, low-power display screen (0.5 to 5 of such requirements, MEMS are the natural en- inches), meeting mobility requirements and fit- abling technology for equipping soldiers. ting into the larger computer network. Outfitting soldiers in mechanized suits was Chemical/ defense. The minia- once the stuff of science fiction; but in the early turization of analytical instruments is a core 1990s the Army embarked on the Land Warrior MEMS technology. Although the United States has project, with a vision of transforming each soldier some chemical agent alarms, they are too bulky into a Terminator III. The product director for the for individual use in the field. Microanalytical in- modular weapons system (MWS) in the Office of struments could be made small enough for each the U.S. Army Product Manager for Small Arms soldier to carry several or integrated in a protec- depicted the link between project and lethality: tive mask or mounted on equipment. Such a sen- With the advent of Land Warrior, you are integrating sor might cost $25 and allow a five order of mag- the infantryman’s capabilities into the digitized bat- nitude reduction in operating power. tlefield without adversely affecting his performance,

24 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Callahan

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Lockheed Persian Gulf no aircraft were downed by friendly Martin recently used MEMS to create a UAV that fire. On the ground, however, 35 Americans died is only 6 inches long and weighs 3 ounces. Be- mainly because vehicles lacked IFF technology. cause of its light weight, soldiers could carry sev- Fortunately, small, low-power, lightweight IFFs eral disposable UAVs. One version of the MEMS are possible using MEMS technology. A passive, model could provide re- secure microdevice could be integrated into the small, low-power, lightweight connaissance, using radio uniform of each soldier and/or his equipment. IFFs are possible using MEMS signals to transmit real- time information from its Implications for Competitive Strategy technology camera to a display. An- The U.S. military can be uniquely enhanced other version might couple by MEMS because of its lead in the revolution in CBW sensors to provide a stand-off chemical/bio- military affairs. Over the next decade or so, only logical warning system. Other versions of UAVs America will be able to realize the revolution in its could jam enemy communications or designate entirety. Successful innovation, combining new targets for PGMs. technology with operational advances, is key to re- Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). Military air- taining this lead and resulting political influence. craft are equipped with a transmitter that when Other nations may acquire pieces of the revo- interrogated emits an identifying code to differ- lution. , Austria, Belgium, Britain, Peo- entiate between threats and friendly forces. In the ple’s Republic of China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and are also researching nanotechnology. There is reason to Analyzing readings from believe that other countries may harness techno- chemical/biological logical advantages to close the military gap be- aerosol warning system. tween themselves and the United States. Because nanotechnology is dual use, regulating its export may be impossible. The same advantages that at- tract America and its allies to MEMS attract poten- tial enemies. Though this pattern has been true for any nation experiencing revolutionary or even evolutionary advances in technology, MEMS is unique. The combination of low costs with high numbers of advanced weapons lures potential en- emies perhaps more than the Pentagon. Rogue states, insurgents, and terrorists face greater re- source constraints. These state and/or nonstate ac- tors may perceive microtechnologies as their only way to compete with wealthier actors. MEMS transcend traditional limits to tech- nological proliferation. The cost of sophisticated weapons has traditionally been a great deterrent to their procurement. But microdevices cost less to acquire and operate through secondary effects such as reduced energy consumption and greater survivability. Their small size also makes them easier to smuggle or buy under the table. They are almost impossible to track, especially because they are dual use by nature and rudimentary to many systems. Both characteristics make global nonproliferation measures unlikely. How can a regime regulate simple valves or cogs—or com- mercial systems such as miniature cell phones or INS/GPS devices? Moreover, verification would be unworkable. Even if a supply-side regime were attempted, the range of suppliers minimizes chances for suc- cess. Anyone who can manufacture a microchip U.S. Air Force (WayneU.S. Air Force Clark)

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 25 ■ NANOTECHNOLOGY

applying MEMS to existing RMA developments and how that application could lead to the full realization of their potential. The case of soldier- level warfare indicates how MEMS can extend ad- vantages to areas of warfighting heretofore largely excepted from the revolution in military affairs. It is unlikely that proliferation will completely disturb the balance in global military power. How- ever, potential enemies could bypass our strengths and exploit weaknesses as well as raise the cost of intervention in regional conflicts. Technological advances, survivability, and redundancy by an enemy could deny a quick and painless victory, possibly deterring intervention in regional crises and thus eroding national leverage. The Nation would see its options limited as both human and economic costs of intervention increased. The push for commercial applications as a way to reduce the research burden for military ap- plications overlooks larger security ramifications and favors would-be enemies. Officials should re- view counterproliferation methods to reduce threats. Perhaps denying some key subtechnology could create a hurdle for MEMS proliferators. Packaging techniques, though not widely publi- cized yet and still in development, might offer such a solution. The Armed Forces are poised to take advan- tage of the revolution in military affairs through microtechnology. Leaders must facilitate this process. The result will be broader capabilities that translate into greater political leverage and na- tional security. But a plan to capitalize on a MEMS revolution must be two-pronged: the United States must utilize the technology and deny its use

Signal Company (Russell J. Good) to any potential enemies. JFQ th 55 Entering coordinates, NOTES Rapid Force Projection 1 Initiative. Barbara Starr, “Plotting Revolution at the Penta- can create MEMS. The knowledge required is in gon,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 23, no. 23 (June 10, the public domain. Thus MEMS obviate the tradi- 1995), p. 38. tional barrier of locating cooperative suppliers. 2 Max Nelson and Calvin Shipbaugh, The Potential of Since nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, Nanotechnology for Molecular Manufacturing (Santa Mon- and chemical weapons are relatively unattainable ica: The RAND Corporation, 1995), p. 3. 3 National Research Council, Microelectromechanical MEMS will become more desirable. They can en- System: Advanced Materials and Fabrication Methods hance existing unsophisticated weapons and also (Washington: National Academy Press, 1997), p. 13. make sophisticated weapons easier to acquire. 4 Scott Gourley, “Lethal Combination,” Jane’s Defence They can be perceived as a great equalizer. Weekly, vol. 30, no. 14 (October 7, 1998), pp. 39–42. The security ramifications of this new wave of technology are seldom addressed. Although some prophets warn of the apocalyptic dangers of self-replicating tiny machines, no one comments on the more immediate and pressing threats of proliferation or how enemies may take advantage of microtechnologies to use the revolution in mil- itary affairs against us.

MEMS offer opportunities to capitalize on new technology. PGMs exemplify the benefit of

26 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Tactical communications training in Italy. Communications Squadron (James D. Green) Communications Squadron st 31 Transformation Trinity Vision, Culture, Assessment By BRUCE H. McCLINTOCK

hile there is no single model for dramatic change in how resources are employed. transformation, certain trends Innovation must precede transformation, though warrant attention. History offers the latter occurs only rarely. In short, innovation W important lessons on the ele- is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ments of innovation. Peacetime transformation transformation. depends on three factors: a coherent and congru- Such meanings suggest the scope of the ent vision, a culture to convert that vision into problem. Most innovation is difficult enough but competing concepts of operation, and a candid creating a critical mass is even harder. If “innova- assessment of those concepts. tion is a crapshoot,” as Admiral William Owens The term innovation describes any change in has suggested, then there is little reason to pre- equipment or application, from field radios to pare for future events. And transformation is weapon systems to organizational restructuring. worse. A crapshoot is inherently linear; smart Some view it as a codeword for strategic change. players know the odds. On the other hand, trans- Rather than redefining the term, it is useful to formation is a complex phenomenon involving consider its origins. Innovation is only one aspect interactive factors operating simultaneously and of change, a building block of transformation—a resulting in a blend of order and unpredictability. Meaning and Method Major Bruce H. McClintock, USAF, a former instructor pilot and flight examiner, is assigned to the Future Concepts Branch of the Space Each organization handles change differently Warfare Center at Schriever Air Force Base. and innovations occur for many reasons even

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 27 ■ TRANSFORMATION TRINITY

within the same organization. Multiple factors act study, “Assumption-based planning is not a concurrently on institutional theories of change, panacea....[It] will only be as good as the insight breaking models of transformation into manage- and care of the people doing that planning.” 3 able pieces. For instance, some observers separate American and British innovation into peacetime, Judgment and Vision wartime, and technological, while others focus on Although insight and intuition are clearly innovation between the wars.1 Such categories important, there is no simple way to acquire bind the application of models. This article refines them. Clausewitz refers to this concept as genius. paradigms of transformation from numerous While the terminology has changed there is con- sources and develops a new, limited framework. sensus on how to build intuition to adapt to un- The model offered is restricted to American peace- certainty. Strategists from Clausewitz to Fuller agree that to gain intuition, leaders must under- in the realm of transformation, successful innovation stand economic, technological, and political fac- tors that influence change. Understanding the in- depends on and military leaders alike ternational security environment is not a result of cosmic inspiration but of carefully educating time transformation. With a focus on transforma- leaders about current and potential shifts in the tion, longer periods of peace offer greater opportu- world order. The process of discerning these shifts nities for gradual change. By narrowing the field is not simple, but the added insight is necessary and blending the elements that surface, a pattern to adapt to uncertainty. for successful conversion emerges. The implementing elements are vision, cul- Innovation isn’t achieved on command. ture, and assessment. Civilian and military lead- Theoreticians must interpret experience as a ers must recognize a changing environment and guide to future action. Although more than de- encourage innovation through coherent visions scriptive, such ideas are not prescriptive. At best of the future. The military also must catalyze and they are counterpredictive, helping identify situa- nurture the modifications to develop competing tions when transformation is least likely. Any at- theories of victory. And as culture changes, the tempt to bolster innovation must acknowledge emerging organization must create assessments to the impact of uncertainty, the inability to predict develop the tools to fulfill the original vision. outcomes precisely because of the influence of With varying levels of emphasis, this trinity is present in all successful peacetime transforma- tion. Although presented in an order of occur- rence, it is important to remember that there is continuous interaction among elements so they defy strictly linear application. The constantly changing facets of transformation repeatedly in- fluence each other. In addition, the elements can act on the strategic, operational, and tactical lev- els. All levels, however, depend on leaders who

U.S. Navy are able to accommodate uncertainty. With strategic intuition leaders can initiate transformation through an innovative vision—the Conceptual design concept of the future identity and mission of or- of amphibious chance or limits on available information. Uncer- ganizations. A look at organizations facing change assault ship. tainty can influence all levels of events from the indicates that “the single most determining factor strategic to the tactical. The chaotic nature of for success in their adaptation is whether or not transformation defies reductionist models that they have and can exploit an appropriate vision of offer linear solutions to complex problems. themselves for decisionmaking.”4 In the realm of Attempts have been made to systematize transformation, successful innovation depends on planning to reduce the influence of contingency. civilian and military leaders alike. After World War I, J.F.C. Fuller sought a scientific Some suggest that leaders must provide serv- framework to understand history and plan for ice visions because the military is resistant to wars.2 One study offered a way of accounting for change. Historians cite the British interwar deci- uncertainty by hypothesizing on future strategic sion to favor pursuit aircraft over as an environments. The common approach is system- example of civilians opposing military parochial- atized hedging. Deliberate frameworks are helpful ism. Although elegant in its simplicity, this ex- but are not the answer. According to another ample does not explain long-term innovation. Some claim that civilians play only minor roles

28 JFQ / Autumn 2000 McClintock

Landing craft gliding ashore, Foal Eagle ’00. Combat Camera Squadron (DanielCombat Camera Squadron E. Richard) st 1

in advancing innovation and can even do much force dramatic change on large organizations to stifle it. Legislatures have the power of the without allowing them to take effect. In general, it purse; thus the military may follow the money is less important to argue over whether policy rather than the mission at the cost of civilian shapes strategy—or vice versa—than to recognize support. Others cite ineffectual interwar progress that miscalculations in either can lead to failure. on armored warfare by the British and French, The one conclusive factor is that civilian and mili- who had little need for offensive forces.5 In other tary visions must be harmonious. words, a fine line can be drawn between vision This does not mean that visions must imme- and hallucination—the budget line. diately be congruent. The views of one group can Though it may seem that commanders must shape those of another over time, but the domi- devise visions that follow national security policy, nant vision must be coherent and compelling. sometimes the reality is that the military has sup- The military, equipped with a consistent, clearly ported civilian policy while civilians have some- articulated vision, can shape civilian views. In par- times followed an emerging military vision. An ticular, the military vision must stand the test of example is the shift to strategic bombardment be- time because the civilian vision is more likely to fore World War II as a result of evolving opera- fluctuate with changing administrations. tional concepts. While it eventually took civilian The evolution of amphibious assault demon- leadership to bless the vision, the military actually strates the significance of congruent, coherent vi- shaped the civilian vision. In other cases, radical sions. In 1920, the Commandant of the Marine environmental changes outstripped policy. Mili- Corps recognized the increasing significance of taries that lack vision are caught short while revo- this mission. His vision did not contradict existing lutionaries accommodate dramatic shifts in policy. policies. It was generally congruent with the views Organizational change reveals that civilian of other services. In addition, civilian awareness of and military leaders must articulate their vision to the Pacific as an important part of the security en- catalyze transformation. But there are many rea- vironment stimulated development of war plans sons why a proffered vision may be inadequate. that involved ground and naval forces. Just as im- Senior officers often cling to outmoded ideas that portantly, the Marine Corps remained committed have little chance of success because of cultural or to the vision for two decades despite shifting sup- technical constraints. Just as often, civilians try to port. This example captures the common themes of most successful transformations.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 29 ■ TRANSFORMATION TRINITY

When the civilian and military leadership theory of victory provided a new identity for the share congruent, coherent visions, transforma- search for a strategic mission. tion is more likely. A coherent vision is one that Organizational culture requires a long-term is clearly stated and relatively constant over the commitment for success. Many cite promotion longer periods needed for transformation. A con- opportunities as a vehicle because rank equals gruent vision, on the other hand, is generally ac- power. Power is transferred based on career paths cepted by the leadership. A truly congruent vision such as carrier aviation, amphibious warfare, and also shares broad acceptance among the services. tactical aviation. Although dominant cultures re- Congruence is difficult to achieve, which sist change, at least some members must accept helps to explain the infrequency of transforma- the need for change establishing new career tion. Leaders can encourage success by acknowl- paths. A dominant culture can change from the edging the uncertainty present in long-term in- top down if the vision is consistently and clearly novation and recognizing the importance of a stated and enough leaders recognize change in consistent vision. Accurate political and strategic the strategic environment. assessments that stimulate rather than inhibit in- novation are prerequisites to success. Exploration and Evaluation With a vision of military roles based on the Culture Wars future, credible leaders can nurture new groups to It takes credible military leadership to foster develop appropriate theories of victory. Still organizational change if a new vision calls for transformation depends on openness to compet- transformation, but organizational change largely ing theories rather than a party line. Assessment depends on changes to the culture of the broader is necessary for two reasons. First, uncertainty group. Culture is the system of underlying shared about future threats requires wargames and simu- beliefs about the critical tasks and relationships lations that explore the shape of possible wars. within an organization. Even with multiple sub- Second, the costs and benefits of new tools and cultures in an organization, a group that shares tactics can only be explored through critical eval- uations that draw lessons. Germany applied this transformation depends on openness to competing approach in developing Blitzkrieg as the Navy in- troduced carrier aviation in the interwar years. theories rather than a party line Both were peacetime transformations that brought wartime success. Exercises and evalua- the overall purpose of the organization has what tions compensate for uncertainty and allow incre- many theorists call a sense of mission. mental improvement. Appraisals validate vision Culture affects group performance in three and uncover faults that refine and strengthen the ways. Organizations in which cultures struggle original concept. for supremacy experience serious conflict. More- Assessment involves exploration and exami- over,organizations resist taking on new tasks nation. Exploration is unrestricted thinking that that are incompatible with the dominant cul- encourages new theories of victory and ideas to ture. Finally, changing an organizational culture support them. It harnesses ideas about theories of takes time. victory and applies them to postulated environ- Because the military is comprised of various ments. Its intent is creating a practical under- constituencies, there is an ideological struggle to standing of the role of new theory in military and define theories of victory. Such concepts help de- policy operations. This differs from conceptual termine the hierarchy in organizations. Those who thinking done as culture matures. The symbiotic accomplish the tasks most critical to the organiza- relationship between culture and assessment is es- tion usually lead it. Civilians are less capable of af- sential. Without a culture open to new theories, fecting peacetime (versus wartime) transformation the original vision may be stifled. This kind of because the process often outlasts civilian terms of outlook gave rise to the use of terms like battle- influence. It takes time for the military to turn an ship sailor to describe myopic thinking. abstract vision based on the emerging environ- Examination uses various tools to determine ment into concrete tasks and organizations. which theories work best. It also scrutinizes the Amphibious assault is an example of sucess- potential of new theories prior to implementa- ful change. It was left to subordinates to fulfill the tion. Unlike the exploration phase where ideas vision and, because of the size of the Marine are widely accepted, examination allows for fail- Corps, the task fell to one officer who converted ure. It can include campaign analysis, trade stud- the need for a new capability into definable terms. ies, systems analysis, prototypes, and exercises. He crafted Operations Plan 712, which served as the basis for amphibious assault planning. This

30 JFQ / Autumn 2000 McClintock

Not every transformation involves new equip- ment. Amphibious assault did not depend on radi- cally new technology. In addition, technology driven transformation usually involves a combina- tion of technologies unanticipated until high- lighted by assessment. Finally, technology changes the techniques of war but not its nature. In the words of one analyst, “It is not merely the tools of warfare but the organizations that wield them that make for revolutionary change in war.”6 While technological changes have catalyzed some inno- vations, they are not necessary or sufficient for transformation. Since few major transformations depend solely on it, technology is considered part Lance Cheung)

( of the strategic environment or a factor scrutinized by the assessment portion of the model.

The above model highlights characteristics Air Force News of military transformation. Change is most likely Flying in glass cockpit on C–141C. to occur when leaders articulate coherent visions of future warfare and the military culture allows The lessons that emerge must be openly consid- advocates of that vision to develop competing ered and applied to be useful. The decision of Air theories of victory—theories that are openly as- Corps Tactical School and theo- sessed. The strategic environment constantly in- rists to discount apparent shortcomings in their fluences these continuously interacting factors. unescorted bombing theory led to severe combat The paradigm described here provides a gen- losses, demonstrating the danger of incomplete eral framework for studying peacetime transfor- or ignored examination. mation. By acknowledging the uncertainty inher- theory prior to World War II stressed ent in long-range planning, it offers an approach one critical element of assessment—linkage. A where understanding the emerging strategic envi- connection must exist between the vision of an ronment develops the critical insight (or genius) expected environment and current strategy and needed to form visions for change. JFQ operational realities. Strategy can help define the context for evaluating new warfighting concepts. NOTES For example, operational realities limit the range of theoretical conflicts. This factor is crucial in 1 See Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: honest assessment because exercise environments Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Williamson Murray and can be tailored to circumstances independent of Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar reality. Intentionally or not, simulation design Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), that ignores reality can incorrectly prove untested pp. 1–5. or operationally unrealistic theories. Between 2 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War 1921 and 1940 the Armed Forces conducted (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1926), pp. 21–23, 30–46, many fleet landing exercises to demonstrate con- 324–27. cepts of amphibious landing. The Navy and Ma- 3 James A. Dewar et al., Assumption-Based Planning: rine Corps experimented with every approach A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times, RAND Report their equipment allowed. The open nature of the MR-114-A (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1993), debate helped refine concepts captured decades p. 59. 4 John K. Setear et al, The Army in a Changing World: earlier. Exercise evaluation reinforced the idea The Role of Organizational Vision, RAND Report R-3882-A that amphibious assault was possible with certain (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1990), p. vi. tactics but would not be easy. Forthright assess- 5 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign ment led to a new approach that proved vital in Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 51–52. World War II. 6 Ibid., p. 46. Lastly, assessment need not be soley technol- ogy based. Transformation modelling can inten- tionally discount the role of revolutionary systems.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 31 ■

Zero at Munda airfield on New Georgia.

Airpower in the Pacific DOD A Case Study in Innovation By THOMAS E. GRIFFITH, JR.

eing ready for future wars depends on Howard observed, “I am tempted to say, indeed understanding two aspects of innova- to declare dogmatically, that whatever doctrine tion. One is common and often consid- the armed forces are working on now, they have B ered: the impact of changes in doctrine, got it wrong.” The objective, he added, is not organization, and technology on innovation dur- being too badly wrong and having the flexibility ing peacetime. Equally important, however, is an to adapt quickly as the shooting starts.1 awareness of the adaptations commanders must Inculcating flexibility is difficult. Contrary to make once combat begins and equipment or tac- the belief that innovation is easier to advance tics do not work as planned. As Sir Michael during actual operations, the inherent uncer- tainty of war makes it hard to discover what works and why. Moreover, commanders and com- Colonel Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., USAF, is commander of the 39th Support batants may not understand affinities among tac- Group and author of MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney tics, training, and equipment. Even if command- and the War in the Southwest Pacific. ers identify areas of failure, change may be

32 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Griffith

large land masses such as New Guinea fixed forces B–17 on over Solomons. into relatively isolated garrisons, effectively turn- ing them into islands as well. Although victory in this theater demanded a mastery of joint operations, airpower was ideal for setting the stage for success because it could gain control of the skies, then cut off supplies and rein- forcements to isolated enemy units. Kenney planned to weaken outposts, then attack men and equipment directly, and finally cover and assist Al- lied naval and ground units. After occupying new territory, the Allies could build airfields to launch the next advance. All these tasks required changes from estab- lished procedures, but sinking enemy shipping proved particularly difficult. Surprisingly, the predicament airmen faced did not result from a lack of peacetime planning. In fact, coastal defense Naval Historical Center had been the most critical mission for the Army Air Corps before World War II. Airmen concluded that the best way to prevent an invasion was to difficult. Institutional resistance doesn’t vanish in sink ships using horizontal bombing at high alti- war, and with lives at stake it can grow. tude before an enemy could land. They reasoned Greater technological sophistication makes it that the right equipment would afford great accu- more important to grasp the challenges of adapta- racy and avoid antiaircraft fire from the sea. tion and how to meet them. Success begins by Wartime experience quickly revealed prob- knowing that military organizations have many lems in pre-war thinking. One failing involved moving parts. As one analyst remarked, “We are the number of aircraft needed to sink ships. Plan- dealing with a system when a set of units or ele- ners based peacetime predictions on formations ments are interconnected so that changes in some of at least nine bombers, which they thought was elements or their relations produce changes in the minimum requirement to hit a moving ship. other parts....In a system the chains of conse- The small number of aircraft sent to the theater, quences extend over time and many areas: the ef- combined with a lack of spare parts and other fects of actions are always multiple.”2 Although supplies, meant Kenney could rarely assemble the this is easy to visualize in the case of weapons plat- needed formation. forms, even soldiers can be regarded as systems re- Even if Kenney had been able to organize quiring training, equipment, and synchronization such a formation, the prevailing assumption was with other individuals, units, and systems. that aircraft would aim at the target independ- Conceiving of forces as systems underscores ently but release their bombs nearly simultane- subtle connections that account for successful in- ously. These techniques proved impractical given novation. By and large, the more connections are the weather: tropical thunderstorms and heavy appreciated, the greater the chance of success. clouds at 1,000 to 2,000 feet often made it impos- The case of General George Kenney during World sible for nine aircraft to fly in formation, let alone War II offers insight into how commanders can locate and simultaneously a moving target. deal with innovation and how a system must be More importantly, the established techniques changed to accommodate it. did not take the friction of war into account. Air- men used the accuracy attained against small sta- Defining the Problem tionary targets in training to make predictions on As the newly named commander of the Al- hitting evasive moving targets in combat. Because lied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, Kenney capital ships were five to six times larger than the arrived in Australia in late July 1942, only six normal 100-foot bombing circle, it was assumed months after the Japanese . that hitting large moving targets was not much In the interim Japan had conquered large parts of harder than hitting fixed targets. The realities of the Western Pacific. Control of this region rested combat demolished that premise. on the ability of the Japanese to employ land, sea, and air forces from relatively small areas to attack Allied positions and lines of communication. Some of these areas were true islands, like Truk. The jungle terrain and inaccessible interiors of

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 33 ■ AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC

Enemy actions also decreased accuracy. As out from fighting in eastern New Guinea. What is one bombardier said, “When I’m bending over more, he lacked naval forces to intercept the con- that bombsight trying to get lined up on one of voy. The only way to prevent the Japanese from those Jap ships and the bullets start coming consolidating their position in New Guinea was through the windows in front of me, they take hitting them before they could land. my mind off my work.”3 Moreover, bombsights Allied intelligence and enemy preparations did not work, bombs did not release properly, and made stopping the convoy immeasurably easier. various human errors occurred. The difficulties A month earlier, a Japanese float plane was spot- did not reduce accuracy in a linear or additive ted 25 miles east of New Britain while new air- fashion but actually created problems at an expo- craft were spotted near Lae. Intelligence officers nential rate out of proportion to inputs. saw these events as indicators of an imminent at- The first change, producing an innovation to tempt to reinforce by sea. Reconnaissance flights stop enemy movement by sea, was the shift to over Rabaul confirmed that estimate. Photos night bombing. Night was less desirable than day taken in late February revealed a record concen- because of the difficulty of locating and hitting tration of merchant ships (299,000 tons) in targets, but such setbacks were balanced by other Rabaul Harbor. Intercepted messages provided in- factors. “At night,” according to Kenney, “you formation on when the convoy would depart, but don’t have Zeros shooting through the bom- not its route. bardier’s window and taking his mind off his With intelligence on convoy routes gathered work; a moving vessel does not see the bombs during the previous four months, lessons from Al- leave the plane...nor have time to dodge.”4 lied attacks on shipping, knowledge of enemy op- The inaccuracy of night bombing, however, tions, and weather forecasts, Kenney’s deputy, meant that it wasn’t a viable long-run solution, Major General Ennis Whitehead, predicted that and Kenney turned to the convoy would sail along the northern coast of the inaccuracy of night bombing low altitude attacks for New Britain, beyond range of attack for as long as meant that it wasn’t a viable daytime missions, pro- possible, and then race to its destination. posing that such tactics Despite the information, finding and de- long-run solution would combine greater stroying the convoy required three days of in- surprise with less inter- tense effort. Allied aircraft first spotted the eight ference from fighters. Thus he decided on skip and eight merchant vessels on the af- bombing, so-called because pilots would fly low ternoon of March 1, but the ships hid under low and release bombs from 350 to 200 feet from cloud cover for two days. The Allies, perhaps as- their targets, skipping them over the water like sisted by intercepted transmissions, tracked the rocks until they hit vessels or exploded beneath convoy and made small but repeated attacks. them. Although Kenney sometimes took credit The strikes were only the preliminary bouts for this tactic, low altitude bombing had been before the main event. On March 3 the attack tried often. Like other successful innovators, he force rendezvoused over Cape Ward Hunt, a refer- would champion alternative methods whatever ence point on the north shore of New Guinea, their source. and received a radio message with the convoy po- sition from a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) The Payoff reconnaissance plane that had harassed the ships Success was not long in coming. In March overnight. At about the same time, other aircraft 1943, some 6,000 Japanese soldiers from the 51st bombed the airfield at Lae, reducing a possibility Division prepared to land near Lae in New of fighter interference. The concentrated attacks Guinea, a key outpost in the defensive perimeter. began shortly before 1000 hours. B–17s were in Their leaders had high hopes for the convoy, the lead, bombing from 8,000 feet and escorted which brought soldiers from Rabaul in New by P–38s. This group was followed by B–25s fly- Britain. A defensive stand in New Guinea would ing at 5,000 feet, and immediately behind them not only stall General Douglas MacArthur in came low altitude attackers—13 RAAF Beaufight- making his drive through the Southwest Pacific, ers, 12 B–25s, and 12 A–20s. but a drawn-out campaign with heavy casualties As the low altitude crews spotted the convoy, might lead the United States to consider a negoti- they peeled off to attack individually. During the ated settlement. ensuing melee, pilots dodged antiaircraft fire and Despite the operational and strategic impor- twisted furiously to avoid hitting one another. tance of intercepting the convoy, MacArthur had Enemy ships violently maneuvered against the limited options. His troops were few and worn aircraft as their crews frantically battled explo- sions. One participant remembered, “They would come in on you at low altitude, and they’d skip bombs across the water like you’d throw a

34 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Griffith

Seabees constructing airfield, Bougainville.

