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ProQuest Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600

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DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

Duk-Hyun Cho, B.A., M.A.

a|c afc a|e s|e afe

The Ohio State University 2002

Dissertation Committee: Approved By Professor Allan R. Millett, Adviser

Professor John F. Guilmartin ______Adviser Professor William R. Childs Department of History

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright by Duk-Hyun Cho 2002

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT

One key to understanding military operations during the

first year of the Korean War is to explore the relationship

between U.S. Navy and United Nations Command because naval

operations were essential to waging the war in Korea. This

dissertation explores U.S. naval operations, focusing on the

Inchon landing, minesweeping operations, blockade and escort

missions, and naval air operations during most of the first

year of the Korean War. It covers the period from the North

Korean invasion until the Chinese intervention.

The amphibious assault at Inchon involved all the

navy's operational capabilities in Korean waters. There was

a basic plan for the landing: neutralize Wolmi-do, invade

Inchon, seize the major airfield at Kimpo, and capture of

Seoul. With the exception of a few mines, Joint Task Force 7

faced no naval opposition upon landing. U.S. Navy knew that

mines were being used by the North Koreans. Anti-mining

operations were carried out by carrier-based aircraft and

minesweepers. Mining operations was a fundamental

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. requirement for preserving the access to the east and west

coastal waters.

The blockade and escort force's main accomplishment was

the control of the seas surrounding the Korean waters.

Destroying the North Koreans' minefields was a particularly

dangerous part of the task force's operations, especially at

Wonsan and Chinnampo. By means of naval bombardment of the

coastal roads and attacks by carrier-based aircraft, naval

interdiction was extended inland.

Like most modern wars, the Korean War was not

anticipated in its causes, its conduct, and its consequences.

The Korean War was one of the most significant historical

events of the Cold War era. Moreover, the Korean War played

an important role in U.S. naval history. During the first

year of the Korean War, it became obvious that the navy had

an essential role in deterring or fighting a limited,

conventional war during the Cold War era. This came at

atomic of rapidly shrinking defense budgets, in which the

Navy was suffering a disproportionate share of cuts, and

reversed a trend that would have severely reduced the Navy's

size and strength. In some, the Korean War gave the U.S.

Navy a new impetus for its development during the Cold War

era.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dedicated to God

to my wife, Eunsil Oh,

to my parents

and parents-in-law

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I must first express my deep appreciation to the

Republic of Korea Navy for allowing me five years of

historical study abroad and for providing me with

encouragement and financial support while studying in the

United States.

I wish to express my deepest admiration and thanks to

Professors Sang-Sin Lee, Joo-Sik Kim, Drs. Sung-Ho Kang,

Dae-Hyeon Lee, In-Young Oh, and Min-Woong Lee, all of whom

extended to me their friendship and insights about history.

My heartfelt gratitude goes to Professor Allan R.

Millett, my adviser. He has been a wonderful mentor to me as

a Ph.D student at the Ohio State University. He has advised

me on all occasions, trusting in my potential. Without his

encouragement and belief in me, I would not have been able

to achieve my dream of having a Ph.D.

Professors John F. Guilmartin and James R. Bartholomew,

and the people of the military history program have also

been a great influence throughout my academic years at the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ohio State University. They have been a strong motivator to

do my best in any situation.

I also would like to express my sincere appreciation to

Professors William R. Childs and Jennifer H. Lucas. They

have always shown great enthusiasm toward my study and

provided me with insightful comments. Mrs. Marsha R.

Robinson read and commented on different sections of this

dissertation. All the comments and criticisms were very

helpful.

My special thanks also goes to Pastors Keun-Sang Lee

and Hakan Kuh for their prayers and encouragement. Finally,

I would like to express my thanks to my family members: my

parents, parents-in-law, sisters, and sisters-in-laws for

their support and prayers. I thank my lovely wife, Eun-Sil

Oh, for her endless love and care. My son Se-Min and my

daughter Yu-Jin have always been the source of faith, hope,

and love.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VITA

October 4, 1961...... Born - Yongduck, Korea

1986 B.A. Korea Naval Academy, Chinhae, Korea

1989...... B.A. in History, Korea University, Seoul, Korea

1989-1992 Full-time Lecturer in Military History, Korea Naval Academy

1994...... M.A. in History, Korea University, Seoul, Korea

1994-1997...... Full-time Lecturer in Military History, Korea Naval Academy

2000-2001...... Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1995 - Present .Lt. Commander, The Republic of Korea Navy

FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract...... ii

Dedication...... iv

Acknowledgments...... v

Vita...... vii

List of Tables...... xii

List of Figures...... xiii

Introduction...... 1

Chapters:

1. Understanding the Korean War...... 15

2. Naval Operations at the Inchon Landing...... 58

3. Minesweeping Operations...... 90

4. Blockade and Escort Operations...... 137

5. Naval Air Operations...... 172

Conclusion...... 210

Appendices...... 217

A: List of Abbreviations...... 217

B: Major Events of the Korean War...... 222

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C: United Nations Security CouncilResolution of June 27, 1950...... 232

D: Operation Order of Blockade - 1...... 233

E: Operation Order of Blockade - 2...... 234

F: Task Group Organization...... 235

G: Summary of Close Air Support...... 238

H: Proposed Target Arrangement with Navy...... 241

I: Excerpt from COMCARAIR GRP II...... 243

J: Target Arrangement with Navy...... 245

Bibliography...... 247

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1.1 Japanese Military and Civilian Forces in Korea..... 20

1.2 Social Status of the Participants in the Movement.. 20

1.3 The Strength of the ROK Armed Forces...... 32

1.4 The Strength of the NKPA...... 32

2.1 Reorganization of Naval Operating Commands...... 67

5.1 Naval Air Power since World War II...... 175

5.2 Sorties per Carrier Month...... 182

5.3 Sorties per Month: Badoeong Strait and Sicily...... 183

5.4 Close Air Support by USS Leyte...... 193

5.5 Close Air Support by USS Philippine Sea...... 194

5.6 Weapons with CAS Employment...... 195

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1.1 Geographical Position of Korea...... 16

1.2 The Invasion of South Korea - 25 June 1950...... 31

2.1 The Inchon Assault...... 78

2.2 The Inchon Landing - 15 September 1950...... 79

3.1 Map of the Entrance to the Mobile Bay...... 92

3.2 Magnetic and Acoustic Minesweeping...... 97

3.3 Moored Minesweeping...... 105

3.4 Wonsan Minesweeping...... 107

3.5 Chinnampo Minesweeping...... 109

3.6 Chongjin Minesweeping...... 110

3.7 Hungnam Minesweeping...... Ill

3.8 Kunsan Minesweeping...... 129

3.9 Haeju Minesweeping...... 130

4.1 On the Border 27 October - 25 November 1950...... 158

xii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

Historians often describe their art by using the German

historie and geschichte. Historians collect historie or the

story of what happened from raw materials such as memoirs,

lessons learned, command stories, letters, recollections,

oral histories, traditions, legends, and sea stories. They

then question each source, analyze its significance, and try

to discover geschichte or "what actually happened." Such

historical truth cannot be discovered without sustained

application and continued analysis of lessons learned, as

well as the thorough study of the real effects of both

failure and success.1

Samuel P. Huntington asserted that the history of the

nation's defense policy could best be divided into three

periods. Huntington identified the continental period, from

the founding of the Republic down to the 1890s, as an era

during which threats to American national security were

narrowly defined and either originated or were dealt with in

North America. A Navy played a secondary role in national

defense. The oceanic period began in the 1890s and lasted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. until 1945. As the nation began to project its interests and

power across the ocean, the U.S. Navy was now the nation's

"first line of defense." Since 1945 the United States has

defined its national interests even more broadly and

attempted to head off or confront threats to those interests

along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. Throughout

this post-World War II transoceanic period, the U.S. Navy

has been assigned missions that involved the projection of

naval power ashore by means of aviation, amphibious, and

missile assets.2

As Captain Arleigh A. Burke, a future CNO, explained in

October 1949, America is a maritime nation. Therefore,

protection of sea lines and the capability to project power

from the sea were absolute necessities to national defense.

Moreover, the only way to achieve this command of the sea

was through a strong Navy. But the testimony before the

House of Representatives by senior military personnel,

especially senior admirals of the Navy, during October 194 9

sent a shock wave through the United States. The U.S. Navy

was defeated in the political controversy known as the

"revolt of the admirals," in which the Navy unsuccessfully

tried to save a new carrier and challenge the Air Force-

defined nuclear strategy of the era. In many ways the Korean

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. War ignited the development of the U.S. Navy during the Cold

War era.3

The origin of the Korean War goes back to the enforced

division of Korea into two competing and antagonistic states

after World War II, a situation hardly anyone in Korea

wanted, but which was imposed on the Koreans by the postwar

geopolitical pressures of the Soviet Union and the United

States. Russia, acting in 1945 as it had acted for centuries,

tried to keep control of every bit of territory its troops

occupied. North Korea was one of the spoils the Russians

gained in their intervention in the war against Japan.

Another was Manchuria, where Japanese forces, upon

surrendering to the Russians, provided abundant war

equipment that the Russians gave to the Chinese Communists.4

Like most modern wars, the Korean War was not

anticipated in its causes, its conduct, and its consequences.

As Eighth Army commander Matthew B. Ridgway wrote thirteen

years after the conclusion of the war, "Before Korea, all

our military planning envisioned a war that would involve

the world." Confounding military planners and Sunday

supplement seers alike, no stratospheric bombers would

overfly the polar regions to unleash nuclear weapons in

enemy heartlands, no great tank phalanxes would clash on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. frozen plains, no airborne armies would descend on strategic

points.5

The Korean War lasted for three years, between June

1950 and July 1953. It was one of the most significant

historical events to occur during the Cold War era. The

Korean War can be divided into three phases. First, there

was the war between the United Nations and the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea) before the

intervention of the Chinese People's Army (CPA) in November

1950. The second phase began with CPA entry into the Korean

War. General Douglas MacArthur called this situation "an

entirely new war." The third phase was marked by the Allied

high command's decision to take a strategic defensive

posture in Korea after October, 1951. During this period the

Korean War became one of attrition, not unlike World War I.

During the Korean War the American government spent

around $40 billion to fight the war and sent over 2 million

men to the war zone. Of these servicemen 33,741 died in

action, and another 2,827 perished in accidents and from

disease. America's allies, principally the South Koreans,

had 220,000 killed in action, Korean civilian deaths were

estimated at 1.5 to 2 million, while the Communists lost

between one and 1.5 million soldiers.6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Historians, social scientists, and policymakers have

interpreted the Korean War in numerous and sometimes

contradictory ways. Since 1950 the fighting has been

described as a civil war, an exercise in collective security,

a forgotten war, an international conflict, a necessary war,

a police action, a proxy war, and a revolutionary struggle.

This diversity has arisen in part because commentators have

emphasized different aspects of the war's character,

evolution, and origins.7 However, it is important to stress

effective domination of the coasts of Korean waters by

United Nations' navies throughout the war; and the

overwhelming victory achieved by United Nations' air power,

"a victory that helped to bring an end to the conflict."8

The fire of 5-inch shells from the cruiser USS Juneau

near Chumunjin on 29 June 1950 announced to the enemy the

beginning of the Unites States Navy's direct support of the

United Nation's war effort in Korea. Directed to support

United States and United Nations policy in Korean waters,

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East,

organized three combat task forces under the direction of

Commander, Seventh Fleet.9

Control of the sea has been one of the United States'

greatest blessings. As George Washington repeatedly pointed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. out, without superiority on the sea the American Revolution

could not have been won. In the twentieth century it has

been indispensable for victory in the giant world wars that

have shaken our times. In the Korean War it was the

foundation for several successes and the repeated salvation

against disaster.10

Without command of the seas between the Free World and

Korea, and in the waters adjacent to that beleaguered

peninsula, the Korean War, as fought, most certainly would

have been lost both militarily and politically with a

finality that would now be plain to every American.

Operations by ground and air forces were completely

dependent on a steady flow of personnel and supplies, the

bulk of which came across the vast Pacific Ocean. No war

involving the United States exemplified the value of sea

power better than the Korean War. The need of a strong,

balanced, and adequate U.S. Navy for controlling the oceans

for the purpose of denying them to an enemy was made

elementarily clear.11

In fact, the first year of the Korean War was the

critical part, and - arguably - the first six months was the

most critical part of the first year. During that period,

the U.S. Navy played a disproportionately important role in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stemming the North Korean advance and then rolling in back.

The Korean War played an important role in U.S. naval

history, helping to revive the navy and marines from their

post-World War II doldrums caused by budget cuts in the

nation's defense operations and exaggerated claims that

atomic weapons had made the navy obsolete for future wars.

After World War II strategic air power advocates argued that

long-range land-based aircraft were the "only viable means"

for delivering atomic weapons on enemy targets and that no

significant naval force threatened America. But during the

ensuing Korean War, it soon became obvious that the navy and

marines had "a central role" in carrying out the Cold War

containment policies the Truman administration developed

between 1947 and 1953.12

Chapter One explores understanding the Korean War. In

looking back to the history before the Korean War, Korea has

been the invasion route of Japan into Asia. Unfortunately,

the Soviet Union engaged in the war against Japan for only

the last two weeks of World War II. After the war Koreans

had to endure occupation by new foreign powers. In the south

alone, the United States had established a military

government until 1948.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Korean War went on for three years, between 1950

and 1953. For many reason the Korean War is one of the most

influential events of the twentieth century as well as the

Cold War era. During the time period between 25 June and 31

December the U.S. Navy played a fundamental role in the

Korean War. Task Force 77 consisted of from one to four CV-9

class carriers with one cruiser and normally one battleship

in the supporting group and a screen of destroyers.

Sea power again reaffirmed its vital importance to the

United States by enabling the projection of much of the

military strength that it had in readiness overseas against

North Korean forces. It did not win, nor was it expected to

win, the Korean War. However, it did enhance the military

effectiveness of both the ground and air forces to an

incalculable degree. Without sea power, the United Nations

effort in Korea could not have taken place.

Chapter Two examines naval operations at the Inchon

Landing. Inchon harbor had many obstacles for landing

operation. The shortage of time, the lack of rehearsal, the

shortage of trained personnel complicated the always-

difficult problem. One of the urgent priorities to Inchon

operation was intelligence. For this reason, Inchon landing

placed remarkably difficult stresses on the amphibious

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assault chain. As Jervis did before Cape St. Vincent in 1797,

General MacArthur realized that a victory was essential at

that moment.

Preparatory reconnaissance was thorough and daring. A

particularly critical component centered on a small naval

reconnaissance team led by Lt. Eugene Clark. Clark's party,

consisting of himself and four specially picked South

Koreans, was to land on one of the small harbor islands near

Inchon. Lt. Clark plotted and surveyed the defenses and

amended the nautical charts of the Inchon harbor. He radioed

back plenty of information on Inchon and Wolmi-do before the

landing operation. Fortunately, there was no submarine

attack. With the exception of a few mines, there was no

naval opposition. There was no air opposition and the actual

opposition of the landing was light. U.S. Navy had an

essential role in the Inchon landing operation.

Chapter Three studies minesweeping operations during

the period from 25 June to 31 December. The Russo-Japanese

War constituted the first major confrontation between world

powers using modern mines so mine warfare was a well-

established technique. Still, at the outbreak of the Korean

War there was no mine type commander as yet established in

the Pacific Fleet. During this period there was plenty of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. information that mines were being used by the North Koreans,

specifically Russian-made magnetic mines.

During minesweeping operations the enemy utilized mine

warfare and other coastal defenses in an attempt to prevent

or hinder shore bombardment and gunfire support. Anti-mining

operations were carried out by carrier-based aircraft. Up

through November 1950 about 10 United Nations ships were

sunk or damaged by enemy mines in the Korean waters.

Fortunately, North Korean mines were not a serious obstacle

at the Inchon landing. But Wonsan harbor was quite a

different situation. For this reason the Wonsan landing

operation was delayed for five days. Minesweeping operations

were fundamental requirement for preserving the command of

the sea in the east and west coast of Korean waters.

Chapter Four looks at the blockade and escort

operations during this time period. The Korean peninsula was

an ideal location to use a close blockade to isolate

specific areas for the purpose of conducting a war. The

essential components were the cruisers and destroyers with

eyes furnished by such naval air reconnaissance as could be

made available. These were organized into several task

elements united under a single blockade commander. UN

Blockade and Escort Force (Task force 95) was one of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. major subordinate commands of U.S. Naval forces, Far East

(NAVFE).

During this period, ground and naval operations were so

closely inter-related that it is difficult to separate them.

Naval surface units remained on the scene of the landings to

render gunfire support as needed and to give anti-aircraft

protection to the unloading and other harbor activities. Air

reconnaissance in support of blockade and escort operations

was conducted by Fleet Air Wing 6 and VP 6 under CTG 96.2.

The final chapter, Chapter Five, takes a look at an

account of the naval air operations. By means of naval

bombardment of the coastal road this blockade operation was

extended inland along the East Coast. It focuses on

organization, fast carrier, escort carrier, close air

support, and interdiction. Air support of the Inchon landing

started at the beginning of September. Operationally, the

fast carriers have been assigned to Task Force 77 since the

outbreak of the Korean War. Night air operations, essential

to the defense of the Task Force, overtaxed the deck crew

when full daylight operations are also scheduled.

In spite of limitations arising from their design,

escort carriers performed missions assigned in connection

with Korean War in a highly satisfactory manner. Close air

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. support (CAS) missions showed the flexibility of naval

forces, and CAS continued to be the prompt and efficient use

of blockade and escort forces to render gunfire support,

cover, and emergency evacuation. Second, naval air

reconnaissance is an essential part of blockade and escort

operations. Air interdiction was performed by the fast

carriers, originally directly under C0M7THFLT. During this

period naval aviation became progressively more modern.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 Tamara M. Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991), pp.1-2. Leopold von Ranke, a German historian in the late 18th century, assured that there are both sides in history, objective and subjective. We remember Ranke's methodological and presentational achievements which were true to their sources, but have to go along new paths without dismissing his ideas. Ranke polarizes opinions. For example Thomas Nipperdey noted in 1986 that, 'Ranke's idea of objectivity' was even today 'a strong theory.' See Leopold von Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation, translated by Sarah Austin, edited by Robert A. Johnson, History of the Reformation in Germany (New York: F.Ungar Pub. Co., 1966).

2 Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," US Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (May, 1954), pp.483-488; John E. Jessup (ed.), Encyclopedia of the American Military (New York, 1994), pp.365-6.

3 Andrew L. Lewis, "The Revolt of the Admirals," Air Command and Staff College (April 1998), pp.1-14.

4 Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost(New York, Hippocrene Books, 1986), pp.7-8. Peter Lowe, British historian, focuses on the historical context and global setting of the war. His book asserts orthodox interpretation. See Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986). Brice Cumings' book explores Korean-American relations for the ten-year period ending with the armistice in 1953. See Bruce Cumings, Child of Conflict: The Korean- American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983).

5 Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp.8-11; Brian Catchpole, The Korean War 1950-53 (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp.5-13; David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp.3-7; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), pp.45-50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 Allan R. Millett, For the Common Defense: A military History of the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p.504.

7 Lloyd C. Gardner, The Korean War (New York Times Company, 1972), pp.3-6; Steven Hugh Lee, The Korean War (London, 2001), pp.4-7.

8 Brian Catchpole, The Korean War 1950-53 (New York, 2000), xi; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1957), v-vi.

9 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.30-5; Harry K. Griffin, "The Navy in Korean Waters," Army Information Digest 12 (December 1951), pp.12-18.

10 James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, 1962), v; Michael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp.1-5.

11 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.491-5.

12 Lester H. Brune (ed.), The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and research (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp.267-8; Michael Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, pp.252-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING THE KOREAN WAR

By moonlight I sit all alone In the lookout on Hansan-do. My sword is on my thigh, I am submerged in deep despair. From somewhere the shrill note of a pipe Will it sever heartstrings?

Fran War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-Sin1

Approaching Korean History

Korea has been called the "Land of Morning Calm."

Americans who served there also heard Korea's traditional

name, Chosun. Across the centuries that followed, kingdoms

and dynasties came and went in the land the Occidentals

would come to know as Coree or Korea. And some of them left

rich legacies of artistic achievement.2 Since ancient times,

Korea, a geographic pivot point in Northeast Asia, has

played a vital role of barrier and bridge between her

neighbors. The history of Korea has had significant bearing

on the development of Japan in ancient times, and on

international power politics of the region in the modern era

(See Figure 1.1).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. X h o n g jift

Chmiin r f l f M / r

Antunjt/sinuiju

H om hung

C h u n J I ^ f J P y o n g y o ru i

K o t f j g w o LCdHDIIflfM

Seoul

Chungju

P o h o n ji

' L A e V u u n

P * * ' *** /? Tsushima

KOREA

Figure 1.1: Geographical Position of Korea Source: Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York, 1987), p.l.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In looking back over history before 1945 it would be

difficult to imagine a more homogeneous and united nation

than Korea. Whatever Koreans' differences in class, they are

of the same culture throughout the peninsula, and the Korean

printed language - Hangul3 and spoken Hangukmal - is

universal. Korean cultural homogeneity can be illustrated in

its place names, a source of confusion for non-Korean UN

personnel throughout the war: Inchon/Ichon, Masan/Munsan,

Pyongyang/Pyonggang, Kasan/Kaesong/Kaechon, to take a few at

random. Americans complained that "every other Korean is

named Kim!"4

What was ominous about Korea's situation was the

aggressive approach revealed by Japan soon after the Meiji

restoration of 1868.5 Japan was exposed to western

imperialism, but a number of Japanese leaders wished to

develop Japanese imperialism with Korea as the first victim.

The extent of divisions within ruling circles, plus the

urgency of ending feudalism in Japan and fostering

modernization, diminished Japanese threats temporarily.

However, Korea was forced to sign a treaty with Japan in

1876.6

Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States

compelled the leaders of Japan to accept a trade treaty with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the North American Republic in 1854. But the officials in

Washington betrayed no interest in Korea. The first American

minister to Korea, Lucius M. Foote, arrived in Seoul in 1883.

During his sixteen-month tenure as minister, Foote arranged

for a delegation of Koreans to travel to the United States.

Treated with cordiality on their arrival in America, the

delegates were received in Washington by President Chester A.

Arthur.7

In the 1890s, Japan's imperial drive gained momentum,

and it rolled right over Korea. The Sino-Japanese War of

1894-58 was a direct result of rivalry between the two Asian

powers for control of the peninsula. It was triggered by

plots and riots among pro-Japanese and pro-Chinese factions

in Seoul, and was fought largely around the Yellow Sea. The

Japanese, with their European-trained army and navy, won

hands down, and the resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki

recognized the independence of Korea from China, a euphemism

for replacing Chinese influence with a very real Japanese

presence.9

In November 1905, Japan forced the Korean king, Kojong,

into accepting a treaty by which his nation in all but name

became a Japanese colony. Therefore, President Theodore

Roosevelt was petitioned, this time by the Korean monarch

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. himself, to act in accord with the instrument of 1882, and

once again the President refused even to consider living up

to his nation's treaty obligations. When Japan ended the

charade of an independent Korea in 1910 by outright

annexation, the United States looked on with tacit approval.

So much for the Treaty of Chemulpo. Here was "power

politics" at its most cynical.10

The Treaty on 22 August, 1910, was the product of a

conspiracy between some treacherous Korean officials who had

been the target of national hatred and Japanese officials of

the Office of the Resident-General. Articles I and II

concerned the final disposition of the Korean regime which,

a Japanese puppet, had existed in name only, while Articles

III to VII were designed to oversee the Korean royalty,

provide pecuniary rewards to collaborators, and provide

government employment as colonial bureaucrats for those

Koreans who were willing to submit to Japan's colonial

policy.11

The Government-General in Korea absorbed the structure

of the Office of the Resident-General and that of the

Government of the Korean (Daehan) Empire as a step toward

expanding and consolidating Japan's colonial domination.12

During the period from October 1, 1910 to August 15, 1945,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. when it ceased to function, the Government-General underwent

structural reorganization in accordance with the needs of

the times. The deployment of the Japanese military and

civilian police forces in Korea to serve the purposes of

colonial rule is shown in the table below.

Military MP Places Year Police Total Police Assistants Stationed 1908 2,374 4,234 4,991 936 11,599

1911 3,296 4,553 6,007 1,613 13,756

1919 3,417 4,762 6,339 1,826 14,518

Table 1.1: Japanese Military and Civilian Forces in Korea Source: Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, p.248.

As the table shows, the number increased around 1910,

and reinforcement had been completed by 1919, when the

nationwide independence movement broke out.13 In late 1918,

some Koreans came to know of President Woodrow Wilson's

Fourteen Points, and the gospel of self-determination

inspired them to take steps r.o regain the independence of

Korea, believing that militarism was now a thing of the past,

that the age of reason and peace had arrived, and that Korea

had the right to reclaim her independence.14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The nationwide mobilization of all the people on the

basis of religious organizations was the most convenient and

safest method, in view of domestic conditions under the

Japanese colonial policy. The Declaration of Korean

Independence was read before the crowd at Pagoda Park in

Seoul on March 1, 1919, whereupon the citizens demonstrated

in the streets, shouting for Korean independence. The

Koreans who were arrested by the Japanese and brought to the

Japanese court for trial represented all occupations, as is

shown in the following table.15

Class Number % Social Position Of them, only 17 were Farmers/Fishermen 5,074 58 fishermen. Students, teachers, clergymen, Intellectuals 1,929 21 doctors, myon officials, and Buddhist monks. Industrial Cottage industries, mining and 263 3 Workers public works

Grain, general merchandise and Commerce Workers 741 8 brokerage

Food and drinks, clothing, 259 3 Service Workers printing and transportation. Wage-earners, laborers, and Labor/Unemployed 611 7 unemployed.

Table 1.2: Social Status of the Participants in the Independence Movement Source: Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, p.262.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Occupation of Korea

Relations between Washington and Moscow had not been

good since the Communists first came to power in 1917. Along

with other Western countries, the United States had

intervened in the Russian Civil War in 1918, and Washington

had not even recognized the Soviet Union until 1933. Even at

Yalta, however, there were some very substantial differences

between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Unquestionably the most serious of these concerned the

future of Eastern Europe, particularly the status of

Poland.16

The Soviet Union was at war against Japan for only the

last week of World War II. An atomic bomb was dropped on

Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Two days later Stalin declared

war against Japan. Nagasaki was bombed the next day, and on

the tenth the Japanese offered to surrender on the condition

that the emperor be allowed to remain in power. The Allied

reply, drafted in Washington, was intentionally ambiguous,

for President Harry S. Truman was prepared to agree to that

condition but could not do so explicitly, since the American

public would be satisfied with nothing less than

unconditional surrender - and a majority of Americans wanted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the emperor to be deposed and tried as a war criminal. But

Hirohito read between the lines, as he was meant to do, and

decided to accept the terms of the reply. Japan announced

its surrender on the fifteenth. The war was over, but the

role in Far Eastern affairs to which Stalin's declaration of

war had entitled him - and which the hasty occupation of

Manchuria and northern Korea by his troops guaranteed that

he would play to the hilt - would lead, in less than five

years, to the Korean War.17

The first significant contact between "The Land of

Morning Calm" and the West took place one morning in

September 1945 when an advance party of the American Army,

in full battle gear, landed at the western harbor of Inchon,

to be met by a delegation of Japanese officials in top hats

and tailcoats. This was the inauguration of Operation "Black

List Forty," the United States' occupation of South Korea.18

To the relief of the committee in Washington, the

Russians readily accepted the 38th Parallel as the limit of

their advance. Almost a month before the first Americans

could be landed in South Korea, the Red Army reached the new

divide and halted there. It was worth remarking that if

Moscow had declined the American plan and occupied all Korea,

it is unlikely that the Americans could or would have forced

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a major diplomatic issue. To neither side, at this period,

did the peninsula seem to possess any inherent value, except

as a testing ground of mutual intentions.19

The significant difference between northern and

southern zones was that the Russians, unlike the Americans,

chose to recognize the People's Committees as legitimate

local governments. The policies of the North Koreans were,

after all, in keeping with those that the Soviets were

instituting in the countries they had occupied in Eastern

Europe.20 The tragedy was that American good intentions and

anti-Communism would lead to the establishment of a regime

in the south nearly as repressive as that in the north, only

its brutality would not be balanced by economic reform.21

President Truman referred the Korean question to the

United Nations. Over Soviet protests, the UN General

Assembly in November 1947 called for all-Korean elections

under the auspices of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea

(UNTCOK; later the "Temporary" was dropped and this body is

still in existence). The Soviets refused even to allow

UNTCOK into its zone. The United States then successfully

pressed UNTCOK at least to supervise its elections in the

South. These elections were duly held on 10 May 1948 and

resulted in the election of a National Assembly, which then

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. elected Syngman Rhee to the presidency of the newly-formed

Republic of Korea (ROK). These elections were certified by

UNTCOK to have been reasonably fair and representative, the

second such in Korean history.22

In place of UN-supervised elections in the North, II-

Sung Kim called a Communist-sponsored unification conference

in Pyongyang with Tu-Bong Kim as chairman. On 9 September,

1948, Il-Sung Kim proclaimed the establishment of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Actually, the

official title was the Democratic Republic of Chosen,

harking back to the 500-year-old name. But the title is

always translated as DPRK.

Overview of the Korean War

An indispensable and practical tenet in the study of

history is that we should be conscious of how the era in

which we live shapes our perspective on the past. We should

not evaluate history from the simple viewpoint of the

present; rather, the historical perspective should take into

account and assess how past actors viewed their own history.

The Korean War influenced the trajectory of twentieth-

century history, but the people involved in the conflict

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were also intimately shaped by the events preceding it

during the first half of the century.23

Why Soviet leaders ordered the commencement of a war in

Korea is a mystery still locked inside the walls of the

Kremlin. The most logical explanation, perhaps, is that

Soviet leaders miscalculated the American reaction and saw

an easy opportunity to expand their perimeter. Dean Acheson,

Secretary of State, speaking before the National Press Club

in Washington, D.C., defined a United States defensive

perimeter in the Far East that did not include either South

Korea or Formosa.24

The defensive perimeter, said Secretary Acheson, "runs

along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the

Ryukyus. . . from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands... So

far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific

is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee

these areas against military attack. But it must also be

clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary

the realm of practical relationship.25

Secondly, Soviet strategists certainly noted the U.S.

government had not only removed occupation troops from Korea,

but had earlier removed its Marine brigade from the Shantung

Peninsula in China. U.S. military forces were obviously

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. withdrawing from the mainland. Any military move by the

communists into South Korea would probably be unopposed.

Thirdly, any military man, including the Soviets, could

deduce from the just-completed Navy-Air Force debate before

a Congressional committee that the U.S. military strategy

was drifting toward preparation for only one kind of war - a

global atomic one. The constant reduction of the U.S. Army

and Navy made it a calculated and acceptable risk to the

Soviet leaders that the U.S. would not - or could not in

time - interfere in a local, ground-type war in Korea.26

For many reasons the Korean War is one of the most

important events of the twentieth century. Looked at from

several perspectives, it influenced the position of the

United States in relation to all other nations as profoundly

as either World War I or World War II. Yet, paradoxically,

even Americans who know their military history almost never

think of it that way. Because it did not end in total

victory for the United States and its allies, most Americans

either complain that it cost too much and accomplished

nothing or regard it as a minor incident in their own

nation's climb to world leadership.27

During the 1950s and 1960s most American

interpretations were orthodox in their support for varying

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. official positions of the American government throughout the

war.28 In the 1960s and 1970s, as the Vietnam War spawned a

rethinking of American foreign policy and the assumptions

behind it, new interpretations were offered. They became

known as revisionist works because they looked more deeply

into the origins of the war and saw with fresh eyes

important realities hidden by orthodox accounts.29

A civil war - as the Korean War surely was - has

internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set

of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own.

