The Naval Way of War

Joint Military Operations Department Today’s Purpose • Provide foundation and context for course sessions that follow • Stimulate reflection by • Navy students about your service • All students about your own organizations • U.S. military services • U.S. Civilian agencies • International navies • Provoke seminar discussion of key similarities and differences among the U.S. services, civilian agencies, and international navies • As such, this lecture provides a point of departure for the trimester The Questions • What do navies do? Why? • Where do they do it? • What do they do it with? • What is the US Navy’s organizational culture? What Do Navies Do? Navies are about movement: • Make the sea a highway for “us” allowing us to go where we want and do what we want to do (control) and/or • Make the sea a barrier to “them” preventing them from going where they want and doing what they want to do (denial)

SS Dixie Arrow, sunk by U-71 off Cape Hatteras Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (26 March 1942) (25-27 October 1942) Then, Navies can do these Things

• Strategic movement of troops • Acquiring advanced bases close to the scene of action • Landing armies on a hostile shore • Supporting those armies with logistics and fires • Blockading/denying • Struggling for mastery of the local sea • Striking against operational targets The Okinawa Landing and the “Fleet that Came to Stay” (1 April 1945) • Conducting strategic fires, nuclear and conventional

Frank Uhlig, Jr., How Navies Fight The Search for Constants: Theories of Sea Power

Alfred Thayer Mahan – Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890) • Navies exist to protect friendly commerce; interrupt their enemies’ commerce. • “Command of the sea” achieved and maintained through “decisive” battle between fleets • Commerce raiding only diverts from this vital objective

Jeune Ecole – ADM Théophile Aube (1880-1905) • Focused on sea denial against more powerful navies • Inability to compete in capital ships • Achieved through new technologies: boats, , The Search for Constants: Theories of Sea Power

Julian Corbett – Some Principles of Naval Strategy (1910): • Relation of naval power to national power • Naval warfare differs fundamentally from land warfare • Decisive battle and principle of concentration less relevant at sea • Passage at sea is what matters • Defending lines of communication (LOC) harder at sea than land

Raoul Castex – Théories Stratégiques (5 V., 2500 pp., 1929-1939): • Translated and studied at NWC in the 1930’s • Interested in land-sea conflict • Argued for blending positive sea control and sea denial • “Maneuvering” to confront the leading naval power under favorable conditions • Interservice coordination essential What Else do Navies Do? Cooperative • Port visits/Naval diplomacy • SAR • Combined naval exercises • Humanitarian Assistance/disaster relief • Theater Security Cooperation/partnership building • Law enforcement/counter-piracy/ counter-drug/counter-terror Competitive • FON ops • Deterrence • Sanction enforcement • Show of force/coercive naval diplomacy • counter-choke point denial USS Klakring (FFG-42) Sevastopol 27 March 2011 • NEO • Non-international Armed Conflict (NIAC) • Limited strikes

USS Porter (DDG-78) launches against Syrian Targets, 7 April 2017 Russian DDG and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) 7 June 2019 Navies and Their Capabilities Vary Rank Designation Capabilities Examples Multiple and sustained power projection 1 Global-reach power projection missions globally Limited global-reach power At least one major power projection 2 France, United Kingdom Blue- projection operation globally , India, , water 3 Multi-regional power projection Power projection to regions adjacent its own Russia, Spain , Brazil, Regional Limited range power projection beyond own 4 Germany, , South power projection Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) Coastal defense within and slightly beyond Saudi Arabia, Norway, 5 Regional offshore coastal defense EEZ Israel, Canada, Indonesia Oman, Finland, North 6 Inshore coastal defense Coastal defense confined to inner EEZ Korea Non Maritime policing within and slightly beyond 7 Regional offshore constabulary Mexico, Ireland blue- EEZ water 8 Inshore constabulary Maritime policing confined well within EEZ

9 Inland waterway riverine Riverine defence of landlocked states Bolivia, Paraguay 10 Token navy riverine Very basic constabulary if at all Many worldwide

Todd/Lindberg Approximate Naval Strength Classification System (2019) Major Fleet Actions Are Few and the Time between them tends to be Long

Salamis 450 BC

Yamen 1279 Lepanto 1571 Spanish Armada 1588 Capes 1781 Aboukir Bay 1798 Trafalgar 1805

Yalu River 1894 Battle of Lepanto (1571) Tsushima 1905 Jutland 1916

Coral Sea 1942 Midway June 1942 June 1944 Gulf October 1944 So What?