New Zealand P–40 taking off from Toronika. U.S. Navy

The Lae transport operation was their last attempt to send significant reinforcements or supplies to eastern New Guinea, forcing the abandonment of forward outposts and any possibility of defense. The enemy commander of Eighth Fleet at Rabaul believed that the engagement opened the door for an American advance on the Philippines and was U.S. Army the final undoing of South Pacific operations. Several factors contributed to the victory in the Bismarck Sea. Intelligence officers deserve stone...the transports were enveloped in flames. credit for revealing enemy moves, but this infor- Their masts tumbled down, their bridges flew to mation would have had little value without pieces, the ammunition they were carrying was changes in bombing methods. Success was the hit, and whole ships blew up.”5 product of innovative decisions made many The contest was over in moments. Kenney’s months before and weeks of training, all capped airmen left every transport on fire or sinking and off by thorough planning and brave execution. three destroyers sinking or badly damaged. An at- tack that afternoon disposed of the remaining Implementing Innovation stranded vessels. In all, every transport went to Understanding the Battle of the Bismarck Sea the bottom along with four destroyers. is vital to appreciating how commanders adapt in While Japanese planners predicted heavy combat and the complexity of changing a system. losses, destruction of the convoy staggered them. Kenney made some of the innovations himself, but not all. His role was inspiring people by sup- porting their ideas. “I encourage personnel who have any ideas to go right ahead with them,” he remarked. “It makes no difference what the man’s

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 35 ■ AIRPOWER IN THE PACIFIC

Kenney and MacArthur in Australia, 1944. U.S. Air Force History Office U.S. Air Force

rank or his previous experience. If he has an idea burned out the gun barrels. Kenney accepted that sounds feasible he is told to go ahead and he such failures as part of doing business. is given every assistance.”6 Kenney acknowledged Since modifications usually meant removing good ideas regardless of aircraft from flying status, Kenney’s deputy in Kenney acknowledged good their source, praising Aus- of flying operations sometimes complained tralia for innovative ef- that the changes had not been adequately studied ideas regardless of their source forts. He singled out indi- or took too long. At one point he protested, “I am viduals, on one occasion convinced that there is too much experimental decorating a sergeant for improvising. Mechanics work being done and not enough thought given learned to use anything on hand for repairs, in- to production.” Later he told his boss, “We do not cluding sixpence coins in engine magnetos and want...an installation which causes us a lot of Kotex for air filters. “Any time I can’t think of grief later on.”8 Kenney could have agreed, but he something screwy enough,” the general observed, knew that innovation would not succeed unless “I have a flock of people out here to help me.”7 leaders defended the innovation process. “We His command was not alone when it came to en- have given ourselves lots of headaches, but we terprising individuals adapted to local conditions, have also gotten some fine results.”9 but without his support many ideas would never Kenney furthered the innovative atmosphere have seen the light of day. In short, he created by ruthlessly eliminating officers who did not the organizational environment that not only en- conform to his notion of taking risk. “The cry that couraged but demanded innovation. the Army is full of red tape is a cry against the Not every innovation worked, forcing Ken- people in the Army who just don’t seem to get re- ney at times to defend his emphasis on change. sults, who can’t make decisions,” he commented. When larger ammunition boxes were proposed to increase the firing burst of machine guns, they

36 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Griffith

“The mediocre man does not get ships sunk or of procedures and equipment before combat. planes shot down and unfortunately neither does But even strenuous efforts in the laboratory or he get air crews and ground crews trained on time on the training range do not guarantee that nor supplies forwarded to the proper place on forecasts will match conditions. Despite the be- time. His depot does not produce results. Even as lief that shortcomings can easily be identified in a staff man he bottlenecks studies and decisions the midst of operations, the friction and uncer- that are vital to the operating forces.”10 tainty of war combine with enemy deception to It is not possible to simply change one as- make innovation difficult to accomplish. pect or part of a system; the entire system must The dominant lesson of Kenney’s experience be revised. Kenney’s work highlighted this is that innovation rarely succeeds on its own, but dilemma. For example, the vision of straight and rather flourishes when the nature of the system is level bombing at high altitude prior to World understood. Being able to grasp the linkages War II introduced a system that had to be modi- among doctrine, organization, and technology is fied for new tactics to succeed. Low altitude at- essential in this process. JFQ tacks required forward-firing guns to destroy ground targets and counter gunfire from ground defenses. Because such armament had not been NOTES needed for standard bombing it was not installed 1 Michael Howard, “ in the Age of at the . Adding forward firepower required Peace,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for De- innovation in the field; four fifty-caliber guns fence Studies, vol. 119 (March 1974), p. 7. placed in B–25s turned them into so-called com- 2 Robert Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis of Po- merce destroyers. litical and Social Life,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. Low altitude bombing also meant modifying 112, no. 4 (Winter 1997–98), p. 570. fuzes. Firing pins developed for release from 3 George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports (Wash- higher altitudes bent when bombs hit water at ington: Office of Air Force History, 1987), p. 66. 4 low altitude, disabling them before they hit the Letter, Kenney to Fairchild, December 8, 1942, George C. Kenney Papers, Center for Air Force History, target. Kenney tapped armament experts in the Bolling Air Force Base, Washington. command who reduced the length of the housing 5 Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan at so the fuzes would not bend or break. War: An Oral History (New York: The New Press, 1992), Aiming bombs with new methods demanded p. 301. a significant change. Developing an aiming device 6 George C. Kenney, “Air Power in the Southwest for level, horizontal bombing resulted in the Nor- Pacific,” Air Force, vol. 27, no. 6 (June 1944), p. 59. den bombsight, virtually useless for skip bombing. 7 Letter, Kenney to Fairchild, December 8, 1942, One commander worked out a technique by drop- George C. Kenney Papers. ping bombs on a sand bar and a wrecked ship 8 Letter, Whitehead to Kenney, May 19, 1943, Ennis near Port Moresby to determine the optimum alti- C. Whitehead Papers, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. tude and airspeed for skipping bombs. 9 Kenney, “Air Power,” pp. 59–60. Though this effort defined basic parameters 10 Letter, Kenney to General Henry H. Arnold, May 1, for bombing runs, pilots had to estimate range 1943, George C. Kenney Papers. from the target without a mechanical aiming ref- erence like the Norden bombsight, rendering their training largely irrelevant. Pilots did not have good results at low altitude until they learned new techniques. In the weeks prior to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, air crews perfected their skills on a sunken boat. By the time of the battle many pilots had dropped 30 to 40 bombs on the wrecked vessel from low altitude. While the training resulted in the loss of one aircraft and damage to two others, the realistic target gave pilots critical experience in the aiming pa- rameters that, in addition to other changes, paid dividends in the Bismarck Sea.

Like other institutions, the Armed Forces face the enduring challenge of recognizing when established methods need to be modified be- cause of new conditions. Making changes in wartime demands rigorous testing and analysis

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 37 ■

10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum.

26th Marine Expedi- tionary Unit, Croatia.

U.S. Army (Barry Benner) U.S. Marines (Rick T. O’Conner) Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles By BRIAN J. DUNN

he capabilities needed for land forces mobility to complement the role of the Army to have grown. Only ten Army and three fight heavy forces. Acting jointly, an Air Force-en- Marine Corps divisions span the globe abled Army-Marine team will dominate the con- T to deal with various small contingen- flict spectrum and win both the first battle and cies while they prepare to fight major theater the war. wars (MTWs). But how should these over- stretched forces be organized to meet competing Tradition and the New Environment requirements in the future? The Army, with a A digitized and faster but still war-focused mandate to win conventional wars, must inno- Army and a radically reoriented Marine Corps vate within a narrow sphere to accomplish its support the notion that “the Marine Corps wins core mission despite the demands of more varied , the Army wins wars,” as characterized by threats and need for incredible speed to reach dis- the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This idea tant theaters. If it tries to dominate the conflict is rooted in historic differences between an Army spectrum by converting heavy mechanized units raised from the people in wartime and a standing into light air-transportable mechanized forces, it Marine Corps available for small landings by the risks limiting its dominance at the high end of Navy in peacetime. The relative size of the serv- the conflict spectrum. The Marine Corps is al- ices before, during, and after wars demonstrates ready light and has more flexibility to adapt to this distinction. The wartime Army expanded new strategic realities. It must abandon amphibi- greatly while the Marines remained essentially ous warfare as a core capability and embrace an unchanged except for World War II. Even the expeditionary role based on and air surge in the Marine forces in that conflict was dwarfed by expansion of the Army. The Cold War changed the strategic environment and required that the Army be prepared for high intensity con- Brian J. Dunn is a research analyst for the legislature of the State of flict on short notice and have light units as de- Michigan and has served in the Michigan Army National Guard. ployable as the Marine Corps. Grenada, Panama,

38 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Dunn

Disembarking from Unloading vehicle at roll-on/roll-off ship, Pohang Harbor, Korea. Foal Eagle ’98.

U.S. Army (SPC Christina Ann Horne) 1st Combat Camera Squadron (Steve Faulisi) in Power Projection

and other operations found the Army deployed (MEUs) have greater firepower, but only two are for the first battle. Despite the fact that the Army routinely forward deployed. The ability to place has been identified with major wars, the Marine initial brigades on the ground on short notice is Corps also has always fought in American wars. an impressive feat, but it does not guarantee that Even with a capable , the Marines the troops can win once they arrive. A few light brigades and a handful of armored vehi- Army and Marine Corps responsibilities should be cles can’t win much of a battle and would be divided based on capabilities, traditions, and the crushed in a war. Prepositioning equipment is one way to new strategic environment speed powerful forces to a theater. The Army has brigade sets afloat in the Pacific and Indian organized in division or greater strength partici- Oceans and on land in the Persian Gulf, Europe, pated. The Army-war link reemerged after the and Korean peninsula. The Marines have preposi- Cold War. As Army divisions were deactivated, tioning ships anchored at Guam, Saipan, and Marine forces were not. Still the Army retained its Diego Garcia. Another squadron patrols the capabilities despite cuts. Mediterranean. Each package can support ground Army and Marine Corps responsibilities and air components for 30 days. Marine should be divided based on capabilities, tradi- squadrons can support battles in the littorals for tions, and the new strategic environment. Air- lower intensity conflicts and should be able to drops can get many Army paratroopers and hold a bridgehead in the face of tougher opposi- Rangers on the ground quickly, but the where- tion for a short time, assuming that Army heavy withal to sustain them in heavy combat cannot troops follow swiftly. be delivered as easily. Marine Expeditionary Units Rapid reinforcement is critical. The Army ambitiously plans to field a brigade anywhere in four days, a division in ten, and five divisions in thirty. This assumes uninterrupted use of ports

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 39 ■ ARMY–MARINE CORPS ROLES

Air Force and fires to complement preposi- Extraction exercise in Balkans. tioned equipment could meet this compressed timeline with sufficient troops. Creating a New Paradigm Although the Marines have a tradition of am- phibious combat, expeditionary warfare is their true mission. The current preeminence in am- phibious warfare is based on circumstances that arose in the Pacific during World War II. Few mili- tary operations conducted today call for large- scale opposed landings. The Marine Corps must adapt and become flexible as an expeditionary force by concentrating on small-scale violent and nonviolent contingencies with MEUs and win- ning the first battle to enable the Army to enter a theater to take the lead in winning the war. An example of finding the right capability

U.S. Army (Joanna G. Sanford) for expeditionary warfare was the Urban Warrior AH–1 during exercise series. Expertise in urban areas will be Slunj ’00, Croatia. useful in many contingencies, including winning the first battle of a conflict, and supporting Army warfighting while maximizing the Marine role. Yet it is only one of the needed competencies. Al- though many assume urban warfare is the future, if everyone is focused on street fighting the capa- bility to seize ground with heavy forces will erode. The Army must still be able to beat organ- ized conventional enemies. The Persian Gulf War was an undervalued demonstration of Army and Marine Corps roles for the future. Although the Marines fought in large formations, it is untrue that they could not be distinguished from the Army. The war-battle distinction was foreshadowed despite the hasty Iraqi capitulation that prevented a clear display of appropriate ground fighting responsibilities. The U.S. Marines (Brook R. Kelsey) U.S. Marines (Brook Army smashed the Republican Guard to win the war as the Marines struck defenses in a supporting role and were positioned to capture Kuwait . and airfields, which is questionable given anti-ac- The war demonstrated the tremendous cess technologies such as mines and anti-air and power of Army heavy forces. If we expect to re- anti-ship missiles. If being denied access in areas peat this 100-hour victory, the Army should not where MTWs are likely to occur is problematic, lighten too much while hurrying to reach a bat- not having forcible entry capabilities for unantici- tlefield. Heavy armor has limits, however, and pated wars could be catastrophic. Both seizing lighter forces remain critical. In addition to and securing lodgment for follow-on forces is an Kuwait City, opportunities for light forces in essential capability. urban areas could have developed from Basra to To take a lodgment area and make it safe for Baghdad if the coalition had pursued grander ob- reinforcements while meeting the aggressive jectives. Marines trained in urban warfare would Army timetable, the enabling forces must be even have made ideal spearheads for such assaults. An- faster. CONUS-based Army paratroopers can be other useful lesson was that even though the Ma- dropped anywhere but can’t keep a door open rine amphibious ability was not used because of long against a well equipped enemy. A Marine ex- anticipated losses, the threat of invasion tied peditionary unit, with its own tanks and light ar- down substantial Iraqi forces. While amphibious mored vehicles (LAVs), offers additional combat warfare should lose its central role for the Marine power, but not much; and there would be sus- Corps, it should be retained as one item in the ex- tainment issues. On the other hand, a combina- peditionary tool kit. tion of Army paratroopers and marines relying on

40 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Dunn

Maritime preposition- ing ship in Persian Gulf. Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Gloria T. Barry) Pacific (Gloria T. Fleet Combat Camera Group,

afford to place sets everywhere. Equipment sets afloat also require good ports near airfields to link troops and weapons, limitations that could prove to be problems against a robust anti-access strat- egy. On balance, afloat prepositioning is preferred for the Marines; but the Army thinks its afloat stocks are superior because they can sail anywhere. But even afloat sets suffer from maintenance prob- lems and a lack of adequate anchorages. Airborne training near One answer is steaming prepositioning ships.

Aviano air base. (James D. Green) Communications Squadron st Taking the concept one step further, sailing with 31 an amphibious ready group (ARG) will protect prepositioning squadrons. As ARGs rotate to homeports, prepositioning ships could unload Winning the first battle requires a faster re- weapons and vehicles for maintenance before sponse than sealift can deliver. LAV-equipped sailing again. Such squadrons travelling with units may be the ideal reinforcement, balancing ARGs will allow the Marines to reinforce landings under-armor capabilities with deployability. Airlift rapidly. Two battalions plus brigade assets either assets can move such units and must be a major in the United States or on Okinawa could be part of the Marine shift to expeditionary battle. combined with LAV variants and heavy equip- Prepositioning and reliance on the Air Force ment to support an embarked expeditionary unit. can increase strategic mobility for the Marines just One battalion and brigade assets could be on im- as they have for the Army, but prepositioning must mediate deployment notice while a reserve battal- be modified for the new mission. Placing more ion would have longer to prepare for movement. prepositioned stocks on land is not advisable. Army land-based prepositioning has serious draw- Expeditionary Battle Force backs. These sites represent high priority fixed tar- In a straightforward application of the battle gets for any enemy contemplating war. In addi- force concept, an MEU battalion landing team tion, although they can be configured to cope with would debark at a port and occupy a nearby air- the specific local threat, the United States can’t field. The squadron would rapidly unload while the Air Force airlifted personnel. If the team must

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 41 ■ ARMY–MARINE CORPS ROLES

airborne troops landing in brigade strength to Target detection at Camp Bonesteel, seize airheads, airlifted marines could dominate Kosovo. cities with dismounted riflemen and fan out with LAV-equipped units into the countryside. In short, Army airborne and Marine forces can supply the light rapid reaction units for first battles supported by carrier air wings and cruise missiles plus long-range Air Force assets. Marine Corps prepositioning can also put light armor into first battles. Army heavy forces and Air Force squadrons exploiting prepositioning can get to se- lected areas in small numbers, but for the quantity needed to win a decisive victory slower sealift must suffice. Medium divisions should be formed at the expense of Army units to provide mechanized capabilities that blend power and strategic mobility. Such forces will be slower to de- ploy than airborne units and weaker than heavy divisions but may bridge the gap between the first battle and offensive war. A strategic expeditionary corps that controls all service assets may have a Signal Company (Daniel Ernst) th role in fielding a joint expeditionary capability. 55 The final element in the range of capabilities is the Reserves. Enhanced readiness brigades of the Army National Guard have a role in winning conduct an opposed landing, MEU combat avia- MTWs. Although the active components can tion assets and accompanying ships, including fight some first battles, is needed to naval aircraft, would support Marine units. Mean- win major wars. Thus the National Guard should while, the squadron would go to a friendly port be refocused on its traditional mission, preparing to unload near an airfield where the Marines to fight and win large-scale conventional con- would arrive. flicts requiring full-scale mobilization. The amphibious group would then load the troops as a second assault wave to reinforce the The Army must remain focused on winning battalion landing team. If the crisis developed wars, and conventional campaigns are the core of slowly, the squadron would land equipment be- this mission. The revolution in military affairs fore the MEU initiated action, shortening the time might make hyper-campaigns of blinding speed to get a second wave on ARG ships. Or tactical air- possible, but they will be significant operations lift could move equipment aimed at defeating organized large-scale resist- and troops from an inter- accepting the supporting role ance. The Nation needs a strategically deployable mediate staging base to the battle capability to buy time for the Army. The of the Army actually expands area of operations even if Marine Corps can provide that competency as a only a primitive field is the utility of the Marine Corps fully capable expeditionary force. JFQ available. V–22s would be beyond the littorals particularly valuable. Co- operation between the Ma- rine Corps and Air Force to practice linking air- lifted personnel with prepositioned equipment is essential. In addition, the Air Force needs more strategic airlift as well as improved intra-theater assets to augment Marine V–22s. If airfields are too far inland for Marine sea- based assault, Army airborne troops can secure objectives. Thus under this concept there is a lim- ited role for the Army. The airborne battalion can deploy anywhere on short notice and Rangers are equally ready. Accepting the supporting role of the Army actually expands the utility of the Marine Corps beyond the littorals. With Army

42 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Dunn The Security of the Americas

Throughout most of its history the United States has conducted relations with Latin America based on an exclusive issue: first, checking Guyanans operating assault craft. the influence of European powers, then combating Communist threats, and today stemming the flow of drugs. The articles in this JFQ Forum Signal Company (Sean Terry) th 55 argue that the future will be markedly different. The Americas share compelling security interests that necessitate cooperation on a continual basis to meet the aspirations and apprehensions of all countries in the Hemisphere.

43 ■ JFQ FORUM

Economic factors occupy a leading role in rethinking security rela- tions with Latin America. About half of all U.S. trade moves north-south today. Included in this flow of goods and services is some 30 to 40 percent of U.S. oil imports. In addition to energy resources, the region contains some of the busiest avenues of international trade. The Panama Canal re- mains a central element in that network and a key pathway for world commerce. Although the United States formally turned over the canal to Panama, this waterway remains important because of its role as an eco- nomic and strategic transit point for allies and friends. Closing military bases in the Panama Canal Zone and developing more complex economic ties are emblematic of dramatic changes in the region. The United States can no longer secure its interests by guarding strate- gic points or casually interacting with countries in Latin America. The Caribbean illustrates dynamics that compel north-south integration and a prescription for updating the U.S. approach to its southern neighbors. The success and future prospects for hemispheric trade will depend in part on security partnerships that advance regional stability, free markets, and democratic institutions. There are also powerful underground economies that shape the re- gion. Billions of dollars are generated by illegal drugs, eroding the fabric of local institutions. Thus counterdrug operations are not only focused on stemming the movement of drugs into the United States, but Bolivian soldiers near are integral to attempts to pro- Cordoba, , tect national integrity. Plan Cabanas ’00. Colombia, which includes a comprehensive package of for- eign aid and military assistance, is a case in point. But military assistance is only one component of Plan Colombia, and the counterdrug effort is just the most visible ini- tiative by the United States to adapt to the new realities of Latin America. Border disputes and domestic insurgencies—tra- ditional bugbears of hemispheric relations—are far less prominent than in the past. Nonstate and Signal Company (Cory Montgomery) th

55 transnational threats such as ille- gal drugs, migration, natural dis- asters, environmental degrada- tion, and disease are primary concerns. Engagement calls for more than military solutions, making interagency cooperation ever more critical. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has helped to build capabili- ties for responding to natural disasters in the region. With the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, an agency of the Department of State, non- governmental organizations, and many other institutions, the command is improving capabilities to handle natural disasters while combining

44 JFQ / Autumn 2000 resources to assist neighbors. As a result, responses to regional disas- ters has been significantly en- hanced in recent years, though there is room for improvement. Moreover, although the region can be subdivided into the Southern Cone, Andean Ridge, Central Amer- ica, and Caribbean, engagement must address the unique conditions in each country. At the same time, cooperation among neighbors is still the best course of action for building trust, sharing resources,

Ship passes through and tackling regional issues. For ex- the Galliard Cut of ample, when Bolivia and Peru ag- the Panama Canal gressively countered drug traffick- between the Gatun and ing, the flow moved over their Pedro Miguel locks. borders to other states. Single state AP/Wide Photos (Julie World Plasencia) solutions prove inadequate in deal- ing with threats that do not recognize national sovereignty and frontiers. Initiatives taken by Colombia will succeed if its neighbors coordinate their policies and efforts. The region has also experienced a strengthening of civilian control over the military as well as a reduction of oppression in the name of inter- nal security. Remarkable developments occurred throughout Latin Amer- ica over the last decade with the encouragement and support of the United States. While U.S. efforts have represented a positive force, much of the credit for improvements must go to dramatic change in the security environment and the maturation of civil institutions. As the security environment evolves, the unified command plan will become a topic of further debate. Responsibility for the Caribbean and ad- jacent waters moved from U.S. Atlantic Command to U.S. Southern Com- mand in 1997. As a result, SOUTHCOM has a much larger area under its purview, but this provides a more coherent and comprehensive way of ad- dressing regional affairs. It should be noted, however, that Mexico stands outside this framework. Consequently, military contact is handled on a bilateral basis between Washington and Mexico City. This JFQ Forum suggests that active engagement in the security of the Americas is essential but that U.S. efforts must be more responsive, nu- anced, and skilled in integrating the military with other instruments of national power. Effective engagement will require a deeper understanding of regional as well as political, economic, and social issues. As myriad links between North America and grow, the pressure to confront security concerns will follow. JFQ

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 45 ■

U.S. and Ecuadorian soldiers coordinating security.

Effective Engagement KYARNG PAO (David W. Altom) (David W. PAO KYARNG The Case of Ecuador By JOHN R. GROVES, JR.

he United States recognized Pact countries and newly independ- the opportunity to reduce its ent states. Its subset, the National military presence in Europe Guard State Partnership Program, has T and Latin America after the sought to extend and build upon mil- Cold War. A peacetime strategy was to-mil relations. needed to promote stability, eco- Although related, the programs nomic progress, and democratic insti- differ. State partnership originated tutions. In Europe, the Partnership for with the National Guard Bureau and Peace (PFP) initiative served to en- the Army and Air National Guard of courage military-to-military and mili- participating states and includes Eu- tary-to-government assistance and ex- rope and Latin America and may be change programs in former Warsaw extended to Southeast Asia. It links in- dividual states with in part- ner countries to improve bilateral rela- Major General John R. Groves, Jr., ARNG, is adjutant general of the Commonwealth tions. Program goals reflect an of Kentucky and a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. evolving mission for the National

46 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Groves

Guard and promote regional stability and civil-military relations in support State Partnership Program of U.S. policy. artnerships with foreign defense establishments were first proposed by Sponsoring states use the PFP con- U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in consideration of the concerns ex- cept to engage host countries in Eu- pressed by the Russian Federation to active U.S. in rope and increasingly in Latin Amer- P the region and a decision to staff liaison teams with members of the Reserve ica. It combines National Guard assets components. In 1993 the National Guard Bureau recommended pairing states including civilian skills and ethnic with Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). From this initiative emerged affinities as well as support from state a military-to-military program for Central and Eastern Europe. Since then it has governments, education institutions, grown beyond the Joint Contact Team Program established by EUCOM to be- and the private sector. come a tool for engage- The PFP program remains a strong ment throughout Latin force in fostering relations between Peruvian and West America and Europe and NATO and newly independent states. Virginia National Guard has been expanded to Similar needs for engagement exist officers. the Pacific region, pro- today in Latin America. State partner- moting interaction in the ship builds on the European experi- social and economic as ence to shape the environment and re- well as military spheres. inforces democratic institutions and State partners participate economic progress. U.S. Southern in training, exercises, in- Command (SOUTHCOM) has aggres- ternships, exchanges, and sively advanced the strategy of engage- civic leader visits. Activi- Airlift Wing (Charles R. Ware)

ment within the region. Awareness of th ties are coordinated through CINCs, country 130 Kentucky initiated one teams, and other agen- of the first state-to-country cies to build democratic institutions that assist nations in many regions of the world. Partnerships create long-term relationships based on confidence and partnerships in 1997 trust. Current participating countries (and their state partners) include:

Albania (New Jersey and New York), Belarus (Utah), Belize (Louisiana), Bolivia host country conditions and emphasis (Mississippi), Bulgaria (Tennessee), Croatia (Minnesota), Czech Republic (Ne- on cooperation, professionalism, and braska and Texas), Ecuador (Kentucky), El Salvador (New Hampshire), Estonia respect for participants have been its (Maryland), Honduras (Puerto Rico), Hungary (Ohio), Jamaica (Washington, guiding principles. Theater engage- D.C.), Kazakhstan (Arizona), Latvia (Michigan), Lithuania (Pennsylvania), ment planning coordinates and com- Moldova (North Carolina), Macedonia (Vermont), Panama (Missouri), bines active component training and (Massachusetts), Peru (West Virginia), Philippines (Hawaii and assistance in host countries, under the Guam), Poland (Illinois), Republic of Georgia (Georgia), Republic of Kyrgyzs- CINC and in cooperation with our am- tan (Montana), Romania (Alabama), Slovakia (Indiana), Slovenia (Colorado), bassadors and their country teams. The Turkmenistan (Nevada), Ukraine (California and Kansas), (Connecti- results have been effective exercises cut), Uzbekistan (Louisiana), and Venezuela (). JFQ and exchanges and continuous, diver- sified shaping activities. Eleven state partnership programs currently exist in the SOUTHCOM region. Until recently the country’s mili- the guarantor states, contained the sit- Latin American Bellwether tary was largely deployed against an uation. The dispute was ended by Unique conditions in Ecuador invasion from Peru. Ecuador and Peru treaty in October 1998. [For details, see have led to a singular engagement engaged in a violent border clash in Glenn R. Weidner, “Operation Safe plan. Kentucky initiated one of the 1997. The prospect of all-out war was Border: The Ecuador-Peru Crisis,” Joint first state-to-country partnerships in real. Signatories to the Rio Accords Force Quarterly, no. 11 (Spring 98).] 1997, organizing its efforts to meet that drew boundary between the two After the treaty was signed, repre- host country requirements and U.S. countries in 1945—Argentina, Brazil, sentatives of Ecuador and Peru as well interests. Ecuador has three north-to- Chile, and the United States—inter- as the United States attended a sympo- south geographical bands—the tropic vened, created a buffer zone, and sium in Cincinnati on emergency lowlands, Andean range, and rain cooled down tempers. For almost two management. The state partnership forest—with their respective subgover- years an observer mission, fielded by programs of Kentucky and West Vir- nance issues of ethnicity, poverty, re- ginia brought together officials from gionalism, unemployment, environ- Ecuador and Peru on neutral ground ment, and infrastructure.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 47 ■ JFQ FORUM

National Guard combat Building school in engineers. Ecuador. KYARNG PAO (David W. Altom) (David W. PAO KYARNG

sucre) was recently tied to the dollar, and preliminary reports indicate that the economy has stopped its freefall. Needed investment, including savings deposits in Ecuadorian banks, are posi- tive signs along with larger revenues from oil exports. Ecuador was one of the first coun- tries in Latin America to move toward democracy when the military govern- ment called for free elections in 1979. But with six presidents over the last few years, punctuated by the only re- cent coup in the region, the future is uncertain. Although the coup in Janu- ary 2000—led by the senior military commander—lasted only a few hours, President Jamil Mahuad was ousted and Vice President Gustavo Noboa took over when Mahuad tried reforms that his opponents found too dracon- ian. Until recently, even a failing bank- ing system and a decision to renege on international loans could not create a consensus for action. At the same time polling by the Inter-American Devel- opment Bank and the European Union KYARNG PAO (David W. Altom) (David W. PAO KYARNG disclosed that Ecuadorians had the least regard for democracy in the re- gion, with only 41 percent preferring for reasons of mutual interest. A small and stable nations. Indeed, Ecuador this form of government in 1998. but positive step was taken toward received the dubious distinction of Strikes, ethnic violence, corrup- shaping the geopolitical environment being the only country to default on tion, and damage from El Niño also between the countries. Brady bonds that allow mostly Latin have confronted the country as a re- Despite peace with Peru, Ecuador American countries to shed debts source-constrained military battles is in turmoil. Although it has abun- owed from the 1980s. On a more opti- narco traffickers. Added to this volatile dant natural resources and adequate mistic note, the national currency (the mix is the fear of internal alliances infrastructure, Ecuador lacks the disci- among unions, indigenous Indian pline required to join the mainstream groups, and Colombian guerrillas. of fiscally responsible, self-supporting,