The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars

in the twentieth century in which the great powers chose to

make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small

nations are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to

help sway the local political balance against domestic

rivals or other great powers. The Chosun Dynasty (1392 -

1910)30 in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its

isolation and independence by playing the Chinese against

the Japanese, then appealed to Czarist Russia and the United

States to protect it from its patrons. This too clever but

desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the

annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, with thirty five years

of misery, and the Korean War.31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Korean War lasted a little over three years, from

June 1950 to July 1953. It was the most significant conflict

to occur during the Cold War and it helped to determine the

course of the Cold War. The Korean struggle was

simultaneously a civil war and international war: Syngman

Rhee32 and Il-Sung Kim33 represented the passionate desire of

left and right to see their country reunited, after the

arbitrary decision to divide Korea at the 38th Parallel,

implemented in August-September 1945.34

Naval Operations in the Korean War

"Mr. President, I have very serious news. The North

Koreans have invaded South Korea." Secretary of State Dean

Acheson was calling President Truman at his home in

Independence, Missouri, on Saturday 24 June 1950. Some eight

hours had already passed since the North Korean troops had

blasted their way into South Korea on June 1950, fourteen

hours ahead of America's Eastern Standard Time.35

At 4 o'clock in the morning Sunday, June 25, 1950,

Korean time,36 armed forces from North Korea had commenced

an invasion against the territory of the Republic of Korea.

The North Korean People's Army (NKPA),37 with seven infantry

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. divisions and one armored brigade in the line, and two more

infantry divisions in reserve, struck south across the

parallel. In Korea it was Sunday, a favored day for starting

modern wars (See Figure 1.2).38 This assault was launched by

ground forces along the 38th Parallel, in the Ongjin,

Kaesong, and Chunchon sectors, and by amphibious landings on

the east coast in the vicinity of Kangnung.39 The South

Korean army was unable to defend itself against the

Communist forces. President Syngman Rhee requested

American aid and forced upon President Truman one of the

most momentous decisions of the postwar period.40 These

deficiencies were to have serious consequences.

Washington's insufficient military aid to the Republic

of Korea caused a grave concern regarding the defensive

strength of the ROK Forces. The KMAG felt that supplies to

the ROK combat troops had reached the minimum required level

by June 1950. The Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG)

estimated that the ROK Forces could not hold the line

against North Korea's invasion for more than fifteen days.

In short, the ROK Forces were at a decidedly inferior

position to the well-equipped NKPA Forces which had

benefited from heavy support provided by the Soviet Union

(See Table 1.3 and 1.4).41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C h o n g jii

t H u n g n o m

im*

»Tevgu

N o rth ’ K o r ta n Tht invasion of SOUTH KOREA Pooplo's Army 25 Junt~Stptcmb«r 1950

Figure 1.2: The Invasion of South Korea - 25 June-September 1950 Source: Max Hastings, The Korean War, p.71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Number of Service Organizational Structure Personnel 8 Divisions (22 Regiments) 67,416 Army Support and Special Branch Units 27,558

Navy 3 Flotillas, 7 Security Units 7,715

Marine Corps 2 Battalions 1,166

Air Force 1 Air Wing, 7 Bases 1,897

Total 105,752

Table 1.3: The Strength of the ROK Armed Forces Source: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War Vol.l, p.89.

Number of Service Organizational Structure Personnel 10 Divisions 120,880 Army Support and Special Units 61,820 Navy and 3 Garrison Commands 4,700 Marine Corps Naval Combat Team 9,000

Air Force 1 Air Division 2,000

Total 198,380

Table 1.4: The Strength of the North Korean People's Army Source: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War Vol.l, p.50.

In Korea the government forces, which were armed to

prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security

Council of the United Nations called upon the invading

troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th

Parallel. This they did not do, but on the contrary had

pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all

members of the United Nations to render every assistance to

the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.42 In

these circumstances Truman ordered United States air and sea

forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and

support.

Seoul fell in three days. After a pause, northern

columns pushed down the peninsula along the east and west

coasts, engaging both Republic of Korea forces and the first

American units being committed piecemeal. The conflict was

also in part a people's war, fought out by an effective

combination of northern veterans and southern guerrillas.

Americans got a swift education. In the first hours

MacArthur boasted that he could handle it with one arm tied

behind his back. A day or so later he said that with a

single division, the First Cavalry Division, he would

quickly have the Reds skedaddling north. Arriving in Korea,

he told Marguerite Higgins that two divisions would be

needed. This was far from enough, it soon turned out.43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The attack on Korea was a blow at the foundation of the

American security program. It was a challenge to the whole

system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but

everywhere in the world. It was a threat to all newly

independent nations. This dagger thrust pinned a warning

notice to the wall which said: "Give up or be conquered."

This was a test which would decide whether the collective

security system would survive or would crumble. It would

determine whether other nations would be intimidated by this

show of force. The decision to meet force in Korea was

essential.44

The United States government clearly was surprised by

the North Korean invasion. American leaders had not

positioned sizable military forces in Northeast Asia because

they were convinced that any challenge from the Soviet-led

Communist bloc would first occur in Europe. After World War

II, the Truman administration garrisoned Japan with only

four army divisions, which in 1950 were under strength and

inadequately trained, and a handful of Air Force and Navy

units. These forces were under the commander in chief, Far

East (CINCFE), General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.45

When the war began the United States Navy had a total

of fifteen carriers in commission: seven large attack

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. carriers (CVA), four light carriers (CVL), and four escort

carriers (CVE). Because World War II carriers were withdrawn

from mothball status, strength had increased by 1953 to

thirty-four carriers: seventeen CVA's, five CVL's and twelve

CVE's.46 In addition, a number of light carriers and escort

carriers with Marine air squadrons served with Task Force 95,

the United Nations Blockading and Escort Force, which

operated chiefly off the west coast of Korea in the Yellow

Sea. These included USS Bairoko (CVE-115), Badoeng Strait

(CVE-116), Bataan (CVE-29), Rendova (CVE-114), and Sicily

(CVE-118). The Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney and

the British aircraft carriers HMS Glory, Ocean, Theseus, and

Triumph also served with Task Force 95.47 During the course

of the war, U.S. naval air (including land-based Marine air)

flew some 275,912 sorties (compared to 392,139 Air Force

sorties), flew 40% of the interdiction missions, 53% of the

close air support missions, 36% of the counter-air sorties,

30% of the reconnaissance missions, and 100% of the anti

submarine patrols.48

The Korean War can be more easily understood if we

consider it as two, perhaps even three, wars. The first

phase was between the United Nations and the Democratic

People's Republic of North Korea can be considered a victory

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for the United Nations. Surely there is no other word for

the successful landing at Inchon in September 1950, the

recapture of the South Korean capital of Seoul, and the

approach, by Eighth Army on the west and X Corps on the east

to the Yalu. By the middle of November, the forces of the

United Nations had scattered the troops of North Korea and

occupied most of its territory. The goals of the United

Nations, to drive the invader from South Korea, and to unify

Korea by force, had been accomplished.

The second phase, which General MacArthur called "an

entirely new war," began with the Chinese entry into the

conflict. This phase must be considered less than successful

In the light of the goals established for the second stage

of the war - to expel the Chinese Communist army and to

occupy and control the territory of North Korea - the war

was a failure.49

But somewhere during the second year of fighting,

around November 1951, the nature of the goals changed again.

This change may be sufficient to define a third phase of the

war. The third phase war marked by the decision to take a

defensive posture in Korea. After the defeat in North Korea

and the slow United Nations return to the 38th Parallel,

military victory seemed to be too great a goal. The war

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. became one of attrition, not unlike World War I. The third

phase was one of waiting, patrolling, skirmishing,

destroying supplies, and attacking to kill rather than to

occupy and negotiating.50

A frequently overlooked aspect of the conflict was the

participation of the ROK Navy. At the request of the U.S.

Army, the Coast Guard had dispatched a small contingent, led

by Captain George McCabe, to the ROK to organize and train a

South Korean Coast Guard. The McCabe group, which arrived on

23 August 1946, was soon joined by the ROK's newly appointed

Lt. Commander Won-11 Sohn. The two men initially established

an officer candidate program at Chinhae to train officers

for coast maritime service, and established an academy

mirroring the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London.

Because of the pressing need to commission officers to lead

the new service, the South Korean Coast Guard Academy

initially offered only a two-year curriculum.51

When the war broke out, the training paid immediate

dividends. Unfortunately for the ROK, former Lt. Commander

Sohn, now an admiral, was in the United States accepting the

transfer of three submarine chasers to join the one (PC-701

Paiktusan) in service. To fill his shoes, the South Korean

authorities asked the U.S. Navy to provide an officer to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assume temporary operational control. Under the command of

Commander Michael J. Luosey, the South Korean Navy set up

patrol sectors, redeployed the South Korean Marine Corps,

and hindered the initial North Korean advance. With the

return of Sohn and his three ships, the South Korean Navy

played a key role in capturing and destroying several North

Korean vessels carrying supplies for the DPRK ground forces

pressing the attack on the Pusan perimeter.

When the Korean War began, the USS Valley Forge was the

only U.S. carrier in Far East waters, but by July of 1953

the United States deployed an average of four Essex-class

carriers in Korean waters.52 The outbreak of the Korean War

required the U.S. Naval forces, Far East (NAVFE) to change

from a "housekeeping" group under General Douglas

MacArthur's Tokyo command headquarters to becoming an

organization for combat using the 7th Fleet, naval ships of

the British Commonwealth, and naval forces of the Republic

of Korea. The NAVFE became the naval component of the UN

Command and was led by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy until June

4, 1952, when, after Joy became a delegate to armistice

negotiations, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe took command.53

The NAVFE formed four combat commands plus the Military

Sea Transport Service (MSTS), which brought U.S. mainland

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. forces to Korea via Japan. The four combat groups were the

7th Fleet Striking Force (Task Force 77), which operated

aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan, off Korea's east

coast; the Blockading and Escort Force (TF 95), which

operated on both coasts of Korea and included a minesweeping

group; the Amphibious Force (TF 90), which operated at the

Inchon and elsewhere as described below; and the Naval

Forces Japan (TF 96), which secured U.S. bases in Japan and

provided antisubmarine protection.54

Between 1 August and August 15, 1950, United Nations

Naval Forces, now comprising warships from eight nations,

operated under the control of the United Nations Naval

Commander, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. The co-ordinated

efficiency of this command proved the ability of the United

Nations to quickly assemble naval strength in distant areas

and operate jointly with great effectiveness. These naval

forces were continuously engaged in their tasks with ever-

increasing effectiveness. To meet the threat of increasing

numbers of troops and supplies coming from the northernmost

regions of Korea, naval aircraft were employed in

interdiction missions to disrupt rail and road facilities

and road networks.55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Naval aircraft were also employed with excellent

results on North Korean strategic targets including barracks,

oil installations, factories, warehouses, power stations,

and supply concentrations. In close support of the infantry,

naval aircraft operating in almost continuous application,

and guided by ground controllers, found a great number of

varied military targets in the battle area. At sea, naval

aircraft ranged the coasts, striking military targets along

the enemy lines.56

In the period from 16 to 31 August the United Nations

Naval Forces encountered only slight resistance by the enemy.

Complete United Nations control of the sea guaranteed the

safe arrival in Korea of additional troops and supplies, and

safe removal by sea of the sick and wounded. Naval patrol

forces met little interference and a close patrol of the

Korean coast was maintained. Further augmentation of the

naval forces continued. New units arriving during this

period were mostly from the U.S. Navy. The entire naval

organization was well integrated, functioning smoothly, and

coordinated efficiently with United Nations Army and Air

Force units.57 Naval forces not only continued to perform

all tasks assigned, but steadily increased the ranges of

application. Naval bombardment forces, both surface and air,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exercised every precaution to avoid harming the civil

population and employed every possible means to identify and

destroy only military targets.58

During the first two weeks of September, United Nations

naval forces continued to demonstrate their versatility of

application by sustaining with undiminished intensity all

their operational tasks. During the enemy's major attack

across the Naktong River, naval aircraft were almost

entirely engaged in an all-out effort in close support of

the ground troops for several days until the attack was

effectively reduced. Thereafter, naval aircraft resumed

their missions against North Korean targets. A concentrated

effort was made against transportation facilities, arsenals,

military warehouses and supply dumps, and troop

concentrations. Naval surface forces continued coastal

bombardment missions on an increasing scale until continuous

day and night firing on the east coast military targets

became habitual.59

Despite the seasonal typhoon winds and swollen seas

encountered during the period between 15 to 30 September,

United Nations naval forces continued to apply their

versatile land, sea, and air elements with increasing tempo.

The most outstanding of their achievements against the enemy

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was the amphibious landing at Inchon, the port of Seoul. The

initial landings, made by United States Marines, were

supported directly by Navy and Marine aircraft in

coordination with gunfire support from cruisers and

destroyers, followed by bombarding rocket ships. The Marines

aggressively seized their initial objectives and led the

advance beyond Inchon.60

For the period of 16-31 October, 1950, the United

Nations naval forces continued to effectively deny to the

enemy the use of Korean coastal waters. Naval air support

and naval gunfire activity were reduced during this period.

Attacks of the carrier-based aircraft were concentrated

mainly on trucks and trains and on road and rail lines on

the Korean east coast north of Wonsan and against the off

lying islands near Wonsan harbor. Military targets in the

vicinity of Songjin were bombarded by United Nations

warships on 17 October.61

The only serious problem confronting United Nations

naval forces during this period was that of enemy mines. A

number of Korean ports liberated by United Nations forces in

recent weeks had been mined by the enemy. In most cases, the

numbers of mines involved was not large. However, the enemy

laid a very massive minefield in the approaches to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. harbor of Wonsan. To clear a channel through this mine field

required the constant employment of a substantial number of

United Nations minesweepers throughout a period of more than

two weeks. A plan for clearing principal North Korean ports

of enemy laid mines had been instituted.62

During the period between 1 and 15 November, 1950, the

Thai Navy joined the United Nations naval forces in Korean

waters. Those forces now included naval units of nine member

nations. United Nations naval forces of all types and

categories, by their constant patrol activity, continued to

maintain absolute control of the movement of all surface

craft in Korean coastal waters. Carrier-based naval aircraft

carried out an interdiction program on lines of

communication in northeastern Korea, attacking bridges, rail

lines and enemy transports wherever found. During the latter

days of this period, these aircraft shifted their attack to

the international bridges over the Yalu River, operating

under strict orders not to violate Manchurian territory.63

Enemy mines continued to engage a large share of the

attention of the United Nations naval forces. The small

minesweeping flotilla and associated units devoted maximum

effort to this tedious and dangerous task throughout the

period and the results of this effort are plainly evident.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ships were able to dock at berths at Wonsan Harbor on 5

November. Light draft vessels were able to enter Chinnampo

and Hungnam on 10 November. Minesweeping continued off

Chinnampo and Hungnam with the prospect that both these

important ports would be completely free of mines in the

near future.64

In the period from 16-30 November, 1950, despite

extreme cold and considerable snow, United Nations naval

forces of all types and categories continued to deny enemy

surface units movement in the waters surrounding Korea.

Carrier-based aircraft, also hampered by snow and adverse

flying conditions, exerted a maximum effort against military

installations, troop concentrations, supply dumps,

communications facilities, and especially the international

bridges over the Yalu River over which the enemy was

receiving most of his reinforcements and supplies. On one

occasion, in the vicinity of Sinuiju, three carrier based-

aircraft were seriously damaged by flak. On 18 November,

carrier-based aircraft of Task Force 77 were attacked by

eight to ten Russian MiG-15 jet interceptors operating from

bases in Manchuria.65

Minesweeping units were continuing the task of sweeping

mines from the harbors essential to the operations, a long

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and tedious process. While still a source of great danger to

United Nations shipping, the menace of mines had been

reduced considerably. Channels leading to the harbors of

Haeju, Chinnampo, Wonsan, Hamhung, Songjin, Iwon and Kojo

have been swept by the minesweeping units and these ports

were open to the shipping in addition to the ports

previously available.66

During the period between 1-30 December, 1950, United

Nations naval forces continued to deny enemy surface units

movement in any of the waters surrounding Korea. In the

early part of this period naval air and surface units

supported Republic of Korea troops in their withdrawal from

the Chongjin area to the Songjin area. Surface units

provided fire support covering the withdrawal of United

Nations Forces from the Wonsan area, a withdrawal which was

accomplished with no loss of either personnel or equipment.

On 5 December all United Nations personnel in the port of

Chinnampo were withdrawn by sea. A total of 6,700 personnel

were involved.67

The intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea

in great strength in November 1950 made it necessary to

formulate possible courses of action to be taken in the

western Pacific in the event that it became impossible to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. prevent the Korean incident from developing into a state of

war between the United States and Communist China.

Consideration of this problem by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

continued concurrently with their interim direction of

operations in the Far East in a rapidly changing situation.

Meanwhile it was necessary that the Chief of Naval

Operations give continuous consideration to readiness of the

fleet to meet its responsibilities in possible

eventualities.68

During the first six months of the Korean War, Task

Force 77 consisted of from 1 to 4 CV-9 class carriers with

one cruiser and normally one battleship in the supporting

group and a screen of destroyers. Throughout this period and

under the conditions existing in Korea, CV-9 carriers of

this task force were able to operate the three basic types

of aircrafts assigned to the air groups quite effectively.

The three basic types assigned to the air groups were the AD,

F4U and the F9F jet fighter. This posed particular problems

in operations from the relatively slow escort carriers

(CVEs). These were barely able to provide enough wind

velocity across the flight deck to permit safe takeoffs by

fully loaded aircraft in calm wind conditions.69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. There existed two serious Task Force deficiencies had

the tempo of war operations increased materially. These were

the low effective intercept ranges of Task Force radar for

air defense purposes and the frequency of gasoline

replenishment required by the fast carriers. By actual test

over a period of two weeks during the middle of November

1950, the best performance of the Task Force as a whole was

a detection of 60% of raids at fifty miles range. The Task

Force was operating in circular formation without the use of

pickets or airborne early warning aircraft.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 Admiral Yi Sun-Sin (1545-1598) is one of the greatest heros in Korean history. Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean-Japanese War in 1592 he had designed a turtle ship, the first iron-clad fighting vessel in the world history, with which he sank hundreds of Japanese fighting ships and transportation ships during the war. He was later named Choongmu-kong (patriotic soldier, an honorific title) by the King Sunjo in honor of the great achievement in his lifetime. For more notable works about Admiral Yi see Sun-Sin Yi, Nanjung Ilgi [War Diary], Original Manuscript, 7 vols.; Imjin Changcho [Memorials to Court], Original Manuscript; Do-Pin Chang, Yi Sun-Sin Jun (Seoul: Koryowon, 1925); Horace H. Underwood, Korean Ships and Boats (Chosun Christian College Press, 1934); In-Pok Cho, A Study on War History of Yi Sun-Sin (Seoul: Myungyangsa, 1964); Sung-Do Jho, Yi Sun- Sin: A National Hero of Korea (Korean Naval Academy Press, 1970); Ui-Hwan Kim, Yi Sun-Sin: As a Man (Seoul: Yunmun Press, 1972); Un-Sang Yi, Choongmu-kong Chunsu (Seoul: Chungmu-kong Memorial Society, 1960), 2 vols. For more scholarly study of galleys in the sixteenth century see John F. Guilmartin, Galleon and Galleys (Sterling Publications, 2002 ).

2 James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War(New York, 1988), pp.19-21; Michael Hickey, The Korean War (New York: The Overlook Press), pp.5-7; Stanley Sandler (ed.), The Korean War (New York, 1995), pp.168-70.

3 Hangul was created under King Sejong during the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910). In 1446, the first Korean alphabet was proclaimed under the original name Hunmin chong-um, which literally meant "the correct sounds for the instruction of the people." See Sohn Pow-Key, et al, History of Korea, pp.133-152, 246-7; Han Woo-Keun, translated by Lee Kyung-Sik, edited by Grafton K. Mintz, The History of Korea (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1974); William E. Henthorn, A History of Korea (New York, 1971); Homer B. Hulbert, History of Korea (New York, 1962).

4 Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation (Western Michigan University, 1988), pp.119-21; Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp.2-3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 For the development of Japan during the Meiji Restoration see James R. Bartholomew, The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition (New Haven: Yale University, 1989).

6 Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, pp.248-58; Peter Lowe, The Korean War (Hong Kong, 2000), pp.7-9.

7 Stanley Sandler, The Korean War, pp.169-70.

8 On 25 July, 1894, the Japanese navy opened fire at the Chinese warships off Asan bay, touching off Sino-Japanese War. This was a war whose origins lay in the Korean question. By the treaty of Simonoseki on 10 April, 1895, China recognized full independence for Korea. Japan gained Formosa, the Pescadores and the strategically important Liaotung Peninsula. And Japan also was to retain a foothold on the Shantung Peninsula until ratification. Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, pp.212-3.

9 James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York, 1988), p.22. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized Korean independence, agreed to pay a 300-million- tael indemnity and ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. Japan had proven herself a major military power.

10 Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished, P.20. In the Chemulpo Treaty concluded under Japanese exaction, Korea consented to Japan's new six-article demand; these included Korea's promise to pay 500,000 won in reparation and permission for the stationing of Japanese troops in the capital for the defense of the Japanese legation. The treaty further broadened the scope of Japan's aggressive activities centering around such ports as Pusan, Inchon and Wonsan. Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, pp.200-2; Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, pp.154-6.

n Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, p.243. For more information about the Japanese colonial policy can be found in Ibid., pp.248-326; Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation, pp.223-60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). This is an insightful research of Korea between 1876 and 1945.

13 Ibid., pp.248-9. Military police was divided into five districts: Seoul (where the headquarters was located), Taegu, Pyongyang, Hamhung, and Nanam. There were two naval stations in Korea, one in Wonsan and the other in Chinhae.

14 Andrew C Nahm, Korea: Tradition and Transformation, pp.264-8; Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, p.262.

15 For the scholarly overview of the independence movement see Dong-Suh Bark, "The American-Educated Elite in Korean Society," Young-Nok Koo and Dae-Sook Suh (ed.), Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), pp.263-80; Dae-Yeol Ku, Korea Under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo- Japanese Relations (Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1985), pp.37-98; Lee, Politics of Korean Nationalism, pp.101-128; Nahm, Korea: Tradition and Transformation, pp.262-4.

16 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (The MaGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997), pp.1-2.

17 Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950- 1953 (Boston, 1990), pp.3-5.

18 Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York, 1987), pp.23-5.

19 Ibid., p.27.

20 R. Whelan, Drawing the Line, p. 32.

21 Ibid., p.34.

22 The first reasonably free elections in Korea were those established by US Army Military Government in the South in October 1946. Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished, pp.26-7.

23 Steven Hugh Lee, The Korean War (New York, 2001), pp.8-10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p.22.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p.23. See Warren I. Cohen, American Foreign Relations, Vol 4 (New York, 1993), pp.3-20; Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York, 1993), pp.102-135; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War (New York, 1993), pp.1-29; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972).

27 S.L.A. Marshall, The Military History of the Korean War (New York, 1963), pp.1-3. For good overview of the Korean War by Korean scholars can be found in Chum-Kon Kim, The Korean War, 1950-1952 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Yang-Myong Kim, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976); Gye-Dong Kim, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1991).

28 Philip West, "Interpretating the Korean War," The American Historical Review Vol 94, No.l (February 1989), pp.81-82. For the study about orthodox view of point see Malvin B. Voorhees, Korean Tales (New York, 1952); Isidor F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York, 1952); John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs, Vol.52, No.2 (January 1974), pp.386-8.

29 Ibid., See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), p.163; Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London, 1951), pp.9-17; Frank Boldwin (ed.), Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationships since 1945 (New York, 1974); Walter LaFeber, "Crossing the 38th: The Cold War in Microcosm," in L.H. Miller and R.W. Pruessen (eds.), Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), pp.74-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 The founder-king, Taejo, abandoned the Koryo capital of Kaesong, leaving the reluctant Koryo nobility behind, and moved to Hanyang (Seoul) north of the Han River to achieve Confucian yangban-dominated statecraft. See Pow-Key Sohn, et al, History of Korea, pp.129-155.

31 Allan R. Millett, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War," The Journal of Military History 61 (July 1997), pp.583-5.

32 Syngman Rhee was born in 1875 as a son of a genealogical scholar. He failed the civil service exams several times before becoming a student of English. Between 1899 and 1904 he was imprisoned for political activities. On his release, he went to the United States, where he studied for some years, earning an M.A. at Harvard and a Ph.D. at Princeton - the first Korean to receive an American doctorate in 1910. His dissertation topic was "Neutrality as Influenced by the United States." Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York, 1987), P.32. See Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland,Vt.: Tuttle, 1960); Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978); Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955); Lee, Politics of Korean Nationalism.

33 For more information about Il-Sung Kim see Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), pp.13-4, 16, 21-2, 429-30; Brian Catchpole, The Korean War 1950-53 (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp.10-2, 343-4.

34 Peter Lowe, The Korean War (New York, 2000), pp.1-3.

35 Brian Catchpole, The Korean War, 1950-53 (New York, 2000), pp.1-3; Max Hastings, The Korean War, pp.52-3.

36 Times and dates in Korea are Far Eastern time: India is 14 hours ahead of Washington, D.C.(EST). Therefore, 0400 25 of June in Korea would be 1400 EST, 1500 EDT 24 June, in New York and Washington, D.C.

37 At the beginning of the Korean War Korean People's Army infantry division had 11,000 men most divisions were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. equipped with Soviet equipment, although there were some notable examples of Japanese, Chinese, and U.S. equipment. A typical KPA infantry division was organized into: Headquarters, 3 rifle regiments, Artillery regiment, Self- propelled artillery battalion, Antitank battalion, Engineer battalion, Signal battalion, Training battalion, Reconnaissance company, Divisional services (Medical battalion, Transport company, Supply services). Stanley Sandler (ed.), The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York, 1995), p.182.

38 Stanley Sandler, The Korean War, pp.47-8; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War, pp.17-9; Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp.39-40.

39 U.S. Congress, Compilation of Certain Published Information on The Military Situation in the Far East (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1951), Beginning of Military Operations in Korea, pp.3365-6.

40 Harry S. Truman, "Statement on the Korean Conflict," Allen Guttman (ed.), Korea: Cold War and Limited War (Massachusetts, 1972), pp.3-5.

41 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War Vol.I, pp.88-9; Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York, 1993), p.2; Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, Naktong to the Yalu (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1961), pp.16-26; Lloyd C. Gardner, The Korean War (New York, 1972), pp.5-7.

42 Harry S. Truman, "Statement on the Korean Conflict," Korea: Cold War and Limited War, Allen Guttmann (ed.), (Massachusetts, 1972), pp.3-4.

43 Bevin Alexander, The First War We Lost, pp.25-8; Hugh Deane, The Korean War 1945-1953 (China Books & Periodicals, Inc.: San Francisco, 1999), pp.91-4.

44 Richard H. Kohn (ed.), Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 82nd Congress, 1st Session,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Testimony of Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State, accompanied by Adrian S. Fisher, legal adviser, pp.1715-6.

45 Stanley Sandler (ed.), The Korean War (New York, 1995), pp 240-3. MacArthur was made commanding general of US Army forces in the Pacific in April 1945 and received the Japanese surrender in September. In the summer of 1950, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the US and United Nations forces in Korea. See Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York, 2000); Robert Smith, MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor (New York, 1982).

46 Eleven CVA fleet carriers, many on repetitive tours, served with Task Force 77, the Seventh Fleet Striking Force, which operated chiefly off the east coast of Korea in the East Sea. These included the USS Antietam (CVA 36), Boxer (CVA 21), Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31), Essex (CVA 9), Kearsage (CVA 33), Lake Champlain (CVA 39), Leyte (CVA 32), Oriskany (CVA 34), Philippine Sea (CVA 47), Princeton (CVA 37) and Valley Forge (CVA 45). While in Korean waters these CVAs had 24 CAG's (Carrier Air Groups) embarked, with a total of 100 squadrons, including 22 Naval Reserve squadrons This total included 38 F4U Corsair squadrons, 35 F9F Panther squadrons, 23 AD Skyraider squadrons and 4 F2H Banshee squadrons. Harry G. Summers, Jr., Korean War Almanac (New York, 1990), pp.42-3.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 See Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York, 1967), pp.40-53, 63-70; Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston, 1990), pp.240-253, 317-8; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.62-5, 90- 106, 354-7; Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, Ltd., 1982), pp.274-85, 309-22; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Romanticism: China and the Korean War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. University Press, 1994); Chen Jian, "Chinese Policy and the Korean War," Lester H. Brune (ed), The Korean War: Hand book of the Literature and Research (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp.189-205.

50 Paul M. Edwards, To Acknowledge a War: The Korean War in American Memory (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp.8-10. The battle casualties in Korea have passed the million-man mark. American casualties have passed 65,000. The Koreans have lost about 140,000. North Koreans probably have lost 750,000 casualties. There were 145,000 of them that were in prison bull pens. Richard H. Kohn (ed.), Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 82nd Congress, 1st Session, May 3, 1951, pp.82-3.

51 South Korean Navy was established by Won-11 Sohn and pioneers of the navy on 11 November 1946. Admiral Sohn has been called as the father of the ROK Navy. Wonil Prize Ceremony is held in March at the Korea Naval Academy in honor of his life. Admiral Sohn's wife, Eunhye Sohn, composed the Korea Naval Academy song.

52 Gerald E. Wheeler, "Naval Aviation in the Korean War," US Naval Institute Proceedings 83 (July 1957), pp.762-5.

53 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.31-4; Lester H. Brune, The Korean War, p.268.

54 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.47-50; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.36-9; Brune, The Korean War, pp.269-70.

55 Arnold S. Lott, The Most Dangerous Sea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1959), pp.268-71; Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.133-146.

56 Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Third Report, September 2, 1950, p.3394-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 Ibid., pp.3399-40.

CO Ibid; Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.147-162.

59 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.162-183;Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Fifth Report, October 5, 1950, p.3408.

60 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp. 183-210; Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Sixth Report, October 21, 1950, p.3414.

61 Field, Ibid., pp.229-46; Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Seventh Report, November 6, 1950, p.3427.

62 Ibid., p.3428.

63 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.242-62; Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Seventh Report, Ninth Report, December 27,1950, p.3433.

64 Ibid; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.130-1, 143-5, 180-192, 199-208, 301-4; Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.94-5, 237-42, 249-51.

65 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.184-5, 224-5; Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (Times Books, 1983), pp.803-4; Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Tenth Report, December 27, 1950, p.3440.

66 Ibid.; Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.268-86; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.122-3, 162-3, 214-6, 329-30, 339-41.

67 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.295-313; Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Eleventh Report, January 31, 1951, pp.3445-6.

68 Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line (Boston, 1990), pp.240- 53; Michael Hickey, The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism (New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), pp.89-90; Military Situation in the Far East, Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Wednesday, May 30, 1951. p.1507.

