UtLLM33It ttu
Subj: Report of Operations 9 October through 29 October 1950 1. EARRATXVE:
On completion of replenishment 29 October, the Leyte, with the remaining units of Task Force 77, departed from the operating area for Sasebo. At 3008361: the LEXTE entered Sasebo, Japan and moored to buoy #17. --NAVAL OPfSEEC1TIONS 1. AIR: Diring the period 11 October 1950 uatil 28 October 1950, air oper- ations were cmducted in accordance with directives of hnmander Task Force 77 against North Korean objectives in support of United Nations Forces in Korea.
Primary objectives for the majority of strike-flights flown by Air C~oup Three were coinrunications and trsnsportaticn facilities in the Wonsan-Chong jin area, with penetrations by jet fighter sweeps to targets 20 miles south of the Manchurian-Korean horder. Vital communications and transportation facil- ities were demolished, damaged and disrupted throughout this entire area, Important enemy communications and transportation installations which were re- built by North Korean Forces were re-destroyed on a priority target basis. Fleet Post Office, - San Francisco, Calif. On October 1950 the USS LEYTE commenced a sustained strike flight period of five days continuous operattons, In five days, 472 offensive sorties were flown sgainst North Korean objectives and 56 defensive sorties for a total of 528 sorties. During this five day period, 61 napalm bombs, 2211 HVAR rockets, 121.5 tons of bombs, 93,009 rounds of .50'calibre machine gun ammunition, 29,204 rounds of 20W cannon ammunition was hurled at the enemy. The following were the enemy's transportation and communications fa+ ilities losses for the period of sustained cperations 11 October - 15 October 1950:
Target a Des troged Damaged Small boats 9 13 Locomotives 2 3 RR box cars 51 45 Trucks 8 5 Warehouses 12 9 Gun emplacement 8 r, 2 Tunne1.s - 1 Floating crane 1 - Barge 2 Tract c rs 2 Ammunition cars 1 - Electric transformer 1 c Dredge - 1
A summary of Naval Air Operations by the USLEXTE with Air Group Three embarked in support of the United Nations Forces in Korea for the period 10 - 29 October 1?50 follows: Offensive Sorties 1,040 Defensive Sorties lk5 Total 1,185
Of the total of 2,956,4 hours flown it is interesting to note that only 633.2 were spent over the target areas, Ammunition expended on North Korean targets: 61 napalm bombs, 3738 HVAR rockets, 268,5 tons of bombs, 158,874 rounds of .50 calibre machine gun am munition, 54,267 rounds of 2OMM cannon ammunition. U.S.S, LEXTE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.
Enemy losses for period 10 - 29 October 1950: Targets Destroyed Damaged
Locomotives 8 11 RR box cars 62 53 Ammunition cars 1 - RR turntable - 1 RR bridge 5 2 Tunnels - 2 Trucks and other vehicles 37 46 Tractors 2 - HW bridges 3 1 Small boats ll 15 Barges 2 c Floating bt'ane 1 - Dredge - 1 Minesweeper type 1 - Warehouses 22 ll. Huts and small buildings 29 .- Fuel dumps 3. - Gun emplacements 5 7 Electric transformers 1 - Troop casualtias ------50 to 75 estimated ------2. LOGISTICS: On 12 October 1950 from 16041 to 17581 the LEXTE replenished ammunition. During the first hour 78.6 tons of ammunition and aviation ordnance were transferred from the USS MOUNT KATMAI (AS16). 3. SHIF'EIOARD PLANE HANDLING: During the period of operations with CTF-77, use was made of the "split decktf. This system gave maximum flexibility to deck operations and was es- pecially effective when there were schedule changes which with normal spot- ting would necessitate a respot or an unacceptably slow launch. This spot is dangerous, however, as a catapult failure or a dud will cause a long de- lay . It was found that it is advantageous to keep the special purpose air- craft, such 85 the F4U-5N and F4U-5P aircraft either on the flight deck or in suoh a position on the hangar deck that they were readily available for any unssheduled launch. Twa AD-jV4 and two AD-N type aircraft were kept on the flight deak, whenever condition3 permitted, to meet any tactical changes that might occur.
-3- kclosure 1 It is believed that consolidation of CV Air Groups idto three operating units by type aircraft and the consolidation of the special purpose units irlto one administrative unit, or into the three main squadrons, depending upon the type of aircraft, would be more efficient, both administratively and operationally. Aircraft shifting to meet scheduled launches would be reduced to a minimum, administration requirements lessened and overall maintenance and availability improved, The loading of AD.3 type aircraft for the early morning launch with loads that necessitated a wing spread proved time consuming because of the lack of space and necessity of accomplishing this re-arming during pepiods of dark- ness. Subsequent loadings during the day presented no problem because of the number of aircraft airborne. 4. ---INTT?LLIGENCE:
AE the t.he the LEYTE commenced. operatfng with CTF-'I?, 5mteI.l- I igence procedures had been well established, The advice and recommendatXons received from CodirPac, CinCPac Fleet and 7th Fleet were of great ' . . value in preparing this ship for immediate operations upon arrival. Maps, Target kssier, Janis Publications, and Blood Chits had all been received and were ready for use when operations began. Kaps and charts were furnished this activity by ComkirPac, The most useful charts were found to be the Pilotage and Approach Aeronautical Charts (scale 1/500,000 and 1/250,000 respectively), The ASL55l series (Scale 1/250,000) were also used to advantage. Twelve copies eaCh of the AbE L751 (scale 1/5r?,OoO) serj.es were igsued to the ship. These were found to be ex- tremely useful for briefing and generally requested by the pilots for use in the air in locating villages and specific targets such as bridges, RR yar& an? buildings. It is recommended that in future operations sufficient copies of rhis series be furnished for issue to each squadron (one per pj.XJt$ or a5 ~:i*~-)'t) . It is recornended that couics of gazeteers of surrounding areas (ChL::a Tast Coast, Jap.an, Manchuria Taiwan) be included in the ship's ZlLowance. The terrain model of Korea furnished wzs found to be of use only for general familiarization of the pilbts with the area. After making several strikes into the area the pilots became familiar enough with the terrain so that the model. had last a great deal of its value.
With respect to photography and it+ use in the operation it WBS found that invamably photography of a targe: for pre-strike briefing and famil- iarization was lacking. hlso lscking was a program of dmage assessment photograpny. The latter is considered essential to properly evaluate damage resulting from a strike and to corroborate the pilots estimates of damage. Gun camera film was not suitable for damage assessment in that in the maj- ority of cases the pullout was made prior to the camera's recording of hits resulting in no photography at the time of impact, of bombs and rockets. nl PI
U.S.S. LEXTE (CV-32) Fleet Post,Office, San Francisco, Calif
In operation it was found that four officers permanently assigned to intelligence could handle the work load. One officer was assigned the task of keeping records including action reports and war diary. The remaining officers, while contributing to the report eff orb, were primarily assigned tasks of briefing and de-briefing, handling of strike flash reports and prep aration of daily summaries. These officers also kept situation plots and assisted in photo interpretation. No photo interpreters were assigned to this ship at the the of entering the combat area. Subsequent to the com- mencemer,: of operations, one officer from the staff was ordered aboard for temporary duty to act as photo interpreter.
i DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL&; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS U.S.S, LFPTE (CV-32) DOD DIR 5200.10 Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California OPER:BED:wb(4) D iE6bNW IED CV-32/Al2
grom: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEXTE (CV-32) To: Chief of Naval Operations Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE (2) Commander 7th Fleet (3) Commander Naval Forces Far East (4) Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
Subj: Narrative Report of Action for the period 5 November through 30 November 1950
Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op 345/aa ser 1197p34 of 3 Aug 1950 (b) USS LFYTE (CV-32) Action Reports #Ul through #276 of Nov 1950 (c) USS DTE (CV-32) conf ser 092A of 9 Nov 1950 (d) USS LEYTE (CV-32) Jet Report ser 0110 of 3 Dec 1950 1; The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a). PART I - COIPOSITION OF FORCES AND MISSIONS U.S.S. LEXTE (CV-32) a unit of Task Force 77 sortied from Sasebo, Japan on 5 November 1950. OTC was Rear Admiral J.F. HOSKINS, U,S, Navy, CTG 77.3 (corn- CarDiflHREE) until 10 November 1950. (Com7thFleet) in U.S.S. MISSOURI, (Corn- CarDivTHREE) (CTG 77.3) in U.S.S. VALtkY FORGE (CV-45;; U.S.S. SHELTON (nD-790), USS JUNEAU (CLAA-119), (ComDesRon 11) in U.S.S. VILLTSIE (DD-716), USS KEBB (DD-782) U.S.S. LOFBERG (D&759), U.S.S. EVERSOLE (DD-789), U.S.S. HXBm (DDR-806I, U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760), U.S.S. EOLE (DD-755), U.S.S. MOXBE (DD-747), U.S.S. MADDOX (DD-731), U.S.S. HOOD (DD-6551, U.S*S* CHANDLER (DD-717), and U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783). On 10 November formation was joined by the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and 0°C became Rear Admiral E.C. E",U.S. Navy, CTF-77 (ComCarDivONE) The U.S.S. LEXTE conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDivONE Op Order 3-50 and da* dispatch air operations plans. The mission was to SuPP 1 ort United Nations Forces in Northern Ktvrea and to furnish defensive combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for TF-77. I U,S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office
CHRONOLQGICAL ORDEB OF EVENTS (A) 11/5/50: Sortied from Sasebo, Japan with the U,S.S, MISSOURI (BB-63:. Sommander Seventh Fleet embarked U.S.S. VALLEX FORGE (CV-45), U,S,S. JUNEAU (CUS-1195 for West coast of Kotea. 11/6/50: Commenced strike flights orer Chcngjin to Hapsu area. Con- ducted flight intruder mission on the Hyesan Railroad. 36 Sorties were flown.