48 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Groves

Like many partnership programs, Kentucky-Ecuador State Partnership the Kentucky National Guard has com- pleted a number of engagement activi- ollowing the model of the Partnership for Peace program developed in ties. They are coordinated with Eastern Europe, Kentucky officially joined Ecuador in July 1997 in es- SOUTHCOM goals for Ecuador and the tablishing the first state-to-country partnership in Latin America. With F Andes. Annual planning and schedul- the exception of Operation Nuevos Horizontes (New Horizons), each of the ing meetings consider command proj- following activities have been funded by U.S. Southern Command: ects and National Guard training to ■ Medical. Beginning with a medical readiness training exercise develop engagement events. Annual (MEDRETE) in Alahuela in 1996, there have been five deployments by the training may be dedicated to the part- Kentucky National Guard and a reciprocal visit by Ecuadorians to conduct nership mission while other events are MEDRETE operations and emergency medical training for military and civilian funded by SOUTHCOM and involve healthcare providers. National Guard members for deploy- ■ Disaster Assistance. Two north-to-south and two south-to-north mili- ments beyond normal two-week train- tary support to civil authorities exchanges have taken place involving military ing periods. Occasionally exercises and civilian disaster response funded by U.S. Army Forces Command specialists. Additionally, par- (FORSCOM) or the Joint Chiefs enable ticipation by the Kentucky deployment of Reserve components for National Guard and Defensa several months. Deploying battalion- Civil in Ecuador, as well as size engineer units to both Panama counterparts from West Vir- and Ecuador are examples. These activ- ginia and Peruvian civil de- ities mainly used members of the Na- fense ministry in a sympo- tional Guard who rotated to the host sium in 1999 led to a disaster country in an annual training status emergency mutual assistance Texas Army National for two weeks, with a small staff to Signal Company (Valentino Garcia)

compact between Ecuador Guard in Argentina. th

55 provide continuity. and Peru. Partnership efforts have included ■ Symposium on 21st Century Strategies. Two events were conducted in support to civilian authorities through cooperation with faculty from the Patterson School of Diplomacy and Inter- disaster assistance and law enforce- national Relations at the University of Kentucky. A four-day seminar in ment exchanges, medical readiness Ecuador at the Escuela Politecnica de Ejercito was attended by that nation’s training exercises, rural health care, military and civilian leadership. mil-to-mil visits, and symposia con- ■ Military Support to Civilian Authorities-Law Enforcement. A south-to- ducted in Ecuador by faculty members north exchange by Ecuadorian military and national police officers and the from the University of Kentucky. A six- Kentucky National Guard to observe law enforcement training, crime scene month deployment in 1998 of over preservation, and forensic evidence analysis techniques in use by military po- 2,000 engineer, medical, aviation, and lice, Kentucky State Police, and Lexington Urban-County Police. A north-to- military police personnel from the south reciprocal visit by the U.S. personnel took place in 1999. Kentucky Army and Air National ■ Military-to-Military Coordination. South-to-north visits by Ecuadorian Guard assisted with a FORSCOM-sup- army, navy, and air force liaison officers took place in 1997 and 1999 to pro- ported operation known as Nuevos Hor- vide an orientation to operations involving the Kentucky National Guard. izontes (or New Horizons). Though not ■ Nuevos Horizontes I. U.S. Forces Command sponsored the deployment a traditional CINC activity, it was a of 2,000 members of engineer, medical, aviation, and military police units benchmark event with a continuous from the Kentucky National Guard to Esmeraldas Province in 1998 to con- and broadly dispersed series of infra- struct schools, clinics, and sanitary facilities in conjunction with conduct of structure improvement projects at the joint MEDRETE operations. JFQ grass roots level. Units exercised the full range of mobilization tasks and de- ployed into environments where total self-sufficiency was demanded under Infusion of U.S. funds and effort into here preliminary indications are worri- conditions of high operational activity. Colombia to counter narcotics traffick- some. Especially in the border area, Training benefits for the National ing and insurgents has yet to make it- the spillover from Colombian guerrilla Guard, mostly cycled in deployments self fully felt. But early indications are and trafficking groups has burdened of 15 to 18 days, were the best possible not encouraging. Drug trafficking is a law enforcement and military person- under peacetime conditions. Retention cancerous threat to the already precar- nel. The extent to which Colombian remains high. The local impact was the ious state of governance in Ecuador. narco interests will move into Ecuador creation of long-term cultural and The impact on Ecuador from in- is not known. community improvements to enhance creased counterdrug initiatives in Colombia remains unclear though

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 49 ■ JFQ FORUM medical and educational opportunities Base camp Bluegrass, for thousands of mostly rural people. Esmeraldas Province. Moreover, an intangible benefit is the sense of accomplishment embedded in the history of the participating units. People Are Key State partnership activities have been criticized as lacking in methods to objectively measure outcomes. While some engagement falls into the categories of goodwill or information exchange, the basis for Army and Air National Guard deployments is clear— training value and accomplishing mis- sion essential tasks. The deployment of the Kentucky National Guard exposed engineer units to real world missions under demanding conditions, includ- ing the movement of vehicles and equipment by road, rail, and sea. Altom) (David W. PAO KYARNG Many partner states have rein- forced mil-to-mil activities through networking and ventures in collabora- its value system is fertile soil for the states—working with the active com- tion with cultural, business, educa- grass roots engagement which the pro- ponents through unified commands— tional, and government organizations gram seeks to cultivate. are engaged in efforts to diminish the in their states. The Kentucky National The value of the state partnership potential of conflict in various regions Guard has worked with groups having program is day to day engagement. Al- of the world. Winning on the battle- longstanding contacts in Ecuador, though Kentucky and West Virginia field remains job number one, but most notably the Partners of the Amer- were aligned with Ecuador and Peru achieving national security objectives icas (founded in 1964 as the people-to- when border hostilities were taking without a resort to arms is also worthy people component of the Alliance for place, the program can take little credit of our effort. JFQ Progress) whose volunteers include for the peace accord. The same can be farmers, artists, emergency planners, said for the military coup in Ecuador building officials, sports teams, and with its counterproductive and embar- university faculty. Part of the long- rassing implications. Program partici- term vision of the program is that mili- pants were little more than bystanders. tary-to-military activities will gradually Counterdemocratic tendencies in Ecuador are part of a political the value of the state partnership culture in which the military has seen itself as the second program is day to day engagement team ever ready to govern when civilian institutions fail. be offset by interaction involving non- The country has a tradition of demo- military interests, initiative, and insti- cratic idealism, but its economy and in- tutions in furtherance of democratic ternal conflicts have blocked progress. institutions and market economics. Now threats from drug trafficking and The peoples of Latin America are guerrilla activity are enormous. generally aware of civic life and gover- nance in the United States. This aware- There is no quick fix for Ecuador ness results in part from immigrants to or any other developing country. The this country who remain in close con- key is contact between peoples. In tact with their families at home. Al- their limited but effective way, state though comparatively few immigrants partnerships seek to build confidence from Ecuador have settled in Kentucky, in the rule of law and commitment to those who have settled elsewhere are a the institutions in which democratic source of information on democratic principles are grounded. institutions. This ebb and flow of The Kentucky National Guard and knowledge about the United States and counterpart organizations in other

50 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Human Rights and

Paraguayans participating in multinational exercise. Combat Camera Squadron (DavidCombat Camera Squadron L. Wilcoxson) st Military Conduct 1 A Progress Report By GEORGE R. VICKERS

ncreased awareness of human civilian regimes in much of the South- rights over the last thirty years has ern Cone and Andes in the 1960s and led to new standards for state ac- 1970s, and where U.S. policies sup- Itors in peace and war. Human ported regimes in Central America that rights concerns have been particularly were opposed by Marxist-inspired salient in the , guerrillas during the 1980s. where military dictatorships overthrew Fresh Start Strategies Since the Cold War, democratic governments have promoted constitu- George R. Vickers is executive director of the Washington Office on Latin America tional reforms aimed at subordinating and coauthor of Democracy Weakened? The October 20, 1996, Nicaraguan Elections. the military to civilian control and

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 51 ■ JFQ FORUM

other, this strategy impunity and lead to a return to viola- aimed to ensure that re- tions. The distinct historical and cul- gimes consolidate demo- tural contexts from which Latin Ameri- cratic institutions and can militaries have emerged make it increase respect for difficult to transfer practices developed human rights. within the unique U.S. experience. The incorporation of democracy and Evolving Programs and human rights as na- Policies tional security policy ob- Since the 1950s the U.S. Armed jectives has been accom- Forces have been provided with a mod- panied by operational icum of training on the laws of war. Al- changes in the role and leged abuses during the mission of the forces de- forced a reexamination of human ployed in the hemi- rights training. After the investigation sphere. Human rights of the My Lai incident by the Peers training has been inten- Commission, a DOD directive issued sified and efforts to re- in 1974 required all military personnel form in to receive training in the laws of war Latin America have been Argentine soldiers commensurate with their responsibili- at checkpoint, introduced. ties. Moreover, exercises were modified

Cabanas ’00. Signal Company (Albert Eaddy) While these initia- to convey the laws of war require- th

55 tives have lowered the ments such as introducing civilians decibel level between into battlefield scenarios. human rights advocates U. S. Southern Command (SOUTH- preventing human rights abuses. Latin and the military, there is no consensus COM) did not have guidance on train- American militaries have also under- on their effectiveness. Two crucial ing until 1990 when the Commander gone a self-examination to adapt their dilemmas arise in attempting to har- in Chief, Southern Command (CINC- roles and missions to the changing monize such efforts with other objec- SOUTH), General Maxwell Thurman, strategic environment. By and large tives. First, training has met obstacles USA, issued a policy memo. It required that limit its impact. The all personnel to undergo awareness democratic transition in many nations backgrounds of many training, investigate and report alleged removed the armed forces from militaries have afforded abuses, and influence host countries to them considerable free- obey internationally accepted norms. internal security operations dom from civilian control In addition, it prescribed responsibili- while portraying them as ties for unit commanders, military as- they have endorsed democratic princi- guarantors of the state. Moreover, a sistance groups, and SOUTHCOM staff ples and human rights. At the first De- legacy of repression and dictatorship elements. When General George Joul- fense Ministerial of the Americas in continues to polarize societies and in- wan, USA, became CINCSOUTH, he 1995, representatives reviewed a com- hibit civil-military relations. supplemented the memo with a video mitment by the armed forces to re- Another dilemma involves threats presentation that unequivocally laid main subordinated to civilian author- such as drug trafficking, organized out responsibilities for reporting viola- ity, act within constitutional bounds, crime, and terrorism. In most mature tions and emphasized that the com- and respect human rights. democracies responsibility for dealing mand mission included human rights. Reflecting changes in national se- with such threats falls to civilian insti- Subsequent CINCs have reen- curity strategy, the U.S. military has tutions. But in much of the hemisphere forced education within SOUTHCOM. played a critical role in promoting these challenges have overwhelmed Under General Barry McCaffrey, USA, a democracy and human rights. While new democratic governments, leading steering group was established to pro- Cold War strategy was dominated by to a call for the military to play a cen- vide advice on human rights and en- deterring communist expansion and tral role. The democratic transition in sure policy implementation. During nuclear war, the strategy of engage- many nations removed the armed his tenure the command also prepared ment and enlargement proclaimed by forces from internal security opera- a pocket-sized reference card summa- the Clinton administration stressed en- tions; thus human rights organizations rizing standing orders and reporting hanced security, prosperity at home, and democracy activists fear that pro- procedures. Human rights organiza- and democracy abroad. Rooted in a be- posed roles and missions will reinforce tions were invited to observe training. lief that there is an affinity between General Wesley Clark, USA, continued democratic systems and free market these programs as CINCSOUTH. economies, and that democratic states are less likely to go to war with each

52 JFQ / Autumn 2000 V ickers

Although the conference allowed Chileans searching for sniper during representatives of national organiza- exercise. tions to interact with high-ranking offi- cers from their countries, participants from both sides suggested greater focus on incorporating human rights issues in operational training exercises and de- veloping more pragmatic and mission- related arguments for respecting them. SOUTHCOM sponsored a working group in 1997 composed of representa- tives of various international and re- gional organizations and officials with responsibility for human rights train- ing. It produced a consensus document that specified objectives for doctrine, education and training, internal con- trol systems, cooperation with external control systems, and the delineation of police and military functions. Deliberations highlighted possibil- Signal Company (Cory Montgomery)

th ities and difficulties of reaching a con- 55 sensus between civil and military rep- resentatives on advancing human rights. On the positive side, a relatively The Armed Forces began inserting officials in, among other things, “cre- detailed consensus was forged during specific human rights training into ating and maintaining effective mili- the two-day meeting. At the same time programs designed for Latin America tary judicial systems and military there were major differences over pri- in the early 1990s. The 7th Special codes of conduct, including obser- orities. Military officers stressed educa- Forces Group, for example, issued its vance of internationally recognized tion and training as key to improving own guidance. In addition to requir- human rights.” performance. They acknowledged the ing training for all personnel involved In a speech delivered at the importance of incorporating support in mobile training teams and deploy- School of the Americas in August 1994, for democracy and respect for human ment training, it required instruction McCaffrey stressed the responsibility of rights in doctrine. Civilian partici- to foreign personnel “if consistent commanders to ensure respect for pants, on the other hand, emphasized with mission and/or training require- human rights and outlined measures the need for both internal and external ments/objectives.” to prevent abuses, which included: control mechanisms to ensure ac- For decades the main U.S. facility ■ zero tolerance of abuse and punish- countability for violations. for influencing military personnel from ment of violators General Charles Wilhelm, USMC, the region was the School of the Ameri- ■ effective training became CINCSOUTH prior to the cas in Panama. The curriculum did not ■ clear written rules of engagement meeting in 1998 that sought to de- include formal instruction even after ■ treating soldiers with respect velop a consensus on criteria for meas- the school was relocated to Fort Ben- ■ leading by example uring performance. Wilhelm sus- ning in 1984. Although human rights ■ controlling troops pended this effort in favor of technical ■ issues were treated peripherally in recognizing honorable conduct. assistance to reform codes of military counterinsurgency training, it was not McCaffrey also instituted an an- justice and human rights training. until 1991 that the curriculum was re- nual conference in conjunction with From 1997 to 2000 such assistance was vamped when a policy memo stated, the Interamerican Institute on Human provided to Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, “The School of the Americas systemati- Rights. The first was held in 1996 and and Venezuela. cally advocates human rights. To this brought together senior military and end, instructional materials in all civilian leaders from the region as well Message Received? courses will stress respect for human as representatives of human rights or- Efforts to promote human rights rights as indispensable to successful ganizations to discuss “the role of the in Latin American militaries in the military operations.” armed forces in the protection of 1990s came at a time of civil-military Congress approved funds begin- human rights.” The agenda focused on tension in many countries. In the af- ning in fiscal year 1991 to expand the obligations of the military under differ- termath of long periods of military dic- international military education and ent international covenants and perti- tatorship in Argentina and Chile, for training program to promote instruc- nent training in the armed forces. example, and after the end of civil tion for foreign civilian and military conflict in El Salvador and Guatemala,

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 53 ■ JFQ FORUM

of war are not brought to trial; they are Bolivians unloading relief aid, Cabanas ’00. not justiciable. Camps and other officers who defended their patria and its institu- tions are being tried under the terms of ex- post facto laws and in the glare of the media. This allows the subversives who lost the war to determine their fate in col- laboration with a government seeking re- venge and political advantage rather than justice...with no effort by the same gov- ernment to bring to justice the terrorists and subversives or to subject them to pub- lic exposure and repudiation, as has been done with the military officers.1 It must also be said that some mil- itary leaders in the region regard U.S. efforts to promote institutional human rights reforms as hypocritical. They re- sent being blamed for the conse- quences of adopting policies that the United States promoted in the 1960s Signal Company (Cory Montgomery)

th and 1970s. Some even perceive empha- 55 sis by Washington on democracy and human rights as part of an attempt to subordinate Latin American security investigating past human rights viola- left impunity intact; thus they de- concerns and advance U.S. interests. tions met stiff resistance from mili- manded prosecution of those who had Ironically some Latin American taries in the region, which argued that committed abuses. human rights organizations, particu- their mandated mission to counter in- Even without transition agree- larly those representing the families of ternal threats legitimized and justified ments for dealing with past violations, victims, also take a conspiratorial view there were often efforts to redefine of U.S. efforts to promote military jus- investigating past human rights or limit military roles by removing tice and human rights training. They the responsibility for internal secu- oppose any form of military-to-mili- violations met stiff resistance rity and restricting the armed forces tary collaboration until active and re- from militaries in the region to defending against external tired officers accused of abuses are threats. Sometimes this involved brought to justice in civilian courts. constitutional change, but every- intervention. Moreover, unlike the where it called for shifting doctrine New Threats, Ancient Rights United States and Western Europe in from the national security focus of the If the transition to democracy has the wake of World War II, codes in Cold War. fostered a new emphasis on individual Latin America required military per- Deep polarization was both an in- rights, it has also produced a far more sonnel to obey orders regardless of centive for and obstacle to efforts to complex array of challenges. The inter- their legality. promote civil-military dialogue and national and regional legal architecture Countering such arguments, human rights training. Many senior of- for promoting and protecting human human rights and other groups held ficers feared that reforms in military rights is based on obligations under in- that excesses committed by armed justice that transferred jurisdiction to ternational covenants to control ac- forces violated international law and civilian courts would expose their tions of state agents. It was commonly covenants that state agents were obli- armed forces to ex post facto laws and argued that only states can commit gated to respect. In many cases na- vengeance by those same people human rights abuses because of their tional constitutions and law were whose efforts to overthrow the state obligation to guarantee rights. In Latin breached. The groups contended that had necessitated intervention. As an America, however, non-state actors until there was accountability for past Argentine officer, General Osiris Ville- often pose the greatest threat to abuses and an end to impunity, the gas, put it in defending General human rights. Drug cartels and organ- military was a threat to the consolida- Ramón Camps (who was accused of ized crime have overwhelmed and sub- tion of democracy. Welcoming reports homicide, illegal deprivation of liberty, verted efforts to strengthen civilian of truth commissions to investigate and torture of prisoners): law enforcement, and in the Andes, abuses, nongovernmental groups com- The real accused in this trial is the army, plained that negotiations ending con- as an institution, in a political trial. Acts flicts and restoring civilian rule had

54 JFQ / Autumn 2000 V ickers

Organization of American States, and National law and policy have international observers to postpone evolved partly in parallel with interna- the second round of elections until tional law. Since enactment of the better guarantees could be assured. Harkin amendment in 1975, Congress Asked whether he feared sanctions has conditioned economic assistance and a possible cutoff of aid from the on respect for human rights and has in- United States, Fujimori replied, “What creasingly attached similar terms to se- sanctions? Are we talking about coun- curity assistance. The Leahy amend- terdrug cooperation? That is a two- ment was extended from prohibiting way proposition.” security assistance to abusive militaries It may not be always possible to to a prohibition on assistance to spe- make human rights and democracy cific units harboring alleged violators. the top priority of U.S. strategy. There These initiatives have fostered develop- may be a conflict between strategic ment of elaborate procedures to moni- objectives and the concrete circum- tor and evaluate human rights perform- stances of particular countries. The ance in other countries. task is to anticipate conflicts and min- imize their consequences. Harmonizing objectives relating to democracy and human rights with Colombians during Future Implications other security goals in the Americas is human rights training. Although incorporating democ- a vital challenge. Past failures have AP/ Wide Photos (Scott World Dalton) racy and human rights objectives into sometimes fostered opposition to de- hemispheric policies in the 1990s was fense policies, limited options in sig- a deliberate response to changes in nificant ways, and also forced changes Caribbean, Central America, and Mex- overall national strategy, they do not in strategic objectives. In addition, an ico, have become a parallel power to represent merely the political whim of expanding body of international hu- the state in controlling national terri- a particular administration. On the manitarian law in an increasingly glob- tory. In this environment, demands for contrary, the growing salience of alized world is likely to require more internationally recognized individual, human rights in national policy is a formal and detailed attention to civil, and political rights are increas- response to the changing global polit- human rights. JFQ ingly countered by demands for ical environment. harsher measures to restore order. So- Over the last thirty years, the NOTE cial cleansing actions and vigilante ef- emergence of new laws, treaties, and 1 See Brian Loveman, For La Patria: Poli- forts to punish criminals are growing precedents has created a body of inter- tics and the Armed Forces in Latin America national humanitarian law (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, the growing salience of human that provides standards and re- 1999). This paraphrases statements made by rights is a response to the changing quirements for state actors in Osiris G. Villegas, Testimonio de un alegato both peace and war. Among (Buenos Aires: Compañía Impresora Ar- global political environment the most important are the gentina, 1990). Convention on the [Impre- in frequency and popularity while sup- scriptibility] of Crimes of War and port for democracy and human rights Crimes against Humanity and the Con- is eroding. vention against Torture. In the Western These new threats pose a dilemma Hemisphere, the American Declaration for the United States in ending mili- and the American Convention on tary involvement in internal security. Human Rights established an institu- The DOD counterdrug strategy has tional framework for promoting and promoted an expanded role for armed enforcing compliance with interna- forces in the region in combating drug tional norms. trafficking. The danger is not only that Even though the United States has increased military participation on the not ratified all international human ground risks abuses, but that reliance rights instruments, new precedents call on militaries as instruments of coun- on all states to abide by the norms they terdrug strategy undercuts Washington define. While the United States cannot in promoting reform to bolster civilian be forced to abide by decisions it op- control and respect for human rights. poses, the growing international con- That dilemma was underscored when sensus constitutes powerful moral and Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori re- political pressure. jected calls from the United States, the

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 55 ■ JFQ FORUM U.S. Southern Command

Providing security for USS Hawksbill he SOUTHCOM area of responsibility transitting Panama (AOR) includes the landmass of Latin Canal. America south of Mexico, waters adja- T cent to Central and South America, the with its 13 island nations and Euro- pean and U.S. Territories, the Gulf of Mexico, and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. It encompasses 32 countries, 19 in South and Central America and 13 in the Caribbean, and covers 15.6 million square miles, a sixth of the world landmass assigned to regional unified commands. Traditionally the countries of the area are divided into four subregions: Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay); Andean Ridge (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Marine Division d

Venezuela); Central America (Belize, Costa Rica, El 2 Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua); and Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Repub- lic, Grenada, Grenadines, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Croix, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago). SOUTHCOM has responsibility for security assistance in Mexico although that country is outside its area of responsibility. The SOUTHCOM mission is shaping the environment within the theater by conducting military-to-military engagement and counterdrug activities. The command promotes democracy, sta- bility, and collective approaches to threats to regional security or U.S. in- terests while preparing to meet fu- ture hemispheric challenges. With its headquarters in , Florida, SOUTHCOM has a total of 800 mili- tary personnel and 325 civilian em- JFCOM

ployees. In addition, the command EUCOM Atlantic Ocean has both liaison officers and repre- PACOM sentatives from the Department of Pacific Ocean State, Drug Enforcement Administra- CENTCOM tion, Coast Guard, Customs Service, Pacific Ocean and other Federal agencies. JFQ PACOM

SOUTHCOM

56 JFQ / Autumn 2000 U.S. Southern Command

CUBA Area of PUERTO HAITI RICO ANTIGUA and BARBUDA Responsibility JAMAICA BELIZE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ST. CROIX HONDURAS GUATEMALA ST. KITTS and NEVIS DOMINICA NICARAGUA ST. LUCIA ST. VICENT EL SALVADOR ST. VINCENT and THE GRENADINES GRENADA BARBADOS COSTA RICA TRINIDAD and TOBAGO VENEZUELA PANAMA GUYANA SURINAME COLOMBIA FRENCH GUIANA

ECUADOR

USS Klakring navigating BRAZIL inter-Chilean waterway, Unitas ’00. PERU UH–60 over Sula base camp near El Progreso, Honduras.

BOLIVIA U.S. Navy (Corey Barker) PARAGUAY The geographic area of responsibility for the CHILE conduct of normal SOUTHCOM operations Combat Camera Squadron

includes Central and South America and the th 4 Pacific and Atlantic Oceans from 92° West, east to 30° West, north to 8° North, west to the Guyana/Venezuela coastal border, and See the SOUTHCOM homepage ARGENTINA the Caribbean Sea and its island nations and (http://www.southcom.mil/home) European possessions, the Gulf of Mexico, for details on the area of and the Atlantic Ocean south of 28° North URUGUAY responsibility, component and west of 58° West. commands, theater strategy, and other issues, or contact: U.S. Southern Command ATTN: Public Affairs Office Unloading C–5 in 3511 NW 91st Avenue Asuncion, Paraguay, Miami, Florida 33172–1217 for training exercise. Telephone: (305) 437–1213/ DSN 567–1213 Facsimile: (305) 437–1241 e-mail: [email protected] MALVINAS / FALKLAND ISLANDS

SOUTH GEORGIA ISLAND Marine Division Combat Camera Unit (Tyler J. Melke)Marine Division Combat Camera Unit (Tyler d 2

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 57 ■ The Legislative Role

Argentina’s lower house. AP/ Wide Photo World in Argentine Defense Reform By P ABLO CARLOS MARTINEZ

efore democracy was reestab- to impose its will on the rest of society. lished in Argentina in 1983, its At the same time, economic elites defense issues were always the abandoned their propensity to use Bprovince of the armed forces. their wealth to retain power through The loss of the Malvinas (Falkland) Is- the military. lands in a brief but violent conflict with Britain, the negative experience Systemic Change of an autocratic regime, and above all The task of the post-1983 political the rift caused by human rights abuses, leaders was affirming democracy by led to a crisis that called for a new de- managing defense affairs in the same fense policy. The military began to way as foreign, economic, educational, abandon its self-perception as an au- and legal issues. The usual alternative tonomous corporation with the power in Argentina—finding a strong man or democratic general—was exhausted. To establish a new order it became neces- Pablo Carlos Martinez is secretary of the Argentine senate defense committee sary to forge a broad-based consensus and advisor to the bicameral committee on inspection and control of internal and eliminate political partisanship, security agencies and activities and intelligence. thus initiating a national policy.