69 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report NO.l, pp.8-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

NAVAL OPERATIONS AT THE INCHON LANDING

The Choice of Inchon

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

Sun Tzu Wu1

According to the traditional concept, military strategy

is the art of employing military forces "to achieve the ends

set by political policy." This definition was formulated by

Liddell Hart in 192 9 and it hardly differs from that of

Clausewitz. Raymond Aron in his book follows it almost word

for word.2

During the summer of 1950, the total dominance and the

flexibility of UN seapower made any point on the peninsula a

potential target for an amphibious strike. The east coast,3

however, features craggy mountain spines and the rare flat

areas have fewer towns, road nets, and rail lines.

Exploration of the interior would be much tougher from the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. east.4 The west coast is more densely inhabited and

alluvial. Not only was the choice of potential invasion

sites greater, any landing there would be more likely to

interdict North Korean supply lines. The important target

areas, in order from north to south, were Pyongyang, Inchon,

and Kunsan. The first was too far behind the lines and in

Manchuria's backyard. Kunsan, to the south, had the best

physical and geographical aspects, but for General Douglas

MacArthur, this choice was too close to the Pusan perimeter.

"The amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have,"

he told his naval planners, "To employ it properly we must

strike hard and deeply in enemy territory."5

Inchon was described in contemporary planning documents

as an Oriental seaport of about the same size and general

attractiveness as Jersey City, New Jersey. Its harbor is

well protected and ice free even when winter howls down the

Yellow Sea from Siberia. An amphibious target, Inchon is the

seaport and nearest landing area to Seoul, twenty-five miles

inland, on the north bank of the Han River. No less

important, Korea's best airport, Kimpo, lies but sixteen

miles distant.6

General MacArthur emphasized that 90 per cent of the

North Korean forces were committed around the Pusan

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. perimeter and the Communist generals would not expect a

landing in force at Inchon. General MacArthur recounted a

lesson of history. He recalled British General Wolfe's

capture of Quebec by scaling the almost vertical cliffs

behind the city during the Seven Years War. This was an

operation which took the defenders by surprise and which, by

its very boldness, succeeded. General MacArthur said he was

convinced that the North Koreans considered an Inchon

landing both insane and impossible and would therefore be

unlikely to defend the area.7

MacArthur first thought of an amphibious landing at

Inchon during his visit to the front near Suwon on 29 June,

before American troops were sent to Korea. Watching the

remnants of the South Korean Army falling back across the

Han River, he knew that, if the communist advance continued,

their supply-lines would become over-extended. A landing

deep in the rear at Inchon, would not only confront the

invaders with a two-front war, but disrupt these supply

lines completely, for the Inchon-Seoul area was the most

important road and rail hub in Korea.8

MacArthur was planning an amphibious landing at the

port of Inchon, from which his men would dash the miles

inland to Seoul, the hub of the transportation network

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. serving all of southern Korea. With the main valve at Seoul

shut off, as it were, supplies reaching the North Korean

army, which was almost entirely concentrated against the

Pusan perimeter, would be reduced to a trickle. MacArthur's

Inchon plan was elementary in concept but audacious in its

specifics.9

The North Korean attack into the depths of South Korea

paralleled the Roman penetration into the center of the

Carthaginian line at Cannae, while MacArthur's rear attack

at Inchon resembled Hannibal's closing of the sack on the

Roman flanks and rear by his heavy infantry and cavalry.

MacArthur saw almost immediately after the war started the

jeopardy in which the North Korean generals had placed their

army. He began planning in the first days of July for a

landing at Inchon.10

Preparation for the Inchon Landing

The "first" Korean War was a conventional war of massed

troops, tanks and cannon, and the North Koreans nearly won

it quickly. Their attack almost pushed the defenders into

the sea. But the U.S. and the other U.N. forces which came

to South Korea's rescue held on to a beachhead at Pusan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Then the Americans hit the North Koreans in the rear with an

amphibious landing at Inchon that caught the Communist

generals by surprise and cracked the Communists. This

landing would never have turned out so well if it had not

been for the American guerrilla.11

At the outbreak of the Korean War Lt. Eugene Clark, USN,

was assigned to MacArthur's headquarters GHQ staff. His

previous experience in China ideally fitted him for the most

unusual of missions for a naval officer. Clark's party,

consisting of himself and four (Lee, Jeong, Kim, Paik)

specially picked South Koreans, was to land on one of the

small harbor islands near Inchon, and to send back to Tokyo

the missing details of the needed intelligence.12 Clark had

spent all but four months of the previous eight years in

Asia. When the idea of an intelligence expedition inside

Inchon's harbor was conceived on August 26, Clark was an

available and logical choice. Years of experience in the Far

East gave him insight on that mystery called the Oriental

mind. He was a good boat handler and had amassed well-

rounded experience at sea in command of two ships of the

types that would be used to penetrate the harbor. He spoke

some Japanese and Chinese.13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Clark's most valuable contribution to the Inchon

landing, he thought, was his discovery that one of the main

navigation lights of the difficult Flying Fish Channel,

located on Palmi-do, could be lit. The Reds had not entirely

destroyed it, merely damaging the rotation mechanism and

extinguishing the wick; otherwise it was intact. Clark

reported these facts to Tokyo by radio and was instructed to

light this important navigational light at midnight on 14

September. This aid made the invasion fleet's passage up

Flying Fish Channel a great deal faster and easier on the

morning of 15 September 1950.14

Korea is a peninsula. This simple geographic fact

dictated most of the naval operations of the war. As Il-Sung

Kim's army, three infantry divisions with armor and air

support, rolled south, eventually bottling up South Korean

and American forces around the port of Pusan, its supply

lines got longer, its resupply problems multiplied, and its

flanks - its vulnerable seaward flanks - were left hanging

in the air, totally indefensible.15

After the final briefing of General J. Lawton Collins

and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman in Tokyo on 23 August, the

decision to land at Inchon was firm, except for the formal

approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President, which

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. arrived a few days after the two JCS members had returned to

Washington. The plan of operation was soon promulgated and

contained the following concept:

1. An initial landing will be made on Wolmi-do to secure the island prior to the major landing. This step is essential because of the commanding position of the island in relation to the Inchon shoreline. On D-Day at L-Hour, one battalion of Marines will land in assault on Wolmi-do to seize the island prior to additional landings. L-hour will be on the early morning tide about 0630. 2. After the Wolmi-do landings, the principal landings will be made on RED, YELLOW, and BLUE beaches at Inchon by the First Marine Division landing in amphibious assault. H-Hour for these landings will be on the afternoon high tide about 1700. This division will then seize a beachhead in the Inchon area. 3. The beachhead will be expanded rapidly to seize Kimpo airfield and the Han River line west of Seoul. The advance will be continued to seize and secure the city of Seoul, the terrain commanding Seoul, and an area to the south. The Seventh Infantry Division reinforced plus X Corps troops will land administratively from second and third echelon convoys in the city of Inchon at a time to be designated after D-Day and then carry on combat operations as directed by the Commanding General Tenth Corps. 4. Bombardment and fire support in connection with all these operations will be proved by cruisers and destroyers. Air cover, strikes, and close support will be provided by fast carrier and escort carrier aircraft within the objection area.

/s/A.D. Struble Vice Admiral Commander Joint Task Force Seven and Commander Seventh Fleet16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This was the basic plan: neutralize Wolmi-do, invade

Inchon, seize the major airfield at Kimpo, and capture Seoul.

As the concept of the operation was finalized in round-the-

clock conferences, the details of the amphibious force and

landing force plans were determined and written down. The

principal forces for the Inchon assault were:

a. Attack Force (Rear Adm. J.H. Doyle) b. Landing Force (X Corps)(Maj. Gen. E.A. Almond) c. Patrol & Reconnaissance Force (Rear Adm. G.H. Henderson) d. Blockade & Covering Force (Rear Adm. W.G. Andrewes, Royal Navy) e. Logistic Support Force (Capt. B.L. Austin) f. Advance Group (added after original plan was put out)(Rear Adm. J.M. Higgins) g. Flagship Group (Capt. E.L. Woodyard)17

Although two divisions requested a small force with

which to enter a large enemy-controlled landmass, the Inchon

landing was, nevertheless, an operation of major operational

and logistical magnitude. To transport, protect, and put

ashore a landing force of this size calls for a considerable

investment in shipping and in personnel, and Chromite,

despite the expectation of air and sea opposition, placed a

heavy load upon the Navy. The total strength of Joint Task

Force 7 amounted to some 230 ships of all shapes and

sizes.18 Except for a few gunnery ships held back to support

the flanks of the perimeter, it included all combatant units

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. available in the Far East. Fifty-two ships were assigned to

the Fast Carrier, Patrol and Reconnaissance, and Logistic

Task Forces; the remainder went to make up the Attack Force

90, under Admiral Doyle. Of these, more than 120 were

required to lift X Corps, while the rest were involved in

gunfire and air support, screening, minesweeping, and

miscellaneous other duties. Despite the great naval

investment in the Inchon landing, some fire support remained

available for the flank forces in the perimeter. On 12

September, pursuant to a suggestion from Admiral Sherman,

the various task groups operating under COMNAVFE19 had been

consolidated, and the Korea Support Group, Task Group 96.5,

upgraded into Task Force 95 (See Table 2.1).

Overall Command of the United Nations Blockading and

Escort Force was assigned to Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith;

the West Coast Support Group, now Task Force 95.1, continued

under control of Admiral Andrewes, and east coast

operations under Admiral Hartman. In preparation for the

Eighth Army's offensive and as a diversionary move

coordinated with the Inchon landing, Hartman's ships

bombarded Samchock on 14 and 15 September, where on the

latter date Helena and Brush were joined by Maddox and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. COMNAVFE COMNAVFORJAP CTF96

Task Fore* 95 COMMANDER U .N. Blockading SEVENTH FLEET and Escort Force

Task Force 77 Striking Force TG 96.1 Fleet Activities Task Force 79 Jopan-Korea Service Squadron 3 TG 96.2 Fleet A ir Japan T G 9 6.3 Scojop Task Force 72 T G 9 6 .4 Service Group Formosa Patrol T G 9 6 .8 Escort Carrier Task Group 706 Group Fleet A ir Wing 1 TG 96.9 Submarine Group

TG 95.1 W est Coost Grovp TG 95.S East Coast Group TE 95.21 East Coost Element 1 TE 95.22 East Coast Element 2 TG 95.6 M inesweeping Group TG 95.7 ROKNavy

Table 2.1: Naval Operating Commands, Reorganization of September 1950 Source: James A. Field, United States Naval Operations, p.211.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Missouri, the first battleship to reach Korean waters.20

Inchon's navigational harzards and tidal silting had

limited its cargohandling capacity to about 10,000 tons a

day, less than half that of Pusan. There were almost no

piers; the port had only five berths in its tidal basin.

(Pusan had thirty.) Only about fifty ships could rest in

Inchon's outer anchorage, and lighterage was an

exceptionally inefficient way to move cargo inland. And then

there was the problem of the assault itself. Only two

marginally adequate landing points existed: Red Beach, on

the western edge of the city, and Blue Beach, in the

southeastern section outside Inchon. "Beach" was for both a

courtesy name only. The two spots were four miles apart, at

opposite ends of the city. They were lined with piers and

seawalls and would have to be taken with scaling ladders,

which limited tactical mass. Each beach could be enfiladed

by the North Koreans, if they were alert enough and knew

some defensive tactics. Finally, there was Wolmi-do, the

cork in Inchon's bottleneck. A causeway connected the

waterfront to the island, which with its little satellite,

Sowolmi-do, dominated and divided Inchon's outer anchorage.

Wolmi-do, with its 350-foot hill and its unknown defensive

strength, had to be taken.21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Inchon landing looked disturbingly like a duplicate of

the ill-fated Anzio operation, in which Churchill's

"wildcat" had turned into a "stranded whale." In fact,

Inchon would be far more difficult to assault than Anzio,

for Anzio had a good landing beach on the open sea whereas

Inchon had nothing of the sort. The latter could be

approached from seaward only via one of a pair of narrow,

winding channels, which could be easily mined. A vessel sunk

in the middle of an approaching column would divide the

fleet, blockading the ships outside from advancing and those

inside from retreating.22

Preparatory reconnaissance, proceeded. As I mentioned

above, Lieutenant Clark and his team spent two weeks ashore

on the islands lining the Flying Fish Channel, right under

the nose of the enemy, plotting and surveying the defenses

and amending the nautical charts of the approaches to Inchon

Aerial photographs were taken of Wolmi-do, where several

batteries of guns were located. These were to be neutralized

by naval gunfire and aerial bombing as the assault developed

The attack could only be mounted on a few days in September

because of the requisite spring tides, and one of these was

the 15th. Ships of the UN Fleet had been bombarding Inchon

intermittently for some weeks and the intensity of their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fire increased with the approach of D-Day. Divisionary

landings formed part of the plan. Late on 12 September the

frigate HMS Whitesand Bay put ashore a company of American

infantry and some naval and Royal Marines personnel at

Kunsan. Similar landings were taking place at other points

along the coast.23

Lieutenant Clark had radioed back plenty of information

on Inchon and Wolmi-do, and Marine air, armed with

incendiaries, had burned away much of the top cover on the

island. Three hundred defenders were still there, burrowed

into trenches and caves. At 0700 on 13 September Rear

Admiral John Higgins's Gunfire Support Group of five

destroyers headed in column up Flying Fish Channel on the

floodtide, Mansfield in the van. Behind them steamed the

cruisers, while overhead orbited combat air patrols from

Task Force 77. Shortly after ten, the destroyers entered

Inchon's outer harbor.24

After firing about a thousand rounds, the destroyers

weighed anchor and headed back to sea. Then the cruisers

came on, six and eight-inch guns blasting away until almost

1700. Behind them, the shore bombardment ships left Wolmi-do

smoking, with a number of the enemy entombed in their caves.

The entire bombardment, while necessary, had alerted every

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. North Korean between the Yalu River and the perimeter to

what was coming. The next day saw more of the same. Wolmi-do

and the entire Inchon area were pasted from sea and sky. No

ships were hit this time, and counterfire was sporadic and

ineffective. Looking over the damage reports on Mount

Mckinley, MacArthur was encouraged. The island was shambles,

with about one-third of its defenders already dead. Wolmi-do

was ready for the Marines.25

No mode of attack is more distinctively American than a

smashing assault from the sea against the flank of an enemy.

American naval forces have done this so often and so

successfully that many, including some in uniform, take this

capability for granted and, like one senior participant in

Operation Chromite, dismiss it as "merely a mechanical

operation.//26

As far as the U.S. Navy is concerned, the one single

operation of the Korean War which in history must reach

transcendent importance is the Inchon assault. For eighty-

two days, the UN ground forces had been constantly on the

defensive and often at the brink of disaster. Ridge by ridge

and mile by mile, the U.S. and ROK Armies had retreated from

the 38th Parallel to a tiny perimeter around the port of

Pusan, punishing the Communists with every backward step.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The issue of the perimeter hung in balance for almost a

month. On September 1950, with the shattering suddenness of

a bursting shell, the course of the Korean War was reversed

by the Inchon landing.27

A major clandestine operation preceded the Inchon

landings. On 1 September 1950 the British destroyer HMS

Charity, escorted by the cruiser HMS Jamaica, landed parties

of Korean partisans on the islands lining the Flying Fish

Channel leading into Inchon harbor. The landings were made

at dawn; when a lone North Korean sentry spotted the boats

in the dim light he opened fire but immediately received a

single 6-inch round from Jamaica, which silenced him. When

the enemy garrison on the next island saw the cruiser

bearing down on them, they hoisted a white flag. By the time

the main landing took place on 15 September, most of the

offshore islands in the Inchon area had been taken. The

majority of those put ashore were ROK soldiers or marines

but they were joined by numerous volunteers and the

Americans soon trained many Korean civilians for this

hazardous work.28

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Landing

Admiral James Doyle led Task Force 90, the attack force.

He had five cruisers and twelve destroyers for shore

bombardment, and most of these ships would home in on Wolmi-

do just before the landing. Throughout the operation, shore

bombardment and close carrier air support would continue. No

USAF planes were to operate in the objective area until D

minus 3, unless Struble wanted them - and because of the

continuing communications snafus, he did not. Altogether,

Task Force 90 numbered 180 ships, including units from the

Royal Navy, New Zealand, and France. Commander Luosey also

found a few South Korean patrol craft and minesweepers.

Forty-seven LSTs, over half of them manned by Japanese,

would provide the bulk of the landing force. In addition,

over twenty auxiliaries were available, and the skies would

be filled with naval patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.29

On the deck of all the destroyers, handy for immediate

use, were grenades and submachine guns. There was a

possibility that troops might come out from the shore and

attempt to board a disabled or grounded destroyer. If so, it

would be the first time in about a century that the ships of

the United States Navy rang with the classic order: "Prepare

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to repel boarders!" The signal to fire was given by flags

flying from the destroyers' halyards. As they came in, the

combination indicating, "Execute assigned mission," was

hoisted, and the signal to open fire would be the lowering

of these flags. Lieutenant Arthur T. White of the De Haven

fired the first shot. Before he depressed the firing key, he

had seen North Korean soldiers scrambling toward a gun pit,

and that was his target. At the first blast the gun pit went

up in dust and disappeared.30

Shortly before 1300 the five destroyers commenced

deliberate fire on the island's batteries and on the Inchon

waterfront. Some minutes of undisturbed bombardment followed,

and then enemy batteries opened up. Communist fire was

concentrated on Swenson, Collett, and Gurke, the ships

nearest the island, and in the course of the next 20 minutes

scored on all three. Collett received the heaviest damage,

taking nine 75-millimeter hits, one of which disabled her

fire-control computer and forced her to fire under local

control. Three hits were made on Gurke; a near miss killed

an officer on Swenson; total casualties were one killed and

five wounded.31

The bombardment had been a destructive one. On the

other hand the enemy had been alerted. During the day U.N.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. headquarters had intercepted a North Korean dispatch which

reported the bombing of Wolmi-do, the approach of naval

vessels, and "every indication that the enemy will perform a

landing." The response of Wolmi's defenders had been

vigorous, and the island's gunners were still firing as the

destroyers departed.32

In the afternoon, when the tide was high again landing

craft carrying the US 5th and 1st Marine Regimental Combat

Teams which were supposed to make an assault landing, slowly

moved in close to Red and Blue Beaches along the approach

channel. Despite a rain which began to fall at that time,

the US Marine and Navy aircraft continued to range up and

down inland roads which led to Seoul-Inchon highway and over

downtown streets of the city, isolating the port. The Naval

Gunfire Support Group moved in closer to the inner harbor to

cover the approach channel. Under these covering fires,

assault troops of the US 5th and 1st Marines, together with

the ROK 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, began

leaving the transports and went on board the landing

craft.33

L-Hour, set for 0630, was preceded by 45 minutes of

bombardment. To the north of Wolmi-do Mansfield, De Haven,

and Swenson fired on the island and on the northern shore of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Inchon; South of the island Collett, Gurke, and Henderson

concentrated to Wolmi-do, Sowolmi-do, and on the city's

southern shore. While the bombardment continued Marine

Corsairs from the escort carriers bombed and rocketed the

island. At 0615, L minus 15, the three rocket ships, each

with an allowance of 1,000 5-inch spin-stabilized rockets,

moved past Green Beach on Wolmi-do's northern tip and let

go.34

BLT 1 and RCT 5 landed at 0633 against light enemy

resistance on Wolmi-do, a strategic terrain feature

connected to the mainland by a causeway and covering the

entrance to the port of Inchon. The island's defending force

numbered approximately 500 troops, representing elements of

an artillery regiment and a North Korean independent marine

regiment. Forty two minutes after the landing, the American

flag was raised over Wolmi-do and resistance had been

overcome.35 At 1730, RCT 5 (-) and RCT 1 landed on Red and

Blue beaches, to the north and south of Inchon. RCT 1 met

light resistance in landing and drove inland in the assault.

RCT 5 landed in the face of scattered rifle, machine gun and

mortar fire. Preparatory air and naval fires had neutralized

many of the enemy's beach defense positions, allowing a

relatively steady advance on the part of both regiments as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they reached their initial objectives prior to nightfall.36

On September 15, 1950, UN forces conducted a successful

amphibious landing at Inchon, about twenty miles from Seoul

and about 180 miles behind the North Korean lines at the

Pusan perimeter (See Figure 2.1 and 2.2). The next day the

Eighth Army began a cautious offensive against the perimeter.

A day later UN forces recaptured the Kimpo Airfield outside

of Seoul. By September 19, enemy forces at Pusan had began

to collapse, and by September 28, Seoul was recaptured and

UN forces were in full pursuit of North Korean armies

fleeing behind the 38th Parallel.37

Before the Marine battalion landed on Wolmi-do at 0633

on the morning of Friday, September 15, the island had been

so thoroughly pulverized and carbonized by air and naval

bombardment that the 250 defenders remaining in bunkers were

dazed and relatively innocuous. The Second wave of Marines

landed at 1730. They controlled the port by midnight,

and by dawn they had all of Inchon in their possession. But

then North Korean resistance became more stubborn and

effective.38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MANSFIELD DEHAVEN Qgr- r :

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ItoTmnjporhrear. ■ ■. Jamaica furth er 's.^ Lim it o f D-doy V&jV i fROCHESTER j6' J&‘ *■ objectives Robi.

Figure 2.1: The Inchon Assault Source: Field, United States Naval Operations, p.196.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m ro a

r- oo CTl

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m C fd I a; cc0) x : T3 •H > CM (0 Q CM

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the Korean War, the Navy again demonstrated the

incalculable value of amphibious operations. The withdrawal

of an isolated and surrounded ROK division from Pohang

without casualty during the early Pusan perimeter defense

was little known or recognized, but, defended by the guns of

the fleet, an implacable enemy was kept at bay and an entire

division of the allies was saved and redeployed within the

lines for further combat.

The Inchon amphibious assault landing by the Joint Task

Force 7 on 15 September 1950 changed the entire aspect of

the war against North Koreans within a matter of a few days

after the landing. The North Korean organized effort, on the

verge of success of completely over-running the Pusan

perimeter, completely collapsed. It was only the subsequent

intervention of the Chinese People's Armies39 that prevented

the complete occupation of Korea and the cessation of

hostilities. This historic landing, changing as it did the

whole course of a war against the North Koreans, opened new

•vistas of strategy to many military leaders previously

limited in vision to purely ground operations.40

The equally historic Hungnam evacuation was an

amphibious operation in reverse. CINCUNC determined as a

matter of military strategy to evacuate northeast Korea. As

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a major part of the force in this operation, under the guns

and the aircraft of the fleet, the 3rd and 7th divisions of

the U.S. Army and the 1st Division of the U.S. Marine Corps

as well as approximately 91,000 refugees were evacuated

without the loss of a man or a single useful piece of

equipment. No corresponding operation exists in modern

military history.41

Evaluation of the Operation "Chromite"

As previously planned, the attack began early in the

morning of September 15 when the U.S. Marines landed on the

island of Wolmi-do, which protected Inchon Harbor. Meeting

little resistance, they secured the island in about two

hours, with only one man killed. They remained on the island

while the tide ebbed and flowed, but in the late afternoon

UN forces were able to strike at Inchon itself. The

operation was as successful as MacArthur had predicted. The

North Koreans were overextended and stretched thin. There

were only about 2,000 North Korean troops in the Inchon area

to defend against a combined UN force of 70,000 personnel,

and while they offered some resistance, they were, for the

most part, easily routed.42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In all, the Marines lost 21 killed in action, one

missing and about 42 wounded at Inchon a remarkably low

total. The improvised operating room set up on LST 898 also

treated 32 injured Korean civilians. Two UN aircraft had

been shot down, but both of their pilots were rescued. It

was one of the most one-sided amphibious victories in modern

warfare. The Task Force could now concentrate on an over-

the-beach logistics build-up for the drive on to Seoul.43

Inchon landing was General MacArthur's first major

amphibious assault as well as his first command over Marine

troops and his first control of large carriers.44 His

strategy in those campaigns had been "to hit'em where they

ain't." In this he had succeeded. His insistence upon Inchon

and the nub of his gamble was a reaffirmation of that

strategy; the North Koreans would consider an Inchon assault

insane and impossible; it would take them by surprise and

opposition would be light.45 The rapid and overwhelming

success of UN forces following the invasion made MacArthur

into even more of a national hero than before and ensured

his lasting military fame. Admiral William F. Halsey

telegraphed the UN commander to say, "The Inchon landing is

the most masterful and audacious strategic stroke in all

history." The successful landing also boosted morale at home,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. colored political discourse, and led opinion makers to

speculate on the course the administration should follow in

the coming weeks and months.46

Military history shows quite a few examples of the

successful application of MacArthur's Inchon strategy. They

have been comparatively rare because of the traditional

rigidity and directness of thinking of most military

commanders. Imaginative and daring commanders, on the other

hand, usually have sought ways, as the great Confederate

leader, Stonewall Jackson, expressed it, to "mystify,

mislead and surprise" their opponents, rather than to beat

out their strength in bloody frontal assaults against

expectant and well-emplaced foes.47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 Sun Tzu Wu, The Art of War (Harrisburg, Penn.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1957),p.51. Sun Tzu was a general in ancient China who is thought to have served in the army of the king of Wu (Nanking). He was the author of one of the first military treatises, The Art of War (Ping- fa), a document which may have been written between 400 and 320 BC during the period of the "Warring States', or, more precisely, at the point when the character of warfare was undergoing a change from a 'chivalric' to a 'realistic' style in which the sole criterion was efficiency. See John R. Elting, The Super-Strategists (New York, 1985), pp.222-256; Gerard Chaliand, The Art of War in World History (Los Angles, 1994), pp.222-239.

2 Andre Beaufre, "Excerpts from an Introduction to Strategy," The Art and Practice of Military Strategy (Washington,D.C.: National Defense University, 1984), translated by R.H. Barry, p.204. Calusewitz's work, On War, is concerned with the conduct of war in the time of Napoleon and does not aspire to the universal relevance of its leading ideas. But even here there were important insights. Calusewitz saw the destruction of the enemy's forces, and the concentration on seeking a major battle, as war's most likely objective. On the other hand, influenced by his experiences in 1812, he recognized that an attack could pass its culminating point of victory and that defense was the stronger means. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (ed.) (Princeton, 1984); Gerard Chaliand (ed), The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), pp.671-723; Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.186-216; B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, 1967).

3 Elongated and irregular in shape, the Korean peninsula stretches from north to south between 43°36' north latitude and the southernmost island of Mara at 33°06'; and longitudinally between 124°11' and 131°52' east longitude. The land consists of 220,839 square kilometers between Tonghae, or the Eastern Sea to the east, and Yellow Sea to the west. The backbone of the land is formed by watersheds which run north to south near the eastern coast. Pow -Key, Sohn, et al, History of Korea, p.3; Michael T. Isenberg,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Shield of the Republic (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), Vol.l, p.191.

4 Isenberg, Shield of the Republic pp.191-3.

5 Ibid.; Malcolm W. Cagle, "Inchon - The Analysis of a Gamble," US Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (January 1954), pp.47-51; Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report: The War in Korea (New York, 1952), p.168; Edwin H. Simmons, Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Inchon (Marine Corps Historical Center, 2000), p.6.

6 Heinl, Victory at High Tide, p. 25.

7 On 12 August 1950 MacArthur had informed his amphibious operations staff that the landings would definitely be at Inchon, prompting his gunnery officer to utter the famous remark: "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap - and Inchon had 'em all!" This operation would be coded 'Chromite' and was to be treated as a matter of urgency. Brian Catchpole, The Korean War: 1950-53 (New York, 2000), pp.39-45, 51-2; Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report: The War in Korea (New York, 1952), pp.168-9; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.76-7.

8 David Rees, The Limited War (New York, 1964), p.11.

9 Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York, 1986), pp.169-75, 179-81; Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston, 1990), pp.185-7.

10 Battle of Cannae, in 216 B.C., is a good example in history of the perfect battle of annihilation. The parallel of Cannae with Korea in the summer of 1950 is so close as to be uncanny. The Carthaginian general, Hannibal, posted his heavy infantry and cavalry on ether flank and advanced the weak central portion of his line to form a salient toward the opposing Roman army. The Romans, vastly superior numbers, gleefully attacked and drove the center back, bending Hannibal's army into the shape of a concave half-moon. Hannibal's heavy infantry on either side then struck the deeply penetrated Romans from the flanks while the Carthaginian cavalry, which had scattered the Romans horse, attacked the Romans from the rear and cut off retreat. Only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. about 3,000 Romans escaped the trap; 70,000 died. Fewer than 6,000 Carthaginians and allied Celts were killed. Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York, 1986), p.150.

11 Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Mason, "The Man Who Made Inchon Possible," Donald Robinson (ed.), The Dirty War: Guerrilla Actions and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare (New York, 1968), pp.202-4.

12 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p. 88.

13 Karig, et al, "The Man Who Made Inchon Possible", pp.202- 3.

14 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.89-92. It was very dangerous mission exceedingly well accomplished. Clark won Navy Cross by Admiral Donald B. Duncan after Inchon landing operation.

15 Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, pp.181-3.

16 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.83-4.

17 Idid., pp.84-5;

18 Joint Task Force 7 (Vice Adm. A.D. Struble) Task Force 90. Attack Force (Rear Adm. J.H. Doyle) 1-2 AGC, 1 AH, 1 AM, 6 AMS, 3 APD, 1 ARL, 1 ARS, 1 ATF, 2 CVE, 2 CA, 3 CL (1 USN, 2 RN) , 1 DE, 12 DD, 5 LSD, 3 LSMR, 4 ROKN PC, 1 PCEC, 8 PF (3 USN, 2 RN, 3 RNZN, 1 French), 7 ROKN YMS, 47 LST (30 Scajap), plus transports, cargo ships, etc., to a total of approximately 180. Task Force 91. Blockade and Covering Force (Rear Adm. Sir W.G. Andrewes, RN) 1 CVL, 1 CL, 8 DD. Task Force 92. X Corps (Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond, USA) 1st Marine Division, Reinforced; 7th Infantry Division, Reinforced; Corps troops. Task Force 99. Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (Rear Adm. G.R. Henderson) 2 AV, 1 AVP, 3 USN and 2 RAF Patrol Squadrons.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force (Rear Adm. E.C. Ewen) 2-3 CV, 1 CL, 14 DD Task Force 79. Service Squadron (Capt. B.L.Austin) 2 AD, 1 AE, 2 AF, 1 AK, 3 AKA, 3 AKL, 4 AO, 1 AOG, 1 ARG, 1 ARH, 1 ARS, 1 ATF See James A. Field, History of United States Naval Operations, p.180.

19 At the outbreak of the Korean War, Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), a command existing since 1947, was the principal naval organization directly subordinate to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command with its General Headquarters in Tokyo. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander of NAVFE from 26 August 1949, directed an organization broken into four principal components: Amphibious Force Far East (TF 90); Naval Forces, Philippines (TF 93); Naval Forces, Mariana (TF 94); and Naval Forces, Japan (TF 96). See Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.45-9, 56-60, 251-3.

20 Ibid., p.212.

21 Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, pp.195-7.

22 E.B. Potter, Illustrated History of the United States Navy (New York, 1971), pp.271-3.

23 Michael Hickey, The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism (New York, 1999), pp.74-7.

24 Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, pp.198-201.

