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Northcentral University Guerilla Warfare During 1 Running head: Guerilla Warfare During WWI and WWII . Guerilla Warfare During WWI and WWII MSG Albert Crawford United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class 58 SGM Vidakovich 17 Mar 2008 Guerilla Warfare During 2 Abstract An amplification and Comparison of the change in the U.S. Army due to the use of Guerrilla Warfare during World War I and World War II. Illustrating positive and negative factors of the shaping of the U. S. Military due to experiences with the enemy’s use of guerrilla tactics which has caused a considerably change in fighting tactics over the years. Finally, the conclusion will synthesize the insights gained from the analysis of Guerrilla Warfare’s impact on the American military Guerilla Warfare During 3 Thesis During World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) there were numerous instances of guerilla warfare being used both against and by the United Sates Military. These techniques were valuable in the shaping of the military and how we would fight in the future. Outline I. Intro A. Used both by and against U.S B. TTP’s II. World War I A. New outlook B. Future doctorine III. World War II A. Need for small force B. Philippines IV. Impact of Guerrilla Warfare on WWI and WWII A. New doctrine and TTPs B. FM’s Guerilla Warfare During 4 Introduction During World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) there were numerous instances of guerilla warfare being used both against and by the United Sates Military. These techniques were valuable in the shaping of the military and how we would fight in the future. Although the majority of the conflicts involved mostly conventional and trench warfare, there were times when guerilla warfare was used by both sides. Guerilla warfare was used primarily to gain the upper-hand or slow the progress of the opponent, not to win a battle. This method of warfare was originally not considered by U.S. military leaders as a viable option or necessity. But when the enemy has a large advantage and or uses these techniques against us, many times the use of asymmetrical warfare may be the best or only course of action. By design guerilla warfare is carried out by a small number of Soldiers in order to win the hearts and minds of people and to degrade the morale of the enemy using methods such as psychological and industrial warfare. By studying the techniques used by all forces involved in both World Wars, you can see how the United States Military has adopted many of its uses and applied them to our current techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). Our special operations forces in all the branches of the military operate on these TTPs and have proven how valuable this method of warfare is to maintaining control of the battle field. World War I WWI provided the United States Military with a new look on how to conduct military operations. This war was the first time that we had served with so many different foreign armies and the procedures varied dramatically. By fighting as a coalition, U.S. Soldiers got to interact with these other foreign armies and learn about their doctrines. Guerilla Warfare During 5 General Oskar von Hastier of the German army was very successful in his implementation of “infiltration tactics.” This technique involved sending a small force behind enemy lines to disrupt or surprise their adversary while the main force attacked. Originally used by both French and British troops, infiltration tactics were hugely successful and were later adopted and used by U.S. forces during numerous conflicts, including Afghanistan and Iraq. Probably the most notable of those that affected the U.S. Military’s future doctrine was T.E Lawrence. Better known as Lawrence of Arabia, he was a British officer assigned as a liaison to Arab rebels during the war. His mission was to assist the Arab rebels in a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. His irregular methods of warfare were extremely effective and were later documented in a book called “Seven Pillars of Wisdom.” His writings were studied by many military leaders throughout the world including the United States. Many of the TTPs currently used by the U.S. Military’s Special Forces community were derived from writings such as these. World War II When the United States entered WWII there became a need to have a small force that could recon the shore ahead of the main body landing by boat. The navy constructed small ten man teams named the Raiders and Scouts to do just that. These teams were initially responsible for assisting with the landing of amphibious troops. It did not take long before their potential was tested and they began conducting underwater demolition missions against the Japanese and conducted guerilla type operations behind enemy lines in China. Realizing the importance of such an outfit, the Navy later developed Naval Combat Demolition Units (NCDUs). The NCDUs in conjunction with the Raiders and Scouts conducted covert operations in Operation Torch to recapture North Africa, Guerilla Warfare During 6 reconnoitered and cleared the beaches for the Normandy Invasion and numerous other operations throughout the war. The NCDUs later became what is known today as the Navy Seals. Another instance of how the United States used guerilla warfare during WWII is the conflict in the Philippines during 1942. COL Wendell Fertig was placed in charge of all U.S. military operations in the Philippines. With no formal military experience, he gathered a large force consisting of who ever he could find to conduct guerilla operations against the Japanese. His force was able to sustain itself by utilizing captured supplies from the Japanese. They continually conducted operations against them and were able to hold their ground even though they had a substantially smaller force. COL Fertig’s TTPs were later used to assist in the formulation of the Army Special Warfare School. Also in 1942 the United States formed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Following the invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt put all American intelligence sections under one command. He named William J. Donovan, Medal of Honor recipient, OIC of collecting all Information in July of 1941. Donovan’s responsibility as the coordinator of this new agency, the OSS, was to collect and analyze intelligence, and conduct special operations missions, mainly in many of the countries involved in the war overseas. As the war progressed, Major General Donovan eventually recruited and commanded over 12,000 armed forces and civilian OSS agents. OSS operatives also assisted during the 1942 Torch operations in North Africa, supported numerous bombing campaigns in theatre, and conducted many guerilla operations in many countries throughout the European region. The OSS was eliminated in 1945 by President Harry S. Truman but later became the framework for the current U.S. Army Special Forces. Guerilla Warfare During 7 The Impact of Guerrilla Warfare on WWI and WWII The TTPs learned from this type of warfare was later used to write the military’s doctrine on counterinsurgency. Numerous manuals now used by the military were written based on the techniques that were initially learned during this time in history. Just a few of these manuals are; FM 31-20, (Operations against Guerrilla Forces), the Special Forces manual (Counter-Insurgency Operations), and FM 33-5, (Psychological Operations). This knowledge proved useful in the wars that followed. Conclusion Guerilla warfare as with any other type of warfare is an ever evolving process. It was the lessons learned during the two World Wars that set up the framework for how the U.S. Army would react to such endeavors. Although each conflict had it’s own unique characteristics together they led us to where we are today. .
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