58 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Martinez

these countries formed the isolating those in uniform who resisted Mercado Comun del Cono civilian supremacy. Sur (MERCOSUR)—or Common Market of the New Legislative Order Southern Cone. Thus Ar- Like the United States, the Argen- gentina was free of open tine constitution gives congress broad conflict with its most im- authority in defense matters. The leg- portant neighbors. islative branch authorizes the execu- Defense policy was tive to declare war or make peace and defined by foreign policy regulates the military in peacetime. and emphasized coopera- The senate approves promotions of tion and integration, such senior officers. In addition, the legisla- as regional economic coor- ture has considerable budgetary au- dination and its instru- thority over the defense establishment. ment, MERCOSUR; entry Although congress was given on the world stage of these prerogatives when the country President Menem and security was founded, it almost never played an opening congress. treaties; acceptance of a important role in defense affairs. In AP/ Wide Photo World market economy; and ac- the post-1983 governments, however, tive participation in U.N. it has invoked its constitutional pow- By 1983 the international situation peace operations. Respect for democ- ers with vigor. Fiscal restrictions im- anticipated the end of the Cold War racy as a system of values was also af- posed severe limits on military spend- and need for change in Buenos Aires. A firmed, although some minority sec- ing. The number of enlisted personnel new vision of national security was tors risked crossing the line by forging and units was also reduced. Changes emerging, one not based on preparing agreements with military factions begun in 1983 required a new defini- to combat internal threats aided by ex- which were involved in uprisings tion of roles for the armed forces. To ternal enemies and fight for disputed against President Alfonsín. form it, congress passed two laws on territories. A credible democratic gov- Two acts stood out in the course of national defense and internal security, ernment opened up possibilities for co- affirming civilian leadership. First, Presi- providing an institutional architecture ordinating defense policy with a re- dent Alfonsín decided to bring junta that defined the degree to which force gional and global strategic framework. members responsible for repression and may be used against threats. Attributes, Argentina began recovering its interna- human rights abuses to justice. For the missions, and functions were delin- tional credibility, leaving behind the first time, active and retired military eated, as were corresponding relation- members were indicted, ships between the powers of the state. President Alfonsín decided to bring tried, and condemned by a These laws sought to affirm the junta members responsible for human federal court and the supremacy of civilian policy, effec- supreme court. While the tively ending attempts at military au- rights abuses to justice number indicted was re- tonomy. This does not diminish pro- duced because of the sanc- fessionalism of the military; instead, it effects of the Malvinas defeat and the tioning of the laws of proper obedience subordinates the armed forces to politi- disrepute of the military dictatorship. and punto final (military personnel who cal decisions and the checks and bal- Introducing change was not sim- committed illegal acts under orders of ances and legitimizing mechanisms of ple. To build trust both in a state and a superiors would not be charged and democracy. A clear distinction was region, democracy requires trans- there would be a statute of limitations made between defense and security parency; therefore it was necessary for for all charges), observance of the law considerations, weakening a domestic Argentina to make strategic decisions remained regardless of the civilian or national security view that identified a explicit after 1983. Difficult choices had military status of the accused. significant portion of the citizenry as to be made, including negotiating the Second, there was a new insurrec- the enemy. Beagle Treaty in 1984, the first step to- tion shortly before the presidential Restructuring the ministry of de- ward resolving the border dispute with pardon of imprisoned military and fense and empowering the joint staff Chile. The process begun during the guerrilla leaders under Menem. This were consequences of these reforms. presidency of Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) time the military obeyed its orders and Under the law of internal security, the and concluded under Carlos Menem put down the revolt. There had never minister of the interior was made the (1989–99) ended conflict with that been such a response by the armed head of the national police by presi- country. Problems with Brazil, originat- forces. Commanders reacted with disci- dential delegation, thereby restricting ing over construction of dams on the pline and heroism. The military cul- intervention in internal security by the Parana River, were resolved. Finally, ture had begun changing under a pol- icy developed over the last decade by

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 59 ■ JFQ FORUM

First defense ministerial of the Americas, 1995. DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)

armed forces. Cases specifically author- In addition to political activism, Building Trust ized by law were logistical support of the Argentine experience revealed a In addition to reform, the wall of the police force, defense of military es- need to balance action and counsel suspicion had to be torn down. The tablishments, and auxiliary use under from academics and military profes- military and civilians had to put prej- terms contained in the constitution sionals. Political scientists together udices aside. Legislators met with the and with congressional authorization with judicial specialists, economists, chiefs of staff to discuss concerns and in cases of internal unrest. Further- and administrators worked closely take advantage of the ability of the more, when it is decided that the with active and retired officers to ad- majority party to influence the de- armed forces should intervene, in no vise legislators. Stimulating this dia- fense agenda and find solutions on circumstances may doctrines or forms logue required open debate, primarily the executive and legislative levels. It of organization and training be devel- for diverse actors who lacked an appre- was not enough to listen only to the oped or equipment procured by the ciation of defense affairs because the military hierarchy. Mid-level, junior, military for internal security. This cate- nation was just emerging from cruel and noncommissioned officers joined gorical separation was necessary in confrontations that had splintered the debate. Retired military personnel order to distance the armed forces civil-military relations. Nongovern- also aided legislators by providing from social conflicts. ment organizations such as founda- technical support on defense initia- A process of reconciliation be- tions and research institutes became tives as did legal, economic, and ad- tween the political parties was needed protagonists for generating ideas, gath- ministrative professionals. to achieve a consensus to pass both ering information, and interacting A pilot program to assemble the laws. In addition, the temptation to re- with foreign institutions. defense committee chairmen of the organize the defense system by resort- Seminars and exchanges multi- MERCOSUR countries was started at ing solely to the fiscal tourniquet had to plied, but generally outside universi- the initiative of Senator Vaca. The ob- be resisted. Simply beggaring the mili- ties, which were reluctant to accept de- jective was to improve the knowledge tary through reduced spending would fense as a legitimate area of research. In of ruling elites and generate trust to not bring the desired result. Politicians fact, it was only several years after make timely decisions without inter- also joined the national debate. Almost democracy was restored that a pilot ference from the media, which often every party created special commissions program began at National University complicated relations among coun- to study defense issues and propose at La Plata for naval students to take tries. On another plane, legislators policies. The armed forces Permanent courses at a university. Moreover, the began taking an active role in meetings Seminar 2000 was a successful venture joint staff established a center for of defense ministers from throughout in idea sharing. It was organized by Sen- strategic studies. the hemisphere which were held in ator Eduardo Vaca, chairman of the sen- Williamsburg, Virginia; Bariloche, Ar- ate national defense committee, who gentina; Cartagena de Indias, Colom- sought every opportunity to acquire de- bia; and Manaus, Brazil. fense knowledge.

60 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Martinez

Mothers of Plaza de Mayo protesting in Buenos Aires. AP/ Wide Photo World

To expedite reform, the senate de- strategic affairs. Hearing from a major crumbled with the Berlin Wall. They fense committee resolved in 1995 to strategic ally and a key member of also argued that it was necessary to convene a series of public hearings to MERCOSUR was an invaluable experi- transform the armed forces on all lev- ence for the legislators. The els. Moreover, change should not be the senate resolved to convene public Brazilian view of interna- regarded as punishment for the mili- hearings to inform legislators on tional and regional issues tary but an inevitable consequence of was decisive in establishing global transformation. the status of civil-military relations a framework in which de- One unique aspect of these hear- fense transformation could ings was the participation of the min- inform legislators on the status of civil- be undertaken. The presence of a istries of foreign affairs and economics. military relations not only in Ar- Brazilian official in the Argentine con- They offered fiscal guidelines within gentina, but also from an international gress was one of many signs of the mu- which the new strategic framework had perspective. The executive branch fa- tual trust between the countries over to be formulated. Gone were the days vored these hearings, and even the the last decade. when defense issues could be discussed armed forces showed interest. Each The hearings respected plurality to without international and economic benefitted from broaching the subject the extent that retired senior officers, consideration. One participant stated on neutral territory, which promised some of whom had played critical roles that the regional situation “foreshad- dispassionate analysis on reform issues, in the military government, offered owed a gradual synchronization in from strategic to budgetary matters. their opinions. Even so-called carapin- strategic thought based on cooperation, At the first hearing, which was at- tadas (painted faces)—military person- and not on competition or conflict.” tended by the vice president and min- nel who took part in at least four insur- ister of defense along with military rections against democratic power— Bold Move and security force leaders, the opening were allowed to state their views. The senate sought to clarify shifts speaker was the Brazilian secretary of Specialists from France, Germany, in foreign policy since the Malvinas , and the United States, ad- (Falklands) War and strategic change dressed the necessity to develop new strategic views as the old concepts

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 61 ■ JFQ FORUM

structure, neither objective was Malvinas War achieved by the legislature. The opportunity to terminate rgentine claims of sovereignty over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands compulsory was pre- date to the early 19th century, although Britain administered the ter- sented with the cover-up of the mur- ritory after 1833. A junta led by Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri A der of a soldier in Patagonia. The inci- seized the islands in 1982. Criticized for fiscal mismanagement and human dent caused tremendous public rights abuses, the junta thought that liberating the Malvinas would unite outrage. Menem, seeing his chance, their countrymen behind the government. Argentine forces invaded on April acted swiftly. The system was reformed 2, overcoming the defending British garrison at Port Stanley. The next day virtually overnight. South Georgia and South Sandwich fell. By the end of the month, Argentina The last task in the transforma- had deployed more than 10,000 troops. Public approval ran high and most tion process was reorganization. The governments in the region were sympathetic except Chile, which clashed with initiative was launched by an opposi- Argentina over islands in the Beagle Channel. A perceived threat from Chile tion congressman and former minister prompted Argentina to keep most of its elite troops at home. of defense. He developed a mandated Britain assembled a task force to respond to the invasion. On April 25, program to be executed over a five- South Georgia was retaken. In early May the Argentine General Bel- year period. As program law, grano was sunk by a submarine. compliance had to be verified; After the main British force ar- and it had to be adaptable to rived, land-based Argentine air- changing circumstances. craft launched strikes and sunk Much of the work in HMS Sheffield and the container drafting legislation was per- ship Atlantic Conveyor. Moreover, formed using an innovative another and two methodology. Committees, were sunk and several formed to analyze the main vessels also damaged. Argentine themes, drew on the experi- forces failed to prevent the ence of retired senior officers. British from landing near Port San Both legal and financial spe- Carlos and advancing to Darwin Architects of Malvinas cialists in budgetary tech- and Goose Green. Then the campaign, Puerto niques joined military advisors British turned toward Port Stan- Argentina.

Argentine Navy in formulating proposals on is- ley where the Argentine garrison sues under study by the legisla- surrendered on June 14, effec- tors. Such cooperation would have tively ending the conflict. [For details, see Robert J. Scheina, “Argentine been impossible without the common Jointness and the Malvinas,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 5 (Summer 94).] In the approach and trust fostered during fif- event, Britain captured 11,400 and killed some 750 Argentines. JFQ teen years of democracy and the expe- rience gained by political elites in de- fense matters. Having legislators who once served in the executive branch in the Menem regime, thus further dis- achieved. Legislative and executive and ministers who were legislators had tancing itself from the tendency in the branch officials acted in concert and an added value. region to regard armed forces as na- cooperation without infringing on This cultural change created a tional guardians for dealing with inter- their respective powers. new political climate. A paradoxical nal conflicts. It explicitly favored the Ending compulsory military serv- condition arose when the executive of- new thinking, “a strategic defense con- ice was more problematic. Young Ar- fice remained neutral in the face of re- cept based on conventional dissuasion gentines had become increasingly re- organization and congress took the ini- and cooperative balance.” A resolution luctant to fulfill their obligations. But tiative. The work fell upon a small in March 1996 also demanded re- approval of a law to discontinue the group of legislators, all members of the sources to guarantee the “proper level draft and recruit a volunteer force was defense committee of the house of rep- of readiness for the completion of the delayed as the senate awaited an agree- resentatives. The law was formed and mission and, in turn, undertake [mili- ment with the armed forces that never voted on with discipline and consis- tary] modernization.” materialized. The Malvinas War tency, first by the lower house and Accordingly, the executive branch demonstrated that the age of con- then by the senate. subsequently approved the directive scripts had passed. But in the effort to Reorganization Law for the realization of integrated plan- simultaneously convert to a profes- ning that incorporated senate propos- sional force and organize a reserve The elements of reform were pro- als and added greater precision to defi- viding for a cadre of technical person- nitions of defense requirements. nel trained to conduct joint and com- Collaboration between the powers was bined operations; a smaller number of

62 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Martinez

This agreement represented the real test of consensus on reform law. An in- ternational financial crisis, which had a severe impact on Argentina, did not permit the expected increase in de- fense spending. The other source of funding for reorganization—selling nonessential military assets—was slowed by recession. Thus the military had to rely on credit to expedite mod- ernization. Noncompliance with the law mobilized congress, especially the senate, where various proposals were introduced to establish a more credible defense budget. They were intended to counter estimates by the ministry of the economy that were being used to pass for compliance with the reorgani- zation law. Budget shortfalls produced ad- verse effects that had to be addressed. One was an exodus of qualified per- Argentine sonnel. For example, the salaries of pi- peacekeepers in lots in the private sector were as much Bosnia-Herzegovina. Signal Company (Tracy Trotter) Signal Company (Tracy as eight times larger than those of mili- th

55 tary aviators. In such cases the military lost its investment in training. Simi- larly, constant adjustments do not fa- operational units with adequate logis- senior noncommissioned officers cilitate long-range planning because tic support and capacity for extended would need a high school diploma, a the decisions are modified continu- operations; commands and staffs with requirement that would take effect ously due to inadequate resources. De- training in operations, planning, and seven years after passage of the law. For spite such difficulties, services have supporting headquarters; mobilization field grade officers, the minimum edu- taken action to accomplish proposed plans to increase operational capabili- cational requirement was a university reforms. The armed forces appear to be ties; the resources to achieve objec- degree. The criteria had a strong im- adjusting to fiscal realities. Abandon- tives; and hierarchization of military pact on military culture and produced ing weapon systems that can’t be personnel with proper remuneration. a force that could handle organiza- maintained, rationalizing infrastruc- The key concepts included jointness, tional and managerial problems. ture, and providing general support rationalization of recruiting, prioritiza- The legislature reserved oversight demonstrate that senior officers iden- tion of operational requirements, per- powers to itself in the form of a bicam- tify with transformation. sonnel systems, and improved readi- eral commission to monitor the reor- ness. Quality was valued over quantity ganization process. In addition, the ex- With passage of reorganization ecutive branch requested that legislation, a new consensus and a bold reforms were enacted in the congress enact a law approving strong compromise are needed; other- the number of military and civil- wise it will become a dead law. The de- education of commissioned and ian personnel under review. An- fense ministry must play a more active noncommissioned officers other aspect of the law was role in orchestrating these measures, strengthening the role of the and congress will have to renew its ini- in terms of people. Bold reforms were ministry of defense and the president tiative, taking full advantage of the enacted in the retirement and pension as commander in chief. Thus the min- best tool at its disposal—the bicameral systems and in the education and istry was given extensive authority in committee on oversight. This will training of commissioned and non- defense production and acquisition. allow congress to play a continuing ac- commissioned officers. Budgetary matters required the tive role. JFQ Professional military education most attention. Defense resources for had to be adjusted to the national edu- reorganization would grow by 15 per- cation system to create a “better en- cent over five years with increases in trance of members of the armed forces the first year of no less than 3 percent. into the general educational culture.” Enlisted personnel who aspired to be

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 63 ■ U.S. Strategic Interests in Caribbean Security By IVELAW L. GRIFFITH

USS George Washington off St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands.

USS George Washington (Joe Hennessey)

he Caribbean is strategi- Geography cally important to the The strategic importance of the United States although it Caribbean is found in its resources, sea T enjoys a low priority in the lanes, and security networks. The overall context of Latin American pol- Caribbean Basin is the source of fuel icy. That situation is unlikely to and nonfuel minerals used in both the change barring some dramatic event. defense and civilian sectors. Of partic- Continued disinterest will result in ular significance are petroleum and further equivocal engagement. The natural gas produced in Barbados, Nation should adopt a more focused, Colombia, Guatemala, Trinidad and proactive, and nuanced approach in Tobago, and Venezuela. Moreover, dealing with the Caribbean Basin. though several countries and U.S. terri- Today U.S. interest centers on three tories in the area do not have energy aspects of the area: geography, geoe- resources, they offer invaluable refin- conomics, and geonarcotics. ing and transshipment functions (Aruba, Bahamas, Curaçao, Dominican Ivelaw L. Griffith is professor of political science and dean of the honors college Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. at Florida International University and the author of The Political Economy of Lucia, and U.S. Virgin Islands). Other Drugs in the Caribbean. mineral resources from the Caribbean

64 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Griffith include bauxite, gold, nickel, copper, E–2C supporting cobalt, emeralds, and diamonds. counternarcotics The Caribbean Basin has two of operations. the world’s major choke points, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea. The former links the Atlantic and Pa- cific Oceans and saves 8,000 miles and up to 30 days of steaming time. The canal has military and civilian value. And while it is less important to the United States than it was two decades ago, other countries remain very de- pendent on it, and many, like Chile, Ecuador, and Japan, are militarily or politically important to Washington. Once ships enter the Atlantic from the canal they must transit Caribbean passages en route to ports of call in the United States, Europe, and Africa. The Florida Strait, Mona Passage, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel are the principal lanes. The Caribbean is also our south- U.S. Navy (Michael Rinaldi) ern flank. Until a decade ago the United States maintained a consider- able military presence throughout the capabilities. The 28-square mile base the Dominican Republic and Jamaica Caribbean, mainly in Puerto Rico at located at Lourdres monitored missile accounting for 55 percent. That year the Atlantic threshold, in Panama at tests, intercepted satellite communica- also saw surpluses with every country tions, and relayed mi- except Aruba, Dominican Republic, the United States is the largest trading crowave communications and Trinidad and Tobago. Last year the partner of Caribbean Community and to diplomatic posts in the U.S. Trade Representative told an Inter- Western Hemisphere. The American Development Bank forum, Common Market countries facility was reputedly the “Taken as a whole, the Caribbean largest maintained by the Basin is a larger market for our goods the southern rim, and in Cuba at Soviet Union abroad. It is still in opera- than...France, Brazil, or China. Like- Guantánamo on the northern perime- tion, but not at Cold War levels. wise, the United States is the area’s nat- ter. In 1990, for instance, there were Yet fear of foreign encroachment ural market, taking 80 percent of its 4,743 military and civilian personnel persists. The United States is concerned exports and providing nearly $50 bil- in Puerto Rico, 20,709 in Panama, and about increasing Chinese interest and lion in foreign direct investment.” 3,401 in Cuba. investment in Panama. Although such The United States is the largest Much has changed since 1990, re- strategic affairs may not be crucial to trading partner and source of capital quiring strategic redesign and force re- Washington, they affect allies as well flows for Caribbean Community and deployment. Today Puerto Rico is as regional stability and security and Common Market countries. CBI na- home to fewer forces, and U.S. South- thus bear watching. tions are a principal market for U.S. ex- ern Command (SOUTHCOM) relocated ports, totaling $21.1 billion in 1998 from Panama to Miami in September Geoeconomics (9.1 percent over the previous year). 1997, leaving behind only small com- The mixture of geography, eco- Exports to the Caribbean Basin ac- ponents. Guantánamo, long considered nomics, and national power in the counted for 3 percent in 1998 (up 2.8 to have little strategic value, serves es- area exercises influence over trade and percent over the previous year). An es- sentially as a political outpost in the investment. For example, the Depart- timated half of each dollar spent in the last remaining communist bastion in ment of Commerce found that for the area is returned to the United States the hemisphere, with about 1,200 mili- four-year period prior to 1988 a total compared with 10 cents from Asia. tary and civilian personnel. of 646 U.S. companies invested over Further, this trade supports some During the 1980s the Soviet pres- $1.5 billion in Caribbean Basin Initia- 400,000 jobs in this country and many ence in Cuba included modern docks tive (CBI) beneficiary countries. More- more in the Caribbean. and repair facilities, reconnaissance over, from 1986 to 1995 U.S. trade sur- Moreover, the Overseas Private In- aircraft, and satellite and surveillance pluses with the area grew from $297 vestment Corporation (OPIC) reported million to $2.6 billion. In 1995 exports grew by 15 percent, to $8 billion, with

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 65 ■ JFQ FORUM in 2000 that from 1995 to 1999 it as- Caribbean to help meet needs for Narcotics operations and capital ven- sisted in 38 projects in the area involv- medium- and long-term capital. tures which they spawn precipitate ing $3.2 billion in investments, which both conflict and cooperation among are expected to generate $1.5 billion in Geonarcotics state and nonstate actors in the inter- U.S. exports and, in turn, support There are four dimensions in the national system. 4,500 jobs in this country. Moreover, drug phenomenon: production, con- Because of the global dispersion of in February 1999, OPIC and Citibank sumption, trafficking, and money drug traffic and physical, social, and established a $200 million investment laundering. These activities threaten political features of facilitating coun- facility for Central America and the the security of states around the world. tries, power involves securing compli- ant action. In the drug world, this power is both state and nonstate in origin, and some nonstate sources ex- Caribbean Community ercise relatively more power than state troops in Guyana, entities. Politics revolves around re- Tradewinds ’99. source allocation through the ability of power brokers to determine who gets what, when, where, and how. Because power in this milieu is not only state in origin, resource allocation is not ex- clusively a state function. Drug operations generate complex relationships. Some involve nonmili- tary pressures such as political and eco- nomic sanctions by the United States against countries it considers not proactive enough in combating drug traffic. Yet the problem entails more than the movement of drugs from and through the area; it involves money laundering, organized crime, corrup- tion, arms dealing, and matters of sov- ereignty. Such activities are reported in Signal Company (Michelle Labriel)

th the International Narcotics Control Strat- 55 egy Report issued annually by the De- partment of State and are reflected in Table 1. Geographic and Economic Statistics the following vignettes: ■ Operation Dinero, an international Land Area GDP GDP Per Capita money laundering sting conducted out of Country (sq. km.) Population (U.S. $ million) (U.S. $) tiny Anguilla from January 1992 to Decem- ber 1994, led to the seizure of nine tons of Antigua and Barbuda 440 66,860 639 9,472 cocaine and $90 million in assets, including Barbados 430 265,630 2,496 9,789 expensive paintings, Head of a Beggar by Belize 2,960 238,550 705 2,949 Pablo Picasso among them. ■ Cocaine seizures in only five na- Dominica 750 73,000 273 3,690 tions—Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Re- Grenada 340 96,200 360 3,758 public, Haiti, and Jamaica—totaled 3,300 kilos in 1993. Seizures for those same coun- Guyana 14,970 849,180 782 998 tries amounted to 6,230 kilos—almost dou- Haiti 27,800 7,800,000 3,900 460 ble—during 1999. Jamaica 10,990 2,576,000 7,445 2,893 ■ Between 1993 and 1998, over 9,000 deportees were returned to Jamaica, most St. Kitts and Nevis 360 40,820 305 7,193 for drug-related offenses in , the St. Lucia 620 152,000 639 3,677 , and the United States. ■ In November 1998, American- St. Vincent and 390 113,220 320 2,874 owned Cupid Foundations closed its busi- the Grenadines ness in Jamaica after 22 years with a loss of Suriname 163,270 412,070 1,104 2,474 550 jobs. Cupid could no longer afford the Trinidad and Tobago 5,130 1,285,140 6,380 4,666 fines incurred with the seizure of its mer- chandise by U.S. Customs because of at- tempts to smuggle drugs in its clothing. Sources: World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary Fund) and World Development Indicators Database (World Bank).

66 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Griffith

The Caribbean Basin

Atlantic Gulf Ocean of Nassau Mexico THE BAHAMAS Havana

CUBA

MEXICO HAITI Santo PUERTO RICO Port-au-Prince Domingo San Juan ST. JOHN JAMAICA ST. THOMAS BELIZE Kingston DOMINICAN SAINT KITTS BARBUDA ANTIGUA REPPUBLIC NEVIS Belmopan MONTSERRAT GUADELOUPE GUATEMALA HONDURAS DOMINICA Caribbean Sea Tegucigalpa MARTINIQUE Guatemala SAINT LUCIA San Salvador NICARAGUA SAINT VINCENT and the GRENADINES BARBADOS EL SALVADOR ARUBA NETHERLANDS ANTILLES GRENADA Managua TOBAGO Caracas COSTA RICA TRINIDAD San Jose Panama VENEZUELA Pacific GUYANA Ocean PANAMA COLOMBIA Georgetown SURINAME Bogota Paramaribo

■ Operation Conquistador, conducted Traditional and Emerging Drugs, political instability, migra- March 10–26, 2000, involving the United Issues tion, and the environment are major States and 24 nations in the region, led to nontraditional issues. There is no uni- the issuance of 7,300 search warrants, arrest Security in the Caribbean has polit- ical, military, economic, and environ- formity in the importance ascribed to of 2,300 people, and seizure of 12,000 them, but a comparison of the tradi- pounds of cocaine, 120 pounds of heroin, mental implications and includes inter- tional and nontraditional categories re- 150 pounds of hashish oil, 30 pounds of nal and external threats. Nonstate morphine base, 172 vehicles, 13 boats, and actors are as important as state actors. veals a generally higher premium on 83 guns. Indeed, many nonstate actors can mo- nontraditional issues. Some states, ■ Between November 24, 1999, and bilize more economic and military as- such as those in the Eastern Caribbean, June 6, 2000, 12 freighters were seized in sets than some countries. Thus the secu- face no traditional security concerns or Miami on arrival from Haiti with over 6,000 rity landscape reveals both traditional overt threats. pounds of cocaine hidden in their cargo. and nontraditional concerns. The foremost nontraditional ■ Since mid-October 2000 Jamaica has threat involves drugs. This multifac- produced a drug-related drama involving Territorial disputes and geopoliti- cal posturing are core traditional issues. eted problem has increased in scope high-level police corruption, illegal wire-tap- and gravity over the last decade and a ping of government officials, and the at- Belize, Colombia, Guatemala, Guyana, half and added security effects. Crime, tempted assassination of the head of the Na- Suriname, and Venezuela have serious tional Firearms and Drug Intelligence Center. disagreements, some of which involve corruption, and arms dealing dramati- multiple disputes. For example, cally impact on national security and Guyana faces claims by Venezuela for governance in political, military, and the western five-eighths of its 214,970 economic terms. They also infringe on square kilometers of territory and by national sovereignty. Suriname for 15,000 to the east.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 67 ■ JFQ FORUM

Today’s relative geopolitical calm Table 2. U.S. Jobs Dependent on Trade with Caribbean Basin Nations justifies the concern of scholars and Year Jobs Dependent New Jobs Created Per Year statesmen about the likelihood of a 1986 127,240 8,400 new phase of benign neglect or even worse. Hence it is important to high- 1987 138,120 10,880 light the challenge of staying engaged 1988 153,800 15,680 in both symbolic and substantive 1989 165,800 12,000 terms. Some years ago, the prime min- 1990 191,380 25,580 ister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines declared: “We have to behave like 1991 200,260 8,880 Grenada or Fiji to get attention, and 1992 225,262 25,002 when we stop misbehaving we are left 1993 248,552 23,290 to languish in blissful obsecurity.” Engagement demands flexibility 1994 268,814 20,292 and adaptability. For some missions, 1995 306,120 37,306 political expediency may require that 1996 318,060 11,940 nonmilitary personnel take the lead, or 1997 368,640 50,580 perhaps coastguardsmen as opposed to soldiers or marines. And flexibility and 1998 402,360 33,720 adaptability may be compromised by U.S. Department of Commerce formula of $1 billion in exports equals 20,000 jobs. pushing the economy of force enve- lope too far. Also, engagement pro- grams must not mistake silence for sat- isfaction. In addition, engagement Two decades ago most Caribbean cies, and the environment. Consistent requires the first team. U.S. leaders leaders were reluctant to acknowledge with this view, SOUTHCOM is focused must not relegate decisionmaking to that their countries faced a drug threat. on counterdrug operations, peacekeep- uninformed interns, junior staffers, or But the severity of the problem grew ing, humanitarian assistance, and dis- freshman bureaucrats. until the danger was obvious inside aster relief. Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and and outside the area. For instance, at a One basic challenge in redesign- Venezuela are clearly hot spots that meeting on criminal justice in June ing policy or strategy is determining should be watched closely; but so must 2000, which was attended by officials which instruments and modalities other countries. Guyana bears scrutiny should be changed. Ex- because of resurgent territorial claims, cept for Cuba, engage- two decades ago most Caribbean the impact of that dispute on invest- ment does not warrant ment and development (especially be- leaders were reluctant to acknowledge revamping existing prac- cause U.S. and Canadian investors are tices. Some things work that their countries faced a drug threat involved), the likelihood of political well and should be re- instability, and the influence of drug tained; others do not and trafficking. Another concern is violent of Europe, Canada, the Caribbean should be modified. This discussion crime in Jamaica, some of which af- Basin, and the United States, the attor- addresses both types. fects foreign tourists and investors. In ney general of Trinidad and Tobago Robert Pastor, who served on the addition, Jamaican organized crime spoke of “the direct nexus between il- National Security Council staff during poses transnational dangers to law en- legal drugs and crimes of violence, sex the Carter administration, noted that forcement and economic interests. crimes, domestic violence, maltreat- Caribbean nations are too small and Drug trafficking and economic depri- ment of children by parents, and other poor to directly challenge the United vation could also lead to renewed po- evils,” and remarked that “aside from States. What really moved Washington litical instability. the very visible decimation of our soci- was the threat of powerful adversaries The Dominican Republic faces eties caused by drug addiction and from other parts of the world forging issues of drug traffic, transnational drug-related violence, there is another relationships in the area that facili- crime, illegal migration, and political insidious evil: money laundering.” tated the harassment of or attack on instability as that nation strives to the United States or its neighbors. translate rapid economic growth into Engagement Challenges “When the threat diminishes,” he re- less deprivation. The economy grew Leaders in the Caribbean and the marked, “so does U.S. interest. That ac- by 6.5 percent in 2000, 8.3 percent in United States share a common assess- counts for the apparent cycle between 1999, and 7.3 percent in 1998, yet ment of the principal security con- preoccupation at moments of intense many Dominicans do not benefit cerns in the area: drugs, border dis- geopolitical rivalry and neglect at from this wealth as some 20 percent putes, poverty, corruption, natural times of geopolitical calm.” of the country’s 8.5 million people disasters, illegal migration, insurgen- live in poverty.

68 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Griffith

SH–3H during counternarcotics training.

Drilling holes for U.S. Navy (David Rush) moorings off Guantánamo Bay. Programs must operate on several Whether it is an issue of drugs, tracks encompassing broad interagency territorial disputes, migrant flows, or activities. Multifaceted engagement is the environment, engagement should especially vital in counternarcotics ef- be pursued on the basis of mutual in- forts. Countermeasures must be multi- terest. This is not always achievable. level—regional and international as Sometimes even leaders of compara- well as national—because drug opera- tively wealthy states, though partners, tions are transnational. Moreover, the are unwilling to agree to collective ef- measures must be implemented on a forts because of concern about their multiagency level to grapple with juris- impact. Domestic factors such as polit- dictional, legal, social, and economic ical change and public opinion often issues precipitated by the drug prob- make it difficult to honor or renew lem. In addition to government agen- pledges. But despite such complica- cies, a range of corporations, non- tions, leaders must not let the possibil- governmental organizations, and ity of conflict undermine cooperation. international bodies such as the Orga- nization of American States and the There are high stakes for the U.N. International Drug Control Pro- United States in the Caribbean. The U.S. Navy (Andrew McKaskle) gram must play critical roles. stakes are also high for the Caribbean Multilateral security measures do countries. New defense and foreign not preclude bilateralism. Indeed, policy initiatives may encourage effec- Puerto Rico also warrants atten- such measures may be more politically tive engagement and investment of tion. Although a domestic question for expedient because they can be de- the resources to match the national in- the United States, Vieques detracts signed and executed faster. There may terest in an area that represents a from U.S. conflict resolution credibility. be budget incentives to act quickly. global crossroads and an essential ele- While Vieques is allegedly indispensa- Moreover, in light of resource difficul- ment for regional stability. JFQ ble for Navy training, this issue high- ties, a premium should be put on reg- lights a troubling aspect of relations be- ulatory and operational aspects of in- tween the mainland and the island. teragency work to guard against turf and prestige battles.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 69 ■

President Fox reviewing troops at Campo Marte.