25 Ibid.

26 Heinl, Victory at High Tide, ix.

27 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.75-7.

28 Hickey, The Korean War, pp.290-5.

29 Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, pp.197-202.

30 Walt Sheldon, Hell or High Water: MacArthur's Launching at Inchon (New York, 1968), pp.167-170.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp. 194-9.

32 Ibid.

33 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War (University of Nebraska Press, 1997), Vol.l, pp.614-5.

34 Field, United States Naval Operations, p. 197.

35 It was estimated that 120 enemies were killed and 190 were taken prisoner. CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.C.3., Amphibious and Ground Landing Force, P.777.

36 Ibid.

37 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997), pp.51-8.

38 Whelan, Drawing the Line, pp. 190-5.

39 For more wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).

40 CINCPACFLT, Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.C.3., pp.777-785.

41 Ibid.

42 Kaufman, The Korean War, pp.54-9.

43 Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished, pp.92-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 Ibid.; Cagle, "Inchon - The Analysis of a Gamble," pp.50-2.

45 Ibid.

46 Kaufman, The Korean War, pp. 54-5.

47 Bevin Alexander, First War We Lost, pp. 151-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS

Mining as Naval Strategy

Mine warfare is by definition the strategic and

tactical use of sea mines and the countermeasures against

mines, including all offensive and defensive mining and

protection against mines. Mining and mine countermeasures

(MCM) are, however, two distinctly different operations. The

primary focus of modern mining operations is to affect sea

control with included missions that neutralize or destroy

enemy ships by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication

(SLOC), submarine operating areas, and home ports.

Offensively, mines attack enemy ships in transit or bottle

them up in their own waters; defensively, mines guard

national waters against enemy interdiction.1 The mine is the

only weapon of naval warfare that is to some extent capable

of altering geographical circumstances by making certain

areas unpassable to ships. Thus an area which has been

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. declared dangerous because of the use of mines is usually

treated with great respect and is avoided as though it were

land.2

Mines have been employed in naval warfare for more than

350 years. Until about 1880, sea mines were known as

"torpedoes." Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut's3 famous

order at Mobile Bay, "Damn the torpedoes, Four bells!" was

made in regard to the crude sea mines built and used by

Confederate forces during the Civil War.4 Farragut's

dramatic entrance through the mine line into Mobile Bay in

1864 has become an enduring legend of naval history and an

important lesson in the training of naval officers (See

Figure 3.1). The incident is also an object lesson in the

history of the Navy's attitude toward the subject of mine

countermeasures.5

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-056 constituted the

first major confrontation between world powers using modern

mines, a confrontation in which mines were tested in the

heat of battle as a system of weaponry. The Japanese mined

offensively, placing fields across Russian harbors with

considerable daring and then enticing the Russian Fleet out

with a show of inferior forces. The Russians mined

defensively, managing thus to extend their shorelines

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. > •H <0 •H OP X X

(1) <1) u U 3 P O' 3 *H O Cu CO

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. effectively to seaward, making it difficult for the Japanese

Fleet to bombard the shore defenses. Six Russian ships were

sunk by Japanese mines, one by Russian mines. Eleven

Japanese ships were sunk by Russian mines. Many ships and

small craft of several nations fell victim to floating mines

after the war was over, giving rise to the Hague Convention

on mines of 1907.7 Experiences in the Russo-Japanese War had

thus demonstrated that mines were dangerous not only to the

enemy against whom they were used, but also to neutrals and,

not infrequently, to the minelayer itself.8

During World War I the Germans laid 43,000 mines and

accounted for forty warships and a total of 1,000,000 tons

of Allied shipping; the United States and British claimed

150 enemy war vessels sunk as a return on approximately

175,000 mines. Development of improved mines and techniques

between wars meant that the Allies knew a lot more about

mine warfare at the outbreak of World War II but had to

await the test of employment against enemy developments in

the field. Oddly enough, the first British field installed

in 1939 as part of the Dover Barrage contained the same type

contact mine used in 1918.9

Throughout the war, the British laid over 76,000 mines

and of these 55,000 by aircraft. The results showed over

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1,050 Axis warships sunk and 540 damaged. The U.S. mine

effort cost the Japanese 266 ships of all types sunk.

Germany laid 120,000 mines and thereby sank 281 warships and

296 merchantmen. German mine sweeping proved inferior to the

British, but the sweeper service on both sides did much to

live up to its motto, "Where the Fleet Goes, We've Been."

From these statistics can be deduced the value of the naval

mine as both an offensive and defensive weapon.10

During World War II the United States conducted two

major mining operations in the Pacific. The initial campaign

was in the southern and eastern oceanic areas, and this was

followed by a close-in operation around the Japanese home

islands in what has come to be known as Operation Starvation.

During the last 5 months of the war, more than 1,250,000

tons of Japanese shipping were sunk or damaged by mines, and

a virtual blockade of the Shimonoseki Straits and of the

inland sea was affected.11 The first of the modern mines is

the magnetic mine,12 first used by the British but perfected

by the Germans in World War II. Unlike the contact mine, the

magnetic mine does not have to be chained to an anchor, but

can be sown freely on the ocean floor.13

At the end of World War II, the Navy's Pacific

minecraft fleet alone numbered more than 500 ships, some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3,000 officers, and about 30,000 men. When the Korean War

began, the entire Navy had only two divisions of destroyer-

minesweepers, two divisions of fleet minesweepers, and

twenty-one smaller sweepers. The navy in Korea was prepared

to defeat Communist air or submarine attack, to sink an

enemy fleet of ships, to do precision bombing and shore

bombardment, to support troops ashore and blockade a hostile

coast—everything, in fact, do everything except sweep up a

field of contact and magnetic mines. It lacked nothing

except a few more minesweepers.14

During the Korean War, there was plenty of evidence

that mines were being used by the North Koreans, for there

had been sightings of drifting mines and of minefields on

both coasts. Accordingly, plans were made to sweep for ten

days before the planned landing at Wonsan. In the first

three days of sweeping, American forces lost two large steel

minesweepers and were so demoralized that the following

message was sent to Pentagon: "The U.S. Navy has lost

command of the sea in Korean waters." Seven more days were

required to complete the sweep, and the commanding officer

of the amphibious force wisely concluded that, because of

ROK advances on land, the landing was not required until the

sweep could be completed. Of the estimated 3,000 mines laid,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. only 225 were swept and destroyed.15

The fist type of the modern mine is the magnetic one.

When the Germans first began to use the magnetic type mine

in 1939, they made two mistakes. Instead of waiting until

enough of them were ready so that all British ports could be

mined simultaneously, Germany employed them in driblets. The

second mistake was inadvertent. A Luftwaffe pilot dropped

one of the new magnetic mines on a mudbank in the Thames

estuary instead of in the ocean, and the Royal Navy promptly

disassembled it and discovered its secret. As will be seen,

magnetic mines were present in the Wonsan minefield.16

The second type of modern mine is the acoustic mine,

which can be detonated by the machinery or propeller noise

of a passing ship. Like the magnetic mine, it can also be

planted on the floor of the sea. The acoustic mine utilizes

a simple hydrophone or "artificial ear" that is set to

"hear" a ship's engines or propellers (See Figure 3.2).17

The third type of modern mine is the pressure mine. In

the lexicon of mine warfare, pressure mines are even more

unsweepable and diabolical than either acoustic or magnetic

mines. In a pressure mine, the negative pressure of a

passing ship sucks a diaphragm upward, closing the firing

switch.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. p.196. NOISE MAKER 7 The Sea The Sea War in Korea, MAGNETIC MAGNETIC MINES

ACOUSTIC MINES FLOATS / \ LONG LONG LEG T ~ T SHORT SHORT LEG - I —__ FLOATS

/ CABLE CABLE REEL MAGNETIC MINESWEEPING ACOUSTIC MINESWEEPING Source: Source: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Figure 3.2: Magnetic and Acoustic Minesweeping

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fourth, the most dangerous type of modern mine is the

combination mine - one that combines one or more of the

above types in the same carcass: a magnetic-acoustic, or a

pressure-magnetic mine. This combination type mine will

explode only when the sweepers employ two or more of the

disturbing forces.18

Minesweeping in the Pacific 1946-1950

In March 1946 Commander Mine Force Pacific Fleet

withdrew from Japan to Treasure Island, San Francisco. Soon

thereafter, the postwar allocation of minesweepers was

determined by CNO. All minelayers were put in mothballs;

mine location ships were scrapped; minesweep tenders were

inactivated and later disposed of. There remained an

adequate Mine Force staff in a CM flagship, two divisions of

destroyer-minesweepers (DMS), two division of fleet

minesweepers (AM), twenty-one motor minesweepers (AMS), and

two new minesweeping boats (MSB).19

In January 1947 the crucial reduction of mine warfare

capacity was felt when CNO announced the dissolution of Mine

Force Pacific Fleet, and the further reduction in Atlantic

and Pacific Fleet mine warfare forces to conform with the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. budgetary limitation imposed by the 1948 budget.

Minesweepers in the Pacific Fleet were further demobilized

and the remaining types divided between two type commanders.

Two officers from Mine Force Pacific Fleet staff remained

active in mine warfare planning. The Readiness Training

Officer reported to Commander Service Force to maintain mine

and minesweep gear logistic responsibilities. The Readiness

Plans Officer reported to CINCPACFLT Staff to maintain

continuity of policy and plans.20

In 1948 there was no further demobilization of forces,

but there was a slackening in training. Without a single

mine type commander it became more and more difficult to

maintain qualified personnel and standardized training. The

DMS, because of the shortage of destroyers, were employed

more and more in their secondary capacity as escort and ASW

ships. The AMS, except for the six stationed in Japan which

were actively conducting post war minesweeping, were

distributed between San Diego, Pearl Harbor and Guam for

operationally strategic reasons. This distribution was not,

however, conducive to good minesweeping training. During

that period, additional officer mine warfare billets were

allocated to fleet staffs, and CINCPACFLT reestablished mine

warfare responsibilities of type commanders.21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Between 1949 and June 1950, the forces available

remained the same in numbers and distribution. Commander

Service Force continued the inventory of minesweeping gear

at advanced bases; continued minesweeping gear roll-back to

Pearl and the Continent; prepared basic Pacific stock levels

to fill the operational needs for locally assigned mine

craft.22

There was no mine type commander as yet established in

the Pacific Fleet. Minesweeping types were still split

between COMSERVPAC (AM, AMS) and COMCRUDERPAC (DMS). In May

CINCPACFLT had recommended the activation of such a command

on D-Day but it was still considered a luxury in ships and

personnel with the foreseeable budget. This recommendation

had been approved by CNO.23

With a new war in June, 1950, the enemy utilized mine

warfare in an attempt to prevent or hinder shore bombardment,

gunfire support, amphibious assaults, and the opening of

supply ports by UN forces. Anti-mining operations carried

out by Naval Air units consisted of search, reconnaissance,

counter-mining with depth bombs and destruction by machine

gun fire by patrol aircraft; counter-mining with general

purpose bombs by carrier aircraft; and search and

reconnaissance by helicopters. This study is made from the

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. viewpoint of the effectiveness of anti-mine operations

carried out by naval aircraft during the period 25 June to

15 November 1950. It is believed pertinent to point out that

anti-mine operations of the scope carried out by naval

aircraft in the Korean War are unique in the history of

naval aviation.24

Historically, Russia has long been noted for her

interest and success in mining — more so perhaps than with

any other naval weapon in modern times. Russia used mines

effectively in the Crimean War, in the Russo-Turkish War of

1877 and 1878, and in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and

1905. In the latter conflict, for example, the Russian Navy

sank two Japanese battleships off Port Authur in southern

Manchuria with moored contact type mines of a type very

similar to those that were to be used at Wonsan nearly a

half century later.25

Initially the Soviet mining efforts in North Korea was

probably undertaken to keep UN ships out of North Korean

harbors and to limit UN naval offensive capabilities. As it

turned out, Korea provided the Soviet Navy an ideal

opportunity to test the United States Navy's ability to cope

with mines in the western Pacific as of 1950. At the same

time Russia could help her North Korean satellite delay the

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. advance of the UN ground forces. Actually, the Korean

peninsula was almost ideally suited for an experiment in

defensive mine warfare. After the UN's entry into the war,

the Communists could foresee that U.S. naval forces would

take every advantage of their amphibious warfare specialty

to move northward. The landings at Pohang and Inchon were

eloquent testimony of this special skill. Moreover, the

Communists recognized the vulnerability of Korea's eastern

coast to amphibious assault, and also to bombardment from

the sea. The waters off the east coast were deep and the

coastal plains narrow. The coastline was reasonably straight,

and the 100-fathom curve lay fairly closely to shore. Off

the good harbors of Wonsan and Hungnam, there was a large

shelf of shallow water which made mine planting

exceptionally effective.26

As early as 10 July shipments of Russian mines were

rolling southward down the east coast railway from the

Vladivostok region. One week later Soviet naval personnel

had reached Wonsan and Chinnampo and were holding mine

school for their North Korean comrades.27 This reaction,

which wholly justified Admiral Joy's concern with the

northeastern railroad route, was sufficiently rapid to get

the mines through before the limited Seventh Fleet and NAVFE

102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. forces could be brought to bear. Some 4,000 mines were

quickly passed through Wonsan, and by 1 August mining had

been begun at that port and at Chinnampo. In time Russian

naval officers ventured as far south as Inchon, shipments of

mines were trucked down from Chinnampo to Haeju, and before

the bridges were knocked down consignments had reached

Inchon, Kunsan, and Mokpo by train.28

This effort to counteract U.N. control of the sea went

undetected. In mid-August search planes had reported enemy

barges and patrol craft at Wonsan and Chinnampo, but while

in retrospect these were believed to have been engaged in

minelaying, the intelligence was not so interpreted at the

time. The operation plans of COMNAVFE, Commander Seventh

Fleet, and Commander Attack Force, while crediting the enemy

with limited mining capabilities at Inchon, stated that

available information indicated no minefields in that

area. 29

From the best information available the enemy began

mining operations about 15 August 1950. These operations

consisted of river and open sea interdiction mining, and

direct harbor defensive mining on both coasts. A total of at

least 2,000 mines were laid. They were the Russian Type 26

moored mines, fired by inertia and suitable for depths of

103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. water to 456 feet, and the Russian magnetic ground mines

(See Figure 3.3). All mines were similar to American types

but contained a much larger explosive charge. Contrary to

the U.S. Navy's methods of mining they were generally laid

in fixed patterns and in rivers and shoal areas not

ordinarily mined. Mines were first sighted on 4 September in

the Yellow Sea. Exploratory and clearance sweeping was

started immediately by the surface minesweeping units in the

area. Actual enemy mining operations were not observed by UN

forces prior to the first sighting on 4 September. However,

the following incidents possibly are significant:

• On 13 August in the vicinity of Chinnampo, aircraft from VP-6 attacked enemy barges and power boats, encountering anti-aircraft fire. • On 14 August in the vicinity of Wonsan aircraft from VP-6 attacked several camouflaged ships and patrol craft, encountering anti-aircraft fire during the attack. • On 16 August in the vicinity of Chinnampo a VP-6 aircraft was shot down while attacking enemy patrol craft. • On 14 October aircraft from HMS Theseus attacked two junks, identified as mine-layers, in position 38°- 35°5'N, 124°-58'E (off Chinnampo).30

104

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. * VO «n Cu HJ (D

£ ■H

£ (0

105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Up through November 1950 ten United Nations ships were

sunk or damaged by enemy mines in the Korean campaign. In

contrast with this number, only five United Nations ships

were sunk or damaged by enemy gunfire or bombs. All naval

vessels in the foregoing number were of the destroyer type

or smaller. The first enemy mines were discovered off

Chinnampo on the northwest coast of Korea on 4 September

1950. Intelligence indicates that the major minefields later

encountered by UN ships were laid commencing in early

September. Some 4,000 mines were shipped by rail through

Wonsan. The preparation and laying of the mines at Wonsan

were done under Soviet supervision according to intelligence

reports. Those laid on the northwest Korean coast were

handled entirely by North Koreans. The mines laid were

predominantly of the chemical horned type moored mine and

the magnetic bottom mine. No hydrostatic mines were

discovered (See Figure 3.4).31

The enemy mine fields were cleverly and effectively

laid, including moored mines in shallow water within six

feet of the surface which made neutralization of the mine

field very difficult and dangerous. Primitive and

inexpensive but highly effective methods of laying these

fields were utilized. Fortunately, the North Koreans had not

106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cn a

to oG 4J <0 0) & to > £ to

O' C M -HQ. -U O a) to

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. undertaken extensive mining in time to affect the amphibious

landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950. Subsequent to that

date enemy mines in North Korea had the effect of delaying

logistic support to the 8th Army by denying the use of

Chinnampo until after mine sweeping had been affected (See

Figure 3.5). Mines delayed the administrative landing at

Wonsan by five days and required the clearance of the ports

of Hungnam and Chongjin before these locations could be used

by UN shipping (See Figure 3.6 and 3.7). In addition the

mine threat forced UN naval gunfire support ships outside

the 100 fathom curve on the east coast and mineable waters

on the west coast of Korea.32

After spearheading the first U.S. landing at Pohang,

the minesweepers headed up Korea's west coast for Inchon,

where General MacArthur made his 5,000-to-l gamble of

landing U.S. forces behind the Communist lines. After August

3, Mine Squadron 3 had been commanded by Captain Richard T.

Spofford, who found his new command above average in morale

and ability, but woefully lacking in proper equipment for

minesweeping. He reported to Admiral Joy that "the force, as

existing, is hardly sufficient to keep three ports open to

the fleet against a limited mining offensive by an alert

enemy." He asked for more minesweepers.33

108

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Source: Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, p.1132. Figure 3.5: Chinnampo Minesweeping to o

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C h o n q j in E a j t C o a s t K o r e a P e r io d • / 5 ~ / 9 N o v .

Ares Jimept '• eh*tun! 4 enehorsf* Forces: U.S. 7AMA, MRS, iAPD S smelt beefs Jep. / zs r .as Rims reported * (ueJuwein) Mieea smept • none as (U L m oored mtij/ieiic

Figure 3.6: Chongjin Minesweeping Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, p. 1135.

110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ■m .

kmU kmU i Am i * * l u r Q wAbce* I 4 M . C i*t r ir JTOm or Figure 3.7: Hungnam Minesweeping Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, p.1137.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Inchon landing presented U.S. planners with the

trickiest problems they had ever faced. Worst was the tide,

highest in the Orient, which rose a maximum of 33 feet.

LST's needed that high tide to reach landing beaches, but

the moon made it available only on September 15, October 11,

or November 3, give or take a day or so. Luckily, Communist

mines were not a serious threat at Inchon. On the morning of

September 10, as Commander Hung So Lee, ROK Navy, sailed

north of Inchon in ROKN PC-703, he spotted a small boat

laying mines. As preinvasion bombardment of Wolmi-do opened

the morning of September 13, destroyers Mansfield and De

Haven saw the first mines in Flying Fish Channel. The tide

was low, the mines were plainly visible, and aggressive

destroyers and cruisers obligingly shot up almost the entire

field, leaving the minesweepers little to do for once.34

The sweepers - Pledge, Kite, Partridge, Mockingbird,

Osprey, Redhead and Chatterer - commenced sweeping the inner

anchorages of Inchon Harbor at 0600 on September 15, found

no mines, and withdrew that afternoon. A short time later

troops scrambled over the seawalls and began fighting their

way into Inchon. Off Korea's east coast that same day, the

battleship Missouri began bombarding enemy positions despite

the fact that she had been proved obsolete by magazine

112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. writers years earlier.35

The Battle of the Mines at Wonsan

On the second floor of the capital in Seoul on

September 29, 1950, General MacArthur met with his

subordinate commanders and described how he planned to end

the Korean War with another amphibious envelopment. In just

three weeks, on October 20, the X Corps would land at Wosan.

During these days of planning, the critical threat to be

presented by Communist mines and the significant role to be

assigned United Nations minesweeping forces were by no means

clearly foreseen. Within two weeks, however, the Wonsan

landing operation could justly be called, "The Battle of the

Mines."36 Wonsan lies at the deepest indentation of the sea

into the east coast of Korea. It is the halfway point of the

important railroad that leads from the Russian-Manchurian

border of Korea down the length of the peninsula to its

southern tip - Vladivostok to Pusan. It is similar in

appearance to some of the harbors of the coast of Maine. The

rugged terrain and steep-sided islands of the bay, green in

summer, snow speckled in winter, bear a striking resemblance.

Before the war, Wonsan had been a popular summer resort as

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. well as an important rail and industrial center. The harbor

islands were vacationland for the wealthy. The city was a

thriving oriental metropolis of over 100,000 residents, its

beautifully-developed harbor a mariner's delight, the finest

on Korea's coasts.37

On October 2 Vice Admiral Struble, abroad his flagship

Rochester at Inchon, ordered all Seventh Fleet minesweepers

underway for Wonsan as soon as possible. Struble sent the

Task Force 95 Advance Force, with its Minesweeping Task

Group 95.638 under the command of Captain Spofford, toward

Wonsan on 6 October. The task group was further increased by

Japanese minesweeping vessels.39

Between 25 June and 30 September, there were three

types of operational vessels employed at Wonsan. First,

there was a DMS type. The four DMS under COMCRUDERSPAC

continued to operate primarily as destroyers to fill the

Pacific Fleet gross shortage of that type. A review of the

War Diaries of USS Endicott (DMS-35) and USS Doyle (DMS-34)

for this period reveals the average operations after arrival

in Korea to be distributed as follows: Carrier Screen - 23

days, Convoy and escort - 9 days, Replenishment and Upkeep -

10 days, Coastal Patrol and Gunfire Support - 24 days.40

114

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The second ship was the AM type. The Pledge (AM-277)

was the only AM of the four authorized that was ready for

minesweeping duties until 7 September when the Pirate and

Incredible reported for duty at Sasebo. Under the

operational control of COMINRON 3 (CTG 96.6) during this

period the following duties were performed:

a. Escort duties between Sasebo and Pusan. b. Moored, magnetic, and acoustic sweeping of Sasebo - Pusan approaches and convoy routes. c. Participation in Inchon amphibious operations as escorts, screen, and at check sweeping. The Pledge performed well, while the Pirate and Incredible continued to suffer the engineering problems of recommissioned ships.41

The third vessel was the AMS type. The fourteen AMS

under COMSERVPAV were divided between San Diego, Pearl, Guam,

and Japan. Those in Japan were employed under the

operational control of COMINRON 3 (CTG 96.6) during this

period in the following duties as assigned by COMNAVFE

OpOrder 5-50 and written orders of CTG 96.6.

a. Moored magnetic and acoustic check sweeping of Sasebo, Pusan, Chinhae, Geijitsu Wan and convoy routes to those ports. b. Harbor entrance control vessel duties at Sasebo and

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Pusan. c. Escort duties between Sasebo and Pusan. d. Participation in Inchon amphibious operations as escorts, screen and at check sweeping. e. Exploratory and clearance sweeping of trap fields on the east coast.42

Training was vigorous and intensive. At the end of this

period, however, all ships had been operating continuously

for nearly three months and required tender availability.

These three small ships required tender assistance at least

every eight weeks. The lack of small escorts and patrol

craft prevented their being released for repairs between

minesweeping operations. The Magpie (AMS-25) struck a mine

and was lost 29 September while sweeping off the east coast

of Korea.43

The naval planning for an amphibious assault at Wonsan

was a near duplication of the preparation for Inchon.

Admiral Struble issued his preliminary plan on 5 October and

his final plan on 9 October. The tasks given by Admiral

Struble to his forces were several:

a. To maintain an effective naval blockade of the east coast, b. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to any east coast Army units in addition to those to be landed at

116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Wonsan, c. To conduct pre-D-Day bombardments, d. To load and transport the X Corps to Wonsan, e. To seize Wonsan by amphibious assault, f. To occupy and defend a beachhead; and following the successful accomplishment of all this, g. To provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistic support to the Tenth Corps.

The major elements of Admiral Struble's task

organization included:

CTF 90 Attack Force (Rear Adm. James H. Doyle) CTF 92 Tenth Corps (Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond) CTF 95 Advance Force (Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith) CTG 96.2 Patrol and Reconnaissance Group (Rear Adm. George R. Henderson) CTG 96.8 Escort Carriers (Rear Adm. Richard W. Ruble) CTF 77 East Carriers (Rear Adm. Edward C. Ewen) CTF 79 Logistics Support (Capt. Bernard L. Austin)44

Experienced in World War II minesweeping operations,

the admiral knew that minesweeping took a lot of

minesweepers, and that he did not have enough of them to

clear one definite area, let alone sweep the extensive east

coast bombardment areas. Two U.S. destroyers had been

knocked out, two ROKN minesweepers damaged, and one U.S.

minesweeper sunk in the preceding week. The battle of the

117

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. mines was definitely on.45

The minesweepers began to clear a path on the southern

approach toward Wonsan harbor on 10 October, with a

helicopter from light cruiser Worchester (CL—144) searching

the waters in advance. The wooden AMSs, which had never had

proper communications equipment installed, received

information relayed from the helicopter through Worchester.

The minesweepers corroborated the mine lines on sonar and

stopped the sweep. Spofford had to choose another channel

with fewer mines if the area was to be clear in time for the

assault. Spofford shifted his clearance efforts to the

Soviet shipping channel. On 11 October intense minehunting

pushed the clearance to the entrance of Wonsan harbor.46

Normally, when sweeping inside Wonsan or at other

places within range of the Communist shore batteries, the

AMSs have destroyers assigned to them for gunfire support.

Once in a while the batteries open up on these sweepers

anyway. Usually the prompt accurate counter battery fire of

the destroyer has its effect after the enemy's first few

rounds; the guns either cease firing or shift their target

from the minesweeper to the destroyer. Sometimes, however,

too many batteries open up and the GFS ship could not take

them all at once. The junior officers on these ships are

118

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. just as good. They all headed departments, of course, and

they all stand top side watches. The normal setup in an AMS

is a lieutenant in command; a lieutenant (jg) as executive

officer, operations officer, and navigator; another

lieutenant (jg) as engineer and damage control officer; and

an ensign as first lieutenant, minesweeping officer, and

supply officer.47

Admiral Joy mentioned that "The main lesson of the

Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary branch of

the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be

neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future. Wonsan

also taught us that we can be denied freedom of movement to

an enemy objective through the intelligent use of mines by

an alert foe."48

While the minesweepers still toiled off Wonsan, the

Army was making vociferous demands for them to open up the

west coast port of Chinnampo.49 As the UN forces pressed

north in October 1950, the heavily mined port of Chinnampo

became crucial to resupply the army, and three days before

Wonsan was opened up, Admiral Joy sent an order to Rear

Admiral Allen E. Smith, who, as Advance Force Commander, was

the officer over Spofford, responsible for conducting that

sweeping operation:" "Sweep Chinnampo." Ordered Admiral Joy.

119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "Sweep Chinnampo?" said Admiral Smith. "Sweep with what?"

There were no organization, no personnel, no plans and worst

of all, no minesweepers.50 With all Western Pacific

minesweepers already fully occupied at Wonsan, Smith sent an

intelligence officer to Chinnampo to gather information on

the extent and type of mining there and urged the deployment

of additional minesweeping vessels from both fleets. Smith

appointed Commander Stephen M. Archer to command the sweep

operations as Task Element 95.6.9.51 Admiral Joy warned

General Walker that if Chinnampo was anything like Wonsan,

the sweepers would need more than three weeks to clear it.52

The mine forces had learned a big lesson at Wonsan: "look

before you sweep." With that in mind the PBMs and one

helicopter spent three days searching for mines at

Chinnampo.53

With Lieutenant Commander DeForest, Archer set up shop

on Admiral Smith's flagship Dixie in Sasebo harbor, and

recruited his sweeping force by the simple old Navy

expedient of "detailing a few volunteers." The volunteers

were destroyer Forrest Royal; destroyer minesweepers

Thompson and Carmick; the small minesweepers Pelican,

Swallow and Gull as they sailed in from Pearl; the ROKN

YMS's-502, -306, -513; a helicopter complete with pilot,

120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Lieutenant R.D. Romer; LST Q-007 on which to land the

helicopter; high speed transport Horace A. Bass and

Underwater Demolition Team 1; landing ship dock Catamount

with fourteen minesweeping boats; and salvage ship Bolster.

Commander Archer also borrowed the Royal Navy's Lieutenant

Commander W.E.H. Rodwell form HMS Theseus and the Australian

Navy's Lieutenant Commander M.G.H. Gladstone from HMAS

Warramunga .54

Surface sweeping began on 29 October by two destroyer

minesweepers, Thompson (DMS-38) and Carmick (DMS-33), later

supplemented with three AMSs, two Korean YMSs, and a tank

landing ship (LST) with helicopters. After interrogating

captured key Korean personnel, intelligence officers

uncovered the pattern of mixed field of 217 contact and 25

magnetic mines by 2 November and the sweep of Chinnampo

began in earnest. Minehunting began from the air with planes

and helicopters, on the surface with small boats, and

underwater with divers.55

The enemy had planted 212 mines in Chinnampo harbor and

blocked one approach channel. There might have been more,

but planes from the British carrier Theseus had sunk what

they suspected was a minecarrying barge. Frogmen later

searched the sunken barge and found 15 mines still abroad it.

121

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On November 6, to test the thoroughness and accuracy of his

sweepers, Commander Clay, with his North Korean pilots,

sailed a North Korean tug from a Chinnampo dock to the open

sea. Then ROKN YMS-503 sailed in to Chinnampo. LSU-1402 went

in next day and other small craft followed. Three days later

Clay took in the first LST. On November 20 the channel was

opened to large ships, with hospital ship Repose being first

m* _ . 56

Before the sweepers rigged in their gear from one

operation, they were urgently needed for the next. While

they still toiled off Chinnampo, the name of the next

operation grew painfully apparent. That would be Hungnam,

the amphibious operation in reserve, where troops happy to

leave the crowded ships at Wonsan would be more than happy

to scramble aboard them again.57

At Hungnam on 7 November 1950 the mine forces again

worked to uncover information concerning the placement of

over a hundred moored contact mines. Advance hunting teams

of small-boat crews and divers thoroughly scoured the area,

attempting to clear a section on the edge of the minefield.

AMSs swept carefully for magnetic mines but found none, and

the harbor was opened by 11 November. Hungnam sweepers then

advanced to open Songjin between 16 and 19 November but

122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. found no mines.58

During the period between 1 October and 30 November,

1950, there were five types of minesweepers in the Korean

War. The two DMS already in Japan proceeded to Wonsan on 8

October, under the operational control of COMINRON 3 (CTG

95.6).59 Moored and magnetic sweeping was conducted at

various ports on the east coast. The second section of DMSs

arrived on 22 October had several days to adjust gear and

replenish and then proceeded to Chinnampo where minesweeping

was conducted for a period of about three weeks.

Three AM type minesweepers started on 8 October to

sweep at Wonsan. The Pirate (AM-275) and Pledge (AM-277)

while sweeping shallow moored mines hit mines and sank on 12

October, the third day of the operation. After the loss of

the Magpie (AMS-25) in September, Merganser (AMS-26),

formerly from Guam, joined MINDIV 31 and proceeded to the

Wonsan operations, under COMINRON 3 (CTG 95.6). MINDIV 51

arrived from Pearl Harbor on 23 October. After seven days

repair and replenishment these three ships proceeded to

Chinnampo under CTE 95.69, conducting moored and magnetic

sweeping in that area until 26 November.