• Does any U.S. naval officer today know how to fight a fleet? • No U.S. naval officer has fought a fleet action since Leyte Gulf (October 1944) • None have been socialized to the wardroom by any officers who did so fight • Few serving officers have been in combat actions • What’s changed significantly since 1944: • Opponents • Technology: platforms (ships and aircraft), sensors, weapons • Greater potential for effective land force engagement with naval forces in open ocean as well as narrow seas • How do you “get good” at fleet actions under these circumstances? Where do Navies do it?

• Open oceans: Blue • Coastal waters: Green • Inland waters: Brown

• Physical environment • Political, social, economic, legal environment • UNCLOS

The ocean is a body of water occupying about two-thirds of a world made for man – who has no gills. – Ambrose Bierce Some Basics about the Oceans

• Cover 71% of Earth's surface • Contain 97% of Earth's water • Represent 99% of living space on the planet by volume • 40% of Earth’s population lives within 100 km of the ocean • Global market value of marine and coastal resources and industries estimated at $3 trillion/year: 5% of global GDP • 90%+ of global trade carried by sea • Globally 50K+ merchant ships of all tonnages; growing • Global conventional oil reserves 157 billion tons; 26% offshore • Seabed mining is coming…

https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ https://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-1/energy/fossil-fuels/ https://business.un.org/en/entities/13 https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/MaritimeTransport/MerchantFleet.html The Physical Environment: Little Ship, Big Ocean

• Vast: Distance and Time always loom large • Multi-dimensional: surface, subsurface, air, space • Extremely dangerous, volatile, uncertain • Mostly trackless: • Where am I? • Where am I going? • When will I get there? • Where is everybody else? • Where are they going? USS Abercrombie (DE-343) • What are they doing? 306 ft., 1350 tons Navigation • Art of approximation • Reduction of uncertainty and error • Inevitable ambiguity and uncertainty • Every system has weaknesses and vulnerabilities

Navigator in the USS Missouri Charthouse (Summer 1944) Where Am I? Aids to Navigation • Coastal landmarks/Aids • Accuracy • Dead Reckoning • Accessibility • Nautical charts • Reliability • Sailing Directions/Pilot Books • Bowditch Practical • Security Navigator/Dutton’s • Celestial navigation • Lodestone • Magnetic compass • Astrolabe • Sextant • Chronometer • Gyrocompass • Radio Direction Finding (RDF) • Sound Navigation Ranging () • Radio Detection and Ranging () • Long Range Navigation (LORAN) • Global Positioning System (GPS) Where is everybody else? Means for Scouting

French Penelope (1806) USS Montpelier (CL-57) (1942) USS Redfish (SS-395)

SBD-5 (1944) OS2U Kingfisher (1938)

PBY-5A “Looking for Nagumo” (1942)

PBY4Y-2 (1945) P-3C and P-8 (2019) MQ-4C Triton UAS (2019) Means of Scouting

Navy Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) (1974-Present Day)

RDF (Pre-WWII) USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) SURTASS (Present-Day)

SOSUS (Cold War) Coastwatchers PRC Ocean Surveillance (Present Day) Philippines (1944) Counter-Scouting

• Camouflage • Running w/o lights • Hide during daytime • Radio Silence • Reduced radar return • Reduced sound signature • Thermoclines USS Nebraska (BB-14) (ca. 1918) • Low/zero electronic emanations • Jamming • Spoofing

JMSDF SSK Sekiryu (2017) Why Scouting? • Naval warfare is attrition warfare. • Thus, the greatest imperative of sea warfare is to attack effectively first: • Bring the enemy forces under concentrated firepower while forestalling their response • This produces an immediate, marked advantage • (Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 1986) • Navies do not hold forces in reserve: they bring everything to bear • It is challenging to remain unseen to the enemy for very long

DesRon 23 at the Battle of Cape St. George 25 November 1943 The Problem of Distance: Loss of Strength Gradient

• The extent of a state’s military power that can be brought to bear in any given place depends primarily on geographic distance. • Applies to all kinds of military force. • Importance varies with type, intensity, tempo, and duration of conflict. • Historical solution has been forward-based/deployed forces. • Effects of distance have been somewhat reduced by increasing range and accuracy of weapons.

Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper,1962). One Answer: Forward Naval Presence

• Deep roots in U.S. history • 18th and 19th centuries left an indelible mark on Navy culture/strategies, informing 20th century choices • Spanish-American War to World War II • World War II through Occupation of Germany and Japan • The Cold War • 1990s to the early 2000s • The Present Far Away from Home • Advanced naval bases • Coaling stations • Harbors and dockyards • Floating drydocks • Naval hospitals • CUBs/LIONs (WWII) YFD-1 Dewey, , PI (1906) Royal Navy Historic Overseas Bases

Changi Naval Base, Singapore US Naval Hospital, Yokohama (1872) (2019) Coaling Station, Pearl Harbor (1919) Afloat Mobile Logistics

• Tenders/Repair/Supply ships • Underway refueling/resupply • Mobile service squadrons

Royal Navy Hoy, USS Supply (1846-1877) Napoleonic Wars

Trials of the Metcalfe system USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) between HMS Trafalgar SERVRON 10, (late 1944) USS Frank Cable (AS-40), and collier (1902) (2017)

Trials of the Metcalfe system between USS Stethem (DDG-63) comes alongside Military battleship HMS Trafalgar and collier (1902) Sealift Command (MSC) fleet USNS John Ericsson (2 August 2007) The Ship • A Navy’s Unit of Action – A lumpy transaction • How navies measure themselves: numbers and types of ships • The most complex technology in any historical period • Always very expensive (Constitution, 2,000 trees, $300k in 1797) • Takes a long time to build (Constitution, 3 yrs.) • Personnel are dear (Constitution, 480 officers, HMS Temeraire (hero at Trafalgar) tugged to her last berth to be broken sailors, Marines) up, 1838. • Expensive to operate • Maintenance continuous, expensive Ships are the nearest thing to dreams that • Lasts a very long time (Constitution, 1797-1881) hands have ever made. – Robert N. Rose • Foes, weapons, doctrine change • Sailors fight from their house Being in a ship is like being in jail, with • Historically, a world unto itself the chance of being drowned. • The object of intense, enduring sentiment – Samuel Johnson Each time I hear the name USS Spence, I feel like a mother who has lost her first born and, being a sentimentalist, I shed a tear… — RADM Henry A. Armstrong, Spence’s first commanding officer

DD-512, Lost 18 , Cobra, 24 survivors The Hull Design Desiderata • Seakeeping: buoyancy, stability • Speed • Handling/maneuverability • Efficiency • Longevity/durability Configuration • Strength/Resilience • Length, beam • Protection/Stealthiness • Bow, stern, USS Constitution Bottom • Space/capacity • Displacement Material • Draft • Wood • Wood w/ copper sheathing • Iron • Steel Alloys • Aluminum USS Michael Monsoor • Fiberglas (DDG-1001) • Carbon fiber Propulsion Design Desiderata • Endurance • Speed • Tactical maneuverability • Reliability • Availability on demand • Dimensional compactness: power to weight and space ratio Modes • Oar • Sail • Steam paddle wheel/screw • Reciprocating: single, double, triple expansion • : low pressure, high pressure • Diesel • Steam Turbine-electric Fuels • Diesel-electric • Wood • Diesel- • Coal (1871-1914) • Gas turbine-electric • Fuel oil • Gas turbine-diesel-electric • Diesel oil • Nuclear Weapons Desiderata Types • Destructiveness/lethality • Hand-to-hand combat/boarding • Range • Bow and arrow • Accuracy/control/concent • Ramming ration • Fire: pitch, fire ships • Probability of hit • Cannon: Smoothbore, rifled • Volume/rate of fire • Mortar • Solid shot • Linearity/Non-linearity • Explosive shells GP, armor-piercing • Electromagnetic Rail Guns • Torpedo, mine • Torpedo, automobile, surface, , aerial • Depth charges, spigot mortars • Aircraft • Aerial Bombs • Aerial Rockets • Guided missiles • Cruise missiles USS Vesuvius • Ballistic Missiles Dynamite Gun (1888) • Hypersonic bodies • Directed energy, various Perpetual Refit and Modification

WW II Essex-class Aircraft Carriers, 1942-1991 Rust Never Sleeps

In 2014, corrosion control/repair cost $3 billion, nearly 25% of overall ship maintenance expenses.