Mexico’s Search AP/ Wide Photos (Claudio Cruz) World for a New Military Identity By CRAIG A. DEARE

he election of Vicente Fox the Cold War required a thoroughgo- Quesada as president of ing reassessment of U.S. national secu- Mexico has dramatically rity strategy, the stunning defeat of the T changed the political reality ruling party will significantly alter the of his country and the region. Before way Mexico faces the future. These the election of 2000, Partido Revolu- changes may well reshape both the cionario Institucional (PRI) was in effect country’s security partnership with the the Mexican political system for more United States and the role of Mexico in than seven decades. Just as the end of the Southern region. Change and Challenge Lieutenant Colonel Craig A. Deare, USA (Ret.), is professor of national security Mexico’s geostrategic importance affairs in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense to the United States has been a con- University and has served as country director for Mexico in the Office of the stant for years; thus its underlying po- Secretary of Defense. litical, economic, and social stability is

70 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Deare extremely significant. It is the second largest U.S. trading partner after Canada and the second largest market for goods and services, surpassing Japan since 1997. As the fifth largest producer of oil in the world, 1.5 mil- lion barrels of Mexican petroleum ex- ported each day satisfy almost 17 per- cent of the 9 million barrels demanded daily by its neighbor to the north. In- creased trade with Mexico reduces poverty in Central America, easing ille- gal immigration into the United States, and maintains stability and economic health in that region. Relations with Mexico will de- pend on how well it manages political, economic, and social transformation. The transfer of power from PRI to the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) was the first time there has been a peaceful change of regimes in the nation’s his- tory. The implications of the fall of PRI are difficult to overstate. When the President Fox visiting party took control in 1929 from the military relief shelter. Partido Revolucionario Nacional, Mexico had a primarily rural population of 15 AP/ Wide Photos (Jose Luis Magana) World million. When PRI left power, the country was 75 percent urban, increas- ingly industrial, and had nearly 100 real economic liberalization and re- tackled as security issues, with illegal million people. The political culture of form began in the early 1980s, largely drugs among the chief concerns. U.S. Mexico was described in the past as as a reaction to economic crises. demand for cocaine, coupled with sup- corporatist-bureaucratic-authoritarian. Nonetheless, the growth has been un- plies from the Andean ridge, has cre- The system is authoritarian in the sense evenly distributed and remains focused ated a situation that threatens Mexico that one party, the Partido Revolu- on oil and sectors favored by central through increased criminal activity cionario Institucional, has monopolized planners. Land reform, a fundamental and corruption. Ideally, better relations the national political life for six decades. issue of the 1910 revolution, remains with the United States should ease the It is top-down and “democratic-centralist” problematic. Vast areas once held by burden of coping with military as well almost in a Leninist sense. It is bureau- wealthy landowners have been redis- as nonmilitary threats to national and cratic in that it is a machine and a system tributed among millions of campesinos, regional stability. that governs Mexico, not any single indi- a popular political move. But owners The objectives of Mexican foreign vidual. It is corporatist in that the PRI in- of small plots are finding it difficult to policy are national sovereignty, nonin- corporates within its ranks the major cor- compete with efficient agro-businesses tervention in the affairs of other states, porate or functional groups in Mexican of developed nations, and further re- and adherence to international law. workers, peasants, and the so-called “pop- forms are necessary. Endemic and con- This policy has evolved because the ular” sector which is supposed to include stant corruption is more serious be- country is located next to the United all others.1 cause of its effect on drug traffic. States. Given its geographical asymme- Moreover, the surprising uprising in tries, Mexico has sought to reduce in- For over a half century one-party 1994 by the Zapatistas in Chiapas un- tervention in its internal affairs. To fur- rule permeated every aspect of political derscores the fundamental problem of ther limit outside influence, it has and economic life. social and economic inequities in dif- preferred bilateral to multilateral deal- Disassembling the legacy of PRI ferent regions. ings. This challenges policymakers in presents serious challenges. First is a the conduct of affairs with their coun- largely centralized and command-di- Military Contacts terparts who find themselves screened rected economy that up through the Though some social and eco- from external actors by the Secretaria de 1980s left the country vulnerable to nomic problems of transformation Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), or foreign external market forces. It is true that have military implications, they re- ministry, a condition which leads to quire nonmilitary solutions. On the complication and delay. other hand, these problems must be

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 71 ■ JFQ FORUM

integrated services into a unified armed forces, the Mexican army and navy are established under the Secretarias de De- fensa and Marina and exist separately and compete for scarce resources, a sit- uation that generally favors the army. Although not a fortuitous relationship, the navy accepts it as a fact of life. Fur- thermore, there is no organization like a joint chiefs of staff, much less an of- fice of the secretary of defense. This may change under the new administra- tion, but it is a legacy of a political sys- tem developed by PRI and is regarded by many as a stabilizing relationship which should not be modified. Attracting the attention of U.S. de- fense policymakers is a difficult propo- sition for Mexico. Its structure does not lend itself to dealing with the Penta- gon. The defense and naval depart- ments are led by four-star flag officers Zapatistas supporters who are uneasy working with civilian in Oventic, Chiapas. officials at home, much less foreign governments. Similarly, the Chairman AP/ Verdugo) Wide Photos (Eduardo World of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has no equivalent, nor does the Joint Staff. The defense secretariat owns the land Mexico’s perspective on national what constitutes national security, it and airspace while the naval secretariat security issues must be appreciated be- has trouble assigning roles and mis- controls the coasts and inland up to fore considering bilateral relations. Ba- sions. As a result, the army and navy the ten kilometer mark. The army and sically national security is not found in have been relatively free in defining navy coordinate when necessary, but their missions over the the concept of jointness is foreign. the army and navy are independent past 40 years, principally Mexican services simply operate inde- cabinet-level agencies within which because of governmen- pendently of one another. Clearly the tal autonomy whereby structural interface is problematic. the air force and naval infantry function accountability has not One anomaly is the unified com- been traditionally de- mand plan. U.S. Southern Command the country’s lexicon. After World War manded by the legislature or society. In- (SOUTHCOM) has an area of responsi- II, such expressions were avoided to es- dications from the new administration bility that includes the land mass cape confusion with the national secu- suggest that this approach could south of Mexico, the waters adjacent rity doctrine concept being used in the change. The United States must be at- to Central and South America, the Southern Cone by authoritarian tentive to this development. Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and regimes. Mexico only began to use the It is also worth noting that the part of the Atlantic. However it does term in the 1970s and 1980s, but with- army and navy are independent cabi- not include Mexico which, like Canada out defining its scope. The military has net-level agencies within which the air to the north, is not assigned to a re- historically seen its role as reinforcing force and naval infantry function. This gional commander, a condition that national stability. explains why these organizations are satisfies Mexico. The country did not The debate over an acceptable defi- essentially different and must be dealt interact with SOUTHCOM when it was nition has continued without either of- with independently in the short term. located in Panama and continues that ficial or academic agreement. This is As PRI built on support from vari- practice now that the command is emblematic of a nation that has strug- ous segments of society, a pillar of the headquartered in Miami. gled with its place in the world despite corporatist model was the army.2 By de- When defense matters require being a major power on the Caribbean sign, the army was part of the political a high level of attention, Mexico and Central American scene. Because structure. The navy has not occupied a turns to Washington which presents the government has difficulty deciding similar role since it has developed on structural problems. The army or navy the margins and has not been formally may appeal to one of several places. If included in the PRI system. Although most modern militaries have gradually

72 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Deare

Mexican soldiers boarding truck, Chiapas. AP/ Verdugo) Wide Photos (Eduardo World

the issue is training or equipment, it Ernesto Zedillo continued to nurture a airspace sovereignty, and disaster relief. may fall within service equities. If it is broader relationship, bilateral military The last issue was selected to ensure operational, the logical focus may be affairs entered a new phase. that Mexico would continue contribut- the Joint Staff, even though that or- In the early 1990s the Chief of ing to the process. Perry suggested the ganization does not support unified Staff of the U.S. Army, General Gordon working group to Cervantes, who was commanders. If it is a question of pol- Sullivan, and his counterpart, General interested but suggested such a deci- icy, Mexico may consult the Office of Antonio Riviello Bazón, established a sion had to be reached by President the Secretary of Defense. Needless to close relationship. In 1995 General Salinas. Perry understood and raised say, this interface structure cannot be Enrique Cervantes, Riviello’s successor, the matter with the President. Because described as user friendly. went to Washington for Sullivan’s re- Salinas liked the idea, Defensa was tirement ceremony. There he called on tasked to make the system work. Bilateral Relations Secretary of Defense William Perry and The working group was organized The coinciding interests and poli- extended an invitation to visit Mexico. with representatives from the Depart- cies of Presidents George Bush and Later that year Perry made the first trip ments of State and Defense. State partic- Carlos Salinas led to subtle improve- by a Secretary of Defense to Mexico ipation was seen as tied to the Mexican ments in relations between their mili- and proposed forming a bilateral work- foreign ministry, needed because of the taries beginning in the early 1990s. ing group. The original five issues ad- inability or the unwillingness of Defensa The North American Free Trade Agree- dressed by this group centered on items to participate without top cover. The ment in 1993 was a major help, a pact considered by Washington to have mu- Principal Deputy Under Secretary of that would have been inconceivable tual interest: counternarcotics, educa- Defense for Policy was charged with ten years earlier. The Zapatista rebel- tion and training, force modernization, running the group because Mexico had lion was seen on both sides of the bor- indicated that its lead official would der as potentially destabilizing for be the under secretary for bilateral Mexico. As Presidents Bill Clinton and affairs. The official of corresponding

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 73 ■ JFQ FORUM protocol rank in the United States was continual warnings that the operations Mexico cautiously and respectfully. The the Deputy Secretary of State. The issue and maintenance expense would be fundamental lack of trust and confi- of interface was alive and well, with the the responsibility of Mexico, the air- dence on the part of the Mexican mili- Washington team led by a civilian DOD craft eventually were returned to the tary toward the United States, in partic- official and his counterpart being a United States. The failure of this initia- ular in the army, makes it important to civilian foreign ministry official from tive came at the cost of goodwill estab- not push too far too fast, especially Mexico City as the military endeavored lished over years. Skeptics warned of with the regime change. Time alone to act in this uncomfortable new role. the pitfalls of such an undertaking, but will reveal how successfully both sides Another awkward aspect was the the players chose to believe that a new handle the situation. JFQ insistence on including Marina in the era of cooperation had arrived. It will lashup. From the U.S. perspective, this take time to rebuild the lost trust. NOTES bilateral relationship needed to include 1 Howard Wiarda, “Mexico: The Unravel- all elements of the Mexican defense es- Affairs between the United States ing of a Corporatist Regime?” Journal of In- tablishment because the Department and Mexico are among the most com- teramerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 30, of Defense controls all components of plex and extensive in the world. The no. 2 (Spring 1988), p. 2. the Armed Forces. In reality, the partic- textbook model for conducting foreign 2 President Lazaro Cardenas includes the ipation of Marina was seen by Defensa policy used by the Department of State army inside the ruling party. See Roderic A. as unnecessary and unwelcome. does not fit this relationship. Federal Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in The first meeting was held in De- agencies have intimate links with Mex- Modern Mexico (New York: Oxford Univer- cember 1995 in San Antonio at a ico while many local and state govern- sity Press, 1992). downtown hotel rather than a military ments operate bilaterally across the installation. Over the next four years border. Rather than adopting a coher- the group experienced successes and ent policy, the United States pursues a failures because of many factors. Of bureaucratic maze of policies toward the original topics, airspace sover- its neighbor. Thus relationships are dif- eignty was dropped at the outset be- ficult, especially in the realm of mili- cause of Mexican reluctance to discuss tary contacts. such issues with the U.S. military. An assessment of military-to-mili- In the end the group focused on tary affiliation must consider differ- counternarcotics, owing to Mexican ences between the two nations in interest in the issue. This underscores a strategic, political, and military terms. major lesson: Mexico aggressively pur- Transformation puts enormous inter- nal pressure on Mexican in- stitutions. Among issues that Mexico aggressively pursues matters must be addressed are the of national interest but only politely change in regime (including entertains others an assertive legislature), eco- nomic transformation, en- demic corruption, growing sues matters of national interest but criminal activity, illegal immigration, only politely entertains others. In an and narcotics trafficking. Increasing effort to make the relationship work, wariness in Washington on the part of DOD developed a plan to assist in Congress has made these challenge counternarcotics. The first element was even tougher. U.S. domestic political a train-the-trainer program, imple- realities suggest that the near term mented with counterdrug funding. prognosis is not promising. More than 3,000 soldiers were trained Policymakers on both sides of the between 1996 and 1999, mostly at Fort border will place greater attention on Bragg by the 7th Special Forces Group matters of mutual economic interest, in tactics, techniques, and procedures while military issues are relegated to for Mexico’s airmobile special forces the periphery. The Department of groups. This aspect of the program was Defense must continue to deal with relatively successful. The second component was pro- viding Defensa with 73 UH–1H heli- copters drawn from the Army. Despite

74 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Battling Storms Delivering water at Soto Cano air base.

Interagency Response to

Hurricane Mitch U.S. Navy (Michael J. Tuemler)

By MELINDA HOFSTETTER

ne objective of the United disaster management.” These objectives States in the Western Hemi- require marshalling Federal agencies in sphere is minimizing the conjunction with other national, O human cost of conflicts and multinational, and nongovernmental natural disasters. This requires a capa- organizations (NGOs). But the success bility for emergency response assess- to this point is debatable. The humani- ment to provide relief with the atten- tarian crisis in the wake of Hurricane dant objective, according to the Mitch in October 1998 revealed that Secretary of State, of decreasing “the the ability of the Nation to respond to need for U.S. disaster assistance such complex contingencies remains through increased host government deeply flawed. Hurricane Mitch was the fourth most powerful Caribbean hurricane of Major Melinda Hofstetter, USMC (Ret.), served on the faculty of the Joint Military the 20th century and the most devas- Intelligence College and currently is associated with the Center for Disaster tating to hit Central America in 200 Management and Humanitarian Assistance at Tulane University.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 75 ■ JFQ FORUM

Panama was ordered to deploy to Hon- Central America duras. Poor weather delayed flights until November 2–3, when CH–47s, Gulf of C–130s, and C–27s moved in-country. Mexico Because a standing JTF–B mission was support of disaster relief, there was an order on the shelf and preparations for execution started within hours, BELIZE without a directive from the Joint Chiefs. No warning or execute orders Belmopan came from SOUTHCOM, and prepara- Caribbean Sea tions were ad hoc. Moreover, SOUTH- GUATEMALA HONDURAS COM issued guidance for developing an exit strategy before forces began to Guatemala Tegucigalpa be deployed. San Salvador This operation was named Fuerte EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA Apoyo (Strong Support) and conducted in three phases: Managua ■ Phase I: emergency response (Octo- Pacific ber 28–November 28)—lifesaving and deliv- Ocean ering aid such as food, water, and medical San Jose supplies ■ Phase II: rehabilitation (November COSTA RICA 28–February 20)—repairing critical infra- PANAMA Panama structure and providing relief supplies so that countries could complete work on their own, and reestablishing national capa- bilities for health and welfare, an explicit objective of U.S. policy ■ Phase III: restoration (February 20–September 1)—implementing the long- term effort to assist affected nations in restoring pre-hurricane conditions. years. Sustained winds of 180 miles per bulldozers, and two naval hospital hour killed 10,000 and devastated ships. Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Interagency Coordination large sections of El Salvador, Cuba, Germany, Japan, the United Presidential Decision Directive 56 Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua Kingdom, and others also sent equip- (PDD 56), the policy on complex con- with the greatest devastation in Hon- ment and personnel. tingency operations issued in May duras and Nicaragua. Heavy rain Many countries, including the 1997, directs interagency teamwork, caused flooding, mudslides, demol- United States, forgave debts while the identifies responsibilities, specifies ished infrastructure, and further loss of World Bank pledged $1 billion in no- planning for coordinating all Federal life. Local economies may take more interest loans. In addition, the Inter- agencies, and offers timely strategic than a decade to recover from $3.5 bil- American Development Bank repro- guidance. Even though it calls for a lion in property damage and the dis- grammed loans to the region and cabinet-level executive committee to placement of two million people. Yet approved new financing for Honduras, supervise participation, the Comman- this scenario was not unforeseen. Nicaragua, and Guatemala. der in Chief, Southern Command When U.S. Southern Command Despite this major response, the (CINCSOUTH), reportedly issued ini- (SOUTHCOM) began a series of exer- flow of information was hampered be- tial guidance alone. The lack of civilian cises known as Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied cause of mass chaos and general unpre- direction reduced unity of effort. Forces) in 1996 at Joint Task Force B paredness for the disaster. After the Moreover, the so-called CNN effect, (JTF–B), Soto Cano Air Base in Hon- hurricane hit, SOUTHCOM gave the with media coverage and phone calls duras, it posited a one-in-200-year hur- green light to JTF–B to put all aircraft from the public replacing doctrine and ricane hitting Central America. in the air and exercise lifesaving meas- planning, appeared to drive the early ures by plucking people from rooftops First Responders U.S. response. and the water and moving them to In November 1998, Presidential Foreign assistance began almost safe havens. Because JTF–B had insuffi- Determination (PD) 99–03 directed the as the hurricane hit with over 40 cient assets, U.S. Army South in drawdown of $30 million in both countries offering relief. Mexico sent goods and services from defense stocks more than 400 soldiers and 28 trans- under the Foreign Assistance Act of port helicopters, 12 cargo planes, 30 1961. The politically-charged nature of

76 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Hofstetter

United States. For Federal agencies to Transporting equip- ment from Puerto get involved formally and financially Cortes, Honduras. in foreign relief, specific conditions must be met. For natural or manmade disasters and complex emergencies, OFDA must determine that lives are at risk and that the host nation cannot manage the crisis and will accept help. Funds may be accessed only after a declaration of disaster by the country involved and the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission, which may result in: ■ deploying regional advisors ■ using disaster assistance authority (an immediate $25,000 in cash may be au- thorized) ■ providing disaster relief commodi- ties from OFDA stockpiles ■ deploying an assessment team ■ deploying OFDA disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) ■ funding proposals from voluntary organizations, NGOs, international organi- zations (IOs), and U.N. agencies. The magnitude of the Hurricane Mitch

U.S. Navy (Leland B. Comer ) crisis called for a combination of these responses. Both Central America and the the operation led to disjointed actions uncertain. The consequence of inac- Caribbean benefit from a well estab- on the highest levels, which hampered tion on the national level included de- lished OFDA program. An immediate decisionmaking. As a result, a task lays in phase II support, lack of coordi- advantage during the hurricane re- force was organized under the White nation in the field, wasted resources, sponse lay in the solid host-nation re- House chief of staff and co-chaired by and duplication of effort. lationships the office developed over the National Security Council and the years. During and between disasters it Office of Management and Budget. But Crafting the Response committed considerable resources to the PDD 56 concept of coalescing Why was PDD 56 not imple- prevention, mitigation, and prepared- agencies did not materialize because mented? One might hypothesize that a ness, including training and stockpil- many members of the task force were Rwanda-era mentality had taken over. ing supplies. It employs the military unfamiliar with political-military plan- During the Rwandan crisis, the highest only as a last resort, primarily because levels of the Government were of expense and the heavy maintenance without implementation of PDD 56, still reeling from the Somalia package. In addition, U.S. forces de- ployed overseas may be distrusted. Fi- guidance was not transmitted to debacle and preoccupied with developing a political-military nally, there is a military concern over the operational level plan for Iraq. At the time of being tied down. Because of the scope Hurricane Mitch, the National of Hurricane Mitch, DOD was ap- ning. Lacking a plan, no intent was de- Security Council was busy planning for proached by OFDA and became subor- fined, no assets were identified, no Kosovo and Iraq once again. dinated to the agency, a normal prac- endstate was established, and no The Agency for International De- tice during disaster relief operations. agency responsibilities were settled. velopment (AID) is the normal intera- When it became apparent that the Moreover, without implementation of gency coordinator for such relief. storm posed a tremendous danger, a PDD 56, major policy and doctrinal- Through the Office of Foreign Disaster strong response by civilian and mili- level issues were left unresolved, and Assistance (OFDA) and with the au- tary components was expected. OFDA guidance was not transmitted to the thority of the White House, it assumes had an ongoing relationship with the operational level. In fact, formal re- the lead in organizing humanitarian Office of the Deputy Assistant Secre- quests for forces were often ignored be- assistance, assessing needs, and procur- tary of Defense for Peacekeeping and cause the source of funding remained ing supplies, services, and transporta- Humanitarian Assistance and with tion. This office can also fund certain activities carried out by NGOs and U.N. agencies outside the continental

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 77 ■ JFQ FORUM

C–5 arriving at Soto Unloading pallets Cano with building of rice at La Mesa, supplies. Honduras. est Virginia Air National Guard (Mike Pitzer) est Virginia Air National Guard W U.S. Navy (Michael J. Tuemler)

SOUTHCOM, especially the com- Damage assessments were accom- Regional Partnerships mand’s logistics directorate. plished through the OFDA deployment The typical country team for such Hurricane Mitch called for an even of DARTs to each country affected by an operation consists of the ambassa- broader effort than the standard intera- the hurricane. Four regional teams re- dor, defense attaché, and military advi- gency relationships implied. As an ported to Costa Rica. A team originally sory group commander who play a OFDA official observed, “the disaster had been prepositioned in Belize where major role. In Honduras the advisory quickly exceeded our ability to coordi- the storm threatened to strike initially, group sent seven officers, three NCOs, nate.” Consequently, a decision was but after the hurricane switched course and a number of civilians as liaisons to made to assign liaison officers to U.S. the team was sent to Guatemala and Honduran agencies, like the Standing military advisory groups in the coun- Costa Rica. A team from the United Committee on Contingencies tries affected and to SOUTHCOM head- States traveled to Honduras. Besides as- (COPECO), the equivalent of the Fed- quarters. Beginning in late October, sessment teams that went to Honduras eral Emergency Management Agency. AID sent OFDA assessment teams to as- daily, a group worked with ministries Officers were also dispatched to the sist indigenous relief workers. More- and the Emergency Operation Center Honduran military operations center to over, the dispatch of logisticians to li- in Tegucigalpa. The OFDA official at determine what assets were arriving aise with the military advisory group in the center prioritized assessments and from abroad and where they were Nicaragua and the OFDA Central Amer- helped Hondurans get relief to hard hit needed. The Navy program manager in ican headquarters in Costa Rica aided areas. That same information was the group worked with his counterparts the flow of relief support. passed to JTF-B for helicopter support to determine how to rescue victims to carry assessment teams, food sup- along the coast and move food via wa- plies, and relief items. terways, as most roads were impassable.

78 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Hofstetter

When CONE briefings ended, no con- Seebees moving dirt and gravel for relief sistent venue for sharing information efforts. existed. Exchange and response relied heavily on NGOs. In general, JTF–B co- ordinated with OFDA, which worked with NGOs on needs and damage as- sessment. Information was shared through after action reports. Pilots also provided data to the planning cell on landing sites, drop-off zones, resource validation, land and air accessibility, and disease hazards. Host-nation agencies are vital de- spite institutional weaknesses. As noted by the report of the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned on Hurri- cane Mitch, the operation demon- strated that “integration of host nation military at every juncture . . . to create a common bond, improve situational awareness, and provide better all around security” is imperative. Coordination and Training Civil-military collaboration is vital in disasters. Yet lack of coordination, U.S. Navy (Michael J. Tuemler) access, and unity of effort presented ongoing deficiencies in Honduras. As- sessments were conducted by the Of- COPECO had offices on the na- The military advisory group fice of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. tional and regional levels as well as worked with Honduran officials to de- Special Operations Command South, local emergency centers. But its per- termine relief priorities. An air tasking U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. sonnel thought the hurricane would order was established to move supplies Army Community Health Promotion hit the north coast, where all the assets to the right places and in the right and Preventive Medicine groups, U.S. had been moved. Then the storm hit quantities. Daily meetings with host- Air Force Rapid Engineer Deployable the capital and traveled south. The nation officials reviewed available air Heavy Operational Response Squadron, committee lacked authority to request and ground assets and the needs of in- Army Chief of Staff Special Medical Ad- dividual districts, including food visor, nongovernmental organizations, the military advisory group supplies. One result was the produc- and more. Accurate and timely assess- worked with Honduran officials tion of movement tables for the fol- ments remain critical to shaping force lowing 48 hours. JTF–B, AID, and structure, tailoring supplies to areas, to determine relief priorities OFDA formed a cell to receive calls prioritizing relief by country, driving for assistance and to coordinate planning considerations, and avoiding what was needed from various min- with CONE members: ministries of waste and duplication. Within OFDA, istries. It was understaffed and under- health, transport, public works, and for example, there is a requirement for funded and suffered from poor facili- government, emergency centers, may- baseline standards of information and a ties, communications, and maps. The ors, community leaders, and the mili- protocol for emergencies. telephone system was overwhelmed. tary. Priorities were established based There are surprisingly few un- These problems stalled relief efforts on on available supplies, support person- knowns in disasters. The fundamental the national level. With help from the nel, helicopter capability, and distance characteristics are well understood. The advisory group, COPECO moved to to affected areas. CONE also hosted imponderables involve location, extent quarters provided by a private engi- nightly briefings until its members of infrastructure damage, and casualties. neering company with international were able to return to their own offices. When a region has qualified health in- phones, computers, copiers, and fax Despite the cell, the chaotic situa- stitutions and defense establishments, lines to emergency centers. This Hon- tion made planning integration diffi- the Armed Forces can successfully inte- duran operations center, known as the cult. The cell continued taking calls grate with host nations. With integra- National Commission for Emergencies from the private and public sectors. tion comes a key consideration for mis- (CONE), was subordinate to the min- sion completion, keeping lines of istry of government and justice. communication open, which falls

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 79 ■ JFQ FORUM within the realm of nontraditional mis- sions. As seen in this relief effort, with 19 countries providing support immedi- ately, a unified front toward achieving common goals is indispensable. After the hurricane, CINCSOUTH ordered that training with emergency operations centers be expanded through command and OFDA initia- tives. There is ample opportunity for in-country, host-nation training to forge effective partnerships in disaster mitigation. But many communities are still living on flood plains in Central America like their U.S. neighbors who build homes on the San Andreas fault. There will never be the perfect re- sponse, but continued multinational exercises in the region will develop re- lationships for future disasters. SOUTHCOM designed the Fuerzas Ali- adas Humanitarian 2000 exercise to simulate multinational, interagency re- Unloading vehicles at lief operations with the participation San Jose, Guatemala. governmental and nongovernmental organizations from Central America, U.S. Navy (Leland B. Comer) the Caribbean, and the United States. It also conducted a regionally-oriented disaster relief command post exercise coordination centers. In place of such bodies involve communities in self- to enhance military coordination with bilateral responses, a regional response help projects, emergency management governments, regional agencies, and coordination center could gather simi- courses, technical training, and emer- other actors. lar requests to develop a macro list of gency and risk planning. needs to show donors. If there had been such a cen- Hurricane Mitch in Central Amer- ter in Miami, the first con- ica revealed a need to become more tact made by donors would agile. The key to multilateral humani- have occurred in an area tarian assistance lies in not regarding where the lines of commu- each relief operation as unique. Miti- nication and transporta- gating the impacts of disasters is in the tion were unaffected by the interest of everyone and thus such storm. These steps would missions require careful consideration have represented a regional of the mechanisms necessary to ac- approach while reducing quire and use reliable information. Sailors and marines workloads and shifting the Some obstacles to information flow are arriving at Managua, task of finding supplies and endemic to crisis management. There- Nicaragua. generating prioritized fore, a sensible approach is for civilian U.S. Navy (Leland B. Comer) needs and transportation and military groups to devise a com- plans to specialists (mili- bined program regulated by policies of A regional response coordination tary, government, and international accountability and transparency. JFQ center could be organized in Miami and nongovernmental organizations) under the supervision of OFDA or the at the regional center. United Nations. During Hurricane Civil-military communication Mitch, many donors went straight to can encourage a standard for interna- the countries concerned. The nature of tional disaster response, establishing a some contributions may never be template for long-term recovery. known because they bypassed existing Countries affected by Hurricane Mitch decided that strong national bodies can handle information and interac- tion on the municipal level. These

80 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Amphibious assault vehicle, RIMPAC ’00. out of joint

The Paradox U.S. Navy (Michael D. Smothermon) of Joint Culture

By DAVID T. FAUTUA

ince the passage of the Goldwater doing so impedes true jointness. The absence of Nichols Act in 1986, critics have raised joint culture, moreover, has also meant that pur- the dangers of forming too close a bond ple-minded members of the Armed Forces have S among the services. Their fear is that found an absence of shared values in which to doing so will subvert institutional traditions and ground strategic thinking apart from priorities set culture, thereby stifling important but diverse by the services. Joint nonculture has triumphed. perspectives. The friction of ideas was considered Indeed, articles published under the rubric of Out to be natural and necessary for joint warfighting. of Joint in JFQ have been largely devoted to the Being too joint, the argument goes, will breed topic; thus a rereading of these contributions may collusion. Yet while some operators and theorists explain the cognitive dissonance surrounding have outlined the pitfalls of restricting service- joint culture in the minds of joint warfighters. specific legacies, they have charged that not Making the Journey The inaugural issue of the journal was pub- Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fautua, USA (Ret.), is chief of strategy lished in Summer 1993 and introduced readers to and campaign plan manager in the Joint Futures Lab, U.S. Joint Forces Out of Joint with an article that laid the founda- Command, and adjunct professor at the Joint Forces Staff College. tion for the “undesirability of absolute jointness.”