The Japanese minesweepers (JMS) assigned duties in

Korean waters performed in their customary reliable fashion.

123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Three ports on the Korean West Coast were independently

swept by the Japanese under British control, while another

ship swept at Wonsan and Chinnampo. In all other cases,

although the language problem persisted, the Japanese swept

for both moored and magnetic mines under adverse conditions

of weather and logistic support. Although Republic of Korea

YMS accompanied both the Wonsan and Chinnampo Minesweeping

Groups, they were not equipped with minesweeping gear and

were not adequately trained to be entrusted to

responsibilities. In both areas they were used as

destruction vessels, pilot ships, and cruisers. These ships

performed cheerfully and willingly and their officers, in

general, were alert and intelligent.60

The fact must be realized that the DMS, AM, and AMS

minesweeper types cannot have their minesweeping duties

sacrificed in order to perform major secondary functions.

BUSHIPS has recognized that fact in reducing DMS and AMS

topside armament. In the optimum AM and AMS design ASW

armament was supposed to be completely removed and AA

armament maintained at the minimum. Any weight gained must

be replaced with essential minesweeping, mine locating

equipment and radio, more dans and spare gear, more fresh

water storage tanks and the like.61

124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Mining and mine countermeasures (MCM) efforts can be

passive and active. Passive measures are defensively

designed or used to avoid detonating a mine and are often

employed by surface vessels. They include:

a. Mine watching - pinpointing areas where mines are laid, usually done by human mine spotters or electronic sensors. b. Mine avoidable - marking mined areas or rerouting of waterborne traffic. c. Depending - demagnetizing a hull by electrical current, thus nullifying the vessel's magnetic field through periodic external application. d. Degaussing - nullifying a ship's magnetic signature through installing permanent equipment on board. e. Noise reduction - reducing the likelihood of a vessel actuating a mine by installing noise reduction features or procedures during shipbuilding. f. Ship-protection devices - using a range of devices to protect a ship from mines, from the early use of nets and booms at anchor and underway, bow watches, and early torpedo catchers and rakes (ancestors of the World War II paravane) to experimental mine- avoidance sonar.62

Active MCM are usually offensively designed and used by

trained MCM forces to locate and neutralize mines without

harm to the vessel or to fool mines into detonating on a

false target. They include:

125

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a. Minehunting - searching waters for mines, from the early use of small boats with searchlights and drives to advanced minehunting sonar. b. Mechanical minesweeping - using minesweepers, either singly or in pairs, towing wire and cable or chain rigged with buoyed sweep gear to mechanically cut mooring cables, allowing the mines to surface so that they may be neutralized. Mechanical minesweeping is the most common form of MCM. c. Influence minesweeping - creating false signatures by a towed device or combination of devices designed to produce the magnetic, acoustic, pressure, or other influence needed to explode mines at a safe distance from the sweeping vessels. Minesweeping vessels must also be passively protected to prevent or to limit the almost inevitable damage that accompanies minesweeping. d. Countermining - attempting to clear mines through the use of underwater ordnance or explosive charges placed most often by divers, or most recently by remotely operated vehicles (ROV). e. Removal - physically removing mines from waters, accomplished only by divers and at great risk to personnel.63

Due to the great difference in depth of water and tides

between the east and west coasts of Korea, mine clearance

was appreciably easier on the west coast then on the east

coast. Primarily due to the Navy's austerity program during

the preceding years, the weapons systems for mine

countermeasures in the Pacific Ocean was totally inadequate.

126

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. When the first North Korean mine was discovered there was no

mine force type commander or staff experienced in mine

counter-measures in the Pacific. Experienced minesweeping

personnel were difficult to find. Rapid reactivation

subsequent to September 1950 plus use of Japan minesweepers

improved this situation, permitting coping with North Korean

minefields to an acceptable degree in November 1950. The

expansion of forces and organizations in the Pacific then

underway would further improve this situation but much

larger expansion would have to take place before the Pacific

Fleet would prepared for major war operations.

Numerous deficiencies in minesweeping equipment and

material were noted during the Korean operations. There were

no mine locator ships in the Pacific. None of UN surface

ships, and only four of USN submarines, were provided with

mine detector equipment to enable them to avoid mines. An

innovation of the Korean campaign was the use of patrol

seaplanes and helicopters for the location and destruction

of mines and the use of aircraft to drop bombs and depth

charges for counter-mining purposes. The location and

destruction of mines by gunfire was quite effective and

warranted continuation of this procedure. The counter-mining

of mines by bombs was ineffective and the counter-mining of

127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. mines by depth charges only slightly better.64 Mines

continued to pose serious problems for the U.S. Navy

throughout the Korean War. Sweeping on the west coast

continued through 1950 with clearances affected at Kunsan,

Haeju, and Kojo (See Figure 3.8 and 3.9). In response to

continued North Korean mining, Admiral Sherman immediately

ordered the recommissioning of AMSs and AMs as a priority

matter.65

In addition to technical minesweeping problems the

November operations brought to light after five years

inattention, the Navy learned that minesweeping operations

require a tremendous expenditure of logistical effort,

coordination of ship type capabilities, and staff

organization and training. Flagships, mother ships, tender

facilities, dan and buoy ships, small boat facilities,

helicopter base, mine disposal and underwater demolition

teams and their supporting boats and ships all have to

accompany the sweepers on a large operation. The assembly,

logistic planning, and operations of such a mixed group is

big problem in itself. Considering the time that was

available for planning, the support forces provided

essential services to the minesweepers.66

128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

M o o r e d Magnetic dap. 3(destroyed) ,

4 9 M - 2 6 I////I I////I U .S . - 4 J y . ’ AJUJ, /A** Chart Chart i •• u n s a n Z ZfciJc r 6 K > > t-3 Oct; Zi Oct -ZJtov vs. dip.- 7dMS Moored W jlst « Coast Korea m m Mints reported Period Mints swept /trees • /trees0.3• A re a sw e p t u n s a K •as* sc* •as* to minesto StlQQ'H Figure 3.8: Kunsan Minesweeping Source: Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, p.1134. to to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. K5-T*.V; \

m on

O 2 •P S-) o a % a) os c o | “i •H ■P fO 3 JK g , -!» 8 rH **•••% O' (0 c > i ; i! }] •r4 U a a) 111 is a) 5 CO cu a) ■p c c -H 2 Eh 3 t-3 -n ti 0 U (0 c X a. o 2 M u ro 0 0 SH o 3 M O' 3 O Cu CO

130

2 Arnold S. Lott, Most Dangerous Sea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1959), pp.10-11, 90-92; Fridrich Ruge, Sea Power 1939-1945: A German Viewpoint, trans. M.G. Saunders (London: Cassell, 1975), pp.13-18.

3 David G. Farragut was a Union naval commander during the Civil War. He successfully sailed through the minefield and defeated the Confederate ironclad Tennessee, bringing about the surrender of Forts Gaines and Morgan at the mouth of Mobile Bay. For this victory, Farragut was promoted to Vice Admiral on December 23, 1864. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, Admiral Farragut (New York: D. Appleton, 1892); Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.8-11.

4 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.122-4.

5 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, pp.1-3.

0 Soviet sources ascribe the first combat use of mines to the Russian Navy off Kronstadt in 1855. John Chomeau, "Soviet Mine Warfare," Naval War College Review Vol 24, No.4 (December 1971), pp.94-5.

7 Patterson, "Mining: A Naval Strategy," pp.54-6.

8 Howard S. Levie, "Mine Warfare and International Law," Naval War College Review Vol 24, No.8 (April 1972), pp.28-9.

9 Harry W. Edwards, "A Naval Lesson of the Korean Conflict," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (December 1954), pp.1339-40.

10 Ibid.

11 Patterson, "Mining: A Naval Strategy," pp.56-7.

131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 The magnetic mine only worked because hulls concentrate the earth's magnetic field (N-pole down). Applying a sufficient reverse field for a short period would leave the hull magnetized in the 'wrong' direction and thus counteract this increased field, rendering the ship undetectable for a while. The most efficient way found to do this was to wipe a current carrying cable loop up and down the entire hull.

13 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp. 123-5.

14 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.269-70.

15 Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.182-3, 191-3, 245-6.

16 Ibid., pp.75-9; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.123-4.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.E., p.1091.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p.1092.

22 Ibid. The Japanese had in operation 84 minesweeping and mine tender types manned by experienced minesweeping personnel. In spite of their small size, low horsepower, and inadequate degaussing the Japanese minesweepers have in the last five years shown themselves worthwhile in minesweeping World War II mined areas.

23 Strategic distribution of available ships were: 1. CINCPACFLT - 12 ships Strategic Ports a. West Coast Requiring Protection 4 DMS (Overhaul & Refresher) 5 3 AMS (Port Protection) b. Pearl Harbor 3 AMS (Port Protection) 2

132

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. c. Guam 2 AMS (Port Protection) 1 2. COMNAVFE - 19 ships a . Japan 3 6 AMS, 1 AM, 12 JMS (Check Sweeping) See CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report NO 1, Project NO.I.A.2.h, Naval Air (Other than Marine Air Operations ANTI-MINE), p.361.

24 Ibid.

25 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p.121. Wonsan is a port city 110 air miles north of the 38th parallel. During the Korean War on 11 October 1950 the 3rd and Capital Divisions of the ROK, moving north along the east coast of the peninsula, entered Wonsan, securing both the city and its airfield. See Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp.330-347, 350-353; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.118-121.

26 Stueck, The Korean War, pp. 122-3.

27 North Korean People's Navy (NKPN) was established in 1948, at the same time as the North Korean People's Army. In reality, however, the NKPN began as an outgrowth of a small Soviet- sponsored coastal defense force organized shortly after World War II. On 25 June 1950 the combat strength of the NKPN was organized into three naval squadrons, the 1st squadron (Chongjin), the 2nd Squadron (Wonsan), and the 3rd Squadron (Chinnampo). The majority of the afloat strength of the NKPN between 1945 and 1950 consisted of Soviet-designed craft, most notably a number of P-4 motor torpedo boats, ex- Japanese minesweepers, and ex-U.S. ships. See also R.F.Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983); U.S. Army, History of the North Korean Army, 1952.

28 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.51, 102-8, 132, 143-5; Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp.183-5.

133

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 Ibid.

30 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, No.l, Project No. I.A.2.h ., p.361.

31 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report N0.1, Project NO.I.E. pp.1081-5.

32 Ibid.

33 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.270-1.

3,1 Ibid., p. 1137.

35 Ibid.

36 Cagle, "Wonsan: The Battle of the Mines," pp.598-9.

37 Sheldon Kinney, "All Quiet at Wonsan," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (August 1954), pp.859-90.

38 Minesweeping Task Group 95.6 was consisted of 1 DD, 1 APD, 2 DMS, 2 AM, 7 AMS, 4 PF, 8 Japanese Minesweepers, 4 Japanese mine destruction vessels, 1 ROKN FS, and other units assigned.

39 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, pp.74-5.

40 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report NO.l, Project NO.I.E. p.1095; USS Doyle War Diary June through September 1950; USS Endicott War Diary June through September 1950.

41 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report NO.l, Project NO.I.E. p.1096.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp. 115-6

134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.272-3; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.130-1; Field, United States Naval Operations, pp.230-1.

4b Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, pp.74-5.

47 P.W. Rairden, Jr., "The Junior Officer in Mine Warfare," Unites States Naval Institute Proceedings 79 (September 1953), pp.977-8.

48 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p.151; Cagle, "Wonsan: The Battle of the Mines," p.611.

49 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, p.278.

50 Ibid.

51 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, pp.80-1.

52 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.278-9.

53 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, p.80.

54 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, pp.278-9.

55 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, pp.80-1.

56 Ibid.

57 Lott, Most Dangerous Sea, p.280.

08 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, p. 81.

59 CTG 95.6 was consisted of 2 DMS (Endicott (F), Doyle), 1 AM (Incredible), 2 AMS (Curlew, Heron), 1 BB (Missouri), 1 DDR (Duncan), 1 AH (Consolation), 1 DE (Foss). Commander was Capt. Richard T. Spofford.

60 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, vol.l, pp.1098-9.

61 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, vol.l, p.1145.

152 Quoted in Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, p.5.

135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

64 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, vol.l. Major Features of the War in Korea.

65 Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, p.79.

66 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, vol.l, p.1099.

136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4

BLOCKADE AND ESCORT OPERATIONS

Blockade as Naval Strategy

There are two basic ways to use a surface navy in war:

for destroying enemy forces and to close enemy ports. In

other words, surface ships are for battle and for blockade.

In practice, naturally, both missions may be used. The

strategy of blockade was used in the Seven Years' War, which

began in 1756. At that time England, allied with Prussia

against France, found it more economical to blockade her

adversary's navy than to entice it into a battle, from which

she would have emerged with undesirable losses, even if she

were victorious.1

Until about the middle of the 19th century, when navies

were still under sail, their ships depended only on food,

water, and ammunition, and, since they carried enough of

those commodities to last for several months and through

several battles, they had limited logistical problems.

Therefore, the problem of bases was not a major issue.

137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Shortly after the middle of 19th century, steam-driven

mechanical propulsion became widespread, and at once

questions of fuel replenishment and, to a lesser degree, in

terms of frequency, questions of repair and maintenance

assumed the utmost importance.2

Control of the sea is exercised for two purposes: to

make the seas a broad highway for one's own forces, and to

deny the ocean to the enemy. Included in the second purpose

is blockade in its broadest sense. Blockade has its place in

both limited and unlimited warfare. In a limited war, its

primary purpose is to isolate a particular theater of action

in order that the enemy in that theater may be reduced

without outside interference. This requires exercise of

control of the sea (and air) within a small geographical

area and usually takes the form of a close blockade.3

In unlimited war the usual primary purpose is to

contribute to the collapse of the enemy's economy by cutting

off its sources of supply. This is usually done by

patrolling the SLOC with particular attention to choke

points through which shipping must pass. This form requires

the broad exercise of control of the seas. The two forms of

blockade may be used concurrently. For instance during World

War II in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy waged an unlimited war

138

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. against Japan with its broad blockade, and also isolated

specific areas one at a time by means of a close blockade in

order to allow the reduction of the garrison without outside

interference.4

The Korean War gives an excellent example of the use of

a close blockade to isolate a specific area for the purpose

of conducting a limited war. The theater to be isolated was

a peninsula; the enemy had no submarines and an

insignificant surface force and naval air power, and his

surface shipping was limited to small steamers, junks,

barges, and fishing craft. The dimensions of the peninsula

were such as to limit the maximum length of the battle-line,

so that given enough ground troops to man adequately this

line, sheer weight of numbers might have little effect on

the outcome.5

The essential forces for sea control were the UN

cruisers and destroyers with eyes furnished by such naval

air reconnaissance as could be made available. These were

organized into several task elements, each under its own

commander and assigned to a certain area of responsibility,

but all directed by a single blockade commander. Each

element consisted essentially of one cruiser and one

division of destroyers, augmented by ROKN small craft where

139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. circumstances warranted. On the West Coast carrier-based

aircraft was included in the system. On the East Coast it

was not included but more or less close liaison was

maintained with naval air reconnaissance.6

On 7 July 1950, the following broadcast was made to all

shipping in the Pacific Ocean:

The President of the US, in keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, has ordered a "naval blockade of the Korean coast."7

While this broadcast did not mention the limits of the

blockade, they were 39°35'N on the west coast, and 41°51'N

on the east coast. These limits were established to keep all

UN task forces well clear of both Russian and Chinese waters.

The imposition of a blockade of Korea was not without legal

difficulties. The Soviet Union and Communist China both

denounced the blockade and refused to acknowledge its legal

existence, although both observed it.8

Since naval opposition was negligible, control of the

seas was quickly achieved and maintained throughout 1950,

with the exception of mine areas, which were denied some

waters to UN forces for a brief period of time. Naval

140

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. operations were consequently shaped to exploit this control

of the sea in support of the ground forces. These operations

can be grouped as follows:

a. Blockade and Escort b. Close support of ground elements by air and naval gunfire c. Deep support of ground elements by naval air d. Amphibious operations e. Mine-Sweeping operations f. Logistic build-up

The peninsula of Korea is 600 miles long and 135 miles

wide. Its area is 86,000 square miles, making it about the

size of Idaho. The 38th Parallel, which bisects Korea,

passes about 60 miles south of Washington, D.C. half a world

away. Korea is situated in the center of a triangle between

China, Russia, and Japan. Some distances as the crow flies

are: Seoul to Shanghai - 600 miles, Seoul to Dairen or Port

Arthur - 300 miles, Pusan to Vladivostok - 600 miles, Seoul

to Tokyo - 800 miles. The navigational distances from the

U.S. Naval Base at Sasebo to Pusan, Inchon and Wonsan are

175, 440 and 475 miles respectively.9

The backbone of the peninsula is formed by a great

mountain chain which runs from north to south near the east

coast. This mountain range sends offshoots to the west and

141

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. south, where it sinks into the sea and forms a great number

of islands. It appears that the peninsula is a tilted

granite block, the east coast having emerged and the west

coast submerged.10

Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force Far East or Task Force

90 had been moved forward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, where it

was awaiting instructions. Under the direct control of

COMNAVFE, Task Force 96, Naval Force Japan, was engaged in

various tasks. Two organizational problems faced Admiral Joy

in the first hectic days: the provision of some sort of

escort for shipping en route to Pusan, and the establishment

of the blockade of North Korea, recommended by the Chief of

Naval Operations on 30 June and ordered by the President the

next day. These matters were dealt with by COMNAVFE in

Operation Order 8-50, promulgated on 3 July and effective on

the 4th, which made further refinements in the organization

of Task Force 96.11

t The UN Blockade and Escort Force (Task Force 95) was

one of the major subordinate commands of U.S. Naval Forces,

Far East (NAVFE). As with all naval task forces, its

composition varied as ships were attached or detached to

meet the demands of the assigned mission. The Task Force was

composed of a West Coast Group (Task Group 95.1), which

142

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. included most of the Allied navies as well as a number of

U.S. and Allied light carriers and escort carriers; an East

Coast Group (Task Force 95.2); and the Minesweeping Group

(Task Group 95.6) as well as an inshore ROK Navy patrol

force (Task Group 95.7). From time to time the battleships

Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey and Wisconsin were on the task

force's gun line, as were a number of cruisers and

destroyers.12

Escort shipping between Japan and Korea had so far been

on a wholly catch-as-catch-can basis: Arikara and Sholhaven

had been so used on 1 and 2 July, Jamaica and Collett on the

3rd. But now provision was made for an Escort Group, Task

Group 96.1, with a commander and units to be assigned when

available. Shortly the job would be turned over to the

frigates under Captain A.D.H. Jay, DSO, DSC, RN, commanding

officer of HMS Black Swan.

Blockade and inshore work south of latitude 37° was

assigned the ROK Navy, shortly to become Task Group 96.7,

with such assistance as might become available from the Far

East Air Forces and from any NAVFE units that happened by.

For the coastline north 37° separate East and West Coast

Support Groups were established: in the east the job was

entrusted to Admiral Higgins' Task Group 96.5, in the west

143

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to the Commonwealth units of Task Group 96.8. The northern

limits of the blockade were set at 41° on the east coast and

at 39° 30' in the west, well south of the northern frontiers,

and the precaution implicit in these boundaries was

emphasized by a specific admonition to all units to keep

well clear of Manchurian and Russian waters. Important

though this statement of policy was, it remained for some

time of purely academic importance, for emergency calls for

gunfire support along the coast were such as to limit the

blockading forces to only intermittent sweeps north of the

38th Parallel.13

Phases of Blockade and Escort Operations

Between 25 June and 31 July 1950, the forces for

establishing a blockade were as follows: United States USS Juneau (CLAA-19) Capt. Jesse C. Sowell Until 24 July 1950, flagship of Rear Adm. J.M. Higgins, COMCRUDIV-5 COMDESDIV 91 Capt. Halle C. Allan USS Mansfield (DD-728) Cdr. E.H. Headland USS Swenson (DD-729) Cdr. Robert A. Schelling USS De Haven (DD-727) Cdr. Oscar B. Lundgren USS Collett (DD-730) Cdr. Robert H. Close

144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. British HMS Belfast (CL) Capt. Aubrey St. Clair-Ford, Bt., DSO, RN HMS Jamaica (CL) Capt. J.S.C. Salter, DSO, OBE, RN HMS Cossack (DD) Capt. R.T. White, DSO, until 26 July 1950 Cdr. V.C. Begg, after 26 July 1950 HMS Consort (DD) Cdr. J.R. Carr HMS Black Swan (PF) Capt. A.D.H. Jay, DSO, DSC HMS Alacrity (PF) Cdr. H.S. Barber HMS Hart (PF) Cdr. N.H.H. Mulleneux Australian (5 July) HMAS Sholhaven (PF) Cdr. Ian H. McDonald, RAN

Such as it was, this small force set the blockade. On

29 June 1950, Juneau fired the first shore bombardment of

the war at Okkye on the east coast. The target was enemy

personnel, and four hundred and fifty-nine 5-incn shells

were fired at them. Twenty-seven casualties were reported.

Okkye was again a target for Juneau's guns on 30 June.14

This started with the surprise attack by North Korean

forces and continued through the defeat of ROK forces, the

commitment of U.S. forces in delaying action, and ends with

the establishment of the Pusan perimeter. Naval operations

during this period consisted of evacuation of allied

nationals, hasty deployment of available forces to blockade,

escort and bombardment duties, air strikes, ferrying troops

and supplies to Pusan, and a logistical build-up.

145

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The ROK Navy deployed to the best of its capability. At

Pusan, the Second Task Force consisted of 4 YMS and 3 JMS;

at Chinhae, various training units adding up to 1 PC, 5 YMS

and 4 smaller craft; at Inchon the First Task Force

consisting of 4 YMS, 2 JML and 1 LST; and at Mokpo the Third

Task Force mustered 2 YMS and 4 JML. These light forces were

immediately deployed to blockade duties, and on the evening

of 25 June the ROKN PC 70115 sank a 1,000-ton North Korean

transport loaded with approximately 600 troops 18 miles off

Pusan. As Pusan was practically undefended at this time,

this act may have saved that vital port from falling into

the hands of the enemy on the first day of hostilities.16

U.S. forces available for blockade and escort missions

were the Support Group (TG 96.5) consisting of the USS

Juneau (CLAA- 119) (COMCRUDIV 5, Rear Adm. J.W. Higgins) and

DESDIV 91 (Mansfield, Collett, De Haven, Swenson) and HMAS

Shoalhaven. The Juneau took over the east coast support

duties, and on 28 June bombarded enemy-held positions in the

vicinity of Samchok. She was shortly joined by Collett, HMS

Jamaica and HMS Black Swan. Ships of DESDIV 91 took on a

variety of jobs, escorting service groups, running barrier

patrols, and acting as life guards during carrier strikes.17

146

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On 4 July the President of the United States ordered a

naval blockade of the Korean Coast (See Appendix D and E).

COMNAVFE implemented this by placing his OpOrder 8-50 in

effect. This OpOrder provided for U.S. Forces (TG 96.5) to

take over the East Coast blockade, British Forces (TG 96.8)

to take over the West Coast blockade, Search and

Reconnaissance Group (TG 96.2) to assist, and provided that

the above would furnish escorts to TG 96.1 "as directed by

COMNAVFE."18

Actually few escorts had materialized. Up to 6 July,

Pusan had handled 55 ships, carrying 15,000 troops, 1,700

vehicles and 300 tons of military cargo. Collett, Shoalhaven,

and ROK YMSs had given such protection as was practicable.

On July 9, Commander Luosey, USN, arrived at Pusan and

assumed duties as Deputy COMNAVFE, Korea (CTG 96.7). On the

following day the ROK Navy was placed under his direction.

On 15 July, he established ROK patrol sectors covering the

East, South and West Coasts south of Latitude 37°.19

On 21 July, COMNAVFE's OpOrder 5-50 was made effective,

which organized the Japan-Korea Support Group as TG 96.5. On

this same date COMCRUDIV 3 (Rear Adm. Hartman) arrived in

Helena with DESDIV 3, and on 25 July Hartman assumed duties

as CTG 96.5. The new organization provided for an Escort

147

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Element (CTE 96.50), two East Coast Support Elements under

command of COMCRUDIV 3 (CTG 96.51) and COMCRUDIV 5 (CTE

96.52) and a West Coast Support Group under command of the

British Flag Officer Second in Command Far East Station (CTE

96.53). For composition of these groups see Appendix F. ROK

naval forces under CTG 96.7 were directed to patrol coastal

areas in coordination with TG 96.5. 20 The Escort Element

thus formed was the first organized effort to escort

shipping and was activated on 24 July by the Commander HMS

Black Swan (PF) with his own ship, plus HMS Hart (PF) and

HMAS Shoalhaven (PF) .21

During the first two weeks of August naval surface

craft continued the constant interdiction of enemy water,

rail and highway movement along both coasts. On the east

coast cruisers and destroyers have been bombarding as called

for in direct support of the Infantry, in addition to their

patrol functions. Naval escorts of troop ships and shipping

continued to guarantee the arrival of additional men and

supplies in the supplies in the battle area, and safe

evacuation and care of wounded.22

As long as the enemy compels innocent civilians to

serve his purpose in front line areas, the problem of

avoiding casualties to non-combatants is exceedingly

148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. difficult. The naval bombardment forces, both surface and

air, exercised every precaution to avoid harming the civil

population and employed every possible means to identify and

destroy only military targets.23

The ground forces were occupied in the defense and

stabilization of the Pusan perimeter and the build-up for

the Inchon operation. At the beginning of this period the

Blockade and Escort Forces were operating as follows:

Escort Element (TE 96.50) now known unofficially as the "United Nations Escort Force" was composed of 5 frigates, one British, one Australian, one French and two New Zealand. It was providing one escort each for a daily Pusan-Sasebo convoy, plus all troopships, and was attempting to rendezvous with and escort all important west-bound ships passing near Sasebo. Normally two destroyers were available for fast escort work.24

On the East Coast, Task Elements 96.51 and 96.52

alternated in round-the-clock naval gunfire support to the

ground elements anchoring the right flank of the UN

perimeter. The element not in direct support off Pohang

would replenish at Sasebo and then conduct blockading and

bombardment sweeps of the coast to the north prior to

relieving on station. On the West Coast Task Element 96.53

devoted its full effort to enforcement of the blockade under

149

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the difficult hydrographic conditions of that area. All ROKN

units were employed on the west and southwest coasts in

close coordination with the British blockade forces in that

area, ROK units operating close inshore, leaving the

blockade to seaward to the heavier vessels.25

The Korean Navy was already fully occupied in the

west. On 3 August the ROK YMS 502 sank seven sailboats which

were landing off Kunsan; four days later and 30 miles to the

northward she sank two motorboats, while other Korean units

destroyed four small junks in the Haeju-man approaches above

Inchon. On the 9th an important step was taken in support of

west coast operations as an LST sailed for Ochong-do, an

island forty miles of Kunsan, to establish an advanced ROKN

supply base which would eliminate the 300-mile round trip to

Pusan.26

Air reconnaissance in support of blockade and escort

operations was being conducted by Fleet Air Wing 6 and VP6

under CTG 96.2 but was as yet not well coordinated with the

surface effort. On 7 August CTE 96.50 conferred with

commander and shortly thereafter closer coordination was

arranged. CTE 96.53 had carrier-based air at its disposal

when the HMS Triumph reported on 8 August.27

150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The 6th of August saw the task force still south of

Korea, attacking objectives assigned by air controllers and

bridge and highway targets from Yosu north to Hwanggan.

Philippine Sea concentrated her efforts on transportation

facilities, while Valley Forge flew twenty-four Corsair and

twenty-two Skyraider sorties under JOC control.28

By 11 August, it had become apparent that the majority

of submarine contacts reported were very doubtful and that

submarines were not an immediate threat. COMNAVFE ruled that

there would be no further augmentation of escort forces, as

blockade operations had priority. By 13 August, the East

Korea Support Group had enough units available to establish

permanent patrol points to block any access to Wonsan from

the North, as well as to carry out his fire support,

interdiction fire and anti-shipping and bombardment sweeps.

Demolition teams from the Bass (APD-124) were aiding the

interdiction program by blowing up bridges and tunnels along

the coastal route.29

About 15 August, Russians mined Wonsan, while the North

Koreans began mining Chinnampo. The mines had been brought

overland by rail and were laid mostly from barges towed by

tugs. Increased activity in these ports was noted by aerial

reconnaissance but was identified as mining.30

151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On 16 August, the ROK 3rd Division reported itself

surrounded in the vicinity of Yonghae and requested

evacuation. During the night of 16-17 August, 4 ROK LSTs,

supported by naval gunfire evacuated 7,000 troops and 100

vehicles without a casualty, retracting by 0716 in the

morning. On 26 August a gunfire support ship was furnished

for the southwest anchor of the defense perimeter in the

vicinity of Chinhae. One ship was maintained on this duty

until 22 September. With the blockade and gunfire support

situation in hand, and the submarine threat failing to

develop, naval forces began re-grouping for the Inchon

operation. On 9 September Task Elements 96.52 and 96.53

reported to Commander 7th Fleet, and on 11 September Task

Element 96.50 was disbanded and its units re-assigned.31

On 12 September, 1950, in compliance with COMNAVFE's

060626z, Task Groups 96.5, 96.6 and 96.7 were dissolved and

units thereof reconstituted as Task Force 95, United Nations

Support Force Far East. Rear Admiral A.E. Smith, USN, broke

his flag in USS Dixie (AD-14) at Sasebo and assumed command

of TF 95, and shortly thereafter the task force designation

was changed to United Nations Blockading and Escort Force.

As D-day at Inchon approached, naval gunfire support

increased in tempo. On arrival of the Missouri, her weight

152

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of shot was added to that of CRUDIV 3 in pounding Samchok.32

The period from 15 to 30 September, 1950, brought the

Inchon landing, the breakout from the Pusan perimeter and

the defeat of the NKPA. During this period ground and naval

operations were so closely inter-related that it is

difficult to separate them. The largest portion of the naval

forces were committed to cover the amphibious landing.

However, TE 95.21 on the East Coast had now been re-enforced

by the arrival of the Missouri and continued a heavy

pounding of North Korean positions and coastal supply routes

in preparation for the break-out. The blockade was by this

time completely effective. The Yellow Sea filled with allied

ships, and a tight screen had been drawn around the Inchon

area. The East Coast blockade and gunfire support forces had

stopped all off-shore enemy ship movement south of the 40th

Parallel and their bombardment of coastal positions and

roads was forcing the withdrawal of the enemy forces inland

and into the hills. This was accomplished in spite of a

four-day interruption occasioned by an ill-advised ROK

commando raid.33

During this period naval surface units remained on the

scene of the landing to provide gunfire support and to give

anti-aircraft protection to the unloading and harbor

153

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. activities. The United States battleship Missouri had just

arrived in Korea waters in time for this operation, after a

long trip, and instantly proved of enormous value with her

great sixteen-inch guns. Noteworthy features of this

amphibious operation were the Navy's clockwork coordination,

strict adherence to schedule, and the overcoming of national

obstacles, especially in the extraordinary tidal conditions

and limited maneuvering room for large vessels.34

Until this time, North Korean fisherman, after

investigation, had been allowed to proceed with their

fishing. CTF S5, however, took the position that these

fishermen must be turned against the Communists and that

food was contraband. He distributed leaflets to the

blockading ships reading as follows:

"The Communists brought this terrible war down upon you. You cannot fish from your boats until the Communists are killed or thrown out. If you do you must suffer the consequences."