USS Black (DD-666) at San USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55) at Norfolk 2 weeks prior to deploying Diego (November 1968) (March 2019)

There is a direct relationship between [corrosion] and the … commanding officer’s ability, willingness to get after it on a regular basis… I think its going to take a concerted effort at all levels — the ship’s force, the intermediate level and then at the depot level — for us to stay after it. – VADM Thomas Moore, Naval Sea Systems Command The Sea Is a Dangerous Place: Volatile, Surprising, Harsh

• Winds: direction, strength, duration • Waves: height, shape, periodicity • Tropical cyclones: hurricanes, , cyclones • Currents: direction, speed • Tides: times, range, neap, spring • Underwater obstructions: reefs, shoals, sea mounts; groundings • Surface obstructions: icebergs, hulks, containers • Collisions with other vessels: surface, sub-surface

O hear us when we cry to Thee, For those in peril on the sea. – Eternal Father, Revs. William Whiting and Rev. John B. Dykes (1861) Ocean Physical Characteristics

https://icp.giss.nasa.gov/research/ppa/1997 What Lies Beneath Stormy Weather, 1856-2006

https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/7079/historic-tropical-cyclone-tracks Damage and Its Control The safety of the ship is always the first responsibility of its captain. – FADM Chester W. Nimitz, USN (1945)

USS Newcomb (DD-586) – damage, Okinawa (11 April 1945)

Duties in Damage Control in Order of Priority: • Keep the ship in the fighting line and fighting. • Safely return the ship to port where repairs can be effected in order that she may return to the battle line. Bad Things: Water • Preservation of buoyancy is under all circumstances first and most important requirement; every demand that can be made upon the vessel in time of peace or war depends upon this.

• In any serious battle between ships, violation of the watertight integrity of the shell is almost sure to occur. USS Maryland (BB-46) , 22 June 1944 • The water volume entering a hull is proportional to the square root of the depth and proportional to the square of the radius: a hole twice as deep allows in 1.4x more water; a hole twice as large lets in 4x more water.

• 1 gal. of seawater = 8.6 lbs.

• 2-in hole 2-ft below waterline lets in 111 gal/min; 6660 gal/hr. or 28.6 tons/hr. • 4-in hole 4-ft below waterline lets in 628.4 gal/min; 37,704 gal/hr. or 162.1 tons/hr.

• WW II German torpedoes usually made a hole 50-55 ft. in diameter; Japanese torpedoes, 65-75 ft. in diameter… !!! USS Tripoli (LPH-10) 18 February 1991 Bad Things: Fire • Ships have ever been highly combustible and/or contained highly combustible and explosive materials. • Experience shows that damage received by a naval vessel as the result of enemy action will often be accompanied by fire.

USS Bunker Hill (CV-17), Okinawa, USS Bennington (CV-20), Dutch fireship attacks HMS Royal James, 2 , 395 killed (11 May Hydraulic fluid aerosol (26 May 1954) Battle of Solebay (7 June 1672) 1945)

USS Enterprise (CVAN-65), 28 killed, 314 wounded, off Pearl Harbor, HI (14 January 1969)

HMS Sheffield, Falklands, Exocet, 20 killed (10 May 1982) USS Helena (CL-50) Battle Damage (2x Torpedoes) Kula Gulf – 6 July 1943 18 December 1944

USS Dyson (DD-572) Radar Image USS Santa Fe (CL-60) • 3 DD’s lost; 790 men perished • 3 DD’s, 1 CL, 3 CVL’s, 2 CVE’s seriously damaged • 19 other ships, less damaged • 146 aircraft lost/damaged beyond repair

USS Cowpens (CVL-25) …the greatest loss that we have taken in the Pacific without compensatory return since the First Battle of Savo [Island]. – FADM Chester W. Nimitz Collision

USS Belknap (CG-26) w/ USS JFK (CV-67) near HNoMS Helge Ingstad w/ Sola TS on Coast of Sicily (November 1975) Norway (8 November 2018) Reported Ship Mishaps, All Navies, 1945-1988 Collision 456 Fire 267 Grounding 130 Explosion 114 Equipment Failure 98 Sinking 75 Weather 65 Propulsion 59 Ordnance 54 Aircraft Crash 34 Flooding 27 Miscellaneous 80