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 81 ■ JOINT CULTURE

Contributed by Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of By not allowing the services to “squabble,” ideas Jointness” contended among other things that essential to jointness would be muffled, “such as “True jointness demands seamlessly linked opera- the unequal division of budget cuts based on na- tions between different military capabilities.” But tional requirements or national security strategy that fortuitous marriage would only occur if the that may not rely on balanced forces.” The way services could “quarrel” over the meaning of to find a common perspective, according to jointness based on “ideas rooted in experience.” Cropsey, is not to exhort the military to get one, In other words, open competition among the but to “provide one that is based on the ideas services over their unique perspectives on rooted in experience.” warfighting was seen as a precondition of joint- Michael Vlahos pursued the same argument ness. Cropsey worried that Goldwater-Nichols de- in “By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye Know Us” (Au- fined “jointness as a diminution of the power of tumn 93). Like Cropsey, he praised the practical the individual services” and that Joint Pub 1, Joint application of jointness, but was troubled that Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, im- the term would become a rhetorical “grail,”

out of joint posed “political correctness” by stating that thereby causing tunnel vision in strategic “there is no room for rivalry on the joint team.” thinkers. Jointness also appeared to him as coun- terintuitive, even sinister, given service parochialism during peacetime. Vlahos suspected that the concept is really a peacetime survival tactic used to stave off budget cuts. Under the Out of Joint: A Universal List (1993–1999) politically unassailable cover of jointness, the services found a way to not only mask service- Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of Jointness,” issue 1 (Summer 93), centric pursuits but to sanction them. In this pp. 72–79; Michael Vlahos, “By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye Know light, jointness spelled disaster, which Vlahos Us,” issue 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 108–10; Bernard E. Trainor, “Joint- warned would “not focus our minds on the next ness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War,” issue 3 (Winter 93–94), challenger or the next war.” pp. 71–74; Carl H. Builder, “Roles and Missions: Back to the What is striking about both Cropsey and Future,” issue 4 (Spring 94), pp. 32–37; J.L. Whitlow, “JFACC: Who’s Vlahos is that despite acknowledging how service in Charge?” issue 5 (Summer 94), pp. 64–70; The State of Civil- cultures have been obstacles to jointness, they Military Relations: Two Views—A.J. Bacevich, “Civilian Control: A prescribe reliance on service traditions to achieve Useful Fiction?” pp. 76–79, and Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civilian it. “Ideas rooted in experience” are precisely what Control: A National Crisis?” issue 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), define and confirm service distinctiveness. pp. 80–83; Robert B. Kupiszewski, “Joint Education for the 21st It is difficult to imagine that legislation can Century,” issue 7 (Spring 95), pp. 72–76; Michael C. Vitale, “Joint- muffle service-centric culture. Beyond service ness by Design, Not Accident,” issue 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 24–30; trumpeting, the authors leave an unveiled im- William W. Mendel, “New Forces for Engagement Policy,” issue 10 pression that their knights could win wars seem- (Winter 95–96); David Yost, “Where Are the Arleigh Burkes ingly on their own, affirming that “we breed Today?” issue 11 (Spring 96), pp. 125–27; Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., cranky individualism because we believe, when and Thomas-Durell Young, “Joint Doctrine Development: Over- all is said and done, that warfare is about LeMay coming a Legacy,” issue 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 94–99; Harvey M. being superior to Kruschev, or Horner being supe- Sapolsky, “Interservice Competition: The Solution, Not the Prob- rior to Saddam.” Moreover, if deceit and pursuit lem,” issue 15 (Spring 97), pp. 50–53; Lawrence B. Wilkerson, of self-interest lurk in the nature of jointness as “What Exactly Is Jointness?” issue 16 (Summer 97), pp. 66–68; Cropsey thinks, it appears counterintuitive to Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment,” conclude that protecting service traditions will issue 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 47–49; C.P. Ankersen, “A somehow curb deceit and the pursuit of narrow- Little Bit Joint—Component Commands: Seams, Not Synergy,” minded interests. issue 18 (Spring 98), pp. 116–21; Vincent M. Dreyer, Bruce C. Emig, and James T. Sanny, Jr., “The Joint Evaluation Report— Jointness as Synergy Career Enhancer or Kiss of Death,” issue 20 (Autumn/Winter It took a third contribution by Bernard 98–99), pp. 65–70; William A. Owens, “Making the Joint Journey,” Trainor, “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf issue 21 (Spring 99), pp. 92–95; Peter F. Herrly, “The Plight of Joint War” (Winter 93–94), to finally suggest that joint Doctrine after Kosovo.” issue 22 (Summer 99), pp. 99–104; Susan E. culture was a crucial but as yet incomplete build- Merdinger, “Recipe for Failure: Centralization and U.S. Joint Forces ing block in elevating service thinking to the Command,” issue 23 (Autumn/Winter 99–00); Barry M. Blechman, level of . Without joint culture, the Kevin P. O’Prey, and Renee Lajoire, “Grading Theater Engagement services would present their requirements “with- Planning,” issue 24 (Spring 00), pp. 98–103; and Damian J. Mc- out regard to their compatibility with that of Carthy and Susan A. Medlin, “Two Hats for the Joint Force Com- other services.” Nor would service culture accom- mander?” issue 25 (Summer 00), pp. 91–98. JFQ modate “a joint way of thinking” under a joint

82 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Fautua

Aboard USS Vincennes in Yokosuka Harbor. out of joint U.S. Navy (Dennis Cantrell)

command. For an exasperated contributor, J.L. furnished by service components...which are Whitlow in “JFACC: Who’s in Charge?” (Summer often drafted back in Washington by service 94), the advent of the joint force air component staffs.” This practice was also the subject of an- commander was a thoroughly “unjoint” event. other contribution entitled “A Little Bit Joint— Problems of target prioritization and of command Component Commands: Seams, Not Synergy” and control systems used in managing joint air (Spring 98) by C.P. Ankersen that identified it as a operations was that they were “generally not structural impediment to jointness. Component joint, but Air Force.” command headquarters act like the tentacles of A jarring assessment of how little things had the services rather than purple-minded staffs of changed almost five years later was offered in joint warfighters working cooperatively under the “Making the Joint Journey” (Spring 99) by a for- joint commander. mer Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Owens recommended radical change, arguing Admiral William Owens. He found “service for consolidating military requirements under a parochialism is still the joint requirements committee, a senior decision- crystalline stovepipes is the most important factor in making body chaired by the Secretary or Deputy force planning.” Over a Secretary of Defense and with the Chairman (or term applied by Owens to decade after Goldwater- his designated representative) as principal military service approaches to jointness Nichols was enacted, mil- advisor. Only service chiefs (or vice chiefs) would itary operations remained be included, along with four senior civilians from more joint in name than the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “We should practice and the joint requirements process was strip out all other requirements bodies,” Owens ad- observed more in rhetoric than execution. Crys- vised, “and consolidate analytic resources in the talline stovepipes is the term applied by Owens to new requirements committee staff.” The process of service approaches to jointness, something that determining requirements would be removed from he detected even in supposed joint commands. the services, which would implement decisions of CINCs generally exercise command through as- the committee. To “strip away” parochialism from signed service components. Thus when the Joint Staff requests input on force structure, CINCs “usually compile the separate recommendations

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 83 ■ JOINT CULTURE

Exercise at Joint Readiness Training Center. out of joint U.S. Army (Raymond A. Barnard)

the battlefield, Owens proposed combining the experts in their service core competencies. “That “great enablers of combat power” (that is, intelli- is the only foundation on which true jointness gence, communications, logistics, and medical can be built.” care) with the services acting as executive agents for these critical support functions. No Safe Haven These dramatic proposals were a refutation of Turning to education, Wilkerson fretted over the notion that protecting service cultures and tra- “knee-jerk change” initiated by the Joint Staff, like ditions would eventually lead to jointness. If any- the attempt to introduce learning objectives for thing, the joint journey had proven the need for force protection and risk management. These ob- limiting service cultures as a means of curbing jectives were promulgated without much fore- parochialism. As Owens saw it, the problem had to thought to existing service priorities and appeared be corrected at the source, at service academies and to be “rooted in political expediency,” which he in officer training programs where the objective found influences action by the Joint Staff. “That is was not simply to commission good officers but why the increasing power of the Joint Staff is so rather “good Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air troublesome,” he continued, “not now or over the Force officers.” By urging that the early education next year but for the future.” Though Wilkerson of officers inculcate joint culture, Owens raised stated that the increasing power of the Joint Staff more worrisome concerns. One could not help did not yet fully “impinge” on the flourishing of questioning the much heralded efficacy of the service cultures or “healthy competitiveness,” he joint education or the value of joint doctrine itself. predicted that given its current direction it cer- A number of practitioners and theorists also tainly will in time. warned of danger in an emerging joint culture. This was the same risk that Harvey Sapolsky Lawrence Wilkerson, for instance, cautioned in had identified in “Interservice Competitor: The “What Exactly Is Jointness?” (Summer 97) that Solution, Not the Problem” (Spring 97). Without true jointness is “not created by doctrine, joint interservice competition, the services would “pre- or otherwise” nor “imparted by fiat” nor even to fer to collude” and, even more distressing, use be regarded as “seamless.” From seminar discus- jointness as a “shield against public scrutiny.” Of- sions and comments by students, he concluded fering a cautionary insight that seemed to antici- that true jointness is nothing more than the trust pate a proposal by Admiral Owens to expose both and understanding that soldiers, sailors, marines, cadets and midshipmen to joint culture, Sapolsky and airmen have in their comrades as, above all, cited “separate academies, distinctive uniforms, and unique military traditions” as attributes of the services that helped maintain public support for the Armed Forces. “Luckily, the services have not

84 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Fautua

F–15s from Kadena air base, Japan. out of joint

18th Communications Squadron (Marvin Krause)

entirely lost their identities, although some pro- interviewed. The article concluded that the aver- moters of jointness wish they had.” age joint specialty officer “seems less optimistic It is perhaps not surprising that joint spe- about promotion after joint duty,” a judgment cialty officers (JSOs) have not escaped attention in that seems to render premature claims of a corps an emerging joint culture. An assessment by Vin- of joint officers “rarely before found in our mili- cent Dreyer, Bruce Emig, and James Sanny, “The tary institutions and culture.” Evaluation Report—Career Enhancer or Kiss of Developing joint doctrine also has been hob- Death” (Autumn/Winter 98–99), surveyed stu- bled by the lack of a supportive joint culture, if dents and faculty at the then Armed Forces Staff indeed such a thing can exist in this contentious College and found some troubling differences in arena. From the outset attempts to connect no- understanding among immediate and senior tions of joint culture and doctrine have been an raters on standards for evaluating JSOs. Of the exercise in forging links that break. This is partly raters queried, only 36 percent felt positive about due to the devotion of the services to their own their comprehension of the evaluation systems of strategic doctrine, which explains their violent re- the other services. Army officers felt the most in- sistance to accommodation. There are also differ- formed “though not ences in how services regard doctrine. Douglas developing joint doctrine also strongly,” followed by Ma- Lovelace and Thomas-Durell Young addressed has been hobbled by the lack rine raters and lastly by them in “Joint Doctrine Development: Overcom- raters from the Navy and ing a Legacy” (Winter 96–97), stating that histori- of a supportive joint culture Air Force. Lacking confi- cally “the services have not agreed on what doc- dence in raters, usually trine means.” from other services, an unsettling 78 percent of re- Lovelace and Young found that while the spondents saw a need to prepare or write portions Army accepted joint doctrine as authoritative, the of their evaluations for self-protection. Just as primacy of the soldier led to a caveat that doctrine bothersome was the comparison of perceptions is subject to judgment in application. That per- among officers of joint assignments before and spective contrasts with a culture in the Navy after their tours. A total of 73 percent of the re- which “focuses on technology and independent spondents who had no joint experience felt that a operations” and “defines doctrine as conceptual”; joint tour would impact favorably on their careers. and with the Marine Corps which emphasizes That figure dropped to 50 percent when JSOs were warfighting as primary and considers doctrine “a codification of its essence rather than a body of knowledge to be consulted in preparing for and conducting war.” And those perspectives differ from that of the Air Force which “sees weaponry as

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 85 ■ JOINT CULTURE

a defining feature of war” and technology as opment of Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed supreme; therefore that service tends toward “a Forces of the United States, Herrly reminded us that subordination of doctrine and operational proce- despite mantras on fighting wars jointly, airpower dures.” Given that joint doctrine was intended to had become the policy tool of choice for combat transcend individual perspectives and integrate the and “has several times become further distorted to contributions of each service to warfighting, one mean of cruise missiles.” can understand how the absence of a cohesive Whether the debate on joint culture contin- joint culture has complicated the task. Meanwhile, ues along a paradoxical path depends largely on the endless process of building consensus among the degree of enlightened self-interest that the the services on draft publications leads planners to services place on jointness and thus their willing- “reach for the lowest common denominator.” ness to adjust institutional norms to accommo- date the cultures of the other services. The The Future of Jointness prospect is not promising, given single-minded- That the idea of joint culture is a seemingly ness in pursuing service transformation agendas

out of joint self-contradictory proposition to the ambitions of which encourage fierce competition for scarce re- a self-professed joint military remains a puzzling sources. There is no doubt that the services will paradox. Equally astonishing is how the term has make efforts to cast transformation as joint- survived as an expression of a possi- friendly, notwithstanding underlying disparities. ble truth even as proponents for Thus claims by the Army that a digitized, lighter, jointness decry initiatives that might information-based objective force will contribute actually draw the services closer or to jointness must be weighed against claims by recoil at the slightest suggestion of the Air Force that it does not have sufficient lift delimiting service cultures. Those for those light divisions because of internal priori- who find this predicament as simply ties that favor strategic bombing aircraft. indicating a divided joint commu- Improving Army strategic speed may be a nity unable to reconcile internal dif- moot point as the Navy deploys new land-attack ferences will overlook the profound destroyers and the Marine Corps fields air am- irony that undermines the joint phibious formations to dominate littorals, an area process. The joint community views that was once a province of the Army. And if this question as a Hobson’s choice strategic airpower should win the day, the conven- between service and joint culture. tional wisdom that the man on the ground is the Advocates of joint culture may be ultimate arbiter of war will have to be amended. struggling in vain to convince the joint community to discover a mid- Changes in service cultures, albeit modest or U.S. Army (Raymond A. Barnard) dle way to nurture, reassure, and sus- logical, are difficult and must come from within Tracking exercise, tain purple-minded warfighters be- the Armed Forces. Thus if the description offered Fort Polk. cause the military simply believes no such course by Admiral Owens on the state of jointness is ac- exists or should exist. curate, no amount of externally driven reform Unfortunately, operationalizing joint doc- will fundamentally alter service culture. Perhaps trine in combat has cast doubt on the importance the most that can be expected at this time is a of a culture of shared values and a common the- forthright recognition that any common perspec- ory of victory. If anything, as Peter Herrly pointed tive is jeopardized if the services continue to op- out in “The Plight of Joint Doctrine After Kosovo” erate under an illusion of joint culture. Without a (Summer 99), the Air Force-only conduct of Oper- cohesive culture of shared values that transcends ation Allied Force in Kosovo “was inconsistent service interests and inspires purple-minded with joint doctrine in both word and spirit.” Ac- warfighters to think as a team, genuine jointness cepting the nature of the operation and the obses- will be muted by service parochialism when con- sion with casualties which resulted in excluding venient, whether on a battlefield or joint staff. ground forces, Herrly said that the debate “runs Many will be unsurprised and even take comfort deeper than terminology and reveals shortcom- from this situation. That is the curious paradox of ings in military culture.” He worried that decision- joint culture. JFQ makers would increasingly conclude that there would be an “orderly, discrete, and bloodless mili- tary option: the air campaign” in wars of the fu- ture. As a former chief of joint doctrine on the Joint Staff (J-7) and a key participant in the devel-

86 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Members of Parachute Regiment securing Lungi airport.

Headquarters Land Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces By RICHARD M. CONNAUGHTON

ritain sent the spearhead battalion of its the concept of integrating operational planning, joint rapid reaction force (JRRF) to preparation, and execution under a permanent Sierra Leone in May 2000. The unit joint headquarters (PJHQ). took control of the airport at Lungi and B Thinking Joint began restoring order to the capital of Freetown, a preliminary to evacuating Britons and foreign na- Both the previous Conservative and current tionals. Some 36 hours earlier, the unit had been Labor governments have viewed the capability to in barracks at Aldershot. Operation Palliser was a mount rapid reaction operations as in the na- classic example of a rapid reaction mission, some- tional interest, in keeping with global responsibil- thing often sought yet rarely achieved. It validated ities as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, to play a part in resolving selected crises. Britain had an inefficient response system in Colonel Richard M. Connaughton, (Ret.), is the executive 1994 and a constant though apparently contra- director of National and International Consultancy and the author of dictory political intention to improve military ef- The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear. ficiency while achieving cost savings.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 87 ■ BRITISH JOINT FORCES

Responsibility for the defense and security of the United Kingdom rests with the ministry. Four-star chiefs of staff advise the chief of the de- fence staff (CDS) on military aspects of defense policy which affect the services, how the services are engaged, and service capabilities. CDS then represents their views to the government. Chiefs have no responsibility for command or control of operations. The commanders in chief retain full command and are responsible for delivering fully manned, trained, and equipped component ele- ments at agreed states of readiness. The relation- ship between the single service supporting com- mands and PJHQ is reportedly very good. The Defence Cost Study recommended es- tablishment of PJHQ to permit “a proper, clear, and unambiguous connection between [govern- ment] policy and strategic functions and the con- duct of operations at the operational level to be CinC Fleet achieved.” This proposed simplification of com- Helicopter carrier HMS Ocean during mand and control resonates with the Goldwater- operations at sea. Before the establishment of PJHQ, command Nichols Act of 1986. In the post-Cold War era, of joint forces deployed overseas was usually when armed forces can increasingly be utilized in achieved by appointing one of three service com- pursuit of diverse foreign policy objectives, the manders in chief as joint commander who, in number of political actors interested in influenc- turn, would designate his headquarters as joint ing operations has grown. Conceptually, CDS headquarters. A chief was not normally appointed must shoulder the aspirations, interests, and until the cabinet chose to deploy forces. This ad often divergent opinions of the broad range of hoc, reactive arrangement was never efficient nor political leaders on the strategic level, leaving truly joint. In July 1994, to improve crisis manage- PJHQ to focus on operations. ment and responsiveness by the chain of com- An unambiguous connection between CDS mand, the secretary of and PJHQ has not been established. A ministry committee, the defence crisis management organ- four-star chiefs of staff have state for defence an- nounced the creation of a ization (DCMO), intervenes between the two, no responsibility for command single, permanent joint thus blurring command and control lines and providing further points of contact for political and control of operations headquarters under a chief of joint operations (CJO). and military intervention. Prime Minister The formation of a joint Winston Churchill loathed military committees: rapid deployment force was also announced, to “You may take the most gallant sailor, the most become operational by April 1996 at the same intrepid airman, or the most audacious soldier, time as the new headquarters. put them at a table together—what do you get? Development of PJHQ was the outcome of The sum total of their fears.” the Defence Costs Study (1994). From this so- Britain divides activity on the strategic level called front-line first study came the operational, into grand and . The difficulty of efficiency-based requirement to separate policy having DCMO intervening between CDS and from operations, a consequence of which would PJHQ is the overlap of interest as organizations be creation of PJHQ. An earlier study, Options for compete to perform on the military strategic Change (1991), planned to reduce manpower lev- level. As one commentator explained, “The prob- els in the Ministry of Defence from 12,700 to lem with DCMO is that members bring to it their 3,750 by 1998. Reductions in Whitehall on that own experience and memories of the operational scale were possible partly because of the belief by level of conflict so that instead of providing the government that the core ministry responsi- strategic level direction there is a tendency to du- bility was policy and that the function of opera- plicate that which is the responsibility and within tions could be separated and moved to a more ef- the competence of PJHQ.” It became evident after ficient site in the suburbs. Operation Palliser that relations between DCMO and PJHQ had to mature. Political leaders and commanders must reflect on their precise areas of responsibility and confine themselves to them.

88 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Connaughton

crisis is emerging. A multidisciplinary Figure 1. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) contingency planning team is organized on the working level under a senior offi- cer from the planning division. A team is Chief of expected to master the situation in order Joint Operations to advise the entire chain of command. Not all efforts move to the third category of interest (step 2), formation

Chief of Force of an operations team (OT). If a crisis Chief of Staff Operational Readiness and Training evaporates or a decision is made that no operational activity is necessary, the contingency planning team may be dis- banded. If the team progresses to step 2, Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications and it is subsumed into an operations team Intelligence Plans and Policy Information Systems (J-2) (J-5) (J-6) headed by a dedicated leader with a rank appropriate to the scale of opera- tions. The role of the team is dealing (civilian) Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Secretary, Director, Joint Force Chief, Joint Force with details associated with command, Personnel and Logistics Operations Finance and Secretariat Training and Standards Operations (J-1/J-4) (J-3) (J-8/J-9) deployment, sustenance, and ultimately the recovery of the assigned force, and to be proactive and responsive in inter- facing with the ministry and supporting Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, Joint Force Special Operations Land Headquarters commands. It does not deploy assets (J-3) (J-3) but continues until the operation is over. Unlike the United States, which al- locates regional responsibilities to uni-

Assistant Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, fied commands, PJHQ maintains a Maritime Air flag/general officer (J-3) (J-3) global watch and JRRF has a global lia- bility. It is this crisis action planning that is undertaken with the ministry as part of the defence crisis management organization, whose main players are not collocated but are linked by a serv- Planning Operations ice video conferencing system which also in- In addition to dealing with crises, CJO is re- cludes single service headquarters and key allies. sponsible for deliberate planning in the form of The organization conducts conferences at least joint guides and contingency/operational plans. daily to review ongoing and emergent operations. The latter replace joint theater plans originated in Implementing Joint Capabilities the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, essen- tially noncombatant evacuation operations con- Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett is the current cerned with extracting nationals in an emer- chief of joint operations. His headquarters of 438 gency. Merging deliberate and crisis action personnel has as its primary role: planning enhances PJHQ flexibility. Nowadays, To be responsible, when directed by CDS, for the plan- crises and subsequent operations do not telegraph ning and execution of U.K.-led joint, potentially joint, their imminence, and PJHQ has a proven system combined, and multinational operations, and for ex- of spotting, monitoring, and prioritizing emerg- ercising operational command of U.K. forces assigned ing crises. to combined and multinational operations led by oth- PJHQ classifies conflicts in four categories ers, in order to achieve [the ministry’s] military (quiescent, stirring, quickening, and surfaced), strategic objectives. which then are put in three categories of interest. CJO has no permanently assigned forces. Assets The normal state is the lowest level of activity, only come under his headquarters for operational whereby intelligence is maintaining a watching missions. The ongoing military contribution to brief on areas of operational interest and creating a Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Middle East is therefore priority list. Concurrently, staff planners are en- the responsibility of PJHQ. Added tasks include gaged in the joint staff development of contin- command of sovereign base areas in Cyprus, gency plans. Step 1 occurs when it is evident that a Gibraltar, and the Falkland Islands. Exclusions are precise, namely the strategic nuclear deterrent and defense of home base (territorial waters and

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 89 ■ BRITISH JOINT FORCES

Figure 2. Joint Force Headquarters Deployments

Operation Location Timeframe

Caxton Montserrat March 1996 Purposeful Central Africa November–December 1996 Determinant Congo/Zaire March–June 1997 Alleviate Albania June–July 1997 Bolton Kuwait February–April 1998 Carrick Indonesia May–June 1998 Ladbrook Congo August–September 1998 Desert Fox Middle East December 1998 Basilica Sierra Leone January–February 1999 Agricola Kosovo June 1999 Langar East Timor September–December 1999 Barwood Mozambique February–March 2000 Palliser Sierra Leone May–June 2000

CJFORT responsibilities were intended to en- sure preparedness. The position of deputy for op- erational readiness and training arose from the Review (1998) with the role of preparing JRRF and joint force headquarters (JFHQ) and monitoring readiness and joint train- ing across five components (land, sea, air, special forces, and logistics). This involves directing tier 3 training on the operational and military strategic levels, coordinating tier 2 training on the tactical and operational levels through defense exercise planning, and formulating and assessing stan- dards and essential tasks for JRRF with reference to manpower, equipment, sustainability, and collec- U.S. Marine Corps (Jimmie Perkins) tive performance. Oversight is achieved through Marines aboard monitoring, testing, and reporting on training HMS Ocean. and operations and facilitating dialogue among airspace, Northern Ireland, and counterterror- the services to exploit training opportunities. ism). In general war, PJHQ has a role under article JRRF comprises a pool of combat and sup- V of the NATO Treaty, possibly forming the na- port forces from which the United Kingdom will tional joint headquarters. CJO operational re- meet all short notice, crisis action planned, mili- sponsibilities include direction, deployment, sus- tary contingencies. Its mission is: tainment, and recovery of the joint force. To be a pool of highly capable force elements, main- Under CJO are two staff officers of two-star tained at high and very high readiness and trained to rank, a chief of staff, and a chief of joint force op- the required joint standards. JRRF is to be deployable erational readiness and training (CJFORT). The and sustainable in joint force packages, tailored to branches under the chief of staff reflect U.S. and meet the operational requirement, in order to conduct NATO staff organizations, facilitating the proper operations up to medium scale warfighting, nationally interaction with a NATO-organized coalition. A or multinationally under NATO, [Western European combined headquarters is similarly organized with Union], U.N., [Organization for Security and Co- branches 1 through 9, the principal difference operation in Europe], or ad hoc coalition auspices. being that it would be staffed by representatives of two or more member states. As a development of The pool comprises the best trained units the St. Malo initiative, an Anglo-French combined from across the military. This shift from relying headquarters exercise was held in June 2000. In on core formations is where JRRF differs from its short, both the chief of staff and PJHQ staff are or- ganized to work with coalition partners.