11/7/50 : Conducted fighter sweeps on Huchang to Hapsu, Close supportl missions were flown in the Sinanju area. Other strike and Photo reconnaissance missions were carried out over ChongjL Onyonbo and Huchang Tonae area. 91 sorties were flown,
11/8/50 : Conducted close support, fighter Bweeps and night intruder missions over Chongjin area. 96 sorties were flown. 11/9/50 : Spent entire day for replenishment. Received 369,752 gallon:: fuel oil; 109,839 gallons of aviation gasoline; 203 tons of amnun it ion . 11/10/50: In company with TF-77, U.S.S. PHILIPPINZ SEA (CV-47) and U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). Conducted strike flights over Sinuiju area, exerted maximum effort to destroy bridges of the Yalu River. 83 sorties were flown.
11/11/50: Conducted strike flight operations in the Chongjin to Namsan-Ni area, against transportation and communications installations. LTJG R.R. B1.T30N, 0429711, U.S. Navy crash- landed his aircraft AD-3, BUNO. 122817 behind enemy lines. Although LTJG BATSON was spen to walk away from the scene of the crash and again on 12 November by Rescue Combat Air Patrol, his present whereabouts and condition are unknown and is presumed missing in action. 102 total sorties were flown this date.
ll/12/50: Strike and Reconnaissance flights were flown over Nanami, Chongjin and Sinui3u area on railroad and highway bridges of the Yalu River. Conducted Bescue Combat Air Patrol in search for LTJG BATSON, 71 sorties were flown.
-2- E san Francisco, California u\iLL-I
11/13/50: Refueled this date. Air Group THREE Shore based Rescue CAP continued search for LTJG BATSON, 11/14/50: Conducted strike flight operations on Hyesanjin and Myong- yonohom area and armed reconnaissance flights in the Chosin Reservoir in close support of ground troops in that area. Continued search for LTJG BZLTSON, 41, sorties were flown;
11/15/50: Conducted close support mission in Myongchon and Kapsan are: Strikes wwe directed at targets in the Nanam and Sinuiju ar Conducted final Rescue CAP operations for LTJG BATSON. 86 sorties were flown,
11/16/50: Refueled and replenished ammunitio@,
11/17/50: Conducted close support missions in the Kapsan area, strikes in Hyesanjin area. 78 sorties were flown. 11/18/50: Conducted strike flights over Sinuiju area on Yalu River bridges-and encountered enemy jet aircraft (MIGlf;)oVF-31, FF.2 Jet Tar'get Air Combat Patrol destroyed one MIG-15 and damagnd anct1ic.r. 39 sorties were flown. U/19/50: Close air support missions were flown in the Najin-Dong area. 26 sorties were fl.ownb
U/20/50: Refueled arid replenished amminition4 11/21/50: Conductrd strike flights and close support missions in the Namsan-Ni 2nd Yudanini area. 79 sorties were flown.
11/22/50: Flights wem in close support of ground troops in the Nanam, NaQ Himg Dong srpa, Stri! 11/23/50: Refueled and rpplenished ammunition. U/24/50: Strike were flown over Changtien-Hoku, Sakchu and North Korean border against communications and transportation facilities. 59 sorties wwe flown. 11/25/50: Flights were cancelled due to heavy seas, high winds and LOW visibility. -3 3 U.S.S. LTTE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California CCPf fi qrrr 0 ~_L.P,S~~SiED ll/26/50: Refuded and replenished stores, provisions and ammunition, 11/27/50: Although hampered by a snow storm and inclement weather which forced 19 aircraft to land at Wonsan prior to return- ing.to the ship, strike flights were flown ever the North- western reaches of Korea againgt enemy supfly columns and communications. 53 sorties were flown. 11/28/50: Strikes were flow over Northwebtern Korea, "S, W.G, WAGNER, 301502, U.S. Navy, was forced to crash land in Northern Korea when his aircraft, F4U5P, BUNOr 122169 was hit by enemy AA. He was rescudd b# a helicopter from Sinanju, Rescue Squadron #3. The rescue helicopter later made a forced landing within friendiy lines with %JS WLGNi3t aboard. Both pilots are missing in action. 58 sorties wer? florn. ll/29/50: Refueled and replenished. I U/30/50: Commenced mexhum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir area. This was the first day of five con- tinuous maximum effort close support missions in this area in support of ground troops encircled by Chinese Conmunist Troops, 90 sorties were flown this dake, (B) _CHRONOIBGICAL SWBY OF CMST AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR NOVEMBEB 1950: DATE CAS AIRCRgFT MCl>TION TAFtGICTS HIT 2"LOYED - MISSION I 11/7 1 Chosen RPsnrvoir Gun Zmplacements-Troops w7 2 Sakchu ridarehouses,Military Bldgs, u/7 3 Yong Byon Tanks,Ulitary Compound w7 4 South Chosen Res, Troops, Trucks Yang Dok Trucks,Troops,Military Bldgs. Puckchin Military Buildings Hagaru-Ri Troops, Barracks, Buildings Myongyon C hom Oil Storage tanks,Bldgs, Concrete bridge. 11/15 9 Pungsan Troops 11/15 10 Kapsan Warehouse, Highway Bridge, Trp ' 11/15 11 Myong Chon Troops, Gun 2biplacements 11/15 12 Myong Chon Military Buildings,Troops 11/17 13 Kapsan Troops,Military Compound 11/17 U Kapsan Military %placements 11/19 15 Myongyon River Troops, Trenches 11/19 16 Myongyon River Troops, Buildings 11/19 17 Myongyon Rivpr Tanks, Troops,Field Piece -4- U.S.S. LZXTE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California (B) (Continued) DPTE CkS AIRCRAFT LOCATION TARGETS HIT --MISSION EhWMYED . 11/19 18 2 Hamjong Pori Troops 11/21 19 4 Yodarn-Ni Troops ,Trenches ,Wildings 11/21 20 2 Hyesm jin Supply Command 11/21 21 2 Hamong-Dong Troops 11/21 22 2 NalllW Troops 11/22 23 2 Chik Tong Troops,Trucks,Supplies 11/22 24 4 Namhung Dong Troops,Trucks,Ehildings, Supply Compound up2 25 2 Mupyong-Ni RR Cars,Trucks,Troops. 11/30 26 l& Chosen Reservoir Troops,%placements w30 27 4 Chosen Reservoir Warehouse 11/30 28 2 Hag am-R i Troops ,lhplacemnts 11/30 29 2 Chosen Reservoir Troops, mplacements 11/30 30 8 Chosen Reservoir Troops,%placements,EUdgs. 11/30 31 3 Chosen Reservoir Gun Fmplacements ,Troops 11/30 32 r, Kwu-R~ Troops, Trenches (c) TOTAL SCIRTIS Total sorties against enemy 734 Total sorties defense TF-77 422 Total sorties for November 1950 1156 Total Flight Time 3355.1 Total days on which air operations were conduct ed 17 -5- U.S.S. L?YTE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California PA.RT 111. PERFORMANCE OF ORDN!MCE uPTH1ILL AND mUIF"T (a) Ordnance expended during the period: -TYPE Bombs loo# FRAG 115 200# FRAG 535 200# GP 2 350# GP w roo# GP 312 lOOO# GP 194 2000# GP .,.!54 , ,, rnT4.L: 306 Tons Rockets : 3.5'' 'PIR 76 HVAR 1975 11.75" IrTiny Tins" 16 'lDTAL: 2067 Rockets Machine Gun Ammunition: .50 Cal. 120,561 rounds 20 MM 24,875 rounds TOTAL: U5,436 rounds NAPALM: MK5 and MKl.2 133 6% mixture 'IDTPL: 8,512k: Napalm (b) PERFOMNCE OF ORDNLNCE EQUIPME3JT The MK66 practice bomb adapted for Napalm was used when the supply of 150 gallon MK-5 and MK-12 drop tanks was exhauspd. The MK-66 was unsatis- factory compared to the other tanks, Some bounces and air burns were observed, Some others skidded on the ground and did not burn. None resulted in wide area fires or in fires of suffieimt duration. This is probably caused by the hpavy guage m&al construction of the skin which prevents a bursting of the tank end permits the extarnal fuzes to be dislodged before effective ignition can result. PART IV BkTTLE DAMAGE (a) ship - None -6- 6 (b) Pircraft: COMBAT OPERE TIONS EF % 2 TOT4.L F9F F4U AD TOTPL Lost 0 1 2 3 101 2 Damaged 0 14 47 61 110 2 (c) Damage Inflicted on 3nemy: -TARCET DAMPGED DESTROYED Highway Bridge 14 8 Railroad Tracks 1 1 Railroad Bridge 8 2 Supply hPS 4 1 Warehouses 3 ll River Ferry 1 0 Smell Cargo Ships [Junks) 1 1 Trucks 29 34 Military Vehicles 20 15 Tanks 4 3 Eiu ildin gs 43 w Barracks 5 12 Gun %placements 4 1 Locomotives 3 2 Ammunition Dumps 1 2 Oil Storage Tanks 0 4 Railroad Cars 3 5 memy Aircraft (MIG-15) 1 1 Railroad Depot 0 1 Railroad Tunnel 1 0 Troop &placements [Numerous attack*. No 4.k. Zmplaceglents available es t bate of damage) PPRT V P%ONNEX PERFOWCE AND CONDITION (a) Medical: The general health of the crew has been good. "ha incidence of veaeral disease has been unusually high due to contacts in Sasebo, Japan. An all out drive against V.D. is being conducted with mandatory attendance for dl the crew at V.D, lectures and films. An average of eighty (80) out patients were treated daily. There were 21 daily patients cjn the sick list, -7- 7 U.S.S. UYTS (CV-32) Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California (a) Xedical (Continued): There were 5 major and 30 minor injuries total from other than air- craft causes. Surgery was performed on 18 members of the shipts company anc on one patient from another ship in company, Of these 19 patients, 2 under- went major surgery and 17 had minor surgery. Two pilots were declared missing in action. Nine injuries resulted from aircraft