Ships were instructed to distribute these leaflets to

fishing boats North of 38° and to send the boats back into

port. If they returned, their boats were to be confiscated

or destroyed and the fishermen returned to the beach.35

154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During this period, the mine threat began to take shape, as

mines were sighted for the first time in the Inchon area. On

26 September USS Brush took mine damage off Tanchon. On 29

September USS Magpie blew up and was lost while sweeping off

the East Coast. On 30 September USS Mansfield hit a mine in

the vicinity of Changjon. As this period drew to a close the

ROK Army on the Eastern flank hit north along the coastal

road, supported by naval gunfire.36

During the first two weeks of October naval forces have

continued to provide naval gunfire support to ground troops

in the Inchon area and at numerous points along the southern

and east coasts of Korea. Generally, the fire of these heavy

mobile guns has been directed from the air or by control

personnel stationed on shore. Many enemy prisoners of war

reported that naval gunfire was especially hated and feared

by the enemy gunfire troops.37

Ground operations focused on occupied in the pursuit of

the defeated enemy. The blockade prevented evacuation by sea,

and the pounding of the East coastal road, coupled with

demolition raids north of Wonsan conducted from the

submarine Perch, seriously disrupted any attempt at enemy

withdrawal along this road. Units of TF 95 which had

reported to Commander 7th Fleet for the Inchon operation

155

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. continued under his control as plans took shape for the

Wonsan landing. On 8 October TG 95.2 reported as a unit to

Commander Joint Task Force 7 for the Wonsan operation.

Wonsan was found to be heavily mined. The Minesweeping Group

(TG 95.6) undertook to clear the area. Sweeping operations

began on 10 October. Despite the loss of the USS Pirate and

USS Pledge on 12 October, a channel was cleared by 25

October (five days after the planned D-Day). While

minesweeping was going on at Wonsan, it developed that

Chinnampo also was mined, and on 29 October minesweeping

operations were commenced at the later port.38

On 1 November it became apparent that the Chinese

Communists had intervened in force.39 Eighth Army units,

over-extended in their pursuit of defeated North Korean

elements, were hit hard and barely escaped envelopment. The

ROK 3rd Division continued on up the coastal road in the

northeast, supported by naval gunfire. Most of the Korean

coastline was now in possession of friendly forces. Surface

units of the Blockade and Escort force were still under the

operational command of the Amphibious Commander, except for

the minesweeping elements which were engaged in clearing

each port as it was captured.40

156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the west, since first contact with the Chinese,41

Eighth Army headquarters had entertained serious doubts

about the future. Early in November Admiral Joy had begun

to fear that the war would continue beyond the winter; by

mid-month he had come to feel that the Chinese had the man

power to expel the U.N. from Korea, and was keeping his

fingers crossed against the third World War. At sea, as on

land, this was a period of contradictions. Following the

strike against the Yalu River bridges the airmen had again

found targets short: on the 18th the escort carriers were

withdrawn; on the 19th Valley Forge and two destroyers were

detached and ordered to the United States for overhaul.42

Personal and training

CRUDESPAC ships in the Far East before the-outbreak of

the Korean War were maintained at approximately peacetime

allowances for personnel and supplies. Upon the outbreak of

hostilities these ships were brought up to 85% complement as

rapidly as availability of personnel and transportation

permitted. Likewise, ships departing for Fart East areas

after 25 June were so provided. Operations departments were

maintained at 100% complement, and the Engineering

157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. l i f 1 2 6 ii? 3 T WTWE

C*7) ON TO TH£ BORDCR . • ’ i f l s One 27 Oct-lfNov. :. 4 +on* DD

VZMuZL F«r*

I f7*"DI V fh m Pvtanj * / 270ct*6NQV-f I CORPS ip r E S B .h m , ■Itm m l ItoHungno Wonsan M in t sues. 6 -1/ Hoy.

r/ TF77 TF 77 1 HQ EICHTH S -lO N m . Replenishing ARMY* FIFTH A n a ! AIR FORCE M m e n i t A ? SMCocfioZl/ 11-31 Oct. I

/ M in t sw eep W a r . hLanding 3-8 No*

3«-

to m p fc ttd l

*3.° H a iti.

Figure 4.1: On to the Border, 27 Oct.- 25 November, 1950 Source: Field, United States Naval Operations, p.255.

158

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Departments at about 95%. The resulting under-complement in

the gunnery department was accepted as a calculated risk in

that the cruisers and destroyers could not have withstood

repeated or simultaneous air attacks with limited numbers in

gun crews and ammunition supply trains. In general it now

appears that the augmentation to 85% complement was a sound

decision for the purpose to be gained.43

The proof of the excellence of U.S. navy peacetime

training was the easy transition from peacetime operations

to wartime operations. This shift was most apparent in shore

bombardment and amphibious missions. While major recognition

must be given to the unit commanders and commanding officers

of the ships concerned for the effective prosecution of the

Type Commander's training directives, due credit should also

be given to the Training Command and the Amphibious Training

Command in helping to maintain a high level of know-how

between wars, particularly in view of the fact that these

commands had been operating on a "shoe-string" basis for the

past five years.44

An apparent weakness in U.S. Navy training program, and

one that was not tested during these operations, was

training in ASW and air defense. Services of tractor planes

available at Sasebo and some firing was done at sleeves, but

159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. destroyers generally did not participate. Shore bombardment

provided training that was helpful in all gunnery work, AA

included. Submarines were available at Yokosuka for ASW

training, but escort types could seldom be spared long

enough for refresher work. Although a fairly complete

underway training element existed at Yokosuka, which was

bolstered by personnel from UTE Philippines, the outbreak of

Korean hostilities resulted in virtual suspension of

training services because of the departure of combatant

vessels from the Yokosuka area. Most training at Yokosuka

was restricted to shakedown training of frigates being

reactivated.45

COMCRUDESPAC commented: "The fundamental weakness

herein is lack of provision of opportunity for training in

the action areas. When ships arrive in the Far East they are

normally capable of consummating any mission and if

continuing training opportunities are made available by

operational commanders, it can be expected that the ships

will produce the required results." This continued training

by operational commanders is considered essential at all

times if ships are to be maintained in an adequate state of

operational readiness.46

160

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Evaluation of Blockade and Escort Operations

The primary mission of the east coast group was gunfire

support. Fortunately, the topography and hydrography of the

area made the secondary mission of blockade practicable at

the same time. The two task elements spelled each other off

the fire support area. At first the element on station

averaged one cruiser and two destroyers. These would render

call fire support during the daytime. At night the cruiser,

screened by one destroyer would conduct harassing fire, on

coordinates designated by the Shore Fire Control Party,

while the other destroyer would make a sweep up the coast to

latitude 38°15'N and return, conducting shore bombardment en

route. The other element would proceed to Sasebo for

replenishment before relieving on station and then would

make a sweep of the coast, bombarding as it went.47

The situation on the west coast was much more difficult

due to shallow depth of water, numerous islands, and

irregular coast-line studded with identitations, providing

inland routes and daytime hide-outs. The enemy made it a

practice, after sustaining initial damage, to move seaborne

traffic only at night, hugging the coast-line, taking

advantage of all natural routes to avoid detection, and

161

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hiding inshore during daylight hours. Admiral Andrewes

stated: "Although it is possible to move small craft by

creeps and shallows along a considerable part of the coast,

at certain points even inshore traffic has to pass round

headlines." The ROK Navy was also blockading the south and

west coasts, and on 21 July was ordered to patrol in close

coordination with the British. On 8 August HMS Triumph (CV)

reported to CTG 96.53. The British commander maintained a

close watch of key ports as practicable.48

The Escort Commander (CTF 96.50) organized an "Escort

and Operations Control Unit" ashore, consisting of two

flotilla staff officers in COMFLTACTS Sasebo office to

maintain close liaison with him and to assign escorts to

missions in the absence at sea of CTE 96.50. This force had

a standing commitment to escort the daily cargo convoy (7-9

knots) from Sasebo to Pusan. On most days a 12-15 knot

passenger ferry also sailed this route. In fact the two

services always sailed together. The ships of these convoys

returned independently to Sasebo to avoid delay, and the

escorts patrolled back over the convoy route. With the

limited number of escorts available it was found just

possible to provide one escort for each convoy and for

independently routed ships. CTE 96.50 observed "while this

162

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was adequate with only the threat of submarine attack, it

would obviously be quite inadequate if this threat

materialized. "49

The patrol and blockade by Task Group 95.1 of Korea's

west coast differed from that of east coast in many respects,

principally due to dissimilar hydrographic and geographic

conditions. The west coast was a honeycomb of islands; it

was area of high tides, of mud banks, shallows, and

difficult channels. Many of the Korean rivers emptied into

the Yellow Sea. Nowhere was the water more than 60 fathoms

in depth. And within 10 miles of the shore, the depth was

less than 20 fathoms. As a consequence, large vessels could

not operate as close inshore on the west coast as was often

possible on the east coast. The bombardment effort,

therefore, was not as great.50

In further contrast to the east coast, the more

numerous islands made the guerrilla problem on the west

coast much more difficult. In the last 18 months of the war,

there was a contest with the Communists for control of key

islands above the 38th Parallel. On some of these captured

islands, UN forces had placed radar stations for the control

and direction of the UN air force's aircraft. Some west

coast islands served as search and rescue stations for

163

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. parachuting airmen whose aircraft had suffered damage over

"MIG alley." Other west coast islands served well as

intelligence outposts. Supporting the west coast islands,

therefore, was a much greater part of the over-all task than

on the east coast. The west coast blockade group, Task Group

95.1, contained three principal elements: the carrier

element, the surface blockade and patrol element, and the

west coast island defense element.51

Fast carrier task forces could have been used to

enforce this blockade and might possibly have been more

effective, particularly if a night-flying carrier were

included. Their planes could have furnished continuous

reconnaissance, the results of which would have been

immediately available to the blockade commander for

assignment of attack missions, surface or air. Planes could

have called for surface units from the task group to

destroyer targets, or could themselves have attacked targets

in locations inaccessible to surface units or beyond

practicable surface steaming range. In addition to the above,

the fast carrier task forces are capable of furnishing their

own air and anti-submarine protection. In World War II,

experience such as the loss of the Prince of Wales, the

Repulse, and the Indianapolis demonstrated that heavy

164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. surface units are often extremely vulnerable to air and

submarine attack unless incorporated into an air-surface

group such as the carrier task groups. On the other hand,

fast carrier task forces were not essential to meeting the

minimum requirements posed by the problem, and were being

employed to better purpose in the interdiction program.52

Throughout the blockade of the Korean coasts, the ships

of the US Navy acquitted themselves ably and with

distinction. American ships, operating with the carriers,

cruisers, destroyers, and frigates of other navies, learned

many valuable lessons and techniques from their UN sailing

partners that would prove of great value in subsequent

years.53

Among the Blockade and Escort Force's major

accomplishments were the control of the seas surrounding the

Korean peninsula, thus denying the enemy the use of the seas

and allowing the free flow of seaborne supplies, equipment

and material to support the Allied was effort; the blockade

of Wonsan harbor, which denied its use of the enemy; and the

interdiction of enemy road and rail lines of communication

through aerial attack by fighters and fighter-bombers from

the task force's carriers, through shore bombardment by the

task force's battleships, cruisers and destroyers, and

165

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. through the launching of commando raids along the coastline

to destroy bridges, tunnels and other critical

transportation choke points.54

There would be no active surface opposition, no

submarine opposition, and practically no enemy air

opposition to the blockade. United Nations naval forces, led

by the U.S. Navy, would have complete control of the entire

five-hundred-odd miles of the North Korean coastline.

The blockade was imposed thousands of miles from the

American mainland. The number of ships for blockading and

bombardment purposes was never plentiful. The legal

requirement for an effective blockade required that every

portion of the blockaded coast had to be under surveillance

once every twenty-four hours by ship (not by air). That this

naval blockade around Korea was a success, that it hampered,

embarrassed, and hurt the enemy, can not be doubted.

Minesweepers, frigates, destroyer escorts, destroyers,

cruisers, and battleships of the U.S. Navy, and units from

seven other navies of the UN, plus the ROK Navy, were

destined to fight a bitter, unglamorous, and seemingly

futile war along the coastlines of Korea. Many ships were to

be hit; an unlucky few were to be sunk. By and large, the

headlines of the war would not recognize these surface

166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. forces. 55

Considering the naval blockade and escort operation

during the period between 25 June and 30 December, naval

reconnaissance was a fundamental element. Screening ships

provided for naval group and support shipping were

inadequate in number to have provided acceptable protection

in the event of submarine or air attack in modern strength.

The movement of ships within enemy harbors was detected and

reported but not interpreted. Particularly, the observed

activity in Wonsan and Chinnampo was not identified as

mining. Therefore, in setting up a blockade or escort force,

close coordination between surface and naval air elements

must be provided for by including an air element in the

blockade or escort force, or providing for close liaison

between element commanders and a common voice and CW channel

between units.56

167

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 Giuseppe Fioravanzo, A History of Naval Tactical Thought (Naval Institute Press, 1979), pp.6-7; Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941).

2 Ibid.

3 During World War II practically the entire Pacific Fleet can be said to have contributed to the blockade. CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.V.6.7.8, p.1652.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p.1653.

6 In this case, the cruiser (on the West Coast the carrier) furnished a headquarters for the element commander, a base for organic air (helicopter on the East Coast, VA on the West Coast), and heavy support for the destroyers if needed. Ibid.

7 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, p.1015.

8 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p.281.

9 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.D.2, p.999.

10 Ibid.

11 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp.58- 60; COMNAVFE OpOrder 8-50.

12 Harry G. Summers, Jr., Korean War Almanac (New York, 1990) p. 64.

13 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp. 61-2

14 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.281-2.

15 Her name was Paiktusan, the name of the highest mountain in Korea. Her mast still remains at the Korea Naval Academy

168

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in memory of past services. For more about the operations by PC-class see Field, United States Naval Operations, p.51, 158, 127, 183, 190, 193, 217, 202.

16 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.D.2, p.1000.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 1001.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., pp. 1001-2.

21 Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Third Report, September 2, 1950, p.3396.

22 Ibid.

23 Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Fourth Report, September 17, 1950, p.3400.

24 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., p.1002.

25 Ibid.

26 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp. 137-8.

27 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., p.1002.

28 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp. 141-2.

29 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., p. 1002.

30 Ibid.

169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 1003.

33 Ibid.

34 Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Sixth Report, October 21, 1950, p.3414.

35 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., pp.1003-4.

30 Ibid., p. 1004.

37 Reports of the United Nations Command to the Security Council, United Nations, on the course of military operations in Korea, Seventh Report, November 3, 1950, p.3422.

38 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., p.1004.

39 On 15 November, the 7th Marines arrived Hagaru-ri, the village at the southern tip of their first objective, the Chosin Reservoir. The 5th Marines followed closely behind. Pilots and North Korean civilians continued to report Chinese enemy troop activity to the north and west of the Marines.

40 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., p.1004.

41 The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was founded on 1 August 1927, during the Nanchang Uprising led by Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and He Dong. At the time of the outbreak of the Korean War PLA forces were composed of experienced Red Army veterans and former Nationalist units that had been integrated into the PLA. For more scholarly work about the Chinese intervention see Edward J.M. Rhoads, The Chinese Red Army, 1927-1963 (Harvard University Press, 1964). And an insightful study of relationship between China and Korea can

170

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. be found in Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic relations (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).

42 Field, History of United States Naval Operations, pp.261-2.

43CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Project No.I.D.2., p.1007.

44 Ibid.

45 Recognition training was at a minimum, principally because of the lack of proper material for conducting such training. Some up-to-date recognition material was provided ships after two or three months had elapsed. Ibid., p. 1007.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 1009.

48 Ibid., p.1010.

49 Ibid.

50 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.295-6.

51 Ibid.

52 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.V.6.7.8, pp.1653-6.

53 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.298.

54 Summers, Korean War Almanac, pp.65-6.

55 Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, pp.283-4.

36 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.D.2, pp.997-8.

171

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5

NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS

Preparing for Operations

The United States Navy and Marine Corps aviation came

out of Korea stronger, more cohesive, and with a better

appreciation of the challenges they faced as a result of

their experiences. Both had entered the war as forces

encrusted with tradition, caught between the era of the

piston-powered airplane and the jet, and the war had

highlighted some of the problems both would have to face in

the ensuing years.1

Naval aviation was not long getting into the fight,

nine days to be exact. On the last day of hostilities, July

27, 1953, four attack carriers with twenty-one squadrons

embarked hit the enemy repeatedly. During the three years

that the U.S. Navy operated in the Korean theater the

versatility, competence, and lethal quality of its air arm

was demonstrated most convincingly.2

172

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Carrier-based Navy airpower enjoyed important

advantages over Air Force aircraft operating from bases in

Japan. The carriers were close to their targets, so turn

around times were reduced: Less fuel was needed and greater

bomb loads could be carried. Moreover, the piston-engined

Navy fighters and attack aircraft had greater endurance at

low altitudes and could maintain cover for friendly forces

for extended periods. By contrast, Japan-based Air Force

fighter bombers had to carry more fuel to reach their

targets, and bomb loads were reduced accordingly. The

problem was particularly acute for the jet-powered P-80 with

their high low altitude fuel consumption.

As of 25 June 1950 the following naval air units were

deployed in the Western Pacific: COMFAIRGUAM (COMFAIRWING 1),

VP 28, FASRON 118 and VU 7B were all located at Agana, Guam.

USS Valley Forge with COMCARDIV 3 and Carrier Air Group 5

aboard was operating with the 7th Fleet, and was located at

Subic Bay, the Philippines. USS Suisun (AVP 53) was based at

Hong Kong. VP 47 was in the process of being relieved by VP

46, and was located at Sangley Point with one detachment at

Yokosuka, Japan. FASRON 119 was also located at Sangley

Point. The patrol squadrons were normally based in the Guam

area, with detachments operating in the forward areas at

173

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sangley Point, Hong Kong, Yokosuka, occasionally Clark Field,

and Okinawa.3

There was no administrative patrol plane organization

permanently assigned to Commander Naval Forces, Far East,

although detachments from Fleet Air Wing One operated from

Yokosuka on occasion as in case of VP 47. Seaplane tenders

were assigned to the Western Pacific by COMAIRPAC on a

rotational basis for tours of from six to nine months. They

normally operated in the Sangley Point - Hong Kong area, and

were temporarily assigned to the administrative command of

Commander Fleet Air Wing One.4

The greatest assembly of naval air power since the

World War II was available to MacArthur at Inchon:

Task Force 77 - Fast Carrier Force Carrier Division 1 USS Philippine Sea Air Group 11 VF-111 Grumman F9F Panther VF-112 Grumman F9F Panther VF-113 Vought F4U Corsair VF-114 Vought F4U Corsair VA-115 Douglas AD Skyraider Carrier Division 3 USS Valley Forge

Table 5.1: Naval Air Power since World War II5 (Continued)

174

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Air Group 5 VF-51 Grumman F9F Panther VF-52 Grumann F9F Panther VF-53 Vought F4U Corsair VF-54 Vought F4U Corsair VA-55 Douglas AD Skyraider Carrier Division 5 USS Boxer Air Group 2 VF-21 Vought F4U Corsair VF-22 Vought F4U Corsair VF-63 Vought F4U Corsair VF-64 Vought F4U Corsair VF-65 Douglas AD Skyraider

Task Group 90.5 Air Support Group TG 90.51 (CVE Element) USS Badoeng Strait VMF-323 Vought F4U Corsair USS Sicily VMF-214 Vought F4U Corsair

Task Force 91 Blockade and Covering Force HMS Tri umph 800 Sqdn FAA Supermarine Seafire 827 Sqdn FAA Fairey Firefly

Table 5.1: Naval Air Power since World War II7 (Continued)

175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5.1: Naval Air Power since World War II8 (Continued)

Task Force 99 Patrol and Reconnaissance Force TG 99.1 (Search and reconnaissance Group) VP-6 Lockheed P2V Neptune 88 Sqdn RAF Short Sunderland 209 Sqdn RAF Short Sunderland TG 99.2 (Patrol and Escort Group) VP-42 Martin PBM Mariner VP-47 Martin PBM Mariner

Source: Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea, pp.59-60

Air activity in support of the Inchon landing started

at the beginning of September. TF 77's mission for the

operation included devoting 40% of its sorties to targets in

the Inchon-Seoul area, with the remaining 60% equally split

on targets north and south of Inchon. In early September,

Valley Forge and Philippine Sea attacked targets ranging

from Seoul and Pyongyang to the west coast port of

Chinnampo; Philippine Seaalone launched 82 sorties on 1

September. Meanwhile, to confuse North Korea about the

location of the planned assault, intelligence planted the

rumor that an invasion would take place at the southwestern

port of Kunsan.9

176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On 8 August, Rear Admiral Richard W. Ruble resumed

command of Carrier Division Fifteen, part of which now

started operating as the Escort Carrier Group (Task Group

96.8), and Rear Admiral Henderson relieved him of his former

responsibilities, and in its place was commissioned

Commander Fleet Air Japan. Meanwhile, on 4 August, Fleet Air

Wing Six was commissioned and the existence of Fleet Air

Wing One Detachment Japan was terminated. Fleet Air Wing Six

was given operational control of all American and British

patrol squadrons located in the Japan-Korea area, and was in

turn placed under the administrative and operational control

of COMFAIRJAP.10

Operationally, the Fast Carriers have been assigned to

Task Force 77 since the commencement of hostilities.

Originally, by C0M7THFLT Operation Orders 6-50 and 8-50,

Task Force 77 was designated as the "Striking Force", with

Vice Admiral Struble as the Task Force Commander. To a

certain degree, the operations of the fast carriers came

under the control of the Commanding General, Far East Air

Forces. By CINCFE letter AG 370.2 of 8 July 1950, the policy

was prescribed that "When both Naval Forces, Far East and

Far East Air Forces are assigned missions in Korea,

coordination control, a Commander in Chief, Far East,

177

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. prerogative, is delegated to Commanding General, Far East

Air Forces."11

The escort carrier organization, administratively and

operationally, was simple. Both USS Sicily and Badoeng

Strait were assigned to Carrier Division 15, under the

command of Rear Admiral Ruble. On 3 August, USS Sicily

commenced close air support operations in Korea. When both

carriers were present, the entire task group operated, but

the organization was sufficiently flexible so that when only

one carrier was present, no organization was required. This

organization was established by COMCARDIV 15's remarkable

Operation Order 15-50. On 6 September, COMNAVFE issued

dispatch orders placing Task Group 96.8 under the operation

control of Commander Joint Task Force 7 (COM7THFLT) for the

pre-D-Day phase of Inchon landing. However the Task

organization and calls of Task Group 96.8 remained in effect

until 12 September, at which time Task Group 96.8 became

Task Group 90.5 (Air Support Group) as prescribed in CTF

90's (COMPHIBGRU's) Operation 14-50. The three Task elements

previously described remained in effect with different

numerical designations, viz., 90.51, 90.52, 90.53 for the

two carrier elements and the screen, respectively.12

178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fast Carriers and Escort Carriers

This section takes a look at the operations of the fast

carrier task forces, the operation of air groups from such a

task force, and the military capabilities and limitations of

the fast carrier force. The carriers performed all missions

assigned satisfactorily. Although lack of material

opposition by enemy air or submarines in Korean waters

should be borne in mind, the U.S. Navy accumulated many

valuable lessons in the general field of naval warfare.

At the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June the fast

carrier force in the Far East consisted of the Valley Forge

with Air Group Five embarked. This ship was then en route

Hong Kong to Subic Bay. A fast turn around at Subic was

accomplished, and on 27 June she was underway for Korean

waters. The first operation of significance was a sweep over

the island of Formosa in passing on 29 June. The first fast

carrier force offensive action of the war was on 3rd and 4th

July against the Pyongyang area. Following this action, the

Valley Forge proceeded to Buckner Bay, Okinawa, where she

remained from the 6th to the 16th of July standing by to

counter possible hostilities against Formosa. On the 18th of

July, the date of the Pohang landing, the force made its

179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. next offensive operation in the Korean area. When this

turned out to be an unopposed landing, strikes were directed

against northeast Korea. It was on this day that Air Group

Five made its effective strike against the Wonsan

refinery.13 From this date until 15 November, the fast

carrier force was in almost continuous operation against

North Korean targets.14

The Valley Forge remained alone until the 3rd of August

when the Philippine Sea with Air Group Eleven joined the

Seventh Fleet. Boxer with Air Group Two reported on 15

September, the day of the Inchon landing, and launched its

first strikes that day. Leyte with Air Group Three was with

Task Force 77 from the 9th of October, having reported from

the Atlantic Fleet. This made a force, actually a task group,

of four large carriers.15

The standard number of squadrons per air group was

five: 2 jet VF, 2 prop VF, 1 VA. Exceptions were the Boxer

with 4 prop fighter squadrons and 1 VA, and the Leyte with 1

jet VF, 2 prop VF, and 1 VA. While the number of airplane

carried should be about 85, including, approximately 17

special mission airplanes, revision of the present

allowances of 93 per CV Air Group is not suggested. The

difference between "on board" and "allowed" can be used to

180

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. great value in several ways: extra airplanes for the pre

embarkation training phase, spare airplanes at forward

fields, equipment for a pilot-airplane pool in the forward

areas, a cushion to permit the responsible commander to vary

the ratio of types abroad within reasonable limits.16

Night air operations, which are required in offensive

strikes and for the defense of the task force, overtax the

deck crew when full daylight operations are also scheduled.

Sustained effort on a 24 hour a day basis is not practicable

for CV class carrier with an air group. To reduce the load

on individual carriers during Korean operations, night

missions were divided among the ships of the force, but the

task remained an extra one after full daylight operations.

Increased night operating capacity of the groups was

obtained by greater employment of all squadron pilots under

favorable night conditions in addition to utilization of the

special night qualified teams.17

Each of the carriers was flying from 90 to 100 sorties

per operating day during the Inchon-Seoul operation, flying

two days out of three. With the reduced tempo of operations

during the Wonsan operation in the last half of October the

number of sorties per carrier per operating day fell to

about 60. The maximum number of sorties in one day for any

181

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. one ship was about 140 (141 in the Philippine Sea on 15

September).18 As an example of the number of sorties per day

over a long period, including days in port, the following

figures are of interest. Over a three month period the

Valley Forge flew an average of 43 sorties per day. The

total sorties flown by Task Force 77 aircraft as reported by

COMNAVFE are listed below, with the average number of

carriers in the force for the month in each case, and the

sorties per carrier month:

Av No. of Sorties per Sorties CV's Carrier Month

July 724 1.0 724

August 2609 1.9 1373

September 4408 2.5 1766

October 2948 3.5 843

November 2382 2.6 917

Table 5.2: Sorties per Carrier Month - July - November 1950 Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.a, p.190.

For comparison, Korea sortie information on the CVE's,

Badoeng Strait and Sicily, follows:19

182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Av No. of Sorties per Sorties CVE's Carrier Month

August 1242 • 00 690

September 1303 2.0 652

October 418 2.0 209 CM o

November 452 • 226

Table 5.3: Sorties per Carrier Month - Badoeng Strait and Sicily Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report, Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.a, p.191.

The ammunition delivery statistics for Task Force 77

are available for 21 September to 3 October, and 10 to 29

October inclusive. Including the weight of machine gun

ammunition fired, the weight of rockets and the weight of

napalm, a total of 3,045 tons of aircraft ammunition were

expended during these periods. Task Force 77 included from

two to four carriers during these periods, totaling 103

carrier days. The rate of expenditure is approximately 30

tons per day per carrier, including carriers which are

replenishing. If every third day were a replenishment day,

this would amount to 45 tons per strike day. However, this

represents a period when intense operations were not

required and is not an index of the capability of the

183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. carriers. More significant is a five-day period reported by

the Leyte during which 528 sorties, 472 of them offensive,

were flown. During this period an average of 77 tons of

aircraft ammunition per day was expended.20

Carriers were not employed for mining operations during

the period covered. The AD-4 aircraft could carry up to

three mines each, either 1000 or 2000 pounds. With one 2000

pound mine 725 nautical mile radius is obtainable. With 6000

lb of the flight mines radius was reduced to 200 nautical

mines.21

The escort carrier, as its name implies, was designed

primarily for convoy duty. Its aircraft were to be search

and attack types which could scout for and destroy enemy

submarine and surface ships, protecting the vital supply

lines of World War II. In this capacity, the CVE and other

ASW weapons performed their missions so successfully that by

early 1944 it became apparent that some of these ships could

be made available for fleet use. Accordingly, in the later

stages of the war, they relieved the fast carriers to a

large extent in supplying attack aircraft for amphibious

assaults, while others carried on in their primary role,

that of anti-submarine warfare.22

184

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Korean War, which found two of these ships in the

Pacific Fleet, found the CVEs, relieved of most of their ASW

duties, providing mobile operations bases for Marine

squadrons to support ground forces on the Korean peninsula.

This, then, is an account of the employment of those ships,

the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and USS Sicily (CVE 118) in

that capacity during the period 1 July to 15 November

1950.23

There are four primary factors which affect the

capabilities and limitations of the CVE: speed,

replenishment requirements, weather, and accommodations for

personnel and aircraft. The CVE is well adapted to operation

of small flights on a rigidly established schedule

throughout a period of time. A tempo that approached maximum

was employed during operations in support of the Inchon

landing at which time a typical schedule called for 32

sorties per squadron. This approximated 100 flight hours

daily, a highly satisfactory performance figure for 24

aircraft. Occasional requests for additional support

increased the actual utilization above the planned figure by

a considerable amount, as, for example, when on one occasion

the Badoeng Strait broke off replenishing operations at sea

to launch all twenty-four of its aircraft in response to an

185

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. emergency call.24

Actual sorties flown reached as high as eighty-two for

the task group on D-Day or an average of forty-one per ship,

and exceeded seventy on several subsequent days. This high

performance attests to the adequacy of CVE maintenance

facilities as well as to the energy and commitment of

squadron personnel. Aircraft availability averaged better

than 92% throughout the period concluding on 15 November.

The full speed ahead for the CVE was approximately 18.5

knots. First and second line attack and fighter type

aircraft require from eight to fifteen knots more air speed

than this across the deck for optimum launching and landing

conditions. To launch with anything less than 24 knots of

wind required World War II fighters such as the Corsair to

carry limited ordnance loads and increased launching

interval because a CVE had only one usable catapult with

light winds.25

As for the weather, sea conditions prior to 15 November

were not sufficiently severe to curtail air operations from

the CVE's. Pitch and roll stayed within acceptable limits.

Only in its relationship to wind speed across the deck for

launch and recovery of aircraft did weather have a limiting

effect on air operations. With less than six knots of

186

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. surface wind, relative wind approached undesirable limits

for the operation of Corsair aircraft and any other aircraft

with equivalent or higher wing loading and performance

characteristics like the AD-4.26

Another factor to consider is the size, operating space,

and accommodations of an escort carrier. The size of the CVE

limits its use to a flying unit no larger than a squadron.