90 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Connaughton

construction of joint task forces from elements in the JRRF pool, as this leads to an inevitable ad hoc nature in the deploying force. Although this can be mitigated through training, there is a need to develop a genuine desire to fight as a team. JFHQ is commanded by a chief of joint force operations (CJFO), a brigadier from the army or Royal Marines who will normally oversee JRRF operations that fall within the one-star command level. A larger scale operation would probably have a two-star commander. A group of two-star officers from all the services have appointments making them potential JTF commanders. The 55 members of the staff are broadly organized in the J-staff tradition. The headquarters forms the de- ployable element of PJHQ. The JRRF concept is evolving, with phase 1 Signal Company (Jeremiah Lancaster)

d development having been completed in 1999. 982 Culmination of phase 2—development of the full Scimitars deployed in capability—will be Exercise Saif Sareea, planned Egypt, Bright Star. for the Middle East in late 2001. Meanwhile, pro- predecessors. The inclusion of special forces is an- cedures are being refined as deployments go on. other. Pool units are configured into two eche- For example, there are operational liaison and re- lons. First echelon force readiness varies from 48 connaissance teams (OLRTs), one of which can al- hours for spearhead forces and a joint task force ways move on 24 hours notice. Ideally the 6-man headquarters (JTFHQ) to completion in 10 days, team will be commanded by CJFO, supported by followed by more substantial second echelon ca- staff officers who can be drawn from any branch pabilities with a phased entry in 11 to 30 days. of the staff. The impression that the team is top- The first JRRF echelon could represent a po- heavy may have arisen during Operation Langar tent force. It can contain a maritime task group in East Timor, where the CJFO presence with an organized around a carrier with frigates and de- augmented OLRT was evident despite the total stroyers, cruise missile capable attack , ground contribution of only a battalion tactical maritime patrol aircraft, mine warfare protection headquarters and a Gurkha company. The team forces, and royal fleet auxiliary (RFA) support also contains individuals with valuable experi- ships. The naval element might also include an ence who can advise ambassadors or heads of amphibious task group. government in hot spots like Sierra Leone. JFHQ is commanded by a chief In addition to light forces, the army could be Jointness in Action of joint operations, a brigadier represented by lead bat- By May 2000 the U.N. peacekeeping force in from the army or Royal Marines tlegroups from 1 Ar- Sierra Leone had seriously deteriorated. A number mored Division with par- of the 8,700 peacekeepers had been killed and as ent brigades in the second echelon. Successful many as 500 detained by the rebel Revolutionary positioning of assets depends upon the force United Front. Secretary General Kofi Annan ap- alignment with the strategic lift required to move pealed to the United States, United Kingdom, and it to be in place to deal with precise crises (six roll France for forces. “We know that the interna- on-roll off vessels have been ordered and C–17 air- tional community and the Western countries craft are to be leased pending the availability of were not ready to go to Rwanda, and after Sierra the Airbus A400M in 2006–2007). Apache Long- Leone I think there’s going to be very little en- bow helicopters will soon be available. The Royal couragement for any of them to get involved in Air Force (RAF) first echelon contribution will be Africa.” These nations, who had plausible rapid taken from across a range of capable systems. This reaction capabilities, declined the invitation from is particularly important because of the need for Annan to put combat troops in Sierra Leone air that can respond rapidly with intelligence, sur- under the U.N. flag. veillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance Britain announced that it would only pro- as well as the destructive capability to support vide technical and logistical support to the light, high readiness land forces. Of note is the United Nations per earlier agreements. Anticipa- tory contingency action was thus put in hand in the event that an evacuation of entitled person- nel was necessary. At 1000 hours, the JTFHQ

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 91 ■ BRITISH JOINT FORCES

commander, Brigadier David Richards, was or- SHIRBRIG made no move toward East Timor dered to deploy to Freetown to prepare a non- or Sierra Leone. When Bernard Miyet, the head combat evacuation operation (NEO) under na- of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Opera- tional auspices. He would have the capability to tions, was asked to account for this inaction, his conduct the evacuation in a hostile environment military adviser, Lieutenant General Giulio Frati- and his OLRT was as much a reconnaissance as celli, replied: operations organization. Emerging hot spots were There are two issues related to the employment of under constant review. British forces practiced an SHIRBRIG. Firstly, it is not an entity that is currently NEO in Sierra Leone over Christmas 1998 and under the control of the U.N. Each deployment needs two operations were conducted in the country the approval of the individual contributors. Secondly, during 1999. the current advice we have from SHIRBRIG is that it Annan’s linking of rapid reaction to Rwanda will only be made available for operations mandated was apposite. To better respond to crises the under chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, although we be- United Nations formed the standby arrangement lieve the SHIRBRIG nations are reviewing this policy. system in 1993. It contained information on units The mission in Sierra Leone...is mandated under from member states available in principle on short chapter VII of the Charter (enforcement). notice. When acts of genocide began in earnest in April 1994, the details of 19 member states were Because chapter VI peacekeeping is initiated only held in the database. As urgent calls went out, no after diplomatic efforts and with consent of the state made its forces available. All the database pro- parties involved, there is arguably no requirement vided was swifter negative responses. for rapid reaction. A decision was made after the Rwandan crisis Initial support by London in response to the to replace the database with a high readiness crisis in Sierra Leone stood in stark contrast to the brigade (SHIRBRIG). National components would zero response of SHIRBRIG. Britain, however, was be designated from states normally associated the former colonial power in the country and with traditional chapter VI peacekeeping. Provi- provoked international condemnation by break- sion was made for command and control, train- ing the U.N. arms embargo. Accordingly there ing, and standard operating procedures. was a compelling reason for making good not only for having supported activities but also because of valid criticism of the late response by Britain to West Africa floods in Mozambique in early 2000. SHIRBRIG and the prevari- Nouakchott cation over Mozambique prove that military effectiveness is in- Senegal R. MAURITANIA significant in the absence of the CAPE VERDE ISLANDS political will to use it. Some JTFHQ officers joined operations team planners in PJHQ Sao Tiago Dakar SENEGAL to enhance understanding with

Banjul MALI subordinate headquarters. The eight key OLRT officers were in THE GAMBIA Bamako the air eight hours after being or- Bissau dered to deploy 3,500 miles, arriv- ing at Lungi Airport by midday GUINEA BISSAU GUINEA on May 6. Richards requested PJHQ to immediately release the Niger River Conakry lead company of the spearhead land element, then the remaining Makeni forces. Because NEO could not be Freetown properly effected without helicop- Bo ter support, four Chinooks were SIERRA LEONE Kenema Bonthe ordered to Sierra Leone via Gibral- LIBERIA tar, Tenerife, Mauritania, and Dakar. The first pair arrived on Atlantic Ocean Monrovia the evening of May 7, only 30 hours after being tasked. Meanwhile, the concurrent political and military activity

92 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Connaughton

British EA–3 lifting off from Aviano, Allied Force. U.S. Air Force (Keith Reed) U.S. Air Force

operating in the hostile environment of Sierra Leone within 36 hours. They faced a drugged-up, well-armed guerrilla force intent on inflicting ca- sualties to stimulate the kind of withdrawal seen in Mogadishu (1993) and Kigali (1994). Moreover, the British troops were not acclimatized or fully protected against malaria, endemic in Sierra Leone. But they were trained to recognize symp- toms: of the 4,500 personnel deployed, only 80 contracted the disease. Some 299 expatriates were evacuated in the first 48 hours but the calming influence of the military stemmed the flow. By now OLRT had be- come JTFHQ, and Richards realized his mission was complete. However, he faced the probability that withdrawal would lead to the failure of the U.N. mission and fall of the elected government. JFC continued to perform protective operations. In the tradition of mission-oriented orders, this CinC Fleet initiative was endorsed by London some days Patrol from after it was unavoidably implemented in Sierra 42 Commando, Leone. Following the evacuation, JRRF was or- Sierra Leone. upon which rapid crisis reaction is founded dered to protect the airhead to allow U.N. ele- moved apace. On May 7, orders were sent from ments to enhance and reinforce. London to redeploy assets. The am- The success of Palliser was largely due to phibious ready group, led by the helicopter carrier commanders on the tactical and operational lev- HMS Ocean, sailed from Marseilles to Gibraltar and els who were entirely focused on their responsi- then to West Africa. This group had spent up to bilities. On the tactical level, the paratroopers six months annually in the Mediterranean. In pressed on, keen to engage in the business for addition to HMS Ocean, it comprised the which they were trained until relieved by the HMS Chatham, two landing ships, and a replenish- commandos on May 26. In mid-June, 42 Com- ment vessel. Embarked in HMS Ocean was the 600- mando also withdrew, leaving behind a pro- strong 42 Royal Marine Commando Group, which foundly more confident United Nations, a bol- had heavier weapon support than the spearhead stered president, and a large team to help train battalion, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment. In the the Sierra Leone army. event close air support was required, the carrier JFHQ staff members are used to working rou- HMS Illustrious with seven Sea Harriers and six RAF tinely on the operational level. Daily political- Harriers, with an RFA ship, was ordered to make military meetings held in Freetown were rooted for the West African coast from Lisbon. in traditional intervention doctrine. Their aim On May 8, Lungi Airport had been secured was penetrating the rebel decision cycle. Key con- and 1 Parachute Group, which included strong siderations in that effort are the media; legal special forces elements, began to dominate its tac- means; tasking special forces; information opera- tical area of responsibility. The paratroops were tions; liaison with coalition, political, and civil

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 93 ■ BRITISH JOINT FORCES

other government departments and allies with a view to greater flexibility and interoperability. Joint staff officers represent a purple wave of the future who are doctrinally aware of the need to work together for interservice ideals. Such laudable achievements reflect organiza- tional change rather than a bottom-up initiative to influence attitudes. Joint and combined opera- tions rarely reach down to touch common sol- diers. Traditionally they are staff oriented. There- fore it is unsurprising to discover, after the organization of the joint nuclear, biological, and chemical regiment, for example, that there is no disciplinary act for joint organizations; thus the army commander cannot personally discipline the RAF members of his unit. And, as change pro- gresses, servicemembers must realize that they are part of more than their own services. Permanent Joint Headquarters Chief of joint As a teaching vehicle, Operation Palliser was operations being rich in both lessons and promise. It defined the briefed. agencies; campaign planning; and force level lo- coming of age for PJHQ. “The real key to suc- gistics. As ever, success depends greatly on the cess,” according to Brigadier Richards, “was and commander, who must be a natural leader, the ul- will remain the quality and motivation of person- timate professional, schooled in joint and com- nel on every level; a willingness to encourage and bined operations, politically aware nationally and use individual and collective initiative; a determi- internationally, and an astute manager of media nation not to be thwarted by inevitable setbacks relations. matched by a corresponding preparedness to in- novate; an inability to accept anything other Looking Ahead than excellence in the pursuit of assigned tasks; The Strategic Defence Review provided real and, as ever, an irrepressible humor that ensures momentum for developing a joint operational ca- high morale.” JFQ pability. Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo were sup- ported by ministry daily political-military meetings funds, which was mili- were rooted in traditional tarily and fiscally sound. intervention doctrine The $490 million (£325 million) CJO budget is used for routine expen- ditures. As PJHQ is streamlined, it has directed re- sponsibilities for formulating joint operational doctrine to a doctrine and concepts center. Logistic support has been rationalized under a chief of de- fence logistics. Joint helicopter command has been formed for command and control of battlefield helicopters, including 67 British-built WAH–64 Apaches. Both Harrier GR–7 and Sea Harrier FA–2 have been amalgamated in joint force 2000, which became operational in 2000. Joint training is planned for army and RAF ground-based air de- fense. A joint nuclear, biological, and chemical de- fense force has been organized with army and RAF assets. Moreover, there has been a basic change in officer training, combining service staff colleges into a joint staff college. The movement toward an enhanced joint operational capability is unstoppable. The process will enlarge understanding and harmony with

94 JFQ / Autumn 2000 The Coast Guard and Maritime Security By BRUCE B. STUBBS U.S. Coast Guard (PatrickU.S. Coast Guard Montgomery) Providing port security for USS Cole.

he mission of the Coast Guard includes fifth service protects American lives, property, safeguarding the maritime interests of and interests, thereby assuring maritime security. the Nation: the exclusive economic Geopolitical realities, economic globaliza- T zone, areas adjacent to the continental tion, shifting demographics, technological shelf, and other waters of importance collectively change, finite resources, and fragile environments known as deepwater operating areas. By deploying are dramatically affecting maritime interests. to deepwater regions for a range of unilateral, Oceans and waterways, in addition to carrying joint, interagency, and combined operations, the trade vital for the economy, will continue to act as conduits for transnational issues such as pollu- tion, overfishing, illegal immigration, drug smug- gling, terrorism, and proliferation. Moreover, bur- Captain Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG (Ret.), is a technical director for Anteon geoning foreign economic links will further Corporation; he served on active duty as the director of operational increase the volume and value of waterborne capabilities at Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard. trade as well as challenges to maritime security.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 95 ■ MARITIME SECURITY

South Korean fishing boat under observation. MH90 helicopter with over- the-horizon inflatable boat. U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard (R.N.U.S. Coast Guard Chaney)

To protect U.S. national interests against events in areas such as the Gulf of Mexico and threats—known and unknown—the Coast Guard the Bering Sea. Focused awareness is detailed is developing an operational concept for safe- knowledge of events and activities occurring in specific areas at all times. Deployed forces the closer a threat appears to the United States, the more require knowledge of events in assigned pa- trol areas as well as fishing grounds, rook- comprehensive the requirements of the Coast Guard eries, sanctuaries, chokepoints, and ship- ping lanes or transit corridors. In addition, guarding deepwater regions. It will include mar- the closer a threat appears to the United States, itime awareness, active and sustained presence, the more comprehensive the requirements of the dynamic positioning, and standoff tactics. It is Coast Guard. designed to ensure deployment of military, multi- Both types of awareness can be achieved by mission, and maritime force packages on-scene various means, including space-based national when and where needed. sensors, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), un- manned aerial vehicles, shore-based over-the-hori- Knowing the Sea zon , all-source intelligence, data links be- Maritime awareness means possessing exten- tween netted forces, and shipboard sensors such sive knowledge of all events and activities that as air- and surface-search radars and passive elec- can impact on the maritime security and safety of tronic surveillance systems. Moreover, awareness America and its citizens. Events include vessel is not exclusively a service concern but rather a transits, fishing activities, pollution incidents, national task achieved by a two-way flow of infor- emergencies at sea, and illegal activities. mation between the Coast Guard and other agen- General awareness involves an overall cies, particularly the Department of Defense. knowledge of events, activities, and trends in a re- gion. Operational commanders as well as de- ployed forces need an understanding of maritime

96 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Stubbs

Mariners disembarking from HH–60J after rescue. U.S. Coast Guard (EricU.S. Coast Guard Eggen)

compensate for the size of forces relative to the area covered. Realizing focused awareness is an immense challenge. It requires integrating surface assets and organic aircraft and boats, supporting MPA, and other systems. General awareness may also be reached by all-source intelligence gathered without committing MPA and surface assets. Such U.S. Coast Guard (StephenU.S. Coast Guard Baker) awareness comes from deployed forces that pro- Raider boats vide active and sustained presence. Dispersed but conducting interconnected, these assets are key to surveil- demonstration. Operational data passes to maritime intelli- lance and detection. A flow of tactical and opera- gence fusion centers (MIFCs), one on each coast. tional data exists between deployed deepwater el- Their role is to collect, fuse, and analyze all- ements and MIFCs, each dependent on the other source intelligence and operational data and pro- for force-wide situational awareness to determine vide it to the Coast Guard in its areas of responsi- if events warrant a response. bility to build common situational awareness. Surveillance of immense maritime regions, a Presence prerequisite for general and total awareness, de- The Coast Guard seeks to eliminate threats mands a range of national, shared, and service- early—at the source, either in international or specific space-based, air, surface, undersea, and U.S. territorial waters. Attacking problems at the land-based sensors and platforms. The optimal source involves mobile training teams, marine combination of systems reflects a balance between safety offices overseas, foreign officers training in economy and effectiveness. Leveraging informa- service schools, foreign naval and coast guard ex- tion and intelligence assets of other agencies helps ercises, and multinational bodies such as the In- ternational Maritime Organization.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 97 ■ MARITIME SECURITY

Active presence embodies and displays U.S. au- thority and resolve but is broadly acceptable be- cause of the service’s reputation as a military, law enforcement, and humanitarian force. Dynamic Positioning The Coast Guard does not maintain a con- stant presence in every deepwater area. Instead it relies on dynamic maritime positioning based on intelligence and cuing. Just as police forces field their heaviest presence in high-crime areas, the bulk of deepwater presence is deployed in areas that most threaten maritime security. Intelligence and cuing, when combined with advanced com- mand, control, communications, computers, in- telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), add to deployed, highly mobile assets that place forces in the right place at the right time. Overall awareness of maritime events guides dynamic positioning. Combining all sources of in- telligence, including historical knowledge of trends in threats and real-time surveillance data, the Coast Guard can shift efforts and forces between areas. This requires highly mobile assets and flexi- ble command, control, and logistics systems. Forward-patrolling forces will generally re- spond to an event. They may be reinforced in re- sponse to larger contingencies or to conduct co- ordinated campaigns. Standoff Maritime Tactics The capabilities of planned deepwater re- placement forces must be increased. By exploiting cutting edge technologies and the speed, range, U.S. Coast Guard (StephenU.S. Coast Guard J. Baker) and endurance of both armed helicopters and Coast Guard Cutter over-the-horizon, rigid-hull-inflatable-boats Albacore off Virginia (OTH–RHIBs), it can generate standoff opera- Beach. Pursuing security at sea cannot be exclusively tional assets that far exceed the capabilities of reactive. As noted in The National Oceans Confer- those available today. ence Report: America’s Ocean Future, “International Because of advances in technology and oper- maritime criminal ac- ational doctrine, it is no longer necessary to put armed helicopters and OTH–RHIBs tivities pose clear cutters alongside surface vessels to conduct a mis- threats to our borders, sion from start to finish. Instead a major cutter can generate standoff operational our economy, our en- with armed helicopters or OTH–RHIBs can quickly assets that far exceed those vironment, and our make contact with ships within eyesight or 100 national security and nautical miles away, depending on weather and available today require strong off- tactical scenarios. With such means for delivering shore law enforce- boarding teams, the role of cutters is reduced in ment.” The Coast Guard attempts to initially ad- the active portion of a law enforcement mission, dress threats abroad. Failing that, it depends on providing true standoff capability for a quantum intelligence and surveillance and on the deploy- change in flexibility and usefulness. ment of forces to deter, contain, or respond before Development of robust, integrated standoff a danger reaches our shores. Consequently, the capabilities also will require the Coast Guard to service maintains an active and sustained presence organize its forces into multimission maritime ac- in domestic and international waters where the tion units (MAUs). These units would maintain fo- United States has vital interests. They will act as a cused awareness within 200 nautical miles of a de- highly visible deterrent and rapid response force. ployed cutter and influence events in that area. The air and boat assets deployed as well as the dedicated MPA would act as extensions of cutter

98 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Stubbs

migration is involved, commanders may initiate these activities and surge added Coast Guard mar- itime action units and other forces. The assets re- inforce the on-scene units or sustain an active presence in areas vacated by other MAUs. Once forces are committed, operating and supporting commands as well as elements from other services have access to a distributed com- mon operational picture. Coast Guard headquar- ters and other Federal agencies can also access per- tinent data, helping build situational awareness across commands, echelons, and organizations 24 hours a day, every day. On-station maritime action units get tasking and information from commanders. They also re- ceive from and provide data to the center, Coast Guard units, and DOD or other force providers. A unit responds to potential or actual maritime U.S. Coast Guard (RobinU.S. Coast Guard Ressler) events as directed by an operational commander Boarding fishing or the judgment of a major cutter commanding vessel in North officer (or commander of a multicutter task unit), Atlantic. sensors and weapons. Units would establish a ro- who is acting within the limits of standing or- bust C4ISR system to receive, evaluate, and act on ders. Tactically, individual units retain command information obtained by cutter-deployed and sup- authority, but they have access to a range of in- porting assets. Aircraft, OTH–RHIBs, and maritime formation. Hence, although a unit may be the mission teams would transfer video and data for only presence in a given area, it is not isolated rapid analysis and decision. Cutters would ex- from intelligence flows and assistance from change tactical data via voice and data-link chan- higher commands. nels. MIFC on each coast would aid units by pro- A maritime action unit relies on sensors viding tailored offboard intelligence while the aboard its boats and aircraft and assigned MPA, as major cutter would pass operational data back to well as data generated offboard, to build tactical MIFC. Data shared with other agencies would be situational awareness. Once committed to prose- fused into the overall MAU tactical picture. cuting a contact, it fuses operational and tactical data to generate total maritime awareness of the Putting It Together area, including classification and identification of Commanders determine the type and level both threats and legitimate contacts and activities. of Coast Guard presence and response capability The nature of the prosecution phase is deter- needed in their areas of responsibility. Matching mined by the mission and particular situation. forces with operational demands, they apportion The object of MAU efforts can be people in the forces to subordinate commands during periodic water or escaping drug-laden boats. Consequently scheduling conferences. the maritime action unit must tailor its operations On the operational level, surveillance and to the task at hand. The major cutter acts as the detection of threats are conducted in several C4ISR interface with other forces and sometimes ways. MIFCs may analyze intelligence and infor- supports operations with its embarked assets. mation from numerous sources and detect a Finally, once the situation has been resolved, threatening trend, such as increased smuggler, the unit is ready for immediate retasking. By dint alien migrant, or illegal fishing traffic. Con- of training and multimission equipment, it can versely, the centers may receive reports of a spe- redeploy to any new assignment. cific activity from deployed Coast Guard mar- itime action units, patrol aircraft, other forces or The unique instrument of national power agencies, ship manifests, private individuals, or contributed by the Coast Guard that upholds commercial ships. In both cases, the intelligence maritime security is focused on awareness, active centers update their situational awareness. and sustained presence, dynamic positioning, To counter an adverse long-term trend, com- and standoff tactics. It doesn’t depend on exotic manders may react to increased threats by the new technologies, but rather on efficiently ex- allocation of MAUs or MPAs to conduct additional ploiting capabilities that are present or on the surveillance, deter activity, or rapidly respond to horizon, both inside and outside the service. JFQ incidents. If a major emergency like mass

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 99 ■

Pre-deployment view of defense support payload.

Space Warfare

Meets NASA Information Warfare By GORDON D. ISSLER

peration Desert Storm has been pro- Coalition forces gained an edge with superior in- claimed as the first space war. Because telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets the ability of the United States to oper- and effective operational security and deception O ate in space was not challenged, there activities. This superiority enabled the coalition to was no battle for space superiority. However there mask its true intentions and convince the Iraqis was a contest for information superiority. Both that an amphibious operation was forthcoming sides conducted surveillance and reconnaissance even as forces moved in place for the left hook operations to gather and exploit information. maneuver that caught the enemy by surprise. Information warfare has been a central ele- ment of military operations for the Armed Forces Major Gordon D. Issler, USAF, serves in the Intelligence, Surveillance, since the Persian Gulf War. Defensive and offen- and Reconnaissance Directorate at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, and sive information operations are conducted to gain also has been assigned to U.S. Space Command. information superiority over an enemy. With the

100 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Issler

Until legal, political, and technical con- straints on the weaponization of space are over- come, operations should be focused on fostering the objective of gaining and maintaining superi- ority in the information campaign. This article examines the merger of these areas to produce a synergistic effect on the operational level. Space Operations The doctrinal void for military space opera- tions should be filled by Joint Publication 3-14, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Opera- tions. When approved this pub will provide an overview of missions conducted by military space forces, establish procedures for their support to the warfighter, and identify space forces that are deployed in the theater. It covers four primary missions: space support operations, force en- hancement, space control, and force application. Two of these areas are well known to warfighters while the other two are not fully developed. Sup- port operations include spacelift, satellite com- mand and control, and surveillance and deconflic- MEU Combat Camera (Branden P. O’Brien) MEU Combat Camera (Branden P.

th tion of space systems which provide capabilities to 13 execute space operations. Force enhancement in- Communicating with cludes reconnaissance and surveillance, environ- USS Tarawa, East mental monitoring, communications, imagery Timor. increasing importance of achieving information and global geospatial information and services, dominance, the role of space has become promi- and positioning—delivering spacepower to joint nent. As the Secretary of Defense has reported: forces in the form of awareness. The support provided by space forces significantly re- Control consists of surveillance, protection, duces the fog, friction, and uncertainty of warfare. prevention, negation, and ensuring the friendly Joint forces can rapidly see, hear, and exploit the envi- use of space while denying it to an enemy. This ronment when space forces are properly integrated mission area is restrained by earlier decisions not into the joint plan. This results in improved situa- to weaponize space as well as budgetary and tech- tional awareness, reduced response time, and a con- nical limits. In addition, a plethora of commercial siderably more transparent battlespace, which pro- satellites that provide remote sensing, imagery, vides the [joint force commander (JFC)] dominant and communications services to potential ene- battlespace awareness. mies complicates space control negation. The force application mission is focused on weapons Given the importance of space to information op- that pass through space, such as intercontinental erations, the next conflict may include a space war ballistic missiles. Since space control and force ap- in the face of efforts to diminish U.S. advantages. plication have not matured as warfighting capa- Recent decisions indicate that DOD leaders bilities, efforts must be directed to space support regard space operations as inextricably linked to and force enhancement to expand the current information operations. Changes in the unified U.S. information advantage. command plan assigned increasing responsibili- Joint Pub 3-14 offers direction for planning ties for information operations to U.S. Space space support to operational level warfare by Command (SPACECOM). It assumed responsibil- joint task forces (JTFs). Unfortunately, it adopts a ity for the military computer network defense construct that synchronizes forces rather than in- mission, and command and control of the Joint tegrating information throughout JTF. Information Operations Center (formerly known as the Joint Command and Control Warfare Cen- A supported CINC/JFC)/JTF commander should desig- ter) in October 1999 and for the military com- nate a coordinating authority for space operations puter network attack mission in October 2000. under the JFC (for example, the [joint force air com- ponent commander]). In this position, the desig- nated coordinating authority will coordinate space support on behalf of all commanders in theater in support of the JFC’s objectives and act in the capacity

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 101 ■ SPACE WARFARE

Positioning satellite communications, Kosovo. Signal Company (Eric Hughes) th 55

Combat direction center aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt, Allied Force. U.S. Navy (Donne McKissic)

of “supported commander” for space with primary re- If a component needs intelligence, it goes to sponsibility in theater for joint space operations plan- the JTF (J-2), and the intelligence community de- ning purposes. To ensure prompt and timely support, termines the appropriate system to task for the CINCSPACE may authorize direct liaison authorized desired information. If a component needs added between the coordinating authority and service com- communications capacity, it goes to the JTF (J-6), ponents of SPACECOM. and the communications community determines On the operational level, however, space ac- the appropriate system. There are synergistic ef- tivities differ from those on land, at sea, or in the fects within these functional communities. air because their effects are unique; providing in- Joint Pub 3-14 goes on to discuss the space formation while not deploying forces in theater forces that deploy in theater to support a JTF. that must be synchronized “[SPACECOM] deploys task-organized [joint space space provides key commun- or deconflicted. Space-de- support teams (JSSTs)] operational control to the JFC/JTF commander to facilitate tasking and use ications, intelligence, weather, rived information should be integrated in JTFs across of joint space forces, provide space-derived infor- warning, and navigation functional lines. Space pro- mation, and ensure space support is provided to the combatant commander.” This appears to du- information vides key communications, intelligence, weather, plicate or even contradict earlier identification of warning, and navigation a “coordinating authority for space operations.” information even though it is not the end-all, be- The draft publication also recognizes the capabil- all for any functional area. Although it is a critical ity of component space support teams that de- battlefield operating system, the Armed Forces ploy to support service components of JTFs. Addi- fight with a system of systems; it must be inte- tional deployable support teams such as the grated with other systems, and not organized sepa- National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) and rately in order to achieve superiority in command, the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) control, communications, intelligence, navigation, team are also considered to be complementary to and information processing. efforts by space support teams. But such teams are only stopgap measures. Current missions and

102 JFQ / Autumn 2000 Issler

Titan II lifting off, measures, deception activities, psychological op- Vandenberg Air Force erations, , physical destruction, Base. special information operations, and perhaps com- puter network attack. Defensive operations integrate and coordinate policies, procedures, operations, people, and tech- nology to protect information and information systems. Activities include counterdeception, counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special operations, employing both lethal and nonlethal means. For effective integration in a joint force, commanders organize an information operations cell. JFCs typically assign the responsibility to staff members, usually the operations officer (J-3). The composition of the cell is mission dependent, but it retains the central responsibility of crafting a coherent strategy aimed at contributing to JFC objectives. This strategy is developed on the JTF level, then disseminated to components for de- tailed planning and decentralized execution. The cell chief normally functions as a member of the Joint Target Coordination Board and also partici- pates in developing the joint integrated priori- U.S. Air Force (Jennifer C. Wallis) U.S. Air Force tized target list. Joint Pub 3-13 identifies the joint activities and defense agencies that can support JTFs through the cell, including the Joint Warfare doctrinal guidance are not sufficiently balanced Analysis Center, Joint Communications Security or mature to facilitate the integration of space Monitoring Agency, National Security Agency, and information operations. Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Infor- Information Management mation Systems Agency. Moreover, JTFs are sup- ported by a JIOC support team that deploys in- Although space concepts are not well devel- theater and typically is integrated in the oped, concepts for information operations have information operations cell. The center is the pri- matured rapidly. Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for mary agency for support of combatant com- Information Operations, mands with joint information operations and as- provides an overview CINCSPACE should retain com- sists in planning, coordinating, and executing of information mis- information operations worldwide. batant command and operational sions conducted by control of military space forces joint forces, an organi- Integrated Operations zational construct for To facilitate information operations, CINC- JTF information opera- SPACE should retain combatant command and tions, and a planning methodology to integrate operational control of military space forces sup- such activities into joint campaigns. porting JTFs that operate in wartime locales (or- The Armed Forces conduct information oper- bits) each day with a global view. Space capabili- ations to maintain superiority and operate inside ties must be deployed in a theater or an enemy observe, orient, decide, and act synchronized with other theater assets. They are (OODA) loop. A coherent strategy directs offen- global and hence, to optimize capabilities, they sive and defensive information operations toward should be managed on the strategic level by a sin- JFC objectives. Offensive operations integrate gle functional component commander. In addi- both assigned and supporting capabilities and ac- tion, space supremacy is not a viable objective on tivities, supported by intelligence, to affect the operational level, just as the effort to com- enemy decisions and promote specific objectives. pletely deny enemy access to space is prohibitive. Actions attempt to degrade, disrupt, or destroy in- Strategic offensive and defensive considerations formation and information systems through the are beyond the level of the operational com- coordinated employment of operational security mander. Moreover, because the SPACECOM mis- sion includes computer network defense, com- puter network attack, and JIOC operational control, it is logical to take the integration of

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 103 ■ SPACE WARFARE

Analysts testing command post, Roving Sands ’00. Combat Camera Squadron (JimCombat Camera Squadron Varhegyi) st 1

space and information operations to the next order of battle to include commercial assets, proj- level. CINCSPACE should merge JIOC support ects when they will pass over friendly forces, and teams and JSST and integrate space support into determines the kind of information provided. JTF operations via the information operations Armed with this knowledge, plans can be devel- cell. Space operations can be organized in this oped for defensive and offensive information op- way because it is not necessary to deploy large erations to mask JFC intentions. The space con- forces in theater. Their assets are already deployed trol mission of negation is actually an offensive and providing information from on-orbit loca- information operation (attack), because current tions. The limited space forces that deploy in a space systems are information systems. theater should integrate into the information op- erations cells on JTF and component levels and Space support must be integrated into plan- facilitate identification of realistic information re- ning for information operations and coordinated quirements. These personnel can communicate through information cells. Establishing a single JTF needs to SPACECOM, which then plans tai- authority for coordinating support and placing it lored space operations (as a supporting com- within a component degrades the synergism of mand) to provide information. integrating space and information on the opera- Planning space support for JTFs should be tional level. Assigning JIOC and computer net- eliminated from annex N (space operations) and work defense and attack missions to SPACECOM integrated into the information operations plan should contribute to integrating and merging in the basic plan and in annex C (operations). joint space support teams with JIOC support This would provide increased visibility for space teams and create joint information superiority operations and ensure that both space and infor- teams. These teams should train and exercise to mation operations are seen as integral to the deploy in support of JTFs and provide expertise joint campaign plan rather than included in a for the information operations cell. In addition, separate annex. Integrating space operations in a the separate annex for space operations must be joint campaign via the information operations eliminated. Planning for space support to JTFs cell can produce synergistic effects that will en- must be integrated with information operations able information superiority and dominant bat- planning and inserted in the operations annex of tlespace knowledge. the campaign plan. JFQ The elements of surveillance, prevention, protection, and negation can be integrated as part of the information operations campaign. The sur- veillance of space objects identifies enemy space

104 JFQ / Autumn 2000 OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN ■

General Joseph Lawton Collins (1896–1987) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

VITA orn in New Orleans, Louisiana; graduated from Military Academy (1917); infantry school of arms and regimen- tal service (1917–19); commanded 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, in France (1919); assistant chief of staff, American Forces, Germany (1920–21); instructor at West Point (1921–25); company officer course, infantry school (1926); school (1927); instructor, infantry school (1927–31); executive officer, 23d Brigade, BManila, and assistant chief of staff, Philippine Division (1933–34); completed Army Industrial College (1937); student and instructor, Army War College (1937–40); chief of staff, VII Corps (1941); chief of staff, Hawaiian Department (1941–42); commanded 25th Infantry Division on Oahu and at Guadalcanal (1942–43); commanded VII Corps, Normandy and during European campaigns (1944–45); deputy commander in chief of staff, Army Ground Forces (1945); chief of public information (1945–47); deputy chief and vice chief of staff, U.S. Army (1947–49); Portrait by chief of staff, U.S. Army (1949–53); U.S. representative Lloyd Bowers Embrey. to military committee and standing group of NATO (1953–54); special representative to Vietnam with rank of ambassador (1954–55); returned to NATO assignment (1955–56); died in Washington, D.C.