accidents. (b) Dental: During the month of November, the Dental Department staffed by three dental officers and four dental technicians completed 963 restorations, sur- gically extracted 13 teeth, performed 70 uncompliceted extractions and ren- dered 253 treatments at 549 individual sittings, exceeding all previous monthly administrations. -PART VI SP3CIAL coMM3NT5 (a) Winter Flight Operations : (1) ?he first snow of winter weather was experiemed in this period, heather deteriorated to a suecession of cold fronts passing through the tar- get and operating areas. Snow storms hampered operations over the target and required several flights to land on Korean airfields until weather in the operating,areas had cleared. Planes are not equipped with any deicing equipment but, by judicious avoiding of icing clouds and bad weather areas, no serious plane or propeller icing occurred. '\ (2) Snow and ice on the flight deck was experienced several Limes ?ad required extreme caution by pilots and flight deck crews to prevent per- sonnel or aircraft casualties. The F9F aircraft, with wings folded, is very unstable and, on an icy flight deck, must be securely tied to the deck with wire to prevent the plane and chocks from sliding across the deck in a turn or in a cross-wind. -& (b) Air Department: Three emergency jet landings wpre made aboard during this period. OnP jet was brought in with no hook. The approach speed was between 099 and 102 knots. The plane engaged two Davis Barriers and was stopped with minor dam- age to wheel fairings. The plane was flying again the nPxt day. The seconc jet was brought aboard with a hood partially extendad. The pilot made a taf low landing-at the cut, caught a wire and was arrested with damage only to t. hook track. The third jet was brought aboard without flaps and made a norm? arrested landing. (c) Communications: Communications between Naval aircraft and Air Force aircraft or ground controlleh have proven the pressing need for standardized VHF multi-channel equipment, crystallization and frequencg assignment. At present the Air Form oprates on a four channel VHF basis and only two of these channels are standard with the Navy& The primary TAC circuit is so jammed that it is al- most impossible to effectively control close air support. The secondary channel available is the emergency channel. 8nd it, is used continually for Support Air Direction and Tactical Control. This obviates its usage for emwgenciPs. (d) Logistics: (1) During this period the LEYTX replenished seven times at sea, Re- ceipts are shown in the following table: -DATE RECEIrn -AMOUNT 9 November FblOil 8,690 barrels Eiv.Gasoline 109,830 gallons Ammunit ion 205,l!9, tons 13 November FuPl Oil 4,480 barrels 4v. Gasoline 82,700 gallons 16 November Fuel Oil 4,328 gallons Av ;Gasoline 60,802 gallons Ammunit ion 162 tons 20 November Fuel oil 3,720 barrels Pv.Gasoline ' 55,670 gallons Ammunition 60 tons 23 November Fuel Oil 3,375 barrels Av. Gasoline 65,562 gallons Ammunition 75 tons 26 November Fucl Oil 3,157 barrels Av. Gasoline 31,000 gallons Ammun it ion 42 tcbns Frpsh,frozen,dry, prov. 128 2/5 tons 29 November Fuel Oil 3,532 barrels Av. Gasoline 69,856 gallons Amnun it ion 35 tons -9- 5 U.S.S. LTTE (CV-32) Ad Fleet Post Office F San F’ranciwo, California / (2) During the ammunition loading from the U.S.S. MI’ KkWJ (AIb16) on 9 Novehbar, 285.79 tons of ahmunition were received at an average rate of 98.78 short tons POP hour, the record for one hour was 117 tons. This excellent rate of trandfer reflected a high degrep of organization and coordination on both the supplying and receiving ships. (3) The replenishment of provisions from the U.S.S. GRPFFIAS (.’.F-29, /- on 29 Novembpr, establishcd a record rate of supply replenishment for the LTTE whether at sea or in port. Most of the transfer was accomplished after dmk. 135 tons of provisions (30 days supply) were delivered at a rate of 34.4 tons per hour. ,’ (4) The major deficiency in supply that has been encountered is that no aviation matorial consigned to the LZYTE on the basis of priority Fbls requisitions,originatPd sinc~departure from CONUS, has been dPliverd to the ship in the operating area. The LTTE is now critically low in high usage aviation spare parts. It is recommcmdod that allowance lists be prepared and promulgated for both war and peacetime operations, and that war allowance lists be made effective at the proper time. (5) MK-12 Napalm tanks have been used at a high rate and replacemmtz have not been available, The biK-5 tanks have heen so badly rusted and corroded that they would not hold gasoline or Napalm and approximately hO% had to be discarded. (e) Intelligence: (1) During the month of November the Aiq Intelligence Office operatPC with four permanently assigned officers. Tho problem of handling and stor- ing the tremendous number of charts noPdPd for this operation was solved by keeping on hand in the A.I.O. store room 15 copim of each chart. Upon receipt of aeronautical charts, immediate distribution was made to all squad- rons on a one to a pilot basis. Other chart issues (eg, PBL-551 and 751 series) were made when necessary or on requost. The AMSL-751 charts were issuod on close support missions when the area of operations was designated by dispatch from OTC prior to t&O-off time. The aeronautical pilotage charts seriPs 290 B and D were not available. WP-C charts were used exten- sively throughout the period whenevw operations required navigation across the Korean Peninsula as they proved superior to all other for DR navigation. U.S.S. LmE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California (2) The practice of briefing squadron AIO's (all on flying status e on this ship) who in turn further brief the squadron pilots was abandoned and is no longer recommmded. At present all pilots are briefed simult- aneously by the AIO. In this manner positive, accurate briefing of all pilots is assured. In addition the flight leader was able to brief on re!- deettous areas, times and other details incident to his particular flight. (3) Close air support was a primary mission during the latter part c the month and amplp opportun2ty was afforded to study this problem from th Air 1nteil.igencP view point. The biggest problem was that of comamicatior,: This ship riormally lacked suffieient information on movement of ground troops to accurately brief C.A.S. pilots. It is realized that this type of information is of necpssity, restricted in distribution and further, that it is not &ways possible to determine the exact location of scattered ground units, E-:3vicwr, an overall daily summary of the ground troop positions with @pprox!.n:dtf= location of divisions and their general direction of moveaent muld !P a~plpinformation, With this information, pilots could better be made to feel the importance of their mission and pilot interest would mount BS a restilt of participation in a known troop operation. Bn example is the enthusiasm which the CAS pilots have regarded the recmt movements of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosen Reservoir. (4) The AWL 750 chart was found to be of pxtreme value in CAS not only in use in the air for finding target coordinates but in briefing and . The size of the chart makes it impractical to carry more than 4 shpetsi"$ joined) in the A/C. However, when thP specific target area is known, it is advisable to issue the map or maps to pilots for a specific CES mission. (5) A program for damage assessmmt photography was put into effect early @ the month and is considered to be of grrcFt value. Through photo interpretation, damage could be accuratplg assPswd and weak or damaged points in targets datPctPd. These vuhorable areas wwe pointed out to pilots and made points of aim for subsequent attacks. In addition the tar- get area photography provided information on types and locction of nnefiy A/& defensps. With this information coordinated attacks were effectively executed on primary target and defense positions. In all of the above mentioned work the K-17 camera with 12" lens was used exclusively. Although this equipent provides excellent photo interpretation photography it lacks sufficiently wide coverage to furnish prints suitable for pilot briefing. It is recommendgd that the K-18 be wed in the initial target photography thus providing wider coverage and more suitable photographs for pilot briefings. The Air Force is currently using the K-18 for area coverage 'and should be a source of this type of photography. -11- U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California (6) The interchange of target photography within the Task Force has proven invaluable and is a step toward the desired coordination required of all available sources of combat photography. (7) PhotogTepkic interpretation can 'be aided by a system whereby inforna%m from grD.und foxes on description or charactnristics of typical enemy D!