This results in the embarkation of elements of a Marine

Aircraft Group abroad several ships and, hence, virtually

eliminates contact between the air group commander and his

several squadrons. Administrative and operational activities

are influenced accordingly. The cramped operating spaces of

CVE's restricts versatility of operations. For example, it

is relatively impracticable to launch and recover more than

sixteen aircraft on any one flight, and when that small

number is put into the air at once, half of them must orbit

while the others land and are stowed on the hanger deck, a

time consuming process.27

In spite of limitations arising from design, escort

carriers performed missions assigned in connection with

Korean hostilities in a highly satisfactory manner. They

maintained a tempo of activity which resulted in extremely

efficient air operations in support of ground forces of the

187

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. United Nations.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Close air support (CAS) is the means by which aircraft

provide direct fire support to ground troops. During the

Korean War the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and Chinese

People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) had virtually no close air

support. U.S. close air support was provided by the Navy,

Marine Corps, and Air Force. Specific U.S. units flying CAS

were the Task Force 77 of the Navy's Seventh Fleet, the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing, and Fifth Air Force. Air units of

other countries, including Australia, New Zealand, South

Africa, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, fought under

the supervision of the Fifth Air Force or Task Force 77. For

these fighter-bomber units, CAS was only one of their

missions; others included air superiority, interdiction of

the battlefield, and reconnaissance.

This section covers the subject of close air support

operations as conducted by naval squadrons operating from

the fast carrier task force. The Dictionary of United States

Military Terms for Joint Usage defines Close Tactical Air

Support as "air action against hostile surface targets which

188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement

of those forces."28

The early Pacific engagements of World War II revealed

that air power properly controlled was a most effective

weapon in support of ground operations and an adequate

system of "on-the-spot" request of support aircraft by

frontline units was essential but did not exist until 1944.

Much improvement in technique was realized at Iwo Jima in

February 1945. However, the next important development, the

direction of attack aircraft by frontline units, was not

used extensively until the Okinawa campaign where improved

portable radio equipment made air-ground communications

sufficiently reliable. It is this capability, achieved in

1945, which lies at the heart of effective close air support

as practiced by the Navy and Marine Corps.29

The U.S. Navy is charged, as one of its primary

functions, with providing naval forces, including close air

support aircraft, for the conduct of joint amphibious

operations. As a collateral function, it is charged with

conducting close air support for land operations. In their

initial close support efforts, Navy flights were employed

under the Army-Air Force system of close air support. These

189

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. early efforts met frustration at nearly every turn. While

this was going on, however, Marine squadrons operating from

the ships of CARDIV 15 were enjoying signal success in

direct support of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. As

control of the Marine air was in accordance with Navy-Marine

Corps doctrine, and control of the Navy units was in

accordance with the Army-Air Force system, it is apparent

that methods of control were responsible to a considerable

extent for this disparity in performance.30

To implement a unique philosophy of close air support,

the Navy and Marine Corps provide close air support means as

follows:

(1) In the air: (a) Aircraft suitable in characteristics and armament for close support missions. (b) Pilots trained (in the case of the Marine Corps) in basic ground tactics, recognition of enemy ground installation, terrain appreciation and in the detailed capabilities and limitation of the varied ground arms. (c) Pilots trained (habitually in case of the Marine Corps, and upon occasion in case of the Navy) in close conjunction with Marine ground forces. (2) Afloat A Tactical Air Control Center in a command ships (AGC) capable of controlling close support operations along with other related air operations. (3) Ashore A Tactical Air Control Center capable, when so directed, of discharging functions outlined above for the afloat agency.

190

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (4) With the Ground Forces As an organic element of the Marine Division there are thirteen Tactical Air Control Parties; one per Infantry battalion(9); one per infantry regiment(3); and one for the Division. Any and all of these parties are capable of requesting and directing the delivery of close air support. They are organic elements of the ground force and train habitually with it.31

On 23 July 1950, as the heavily-outnumbered UN forces

were pushed slowly and steadily backward toward Pusan by the

savage and cunning attacks of the Communists, an urgent plea

for close support help from the carriers was received.

Eighth Army's request, tagged with that awful precedence

prefix "emergency," was multiple-addressed to every major

commander in the Far East theater: MacArthur, Joy, Struble,

and Stratemeyer.

Request information as to possible naval air employment in close and general support role in Korea . . . urgent requirement exists west coast Korea commencing 23 July . . . 32

This sudden request for naval air assistance commenced a two-month period of participation by Task Force 77 in a

close air support effort which, until the Inchon landing,

would occupy the major portion of the aircraft carriers'

time and energy. This period would also highlight a

fundamental difference of opinion and disparity in doctrine

191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. regarding close air support between the Navy and Marines on

the one hand, and the Air Force and Army on the other.33

Navy success in close air support throughout

hostilities in Korea was directly dependent upon the method

of control under which the close support flights operated.

In the Inchon-Seoul operation, Navy close air support of

Marine, Army, and ROK ground forces, while sporadic in tempo

was highly effective. In the North Korea, on east and west

coast employments, estimated results can be ascertained from

the following tabulation of efforts on November 1950, which

is considered by CTF 77 to be representative.

An analysis of close air support efforts by TF 77

(August 5) shows the interesting fact that in an earlier

period, 26 July - 3 September, 231 Navy sorties of a total

of 480 controlled by the Air Force under the Air Force-Army

close support system were delivered outside the bomb-line.

This means that they were delivered in a zone so far in

advance of friendly forces that no control was required nor

was detailed integration with the fire and movement of the

support forces involved.34

192

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Armed recco diverted to close support by Davastate ABLE. Final 4 0715 8VF-6VA X Corps controller Boyhood 14. Controller reported good results.

Armed recco. No contact with 7 1020 4F9F-2 Eusak controllers due to heavy traffic.

Did not 8 1020 8VF-6VA Eusak contact Controllers

Mosquito Cobalt controller, strafed enemy 13 1340 4F9F-2 X Corps troops then detached by controller to armed recco.

Table 5.4: Close Air Support by USS Leyte - 5 August 1950 Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c., p.230.

193

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4 8VF-6VA X Corps Okay

5 3F9F Eusak-5thAF No contact

6 7VF-5VA Eusak-5thAF Comm. Okay-45 min. delay Dump along road

7 4F9F Eusak-5thAF No contact

8 8VF-6VA Eusak-5thAF No contact. Armed recco

9 4F9F Eusak-5thAF No contact

10 7VF-4VA Eusak-5thAF Poor comm. Wait 25 min.

14 VF-VA X Corps Okay

15 4F9F Eusak-5thAF No comm.

Table 5.5: Close Air Support by USS Philippine Sea - 5 August 1950 Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c., p.231.

Three of COMCARDIV ONE's fundamental areas of

difficulty lay in communications. The first, lack of

adequate ship-to-shore circuits, created a barrier against

effective exchange of information between Task Force 77 and

Mellow Control, the Taegu agency of 5th AF, Advanced. Since

mid-January 1950 the problem of Air Force - Navy

communication had been under study by 7th Fleet with

194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inconclusive results other than a realization that solution

lay at the theater level or higher. Nevertheless, a

representative of CTF 77 was sent to Taegu on 28 July, and

early in August a conference in Tokyo attempted to find a

solution of this problem without success.35

Carrier forces in Korea in 1950 operated two types of

aircraft particularly capable of accomplishing the close

support mission. One of these was the dependable F4U

(Corsair), the other, the post-war AD (Skyraider). Their

common loads are shown in the following tabulation:

Ordnance 20mm External Approximate Bombs Rockets Aircraft Cannon Fuel Endurance

F4U Load Able 800 rds 1x1000# 8-5"HVAR lxl50gal 4 hours Load Baker 800 rds 2xl50gal 8-5"HVAR None 2.5 hours (Napalm)

AD Load Able 400 rds 3x500 12-5"HVAR None 4 hours Load Baker 400 rds 3xl50gal 12-250# None 4 hours (Napalm) Frage Load Charlie 400 rds 2x1000 12-250# lxl50gal 6 hours Frage

Table 5.6: Weapons in the CAS Employment Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c., p.235.

195

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The above listed capacities make these aircraft potent

weapons in close air support employment. These load-carrying

and attack capabilities should have ensured utilization of

these aircraft while on station if any targets existed.36

The record, however, indicates the reverse frequently

occurred when naval aircraft were placed under the Air Force

system of control. Because Air Force jet aircraft, lightly

loaded though they were, were able to stay on station for

only a very short period of time, they were given immediate

employment whenever targets were available.37

The carriers were in all respects capable of

accomplishing their missions. With air groups as presently

constituted, including one or two jet squadrons, it was

desirable to replenish aviation fuel after two or three days

of operations. Approximately 190,000 gallons usable capacity

of the Essex class would refuel 240 jet sorties at 800

gallons or 630 propeller-driven sorties at 300 gallons. This

would provide for three days of heavy operations (140

sorties per day). After one day for replenishment at sea the

CV-9 class carrier was ready to operate for another two or

three days. A ship of the CVE-105 class remained at sea for

much longer periods without replenishment.38

196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Night close support operations by carrier-based

aircraft were non-existent during the Korean campaign of

1950. Shore-based Marine night fighter squadrons did perform

occasional rudimentary night support operations but these,

relying on visual recognition by aircraft pilots as in day

operations, were a far cry from that desired. Noting the

effectiveness of close air support under conditions of

favorable weather and visibility, the value of such support

around the clock would have been inescapable.39

During the last two weeks of October naval forces

continued to deny the enemy the use of Korean coastal waters.

Naval air support and naval gunfire activity were reduced

during this time. Attacks by carrier-based aircraft were

concentrated mainly on moving transport and on roads and

rail lines on Korean East coast north of Wonsan and against

the off shore islands near Wonsan harbor. Military targets

in the vicinity of Songjin were bombarded by navy ships on

17 October.

In sum, CAS helped save United Nations troops from

annihilation in 1950. The first occasion was during the

retreat into the Pusan defensive perimeter during June-

September 1950. The battlefield was very fluid, and

artillery units were inadequate for fire support. CAS took

197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the place of heavy artillery and blunted the KPA attacks.

The second occasion was after the massive appearance of

Chinese forces in November 1950. Adequate artillery could

not be brought to bear as United Nations troops withdrew

southward, and CAS blunted many Chinese attacks.

INTERDICTION

"Interdiction" is defined in the JCS Dictionary of

Military Terms as "offensive operations to prevent or hinder,

by any means, enemy use of an area or route." Air

interdiction of ground areas is essentially an Air Force

responsibility.40 As prescribed by the Secretary of Defense

on 21 April 1948, and approved by the President, it is a

primary function of the Air Force to "furnish close combat

and logistical air support to the Army, to include . . .

interdiction of enemy land power and communications."

Interdiction operations by naval aviation in the Korean War

cannot be regarded as contemplated by existing unification

manifesto and can only be justified by the Statement at Key

West Conference that "The conferees agreed that, in time of

war, the delineation of functions would not be governed by

such a document (as JCS 1478-23) but by the means available

198

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. at the time and by the urgency of the situation." The Korean

War was considered to be an urgent situation.41

In general, the interdiction operations of naval

aviation were performed by the fast carriers and were

regarded as second in importance only to close air support

operations. Marine squadrons, both carrier and shore based,

devoted their principal efforts to close air and deep

support. The initial interdiction effort commenced on July,

incident to strikes against targets in the vicinity of

Pyongyang. On this date the Valley Forge air group hit two

locomotives, one freight train, railroad marshalling yards,

railroad and highway bridges and trucks.42 From then on,

carrier aviation engaged in intermittent operations of an

interdiction type, although not generally according to a

pre-determined interdiction plan. These operations

culminated in the November attacks against the Yalu River

bridges occasioned by the dispatches following: CINCFE's

040717Z of November to COMNAVFE stated, "immediate maximum

air effort your forces be coordinated in close support of

ground units and in interdiction of enemy communications,

assembly areas and troop columns.43

Air interdiction was performed by the fast carriers,

originally directly under C0M7THFLT (Vice Adm. A.D.Struble),

199

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. acting in his capacity as Commander Task Force 77, and with

Rear Adm. Hoskins (COMCARDIV 3), in command of the Carrier

Group, usually acting as CTC. On 25 August Rear Adm. Ewen,

COMCARDIV 1, became Commander Task Force 77, and remained so

until late December.44

In view of daytime interdiction subsequent to the

Valley Forge operations of 3-4 July, the Commanding General,

Far East Air Forces (FEAF) sent the following dispatch to

C0M7THFLT, "070735Z If you participate in further air

strikes request you confine activities to area north of 38th

parallel and east of 127°. Further request you follow

category priority for targets as follows: rail and highway

cuts, POL, airfields." This was not in accord with the naval

concept concerning carrier employment at that time.45

In spite of their background and experience, officers

did not have sufficient target data upon which to make their

decisions. Therefore, they gradually relinquished their hold

on effective air power and by 1 August, the Far East Air

Force had regained control of their interdiction program.

CINCFE's letter of 8 July had stated that "when both naval

air and FEAF are assigned missions in Korea, coordination

control. . . is delegated to Commanding General, FEAF," and

this, in general, was the policy that FEAF clung to through

200

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the remainder of the period.46

On 3 August 1950, a conference was held at FEAF

Headquarters between four Air Force generals and one Navy

captain, two commanders and two lieutenant commanders (all

naval aviators) to accomplish an improvement in coordination

of air effort and to establish naval air target priorities.

A summery of the arrangements which were mutually agreed

upon between conferences:

a. First priority will be given to close support activity under the tactical control of the Fifth Air Force. The urgency of the current situation necessities this priority.

b. Second priority will be given to close interdiction of key enemy transportation in areas south of 38 North. Since this same area had been assigned Fifth Air Force by FEAF, the Navy will coordinate with Fifth Air Force in selecting targets. c. As third priority or when the situation dictates, Naval units will attack key transportation facilities north of 38° which have been assigned to FEAF Bomb Command.47

In September, the fast carriers devoted most of their

effort to close air support of the Inchon landing. In

October, when the Wonsan assault did not materialize, they

201

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were assigned the area east of 127° E., and north of the

bomb line. As stated in COMCARDIV One's War Diary 1-31

October, interdiction targets were confined principally to

rail and water transportation facilities. The bomb line

advanced rapidly to the north and the area assigned the Fast

Carriers diminished correspondingly until, as COMCARDIV

One's War Diary remarked on 18 October: Targets were

becoming scarce and the operating areas were becoming

smaller and smaller.48

But with the sudden change in the tactical situation in

North Korea, and in compliance with CINCFE's dispatch of 4

November, giving the mission "Immediate maximum air effort

your forces be coordinated in close support of ground units

and interdiction of enemy communication, assembly areas and

troop columns," there were ample targets for the fast

carriers. COMNAVFE's directive was simpler, "Destroy all

enemy installations and troops with in North Korea."

Unfortunately, Task Force 77 was unable to comply. Instead,

its major effort was devoted to attacks on the Yalu River

bridges, particularly those in the vicinity of Sinuiju.

During this period, the fast carrier interdiction program

against the Yalu River bridges was in progress but had not

been completed.49

202

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Although the Air Force and Marine air had conducted

some night armed reconnaissance sorties which might come

under the heading of interdiction, the Navy's air effort

during darkness was comparatively limited. Navy night

intruder missions were executed during the five days

immediately following D-Day at Inchon - as described in

COMCARDIV One's War Diary 1-30 September - under the direct

control of the Tactical Air Direction Center, in the USS Mt.

NcKinley, later from the TADC on the beach at Kimpo. They

were also carried out intermittent raids during the Wonsan

operations, and occasionally during the all-out effort

subsequent to 7 November in North Korea.50

Air interdiction efforts during this period failed to

hinder enemy use of areas and routes as expected. For this

reason, interdiction by air during this period must be

considered a failure despite a preponderance of air strength

and negligible enemy air opposition. Had interdiction been

as effective then as it became in 1951, the course of the

war in November and December, 1950 probably would have been

changed.51

During the Korean operations, naval aviation became

progressively more modern. In the first six months of combat,

jet to propeller-driven aircraft sorties were at a ratio of

203

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. one to two. For the last six months (February to July, 1953)

the ratio of jet to propeller sorties was four to three. For

fighter cover, light bombing, flak suppression, night attack,

and night CAP, TASK Force 77 depended on the World War II

Corsair throughout the war. As new air groups came to Korea,

the number of F9F-2 Panther squadrons increased, until by

1953 most fighter cover and a large per cent of the

interdiction work was done by jets.52

204

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1986). viii-ix. For the overview of the U.S. Marine Corps operation during the Korean War, see Lynn Montross, et al, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1962).

2 Gerald E. Wheeler, "Naval Aviation in the Korean War," US Naval Institute Proceedings 83 (July 1957), pp.762-4.

3 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.l, pp.165-6.

4 The initial policy for employment of fast carriers following World War II was to keep two Essex class carriers in the Western Pacific. Ibid.

5 With Task Force 91 and 99 watching the flanks and extremities, MacArthur could count on supporting X Corps with no less than ten Corsair squadrons and three Skyraider squadrons, with four squadrons of Panthers to provide cover and undertake secondary strike duties. Hallion, Naval Air War, pp.59-60.

6 With Task Force 91 and 99 watching the flanks and extremities, MacArthur could count on supporting X Corps with no less than ten Corsair squadrons and three Skyraider squadrons, with four squadrons of Panthers to provide cover and undertake secondary strike duties. Hallion, Naval Air War, pp.59-60.

7 With Task Force 91 and 99 watching the flanks and extremities, MacArthur could count on supporting X Corps with no less than ten Corsair squadrons and three Skyraider squadrons, with four squadrons of Panthers to provide cover and undertake secondary strike duties. Hallion, Naval Air War, pp. 59-60.

8 With Task Force 91 and 99 watching the flanks and extremities, MacArthur could count on supporting X Corps with no less than ten Corsair squadrons and three Skyraider squadrons, with four squadrons of Panthers to provide cover and undertake secondary strike duties. Hallion, Naval Air War, pp.59-60.

205

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 Ibid., pp.61-2.

10 Fast Carrier organization has followed conventional lines through out the period. CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.l, p.166.

11 Ibid., p. 167.

12 Ibid., pp. 168-9.

13 See CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.e., For Anti-submarine warfare by Naval Air see CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.j.

14 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.a., p.183.

15 Ibid., p. 184.

16 Ibid., p. 185.

11 Ibid., p. 190.

18 COMCARDIV 1 Preliminary Action Report, 12 September 1950 - 3 Oct 1950.

19 CO USS Badoeng Strait War Diary July through November 1950.

20 Ibid., Variation in type of munitions expended caused some logistic inconvenience; wider fluctuations could have hampered resupply. For more information see CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project II.A.l., Supporting Operations, Surface Logistics, pp.28-9; Project No.I.C.4. Logistics and Equipment, p.884.

21 Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.a., p.195.

22 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.b., Combat Operation Section, p.207.

206

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., pp.209-10.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p.211.

27 On one occasions, the Badoeng Strait launched all 24 of its squadron's aircraft but recovery, echeloned into three groups, consumed more time than is desirable for so small a group, due to the necessary of striking aircraft to the hanger deck at frequent intervals during the recovery. Ibid., pp.211-2.

28 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c., p.223.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., pp.223-4, 228.

31 Ibid., pp.228-9.

32 Quoted in Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, p.47.

33 Ibid.

34 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c., p.231.

35 Ibid., p.232.

36 For more specific information on these and other aircraft employed for close air support by the Navy can be found in CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.7., Combat Operation, Naval Air, Equipment, pp.480-499.

37 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.b., p.235.

38 For example, The Sicily started striking on 3 August and dispatched offensive sorties on 27 out of the next 29 days. During this period there was only one 35 hours interval for

207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. replenishment at Sasebo. However, the commanding officer reported that this tempo of operations in the Sicily closely approached pilot fatigue limits. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.7, Combat Operation Section, Equipment, p.485.

39 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.b., Combat Operation Section, p.236.

40 Air Force's Interdiction Plan called for concentrated effort upon the enemy's three main lines of communication: a. The East Coast Route (Chongjin-Hungnam-Wonsan-Samchock- Kyangju). b. The West Coast Route (Sinuiju-Sinanju-Pyongyang-Sariwon- Seoul) and the alternate (Sakchu-Chongju-Sinanju-Pyongyang); and its north centeal supr (Kanggye-Huichon-Sinnanju). c. The South Transverse Route (Seoul-Wonju-Andong-Kyongju). Ibid., p.281.

41 CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.d., Combat Operation Section, p.281.

42 Ibid., The Air Force developed an Interdiction Plan and established target priorities for the principal lines of communication in Korea. At times this plan was under the closest and strictest supervision of GHQ, CINCFE, with a heavy emphasis upon the Army's interpretation of International and the Air Force's capabilities therewith. The overview of the US Air Force during the Korean War can be found in Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Forces, 1983).

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., p.282., The Navy abandoned the "hit and run tactics" and in some way overcame "task force logistics considerations" so that "protracted operations in the same locality became an actuality in the Wonsan operation and thereafter."

46 Ibid., pp.282-3.

208

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 Ibid., p.284.

48 Ibid., p.285.

49 Ibid., These attacks can be found in CINVPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.e., Combat Operation Section, Attack, pp.303-10.

50 Ibid., p.285.

51 Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.d., Combat Operation Section, Naval Air, p.277.

52 Wheeler, "Naval Aviation in the Korean War," pp.765-6.

209

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONCLUSION

As I mentioned in an earlier Chapter, Korea has been

called "The Land of Morning Calm." Korea also has another

nickname, "The Hermit Kingdom," that is more descriptive of

Korea's strategic outlook. Throughout history, the Korean

government did its best to remain isolated and clear of

great-power politics. For this reason, it was Korea's

fortune, and sometimes misfortune, to be located where the

spheres of three great powers, China, Russia, and Japan,

interest. In many ways, the Korean peninsula has been an

invasion route to Japan and China throughout history.

Noteworthy examples include the Japanese invasion of Korea

in the 1590s as a first step to conquering Ming China; the

Japanese invasion of Korea during the Russo-Japanese War;

and, of course, the Korean War. It is important to remember

that in every case, at least one of the warring parties

could reach Korea only by sea. As a result, control of the

seas surrounding the Korean peninsula has always been a

major strategic concern.

210

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Throughout the nineteenth century the Yi dynasty

struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by

playing the Chinese against Japanese, then appealed to

Czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its

Asian patrons. This too clever but desperate bit of

diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by

Japan in 1910, and the Korean War. Korean peninsula was the

first major battlefield of the international rivalry between

the two superpowers, the Free World and Communists. It is

obvious that the Korean War has been the greatest of many

tragedies in Korean history.

As we all know, the Korean War continued for a little

over three years, from June 1950 to July 1953. For many

reasons the Korean War is one of the most important

historical events in the twentieth century. It influenced

the position of the United States in relation to all other

nations as profoundly as either World War I or World War II.

Unlike the Civil War in the United States, the Korean War

was simultaneously a civil war and international war.

The Inchon landing, Operation Chromite, had many kinds

of obstacles: geographic handicaps, shortage of time and

intelligence. In addition to the physical and military

factors at Inchon, there was one final political facet which

211

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had to be given attention. Nevertheless, General MacArthur

and his planners overcame these hurdles. As Sun Zu said, "If

you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the

result of a hundred battles." MacArthur was well aware of

the limitations and capabilities of the landing forces as

well as the North Koreans.

During the landing operation X Corps captured some

7,000 NKPA soldiers and another 14,000 were killed in action

at a cost of some 3,500 friendly casualties. The First

Marine Division suffered 2,450 casualties, including 366

killed in action, 49 died of wounds, 6 missing in action and

2,029 wounded in action. The Inchon landing was a complete

operational and tactical success. During the operation the

U.S. Navy had an essential role in complete success.

During the first year of the Korean War, there was

plenty of evidence that mines were being used by the North

Koreans. Accordingly, operations plans were made to sweep

for ten days before the planned landing at Wonsan. The

landing could not occur until the sweep could be completed.

Of the estimated 3,000 mines laid, only 225 were swept and

destroyed. Due to the great difference in depth of water and

tides between the east and west coasts of Korea,

minesweeping was appreciably easier on the west coast than

212

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on the east coast. Mines continued to pose serious problems

for the U.S. Navy throughout the Korean War, especially

during its first year. Sweeping the minefields was a

particularly dangerous mission, especially the extensive

minefields at Wonsan and Chinnampo. For example, Wonsan

landing was called as "the battle of the mines."

The Korean War illustrates the use of a close blockade

to isolate a specific area for the purpose of conducting a

limited war. Blockade and Escort Force (Task force 95)

organized on September 12, 1950. Task Force 95 was one of

the major subordinate commands of U.S. Naval Forces, Far

East. The primary mission of the East Coast group was

gunfire support. Fortunately, the topography and hydrography

of the area made the secondary mission of blockade

practicable at the same time. The situation on the west

coast was much more difficult due to shallow depth of water,

numerous islands, and irregular coast-line. The ROK Navy

also blockaded the South and West Coasts.

The naval blockade and escort operations during the

period between 25 June and 31 December made naval

reconnaissance a fundamental element. Screening ships

provided for naval group and support shipping were

213

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inadequate in number to have provided acceptable protection

in the event of submarine or air attack in modern strength.

Judging the blockading and escort operations, Task Force

95's major accomplishment was the control of the seas

surrounding Korea bordering the east and west coasts. In

addition to carriers, the blockade and escort force operated

naval gunfire support ships. These units provided

indispensable fire support to ground forces and denied the

enemy daytime use of the main coastal roads.

Evaluating the naval air operations by the fast carrier

task forces leads to the conclusion that they performed all

their missions satisfactorily. The escort carrier was

designed primarily for convoy duty. Its aircraft were to be

search and attack types which could scout for and destroy

enemy submarines and surface craft. Aircraft availability

averaged better than 92 per cent throughout the period

concluded on 15 November. In spite of limitations arising

from design, escort carriers performed their missions in

satisfactory manner.

Air interdiction operations were conducted under the

nearly ideal conditions of meager air opposition and flak.

They were conducted against an enemy capable of living off

the land and whose essential logistic requirements in tons

214

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American forces.

Sea power, air power, ground power, and amphibious

operations all have been essential topics of military

discussion since World War I and II. Sea power is the object

of naval strategy and tactics. The words sea power conveys

an ability to operate upon the sea, and possession of an

"instrument" that, through its employment, allows a nation

to project power across the sea. By naval power we mean the

aggregate of sea forces and the logistical, technical, and

defensive infrastructure at their disposal assembled with

the object of gaining control of the sea.

During the first year of the Korean War, sea power

again reaffirmed its vital importance to the United States

by enabling the projection of much of its military strength

that it had in readiness overseas against North Korean

forces. The United States Navy not only permitted the

projection of the ground and air forces against the North

Koreans on the peninsula, but it also directly exerted its

own considerable power in the form of withering fire support

by ships and naval aviation. It played an essential

supporting role for both the ground and air force.

215

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the final analysis, without command of the seas the

United Nations could not have conducted a war in Korea.

Operations by air forces and ground were completely

dependent on the sea lines. Six of every seven people who

went to Korea went by sea. And fifty-four million tons of

dry cargo and twenty-two million tons of petroleum products

went to Korea by ship. There is no doubt that the Korean War

played an essential role in U.S. naval history. After World

War II air power advocates asserted that long-range land-

based aircraft were only viable means for delivering atomic

weapons on enemy targets and that no significant naval force

threatened the United States. In some respects, it was a

reasonable argument after the bombs fell on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. But the Korean War experience reversed this

situation. During the Korean War, it became clear that naval

forces had a central role in carrying out the Cold War

operations short of a world war. Korean War gave the U.S.

Navy a new impetus for its development during the Cold War

era.

216

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. Ships

AD Destroyer tender AE Ammunition ship AF Refrigerated store ship AGC Amphibious force flagship AH Hospital ship AK Cargo ship AKA Attack cargo ship AKL Light cargo ship AM Fleet minesweeper AMS Motor minesweeper (formerly YMS) AN Net tender AO Oiler AOG Gasoline tanker AP Transport APA Attack transport APD Fast transport (destroyer escort conversion) ARG Internal combustion engine repair ship ARH Heavy hull repair ship ARL Landing hull repair ship ARS Salvage vessel ASR Submarine rescue vessel ATF Fleet tug AV Seaplane tender AVP Small seaplane tender BB Battleship CA Heavy cruiser CL Light cruiser CLAA Antiaircraft light cruiser CV Aircraft Carrier CVE Escort aircraft carrier (merchant ship hull) CVL Light aircraft carrier (cruiser hull) DD Destroyer

217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DE Destroyer escort DMS Fast minesweeper (destroyer conversion) DUKW Amphibious truck JMS Japanese minesweeper (YMS type) LCVP Vehicle and personal landing craft LPH Helicopter amphibious assault ship LSD Dock landing ship LSMR Rocket ship (medium landing ship conversion) LST Tank landing ship LSU Utility landing ship LVT Tracked landing vehicle LVTA Armored tracked landing vehicle MSC Coastal minesweeper (non-magnetic) MSI Inshore minesweeper (non-magnetic) MSO Ocean minesweeper (non-magnetic) PC Submarine chaser PCEC Amphibious control vessel (patrol escort modification) PF Frigate (patrol gunboat or corvette) PT Motor torpedo boat T-AP Transport assigned to MSTS T-APc Small coastal transport assigned to MSTS YMS Motor minesweeper (World War II designation)

2 .Aircraft

Suffixed numbers and letters indicate changes to the model and special uses and configurations. Important categories of aircraft are:

A attack F fighter H helicopter P patrol PB patrol bomber R transport U utility

218

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Relevant manufacturer's designators are:

D Douglas F Gruman H McDonell M Martin 0 Lockeed (former) S Sikorsky U Chance Vought V Lockeed (current) Y Consolidated

3. Miscellaneous

ACB Amphibious Construction Battalion (Navy) ADCOM Advance Command and Liaison Group (Army) Anglico Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company AP Armor-piercing BLT Battalion Landing Team CAP Combat air patrol CarDiv Carrier Division CAS Close air support CCF Chinese Communists Forces CincFE Commander in Chief, Far East Command CincLantFleet Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet CincPac Commander in Chief, Pacific CincPacFleet Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet CincUNC Commander in Chief, United Nations Command CNO Chief of Naval Operations Com Commander (in compounds), as ComNavFE Commander Naval Forces Far East Crudiv Cruiser Division CTF Commander Task Force CTG Commander Task Group CW Continuous wave DesDiv Destroyer Division ECA Economic Cooperation Administration ESB Engineer Special Brigade (Army) EUSAK Eighth U.S. Army in Korea

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FAFIK Fifth Air Force in Korea FEAF Far East Air Forces FEC Far East Command FLAW Fleet Logistic Air Wing FMF Fleet Marine Force FOSICFES Flag Officer Second in Command, Far Eastern Station (British) F/S Fire Support GCA Ground control approach GHQ General Headquarters HC High capacity IFF Electric identification device JapLogCom Japan Logistical Command JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JOC Joint Operations center JTF Joint Task Force KMAG Korea Military Advisory Group (U.S. Army) KMC Korean Marine Corps Lant Atlantic (in compounds) MAG Marine Aircraft Group MATS Military Air Transport Service MAW Marine Aircraft Wing MDA(P) Mutual Defense Assistance (Program) MinDiv Minecraft Division MLR Main line of resistance MSR Main supply route MSTS Military Sea Transportation Service MTACS Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron NAF Naval Air Facility NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NavFE Naval Forces Far East NCO Non-commissioned officer NKPA North Korean People's Army NMJ Naval Member, Joint Operation Center OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History OpArea Operating Area OPLR Outpost line of resistance OpNav Office of Naval Operations OpPlan Operation plan OTC Officer in tactical command Pac Pacific (in compounds) PhilGru Amphibious Group POL Petroleum, oil, lubricants

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. POW Prisoner of war RAF Royal Air Force RAN Royal Australian Navy RCN Royal Canadian Navy RCT Regimental Combat Team RN Royal Navy (Great Britain) RNZN Royal New Zealand Navy ROK Republic of Korea ROKN Republic of Korea Navy Scajap Shipping Control Administration, Japan SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SerPac Service Force, Pacific Fleet SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe SPB Shore Party Battalion (Marine) TAC Tactical Air Command TACP Tactical air control party Tacron Tactical Air Control Squadron (Navy) TADC Tactical air direction center TE Task Element TF Task Force TG Task Group UDT Underwater Demolition Team UNC United Nations Command USNS U.S. Naval Ship ("in Service", i.e. non commissioned vessel of MSTS nucleus fleet) VHF Very high frequency VT Variable time (radar-controlled) fuse VMF Marine Fighter Squadron VMFN Marine Night Fighter Squadron VMO Marine Observation Squadron VMR Marine Transport Squadron VP Patrol Squadron

Source: James A. Field, History of the United States Naval Operations, pp.479-483.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX B MAJOR EVENTS of NAVAL ASPECTS OF THE KOREAN WAR IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE

East Longitude Dates

25 June 1950: - Announce on radio by North Koreans of their invasion South Korea made at 1200K.U.S. fighter planes of 8th fighter Group fired on by small North Korean convoy at 37°50'N.-129°40'E. off coast South Korea at approximately 1700K. - ROK Navy patrol craft (PC 701) sank an armed North Korean steamer with 600 troops, 18 miles off Pusan. This was first naval surface action of war.