The question arises periodically as to what a Chief of Staff should do if, in all conscience, he cannot support the budget or other policy decisions of the President or the Secretary of Defense. In such a case he is entitled by law to appeal directly to the President, over the head of the Secretary, if necessary. I believe that in loyalty to the President as Commander in Chief, a Chief of Staff should support the President’s programs unless, in a crisis, a chief is convinced that the security of the country is at stake, in which instance he should ask to be relieved. I came close to such a point shortly after the outbreak of the when I felt impelled to inform Secretary Louis Johnson at an Armed Forces Policy Meeting that I would be unable to accept any further cuts in the number of active divisions in the Army. If the Korean War had not intervened I might well have been relieved or forced to resign. — From Lightning Joe: An Autobiography U.S. Army Center of

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 105 ■ THE JOINT WORLD

Intelligence Center (NMJIC), theater and Airfields; and Suppression of Enemy Air Doctrine joint intelligence centers, and joint intel- Defenses [find these as well as other ligence support elements in the field dur- related titles on the ALSA Web site at FORCE MULTIPLIER ing Desert Storm and Joint Endeavor. http://www.dtic.mil/alsa]. JFQ Current intelligence doctrine Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for reflects the technology of the late 1990s. Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, pro- The need to support JFCs in visualizing Lessons Learned vides an overview of intelligence support battlefields and gaining information for joint operations. Unlike an earlier superiority is crucial in military opera- version that appeared in 1995, designed GROUND ZERO tions. Doctrinal precepts, particularly as a stand-alone volume, the new pub those related to joint intelligence archi- The Joint Warfighting Center relegates many details to supporting doc- tecture, have been adapted to a high-tech (JWFC) was established in 1994 while the uments. But the key themes remain and environment. Technology in turn pro- Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), permeate the discussion, advising joint vides a new dimension to intelligence one of its elements, became operational force commanders on the qualities of operations. For example, Task Force J-2 in 1998. The JCLL mission is to collect, intelligence and maximizing its contribu- has been able to request support from analyze, and distribute lessons learned, tions. At the same time the pub stresses service intelligence centers and those issues, and observations from operations, that JFCs must bring intelligence staffs outside a theater of operations. But with training events, and other sources to into both decisionmaking and planning virtual capabilities, including video tele- enhance and inter- processes from the outset of an opera- conferencing and other electronic media, operability of joint forces. Thus JCLL tion. Above all, intelligence (J-2) and such a federated effort can operate more addresses issues including methodology operations (J-3) staffs must work together effectively in real time. for collecting lessons (such as joint after to ensure that mission objectives and One vital aspect of the architecture action reports), representing these les- strategy established by JFCs can be imple- is the capability for communications and sons in a database (such as unclassified mented effectively. data transfer. The need for real-time lessons on the Internet and classified les- Joint Pub 2-0 outlines both the sup- information and analysis has made the sons on SIPRNET), publicizing informa- port intelligence offers and the role it can multimedia-capable joint worldwide tion on JCLL to promote lesson sharing play in military operations. The pub pres- intelligence communications system (such as those activities published in ents a conceptual model of the intelli- (JWICS) the standard mode of transmis- JCLL bulletins), and technologies for les- gence process, although part of the sion of sensitive and compartmented sons learned processes. description of various phases of the intel- intelligence as well as other data. Though The joint after-action reports data- ligence cycle is prescriptive rather than there are still elements with incompati- base was developed for the joint real life. While dissemination of intelli- ble computers, all echelons of a theater warfighting community. When alerted gence to senior consumers works well, it command structure can talk to counter- for a contingency, U.S. forces can consult reaches various echelons in the field less parts in other theaters or Washington on the data for lessons learned from previ- smoothly. The challenge for timeliness any level of classification. For instance, ous operations. Currently there are 1,900 remains, particularly on the tactical level. during operations in Haiti, the President active lessons in the JCLL database. The need for flexibility by intelli- used video teleconferencing in NMJIC to For more information, write to: gence staffs is emphasized. Interaction of speak with the various commanders. Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Com- various phases of intelligence can disrupt Joint Pub 2-0 should not only be mand, ATTN: JWFC (Code JW4000), 116 the normal sequence; and urgency can required reading for J-2 staffs and other Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, Virginia dictate the complete omission of some members of the intelligence community, 23435–2697; Fax at (757) 686–6057; or phases. Joint Pub 2-0 treats the responsi- but also for joint commanders and their send e-mail to [email protected]; or via bilities and tasks of intelligence on the staffs. Military consumers should under- the Internet at http://www.jwfc.jfcom. strategic, operational, and tactical levels. stand how to make intelligence work for mil/dodnato/jcll/. JFQ Again the flexibility and requirements for them. JFCs must drive intelligence, early J-2 participation in planning and which remains an indispensable ingredi- decisionmaking is highlighted. Joint History ent in their calculations. JFQ intelligence also is presented as an inte- gral part of an overall command, control, KOREAN WAR communications, computers, and intelli- gence structure which enables an unbro- ALSA PUBLICATIONS The Air Force Historical Foundation and Air Force Historian will host a sym- ken flow of information among national, The Air Land Sea Application Center theater, and field intelligence agencies. It posium on “Coalition Air Warfare in the (ALSA) is tasked to develop multiservice Korean War” on October 17–18, 2001, in provides a seamless integration of the tactics, techniques, and procedures to decisionmaking cycle with all intelli- Washington. For more details, write the facilitate joint information exchange and Air Force Historian, ATTN: AFHSO, 200 gence phases to ensure access by com- operational solutions across the entire manders to the latest data. Recognition McChord Street (Bldg. 94), Bolling Air military spectrum, meeting the needs of Force Base, Washington, D.C. 20332– of requirements to synchronize these warfighters. The following publications efforts underscores the need for collabo- 1111 or send e-mail to JacobNeufeld@ recently appeared: Bomber Maritime Oper- Pentagon.af.mil. JFQ ration between operators and intelligence ations; Multiservice Procedures for Integrated officers. This precisely designed architec- Combat Airspace Command and Control; ture facilitated the performance of organ- Introduction to Tactical Digital Information izations including the Defense Intelli- Link J and Quick Reference Guide; MTTP for gence Agency, National Military Joint NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports,

106 JFQ / Autumn 2000 OFF THE SHELF ■

problem with this reasoning is that China in 1870–71 and military prospects today Invitation to the is credited with technological capacities is hardly compelling: America as an which seem exaggerated, at least in view island is far more reminiscent Revolution of a tendency to downplay European of imperial Britain after Waterloo. potential. The nations of Europe have a Finally, Owens justifies support for A Book Review by combined gross domestic product several the revolution in military affairs by argu- FRANÇOIS L.J. HEISBOURG times larger than China’s and a level of ing that it will challenge “hoary dictums” defense spending more than twice as on the fog and friction of war. Without Lifting the Fog of War large. Yet Europe—second only to Amer- question, emerging technology increases by William A. Owens with Ed Offley ica in the use of information technol- the scope and depth of battlespace vision. New York: Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, ogy—is given short shrift, whereas China And there is no doubt that the United 2000. is credited with extraordinary RMA States is uniquely placed to attain battle- 256 pp. $25.00 potential. This doesn’t mean that there space superiority. But an enemy can be [ISBN: 0–374–18627–8] isn’t a significant gap in military capabili- relied upon not to cooperate: what can be ties between the United States and Europe hidden will be hidden; what can be made or that China won’t become an ever ambiguous will be made ambiguous. The n an otherwise convincing case for greater regional power that may act in an Israelis had excellent intelligence on Ireshaping the Armed Forces through a inimical manner. But unless it were inor- Egyptian dispositions on the eve of the revolution in military affairs (RMA), dinately careless, Washington should Yom Kippur War in 1973; and the William Owens invokes three arguments remain well ahead of Beijing in the RMA buildup of Iraqi forces along the border that do not entirely pass muster. First, he race, given the latter’s vast accumulation with Kuwait did not go unnoticed in claims the U.S. military is faced by of low-tech legacy systems and a highly 1990, especially because a typical system “imminent” and “general” collapse hierarchical communist leadership, fac- of systems aspect of technology (a - because of the gap between current levels tors which are clearly not RMA-friendly. bearing aerostat) was actually being tested of funding and the block obsolescence of The second problem is that the in Kuwait as Iraq invaded. Indeed, an weapon systems procured in the Reagan United States may learn, as Britain did immediate effect of RMA technology is years. But he points out elsewhere in between 1815 and 1914, that what putting constraints on warfighting: thus Lifting the Fog of War that America appears as a relatively brief strategic pause collateral damage in general, blue-on-blue accounts for a third of all defense spend- may actually be a lasting phenomenon. casualties in particular, and targeting ing around the world, more than during Owens rightly criticizes limited attempts errors have become unacceptable because most of the Cold War. Indeed, the United at military reform during the first half of they can’t be blamed on technological States and its allies in Europe and Asia the 1990s, which posited a fairly rapid limits. By comparison, anti-American command two-thirds of global expendi- reconstitution of Russian military capabil- crowds did not take to the streets in tures on defense, and most other coun- ities, but he may be making the same Gaullist France when its ambassador was tries are neither actual nor potential mistake by focusing on a medium-term killed and its embassy was bombed in adversaries. So notwithstanding the Chinese surge. The United States has Hanoi by American planes: such collateral problems that the end of the Reagan been used to dealing with a single major damage was accepted as a misfortune of buildup will undoubtedly spark, the sig- enemy, the Axis, then the Warsaw Pact. It war. Greater battlespace awareness creates nificant amount of available resources doesn’t follow that the post-Cold War era new standards of conduct, an evolution does not make a prima facie case for a is simply a waiting period to recast the that one can only welcome—but which revolutionary treatment. Indeed many 1941–90 paradigm: we are as likely to face introduces new friction. would argue, as Owens does occasionally, a long period with multiple risks. The par- that American resource needs could be allel drawn by Owens between the col- greatly reduced through a change of lapse of France in its race against Prussia strategy rather than technological means. He complains in particular about an excessive number of open-ended military commitments during the Clinton years. Admiral Owens, a former Vice Lifting the Fog of War Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the subject of a recent JFQ book lecture by also justifies an all-out RMA through his expectation that China will become a the author which was held at the National peer competitor of the United States by 2010–2015. He considers the quarter cen- Defense University on June 7, 2000, and tury between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as a strategic televised by C-SPAN [see videotape 157710]. pause which must put to good use via a revolution in military affairs. The first

Missing an issue? Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limited François L.J. Heisbourg is chairman of the Geneva Center for Security Policy and vice quantities to both members of the Armed Forces and to public institutions. Please send chairman of the council of the International requests to the Editor at the address or FAX number listed on the masthead. Institute for Strategic Studies.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 107 ■ OFF THE SHELF

But this criticism carries very little War II, the book has a chapter on the weight in light of bottom line in Lifting WINNING THE revolution in military affairs that the Fog of War. The revolution is going to occurred in the aftermath of the Great happen one way or another. Indeed, this GOOD WAR War. Innovation and experimentation is the major justification for going down prepared the belligerents in varying A Book Review by the RMA road, in the same way that over degrees for restoring mobility to the bat- the last two centuries only militaries COLE C. KINGSEED tlefield. By 1939 tactical refinements which integrated the tools of the indus- gave German troops an initial advantage, trial revolution had a chance of prevail- A War to be Won: which their leaders subsequently squan- ing. Revolution has become a necessary Fighting the Second World War dered because of an inability to grasp the condition of proficiency, whatever the strategic balance between means and by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett strategic context; by restoring maneuver Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap ends. Meanwhile, the Allies embarked on warfare versus attrition, it is well suited Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. war mentally and physically unprepared. to a volatile environment which 656 pp. $35.00 For the balance of their analysis, demands flexibility and mobility. [ISBN: 0–674–00163–x] Murray and Millett focus on geographic Because it is built around pervasive, theaters and make a significant contribu- close-to-real time command, control, tion to an understanding of World War communications, computers, intelli- ith more than 4,000 titles on II. In considering the German gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, WWorld War II currently in print, of France in 1940, for example, they con- the revolution in military affairs calls for why is another general history of the clude that the success of the Wehrmacht jointness on all levels. Owens is at his 20th century’s greatest conflict necessary? did not rest upon operational doctrine best in discussing joint matters. This Williamson Murray and Allan Millett developed because of defeat in World should be mandatory reading for all answer that question with A War to Be War I. Rather it resulted from intelligent thinking members of the defense com- Won: Fighting the Second World War, a maturation of doctrine from 1917 to the munity. By emphasizing the organiza- book that is likely to become the defini- Polish campaign. German capabilities tional and cultural aspects of reform, he tive single-volume account of military were evolutionary, not revolutionary. points out that RMA is unquestionably a operations from 1939 to 1942. Having The unifying theme was a coherent com- revolution in military affairs, not simply a previously edited a series of works that bined-arms approach to modern war. revolution in technology. It is regrettable advanced scholarship on military affairs Another aspect of this book is its that he does not consider the state of in the 20th century—Military Effectiveness balance; the Pacific Theater receives affairs in allied militaries. Lessons can be (New York: Routledge, 1988–89); attention equal to that given to Europe. drawn from the Joint Chief of Defence Calculations: Net Assessment and the According to the authors, Midway repre- Staff in Britain, longstanding British and Coming of World War II (New York: Free sented the high-water mark in Japanese French reliance on joint procurement Press, 1992); and Military Innovation in the expansion but not a shift in the strategy structures, and movement toward joint Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge of seize-and-hold. Japan still possessed professional military education. Such University Press, 1996)—Murray and advantages over the United States, but its comparisons would be useful in address- Millett are two of this country’s premier high command temporarily lost the ini- ing one American handicap vis-à-vis military historians. Their latest collabora- tiative. By 1944 dependency on oil RMA: if the United States enjoys the tion is a balanced assessment of opera- spelled disaster as American submarines unique advantage of global stature, it tional aspects of the war, from its roots to sank an increasing number of enemy incurs the corresponding drawback of an epilogue which analyzes the conflict merchant ships. With defeat inevitable, large force structures and organizations in retrospect. Imperial headquarters transferred the best that find it hard to keep abreast of tech- The authors trace the origin of the army units and commanders from China nological change as exemplified by war beginning with the rise of fascism. and elsewhere to the inner defenses of Moore’s law (the doubling of processing After concluding that by late August Fortress Japan. The tenacity of enemy capability every 18 months). Finding the 1939 the strategic balance had swung defenders on Iwo Jima and Okinawa con- optimum balance between centralization significantly against the Western Allies, vinced Truman and his advisors that the (without which jointness won’t happen) Murray and Millett opine that the long atomic bomb was a legitimate weapon to and delegation of authority (a condition road to September 1, 1939, was paved terminate the conflict. for flexibility) will be key to the Ameri- with good intentions, which were not If the intent of the authors is to can revolution in military affairs. enough in the world of Hitler and Stalin. challenge historical conventions, they Since most military operations after By the time Germany attacked Poland, succeed. Nowhere is this approach more the Cold War have involved coalitions, only cold steel could defend Western evident than in their assessment of those there must not only be jointness within interests and aspirations. Half a world commanders who waged the war. Of national militaries, but interoperability away the drama was simultaneously particular interest is Omar Bradley, among allies and coalition partners. unfolding as Japan embarked on a war whom they describe as the most over- Owens does not go into detail on the freer of conquest. rated American general of the war. Mark flow of technology among allies, which is To illuminate the tactical and tech- Clark, Simon Bolivar Buckner, and peripheral to his main theme. But as a nological adaptations leading to World Douglas MacArthur also fare poorly, as European, this reviewer can only hope does Chester Nimitz, whom Millett and that, given his professional experience, he Murray characterize as very cautious. will find an opportunity in the future to Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, USA, teaches Dwight Eisenhower gets high marks for focus on the inter-allied implications of history at the U.S. Military Academy and is managing the generals under his com- the revolution in military affairs. JFQ the author of Eisenhower and the mand, as “fractious and dysfunctional a of 1956. group of egomaniacs as any war had ever

108 JFQ / Autumn 2000 OFF THE SHELF ■

Unloading British vehicles on D–Day. CHANGING THE GUARD IN LATIN AMERICA A Review Essay by FREDERICK M. NUNN

ver the past half century the United OStates has viewed Latin American militaries mainly in relation to its own national agenda and values. The empha- sis must now change to a nonideological study of professional military institutions in transition. To share expertise and enhance cooperation Washington must appreciate these dynamic organizations on their own terms. Systematic study of the political role of militaries in Latin America began dur- ing the 1950s. Policy-oriented writing was regional rather than national in scope and laced with Cold War issues. Of cen- tral interest was an inclination by officers to intervene in politics. Some observers National Archives regarded this military political activism as originating in Cold War policies formu- lated in Washington. Still others viewed it seen.” Among the senior commanders, outstanding capabilities in deception, as emerging from or socioe- George Patton emerges as the most com- planning, and conducting operations. conomic factors that presaged a capitalist- petent and the only one who under- In the final analysis, Murray and communist confrontation in the region, stood the use of Allied ground mobility Millett have produced a superlative, an idea that Edwin Lieuwen developed in to exploit enemy tactical and opera- balanced operational history of World Arms and Politics in Latin America, which tional weaknesses. War II. Separate appendices addressing probed controversies surrounding inter- With due respect to other members military operations, the conduct of war, vention by the military in domestic of the Grand Alliance, the authors weapons, and the primary literature of politics. This volume was followed by nonetheless confer the highest accolades the conflict provide additional luster. Generals vs. Presidents: Neo- in to Soviet commanders, who mastered Was the Allied victory worth the Latin America, which Lieuwen published what their own theorists only dreamed of cost? The authors indicate that it was, for four years later. in the 1930s: operations that paralyzed an as A War to Be Won reminds us, the con- In The Military and Society in Latin enemy by striking deeply into rear areas. flict unleashed by Japan in 1937 and America, John Johnson explored cultural The offensive by Soviets in summer of Germany in 1939 came close to destroy- and historical ingredients influencing 1944 completely destroyed the Germans ing the centers of world civilization and domestic military activities. He found an in perhaps the finest operational victory imposing imperial regimes founded on activist military profession as one dimen- of the war. A subsequent offensive into racial superiority, slavery, and genocide. sion of a process of change that would the Balkans was equally impressive, “a The enemies of democracy did not suc- modernize the region. A bolder argument masterful marriage of military operations ceed because of the extraordinary efforts supporting sociocultural cause and effect to the goals of politics and grand strat- and sacrifices made by Allied soldiers, was Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis egy.” Soviet commanders exhibited sailors, marines, and airmen to whom and the Military Coup by José Nun, which this book is dedicated. JFQ offered a class-conflict interpretation of military political activism stemming from its representation of bourgeois interests at the expense of the lower classes. All these works stimulated interest A War to be Won in determining the cause of intervention: was the subject of a recent JFQ book lecture by social origins, dialectics, U.S. influence, the authors which was held at the National or an idiosyncratic strain of militarism? Such questions led students of military Defense University on May 8, 2000, and

televised by C-SPAN [see videotape 156997]. Frederick M. Nunn is visiting professor of history and Latin American studies at the University of Arizona.

Autumn 2000 / JFQ 109 ■ OFF THE SHELF

On close study, military intervention in Arms and Politics in Latin America The Politics of Military Rule in domestic politics resembled participation Brazil, 1964–1985 by Edwin Lieuwen in political processes of nations which New York: Praeger, 1960. by Thomas E. Skidmore were compensating for immature civilian New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Generals vs. Presidents: institutions. That is, the armed forces Neo-Militarism in Latin America Chilean Politics, 1920–1931: were as much part of the sociopolitical world as apart from it. Their actions were by Edwin Lieuwen The Honorable Mission New York: Praeger, 1964. of the Armed Forces like those of a profession with a corpo- rate identity, which while ideally outside by Frederick M. Nunn The Military and Society Albuquerque: University of New Mexico the realm of politics was in practice an in Latin America Press, 1976. integral component of it. by John J. Johnson This research not only produced Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. The Military in Chilean History: more focused case studies but drew on Essays on Civil-Military Relations, both evidence from the region and inter- Latin America: The Hegemonic 1810–1973 national scholarship on civil-military rela- Crisis and the Military Coup by Frederick M. Nunn tions. Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military by José Nun Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Professionalism in South America, Berkeley: Institute of International Press, 1976. 1890–1940, by this reviewer, relied on Studies, University of California, 1969. sources from Latin America and Europe— The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, France, and The Military in Latin American Military Radicals, 1968–1976 Germany—to assess the long-term impact Socio-Political Evolution: by George D.E. Philip of European military missions and Four Case Studies London: The Athlone Press, 1978. exchanges on regional thinking. edited by Lyle N. McAlister Robert Potash produced an authori- Washington: American Institutes Military Reformism and Social tative trilogy between 1969 and 1996 for Research, Center for Research Classes: The Peruvian Experience, entitled The Army and Politics in in Social Systems, 1970. 1968–1980 Argentina. He chronicled the history of by David Booth and Bernardo Sorj army forays into and retreats from the Yesterday’s Soldiers: European New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. arena of politics for the better part of the Military Professionalism in South past century. Political propensities had America, 1890–1940 The Armed Forces and Democracy their origins prior to the arrival of the by Frederick M. Nunn in Latin America United States as a hemispheric power and Lincoln: University of Nebraska by John S. Fitch their consequences are thus of a histori- Press, 1983. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University cal nature. However unsavory, these Press, 1988. actions were part of national historical The Army and Politics in Argentina, and political processes. 1928–1945: From Yrigoyen to The Time of the Generals: Latin The achievement of Alfred Stepan Perón; 1945–1962: From Perón to American Professional Militarism in The Military in Politics: Changing Frondizi; and 1962–1973: in World Perspective Patterns in Brazil was his dissection of From Frondizi’s Fall to the by Frederick M. Nunn various political stances of soldiers in the Peronist Restoration Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, largest and most powerful country in the 1992. by Robert A. Potash region. He showed that what emerged Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 1980, 1996. The Constitution of Tyranny: from the 1964 overthrow of civilian Regimes of Exception in Spanish authority was an institution bent on The Military in Politics: America resolving national problems based on a military ethos. Military leaders and their Changing Patterns in Brazil by Brian Loveman by Alfred C. Stepan Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, civilian allies alike did not look amiably Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. on the form and content of their demo- 1971. cratic system. Thus they held power La Patria: Politics and the Armed until devolution in 1985. Forces in Latin America A few years after civilians regained (Note: Some of titles listed herein are out of print or by Brian Loveman the reins of power, The Politics of Military have been reissued in other editions.) Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1999. Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985, by Thomas Skidmore, confirmed what many students of civil-military relations in the region had deduced. In his research on Brazil, the political nature of professionalism exacer- institutions in Latin America to rethink sociocultural matrix. Their findings chal- bated militaristic tendencies to the point the approach to armed forces and politi- lenged and refined cause-and-effect rela- where militarism (a willingness and cal behavior. Rather than treat activism tionships advanced by Lieuwen and propensity to find solutions to national as a regional phenomenon, some efforts Johnson. One study that revealed such problems based on the military ethos) was shifted to comparative research and case variations was The Military in Latin inseparable from military professionalism studies on soldiers within the national American Socio-Political Evolution: Four Case Studies, edited by Lyle McAlister, on Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

110 JFQ / Autumn 2000 OFF THE SHELF ■

Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America and La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America. These works deal with aspects of relations between military professionals and society. Each is also characterized by synthesis and recog- nizes the uniqueness and comparability of military institutions in the region and elsewhere and evinces interdisciplinary methodology. They explore both the ori- gin of military activism and resurgence of democratic institutions and renewed efforts to reestablish civilian oversight of Ministerial meeting in defense establishments and recast civil- Manaus, Brazil, military relations. October 2000. Today the pages of Latin American DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) military journals contain essays devoted to the realities of the new world order: peacekeeping, internal roles and mis- (the state or condition of being profes- Radicals, 1968–1976, by George Philip, sions, relations with the civil sector, sional in the dictionary sense). and Military Reformism and Social Classes: hemispheric cooperation, narcotics, On the other coast of South Amer- The Peruvian Experience, 1968–1980, by terrorism, and the United States. In some ica, Chile and Peru were also put under David Booth and Bernardo Sorj, both respects the military within the region the microscope. Chilean Politics, 1920– address distinct characteristics of the have better views of their counterparts 1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed 1968–80 experiment with military social- to the North than the reverse, a condi- Forces and The Military in Chilean History: ism. Overlapping the heyday of mili- tion facilitated by Military Review Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810– tarism in Latin America, the early years Hispano-American, the bimonthly Span- 1973, which this reviewer published in of the regime boasted dynamic efforts to ish-language edition of the journal of the 1976, exposed the historical background solve cultural, economic, political, and U.S. Army Command and General Staff of the uprising in 1973. Soldiers have social problems based on priorities estab- College. A Portuguese-language version played critical parts in the foundation lished by soldiers. The professional mili- also appears on a quarterly basis for and development of Chile in the 19th tary uniqueness of Peru was matched Brazilian readers. Conversely, readers in century—as well as repression of dissi- only by its militaristic typicality. the United States need greater access to dence. In 1924 and 1925 the military These works have led to an attempt military literature produced by counter- moved against a faltering, irresponsible to find a new synthesis based on multi- parts in Latin America. Even the transla- government. Led by army officers, a civil- archival sources and multidisciplinary tion of selected articles published in the military coalition forged a new constitu- approaches. Almost three decades after region can provide a window for readers tion and recast the role of government, Lieuwen’s seminal work on military poli- in the Armed Forces without a command demonstrating in retrospect that the tics came The Armed Forces and Democ- of Spanish or Portuguese. It would en- 1973 uprising was not as aberrant as it racy in Latin America by John Fitch, fol- hance the awareness of North Americans first appeared. lowed by The Time of the Generals: Latin and add to common ground for regional Peru is also a noteworthy case. American Professional Militarism in World military cooperation. JFQ The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Perspective by Frederick Nunn and two volumes by Brian Loveman, The

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