-.?i tary j.natc!.!.!. a:t:ioas, buildings, equipment, cornouflage, etc., could bl diss -i:1:?::1 t4 t.o force pnot,o interpreters. This would materially facilit?.I the .BJC'?~:;; G.< the Lrrt~~rpetwsand solvg the mystery of the many unidentified build5si;: ,r..-C.. chjccts so frequently reported. T, U. SISSON copy t3o: CX.; (hdvance) ( 2) VSS VALLTY IQRGE US5 PHILIPPINE SEA USS PRINCE;TDN uss SICILY COMCARDIV-5 COMAIRWJT CObkIRPkC From: Cornanding Offiaer, U,S,S, LZY?!3 (CV-32) I Tot Chief of Naval Operations 8JAN 7951 via: (I) Commander Carrier Division ONT Commander Seventh Fleet Commander Naval Fomes, Far Zast )+6? Il+i/ (4) Commander in Chief, U,S, Pacific Fleet Sub3: Narrative Report of Action for the period 1 December 195aO through 26.December 19'50 I' I Ref: (a) CNO ltr OP /a8 ser 1x97~34of 3 Aug 195 (b U.S.S. UY er 0gA of 9 NQV 1950 (c U.S.S. ser @I21 of 18 D (d IU.S.S.' L3Ym Action Reports "2 1. The U,S .So UYT3 (CV-32) Narrative Re is forwarded here- with in accordance with Fference (a), V \ u,s,S. LLY~(CV-32) a unit of of Japan, OK was Rear Admiral 3.C , 131 U.S.S. PWILIPPIrn SZA (CV47). CarDitrTHR22) (CTC 77.3) in U,S,S, US), ComDeeRon 11 in the U,S,S, U,S,S. UBFEXtG (DD-759), 'U,S,S. CHlrNprLElR (CD-717), Ron 2 in the WiS,S, SON (D0-785), U.S* BRINKGY BUS (DD-&3?), .I %e U,S,S, LTF3 conducted @-Order 3-50 bddam dispata support United Nations Forces in bat air patrol and December, Air Group TIBE was comitt'ed p sions in the Chosin Resrsrvoir and Hungnam A~ea. t 4. PART .II (a) Total sorties for December 1950: -1124 r' Sorties pver Korea 1. 781 Sorties over W-77 343 Total hours flown I 3210.9 hrs. %taL days operations 2 Days on vvhich air operations conc.uched 18 c CHRONOLOCJICAS, aRD-% OF 3"Ts :Continme nayimwn effort close support missio the ChosinReservair Area, This was the second d max- ' imUm efforb close support missions in thfs area in supp ort of ground troups encircled by Chinese Comunist Troop&,. Durijng instrument flight opereitions along route to dnd sno@storks in the action area 22 Forties including night sorties were flbm,, Continued maxhum effort close support missions in the Chosin Reservoir &Sea. Clom Support 'ded fop Firstr bhrine &vision un~er.mss attack by se Communist Troops, Continue2 aupprt Plights until 20381 wPth night , intruder aircraft. . BA sorties were flown, 6 2/3/50 : Cbntinued ma~bmeffort close support mi Chosin Reservoir Area. Close support pro to. Firs%Jlarfne Division. .36 Rapalm Bombs were expended on two pmaU.el ridges I& miles long cr Cammunist Troops holding these highly s positions along the only rrsab3.e route k sorties were flown. I 12/4/50; Continuel? mwimw eff Chosh Reservoir, (Koto-Ri) Area, brashed in Khtoqli A caused b9 en- anti- Jesse L,, rn@, 5cXc477, juries and was unable to LTJG T,J,' HUDN3R Jr. BUMO. 82050 wheeis ed to remove Jesse FROWN who was e. HuRER and rescue helicopter pi1 -2- 12/6/50: Rejoinei TF-77. RecomeMaeti close supprt 4liss&ons over ' Ghosin Reservoir Area zt a301 with Night Xntruder Missions using Mark 6 flares to illwninaie enemy troop, eoncentrat- ions. 67 sorbies were flown, 12/7/50r Cmnencec! flight operations vith $et TARCAP over, Chos3.n Reservoir and oont%nued maximum effort close air aupport miss'iws throughout the day. 72 sorties were flown, 12/9/50: Continue? with ttiaximuct gffort clbse support dssions cover- i"ng withdrawal of First Xarine Division from Chosin Res- ,ervoir to Hamhung. 82 sorties were flown, i i 12/10/50: qontinuec! mc?xhurn effort close suppo mj,ssions covering final stages of First harine Divisio wi$hdraw&L to Hamhung. 61 sorties were flown. 1 U/l1/50: In logistics, support area. SeplenisfieC 117& 1 gallom of fuel oil, 68,194 gallons aviatAon gasoline, 120 tons of ammunition an? 99 tons of Fresh, frozen and dry provisions. l2/l /50: Strike flights were directed against Huichon, Banggye and honsan, with close support missions in the Oayonbo, Song- jin and Yu~un-Ni.areas. kD4> BUNO. $23883 hit a high * ' tension wire irnd crashei in Korea beh- enemy l$neSm Pflot LCDR R.M. BkG&U, 85753, U. S. Navy, Squadron Corn- mancier of VA-35 of C-3 was capture? by enemy troops ,kind, *. i is missirig in action. 81 sorties were flown, U/L3/50: Strike flights were. fl & Kuchu and Tokchon areas, ,Highly effective close port rcissions were flown in dupport' of troops holi-:ing the perimeter at Hamhung. -87 sorties were flown. of troops holding perimeter at Hamhung. Strikes were Cirected into Fusen Reservoir area against Chinese Red Troops .and troop replaaements moving into Hamhung area. 56 sorties were flown. 12/15/50: Replenished in the logistics area, Receiver?. 322,036 gal- lons of fuel'oil, 151,008 gallons of aviation gasoline, 38 tons of ammunition, 37 tom of provisions, truder,&ssibns in the , itrerse weather conditions k. 'suppOrt missions in Hwgnam sez port area, oops covering evwuation operations. 53 sorties were flown. 12/18/50: beliverec? 99,832 gallons of fuel oil to U.S,SI, HIWa (DIHZ-€B6), 32/19/50: Replenished all day. ,Reeehed 22&,l!54 gallons of fuel. oil,* . 44,987 gellons of avietion gasbline, and $G tons of aim- ' unftion, U/2Q/50: Close suppakt missibns and TARCAP covered the HwtgnAm areal Strikes Rere directed against fihwToejo area, 74 so,rties , were flown, 12/21/50~ Close support missions covered Hungmm perimeter and gun fire spotters flew missi6m i.n coordination with surface naval units in the sane area, 78 sorties were flown. I U/22/50: Replenished at sea, Rbceived l26;789 gallons of fuel ailq . 70,770 gallons of aviation ggaoline and 75 tons of ~m- unition, I \ 1!2/23/50: close Support missions covered Hungncun perimeter and gun 1 fire spotters flew aissiorq in coorlination Nit$ surgace units in the same area, 74 sorties were flown, I 12/24/50: Close support missions covered Hwgnm perbeter and gun fire spotters flew missions in coordination with swi$ae naval units Sn the same area, Deep support missions were dbectsd at targets the Punghori, Chosin Reservoir end Wagaruri arms, 71 sorties ware flokn, 12/26/50: 3nroute from Strike ttrea' to Sasebo, Japan. l,0531 mobred to bow #lP&asebo-Ko, Ja~anj ,- -4b ,. DAIY CAS AIRCRAFT ' Itoca%%X? TARG3TS HIT 33 6 Kunu-Ri Troop concentrations 34 8 Kunu-Fi Troop concentrations 35 1, Chotjen Reservoir Troops 36 2 Chosen Reservoir B?oogs 37 2 Chosen iteservoir WoQPs I 38 k Chosen Reservoir Troops 39 7 Chosen Reservoir Bivuoac area 40 4 Choseq Reservoir ?S?OOpS k3. 8 Chosen Reservoir Troop emplac enents 4.2 2 Chosen Reservoir Troop ; ridges 43 4 Chosen Re8erveir Troops ,ehilplacer+~ents hr, 6 Chosen Reservoir Troops;emplaoeaents 45 4 Chosen Reservoir Troop6 ,enplacmLents 46 7 Chosen Rss ervoir Troops, enplacemonts b7 2 Chosen Reservoir Troops; enplacements 48 4 Chosen Resemir troop^, amplacements 49 IS North of Chosen Res, 'Poops, emplacmerrts 50 8 ChoSen 3eservoir ' Troops, enplacements 5s. ' 5 Chosen Reservoir Troops ,emplacerrkents 52 r, Chosen Reservoir lYoops r, Woops' 53 Chosen R4semro x. 5s 4 Chosen Rese Troops,emplaaements 55 s Chosen Rese mops 56 5 Chosen Reservoir Troop - 3 Chosen Reservoir Troops,emplacements, 57, buildings 58 ia Chosen Peservoir Troops,buildhgs 59 7 Chosen Reservoir Woops 60 r, Chosen Reservok Troop 61 8 Chosen Reservoir 62 Chossn Resemlr Troops 63 G&~JSQFesepvoir Troops 64 2H Chosen Reservoir Truck 65 ' 3 Chosen Reserwh %oops 66 4. Chosen Reservoir Troops 67 4 Chosen Reservoir Troops 68 r, Chosen Reservoir Troops .. 69 5 Chosen Bes ervoir ~roups,gun eapiacenent ,I 70 2 Chosen Reservoir Troop * n 5 Chosen Resei;nrok Troop ,emplacements 72 h. 'Chosen Reservoir Troops ,ap&acenent s I 12.D 13' ll Chosen Qesarvoir Troops ,emplacements r I 16 Chosen Reservoir Troops, emplac anent s 6 Chosen Reservoir Troops, emplac ement s a Chosen Reservoir Troops ,emplacements ;I buildings < Chosen Reservoir Troopb ,emplacements buildings < Chosen Reservoir Troops ,emplacements 4 buildings . ; Chosen Reservoir Railroad trestle,'tr ps f2/9 80 3 ' Chosen Reservoir Troops 12/9 61 5 Chosen Roservofr Troops + u/9 82 , 6 Chosen Reqervbfr Tlroops 12bO 83 7 Chosen Reservoir Troop 12211 84 4 Chosen Resermir Troops,emplacements 12/11 85 ,6 Cho s-en Reservoir Troops, emplacements ' 12/11 86 2 Chosen Reservoir Troops ,emplaCements 12/11 87 4 Chosen Reservoir Troops emplac merit s Z$ll 88 4 Choscfl Reservoir Troops ,emplacements 12/11 89 3 Chosen IZese"rvoir Troops,emplacements , 12/11 90 2 Chosen Reservoir Troops,emplacements , 12/12 91 8 Chosen Reservoir Troops ,buildings, trucks 12/12 92 12 Chosen Reservoir .- Troops ,buildings, trucks 12/u 93 17 Chosen Reservoir WOOPS ,bd.ldingS j trucks 12/12 94 2 Chosen Rasemob Troops, buildings, . trucks - 12/12 95 2 Chosen Reservoir Troops, buildings, trucks l2/&3. 