Mishap Total 1276

Event Total 1459*

*Numbers reported for all navies; under-reporting is assumed, especially for USSR. **Event Total exceeds Mishaps Total because some mishaps involved more than one event. U.S. Submarine Mishaps, 1983-1987

Groundings 12 Collisions 50 Fires 113 Floodings 38 Ordnance Mishaps 61 Equipment Mishaps 82 Explosions 14 USS Daniel Boone (SSBN-629) (1987) Heavy Weather 14

USS (SSN-711) (2005)

Source: U.S. Navy, “Submarine Force: Mishap Statistical Summary, Calendar Years 1983- 1987,” n.d. Organizational Culture and the U.S. Navy

• Shared values, beliefs, and assumptions about how should • Its members behave and interact • Decisions be made • Work be carried out • Durable, resistant to change; change usually generational • Influenced, but not determined, by • Purpose and tasks • Formal structure and processes, including most important technologies • Environment and history, including failures and successes • Individuals who work within and lead it

Edgar Schein (1988) Organizational Culture and the U.S. Navy • Layers of organizational culture • Basic underlying assumptions – implicit, relatively invisible • Espoused values – Title 10, Service Pubs, Joint Pubs, Traditions • Artifacts – Ships, aircraft, weapons, systems

Edgar Schein (1988) What Naval Officers Believe

What naval officers believe about: • Duties/Specialization • How to get good • Ships • Doctrine • Planning • Command Philosophy • Relations with other services • Jointness • The Ideal War Then… and now Naval officers are members of a distinct race of high traditions, which they are expected to know and fulfill. — Reginald Belknap (1918)

There is a long list of heroes in the submarine force, and when you join it, you are joining that legacy. — CDR Dennis Murphy, CO USS Tucson (2001) Duties of the Commanding Officer – Present

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all Sam Dealey USS Harder necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and WWII customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

TITLE 10 § 5947. Requirement of exemplary conduct. (Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 372.) Part of Chapter 551, which comprehensively delineates responsibilities of Officers in Command. Duties of the Commanding officer – Royal Navy 1734 The 19th Quarterdeck Officer…

To make the observations and calculations required in navigation, to handle the ship under sail, to fire a gun so as to hit a mark, to keep in good condition the ship, the rigging, the sails, and to manage the crew, made up the whole round of a naval officer’s duties. – James R. Soley (1903) Officers Become Engineers

The line officers fear that the engineers wish to command the ships. Let the commanding officers become engineers, and let engineers rule our ships, then all fears will be dispelled, and the navy will quickly become a unit.

— Ira M. Hollis (1897) The Navy • Remains divided by its several officer communities and staff corps. • Historically most stove-piped of any service. • Unrestricted line officers, restricted line officers, limited duty officers, staff corps officers • Information Warfare Corps* How to Get Good

To maintain our present skills, naval officers must anticipate and actively seek a vigorous seagoing life. – RADM (1950) What about Newport? The Navy’s New Learning Strategy: A Sea Change? • Released: Today, 2 March 2020 • Purpose: To Develop a Thinking Force able to beat a peer foe who has more stuff • Highlights • Issued as a combined Navy and Marine Corps Strategy • One-Year Strategic graduate education required for promotion to flag • Fit Reps to include bullets on educational progress • More naval officers to JPME resident education, especially Newport • Non-resident and low-residency PME programs to expand • Naval Community College for Enlisted Personnel

John Kroger VADM Stuart Munsch Chief Learning Officer N7 What the Navy Prefers in Its Ships • More deliverable combat potential • Multi-mission capable vice single-purpose • Large ships: economies of scale – seakeeping, resilience, speed, endurance, fuel, ordinance, aircraft • Bigger is better • Always better to build major combatants than service and auxiliary ships

USS Ranger (CV-4) (1934) Essex-class, 24 ships (1941-1950) 769 ft., 14,500 tons 888 ft., 27,500 tons What the Navy Does about Ships when War Comes • Converts merchant ships • Makes do with the wrong ships • Builds new ships too late for the conflict USS Monadnock (1898) • Builds inexpensive ships for the duration USS Oliver Hazard Perry (1864) • Converts existing ships for new purposes • Gets it right • Usually some mixture of all of the above LCS (L) (3) (1944) USS Brooks (1920)