26 June 1950: - 700 Americans and friendly foreign nationals evacuated from Seoul via Inchon to Japan by sea under direction of COMNAVFE. Escorted by USS Mansfield (DD 728) and USS De Haven (DD 727) .

27 June 1950: - As directly by CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT (Vice Adm. Struble) at Buckner Bay, Okinawa, reported for duty to CINCFE (Gen. MacArthur). - President Truman ordered Naval and Air Force in Far East to support operations of South Korean Forces and Directed Seventh Fleet to take steps to prevent an invasion of Formosa. - North Koreans captured Seoul.

28 June 1950: - UN Security Council ordered military sanction against North Korea. - British Admiralty placed Royal Naval units in Japanese water at disposal of COMNAVFE (Vice Adm. Joy). COMNAVFE requested British ships to rendezvous at Buckner Bay, Okinawa.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 June 1950: - USS Juneau (CLAA 119) took shore targets under fire in vicinity of Samchock, Korea; first significant naval gunfire support mission of Korean War. - Anti-submarine Warfare patrol off Sasebo area formed.

1 July 1950: - CINCPACFLT formed Task Force York (ships assembled on West Coast of U.S. and at Pearl Harbor for Korean campaign) under Rear Adm. Boone. - COMNAVFE authorized COMSEVENTHFLT to continue strikes after 3 July as practicable. - COMNAVFE discontinue routine ASW patrols of Sasebo area until further notices.

3 July 1950: - Planes of Seventh Fleet and British FES ships under over all command of Vice Adm. Struble(COMSEVENTHFLT) began carrier operations off west coast North Korea as ordered by COMNAVFE on 30 June.

5 July 1950: - CINCPACFLT established Service Squadron 3, effective 7 July as principal logistic agent of COMSEVENTHFLT. - Fleet Marine Force Pacific directed 1st Marine Division to form the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. - COMNAVFE placed his operational order 50 in effect implementing President Truman's order for a blockade of the Korean Coast.

7 July 1950: - UN Security Council appointed Gen. MacArthur Supreme Commander of UN Forces in Korea.

9 July 1950: - Cdr. Michael J.L. Luosey took command of ROK navy.

10 July 1950: - As directed by COMNAVFE naval blockade extended to include ports of Wonsan and Chinnampo. CNO directed CINCPACFLT to sail Task Force Yoke when ready.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 July 1950: - CNO authorized activation of ships from the Reserve Fleet. - NK Prisoner of War reported mines laid vicinity of Chongj in.

12 July 1950: - First increments of 1st Marine Brigade sailed for Far East from San Diego. - COMNAVFE set up Naval Air Japan as temporary organization for all naval aeronautical activities in Japan.

14 July 1950: - COMNAVFE authorized attacks on unidentified submarines in self defense or when offensive action against our forces was indicated. - Main body of 1st Marine Brigade sailed from San Diego with approximately 6,000 troops.

15 July 1950: - Task Force 90 transported two RCTs of the First Cavalry Division from Tokyo Bay to Pohang via Inland Sea and Shimonoseki strait. - Frigate (PF) activation program began at Yokosuka.

18 July 1950: - First Cavalry Division (RCT 5 and 8; 10,027 troops) landed administratively at 07151 by CTF at Pohang.

18-19 July 1950: - Carrier based planes from Seventh Fleet destroyed North Korean airfields, railroads, factories and oil refinery at Wonsan. Other targets at Hungnam, Hamhung, Numpyong destroyed or damaged.

19 July 1950: - First Navy plane shot down by North Korean.

23 July 1950: - USS Boxer (CV 21) arrived Yokosuka in eight days sixteen hours from Alameda established trans-Pacific record in delivering a load of F-51 airplanes, equipment and personnel for the Air Force.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 July 1950: - COMNAVFE established Escort Element (CTE 96.50) under Capt. A.D.M. Jay, RN, consisting of HMS Black Swan (PF), HMS Hart (PF), and HMS Shoalhaven (PF).

27 July 1950: - COMNAVFE directed harassing and demolition raids by CTF 90 utilizing UDT and Marine reconnaissance personnel against selected North Korean east coast military objectives.

29 July 1950: - First shipment 6".5 Anti-tank aircraft rockets (ATAR), developed by Navy at NOTS Inyokern for the Air Force, delivered to the latter.

30 July 1950: - CTF 90 completed Pohang administrative landing.

1 August 1950: - 2nd Infantry Division landed at Pusan. - COMNAVFE ordered two CVE's (USS Sicily (CVE 118) and USS Badoeng Strait(CVE-116) with assigned DD types to provide close air support to UN land forces in Korea. - USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) reported to COMSEVENTHFLT for duty.

2 August 1950: - 1st Marine Provisional Brigade began landing at Pusan.

3 August 1950: - Marine Fighter Squadron 214, embarked in USS Sicily, attacked at Chinju with rockets and incendiary bombs - first action for Marine Carrier based air.

3-5 August 1950: - Marine infantry in vicinity of Masan-Changwon on combat patrol aided by helicopter. First instance of this type of aircraft being used to carry rations water and to evacuate personnel.

4 August 1950: - Fleet Air Wing 6, commissioned and given operational control of all American and British patrol squadrons located in Japan-Korea area.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 August 1950: - 1st Marine Brigade launched attack southwest toward Kosong, 1st Marine Brigade became involved in action for first time.

8 August 1950: - Fleet Air Japan (COMFAIRJAP) established by COMNAVFE, replacing NAVAL AIR JAPAN.

11 August 1950: - HMS Warrior (CVL) and HMS OCEAN (CVL) joined British and American Forces in Korea.

12 August 1950: - Marines advanced to Sachon and Changwon.

14 August 1950: - Marine Brigade moved into assembly area at Maryang.

15-16 August 1950: - First successful series of night raids on Korean East Coast by a landing party composed of a Navy underwater demolition team and U.S. Marine embarked in USS BASS (APD- 124); railroad bridges and tunnels destroyed.

16 August 1950: - 1st Marine Brigade began to move to Yonson, CNO ordered 7th Marines to Far East. - Navy Task Element (TE 96.51) successfully completed the evacuation of the entire 3rd ROK Division from a position south of Yongdok.

17 August 1950: - First element of 1st Marine Division sailed from West Coast for Korea. - Marines began first battle of Naktong River Bulge.

18 August 1950: - ROK Marines under cover of Korean Navy guns landed and captured city of Tongyong.

20 August 1950: - CINCUNC ordered capture of Inchon-Seoul area by amphibious assault using RCT's 1 and 5, 1st Marine Division.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 August 1950: - Carrier based planes of TF 77 (Valley Forge (CV 45) and Philippine Sea (CV 47) set new record with 202 sorties in one day in Pyongyang area.

22 August 1950: - CNO, Adm. Forrest Sherman broke his flag in USS Rochester at Sasebo.

1 September 1950: - Korean Reds continued offensive toward Pusan; Masan threatened; Songsan fell; Marines and Second Army Division counter-attacked.

2 September 1950: - 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines moved to Yongsan and took up defensive positions. 9th RCT of 2nd Infantry cleared town of Yongsan. - North Korean drive stopped as UN forces took the offensive.

3 September 1950: - Marine fought due west of Yongsan in second Battle of Naktong River Bulge. - Marine carrier-based planes rendered close support from Ashiya Air Force Base while CVE's were replenishing.

4 September 1950: - COMNAVFE ordered change of Fleet Base from Buckner Bay to Sasebo. - USS McKean (DD 784) destroyed 4 mines 38*28'W-124*24'E.

5 September 1950: - Russian bomber shot down in vicinity of TF 77; incident announced to UN. - Marine Brigade relieved from front lines and moved to Pusan to embark for Inchon operation. - Element of 1st Marine Division arrived in Japan.

8 September 1950: - Marine Brigade began loading at Pusan for amphibious assault at Inchon.

8-12 September 1950: - 7th Marines arrived at Kobe.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10-12 September: - 1950 Typhoon "Kezia" gave concern to Inchon landing operations and eye of typhoon passed over Kobe.

12 September 1950: - COMNAVFE established UN blockading and Escort Force (TF 95) under Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith.

15 September 1950: - USS Missouri (BB 63) arrived from Atlantic and joined TG 95.2 in bombarding Samchock area; first bombardment by 16 inch naval guns. - 3rd Battalion 5th marines landed in assault at 06331 on Wolmi-do Island, Inchon from Advance Attack Force of TF 90. - 1st and 5th Marines landed in assault at 17301 on Inchon beaches. - USS Boxer (CV 21) reported for duty with TF 77.

16 September 1950: - Marines captured Inchon. 7th Infantry Division landed administratively at Inchon as follow-up force. 5th Marines began drive for Kimpo Airfield.

17 September 1950: - Marines captured Kimpo Airfield. - HMS Jamaica (CVL) shot down one of 2 Yak aircraft attacking the Rochester at 05551. This was the only plane shot down by naval gunfire to date. - TF 77 flew 304 sorties, destroying 299 vehicles north of Inchon.

20 September 1950: - Han River crossed and immediate approaches to Seoul under assault.

21 September 1950: - Marine aircraft sorties from Kimpo Airfield made for first time. - 7th Marines landed administratively at Inchon.

23 September 1950: - Mines in Korean waters have become a serious problem. - Intelligence reports indicated that 3,500 mines had been laid to date.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 September 1950: - Seoul fell to 1st Marine. Total U.S. Marine casualties for Inchon-Seoul operations were 2,301.

26 September 1950: - USS Brush (DD 745) struck mine off Tanchon.

29 September 1950: - COMFAIRJAP initiated utilization of aircraft for anti-mine operations by establishing daylight patrol along West Coast of Korea, including extensive use of helicopters. - USS Magpie (AMS 25) mined and sunk while mine sweeping off Korean East Coast.

30 September 1950: - USS Mansfield (DD 728) mined in vicinity of Changjon.

1 October 1950: - General MacArthur issued surrender ultimatum to North Korean forces. South Koreans crossed 38th Parallel. - USS Missouri bombarded installation on Korean East Coast.

4 October 1950: - Task Force 77 reported that planes from its carriers had flown 3,330 sorties during the 13 day period of the Inchon assault. - COMNAVFE announced that more than 65 moored and floating mines had been destroyed during the past month in Korean waters. - COMNAVFE ordered sir strikes and shore bombardment of Chinnampo and Haeju areas.

6 October 1950: -ROKN vessels authorized to operate on East Coast of Korea as far north as necessary to support advancing ROK ground forces.

8 October 1950: - USS Leyte (CV 32) reported to TF 77 from Atlantic. - Marines being withdrawn from north of Seoul to participate in Wonsan landings. Elements of 1st Marine Division commended embarking in assault shipping at Inchon for Wonsan operations.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 October 1950: - Mine sweeping commenced in Wonsan area.

11 October 1950: - Planes from TF 77 destroyed North Korean vessels off Songjin and Wonsan and north of Hungnam. Railroads, Trucks, warehouses and supply dumps in Songjin area were destroyed.

12 October 1950: - USS Pirate (AM 275) and USS Pledge (AM 277), which sweeping approaches to Wonsan, struck mines and sank.

14 October 1950: - Marine Air Squadron (VMF 312) operating in Wonsan area.

15-31 October 1950: - Naval Forces largely concerned in Wonsan area in support of mine sweeping and amphibious landing. - Blockading forces, consisting of USS Missouri (BB 63) and accompanying destroyers patrolled approaches to Wonsan.

17 October 1950: - Wonsan attack force (TF 90) sailed from Inchon.

20 October 1950: - Attack force (TF 90) arrived off Wonsan; landing delayed six days because of uncompleted sweeping of enemy mines in area.

24 October 1950: - Marine pilots reported AA fire from Manchurian side of Yalu River.

26 October 1950: - 1st Marine Division landed administratively at dawn on beaches of Kalma Peninsula, Wonsan.

29 October 1950: - 7th Division landed administratively at Iwon 10201.

6 November 1950: - Minesweeping operation at Hungnam commenced by CTG 95.6.

7 November 1950: - Marine Jet Fighter Squadron (VMF 311) ordered to Far East.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 November 1950: - Landing of 7th Infantry Division at Iwon completed.

9 November 1950: - TF 77 made initial effort against international Brigades at Yalu River. - Soviet designed MIG-15 planes attacked F9F's from USS Philippine Sea. First engagement between planes of this type.

10 November 1950: - PBM destroyed 9 mines vicinity 38°42'N, 124°55'E.

11 November 1950: - USS Buck (DD 761) and USS Thomason (DE 203) damaged by collision at 39°13'N, 129°32'E.

15 November 1950: - Mine sweeping operations commenced at Songjin. 7th Marines reached Chosin resevoir.

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, pp.15-20.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX C

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JUNE 27, 1950

Thanks again to the absence of the Soviet delegate, who have voted the resolution had he been present, the Security Council sanctioned American intervention.

Resolution concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, adopted at the four hundred and seventy-fourth meeting of the Security Council, on June 27, 1950: The Security Council, Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel, and Having noted from the report to the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th Parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. (Voting for the resolution: United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Norway, Ecuador, and Cuba. Voting against: Yugoslavia, Abstention: Egypt, India [two days later India accepted the resolution]. Absent: Soviet Union.)

Source: Allen Guttmann (ed.), Korea: Cold War and Limited War (Massachusetts, 1972), p.5.

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OPERATION ORDER OF NAVAL BLOCKADE - 1

Priority 7 Jul 1950

FROM : DA(JCS) TO : CINCFE INFO : CINCFE, COM 7TH FLT, COMNAVFE NR : JCS 84885 The following broadcast to all shipping this date. "The President of the US, in keeping with the United Nation Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace on Korea, has ordered a Naval blockade of the Korean Coast." CINCFE CX 57097 refers

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, p.1015.

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OPERATION ORDER OF NAVAL BLOCKADE - 2

4 Jul 1950

FROM : SEC STATE TO : SCAP (US POLAD) NR : 040427 Z You are instr immediately to inform the govt to which you are accredited that "the President of the US in keeping with the UN Security Councils reqst for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea has ordered a Naval blockade of the Korean Coast, this blockade is off immediately"

ACHESON

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, p.1015.

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TASK GROUP ORGANIZATION

Task Group 96.5 (CTG 96.5 - Rear Adm. C.C. Hartman) (26 July - 12 September 1950)

TE 96.50 - Escort Element

HMS ALACRITY (PF) - Detached 26 July 1950 HMS MOUNTS BAY (PF) - Reported 12 August 1950 HMS BLACKSWAN (PF) - DETACHED 10 August 1950 HMS WHITESANDS BAY (PF) - Reported 24 August 1950 HMNZS PUKAKI (PF) - Reported 1 August 1950 HMNZS TUTIRA (PF) - Reported 1 August 1950 MNAS SHOALHAVEN (PF) - Detached 3 September 1950 FS LA GRANDIERE (PF) - Reported 1 August 1950 HMS HART (PF) - Detached 3 August 1950

TE 96.51 - EAST KOREA SUPPORT ELEMENT ONE (Rear Adm. C.C. HARTMAN)

USS HELENA (CA 75) USS WILTSIE (DD 716) - Reported COM7THFLT - 6 September 1950 USS CHANDLER (DD 717) - Reported COM7THFLT - 6 September 1950 USS HAMNER (DD 718) - Reported COM7THFLT - 3 September 1950 USS CHEVALIER (DD 805) - Reported COM7THFLT - 3 September 1950 USS J.E.KYES (DD 787) - Detached 1 August 1950 USS MADDOX (DD 731) - Reported OPCON - 5 September 1950 USS BRUSH (DD 745) Reported OPCON - 7 September 1950

TE 96.51 ~ EAST KOREA SUPPORT ELEMENT ONE (Rear Adm. C.C. HARTMEN)

USS H.J.THOMAS (DDR 833) - reported OPCON - 7 September 1950 USS S.N.MOORE (DD 747) - reported OPCON - 5 September 1950 USS ENDICOTT (DMS 35) - reported OPCON - 26 August 1950

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. USS DOYLE (DMS 34) - reported OPCON - 26 August 1950

TE 96.52 - EAST KOREA SUPPORT ELEMENT TWO (Rear Adm. H.M. HIGGINS)

USS TOLEDO (CA 133) - OPCON COM7THFLT - 9 September 1950 USS MANSFIELD (DD 728) - OPCON COM7THFLT - 9 September 1950 USS COLLETT (DD 730) - OPCON COM7THFLT - 9 September 1950 USS DEHAVEN (DD 727) - OPCON COM7THFLT - 9 September 1950 USS L.K.SWENSON (DD 729) - OPCON COM7THFLT - 9 September 1950

TE 96.53 - WEST KOREA SUPPORT ELEMENT (Rear Adm. W.C. ANDREWES, O.B.C.B.E., D.S.O., RN)

HMS ALERT (PF) - Reported 6 July 1950 (Headquarters Ship Sasebo) HMS LADYBIRD (PF) - Reported 7 September 1950 (Headquarters Ship Sasebo) HMS BELFAST (CL) - Detached 6 July 1950 HMS KEYNA (CL) HMS CEYLON (CL) - Reported 29 August 1950 HMS TRIUMP (CV) - Reported 8 August 1950 HMS COSSACK (DD) - Detached 11 August 1950 HMS COCKADE (DD) HMS CONCORD (DD) - reported 10 September 1950 HMS COMUS (DD) - Reported 8 August 1950 - bomb damage, enemy aircraft on 23 August, under repair, Kues, until after TG 96.5 disestablished. HMAS BATTAN (DD) HMAS WARRAMUGNA (DD) - Reported 29 August 1950 HRMS EVERTSEN (DD) - Grounded 9 August 1950, under repair Sasebo until after TG 96.5 disestablished. HMS CHARITY (DD) HMCS CAYUGA (DD) - Reported 30 July 1950 HMCS ATHABASKAN (DD) - reported 30 July 1950 HMCS SIOUX (DD) - Reported 30 July 1950

Task Group 95.2 - Korean Two (Blockade Group) (Rear Adm. C.C. HARTMAN) 12 September - 23 October 1950

USS HELENA (CA 75) - Detached 23 October 1950 USS MADDOX (DD 731) - Detached 20 October 1950 USS S.N.MOORE (DD 747) - Detached 4 October 1950

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. USS BRUSH (DD 745) - Mined 26 September, Detached 10 October 1950 USS H.J.THOMAS (DDR 833) - Detached 20 October 1950 USS ENDICOTT (DMS 35) - Detached 10 October 1950 USS DOYLE (DMS 34) - Detached 10 October 1950 USS MISSOURI (BB 63) - Operated with TG 95.2 - 18 September and 12-13 October 1950 USS WORCESTER (CL 144) - Reported 22 September USS TOLEDO (CA 133) - Reported 9 September - Detached 23 October 1950 USS MANSFIELD (DD 726) - Reported 24 September, Mined 30 September, detached 10 October 1950 USS DEHAVEN (DD 727) - Reported 24 September 1950 USS COLLETT (DD 730) - Reported 20 September 1950 - availability Sasebo until October 8, 1950 when reported

Task Group 95.6

USS L.K. SWENSON (DD 729) - Reported 24 September 1950 USS ROCHESTER (CA 124) - Reported 9 September 1950 HMS CEYLON (CL) - Reported 9 September 1950 HMAS WARRAMUNGA - Reported 9 September - Detached 20 October 1950 HMCS ATHABASKAN - Reported 9 September - Detached 20 October 1950 HMS COCKADE - Reported 9 September - Detached 20 October 1950 USS ENGLISH (DD 696) - Reported 14 October 1950 USS HANK (DD 702) - Reported 20 October 1950 USS W.L.LIND (DD 703) - Reported 14 October 1950 USS BORIE (DD 704) - Reported 20 October 1950 USS ZELLARS (DD 777) - Reported 14 October 1950 USS C.S. SPERRY (DD 697) - Reported 14 October USS MASSEY (DD 778) - Reported 14 October USS SOUTHERLAND (DDR 743) - Reported 20 October 1950

SECRET

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, pp.1017-9.

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SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

22 July: - 1st Navy close air support mission flown by TF 77 aircraft from USS Valley Forge with CAG-5 embarked. - HMS Triumph supplied CAP.

28 July: - CTG 77.4 sent liaison officer to JOC, 5th AF to arrange assignment of Naval aircraft to specified forward air controllers (airborne).

29 July: - Improvement in utilization of naval aircraft noted, but still left much to be desired. - TF 77 retired to Buckner Bay for replenishment. HMS Triumph detached from TF.

1-4 August: - Representatives of 7th Fleet conferred in Tokyo with FEAF, and NAVFE on target assignments, arriving at agreement covered in Appendix I, Proposed Target Arrangements with Navy.

1 August: - USS Philippine Sea with CAG-11 embarked joined TF 77.

5 August: - 1st day of strikes launched from both Valley Forge and Philippine Sea.

5-21 August: - TF 77 alternated between Sea of Japan (East Sea) and Yellow Sea, launching close air support, interdiction, and support of troop evacuation mission against targets throughout Korea.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 August: - TF 77 launched offensive sorties against targets in southeastern Korea. - Characterized as ineffective due to lack of adequate communication facilities ashore, a proper communication plan, poor control and virtual absence of radio discipline.

1 September: - While operating in Yellow Sea against targets in NW Korea, 5th AF Advance Hdqtrs called for "all available aircraft for close support." All available were launched, with unsuccessful results for same reasons as on 26 August.

2 September: - Liaison flight by Commander CAG-11 dispatched to JOC Pusan resulted in recommendations outlined in Appendix 2, Close Air Support Functioning, Observations thereon: EXCERPTS FROM.

3 September: - TF 77 flew last close support mission in Pusan beachhead area. TF retired to Sasebo for replenishment.

11 September: - TF 77 sortied from Sasebo.

15-4 October: - TF 77 participated in Inchon landing, joined on 15 Sept. by USS Boxer with Air Group TWO embarked and provided close support mission when required by element of X Corps. Interdiction operations predominated. Efforts recognized as outstanding effective by CG X Corps. Ships alternate for replenishment at sea.

4 October: - TF 77 anchored Sasebo.

8 October: - USS Leyte with Air Group THREE embarked joined TF 77.

9 October: - TF 77 sortied Sasebo.

10-270ctover: - Intermittent close air support rendered elements of ROK forces through AF Forward Air Controllers (Airborne). No

239

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fixed close air support plan existed. Interdiction and counter-mining efforts predominated.

29 October: - Entire TF 77 departed combat area for replenishment in Japan.

5 November: - TF 77 sortied from Sasebo and Yokosuka to engage in interdiction operations.

10 November: - Close air support third priority mission except in emergency, then to take first priority. Plan decided on to schedule interdiction strikes at close air support tempo, to report to X Corps TACC for use en route to interdiction targets.

22 November: - Representatives of TF 77 conferred at 5th AF on forthcoming operations. No important development.

23 November: - 5th AF representative conferred aboard flagship of TF 77 relative to forthcoming operations. As result, no close air support expected of TF 77. Interdiction operations to continue.

28 November: - Critical situation of 8th Army and X Corps resulted in approximately equal division of effort in close support of both.

4-25 December: - Principal effort of TF 77 directed in support of 1st MarDiv attack to such from Chosin Reservior and in protection of Hungnam beachhead area.

26 December: - TF 77 entered port after 50 days at sea.

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c., pp.224-6.

240

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PROPOSED ARMY TARGET ARRANGEMENT WITH NAVY

3 August 1950 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Operations SUBJECT: Proposed Target Arrangements with Navy

1. It was tentatively agreed, subject to approval by you, Commander, 7th Fleet and CIMNAVFE, that Navy target priorities and coordination will be established as follows: a. First priority will be close support activities under direct control of 5th Air Force. b. Second priority will be close interdiction support in areas such of 38° N, less those targets specifically assigned Bomb Command. Target coordination to be accomplished between 5th Air Force and Navy.

(1) FEAF will provide 5th and Navy with our selected targets and maps between 37 and 38 degrees. The D/I will provide as much target data as possible relating to these targets.

(2) An additional list of profitable targets on bridges south of 37° will be prepared and provide 5th AF and Navy.

c. As third priority, or when the situation dictates, Bomb Command interdiction targets will be attacked by the Navy.

(1) FEAF will provide Bomb Command target list plan, map plot and such target information as D/I has available.

(2) Coordination of Navy strikes on these targets will be handled as follows: Navy will request clearance directly from FEAF Headquarters for attacks on specific Bomb Command targets. FEAF will coordinate with Bomb Command and either clear the Navy for these attacks, or designated Bomb Command target time and clear Navy to attack the other times, or will recommend alternate targets in the same area which are not being attacked

241

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. by Bomb Command. FEAF reply will be addressed to Commander, 7th Fleet and to COMCARDIV 3.

Officers present at the meeting: Maj. General Weyland, Brig General Timberlake, Brig. General Crabb, General Banfill, Col Myers, 5th AF, representatives from Operations, D/I Targets and Communications. Naval representatives were Captain Hill, Lt Cmdr Lee, Lt Cmdr Pittman, Cmdr Lanham and Cmdr Lambert.

R.H.WARREN Colonel, USAF Director of Operations SECRET

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c, p.238.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX I

EXPERT FROM CGMCARAIRGRP II MEMORANDUM REPORT SERIAL 695 DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1950

8. In view of the present setup at JOC it is recommended for the immediate future that planning of close air support by TF 77 include the following:

(a) Delivery of flight schedule to Mellow Control by aircraft for air drop. This schedule to show:

1. No. and type aircraft in flight 2. General aircraft loading 3. Time of arrival at target area 4. Approximate length of time in area available

(b) Aircraft which drops (a) above contact Mellow for information as follows: Name and coordinate location of divisional TACC and its channel VHF for desired TF 77 effort.

(c) If (a) and (b) above are accomplished prior to midnight of day of effort then disseminated of this information can be made within TF 77. If (a) (b) are made as a result of a rush call then delivery plane must contact incoming flights and direct them to report to specific division TACC and give channel frequency. It is considered desirable to keep flights from requirement of passing through Mellow Control. This requires added flight time and added communication trouble. It is estimated that with present front lines a flight coming from Korean west coast would spend and an extra twenty five minutes if required to pass through Mellow Control.

(d) Occasional sending of liaison officer to JOC to obtain latest date on calls, frequencies, locations, etc. of the TAC system. Group Command suggested for this work.

(e) Procurement of UTM gridded charts in sufficient number for all pilots. It is anticipated that this grid, now ordered effective, will become universal.

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with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (f) Elimination of the Air Coordinator from Plan Uncle. Have each flight coordinated by its strike leader.

(g) Send jets in units of 8 when practicable to cut communications traffic. They should report as 8 and then be split if target information indicates. An area strafing target can well use 8 jets.

(h) Provision of secondary targets in immediate vicinity of bomb line. Evidently any hiding place along bomb line (i.e. village, woods along trafficed roads particularly next to bridge, etc.) is a satisfactory secondary target.

(i) Use of primarily anti-personnel armament loading. Napalm is extremely popular with ground forces as a result of interrogation of POW's.

(j) Instructions to flights to work directly with TACP where practicable and Mosquito concurs. Absence of a Mosquito should not prevent effective work by flight leader.

CONFIDENTIAL

Source from CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.c, p.238-9.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX J

US AIR FORCE TARGET ARRANGEMENTS WITH NAVY

AG 7692 5 August 1950 Subject: Target Arrangements with Navy To: Commander Naval Forces, Far East

A conference was held at FEAF Headquarters on 3 August for the purpose of effecting close coordination between Naval air strikes and FEAF air operations. These follows for your information a summery of the arrangements which were mutually agreed upon between conferees:

First priority will be given to close support activity under the tactical control of the Fifth Air Force. The urgency of the current situation necessities this priority. Second priority will be given to close interdiction of key enemy transportation in areas south of 38 North. Since this same area had been assigned Fifth Air Force by FEAF, the Navy will coordinate with Fifth Air Force in selecting targets.

As third priority or when the situation dictates, Naval units will attack key transportation facilities north of 38° which have been assigned to FEAF Bomb Command. Coordination of Navy strikes on these targets will be handled as follows:

Naval Task Group will advise FEAF Headquarters of those targets which they desire to attack. FEAF Headquarters will coordinate with Bomb Command and either approve attacks of these targets or designate alternates in the same general area. This coordination is necessary to insure that Navy attacks are not made at the same time B-29's are striking targets.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Naval representatives were provided with complete target lists and available target data pertaining to designated targets. Naval representatives at the meeting were:

Captain Hill Commander Lanham Lieutenant Commander Lee Commander Lambert Lieutenant Commander Pittman

FOR THE COMMINDING GENERAL

OTTO P.WEYLAND Major General, U.S. Air Force Vice Commander for Operations cc: CINCFE

Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report No.l, Project No.I.A.2.d, p.298.

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Action Reports COMCARDIV I Action Report for 6-21 September 1950 COMCARDIV I Action Report for 21 September - 4 October 1950 COMCARDIV I Action Report for 9-29 October 1950 COMCARDIV I Preliminary Action Report, 12 September 1950 COMCARDIV 15 OpOrder 15-50 COMNAVFE OpOrder 5-50 COMNAVFE OpOrder 8-50 COM7THFLT OpOrder 6-50 COM7THFLT OpOrder 8-50 COM7THFLT OpOrder 10-50 CTF 77 Report of Operations in the Korean Theatre, B-III-10 CTF 77 Report of Operations in the Korean Campaign, Part 3-

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