96 8 Chosen Reservoir Traop~ja@Rcetnerrts 12/13 97 10 Hl.U-lgIl?lLl Troops,emplacements 12/33 9s 9 Hungn:m Troops; mpIac,ements J-W.3 99 i 4 Hungnan Troop, emplacements 12/u 100 4 HaBaru-Ri Troops, emplac eme nt s u/l3 101 4 Chosen Reservoir Troopsjemplacements 12/13 102 k Chosen Reservoir h.oops;emplncunents , 12/13 103 10 Chosen Reservoir Troops, emplacements 12/14 104 16 Chosen Reservoir I Troops 12/U 105 Irc, Chosen Reservoir Troops / 12/17 k06 2 Chuhari Mops, amplacements 12/1'J 107 4 Chuhari WOOPS; emplacements 12/17 Wt3 8 KO t043i Troops,empfacements -6- WSICaa \ -- 12/17 109 6 Troops ,emplacements w4.7 uo 10 Troops;emphcemen%s 12/20 u 12 Troops, buikings 12/20 u2 5 Troops ,buildings 12/20 l3.3 4 Troops ,buildings u/20 1l.4 6 Troops, buildings 12/20 115 6 .T~oo~s,building@ 12/21 ll6 9 Troops,buIldings, trenches 12/21 317 6 'Ik.oops, builciiqs, trachee 12/21 118 6 WQO~S,buildings ? tkenches 3 Troops buildinget trenciges. 12/21 120 5 Troups&uilcZnp, trenches 12/21 221. 6 Troops ,buildin& trenches 12/21 122 rc Huni.;nun WOOPSj build infis 8 t renckw 0 12/21 123 ;G Chosen Reservoir Troops,buildings, trenches 12/21 3-24 2 . Chosen Reservoir Troops ,buildings, / \ trencheb 12/23 125 6 ,+ . Yonpo Xfrfield Troops, emplac anent s, I supplies 12/23 226 3 Tonpo Airfie&d Troopis, ernpI.acements, supplies 12/23 3-27 6 Ydnpo i,irf feld Troop,emplacemats, supplies , 12/23 U8 4 Troopis 12/23 3.298 -4 Fuel storage piles I ' 3-2/23 I30 6 12724 131 16 Chosen Xcssrvoir 5 Chosen Reservoir Foop,buU.Zings 5 Chgrsen Reservoir Troops,build&$. 12/24, 134 4 H&Mg Airfield \ P%FmW*C3 OF CRDNANCS MA!lXRIwI AND 32UIFWNT (a) Orclnatlne expended during the period 1 December to 26 December 1950: -m -QUANTITY Bombs: lW# FRAO 1,496 220# FRAG 360 350 ADB 2 So# GP 63 20w GP . 6 , MTAL 1,927 bombs 311,230 psunds Napalm: Uk-5 and MK-12 (6%mixture) \ Flares: lik-6 , 40 PART IV I 1__ (b) &kcraft: F9F ti'4v AD TOTAL F9F F4U AD TOTAL Last: 02 3 5 I 0 '1 2' Damaged: 0 4 9 13 01 0 L -TAi2GB -/ Buildings Railroad Trestle \ Highway bridge Towns occupiec! by enemy forces (sto 100 percent destroyed) Armunition Dump Fuel Dmps Supply mps Tanks E Arored Cars hCb hconotives Railroad Cars Oxcarts Jeep vehicles Horses ken' Field Fieces Mortftr positions (silenced) Conrrand Posts ,Artillery Observation Post Machine Gun Nesta (silenced) / Hngaru-Ri during a Chosin Reservoir fight. PART V i 3, Medical: 7 i (b) Injurieqt h) Aircraft 4 ' 2) hjor 3 I, &nor 29 (01 Surgeryr (1) Ship's Company 18 (2) Fron Other Ships 0 (3) Major Surgery 3 (4) Minor SuSgery .I5 (d) Average number of patients treatec: dnflj - 75- Out patients, Average nur,lber of patients on sick list, daily + U, (e) First Aid Lecturps to various divisions - 4 k (f) Cknercl. Health of the crew, Training Films ana Lectures / (1) General health bf the crcjw has bcen good. I (2) "rainini;. films were shown and lectures werb given on the yrobh lens of survivaL to the entire shi;ts cornpany and a'ir gmup during the period covered by this report, [3) UuriW the rinth 17 veneral disease training films and lectures were given to rar,ztlinder of ship's company and air group per- sgnnel who wpPe unable 'to attend lectures during November, as well. as all new personnel upon reportin;; aboard during this . . honth. 2, Dentalr During the nonth of Dccaber, the Dental Departnent f3tnffed by two Dental , Officers and four dental technicians coapleted 725 restorations, surgically exfiracted 15 teeth, performed 66 uncomplicated extractions aDd, rendered 150 treatments at 594 hclividual sittinp. 3,012 restorztions were completed since 5 Segtember 1950, * (a) Aircraft Conposition of Air ,Groups 0 (1) During the period 10 October to 25 December 3,350, the'U.S,S. L3YZ was in? the Korean Theater for a total of 76 days. During this per- iod, air operatSons were conduoted on 49 days and a total of c -10- ' (2) The aimraft complenent by type assigned to the ship was as . foUows g (3) 'he followin& figures represent the average availability of Air Group Threefs aircraft by type over the period of 49 days of aik operations. . I '11.7 FYFrs 77.7% 33.7 F4U's 85.l$ 20.4 ADls -. 82.1% Average availability for all Air Group Three aircraft vas 81,6$. %is is consider& to be a very high contindm skm&.M dg craft maintenance at sea. me mJor difficulty was the non- receipt of spare parts, If AOG aircraft were discounted avail- ability would have been about 8'@, \ (4) The number of total sorties, and sorbies hown ov,er Korea are jn the I indicated by type, follming fi,:ures: SRTIES 1 SGRTI3S OEit KOJSA .llc3 1 821 FStp 207 F9F 1,1586 F4W 1,291 Flcfl 0 962 AD 750 AD TOTAL: 3,369 %TAU 2,248 , (5) Ordnbce expenditures by offensive sorties over Korea were as follows 2 F9F 33,698 153 646 F4U 473 i 12,461 + I F9F -0oO 000 000 000 F4u 5,394 OOO 116.58 k96 2 518 ’ 70 %+. 51 a26 ;+ mmz: -7$m- 213 (6) Although comperative sfetistics are not awilable on the orcinmce. loads carried by the PRILLiFINS S3A or the VltLUY FORG2, it is considered that plane complement of the UYTE:’Air Group provided greater inhekent bomb and rocket load carrying capacity for the I( effective destruction of enemy trdops, equipment, shelters, and supply lines, (a) Jet planes assigned to the ship, although two less than a nor- nal 18 plane sqwdron, were sufficient to meet scheduled de- nmnds of C@, TAi3CkF, Sweeps and condition 10 aircraft. It is sccorienc‘ed that the complement of jet aircraft for all CV-9 class cmxG.ers be lhitqd to one squadron of ‘18jek-fibhters, ’ ‘&is is conqiderei the most effective coiiijplement of aircraft fa any operations forseeable in the near future because it allovrs for the raiximumnumber of attack type aircraft and yet provi an adequate jet defense for the Task Force and strike moup. ., (b) The statistics ,given herein and above seea to confirm the ab- ove principle ant! recommendation. The comparative attack capacity of various possible Air Group compoqitions followr -L3YE * PHIL SSA* CkWIa*X FqF 16 24 18 Fllu 40 34. 24 52 82 70 .532 nockets 576 Rockets l48,000# Bombs 192,OOQf Bombs (b) Rockets 680 Rockets 656 Rockets 684 Rockkts Jets ’ 168,ooo1y Bombs ll+%,OOw Bombs 192,000# Bomb8 * Approximate present operations complement, .W1 Hypotheticall Air Group consid,ering no Ff+Uts available. -12- i 'lb) Aviation Ordnance: DECLASSlFIE0 .(L) In operations on board this vessel involvine the *$of shipboard ordnanc.e handling equipment the following difficulties have been encountered: (See USS BY= serial 1513 of 1 December 1950 to CcmAirPac)' (A) MK 4 ~omband Torpedo ~ruckr (1) The MK 4 MOR.0 .Bomb and mrpedo Truck is wed to move ah- craft ammunition from bomb elevators to the rekpective kefx. dy sep6ce Ammumiti been found that the b and Torpedo Truck is the brake cable is ve broken, pasgage of the loaded truck over barPier cables ' sets the brake. To release the brhke it is thennecessn to unload the truck, turn the brake acuiting drum by ha , until the wheels are unlocked, refoacf the truck, and contsi ue passage to ready service'locker. The current use of Davis type jet barriers present aclditional problems in movt ment of this truck over the flicht deck, lhese difficut- ties could be eliminated by the we of larger wheels on the truck to raise the carriap of the truck higher the deck, k stronger manner of securing the brake aCU8t-r ing cable to the brs&e acuatini: c$+um, pLus the use of 1arr ger cable woqlc? elininate the problem of breakdown in thq brake mechanbm. (B) Bomb Ski&: (1) All bdmb skicis should be eciuippecl with the- type sec- urinb strap rather than Cht web straps now generally in us< The web straps have poven to be unsatisfactory due to t28 deterioration .of ehe straps because of exposure to elealente and wear &orn norim1 ,usage. (C) Bomb Skid Adapbr: (1) 'lhe MK 3 Boob Skid. Adapter currently used to transport W&its is not satisfactory due to @bgmon~indicated below: (a) Xacks for stowa$e of HVAI'tfs on adaptars are construct- ~ ed of metal which bends, (b) HVAnfs aye not sufficiently well secured in ac?apterj and at times during5 transport over flight deck the HVARrs are tumbled on to the f3&ht deck. -13- the me of stronger qietal is recommended. (d) TO remedy condition in regards to insecurity of HVA~~~Sin adapter it is recornended that a metal securing strap, shaped to contour of HVAR motor be manufactured, anc! hinged to inboard of adapter, k flange should be added to the HV& rack and this flange shou3.d be slottecl, to acdohodate a + securing pin, .The securing p3n can be manufactured out bf unthreaded metal stock and have a wiw type nut, backed by spring pressure to effect locking of metal strap to flange of' HVAB adapter stowage rack, (D) Bomb Skid Stowage: (1) At present no allocated slawage 'space on' $light