SSBN to SSGN (2008) USS Essex (CV-9) The Navy and Doctrine

• Distillation of practical experience • Historically, neither comprehensive nor centralized • Has usually recognized several adequate solutions • Deemed legitimate for single-service, tactical and technical levels • Suspicious of Joint Doctrine • Since Goldwater-Nichols (1986) growing awareness that the Navy must play in Joint Doctrine (JFMCC) • Navy Warfare Development Command

Doctrine isn’t what is written in the books; it is what warriors believe and act on. – Wayne Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Fleet Operations (2018) Planning

• Cannot with certainty predict complete pattern of the war for which we prepare • Planning concepts must cover many possibilities • Plans of depth and breadth • Flexible and adaptable • By intent and design can be applied to unforeseen situations • Usually more than one adequate solution Planning – Cold War

A large part of the Navy seemed to be willing to ignore the requirement for formal planning (and formal planning education) altogether. Everything learned up through World War II about planning processes, procedures, and methodology seemed to have been discarded since it did not offer the easiest and quickest way to solve the current, lowest-level, tactical military problems. – NAVY PLANNING (NWP 5-01, EDITION JAN 2007) Command Philosophy

ADM Lord Nelson’s “Touch” • Provide clear guidance and intent • Subordinates exercise disciplined initiative • Necessary to build mutual trust and confidence: The Band of Brothers

ADM William S. Sims, USN • Radical, reformer, modernizer • Anglophile • CDR US Naval Forces , WWI • PNWC, 1917, 1919-1922 • Self-consciously emulated Nelson and his “Band of Brothers” Command Philosophy: Initiative

No captain can be on all bridges at all times. – FADM Ernest J. King, COMINCH and CNO

U.S. Navy War Instructions (November 1944) Communications

Desiderata If, then, we can devise a system by which • Speed • Volume we can have reliable communication with the • Distance shore from any position as far as 150 miles at sea, • Accuracy we will have solved the all-important problem, and • Reliability the only way to obtain this long-distance • Security communication over water is by means of Modes messenger pigeons. US Navy Pigeoneer (1944) • Signal flags – LT Edward W. Eberle (1897) • Semaphore • Homing pigeons • Cannon • Dispatch Boats • Signal Lights • Undersea cables • Radio, Telegraphy • Radio, Voice Pigeoneer Rating (1960) • Radio, LF, VLF, ELF • SONAR • RADAR Damned Errand Boys

The cable spoiled the . Before it was laid, one was really somebody out there. But afterwards one simply became a damned errand boy at the end of a telegraph wire. — RADM Caspar F. Goodrich, President, NWC, 1889-92/1896-98

1902-1903 Composite Warfare Commander

• Open-ocean fleet-on-fleet battle against Soviet forces during all-out war • Intended for effective execution against large numbers of ships, aircraft, and missiles • Decentralized • Commander’s intent • Subordinate commanders with clearly defined roles and relationships • Single service • Remains service doctrine for CSG’s and ARG’s Jointness and Unity of Command

• Unity of Command chief point of contention between Army and Navy during WW II • Navy interpretation: generals commanding fleets • Still colors Navy response to joint doctrine, especiallyWRT employment of naval aviation JFMCC

• Initial draft – July 2001 • Initial JP 3-32 (August 2006) • Intended as maritime functional component commander equivalent to JFLCC and JFACC • Joint Pub 3-56.1 Command and Control for • Joint Air Operations (November 1994) • Operational-level planning and conduct of maritime force operations requiring the close coordination of Navy, Marine, Coast Guard, and other forces within the JOA Relations with the Other Services

• Two ships passing in the night – Army • Complementary – Coast Guard • Force Multiplier – Coast Guard • Ambivalence – Marine Corps • Competition for • Mission and budget – Air Force • Dominance – Air Force The Navy’s Preferred War

• Since Mahan, the Navy has preferred to fight a decisive major fleet action with large combatants in the open ocean for control of the sea • World War II seemed to confirm this preference • Coral Sea (May 1942) • Midway (June 1942) • Philippine Sea (June 1944) • Leyte Gulf (October 1944) • However, the war the Navy wants to fight is often not the war it actually fights. This affects • War plans • C2 • Ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons • Ability to prosecute important components of the naval war • Who gets promotion/command Battle of Jutland, 250 ships, 100,000 men (31 May-1 June 1916) So.. How Shall the Navy Prepare for the Next Fight? It isn't that life ashore is distasteful to me. But life at sea is better. – Sir Francis Drake