The Naval Way of War Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College Today’s Purpose • Provide foundation and context for course sessions that follow • Stimulate reflection by • Navy students about your service • All students about your own organizations • U.S. military services • U.S. Civilian agencies • International navies • Provoke seminar discussion of key similarities and differences among the U.S. services, civilian agencies, and international navies • As such, this lecture provides a point of departure for the trimester The Questions • What do navies do? Why? • Where do they do it? • What do they do it with? • What is the US Navy’s organizational culture? What Do Navies Do? Navies are about movement: • Make the sea a highway for “us” allowing us to go where we want and do what we want to do (control) and/or • Make the sea a barrier to “them” preventing them from going where they want and doing what they want to do (denial) SS Dixie Arrow, sunk by U-71 off Cape Hatteras Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (26 March 1942) (25-27 October 1942) Then, Navies can do these Things • Strategic movement of troops • Acquiring advanced bases close to the scene of action • Landing armies on a hostile shore • Supporting those armies with logistics and fires • Blockading/denying • Struggling for mastery of the local sea • Striking against operational targets The Okinawa Landing and the “Fleet that Came to Stay” (1 April 1945) • Conducting strategic fires, nuclear and conventional Frank Uhlig, Jr., How Navies Fight The Search for Constants: Theories of Sea Power Alfred Thayer Mahan – Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890) • Navies exist to protect friendly commerce; interrupt their enemies’ commerce. • “Command of the sea” achieved and maintained through “decisive” battle between fleets • Commerce raiding only diverts from this vital objective Jeune Ecole – ADM Théophile Aube (1880-1905) • Focused on sea denial against more powerful navies • Inability to compete in capital ships • Achieved through new technologies: torpedo boats, cruisers, submarines The Search for Constants: Theories of Sea Power Julian Corbett – Some Principles of Naval Strategy (1910): • Relation of naval power to national power • Naval warfare differs fundamentally from land warfare • Decisive battle and principle of concentration less relevant at sea • Passage at sea is what matters • Defending lines of communication (LOC) harder at sea than land Raoul Castex – Théories Stratégiques (5 V., 2500 pp., 1929-1939): • Translated and studied at NWC in the 1930’s • Interested in land-sea conflict • Argued for blending positive sea control and sea denial • “Maneuvering” to confront the leading naval power under favorable conditions • Interservice coordination essential What Else do Navies Do? Cooperative • Port visits/Naval diplomacy • SAR • Combined naval exercises • Humanitarian Assistance/disaster relief • Theater Security Cooperation/partnership building • Law enforcement/counter-piracy/ counter-drug/counter-terror Competitive • FON ops • Deterrence • Sanction enforcement • Show of force/coercive naval diplomacy • counter-choke point denial USS Klakring (FFG-42) Sevastopol 27 March 2011 • NEO • Non-international Armed Conflict (NIAC) • Limited strikes USS Porter (DDG-78) launches against Syrian Targets, 7 April 2017 Russian DDG and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) 7 June 2019 Navies and Their Capabilities Vary Rank Designation Capabilities Examples Multiple and sustained power projection 1 Global-reach power projection United States missions globally Limited global-reach power At least one major power projection 2 France, United Kingdom Blue- projection operation globally China, India, Italy, water 3 Multi-regional power projection Power projection to regions adjacent its own Russia, Spain Australia, Brazil, Regional Limited range power projection beyond own 4 Germany, Japan, South power projection Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) Korea Coastal defense within and slightly beyond Saudi Arabia, Norway, 5 Regional offshore coastal defense EEZ Israel, Canada, Indonesia Oman, Finland, North 6 Inshore coastal defense Coastal defense confined to inner EEZ Korea Non Maritime policing within and slightly beyond 7 Regional offshore constabulary Mexico, Ireland blue- EEZ water 8 Inshore constabulary Maritime policing confined well within EEZ Philippines 9 Inland waterway riverine Riverine defence of landlocked states Bolivia, Paraguay 10 Token navy riverine Very basic constabulary if at all Many worldwide Todd/Lindberg Approximate Naval Strength Classification System (2019) Major Fleet Actions Are Few and the Time between them tends to be Long Salamis 450 BC Yamen 1279 Lepanto 1571 Spanish Armada 1588 Virginia Capes 1781 Aboukir Bay 1798 Trafalgar 1805 Yalu River 1894 Battle of Lepanto (1571) Tsushima 1905 Jutland 1916 Coral Sea 1942 Midway June 1942 Philippine Sea June 1944 Leyte Gulf October 1944 So What? • Does any U.S. naval officer today know how to fight a fleet? • No U.S. naval officer has fought a fleet action since Leyte Gulf (October 1944) • None have been socialized to the wardroom by any officers who did so fight • Few serving officers have been in combat actions • What’s changed significantly since 1944: • Opponents • Technology: platforms (ships and aircraft), sensors, weapons • Greater potential for effective land force engagement with naval forces in open ocean as well as narrow seas • How do you “get good” at fleet actions under these circumstances? Where do Navies do it? • Open oceans: Blue • Coastal waters: Green • Inland waters: Brown • Physical environment • Political, social, economic, legal environment • UNCLOS The ocean is a body of water occupying about two-thirds of a world made for man – who has no gills. – Ambrose Bierce Some Basics about the Oceans • Cover 71% of Earth's surface • Contain 97% of Earth's water • Represent 99% of living space on the planet by volume • 40% of Earth’s population lives within 100 km of the ocean • Global market value of marine and coastal resources and industries estimated at $3 trillion/year: 5% of global GDP • 90%+ of global trade carried by sea • Globally 50K+ merchant ships of all tonnages; growing • Global conventional oil reserves 157 billion tons; 26% offshore • Seabed mining is coming… https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ https://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-1/energy/fossil-fuels/ https://business.un.org/en/entities/13 https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/MaritimeTransport/MerchantFleet.html The Physical Environment: Little Ship, Big Ocean • Vast: Distance and Time always loom large • Multi-dimensional: surface, subsurface, air, space • Extremely dangerous, volatile, uncertain • Mostly trackless: • Where am I? • Where am I going? • When will I get there? • Where is everybody else? • Where are they going? USS Abercrombie (DE-343) • What are they doing? 306 ft., 1350 tons Navigation • Art of approximation • Reduction of uncertainty and error • Inevitable ambiguity and uncertainty • Every system has weaknesses and vulnerabilities Navigator in the USS Missouri Charthouse (Summer 1944) Where Am I? Aids to Navigation • Coastal landmarks/Aids • Accuracy • Dead Reckoning • Accessibility • Nautical charts • Reliability • Sailing Directions/Pilot Books • Bowditch Practical • Security Navigator/Dutton’s • Celestial navigation • Lodestone • Magnetic compass • Astrolabe • Sextant • Chronometer • Gyrocompass • Radio Direction Finding (RDF) • Sound Navigation Ranging (SONAR) • Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) • Long Range Navigation (LORAN) • Global Positioning System (GPS) Where is everybody else? Means for Scouting French Penelope (1806) USS Montpelier (CL-57) (1942) USS Redfish (SS-395) SBD-5 (1944) OS2U Kingfisher (1938) PBY-5A “Looking for Nagumo” (1942) PBY4Y-2 (1945) P-3C and P-8 (2019) MQ-4C Triton UAS (2019) Means of Scouting Navy Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) (1974-Present Day) RDF (Pre-WWII) USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) SURTASS (Present-Day) SOSUS (Cold War) Coastwatchers PRC Ocean Surveillance (Present Day) Philippines (1944) Counter-Scouting • Camouflage • Running w/o lights • Hide during daytime • Radio Silence • Reduced radar return • Reduced sound signature • Thermoclines USS Nebraska (BB-14) (ca. 1918) • Low/zero electronic emanations • Jamming • Spoofing JMSDF SSK Sekiryu (2017) Why Scouting? • Naval warfare is attrition warfare. • Thus, the greatest imperative of sea warfare is to attack effectively first: • Bring the enemy forces under concentrated firepower while forestalling their response • This produces an immediate, marked advantage • (Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 1986) • Navies do not hold forces in reserve: they bring everything to bear • It is challenging to remain unseen to the enemy for very long DesRon 23 at the Battle of Cape St. George 25 November 1943 The Problem of Distance: Loss of Strength Gradient • The extent of a state’s military power that can be brought to bear in any given place depends primarily on geographic distance. • Applies to all kinds of military force. • Importance varies with type, intensity, tempo, and duration of conflict. • Historical solution has been forward-based/deployed forces. • Effects of distance have been somewhat reduced by increasing range and accuracy of weapons. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper,1962). One Answer: Forward Naval Presence • Deep roots in U.S. history • 18th and 19th centuries left an indelible mark on Navy culture/strategies, informing 20th century choices • Spanish-American War