deck exist@ for the stolage of bomb skids. As a result of this condi-. tion bomb skids are stowed where space permits. The need i for empty bomb skids on the fliGht &ck is justified by vMue of thPe need far jettisoning of bombs and rockets b? bg ever present when engaged in combat operations, If stow- racks were constructed, a greater number of bomb skids could be stored on the flight deck without necessity 'of utilizing actual deck space. HRving bomb skids stowed in a definiate loaction will greatly expedifW skid proc- , urement by all ordnance personnel when need for jettisoning a c?eck load of aircraft ammunition becomw8 necessary, (2) Tnc present parachute flare'suspension band has proven to be unsatisflilctory fbr Use on MK 55 B90D 0 Bomb IZacks and it ib necessary to man&wture metal suspension bands, as well as Wut downlt to proper size, excess suspension bands from the lOQ# I'kter Fillec? Bombs. ,It is recommended that a new type suspehsion band for all parachute flares be msnuf'act- ured, wing the type used on -loo# Yater Filled Bombs as a mCie3.. (3) 'fhe T-2 ts;pe of gun neater employed on the 20 I54 aircraft gun has a service U,fefl of from 4 to 6 hohs, The shwt %.fett is accredited to the fact that the heatiw eleAent of the T-2 gun heater is too &agile, Qoughtr arrested . landings by aircraft causes a breakdown of the heating ele- ment. {4) The firing pin in the T-31 20 &&I n'ircraft gun is subject t0 what is considerecl excessive breil..kcTbe* Due to this hibh breakage it is often necesstlry to change ring phs pfter approximately ro&ds of amunition hav (5) Thc electrical (canndn) connection Itpinst1 of the MK 55 WD 0 Bomb Rack are extremely brittle and therefore are subject to excessive breakage in normal service. The electrical connectisn rlpinsIl on the MK 55 MOD 0 Bomb XacP which suffer the greatest mortality are in the bomb rele c4rcuit of the MK 55 *B6oD 0 Bomb Rack, Due to operationa bequirements I it is equentiy necessary to install an4 remove the biK 55 MJ 0 Bamb.Rack from the aircraft, and it is during the iasta tion and removal operations that *thB' rrpFns*t prevent the c6mpletion of the eleotrical bombing circuit and result. in t'hunglt-binbs being returned to the' i carrier. (6) The MK 5 MOD 5 Rocket Launcher presently in use on th4 F4U4 &ode1 faircraft'is not constructed wen enough to &&* tah the weight of the HVhR, Numerow cases cvf MK 5 XCE3 k rocket launchers breaking, when planes are texing forward'; or are towed into the tlspt" hare eccured, and the rocket have drppped on deck as a result. It is recomaended that c? bracing method be devised for the rocket layncher post (front and rear). Due to method ,of sehrbg 5 hDD 4 1. rocket launcher mounthb plate to wing, ancc employment of,. the rocket launcher to carry HVS*s Uw'ttrivetstf of the, tlskint' on the widg of the aircraft "work" loose an2 sepsr- ate from the ribs of the wing, . f (7) Cold weather anc! high winds across f2igbt deck especially during predawn hours, constitutes a great prdblem in loady ing of airoraft wing stations with ordnance material. (8) Loading of the wing stations of the 19 type aircraft wi%h orchance material weighing mre than the HVL.X,'is a majoi. prablan of ordnance loading, Developent of a means' to lo$d the wing stations, safely mcl rapidlyb to mxbtm eapaciey on the,AD type aircraft, urgently needed. / b I. , (c) Comunications : ., . I I Two tactical circuits are not considerec' suffieient for even the tactical weds of the Task Force. (See LSYTS serial 098 of 21 NOV- ' ember 1950.) Current uswe of either or both for achinistratfve tr2ff- ic ac'cls an excessive bwdent,o an aheasy overloaded system. Tt is recowaenc?ed that ac"3ninistrative traffic be removed from the tactical \ circliits. ' / 5 December Fuel Oil 344,652 gallons kvia t ion Gas oline l25,OOO gallons iunmunit ion 205 tons 8 December Fuel Oil - 35,296 gallons Aviation Gasoline 63,156 gallons Ammunit ion 75 tons 11 December Fuel Oi3. 5 U7p413.gallons kviat ion Gasoline 68,W4 gallons Ammunition b 120 tons I Fresh,frozen,dry provisions 99 tons 15 Decemher Fuel Oil ' 322,036 gallons Aviation Gasoline l5&,OO8 gallons hwit;ion . 38 tons Gresh,frozen,dry provisions .- 37 tons - 19 December Fuel Oil 224;154 gallons Aviation Gasoline ,44,987 ga11ons , Ammunit ion I t& tons 22 December Fuel Oil 326;789 gallois Aviation GCISO~~~S 70,770 gallons Amnlunitiofl 75 Tons ,* (2) THe U.S.S. IEY"3fs' reardng,operations 8 Jkcember 1950 from the U.S.S. UT KATUX (~1.346)was conc?ucted durinf: darkness with the aid of cargo lights, Despite the dght operations the rearming rate achieved was 80 short tons per hour, This excellent rate of transfer reflecte?. a high degree of orgsnization and coordination on.both the supplying and the receig'ng ships. (3.) On 15 DcceliIber 1 50 the U.S.S. UYE (CV-32) rearmed from the'U.S,:, ~ PAFLICUTIN\ (A348? under diffi-cult oonditions cawed by heavy seas. ever, a transfer rate cf 55.9 short tons per hour was mah$ain- as a result of excellent performance of personnel on both the receiving ,and suppXy& ships. (e) UU, I)ama,~efrom Jettisoned HVAR: '(1)On 17 December 1950 at 3.3441 a HVf3 rocket t hat fallen a 0 lanc!in& airplane was Jettisoned from the t &ok level, fr,me number 126, starboard side. The rocket w en to travel aft and towards the ship and then finally exploded deep in the water. 1 -%- I (3) '%is dama;e was repair& tunporarily by welling rivets in the lap seam of "Gfl and "H" straps an<. building a small steel cofferdam in the bottom of B-79-F in the dacla,pxi area. The split in the bulk- head of T. €3. #l qas Gut out and a plate patch welded in its place, . copy to1 USS FRINC3MN COMCARDIV5 CON%lRLANT COWRPAC , .. DEcrAssmEb 'From: Commanding Office?, U.S.S. LTTP (CV-32)-, To: Chief of Naeal OpeG%ions DOVV'NGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS. Via: (1) Commander CZrFicr Division ONT DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 EARS (2) Command'tir Swmth F1% DOD DIR 5200.10 (3) Command% Navnl Forces, Far Emt (4) Commander in Chief, UeCS, Pacific F1c.et A Subj: Narrative Rwrt of Action for the period 7 January 1951through 19 - January 1951 Ref: a) CNO ltr OP-B45/aa ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950 b) U.S.S. LTT3 Action Reports "439 through 505 of January 1951" 1c) U.S.S. LTTE ser 092A of 9 November 1950 (d) U.S.S. LqTE ser 0121 of 18 Decr?mber 1950 (e) U.S.S. LTTE ser 08 of 8 January 1951 1, The U.S.S; LTTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action for January 1951 is forirarded herewith in accordance with reference (a) P*W I COMFYISITION OF FORCTS /AID MISSIONS The U.S.S. L%TE (CV-32) sortied from Sasebo-Ko, Japan on 7 January in accordance with ComCarDiv ON3 classified dispatch 0523452 of January 1951 as a unit of Task Group 77.3 to join Task Force-77 opernting in the strike area, Sea of Japan, Task Force-77 was composed of tha following: OTC was rear Ad- miral E.C. IWdN, CTG-77.3 (ComCarDivOhril;) in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINS S& (CV-47). SOP!. Vice E.dmiral STRUBLE, U.S. N. Commander Seventh F1e.t in the U.S.S. MISSOURI, ComCarDivFIVT and CTF-77 in the U.S.S. PRDICETON, Comdesronll in the U,S,S, WILTSIE. Shipts included: U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-69), U.S.S. PHILIPPIN3 SdA (CV-47), U.S,S, PRINCr>rON (CV-37), U.S.S. V',U@ FORGd (CV-kT), U.S.S. JUN~AU (CLU-U~), u,s.s. XNCH~TQ (cM~), U.S.S. ST PNL (cw~), u.s.~. B&FE (DD&&358), U.S.S. K&L& (DDL765), U.S.S. NORRIS (DDL859), U.SS. MC CAFFaY (DDL86O), U*S.S, GuRKd (DD-783), U.S.S. HJ"QSON (DD-785)9 U*S*S* TEDMAS (DD-833), U.S.S. OZBOURN (DD-846), U*S.S* SHJi;LTON (DD-790), u*S*S*KY-d3 DD-787), U.S.S. HIGBd (DDR-F306), U.S.S. 1SBli;L;L (DDe869), U.S.S. BRINKLa BJ'*SS IDD-887), U.S.S. STICKWaL (DD-888) and U.S.S, DUNCLN (DD-874) . The U.S.S. mTd (CV-32) conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDiv 0NZt.s Op.Ordw.- #,!+-'jO and air operations plans Z.1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4 as modifigd by daily dispatch arders, The mission was to support Unitod Nations Forces in Korea and to-furnish defensive cambat air patrol and anti-submarine pabrol for Task Force Sevnty Seven. TOTAL SORTIES FOR J"I!*RY 1951: ZaB Sorties over Korea 300 Sortips over TF-77 162, Days in cpera.ting area 12 Days on which flight operations were conducted 7 Total hours flown 1,456.9 hrs . CHRONOLQGIC!L ORDSR OF hVlinl'TS 1/8/51: Conducted wsather recco over South Central Korea. Further air , strikes cancelled by OTC duq to poor visibility over target area. 1/9/51 No flight operations were conducted on these dates due to low tku ceiling and poor visibility. 1/u/51: 1/12/51: In logistics support area. Replenished kl, tons of ammunition, 18,732 gallons aviation gasoline, 8,590 barrels of fuql oil. 1/13/51: Corn-nced flight operations with TARCLP over South Central Korea. Close Lir Support Missions and TARCiS wr" flown pver the Suwon and Wonju areas in support of advance patrols engaging the enemy in those areas, 69 sorties were flown, l/U/51: Air operations consisted of-concentrated close air support missions in the Ionju and YongwDl areas, A photo rpconnaissance mission was directed to Seoul for advance planning purposes. !D-3 BUNR 122797 crashad into sea after takeoff as a result of complete engine failure. The pilot, %S D.A, Jacobs, 470708, U.S, Nayy was recovered by L%Td helicopter within 4 minutes after crashing, and was aboard safely ond uninjured within 7 minutes after crash. 109 sorties were flown. 1/15/51: CommencPd air operations with strikes zgainst military emplacemPnts and ammunition dumps in the Kangnung, Wonju, Tanymg and Namdae-Ri areas, destroying 38 buildings and one ammunition dump, Six villages housing %my troops wer5 destroy.3d by Surnhg with napalm and numerous troops wee killpd. 68 sorties were flown. -- I 1/16/53.: Rendezvoused with logistics support group in logistics area. Re- plenished 87.5 tons of ammunition, 328,000 gallons aviation fuel, 6,220 barrels of fuel oil. Receivqd 7 Korean rPfug??s from the Wonsan area who were in critical condition from the U,S,S, NORRIS (DDL859). U.S.S. NORRIS rescued 21 Korean refugees from drifting Sampan upon orders from 0% (Commanding Officer, U.S.S. L-Td). P& ~i (BontinmeSo 2 I-t Id75 I c1 Erp .my CHRONOZOGICkL ORDm L v Li 13 J 1I- I OF .WWITS ED (Continued ) 1/17/51: Conducted air s trikps against Hungnem, Yudong-Ni, Won ju, and Seoul with close support missions h the’Wonju, Yenpl, Nokchond and Hoengsong areas. 96 sorties were flown. 1/18/51: Directed fighter sweeps into tk Hungnam mea, Closn air support I missions were conducted in the Machiri, Hoengsong, Oktongui, 104 sorties were Kusanni, Hajinburi, Yongju and Murungni areas, I flown. I&/!~J Concentrated close air support missions were directed to the Yongwal and bchari areas. At 1512 departed strike area enroute to Sasebo, Japan in accordance with CTF-77 classified dispatch 18033CZ. 35 sorties were flown, (c) CKRONOMGICLL SWLRY OF CTx)sE”, i,IR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR J:dUmY 1951: DATE CB 1: 1-m LOCBTION TAkGETS HIT - MISSION EUPMYED 2 Suwon Troops, houses 3 Won ju Troops, houses 2 Suwon Troops 5 Yongin Troops, buildings 4 Won ju Troops, buikdings r, Won ju Buildings 4 Suwon Supply Dump 5 Won ju Lborted due to weather 6 Won ju Burned enemy villzge 2 Yongwol Tf+oops,tank,truck, bridge 6 Seoul Tank, truck, troops 2 Y ongwol Troops, houses 6 Won ju Troops, military supplies 4 Won ju Troops, houses 13 Y ongwol Buildings, 4 Troops 8 Warehouses 6 Troops,enemy village 4 Troops, buildings 4 Troops,Dest ,~*moDump. 6 Troops, buUdings -3- 3 ‘ 1/17 %56 2 Hung nam Bdldings 1/17 157 2 HUIlgI-lXl Warehouses 1/17 158 2 Y udo ng-N i Troops, Pack Animals 1/17 159 2 Won ju Troops 1/17 160 4 Seoul Troops, enemy village I 1/17 161 4 Pungnh-Ni Supplies,buildings, troops 1/17 162 3 Hungnam Troop column 1/17 163 2 Yongwol Troops, houses 1/17 164 2 Nokchonni Barracks, troops 1/17 165 4 Ilocngsong WO@PS (500) 1/17 166 4 jiongwol Troops, enemy village 1/17 167 4 Yudong-Ni Snemy village, troops 1/17 168 2 ‘rdonju Demy village, troops 1/18 169 2 Mcchiri Troops, houses 1/18 170 4 h oeng s o rig Troops, houses 1/18 171 4 Oktongin Troops, tank 1/18 172 4 Kusanni Gun emplaements, troops 1/18 173 k Ha jinburi buildings 1/18 1’74 2 Yong ju Troops , buildings 1/18 175 6 IbIur ungni ‘Woops, buildings 1/18 176 4 Ha j irlburi 3nemy villages 1/18 177 4 btJon j u Troops 1/18 178 4 Yongin Troops 1/18 179 2 Kusnnni %.any village 1/19 180 12 Yongvinl Troops 1/19 181 4 Iviac hari Troops, buildings L PART I11 (a) Ordnance expended during the period 1 January to 19 Janucirry 1951: -TYPS QUkrlT TITY I Bombs: la# WiG (Daisy Cutters) 2 56 263 9 6 TOTAL 534 Bmbs Rockets: 3.5" 22 511 HVrn 83 1 TOT& 853 Rockets Machine Gun Ammunition: .50 cal. 91;260 20 mi 23 5 466 'I"TAL 114,726 Zounds Napalm: MK-5 2nd MK-12 (%mixture) tanks .341 TOTAL 22,506 # Napalm (b) Performance of Aviation Ordnance : Napalm: With the advent of cold weather, greater cme wm taken that napalm was mixed well in advance of Lake-off, gasolint. w3.s heated whilc I?:&- ing and the mixture w3.s agitated to insure a goo6 llgeltt. Some h- proper burns and duds were still encountered so a continuing record of locati.cn, altitude, arglc of drop and results was Kept to ascertain the causes of fKhre. Of 341 AiiK-12 and Jap F5l tariks dropped, 46 failed to ignite properly. Kost of these were dropped in snow and either slid along on top of the snQw withut the suci6en deceleration and bursting 02 hitting a hard object or they buried themselves in the snow so the results couLd not be observed. It is recori:Lended that a study of snow drops and fuze action be mnc!e to determirie and correct the probable causes of failures under these conditions. (c) 20W Guns: Careful rfiintenmce, routine inspection 2.ncl clwiiing and wiping the guns dry has resulted in excellent 2Ol!&I gun perforlimnce in spite of the cold weather encountered. -!+ BAW DAMAGE (a) Ship: - None (b) Aircraft: 1 COMB AT OFEiATIONJ4L- FqF F4U AD TUTa FP F&U fiD TOTAL Lost : 0 0.0 5- 00 1 1 mmaged: 0 3 4 7 00 0 0 (c) Darnage Inflicted on %my: 1 Buildings containing enemy troops 53, 227 Villages containing enemy troops (LCSS than 5%) 6 (Over 50%) 7 Supply Dumps 00 ,1 fimmunition Dumps 00 1 Tanks 1 2 Trucks 2 1 Gun Positions 2 1 (2t&%i Q,uni) Numerous enemy troops were killed by highly effective close support rnissions in the V:onju - Suwon area. PART V 1. Medical: (a) Casualties : (1) One aviator, 3NS 1iiillia.n George Sagner, U.S. Bavy, reported m;ssing in action in December report officially declared killed in action. (b) Injuries: (1 Aircraft - 1 (2 1;Major -5 (3) Minor - 21 -6- 6 (Continued ) Surgery: (1) Ships Company - 11 2) From Other ships - 0 6, &la-- jor surgery - 3 (4) Uinor surgery - 8 Average number patients treated daily - 125 (out-patients) Average number of patients on sick list d8.Xly -. 10 First Aic! Lectures to various divisions - 19 General Health of the crewI Training Fiband Lectures: (1) General health of the crew has been good. Incidence of vcneretll disease has run unusually high as 2 result of contacts in Sasebo, Japan. (2) Training Films were shcwn and 31 lecturcs were given an the problem of survival to the ships company 2nd air group during tix period covered by this report. (3) During the month 19 venereal diseasc training films arid lecturcj: were given to r(nainder of dhips compnny cult; air group persclnnel who were unable to attend lectures during December as well 3s all- new personnel upon reporting aboard during tiis lliiinth. (4) Seven (7) Korean refugees suffering from frost bitten feet were received on board for treatnent from U.S.S. NOJRIS c;n 1/16/51. They were transferred on 1/17/51 to U.S.S. ISB%,L fm further transfer Lo brmy authorities at Fusan. 2. Dental: During the month of January, the Dental Depni-tmwnt staffed by two dental officers ?.nd four dental technicians completed 460 restorati-om, surgically extracted 13 teeth, performed 50 uncomplicated extractions with 16 nliscellmeous treatments an2 170 oral prophylnxis at 479 in- dividual sittings. -7- 1. Night Operations: (a) Air operations in close support of ground troops continued to emph?.Size that a coniinuing umbrella of aircraft is required over tht front lines in order to provide the air cover vilheii and where needed. It is rel- atively simple to provide this in a reasonable amount during daylight hours and to increase the amount of cover as nore carriers are made available. But, to provide, in addition, an effective night cover to hold down the enemy's nocturnal niovements resulLs in ?, hardship on the flight deck crews, taxi pilots and ordnaoue crews of the daytim operating carriers. Tith three or more carriers however, such cover can be provided. ?he night or all-weather detachmisnts on cPrrFers should be continued in preference to a nipht carrier because all CV deck crew should bt expert, in night operations, arid a more complete overall night coverage is available if rcquireri. 2. lbgineering: (a) lhd main engine :'nd boiler installation of the VYE hr.s worked wi.th:,ut breakdown in over 2$ years and 200,000 miles of steaming. The LX'T?, has only lighted off eight boilers for required full power runs and by steaming c:n four or six boilers has been able to schedule a continuing rotational. upkeep and maintenmce program on all boilers and auxiliary machinery. Six boilers have always been used when jets were scheduled, In ?ill kinds of air operations fron the light winds in the @editerranem to the vc..riablo winds of the Japan Sea, six boiler power for speeds up to 30 knots has proven adequate for even jet opers-tion. 3. Jet Barriers : (a) Another case of a voluntary no-hook jet lrndirip occurred during tnis period of operations. Thc hook of an F9F-2 extended during a catapult shot r?nd the hook shoe w:is broken off. 'ihe pl-ine w,zs brouqht :.,bo,zrd in a norm?l t*.ppronch vvithout hook. Approach speed was 103-104 knots, wind over the deck vcis 42 knots. Davis Barriers 1, 3, 4 arid 5 were rigged. The plmc engaged three bnrriers and wns arres ted sith dnrir:,e to only the wheel fairings. Thg ~;l:!ne was ready to bc flowri 24 hours later. After three sixh successful no-hook 1r:ntiings iii t,he pas% six months, it is considered that the J&vis Pjpe Barriers is very efficient- and causes minimuin damage to the aircraft. It is rccomendeC, however, that touch-down speeds be held iis low as possible. -8- 4. MARK-V IFF Doctrine: (a) It is recornmended that the employment of @ode 2 (personal identific?~I I and l\iode 3 (flight leader identification) of 1Lark-V IFF be regulatcd by specific air control orders from fighter air directors when needed for positive identification. 'Ihe automatic and uncontrolled usu of these methods of special electronic identification severely rcduces thc effectiveness of the designed purpose by saturatirit; the air contrdlers llFPItt scope with too many similar responses so as to preclude positive individual identification. mis is especially tkic case in the air contrc;l urnbrella over the Bsk Forc6. (b) It is recomeride? that during emergency operation, the letter for Mark-Ti identification usagc assigned to a carrier be the letter nppcarinf; on the aircraft configuration as prescribed for U.S. hvy Znd, Air Force AircrAf t . (c) It is recormended that a policy be prrjmulgated for t.he ernerkcricy em- ployment of IFF similar to the following: (1) Aircraft 3quippsd with hiark V System: (a) Plane having emergency, go to hzode 1'1 (3mergency) and key morse identification letter prescribed fcr air group imolved in ernergency. (b) If pkne goes clown, Division Leader or Wi.n@mn of aircraft in emergency turn on Mode IV (3crgency) and key morse identif- ication letter . (c) No two airborne aircraft in same flight should key identification lett cr , -9- DgECLASSIFI ED SPXIAL C~?S(Continued) 5. Air Operations (Total Summary): (a) Air Operations conducted against North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces 9 October 1950 through 19 Januzry 1951: Overall total sorties 3,933 Total Offensive an?, Defensive sorties plus aborts 3,736 Total Offensive sorties plus aborts 2,540 Total defensive sorties plus aborts 1,196 Total overall flight time l0,933,5 hrs. Total tirile over tzrget 2,513.36 hrs. Total offensive sorties less aborts 2,454 Total offensive aborts 84 Total Defensive sortibs less aborts 1,183 Total Defensive aborts 13 Total fidrilinistrat ion Flights 197 Total Offensive flight tine 7;813.5 hrs. Total defensive flight time 2,718.3 hrs . Total Mministration flight time . leO1. 7 hrs . Total the over target under support controller 1,225,43 hrs. Total time over target on strikes 1,287.93 hrs 6. VHF aaclio Installation- in Prhiry Fly: (a) During this period a more complete evcl,lucttion was axle of the AbT/3tC-1 VHF transmitter/receiver installed in Primary Fly on a trial basis. This installation has resulted in more cmplete 2nd flexible control of aircraft. It is especially useful while operating with other carrier: that utilize individud land/launch frequencies. In one instance the flexibility of control resulted in expediting the recovery i-f a Itsick chick" that had just been launched from another carrier, thercbg saving an aircraft an6 possible a pilot. This installation consists of an AN/AIzC-1 unit installed in Primary Fly, with I-oc?~controls, .power supplied from the ships 28 volt system ant! with an antcnna so situated on the mast to give 360' coverage, -10- 7.. , Intelligence: (a) General: Duri@ this period the dir Intelligence Office continued to operate with four permanently assigned officers. All pilots were ' briefed and debriefed in'the shipts Air Intelligence Office by the ship's intel1it:ence officers. This system was initiated due to the . I absence of squadron and air group non-flying intelligence officers. Tt proved a very wrpeditious mkam of accomplishing both briefing and debriefing, expedited the suhnission of strike flash reports and facil- itated the maintewnce of accurate records. (b) Air Intelligence Office spaces: The use of the intelliigencc office for briefing and! debriefing. presents a pmblem due to the lack of sufficierk 1 space available not only for the accormdation of thc pilots of a strike group but also for the display of 'necessary intclligence. Display boards are lacking in nuniber and generally too short to accomodate charts of the entire operating area. In order to partially alleviate this dif- ficulty a 1/250,000 scale chart (AbE I.,-552) of Korea was joined and attached to a roller curtain, This unit was secured to the overhead (with temporary attachments) immediately in front of the chart desk. This location of the chart makes the entire length of the office avail- able for the accomodation of large groups anC makes the chart easily visible for all. For briefing the chart is rolled down (by means of an attached cord) to the desired area. A sheet of clear plexiglsss is suspended before thc chart showing all the information rzquired for tho particular flight. The chart is especially useful in aebricfing ?.ir- field sweeps and armed reconn&zmnce missions which frequently extend beyond the usual operating area. (c) Maps and Charts: In spite cf the difficulty presented in storing and handling the large number of charts used by the air group it is felt that the nature of the operations in the Korean theatre makes it man- datory that a complete set of charts be maintained on board. 'BiS skips inventory of charts of tho Korean area off-loaded in Sasebo totalec! 35,000 sheets. Charts of ezch individuzl series should be carried in enough numbers to provide one sheet per pilot with several spares (a total of l.&O-l5O of each chart). The problem of storage was solved by establishing a ch3rt store room in the blower room adjsinirig the number 2 elevator richinery room, The storc room in the liitelligence Office was used to stock approximately ten to fifteen sheets of ench series of charts, availaole for ready issue. -11- I (d) fnteUfge&e: With a Uw$'&d'*&epW~& thi8 sup ree&Irki 8diiaierrt material to remain ueU idbinied on the mreU aituat$on. . (1) One exception to be noted is that ourreot infomatior) regarding the activity of @ound troop was lacking inthe initial phases of the operating period,. nie importance of having this infosination for accurate briefing and for maintaining high interest level among pilots during close suppol't operations cannot be overemphasieed. The recent initiation by Crlp-77 of a program for submitting detailed accounts of recent ground actiw to carriers and t he inclusion in the General Situation Summaries originated by Commander Naval Forces Far 3ast of detailed ground action was of astreme value to the overall operatirlg efficiency of this ships air group. (e) In several instances during close support work strike groups experienced difficulty in identifying friendly troops. pe problem was due primarily to the fact that ground troops were not prompt in displaying recognition signals and in some cases did not show the correct signals for the day. (f) Recommendations: (I) "hat the practice of briefing and debriefing strike groups as a whole rather than by squadron elements separated in ready row be con- sidered for adoption as standard practice. The adoption of this practice will also serve to decrease the total number of air in- telligence officers required and squadron intelligence officers could be utilized in the main Intelligence Office. (2) That the Intelligence Office of CV-9 carriers be rearranged and refurnished to better utiliae the space now available and to accawnodate more and larger display boards. , (3) %at in the design of the chart storage space for this class carrier, space be made available for a maximum inventory of 75,q charts. . Further consideration ahould be given to the stowing of folded (WAC ahd Filotage charts) and rolled (MS err: Approach charts) chats. (4) mat intefligencs material. be more expaditiausly disseminated. (5) mat ground forces be advised of the necessity for prompt and corred , diaplay of identification signals upon sighting friendly aircraft operating in their area. copy too /;;Lyr-"Y CNO (Advance) (2) /' c.J€c-Jt\c uss srcm > US5 VWYFQIG3 CQMC 2RDTV-5 TI U, SfssCN.. USS PHILIPFIN3 STU COYaLANT USPXNCSXIN ~CUIRPAC ComCarDivFOUEt